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# Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

# AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST AFFIRMATIVE**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

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# Affirmative Evidence

## General Engagement Good

### Economic Engagement Fosters Cooperation

#### Despite disagreements, economic engagement is a shared interest for cooperation

Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator, March 20, 2017, “China and the US: an odd couple doomed to co-operation,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/baf21daa-0b3c-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b, Accessed 3-21-2017

However contrasting the two countries may appear, they do share interests. Maintaining the open world economy is one of them. It is vital that Mr Trump be persuaded that his views on trade are mistaken. It is surreal that we depend on a Chinese communist to persuade a US president of the merits of liberal global trade. Yet today’s desperate times require such desperate measures.

#### Sino-US cooperation is crucial to avoid regional wars and a trade war. China has huge incentives for economic cooperation

Eric X. Li, political scientist in Shanghai, April 6, 2017, “America Can Be First Without China Being Last,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-04-06/america-can-be-first-without-china-being-last, Accessed 4-25-2017

For Xi, regional security must be his number one concern. China cannot continue to develop without a conducive external environment. For that, it needs the United States’ cooperation on a range of issues, including its competitive relationship with Japan, potential conflicts in the South China Sea, and instability on the Korean Peninsula. In all these areas and more, China’s predominant objective is to avoid war.  Second on Xi’s list is probably the avoidance of a trade war. With economic growth slowing, the last thing China needs is a trade war with anyone, let alone the United States. Similarly, Xi wants to see the implementation of China’s economic outreach program, called Belt and Road with the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as its appendix, to develop a regional economic order that would support China’s next stage of growth.  Given these lists, China has a lot to offer the United States. It is actively engaged in an economic restructuring to shift its reliance away from exports. In the past few years, the value of its imports from the United States has grown at double the rate of that of its exports to the United States. China might be willing to voluntarily reduce further its exports and push for an increase in imports to help bring more balance to U.S.-Chinese trade.  And this would be in line with China’s objective of building a more consumption-based economy.

### General Engagement Fosters Cooperation on N. Korea

#### Greater Sino-US overall engagement makes cooperation on N. Korea feasible

Eric X. Li, political scientist in Shanghai, April 6, 2017, “America Can Be First Without China Being Last,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-04-06/america-can-be-first-without-china-being-last, Accessed 4-25-2017

With the South China Sea somewhat calmer than it has been of late, and with the issue of Taiwan out of the headline, conditions are conducive for U.S.-Chinese cooperation on the North Korea nuclear issue. The two countries essentially share the same long-term objective, which is the denuclearization of the peninsula. Any military conflicts on the Korean peninsula threaten the Chinese more than anyone else, save the Koreans themselves, of course. If the two leaders develop a more cooperative relationship by working through the other items on each other’s lists, Washington might be able to see substantive movement and a more collaborative attitude from the Chinese side on the North Korean nuclear problem.

### Cooperation Better than Conflict

#### A US-China conflict would be devastating. Cooperation is the only path

Ken Moak, taught economic theory, public policy and globalization at university level for 33 years, March 31, 2017, “US-China economic cooperation is the only way going forward,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/us-china-cooperation-way-going-forward/, Accessed 4-30-2017

China has neither the ability nor the desire to challenge US global hegemony. Its military, though capable of inflicting catastrophic damage to the US and its allies, is weaker and less advanced. China has too many problems — rampant corruption, ethnic tensions, environmental degradation, etc. — to make new enemies. President Xi is correct: US-China cooperation is the only way forward. Conflict between China and the US would a have a devastating effect not only on both countries but also on the rest of the world. Trump’s meeting with Xi April 6 and 7 would appear to indicate the US president realizes the relationship must remain open and productive. Moreover, the majority of the American public and its states want a better US-China relationship.

## (BIT) Bilateral Investment Treaty

### Harms - China Blocking Investments now

#### China is actively blocking US investments now

Hannah Beech, Staff Writer, March 21, 2017, “Rex Tillerson’s Deferential Visit to China,” The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rex-tillersons-deferential-visit-to-china, Accessed 3-21-2017

China now boasts the world’s second-largest economy, but it hardly serves as a global economic role model. As growth in China has tapered off, protectionism has surged. American companies, once loathe to offend Beijing lest they threaten market access, now complain openly about state-supported efforts to cut into their profits or copy their technology. Just as Tillerson arrived in town, news emerged that Pinterest had been added to the long list of banned Western Web sites in China, one which already includes Google and Facebook. Pinterest’s life hacks and craft tips seem an unlikely target, but even the most apolitical of foreign companies can fall victim to politics.

### Solvency - China Wants Engagement

#### China is ready and willing to engage over a bilateral investment treaty

China Daily, Staff Writer, April 11, 2017, “China hopes for progress in investment treaty negotiations with US,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-04/11/content\_28874066.htm, Accessed 4-30-2017

China is willing to work with the United States to progress negotiations on the bilateral investment treaty, Premier Li Keqiang said Monday. As each other's largest trading partners and with economic interests highly integrated, China and the US can achieve win-win through deepening cooperation, Li said when meeting with the first delegation to China from the new US congress. "China is willing to expand trade, two-way investment and cooperation at the local level and handle any disputes or frictions through dialogue with the US to realize a more balanced trade relationship," Li said.

### BIT Resolves Trade Conflicts

#### Engaging China over a bilateral investment treaty accelerates economic reforms in China and opens up competition from US businesses

Bloomberg News, Staff Writer, April 18, 2017, “Trump's Deficit Crusade Overshadows Xi's Investment Treaty Pitch,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-19/trump-s-deficit-crusade-overshadows-xi-s-investment-treaty-pitch>, Accessed 4/30/2017

Xi is [pushing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/terminal/OO1IR03V2800)to revive talks for a [Bilateral Investment Treaty](https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-04/trump-administration-needs-a-plan-to-deal-with-china) among other priorities such as cooperation in infrastructure construction and energy, according to the official Xinhua News Agency. While Xi doesn’t need to worry about placating voters, he does have internal party constituencies to win over, and an investment deal could be just the thing to accelerate economic reforms. “The two nations seem to be moving at different paces,” said Song Hong, a senior fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government-backed think tank. “Trump wants to have something that can be delivered very quickly, whereas China hopes to push forward the BIT, which will set the framework in years to come.” China proposed the "100-day" plan to lock in an "early harvest" before a planned visit from Trump, China’s ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai told the state-run CGTN English news channel on April 13. The intention was to show commitment to "a healthy and stronger economic relationship" and focus initially on the "easy issues while making continued efforts on the harder issues," he said. That suggests China is prepared to go along with Trump’s focus to quickly address a deficit that favored the Asian exporting powerhouse by $347 billion last year. Yet it’s the BIT that could prove more significant if agreement on that can ever be reached, by driving the next phase of China’s economic development and forcing long-cosseted services industries to face competition from American companies.

#### Engagement over a bilateral investment treaty helps resolve case-by-case market conflicts

Bloomberg News, Editorial Board, April 4, 2017, “Trump Needs a Plan to Deal With China,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-04/trump-administration-needs-a-plan-to-deal-with-china>, Accessed 4/30/2017

On trade, the administration should be similarly focused. Rather than issuing empty threats about imposing 45 percent tariffs or declaring China a currency manipulator -- for which there’s a shaky case at best -- the U.S. should look for ways to limit Chinese access to the U.S. market on a [case-by-case](http://asiasociety.org/center-us-china-relations/us-policy-toward-china-recommendations-new-administration), sector-by-sector basis. Massive Chinese investment in strategic industries such as semiconductors may deserve [extra scrutiny](http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/rational-thinking-about-chinas-semiconductor-push/); buyouts of Hollywood studios don't pose a similar threat. Accelerating negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty is in the interest of both sides.

## Climate Change Cooperation

### Inherency / Harms Ext.

#### Trump has reversed progress in climate change and taken cooperation with China off the table. This eliminates a crucial CBM that sustains relations and undermines global action on climate change

Jackson Ewing, the Director of Asian Sustainability at the [Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)](http://asiasociety.org/policy-institute)  April 27, 2017, “U.S.-China Climate Relations: Beyond Trump,” Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/04/27/us-china\_climate\_relations\_beyond\_trump.html, Accessed 4-29-2017

The days of cooperative climate change action in Washington and Beijing were short-lived. After decades of friction in the climate arena, the United States and China spent the last three years of former U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term in office building a partnership that caught even close observers by surprise. In a March 2016 joint presidential statement, Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping [declared](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change) climate change a “pillar of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship” and committed to ratifying the lauded [Paris Agreement](http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php). The countries were by then drawing on more than two years of bilateral [agreements](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change) on clean energy and emissions reduction targets, along with [subnational agreements](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-us-and-china-go-local-on-climate-cooperation/) between cities, states, and provinces to bolster technical cooperation in areas ranging from carbon pricing to clean energy to sustainable urban infrastructure. This cooperation reversed a history of recriminations and [posturing](http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/copenhagen-snubs-skulduggery-and-sleepless-nights-1845092.html) that long defined the Sino-American climate change relationship. China would often emphasize its continuing poverty challenges, development needs, and relative lack of historical culpability for the climate problem, while the United States trotted out the common refrain that holding negotiations is well and good, but ultimately pointless if China fails to reduce emissions in internationally verifiable ways. For years, this divide between Beijing and Washington stubbornly persisted. The Obama-Xi rapprochement was significant because it moved past these arguments and looked for opportunities in a nascent global climate regime based on voluntary commitments by all countries regardless of development levels. This played to the preferences of both China and the United States to chart their own paths without feeling overly constrained by international accords. It also dovetailed with China’s growing determination to solve its domestic pollution crisis, and with a realization in both capitals that clean energy was an economic growth sector. The Trump presidency has ended this relatively brief period of national climate cooperation between the world’s two largest emitters. U.S. President Donald Trump has removed any mention of climate change from the executive branch agenda, and has moved to dismantle the U.S. Clean Power Plan (CPP), open up federal lands to fossil fuel exploration, reduce vehicle emissions standards, and broadly defund and de-emphasize environmental regulation and enforcement. Whether or not he attempts to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, which is [not](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf) a straightforward process, Trump is already [disregarding](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/28/climate/trumps-executive-order-pushes-the-us-climate-pledge-further-out-of-reach.html?te=1&nl=morning-briefing&emc=edit_nn_20170329&_r=1) the American commitments detailed in the pact.  Rather than sending the United States and China back to their adversarial positions of the past, Trump’s moves have [taken](http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/328132-should-us-falter-china-poised-to-capitalize-on-clean) climate change off the bilateral agenda completely. This eliminates a valuable mutual confidence-building measure and sets back global climate change efforts significantly.

#### Trump’s anti-environmental executive orders represents a divergence in Sino-US climate cooperation that spills over to overall relations

Justin Elliott, intern in the Carter Center’s China Program, March 31, 2017, “It’s Not Easy Being Green: US-China Divergence on Climate Change?,” US China Perception Monitor, http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2017/03/31/its-not-easy-being-green-us-china-divergence-on-climate-change/, Accessed 4-29-2017

So what does all this mean for Sino-US cooperation on climate change, and for global action in general? Following the announcement of the executive order, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang [assured](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1449905.shtml) reporters that China would continue to honour its commitments and obligations to address climate change “no matter how the climate policies of other countries may evolve” – an understandable position given the significant environmental issues facing China presently. However, if this divergence continues and widens it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect of US-China cooperation. In[a roundtable article](https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9694-Roundtable-What-would-a-US-withdrawal-from-the-Paris-Agreement-mean-for-China-) by the Chinese environmental policy website China Dialogue, canvassed experts were clear that the effect would mostly be symbolic, although some of the canvassed experts expressed concern that the US reversal in attitude may dampen global investment and support for renewable technologies, [pressure](https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/9678-China-takes-another-step-to-reduce-coal-fired-power) that [could](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/asia/trump-climate-change-paris-china.html?_r=0) be felt in China, too. If the US continues to weaken or abandon its efforts to address climate change, it will cede leadership to China and other countries in driving global climate change efforts, and opens up another rift in the US-China relationship on an issue that requires global and widespread consensus and cooperation.

### Cooperation Key To Solve Climate Change

#### Sino-US climate cooperation is crucial to global solutions. The question is if US backtracking will undermine efforts

Michael Holtz, Staff writer, March 3, 2017, “China's coal consumption drops again, boosting its leadership on climate change,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2017/0303/China-s-coal-consumption-drops-again-boosting-its-leadership-on-climate-change, Accessed 3-29-2017

China’s aggressive push has put it on track to hit the goals it announced as part of the Paris accord much earlier than its initial targets, according to Greenpeace East Asia. China pledged that by 2020, the level of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP will be 18 percent lower than in 2015. It also guaranteed that emissions will peak no later than 2030. Li of Greenpeace says he doesn’t doubt China’s commitment to achieving its climate goals. The harder question to answer is whether the US will keep its promises under the Trump administration. “The US and China play such an important role that in the long run there is no climate solution without the cooperation of these two countries,” Li says.

#### Direct progress is possible. The key is to build upon previous climate cooperation

Joanna Lewis, PhD, Prof. at Georgetown University, Zhang Xiliang, PhD, Prof. at Tsinghua University, et al. February 23, 2017,

Georgetown University U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, Background Report, https://s3.amazonaws.com/global-db-public/global-db-public/publication/translation/document/1151/US\_China\_ClimateChange\_Background\_Report.pdf, Accessed 3-29-2017

If President Trump reaffirms the Paris Agreement, other pressing issues also need further discussion in the near term. How can the United States and China cooperate with other global players to more effectively ensure that developing nations have the funding and access to the appropriate low-carbon green technologies needed to meet their emissions targets? Is there more room for U.S. and Chinese experts to cooperate to create more advanced green technology solutions? The past few years have proven that Beijing and Washington can find a way forward on this key global issue. The challenge now is to sustain and build on this impressive achievement.

### Warming is Real & Anthropogenic (New Study)

#### The newest study confirms rapid climate change is real and human-induced

Chelsea Harvey, Staff Writer at the Washington Post, April 6, 2017, “Study offers a dire warning on climate change,” Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/04/05/study-offers-dire-warning-climate-change/cyozAC0fjeamFAWhiEXAFL/story.html, Accessed 4-29-2017

The new study speaks to the power of human influence over the climate. It suggests that after millions of years of relative stability in the absence of human activity, just a few hundred years of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are on track to cause unprecedented warming. To come to these grim conclusions, published Tuesday in the journal Nature Communications, the researchers constructed a continuous record of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations spanning the last 420 million years. They created the record by compiling more than 1,500 estimates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations drawn from 112 published studies. According to lead author Gavin Foster, a geochemistry professor at the University of Southampton, those estimates were constructed mainly using the carbon isotope composition of ancient soil samples or examining the abundance of pores on the leaves of fossilized plants, an indicator of how much carbon dioxide was available for them to draw from the air while they were alive. The findings suggest that, until humans started rapidly burning fossil fuels with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, Earth’s climate had been relatively stable for millions of years, and carbon dioxide concentrations were declining. Thanks to the human emission of greenhouse gases, though, that’s all changing at a record-breaking pace.

### Climate Leadership Adv. – Chinese Leadership Internals

#### China is eager to further climate change cooperation with the U.S. Absent US action, China will become the global climate leader

Aurora D’Aprile, Staff Writer, January 2017, “Will China Take the Lead on Global Climate Leadership?,” International Climate Policy, No. 44, https://issuu.com/iccg/docs/iccg\_international\_climate\_policy\_m\_33705972a02850, Accessed 3-29-2017

While the world is closely watching the first initiatives of the Trump presidency, speculations circulate about who would take the lead in guiding global climate action [in case the United States take a step back](http://climateobserver.org/expectations-climate-policy-trump-administration/). The European Union, once at the forefront, is burdened by internal divisions on major issues (e.g. Brexit, migration flows, economic recovery) and it is unlikely to regain its full leadership soon, also considering the crucial elections scheduled in 2017 (France and Germany, but also the Netherlands and maybe Italy) that might see antiEuropean positions gaining ground in key member states. In the last decade, the progressively closer climate cooperation of the United States and China, under the governments of Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, has created a two-fold leadership almost impossible to replicate, which was a key driving force behind the Paris agreement adoption and rapid entry into force. China’s moves are now under the spotlight to understand if the Asian giant can sustain the momentum even without its closer climate ally. According to Chinese top officials, the intention is there. In a landmark speech at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, [Chinese premier Xi Jinping made a clear statement](https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2017/sessions/83846) in support of the global action on climate change, stating that the Paris climate deal (under which China pledged to peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and reduce carbon intensity by 60 – 65% by 2030) is a “hard won agreement” to which countries “should stick to, rather than walk away”. It was the first time a top Chinese leader officially participated in the Davos gatherings, another sign of the increasing global standing of China after the G20 summit in Hangzhou last year. In Davos the special envoy for climate change Xie Zhenhua also [clarified China’s “firm attitude to engage in global climate change actions”](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2017-01/17/content_27971833.htm?utm_source=Daily+Carbon+Briefing&utm_campaign=c2b0941a7a-cb_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_876aab4fd7-c2b0941a7a-303429417), adding that the global trend towards sustainable growth “is not something that can be reversed by a single political leader” and that climate cooperation with the US will continue, mainly led by the US-China Climate Change Working Group. Few days later, the Chinese president reiterated his message at United Nations’ European headquarters in Geneva.

#### US backtracking on domestic climate legislation undermine cooperation with China, who will become the global leader

Michael Holtz, Staff writer, March 3, 2017, “China's coal consumption drops again, boosting its leadership on climate change,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2017/0303/China-s-coal-consumption-drops-again-boosting-its-leadership-on-climate-change, Accessed 3-29-2017

The latest sign of China’s emergence as a world leader in addressing climate change came Tuesday when the government released data showing that the country’s coal consumption dropped in 2016 for a third year in a row. Hours later in Washington, President Trump signed an executive order aimed at rolling back one of former President Obama’s major environmental regulations on clean water. His administration is also expected to take aim at Mr. Obama’s signature 2015 climate change regulation on greenhouse gas emissions in coming weeks. The United States and China became critical partners in the fight against global warming during the Obama administration, crucially joining last year to endorse the landmark Paris climate accord. But their paths have diverged since the Trump took over the White House in January. Trump’s change in tack has provided China – the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases – the opportunity to lead on climate change by reducing its dependency on coal in favor of natural gas and renewable energy. (Coal consumption in the US has also declined, mainly because of a glut in the global steel market and cheap natural gas.)

### Climate Leadership Adv. – Chinese Leadership Internals

#### US retrenchment on climate change undermines cooperation with China to solve globally. Absent domestic action, China will become the global climate leader

Michael Holtz, Staff writer, March 3, 2017, “China's coal consumption drops again, boosting its leadership on climate change,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2017/0303/China-s-coal-consumption-drops-again-boosting-its-leadership-on-climate-change, Accessed 3-29-2017

China’s efforts to curb emissions stand in stark contrast to Trump’s pledge to revitalize the American coal industry. In February, he eliminated a regulation established by the Obama administration that restricts coal companies from dumping mining waste into streams and waterways. Trump claimed the move would save 77,000 jobs, a [widely disputed](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/02/27/did-president-trump-save-77000-coal-mining-jobs/?utm_term=.f67aab590748) figure. Trump has called climate change a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese and picked Scott Pruitt, a fierce opponent of Obama’s rules to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency. Mr. Pruitt has wasted little time in his new job. On Thursday, the EPA announced plans to withdraw an Obama-era request that oil and natural gas companies provide information on methane emissions. The US is the world’s second largest emitter of man-made emissions behind China, and methane has a global warming potential more than 25 times greater than that of CO2. In the face of American retrenchment on climate change, China can play an important role in implementing the Paris agreement, says Ma Tianjie, managing editor of China Dialogue, an English- and Chinese-language website that focuses on the environment. “This is where China is going to show its leadership,” he says. “By providing confidence to the global community.”

#### China is open to international cooperation on climate change, but without US action, China will become the global leader

Fengshi Wu, an Associate Professor at the China Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, [March 30, 2017](http://www.eurasiareview.com/30032017-from-paris-to-beijing-china-next-champion-on-climate-change-analysis/), “From Paris To Beijing: China, Next Champion On Climate Change? – Analysis,” Eurasia Review,

http://www.eurasiareview.com/30032017-from-paris-to-beijing-china-next-champion-on-climate-change-analysis/, Accessed 4-29-2017

As the tides of nationalism and political conservatism rise in the West, the world may turn to other centres for leadership and inspiration. In fact, the Paris Agreement was reached without American leadership, or any particular form of unilateral diplomatic championship. Under Xi Jinping China has made no secret that it aspires to bigger roles on the global stage, including taking on leadership in global governance and multilateral cooperation. Xi’s recent speech at Davos World Economic Forum, though a little ironic, came as a timely boost for international trade and economic cooperation. In the case of climate change, should China become the next champion, this is not only because it seeks international status, but there is also concrete convergence of domestic interests and international commitments. Decades of participation in the global debate on climate change and in domestic research and innovation have convinced Chinese policymakers the long-term value of green energy, energy efficiency and afforestation, and international climate cooperation.

#### US economic competitiveness depends on expansion in, not retreat from, the clean energy market

Jackson Ewing, the Director of Asian Sustainability at the [Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)](http://asiasociety.org/policy-institute)  April 27, 2017, “U.S.-China Climate Relations: Beyond Trump,” Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/04/27/us-china\_climate\_relations\_beyond\_trump.html, Accessed 4-29-2017

Beyond regulation, business and market forces will ultimately prevent the United States from completely devolving into the energy systems of the past. The American shale gas production boom will continue to make coal production and consumption less economically attractive, at least in the near-term. The clean energy market is growing steadily and [may reach](http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2015/04/21/federal-investment-is-key-to-growth-of-clean-energy-industry) $6 trillion in value by 2030. In light of this, 630 American businesses and investors -- including General Mills, DuPont, and Hewlett Packard -- signed an open letter to then President-elect Trump and Congress imploring them to protect and continue supporting low carbon policies, continued U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement, and investment in a low carbon economy.  U.S. competitiveness abroad depends on it not fully retreating from the clean energy growth space. China is planning to invest $360 billion in renewable energy through 2020, creating 13 million jobs and solidifying its place as a leading clean energy consumer and exporter. If America recedes from these opportunities, China and other countries will [fill the void](https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/01/america-cant-afford-to-be-a-climate-loner/).

### Relations Adv. Ext. - Climate Cooperation Key To Overall Relations

#### Climate change cooperation has been a highlight of Sino-US relations that spills over to other crucial issues and avoids conflict

Xinhua News, Staff Writer, March 20, 2017, “Commentary: Cooperation the correct choice for China-U.S. relations,”

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/20/c\_136143489.htm, Accessed 4-29-2017

Cooperation between Beijing and Washington has been highlighted in joint efforts on climate change and in handling of the [Iran](http://search.news.cn/language/search.jspa?id=en&t1=0&t=1&ss=&btn=0&ct=Russia&n1=Iran&np=content)ian nuclear issue. These hard-won achievements should be appreciated and valued, especially at a time when the Asia-Pacific and the wider world are facing a thicket of thorny issues that require close coordination between the two countries, such as the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula. Cooperation has prevailed over confrontation for four decades, leading to prosperity in both countries and delivering benefits to the world at large. Let us hope for more optimistic signs on the heels of Tillerson's visit.

#### Cooperation over climate change sets a model for greater cooperation on other issues

Joanna Lewis, PhD, Prof. at Georgetown University, Zhang Xiliang, PhD, Prof. at Tsinghua University, et al. February 23, 2017,

Georgetown University U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, Background Report, https://s3.amazonaws.com/global-db-public/global-db-public/publication/translation/document/1151/US\_China\_ClimateChange\_Background\_Report.pdf, Accessed 3-29-2017

The China-U.S. negotiations on climate change are a model of how the United States and China can find common ground on complex and weighty problems with global ramifications. Both leaders were committed to finding a way to combat global warming and exhibited an eagerness to find areas where the United States and China could collaborate to their mutual benefit. President Obama’s decision to place the negotiations in the hands of a seasoned political figure, known to carry great gravitas within U.S. politics, demonstrated to Beijing the seriousness that Obama attached to the issue. John Podesta did not present Zhang Gaoli with public demands but with an offer to jointly announce commitments, meeting President Xi’s expectation that the Americans would begin to treat China as an equal on the world stage. The meeting in Washington in March between Xi and Obama grew out of this approach. At that meeting, Obama announced to the world that “Our cooperation and our joint statements were critical in arriving at the Paris Agreement.” After the Paris climate change accord was reached, Obama called Xi and expressed appreciation for the “important role China played in securing an historic climate agreement.”

## Energy Cooperation

### US-China Cooperation Good / General

#### There’s huge potential for US-China energy cooperation

Zhang Yongxing, Staff Writer, March 11, 2017, “Interview: China, U.S. enjoy huge potentials for pragmatic energy cooperation,” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/12/c\_136121412.htm, Accessed 4-29-2017

In recent years, Zhou pointed out that China and the United States have enjoyed successful cooperation in the conventional energy such as coal's clean utilization and the green energy. He believes that there exist a lot of opportunities for the two countries to expand their cooperation in wind power, solar power, electricity-powered vehicles, the shale gas, the liquefied natural gas (LNG) and etc. "If China and the United States can deepen their cooperation in the development and use of new energy technologies, this will be highly beneficial to the world energy development, including the green energy, and the climate change," he said. Echoing Zhou's views about Sino-U.S. energy cooperation, Xu Xiaodong, deputy president of China's Electric Power Planning & Engineering Institute, told Xinhua that Sino-U.S. ties are the most important one in the world today and the two nations share a great space for the mutually beneficial energy cooperation in the future.

#### US-China energy cooperation benefits the entire globe

Zhang Yongxing, Staff Writer, March 11, 2017, “Interview: China, U.S. enjoy huge potentials for pragmatic energy cooperation,” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/12/c\_136121412.htm, Accessed 4-29-2017

China and the [United States](http://search.news.cn/language/search.jspa?id=en&t1=0&t=1&ss=&btn=0&ct=Syria&n1=United+States&np=content), the most powerful economies in the world, have great potentials to promote their pragmatic energy cooperation, which will definitely benefit themselves and the world as a whole, experts told Xinhua on Friday. In an exclusive interview with Xinhua, Zhou Xizhou, senior director of gas, power & renewables-APAC IHS Markit, which organized the CERAWeek energy conference in Houston, said that China is the largest developing country in the world while the United States is the most developed one. The two countries, both receive the lion's share of the world economy, share the important task of economic development. "Energy is no doubt the motive power propelling the modern economy to develop. It is necessary and important for China and the United States to deepen their energy cooperation, and such cooperation is the common aspiration of the two countries and the whole world," he said.

## North Korea

### Status Quo Engagement Stalled

#### Engagement with China over N. Korea is stalled in the status quo

Bruce Harrison, Staff Writer, April 25, 2017, “Are the US and North Korea Heading for Conflict?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/are-the-us-and-north-korea-heading-for-conflict/, Accessed 4/26/2017

For one, North Korea’s “existential beef” continues to be primarily with the United States. On top of that, he says, North Korea is unable to rely on any “great power patrons.” There are [signs](http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/russias-love-affair-with-north-korea/), however, that Russia may be willing to play a bigger role in supporting North Korea. And even though China appears to be fed up with Pyongyang, [analysts](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-oil-idUSKBN17F17L) say Beijing is unlikely to do anything that would truly destabilize the North. Trump’s new North Korea policy dubbed “maximum pressure and engagement” indicates a door has been left open for dialogue. But for now a path to talks seems foggy at best, nonexistent at worst. Yang Moo-jin, a professor at Seoul’s University of North Korean Studies, told The Diplomat he feels the U.S. is focused solely on pressure and sanctions.

### Harms Ext. – War in the Status Quo

#### The current approach includes a variety of the same failed polices at best, while risking a full-blown war on the peninsula

Michael D. Swaine, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 21, 2017, “[China and America Need a One-Korea Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/, Accessed 3-21-2017

The concept of such a “future Korea” dialogue is unlikely to be floated in the Korea policy review the Trump administration is reportedly undertaking. Most of the ideas publicly discussed by various Trump supporters are revised versions of past practices, including more sanctions, more enticements, or some combination of the two. Those few new ideas that have been floated include more concerted U.S. threats or enticements directed at Beijing in an effort to get it to “solve” the problem by pressuring Pyongyang and preemptive strikes on Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. But the former is unlikely to earn China’s consent, and the latter might precipitate a full-blown war on the peninsula. Tillerson’s remarks while in Asia, including a declaration that former President Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” had ended, suggest that such dangerous options are now more actively under consideration.

#### Pyongyang is actively testing the US-Japan-S. Korea military deterrent

J. Berkshire Miller, a Tokyo-based International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow on East Asia at the EastWest Institute, March 15, 2017, “[Japan’s N Korea Options](http://www.intellasia.net/japans-n-korea-options-581442),” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-03-15/japans-north-korea-options, Accessed 4-25-2017

Earlier this month, North Korea launched four ballistic missiles toward Japan. Three of them landed within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, less than 200 miles from the country’s coast, in an area frequented by Japanese fishing boats. The missile test, North Korean state media claimed, was aimed at “the bases of the US imperialist aggressor forces in Japan.” By demonstrating that it could carry out a so-called saturation attack – one in which a massive barrage of missiles would overwhelm Japan’s defenses – Pyongyang sought to weaken the credibility of the military deterrent that Japan, the United States, and South Korea have erected against it.

### Solvency Extension - General

#### North Korea is close to nuclear missiles that could hit the US, China, South Korea & Japan. The status quo approach is a proven failure. It’s time for the US to engage China in direct talks on applying direct pressure on North Korea. Understanding mutual concerns is essential to stability in future unification

Michael D. Swaine, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 21, 2017, “[China and America Need a One-Korea Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/, Accessed 3-21-2017

These destabilizing events are occurring as North Korea steadily moves toward the deployment of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of striking not only South Korea and Japan but also U.S. territory. This eventuality has been deemed “unacceptable” by countless observers, including Trump, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson raised the possibility of U.S. “preemptive action” against Pyongyang during a recent trip to Asia. Yet despite such apparent resolve, Washington, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and at times Moscow have thus far been entirely unsuccessful in their multi-decade efforts to entice, threaten, or cajole Pyongyang into abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Rather than retread past failures, it’s time for the United States and China to cooperate in starting over. Both sides have to recognize the reality, if not the legitimacy, of each other’s fears about North Korea and make concessions that indicate their good faith in eventually moving toward a peaceful, unified peninsula acceptable to both sides — that is to say, a Korean Peninsula that is united and largely non-aligned (i.e. without foreign forces). This would risk alienating South Korea and Japan, but it’s the only way to clear the path for China to exert its full influence against its neighbor, forcing Pyongyang to confront a true choice between extreme isolation and likely collapse on one hand and assured security, albeit absent any nuclear arsenal, on the other. One major thing preventing China and the United States from presenting such a clear choice to North Korea is lingering but unnecessary contradictions in their strategic calculations. The Chinese leadership is deeply suspicious of Washington’s ultimate objectives and sees North Korea as an essential buffer against a future unified peninsula with U.S. forces deployed along China’s border. This is deeply reminiscent of the unacceptable situation confronting Beijing before its entrance into the Korean War in 1950. The United States, in turn, believes that Beijing will never place denuclearization of the peninsula above potential instability and hence will tolerate a nuclear-armed Pyongyang, if the alternative were a unified peninsula under U.S. influence. Any negotiation between Beijing and Washington about Pyongyang should thus involve an open discussion about a unified Korea that would be amenable to both sides.

#### China would bow to US pressure under leverage of chaotic collapse. Only the credible bluff of devastation solves

Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington, D.C., and was the principal drafter of the legislation that later became the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, et al. May/June 2017, “Getting Tough on North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea, Accessed 4-25-2017

China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime on its northeastern border. Accordingly, Washington must make clear to both Kim Jong UN and Chinese President Xi Jinping that it would prefer the regime’s chaotic collapse to a stable, nuclear-armed North Korea. The missing ingredient in U.S. diplomacy with Pyongyang has been not trust but leverage—and the willingness to use it. Washington must threaten the one thing that Pyongyang values more than its nuclear weapons: its survival.

#### Engaging China is Key

Lori Esposito Murray, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2017, “How Trump Can Get Xi to Yes on North Korea,” Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/commentary-how-trump-can-get-xi-to-yes-on-north-korea, Accessed 4/28/2017

Stopping a determined nation from developing nuclear weapons is difficult. Reversing established capabilities is even harder. But it has been done. To move North Korea into the success column, Trump needs to ensure Xi Jinping recognizes North Korea is a U.S. priority, that we are willing to work with China’s security interests, and that the U.S. will keep its eye on the ball and not blink.

### Solvency Extension – A2: THAAD Prevents

#### Chinese inaction on N. Korea is the reason we’re putting THAAD in S. Korea

John Hemmings, Director of the Asia Studies Centre at the [Henry Jackson Society](http://henryjacksonsociety.org/) and an Adjunct Fellow at [CSIS](http://csis.org/expert/john-hemmings), March 6, 2017, “China's fear of the US prevents any defusing of the North Korean threat,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/06/chinas-fear-us-prevents-defusing-north-korean-threat/, Accessed 4-25-2017

The past year has seen a strong Chinese [campaign](http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2075919/china-puts-economic-squeeze-south-korea-over-us-anti) to pressure Seoul into stopping the deployment, with the government banning Chinese tour groups to the country, and boycotting a retail company after it agreed to supply land for the THAAD deployment. In many ways, Beijing is the victim of its own ally in all this. Unable or unwilling to pressure North Korea where it might truly hurt – on energy and food supplies – Beijing focuses its ire on South Korea alone, using economic and political pressure, and offering only platitudes about restarting peace talks. In a sense, this pattern of prioritizing its own security preferences – at the expense of its regional neighbours – is becoming a hallmark of Chinese security policy in the region. It is quite ironic, given the fact that its trade relationship with Seoul far outstrips that with Pyongyang. Dr. Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a senior lecturer in international relations at King’s College London says, “China is focusing on the wrong potential threat. If there were going to be a conflict in Northeast Asia, it would be the result of North Korea's actions, rather than South Korea's or anything related to THAAD.” In reaction to Chinese displeasure, both Washington and Seoul have sought to remind Beijing ultimately, whether or not THAAD is deployed rests on China’s own actions. Before her downfall in a corruption scandal, South Korea’s strong-minded President Park Geun-hye [stated](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/02/South-Koreas-Park-Geun-hye-THAAD-unnecessary-if-North-Korea-threat-subsides/9561472828749/) that the South would not need THAAD if China dealt with the North Korean missile threat. Admiral Harry Harris, the current Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), in charge of US forces in Asia Pacific, reiterated that, [saying](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-north-korea-idUSKCN0VY2C9), “If China wanted to exert a lot of influence on somebody to prevent THAAD from being considered going into Korea, then they should exert that influence on North Korea.”

### Relations Adv. – Cooperation Spills Over

#### Cooperation on N. Korea can spill over to other issues

Stratfor.com, Staff Writers, April 14, 2017, “Testing the Depth of U.S.-China Cooperation,” Stratfor Worldview, https://www.stratfor.com/article/testing-depth-us-china-cooperation, Accessed 4-30-2017

Once again, the dogged struggle over the future of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program appears to be nearing a moment of truth. On Wednesday, 38 North, a website that tracks political and security developments in North Korea, released satellite imagery of the country's Punggye-ri nuclear test site that indicated Pyongyang is "primed and ready" to trigger a nuclear test explosion, which would be the country's sixth. Expectations are high that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will order the test to be conducted Saturday, the 105th anniversary of the birth of the founder of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, his grandfather Kim Il Sung. The developments in Pyongyang have riveted the attention of the United States and China on North Korea. In recent weeks, discussions over how to manage — and, if possible, delay or halt — [North Korea's nuclearization have dominated the discussions](https://www.stratfor.com/article/negotiating-strategy-handle-north-korea) between China and the United States. The issue superseded China's maritime territorial activities and U.S.-China trade ties as the focus of last week's summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping and was the topic of a phone call between the two leaders on Tuesday. In fact, the challenge of North Korea's nuclear weapons program appears to have opened a window for limited cooperation in otherwise tangled negotiations over the numerous other issues the countries face.

### N. Korea Nukes Adv. – Timeframe / Impacts

#### North Korea could have 40 nuclear weapons by 2021

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, January/February 2017, “North Korea: One Impulse for Trump to Heed,” Arms Control Today, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-01/> features/north-korea-one-impulse-trump-heed, Accessed 3-21-2017

North Korea’s fifth nuclear test may have yielded a nuclear device that can be mounted on a missile, although a few more tests still may be needed to prove its reliability. The North’s reactor at Yongbyon is fitfully generating more spent fuel, a refurbished reprocessing facility has just turned that spent fuel into plutonium, a new reactor is nearing completion, and its uranium-enrichment program, an alternative route to produce the explosive material for a nuclear bomb, has expanded. At its current pace, Pyongyang could have enough fissile material for more than 40 nuclear weapons by 2021.

#### Every missile failure brings them closer to success. N. Korea could have 100 nukes by 2025

Robbie Gramer and Paul McLeary, Staff Writers, April 20, 2017, “Trump’s North Korea Standoff Rattles Allies and Adversaries,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/20/trumps-north-korea-standoff-rattles-allies-and-adversaries/, Accessed 4-25-2017

North Korea’s latest provocation was the attempted launch of a still unidentified missile that blew up almost immediately after launch. But experts warn that with each failure, North Korea inches closer to a viable missile program and with it the capability to lob nukes at U.S. and allied territory. Since 2014, about three-quarters of Pyongyang’s missile launches (51 of 66) have succeeded, as nuclear nonproliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis [noted](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/19/the-united-states-isnt-hacking-north-koreas-missile-launches/). As tests continue, missile development continues apace, and North Korea bulks up its nuclear arsenal in the future, the threat — and the difficulty of dealing with it — will only grow. North Korea could have as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2025, said Michael Mazarr, another Asia security expert with Rand. “A North Korea of the mid-2020s is going to be a very different challenge than the one it is today,” he said.

#### North Korea can strike the US in 3-5 years. It’s crucial that China actively work to avoid instability

Mitchell Blatt, a journalist based in Seoul, South Korea, March 21, 2017, “Why China Must Confront North Korea,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-must-confront-north-korea-19856, Accessed 3-21-2017

There is little time left to continue playing this game. Thae Yong Ho, [who defected](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korean-defector-believes-he-can-help-topple-regime-by-speaking-out/) from his position as North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom in 2016, says that his former employer is within three to five years of being able to strike the United States, and independent analysts agree. North Korea’s foreign ministry warns that an ICBM test is not far off, and analysts like Melissa Hanham of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Scott Lafoy of NK News confirm that North Korea has—or is near reaching the capability—to do so. North Korea’s progress made huge strides in 2016. Continuing down the same path would effectively let North Korea achieve its goal. While the options on the table are limited and will not be easy, there are few other good choices. Donald Trump’s presence in the Oval Office doesn’t inspire confidence, but America and South Korea can’t just sit idly by for four years because of who is president. If China wants to avoid instability, then China must take an active role and take responsibility. It is time to end the false narrative that the West’s actions have caused the Korean peninsula to become destabilized and put the blame squarely where it belongs. As long as North Korea is an out-of-control threat, South Korea will need to take tough actions. China is reaping what it sowed from years of complacency.

### N. Korea Nukes Adv. – Timeframe / Impacts

#### The consensus of intelligence agencies is that N. Korea can nuke L.A. within 2-3 years and can hit S. Korea and Japan now

Bill Powell, Staff Writer, April 25, 2017, “What War with North Korea Would Look Like,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html, Accessed 4/26/2017

U.S. alarm about North Korea has spiked for two main reasons: The first is the aggressive missile-testing regimen Pyongyang has carried out under Kim Jong Un. During his four-year reign, Pyongyang has already test-fired 66 missiles, more than twice as many as his father Kim Jong Il did during his 17 years in office. Kim’s regime has gradually increased the range of its missiles. Combine that with the North’s efforts to miniaturize its [nuclear arsenal](http://europe.newsweek.com/north-koreas-weapons-what-we-know-585642), so that its 10 to 16 bombs can fit onto a warhead, “and you have two streams coming together—range and miniaturization—that you don’t want to cross,” says retired Admiral James Stavridis, now dean of the Fletcher School for diplomacy at Tufts University. Some U.S. commanders fear the North can already put a nuclear warhead on a missile. Admiral Bill Gortney, head of the North American Aerospace Command, told Congress two years ago that he believes Pyongyang can use a medium-range missile to deliver a nuclear payload, meaning it can hit South Korea or Japan. The consensus intelligence estimate is that the North is now 18 to 36 months away from sticking a nuke on a missile that can reach Los Angeles. All that explains why from both current and former military officials, there has been increasing talk of pre-emption. In November 2016, General Walter Sharp, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated that if North Korea puts a long-range missile on a launch pad, and the U.S. is unsure of its payload, Washington should order a pre-emptive attack to destroy that missile.

#### Tensions are high now. N. Korea could soon have nuclear weapons to attack the U.S. and Australia

Chris Chang, Staff Writer, April 17, 2017, “Why it’s so important for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons,” news.com.au (Australia), <http://www.news.com.au/technology/why-its-so-important-for-north-korea-to-develop-nuclear-weapons/news-story/ae936c8099fdcfb137860260afcee844>, Accessed 4/28/2017

[Tensions have reached boiling point](http://www.news.com.au/world/donald-trump-reportedly-considering-strikes-on-north-koreas-nuclear-sites/news-story/ab3d7639b41f35ab7dec43cfa1837412)in the region after a series of nuclear and missile tests in North Korea prompted the US to send an armada of warships to Korean waters including aircraft carrier the USS Carl Vinson. Experts believe that North Korea could develop a long-range missile capable of reaching the US, with a nuclear bomb at the tip, within four years. “That is a hell scary moment,” Professor John Blaxland told news.com.au. Prof Blaxland is the acting head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, and said the nuclearisation of a ballistic missile could threaten the US, halfway across the world, as well as Australia.

### N. Korea Nukes Adv. – Nuclearization Impacts

#### N. Korean nuclearization is the greatest threat to regional security

Justin McCurry, Staff Writer, April 6, 2017, “Trump tells Japan 'all options on the table' in face of North Korea provocation,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/trump-japan-all-options-north-korea-provocation>, Accessed 4-26-2017

Trump and Abe agreed that North Korea’s latest ballistic missile test posed a threat to security in the region, the Japanese prime minister told reporters after the phone call. “[We] agreed that yesterday’s missile launch by North Korea was a dangerous provocative act and a grave threat to security. I told him that Japan is watching closely how [China](https://www.theguardian.com/world/china) will cope with this North Korean issue. “President Trump then made a strong remark, saying all options are on the table.” Susan Thornton, the top US diplomat for East Asia, called North Korea “an urgent and global threat”. She told reporters: “We are looking for an action-focused, results-oriented approach, and we are going to be trying to cooperate with other partners and allies in a global coalition really to try to solve this problem in an urgent way that we haven’t really taken up before.”

### N. Korea Nukes Adv. – War Impacts

#### A showdown with N. Korea risks thermonuclear war

Neil Connor and David Millward, Staff Writers, April 13, 2017, “World 'on the brink of thermo-nuclear war', as North Korea mulls test that could goad Trump,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/13/us-may-launch-strike-north-korea-goes-nuclear-weapons-test/, Accessed 4/28/2017

North Korea has warned that the world is on the brink of “thermo-nuclear war” as fears rise that Pyongyang is planning a test of military hardware that could provoke a response from President Donald Trump. Tensions over the North’s nuclear ambitions escalated further on Friday after reports in the US that Washington was ready to launch a pre-emptive strike, while China called for all sides to pull back from an “irreversible and unmanageable stage”. Evidence of increased activity in recent weeks at the North's nuclear test sites has sparked fears that the country may be about to conduct its sixth nuclear test since 2006 at the weekend.

#### Hundreds of thousands of people would die in the first 90 days of a Second Korean War

Franz-Stefan Gady, Associate Editor, April 19, 2017, “What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war-look-like/, Accessed 4/26/2017

What would a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula look like? To many, this question might trigger a severe case of apocalyptic anxiety, where, on the one hand, we assume that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is willing to embrace Götterdämmerung-like catastrophic violence to defend its Stalinist regime, whereas, on the other hand, we seem to be incapable of genuinely fathoming the carnage any military conflict between Seoul and Pyongyang would cause. One explanation for this may be that estimates of casualties and physical destruction on the Korean Peninsula (and possibly Japan) under any war scenario are so exceedingly high. Should Pyongyang live up to its threat of turning Seoul into a “sea of fire,” casualties in the larger Seoul metropolitan area alone may surpass 100,000 within 48 hours, according to some estimates, even without the use of North Korean weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. Department of Defense assessed that a Second Korean War could produce 200,000-300,000 South Korean and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.

#### Hundreds of thousands would die in the first 72 hours, with lingering conflict and retaliation plans expanding devastation

Franz-Stefan Gady, Associate Editor, April 19, 2017, “What Would the Second Korean War Look Like?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war-look-like/, Accessed 4/26/2017

While North Korea’s true military potential is disputable, most analysts believe that tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians would be killed within the first 48 hours of the conflict at a minimum. The corridors where North Korean troops would be advancing would almost certainly be turned into human abattoirs. One military estimate puts the number of North Korean casualties at 100,000 in the first 72 hours. Should only ten percent of the North Korean invading force make it into Seoul, it still could take weeks of urban combat to dislodge them and kill thousands of civilians caught in crossfire, not to mention the thousands of soldiers that will perish in the slow re-conquest of portions of the city. Yet mass casualties would not only be confined to the South in the event of war. Seoul’s so-called Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation plan foresees the targeted destruction of sections of Pyongyang in the event of conflict even if it does not cross the nuclear threshold, which could cost the lives of tens of thousands in the North Korean capital. The plan also calls for surgical strikes against key leadership figures of the communist regime as well as military infrastructure. The U.S.-ROK war plan for conflict on the Korean Peninsula purportedly calls for immediate but proportionate retaliation in kind should the North decide to launch an attack. (While fragments of this plan have been leaked to the press, it is impossible to confirm their veracity.)

### US Pre-Emptive Attack Adv. – China Solves or US Invades

#### It’s time for China to step up pressure on North Korea. The alternative risks direct US military action

Mitchell Blatt, a journalist based in Seoul, South Korea, March 21, 2017, “Why China Must Confront North Korea,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-must-confront-north-korea-19856, Accessed 3-21-2017

If the United States pursues a more militaristic agenda towards North Korea under Trump, then China has largely itself to blame. After years of China turning a blind eye to sanctions violators and keeping the dangerous North Korean regime alive and its leaders well fed, now a new American administration is saying enough with the current policy of “strategic patience.” Whether Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s comments during his visit to Seoul and first trip to Asia really reflects a change in strategy remains to be seen. “Let me be very clear: the policy of strategic patience has ended,” he said, leaving military options on the table. Trump has been notoriously hard to pin down on almost everything, especially foreign policy. During the campaign he often said that South Korea wasn’t paying the United States enough for its defense, but now it appears he has dropped any attempts to renegotiate those defense parameters, at least in light of North Korea’s increasing provocations. Still, a policy focused on applying fines and blacklistings to Chinese companies named in violation of sanctions and refusing to talk with North Korea wouldn’t be a huge departure from the Obama administration’s second-term policy. The Treasury Department increasingly used its authority to blacklist companies like Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development in 2016 and placed sanctions on more than a dozen North Korean officials for human-rights violations. Former Secretary of State John Kerry even warned of increasing use of such sanctions in a November meeting with Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi. Tillerson was just following the existing policy direction created by the previous administration when he reportedly planned to say the same thing to the Chinese in his March meeting. But if the Trump administration does up the ante, it will be because proposals to engage in toothless talks with North Korea—like that made this week by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi—have utterly failed, and China hasn’t done its part to try to reign in its rogue frenemy. China’s call for the United States and North Korea to “apply the brakes” is too little, too late. Juxtaposed against its vitriolic response to the South Korean deployment of Terminal High Area Altitude Defense, China’s impassive response to multiple North Korean nuclear tests, always predicated on the same “firm opposition” talking point, which makes it look like China hasn’t been taking the threat of a nuclear North seriously.

#### The alternative to Chinese action is a US strike on N. Korea

Graham Webster, a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, April 10, 2017, “A False Start for Trump and Xi,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-10/false-start-trump-and-xi, Accessed 4-25-2017

It’s possible that the United States decided to strike Syria during Trump’s dinner with Xi in part to show China that it would not hesitate to act unilaterally against North Korea. If that was the administration’s intention, its choice was misguided. The strike against Syria did not add weight to Trump’s implied threats against Pyongyang, since Trump had not threatened Syria before the chemical attack that triggered the U.S. action: only after the attack did Trump say that Assad had “[crosse[d] many, many lines](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idlib-idUSKBN1770YU).” What’s more, for Trump to have signaled that he would follow through on his warnings to North Korea, he would first need to have made those warnings clear, and, so far, his administration has not done so. On the same day that Trump [said](https://www.ft.com/content/4d9f65d6-17bd-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a) that the United States would “solve North Korea” if China did not, for example, his ambassador to the United Nations told ABC that China was “the only country that could stop North Korea.” Finally, North Korea’s recent provocations are not comparable to Assad’s use of poison gas: although Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are alarming, they still represent the development of a weapon—not the use of one. North Korean and Chinese officials surely know that the relatively strong international support Trump received for the strike in Syria would not be present in the case of a preemptive attack against North Korea.

#### Unless China acts, the US will sanction China and/or commit preemptive military action

Justin McCurry, Staff Writer, April 6, 2017, “Trump tells Japan 'all options on the table' in face of North Korea provocation,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/trump-japan-all-options-north-korea-provocation>, Accessed 4-26-2017

North Korea is expected to feature prominently [during talks at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/xi-jinping-holds-all-the-cards-ahead-of-mar-a-lago-meeting-with-trump) in Florida on Thursday and Friday, days after the president warned that the US was prepared to act alone against North Korea if China refused to exert more pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will,” [Trump said in a newspaper interview](https://www.ft.com/content/4d9f65d6-17bd-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a) at the weekend. His administration is reportedly considering sanctions against Chinese banks and firms that provide [North Korea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/north-korea) access to the international financial system, while retaining the option of conducting a pre-emptive military strike.

### US Pre-Emptive Attack Adv. – China Solves or US Invades

#### Cooperation over N. Korea is stalled now. A pre-emptive US strike causes a major war and turns away China and allies

Stratfor.com, Staff Writers, April 14, 2017, “Testing the Depth of U.S.-China Cooperation,” Stratfor Worldview, https://www.stratfor.com/article/testing-depth-us-china-cooperation, Accessed 4-30-2017

Notwithstanding the symbolic gestures and pledges of goodwill, Sino-U.S. cooperation on diplomatic responses to North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains substantially unchanged. Of course, the United States has signaled its [willingness to use military force](https://www.stratfor.com/article/derailing-nuclear-program-force) unilaterally to disrupt or dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear weapons infrastructure, or even to overthrow the Kim government. Washington's dispatch of its carrier strike group, including the USS Carl Vinson, to nearby waters; pledges of increased defense support for South Korea and Japan; moves to accelerate deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile system in South Korea; and, arguably, its missile strike against Syria — which Trump ordered over dessert during Xi's visit — are cases in point. But it is exceedingly difficult to say whether these moves represent a credible, impending threat to North Korea or are primarily [meant to pressure China to act](https://www.stratfor.com/article/tough-sell-north-korea). Unless Washington genuinely believes Pyongyang is a paper tiger, the United States must expect that any action against the North will trigger a major conflagration on the Korean Peninsula. Neither Japan nor South Korea, much less China, would support such a move.

### US Pre-emptive Attack Adv. - Impacts

#### N. Korea would retaliate against a pre-emptive strike by invading the South and using chemical weapons and foreclosing civilian escape. Even though the U.S. would win, a conventional war in Korea would kill over a million people with a high potential for a nuclear “use or lose” scenario involving 10-16 nuclear weapons

Bill Powell, Staff Writer, April 25, 2017, “What War with North Korea Would Look Like,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html, Accessed 4/26/2017

Whether it does will come down to how Kim reacts to the pressure now being put on him from the West. The U.S. knows relatively little about the young man’s psyche and stability, but what it does know isn’t encouraging. In addition to his aggressive missile testing program, Kim has a new war plan of his own: to complete an invasion of South Korea within a week using asymmetric capabilities (including nuclear weapons and missiles). Reunification of the two Koreas under Pyongyang’s rule, as ludicrous as that possibility seems to the outside world, has always been the foremost goal of both Kim Jong Un and his father. For a while, in the wake of the famine in the late 1990s that killed tens of thousands of North Koreans and the deep, relentless poverty that followed, military strategists began to discount that possibility, believing it to be rhetoric unmoored from reality. All you had to do was look at the satellite images of Seoul and Pyongyang at night, one brightly lit and the other dark, to see which half of Korea was strong, and which was weak. And although the economic disparity hasn’t changed much, the North’s weaponry has, its war plan has, and its dictator’s bellicose rhetoric has. The young man known in China as “Fatty Kim the Third” (Kim Jong Un is the grandson of Kim Il Sung, who was the supreme leader of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from its founding in 1948 until 1994) appears to be serious about being a nuclear power. In speeches, he mentions the reunification far more often than his father did, North Korea watchers say. If the U.S. launches a pre-emptive strike, Kim appears likely to hit back, starting with an artillery barrage—thousands of rounds per hour. “Without moving a single soldier in its million-man army,” says former CIA analyst Bruce Klingner, now at the Heritage Foundation, “the North could launch a devastating attack on Seoul.” Would the two sides be able to de-escalate at that point? A senior North Korean military defector has said that under Kim’s new war plan, the North intends to try to occupy all of South Korea before significant U.S. reinforcements could flow in from Japan and elsewhere. This invasion could start, Cha wrote in his recent book, The Impossible State, by terrorizing the South Korean population with chemical weapons. “An arsenal of 600 chemically armed Scud missiles would be fired on all South Korean airports, train stations and marine ports, making it impossible for civilians to escape.” The North’s arsenal of medium-range missiles could also be fitted with chemical warheads and launched at Japan, delaying the flow of U.S. reinforcements. And those reinforcements would be urgently needed on the Korean Peninsula, since the U.S. has only 28,000 troops in South Korea, and the South’s armed forces, though far better trained and equipped than the North’s, consist of 660,000 men, more than 300,000 smaller than the South’s. U.S. war planners believe North Korean forces would to try to overrun South Korea’s defenses and get to Seoul before the U.S. and the South could respond with overwhelming force. As Cha says, “as wars go, this would be the most unforgiving battle conditions that can be imagined—an extremely high density of enemy and allied forces—over 2 million mechanized forces all converging on a total battlespace the equivalent of the distance between Washington, D.C., and Boston.’’ The United States would immediately dispatch four to six ground combat divisions of up to 20,000 troops each, 10 Air Force wings of about 20 fighters per unit and four to five aircraft carriers. In Cha’s scenario, U.S. and South Korean “soldiers would be fighting with little defense against DPRK artillery, aerial bombardments, and in an urban warfare environment polluted by 5,000 metric tons of DPRK chemical agents.” Even if that artillery barrage and push into the South gave the North the initiative, there is no question, military planners all say, who would ultimately prevail in a second Korean War. The U.S. and South Korea have far too much firepower, and if Kim Jong Un decided to go to war, that would be end of his regime, whether he knows it or not. But this would not be a one-week walkover, like the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, when his forces were arrayed like clay pigeons in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deserts, where they were easily destroyed by U.S. air power. Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly $1 trillion of economic damage. The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. If the North could figure out a way to deliver one, why wouldn’t Kim go all in?

### US Pre-emptive Attack Adv. - Impacts

#### A US preemptive attack on N. Korea causes massive casualties that outweigh the risk of nuclearization

Jon Wolfsthal, A nonresident fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and nonproliferation, April 24, 2017, “[Could Playing Chicken With North Korea Pay Off?](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/24/could-playing-chicken-with-north-korea-pay-off/),” Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/24/could-playing-chicken-with-north-korea-pay-off/>, Accessed 4/26/2017

For well over a decade, North Korea has calculated (correctly) that Beijing, Seoul, and Washington would all choose relative stability and conflict avoidance over taking military action to end North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The threat of North Korean nuclear weapons, the argument goes, contains a risk of disaster — but attacking North Korea to prevent its programs from advancing is a sure-fire calamity. Casualty [estimates](http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war-look-like/) from just the first few days of fighting the Korean War’s sequel is enough to sober up even the most bloodthirsty chest thumper.

#### A U.S. pre-emptive strike triggers the Second Korean War risking tactical nukes

Bill Powell, Staff Writer, April 25, 2017, “What War with North Korea Would Look Like,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html, Accessed 4/26/2017

But the grim reality is that a pre-emptive strike, against North Korean missiles or nuclear facilities—or both—could well mean war. Should the day come when President Trump believes he needs to order a pre-emptive strike against targets in North Korea to eliminate a direct threat, the U.S will not be able to take out all of the North Korean artillery front loaded near the border. “Not,” says former National Security Council staffer Victor Cha, “without using tactical nuclear weapons,” which is not something the U.S. would consider, given that Seoul is right down the road. A U.S. strike, simply put, could well trigger the second Korean War.

### Japan Adv. – Pre-emptive Strikes / Impacts

#### There is a high risk of Japanese militarization for a pre-emptive strike on N. Korea. This approach will fail and exacerbate tensions throughout the region

J. Berkshire Miller, a Tokyo-based International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow on East Asia at the EastWest Institute, March 15, 2017, “[Japan’s N Korea Options](http://www.intellasia.net/japans-n-korea-options-581442),” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-03-15/japans-north-korea-options, Accessed 4-25-2017

Even in its current form, however, Japan’s constitution does not necessarily prohibit the country from carrying out a preemptive strike against a threat from North Korea. The constitution may permit preemptive actions when they are the only way to safeguard Japan’s security against an imminent danger and when they are carried out with a proportional amount of force. What’s more, although the prevailing interpretation of the constitution places the overseas deployment of Japanese forces with the aim of using force beyond the limits of self-defense, it does not explicitly rule out striking overseas targets using equipment based in Japan. This leaves the door open for lawmakers and lawyers to justify using preemptive weapons. In any case, the procurement and deployment of weapons such as cruise missiles would not in itself need to fulfill the constitution’s requirements for the use of force. But there are challenges to gaining preemptive strike capabilities that go beyond the constitution. First, it’s not clear whether such capabilities – even when combined with a US-led surgical strike – would be able to neutralise Pyongyang’s missile programmes, which are being developed to withstand preemptive attacks. Second, the costs associated with such a strike, which would probably include retaliatory actions by North Korea against Japan and South Korea, may outweigh the benefits. And finally, Japan’s development of preemptive capabilities would raise eyebrows among pacifists in Japan and among officials elsewhere in the region – especially in China – and help feed into false narratives about Japan’s alleged remilitarisation. Beijing would also likely protest the deployment of THAAD or other missile defense systems to Japan. Even though these arguments from China would ring hollow in light of Beijing’s own ability to strike Japan, it will be hard for Tokyo to bolster its national security without exacerbating broader tensions in northeast Asia. Japanese officials and their allies in South Korea and the United States should continue to publicly discuss their options anyway, if only to signal to Pyongyang that its escalations will not be met with silence.

#### Japan is actively debating on militarization for a pre-emptive strike on N. Korea

J. Berkshire Miller, a Tokyo-based International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow on East Asia at the EastWest Institute, March 15, 2017, “[Japan’s N Korea Options](http://www.intellasia.net/japans-n-korea-options-581442),” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-03-15/japans-north-korea-options, Accessed 4-25-2017

North Korea has conducted dozens of missile tests and three nuclear tests since Kim Jong Un took office in late 2011. Over the same period, Pyongyang’s missile capabilities have grown and its arsenal’s vulnerability to attack has diminished. Last August, North Korea successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In February, it tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile propelled by solid fuel – a technological leap that would allow Pyongyang to dramatically reduce the signs of an impending launch, helping to insulate its missiles from preemptive strikes. The Kim regime is now attempting to create a nuclear warhead small enough to attach to the tip of a missile, a step toward its ultimate goal of creating an intercontinental ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear bomb to the continental United States. Through an elaborate shell game involving mobile missile launchers and the diversification of its launch sites, North Korea has sought to sow doubts in the United States, Japan, and South Korea about the potential efficacy of preemptive action. All of these developments have worried Japanese policymakers, deepening a long-standing debate in Tokyo over the country’s security posture. At issue is whether enhancing Japan’s missile defense capabilities will be enough to meet the threat and whether Tokyo should equip itself for a preemptive strike against North Korea – a move that could raise China’s ire and create domestic controversy due to Japan’s own constitutional constraints.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Internals

#### Absent Chinese action on N. Korea, Japan could go nuclear overnight

The Japan Times, Staff Writer, April 26, 2017, “Japan could get nuclear weapons ‘virtually overnight,’ Biden tells Xi,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/24/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-get-nuclear-weapons-virtually-overnight-biden-tells-xi/#.WQJmK\_krKR0, Accessed 4/27/2017

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden has told Chinese President Xi Jinping that Japan has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons “virtually overnight.” Speaking at a Public Broadcasting Service program aired Monday, Biden said he had urged Xi to exert influence on North Korea so it will abandon its missile and nuclear weapons developments. Referring to Pyongyang’s recent nuclear test and missile launches in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, Biden said that if China and the United States fail to take effective action against North Korea, “What happens if Japan, who could go nuclear tomorrow? They have the capacity to do it virtually overnight.” Biden did not say when his conversation with Xi took place. The vice president said China “has the single greatest ability to influence North Korea by cutting off A, B, C, D, a whole range of things, but it also could cause the implosion of North Korea.”

#### Trump’s armada bluff makes Japan doubt the alliance against the backdrop of an aggressive China. Inaction risks Japanese proliferation

Liubomir K. Topaloff, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, April 21, 2017, “Japan’s Nuclear Moment,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-nuclear-moment/, Accessed 4/26/2017

If Japan wanted to develop nuclear weapons, there would be no better moment than now to start. As the North Korean regime grows desperate to get a more generous ransom against its nuclear program, the threat it poses to Tokyo is multiplying. Last week Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, warned that North Korea is preparing the capability to launch missiles carrying the chemical weapon sarin against Tokyo. U.S. President Donald Trump further added to the turmoil by declaring last week that an “armada” of American military vessels was heading to the Korean peninsula, only to be contradicted by his own military, which broke the news days later that the “armada” was sailing near Singapore, over 3,000 miles away from the Korean peninsula. At the time Trump boasted of the “armada,” it reportedly was travelling in the opposite direction. So much for the credibility of the American extended deterrence, which should guarantee the security umbrella over Japan, a policy in force since 1975. Now, both South Korea and Japan feel cheated and let down, while the U.S. administration was caught red-handed in a bluff. A truly embarrassing situation, indeed. In the meantime, Japan must take into account China’s aggressive assertiveness in the region, its continued building of artificial islands in the South China, and unilaterally enforced new Air Defense Identification Zone over the sea, and its claims over various islands and archipelago also claimed by its neighbors – not just Japan, but also Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines. Added to this is the apparent inability of now two consecutive U.S. administrations to curb the security dilemma that ensues from these Chinese actions, which contributes to the sense of insecurity and urgent necessity for Japan to take its national security in its own hands.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Brinks

#### Japanese public objections to nuclear weapons could soon change with a growing N. Korean threat

Liubomir K. Topaloff, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, April 21, 2017, “Japan’s Nuclear Moment,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-nuclear-moment/, Accessed 4/26/2017

It’s true that Japanese society is largely against nuclear weapons, not only because of the fact that Japan is the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, but also due to the general isolationist and pacifist political identity of the majority of Japanese. However, this could quickly change and give way to greater support for nuclear weapons as a result of the growing threat from North Korea. Kim Jong-un is growing desperate to prove his credibility, and — like a thug who cuts a finger or an ear from his kidnapped victim as a proof of his resolve — he too may launch a missile or two against Japan or South Korea, by mistake or by miscalculation, in an attempt to win the  current nuclear game of chicken. Either way, not many Japanese will feel suicidal when faced with the choice to support a nuclear program or risk being randomly annihilated by North Korean bombs, or for that matter Chinese aggression.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / General

#### Japanese prolif causes an action-reaction cycle of escalating proliferation and wars that draw in Russia and India

Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2016, "Underestimated: Our not so Peaceful Nuclear Future,” Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1310, Accessed 4/29/2017

Consider the action-reaction dynamic Seoul or Tokyo going nuclear might set into motion with Beijing and Pyongyang. Presumably, in all cases (China included), each state would try to protect its strategic forces against possible attacks by building more passive defenses (hardening, mobility, tunneling, etc.). They also would focus on building up their offensive forces (both nuclear and non-nuclear) so they might eliminate as much of each other’s strategic forces as soon as any war began (this to “limit the damage” they would otherwise suffer). Finally, they would increase the number of nuclear weapons assets, missile portals, and other strategic aim points to prevent any of their adversaries from thinking they could “knockout” their retaliatory forces. This, roughly, is what unfolded during the Cold War rivalry between Washington and the Soviet Union. As was the case for Russia and the United States then, it could easily drive up East Asian nuclear weapons requirements well beyond scores or even hundreds of weapons.

#### Japanese proliferation enflames every major conflict in Asia risking catastrophic war & the use of loose nukes, while collapsing the NPT and the US security alliance

Daniel Bob, Director of Programs and Senior Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, January 24, 2017, “[Encouraging Japan to Go Nuclear Won’t Denuclearize North Korea](http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/),” 38North.org, http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/, Accessed 4/26/2017

Japan’s public and its leaders understand that choosing to go nuclear would actually reduce the country’s security. It would undermine the country’s vital alliance with the United States and likely provoke South Korea, America’s other key alliance partner in East Asia (which has also rejected nuclear weapons despite having the technical capability), to follow suit. However, 59 percent of Koreans gave a positive answer when asked, “Should South Korea possess nuclear weapons?” according to the same Genron NPO survey cited above. Given their ongoing distrust of Japan, Koreans would almost certainly view their neighbor—if armed with nuclear weapons and unmoored from its alliance with Washington—as a threat, generating even more support for developing a nuclear arsenal. If Japan and South Korea joined the nuclear club, China could be expected to respond by increasing its own store of nuclear bombs, while other states in the region would feel less constrained by their NPT obligations. The likely result would be the end of both the US-led alliance system in Asia, which has been so successful in advancing US and regional interests, and the NPT, which stands as the world’s most important and successful arms limitation treaty. Within East Asia, historical animosities still afflict Japan’s interactions with South Korea and China; territorial disputes undermine Japan’s relations with China, Korea and Russia as well as China’s relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam; internal conflicts linger in Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines and Indonesia; and a number of autocratic regimes and democracies alike face instability. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would not only increase the chance of catastrophic war in the context of regional tensions, but also of loose nukes falling into the wrong hands.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / General

#### A nuclear-armed Japan leads to a nuclear arms race in NE Asia and the Middle East making a nuclear exchange inevitable

Stephen Schwalbe, associate professor at American Public University and Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy from Auburn University, [April 11, 2017](http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/), “Analyzing the Idea of a Nuclear-Armed Japan and South Korea,” In Homeland Security, http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/, Accessed 4/28/2017

It would appear that the idea of a nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea is not well thought out. That course of action could easily lead to a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia as well as in the Middle East. Given the instability of the North Korean leadership, primarily Kim, Jong-un, and Iran’s fanatic support for Shia terrorist groups, the probability of a nuclear weapon exchange somewhere in the world would increase exponentially. When negotiating, it is good to bluff at times. I hope China does not call our bluff as it could lead to a dark era in mankind’s history.

#### A nuclear Japan would causes catastrophic conflicts across East Asia

Nidhi Prasad, Masters of Philosophy in Japanese Studies at the Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, October 12, 2016, “Yes, Japan Could Build Nuclear Weapons (But at What Cost?),” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/yes-japan-could-build-nuclear-weapons-what-cost-18019, Accessed 4/26/2017

Third, Japan’s development of nuclear potential would significantly impact its security alliance with the United States. In 1968 Eisaku Sato [defined](http://journalarticle.ukm.my/341/1/1.pdf) Japanese nuclear policy based on four pillars, which included a reliance on US extended deterrence. Japan breaking out would mean undermining the foundations of the alliance which have become hardwired into the strategic landscape of the region. Japan’s own security policy would also have to be seriously modified. Fourth, Japan would have to factor in the political ramifications of such a decision, particularly with respect to its relationships with China and South Korea. The outbreak of conflict between the world’s second and third largest economic powers would be catastrophic. China’s creeping operations in the South and East China Sea could also expand if Japan developed its strategic capabilities. Additionally South Korea may demand its own deterrent capability, which would drastically transform the strategic landscape of East Asia.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / NK Nukes

#### A nuclear Japan only hardens N. Korean nuclear development and scuttles Chinese diplomatic efforts

Daniel Bob, Director of Programs and Senior Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, January 24, 2017, “[Encouraging Japan to Go Nuclear Won’t Denuclearize North Korea](http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/),” 38North.org, http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/, Accessed 4/26/2017

During his Presidential campaign, Donald Trump said that a nuclear-armed Japan might not be a “bad thing” for the United States “because of the threat of North Korea.” In a recent op-ed, Charles Krauthammer seemed to agree, advising the incoming administration to declare that the United States should no longer oppose Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. He argued that “the Chinese have many nightmares, none worse than a nuclear-armed Japan,” and China can “halt” the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Both are wrong: a nuclear-armed Japan would endanger American—and Japanese—security interests, while only reinforcing North Korea’s determination to keep its nuclear weapons as the key to its survival.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / NPT Scenario

#### Japanese proliferation collapses the NPT and increases proliferation globally

Stephen Schwalbe, associate professor at American Public University and Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy from Auburn University, [April 11, 2017](http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/), “Analyzing the Idea of a Nuclear-Armed Japan and South Korea,” In Homeland Security, http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/, Accessed 4/28/2017

A nuclear armed Japan and South Korea, however, could mean that the end of the NPT. At that point, other nations might want to acquire nuclear weapons, especially if the United States becomes more isolationist. Even if Japan and South Korea were given the green light to develop nuclear weapons, the problem becomes testing them because the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bans all nuclear detonations anywhere. It was adopted by the United Nations in 1996, but officially is not in effect because eight nations have not ratified it.

#### The nonproliferation regime is the biggest barrier to nuclear war. This outweighs all other impacts because it magnifies their effects

Nuclear Threat Initiative, Staff Writers, 2016, “Module 1: What Is It? Why Is It Important?,” NTI Educational Tutorials, <http://tutorials.nti.org/nonproliferation-regime-tutorial/nti-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime-treaties-by-country/>, Accessed 4/29/2017

The humanitarian, economic, and environmental consequences of nuclear war are unimaginable. While the likelihood of a full-scale nuclear exchange has decreased significantly since the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the continued existence of more than 17,300 nuclear warheads poses ongoing risks of intentional, accidental or unauthorized nuclear weapons use. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and working toward the reduction and eventual elimination of existing nuclear arsenals, therefore benefits all members of the international community. By the mid-1960s, five countries had developed and tested nuclear weapons. Policymakers and analysts feared a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation, with President John F. Kennedy famously observing in 1962: “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the president of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” Today, only nine countries possess nuclear weapons. From a Cold War height of approximately 64,449 nuclear warheads, the world’s nuclear arsenals have decreased to roughly 17,300 warheads. Worst-case scenarios have been avoided in no small part thanks to the development of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, whose extensive network of treaties, organizations and non-binding agreements have aided in the development and implementation of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament measures.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / NPT Ext.

#### The NPT is the cornerstone of nonproliferation. It’s absence removes the key barrier to nuclearization

NATO WMD Non-Proliferation Centre, Staff Writers, March 2017, “NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” NATO Factsheet, http://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\_2017\_03/20170323\_170323-npt-factsheet.pdf, Accessed 4/28/2017

The NPT remains of the utmost importance today. All five of the nuclear-weapon states jointly reiterated at the 2015 NPT Review Conference that “for forty-five years, the NPT has served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime... and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament.” Without the NPT in place, there is no legitimate international grounds for preventing countries from seeking nuclear weapons. The NPT provides a strong legal framework to address the ongoing threat of the nuclear weapons proliferation by states and non-state actors, as well as providing impetus to seek to address the continuing threats to international security.

#### Nuclear proliferation makes nuclear war extremely likely, killing at least billions

Lawrence M. Krauss, director of the Origins Project at Arizona State University, Chair of the board of sponsors of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and is on the board of the Federation of American Scientists, October 13, 2016, “The Real Nuclear Threat,” The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-real-nuclear-threat, Accessed 4/28/2017

Nuclear proliferation destabilizes the equilibrium of mutually assured destruction. In a multipolar nuclear world, in which many countries have a few nukes and threaten to use them, the possibility of a “limited” nuclear war—one in which all of civilization is not obliterated—begins, for some people, to appear feasible. The truth, however, is that there’s no such thing as limited use of nuclear weapons. Retaliation and escalation are extremely likely. Even the use of nuclear weapons in a “local” conflict—say, between India and Pakistan—would have disastrous consequences. Millions would die in the initial nuclear exchange, of course. But the [residue from the nuclear blasts](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf) would also produce long-term climate changes that would affect global agriculture for perhaps a decade, killing as many as a billion people through starvation. If he acted on his statements, Trump would usher in a chaotic, unpredictable, and dangerous nuclear future.

### Japan Adv. – Prolif Impacts / China Retaliation

#### Japan with nukes is China’s #1 nightmare causing massive expansion in their arsenal

Kyle Mizokami, cofounder of the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, February 3, 2017, “China and North Korea's Greatest Fear: Japan Armed with Lots of Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-north-koreas-greatest-fear-japan-armed-lots-nuclear-19304, Accessed 4/26/2017

Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient.

It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal.

### A2: Pressure CPs

#### China rejects US threats of hardline strategies toward North Korea. They want dialogue

Nick Wadhams, Staff Writer, March 18, 2017, “China Pushes Back on U.S. Talk of ‘All Options’ Over North Korea,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-18/china-pushes-back-on-u-s-talk-of-all-options-over-north-korea, Accessed 3-21-2017

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pushed back against the tougher U.S. line on North Korea, reiterating his country’s view that the only way to rein in its reclusive neighbor is through talks. Wang spoke at a briefing in Beijing with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who in Seoul on Friday refused to rule out a preemptive strike against Pyongyang if the threat from its weapons program was deemed [severe enough](https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-17/next-stop-beijing-tillerson-seeks-to-press-china-on-north-korea). While that’s largely in line with prior U.S. positions, Tillerson’s comments -- and Twitter posts from President Donald Trump -- signal the level of concern over North Korea is rising. “The most important principle we have identified is that no matter what happens, we have to stay committed to diplomatic means as a way to seek a peaceful settlement,” [Wang](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/) said on Saturday. “We hope all parties, including our friends from the United States, could size up the situation in a cool-headed and comprehensive fashion and arrive at a wise decision.”

#### China will directly retaliate against US trade pressure

Kevin Yao, Staff Writer, March 20, 2017, “China prepares to counter any U.S. trade penalties: sources,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-trade-idUSKBN16R0PW, Accessed 3-21-2017

China's government has been seeking advice from its think-tanks and policy advisers on how to counter potential trade penalties from U.S. President Donald Trump, getting ready for the worst, even as they hope for business-like negotiations. The policy advisers believe the Trump administration is most likely to impose higher tariffs on targeted sectors where China has a big surplus with the United States, such as steel and furniture, or on state-owned firms. China could respond with actions such as finding alternative suppliers of agriculture products or machinery and manufactured goods, while cutting its exports of consumer staples such as mobile phones or laptops, they said. Other options include imposing tax or other restrictions on big U.S. firms operating in China, or limiting their access to China's fast-growing services sector, they added.

### A2: Direct N. Korea Engagement CP

#### Engaging N. Korea will fail: continued nuclear development and authoritarian rule empirically prove

Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington, D.C., and was the principal drafter of the legislation that later became the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, et al. May/June 2017, “Getting Tough on North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea, Accessed 4-25-2017

The promised results of engagement have never materialized. Since the death of his father, Kim Jong Un has accelerated the pace of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, stamped out foreign media, and tightened the seals on the country’s already closed borders. He has expanded prison camps and carried out bloody purges, and he even seems to have sent a team of assassins to murder his half brother in a Malaysian airport earlier this year. Pyongyang’s party elites are richer than they were ten years ago, but they also live in greater fear of falling out of favor with the regime and are defecting in greater numbers. Although there is no wide-scale famine of the type that ravaged North Korea’s countryside in the 1990s, most North Koreans barely scrape together enough to eat. North Korean society has changed in the past two-plus decades. Markets now provide people with most of their food, consumer goods, and information. Yet as the economists Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard have documented, those changes have occured despite, not because of, official efforts. They have been driven by the country’s poorest and most marginalized people, those who turned to smuggling to earn a living, often at the risk of death or life in a prison camp. The United States and its allies should focus on these signs of real change, not on brokering yet another deal with the regime that would only perpetuate the status quo.

### A2: Sanction N. Korea CP

#### Sanctions are a non-starter. They don’t hurt the economy enough to cause change and are circumvented

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, January/February 2017, “North Korea: One Impulse for Trump to Heed,” Arms Control Today, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-01/> features/north-korea-one-impulse-trump-heed, Accessed 3-21-2017

Tougher sanctions. The favorite prescription of the foreign policy establishment is to tighten sanctions. To appear to do something while failing to tackle a difficult political problem is the classic stance of Washington insiders. Yet, sanctions may have less appeal to an anti-establishment outsider such as Trump and for good reason. Sanctions have enjoyed far less success against North Korea than against Iran. As the experience of negotiating with Iran suggests, moreover, relaxing sanctions may help stanch nuclear arming better than tightening them. Although UN sanctions have impeded weapons trade with North Korea, the evidence suggests that they have not done much to hamper North Korea’s economy, which has continued to grow at a modest pace over the past decade. Its foreign trade persists despite efforts of the U.S. Department of the Treasury to cut off its access to banks around the globe, suggesting that hawala, the informal networks of brokers and middlemen who move money for clients in countries with large Muslim populations in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and similar middlemen in China have picked up some of the slack. Unlike oil-rich Iran, North Korea does not have many big-ticket items to buy or sell, making letters of credit from international banks less of a necessity. In a world where money flows more freely than water, trying to plug the many leaks seems doomed to fail. North Koreans may denounce financial sanctions as a sign of U.S. hostile intent, but they are crying all the way around the banks.

## Space Cooperation

### Solvency – Mars Coop

#### We should cooperate with China on missions to Mars

Jeff Foust, Staff Writer, March 21, 2017, “Chinese official denied visa to attend U.S. planetary science conference,” Space News, http://spacenews.com/chinese-official-denied-visa-to-attend-u-s-planetary-science-conference/, Accessed 3-21-2017

China’s first full-fledged Mars mission is scheduled for launch in 2020, flying both an orbiter and a lander, the latter equipped with a rover. Head said that China is also studying a Mars sample return mission for around 2030. The lunar exploration program in particular, which included two orbiter missions and one lander, has helped build interest in planetary science studies in China. “There’s not historically been a major lunar and planetary science community in China, but in the last decade or so it’s been growing,” he said. Despite the visa denial and other obstacles to cooperation, such as provisions in NASA appropriations bills in recent years that restrict bilateral cooperation with China, Head said he was hopeful for greater cooperation in the future. He noted that he’s worked with scientists in Russia and the former Soviet Union for 45 years, overcoming technology transfer and other obstacles even during the Cold War. “There’s much to be gained from cooperation and collaboration in the scientific community,” he said.

# Negative Evidence

## A2: North Korea

### QPQ CP Solvency

#### Only executing dialogue in the context of a quid-pro-quo over North Korea toward peaceful unification secures denuclearization without backing North Korea into a corner

Michael D. Swaine, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 21, 2017, “[China and America Need a One-Korea Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/china-and-america-need-a-one-korea-policy/, Accessed 3-21-2017

The very existence of a Sino-American dialogue on a unified Korea would doubtless place enormous pressure on Pyongyang, facing the prospect of total isolation. However, to be effective, it must also be combined with an alternative “way out” in the form of positive incentives, as part of an incremental, quid pro quo normalization process. These could include a peace treaty, rather than the long-standing cease-fire left over from the end of the Korean War; diplomatic recognition; the ending of all existing sanctions; economic assistance; and the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. Such actions would occur only in response to drawdowns in North Korean conventional forces, the gradual opening of its economy, and the capping and eventual dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. These incentives, along with the threat of entrance into serious talks on Korea’s future, would thus present Pyongyang with the choice of either adopting a denuclearization process with staged benefits that include virtually all of its past demands or languishing in isolation from a dialogue that, if implemented, would likely lay the foundation for its eventual demise. The key to this approach lies primarily with China. While consistently supporting positive incentives toward North Korea, Beijing has resisted talks on Korea’s future because of a fear of Pyongyang’s reaction and its distrust of the United States. Today, however, China’s leaders might be much less concerned about upsetting Pyongyang, given their intense and growing dislike of the current North Korean leadership. Chinese President Xi Jinping has purposely avoided meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong UN, and Beijing officials and scholars barely conceal their contempt for a government that continues to reject their advice, defy U.N. resolutions, murder their North Korean supporters, and provoke Seoul and Washington into deploying the intolerable THAAD system. Moreover, and most importantly, they would almost certainly be more willing to run the risk of Pyongyang’s ire if the United States could credibly offer the possibility of a unified Korea that permanently removes the American military from Beijing’s doorstep.

### A2: Solvency – Engaging China Over NK Fails

#### The status quo is engaging China now over N. Korea and that fails

Warren Mass, Staff Writer, April 11, 2017, “North Korea Warns of Nuclear Retaliation at Any Sign of U.S. “Aggression”,” The New American, https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/25802-north-korea-warns-of-nuclear-retaliation-at-any-sign-of-u-s-aggression, Accessed 4/28/2017

President Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping met in Florida last week and Trump asked Xi to use his influence with North Korea to get the rogue communist statement to curtail it nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests. The Pyongyang government has conducted five nuclear tests, two of them last year, and is working to develop missiles carrying nuclear warheads that can reach the United States. Trump said in a Tweet that a trade deal between China and the United States would be “far better for them if they solved the North Korea problem.” “If China decides to help, that would be great,” he said. “If not, we will solve the problem without them!”

### A2: Solvency – China Will Say No

#### Despite frustration, China will not take a hard line on N. Korea

Robbie Gramer and Paul McLeary, Staff Writers, April 20, 2017, “Trump’s North Korea Standoff Rattles Allies and Adversaries,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/20/trumps-north-korea-standoff-rattles-allies-and-adversaries/, Accessed 4-25-2017

China has become exasperated with North Korea, following a series of provocative missile tests and the assassination in February of Kim Jong Nam, the North Korean leader’s exiled half-brother, allegedly ordered by the regime. China appears to be complying more fully with U.N. sanctions on trade with Pyongyang and recently agreed to stop importing North Korean coal, a source of hard earnings for the Hermit Kingdom. Beijing’s “level of frustration and ire directed at North Korea is unprecedented,” said Bruce Bennett, an expert on Asian security with the Rand Corp. in a press call Thursday. But that doesn’t translate into an appetite for regime change or into taking steps that could precipitate it, Bennett said. “There’s a reluctance to push back hard — they’re afraid of what the consequences might be.”

### A2: Solvency – China Pressure Won’t Solve

#### The idea that China can solve the N. Korea problem is false and exaggerates their leverage

Bob Fredericks, Staff Writer, April 12, 2017, “[China sends warning to North Korea not to mess with US](http://nypost.com/2017/04/12/china-willing-to-work-with-us-against-north-korea/),” New York Post, http://nypost.com/2017/04/12/china-willing-to-work-with-us-against-north-korea/, Accessed 4/28/2017

But the US and other foreign governments have long overestimated China’s ability to affect Pyongyang’s behavior, said Ruan Zongze, a US relations expert at the China Institute of International Studies, a think tank run by the foreign ministry. “There’s a view that China possesses the key to solving the peninsula problem, or that China has the faucet and that all China has to do is shut it off and the peninsula issue is solved,” Ruan said. “In fact, I think the outside exaggerates the sort of role China can play. China isn’t really as influential as all that,” he said. Beijing’s insistence on a peaceful approach to resolving the issue is rooted in its belief that any attempt to denuclearize the North by force would bring cataclysmic results for all sides, including China, Ruan said.

#### Engaging China to pressure N. Korea will fail. We fundamentally differ on the problem and solution

Chris Chang, Staff Writer, April 17, 2017, “Why it’s so important for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons,” news.com.au (Australia), <http://www.news.com.au/technology/why-its-so-important-for-north-korea-to-develop-nuclear-weapons/news-story/ae936c8099fdcfb137860260afcee844>, Accessed 4/28/2017

Many countries have been looking to China to try and solve the impasse, saying it should exert its influence over North Korea to get it to fall in line. But Brad Glosserman said the belief the Chinese could force an outcome in Pyongyang was a mistake. He pointed to the US relationship with Israel as an example, saying despite all that America does to help the Jewish state, it is unable to force Israel to do what it wants. “The problem with North Korea’s relationship with the world, is the North’s relationship with the US,” he said. “What China believes is that if there is to be a resolution, it must be a resolution between Washington and Pyongyang. “Beijing’s only real role is to facilitate that task, the idea that they can put the screws on ... and deliver North Korea is something that the Chinese don’t believe and I don’t believe.”

#### The timing of the Xi dinner and Syria strikes make it more difficult to work with China to solve N. Korea

Graham Webster, a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, April 10, 2017, “A False Start for Trump and Xi,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-10/false-start-trump-and-xi, Accessed 4-25-2017

Trump may have demonstrated to Chinese officials that he can use force without warning and that he can quickly change his mind about when to do so. This may keep China on its toes—it recalls a form of deterrence thinking from the Richard Nixon era known as the madman theory—but it will not help the Trump administration coax Beijing into [further pressuring North Korea](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-03-21/making-china-pay-north-korea) to curb its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Indeed, together with the United States’ decision to send an aircraft carrier group toward North Korea over the weekend, the Syria strikes may signal Washington’s turn away from the belief that sanctions will solve its problems with North Korea. By surprising Xi at dinner and by turning up the military pressure in the region, Trump has made it harder for the United States and China to manage their interests on the Korean Peninsula in a coordinated way.

### A2: Solvency – China Pressure Won’t Solve

#### Engaging China to pressure North Korea will backfire with ramped up nuclear development. N. Korea hates Sino-US coop because it forces dependence and China won’t deal under Trump threats

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, January/February 2017, “North Korea: One Impulse for Trump to Heed,” Arms Control Today, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-01/> features/north-korea-one-impulse-trump-heed, Accessed 3-21-2017

Let China do it. Another favorite prescription in Washington is to outsource the North Korean problem to China. That misreads Pyongyang’s purpose: it has long sought to improve relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as a hedge against overdependence on China for its security and prosperity. Nothing threatens Pyongyang more than cooperation between Washington and Beijing. When Washington and Beijing applied concerted pressure on Pyongyang, the North responded with nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 in an effort to drive them apart. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly voiced support for letting China deal with Kim. “I would get China to make that guy disappear, in one form or another, very quickly,” Trump told CBS. “China has absolute control of North Korea. They won’t say it, but they do, and they should make that problem disappear.” As it has demonstrated over many years, China has no interest in making Kim or North Korea disappear, which limits how much pressure it is willing to apply on Pyongyang by imposing stringent sanctions. At the same time as he wants China’s help with North Korea, Trump has shown an impulse to pick a fight with China over trade and Taiwan. How will that help persuade China to step up pressure on Pyongyang, let alone “make that guy disappear”? “They don’t live and they don’t breathe without China,” he said of Pyongyang. “They wouldn’t get anything without China. China has the power, and we have to tell China to straighten out the situation,” Trump told Fox News. “We have power over China because of trade. Frankly, if we ever stopped it, believe me you would see a depression in China like you have never seen a depression before.” Yet, such a depression might also reduce U.S. growth and imperil South Korea and Japan, whose economies depend heavily on trade with China. And threatening to break the commitment to a one-China policy is likely to encourage Beijing to prop up Pyongyang.

#### China won’t crackdown effectively on N. Korea because it fears containment from a united Korea

John Hemmings, Director of the Asia Studies Centre at the [Henry Jackson Society](http://henryjacksonsociety.org/) and an Adjunct Fellow at [CSIS](http://csis.org/expert/john-hemmings), March 6, 2017, “China's fear of the US prevents any defusing of the North Korean threat,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/06/chinas-fear-us-prevents-defusing-north-korean-threat/, Accessed 4-25-2017

While Beijing has argued – often correctly – that it has little leverage over the regime in Pyongyang, the truth is that China holds the keys to resolving the issue. Every day, hundreds of trucks, carrying fuel and coal enter into North Korea from the Chinese border. If China were to stop these, North Korea’s economy would cease to function in short order. China continues to supply the North partly because it does not really want a unified Korea on its doorstep. This is especially true of any future state based on the South Korean model, with its strong security alliance with Washington. Talking with Chinese diplomats and scholars on the issue, one is struck by the fear of containment that runs through Chinese policy circles; the possibility of American troops on the Yalu River exerts a stronger grip on them than North Koreans weapon systems – systems that are after all, aimed at Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, rather than Beijing.

### A2: Solvency – China Pressure Won’t Solve

#### China has no incentive to pressure N. Korea. It has a wide-ranging network of support for the regime

Eleanor Albert, Online Writer/Editor, April 26, 2017, [CFR Backgrounders](http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/backgrounder.html), http://www.cfr.org/china/chinanorth-korea-relationship/p11097, Accessed 4/28/2017

China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border. Pyongyang’s [fifth nuclear test](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37314927) and ongoing [missile launches](http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/15/asia/north-korea-missile-test/) have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has continued to advocate for the resumption of the [Six Party Talks](http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/), the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top North Korean officials since its young leader came to power and the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s exiled half brother, in Malaysia also spurred renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North Korean leadership. Yet China’s policies have done little to deter its neighbor’s nuclear ambitions. China’s support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950–1953), when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally. Since the war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea’s leaders: Kim Il-sung (estimated 1948–1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994–2011), and Kim Jong-un (2011–). But strains in the relationship began to surface when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing supported [UN Security Council Resolution 1718](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11732/), which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution and others (UNSC Resolutions [1874](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20SRES%201874.pdf) [PDF], [2094](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2094.pdf) [PDF], [2270](http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm), and [2321](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2321.pdf) [PDF]), Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomacy to punishment. After North Korea’s most recent nuclear test in September 2016, China called on North Korea to not take action that would “[worsen the situation](https://www.ft.com/content/a6da9824-7636-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a).” Still, Beijing continues to have wide-ranging ties with Pyongyang, including economic exchanges and high-level state trips such as senior Chinese Communist Party member Liu Yunshan’s visit to [attend](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/09/c_134696049.htm) the seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in October 2015. Separately, China has stymied international punitive action against North Korea over human rights violations. China [criticized](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/world/asia/china-faults-report-citing-north-korean-leader-in-atrocities.html) a February 2014 [UN report](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26223180) that detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, including torture, forced starvation, and crimes against humanity, and attempted to block UN Security Council sessions held in December [2014](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/asia/united-nations-security-council-examines-north-koreas-human-rights.html) and [2015](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0TT2RU20151210) on the country’s human rights status.

#### Engaging China to pressure N. Korea is unrealistic and misguided

Lori Esposito Murray, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2017, “How Trump Can Get Xi to Yes on North Korea,” Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/commentary-how-trump-can-get-xi-to-yes-on-north-korea, Accessed 4/28/2017

The past several years have demonstrated that the long-standing U.S. demand that China must play the central role in a strategy of expanding sanctions with North Korea may be misguided and unrealistic. While China has shared interests in resolving the crisis, there are clear limits to the pressure China is willing to apply. This reticence is due to China’s fears of a refugee influx it cannot control if the North Korean regime collapses, and its fear of losing a buffer state on its border. China also benefits from North Korea distracting the U.S. presence in Asia, as China’s own presence rises.

### A2: Nukes Adv. – Won’t launch

#### Kim Jong-un doesn’t want to actually nuke the U.S., just secure regime support

Charles V. Peña, a senior fellow with Defense Priorities with more than twenty-five years of experience as a policy and program analyst and senior manager, supporting both the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, March 19, 2017, “Can America Deter the Regime Survival Ambitions of a Nuclear-Capable North Korea?,” National Journal, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-deter-the-regime-survival-ambitions-nuclear-19825?page=show, Accessed 3-21-2017

It is also important to understand Kim Jong-un’s motivations. We assume he wants to directly challenge and threaten the United States—even take military action against us. But it is just as—if not more—likely what Kim Jong-un wants is something else: to secure his own survival and that of his regime, much like his father and his father’s father before him. That would certainly explain the executions and assassinations of those who might usurp him, which include family members. Having nuclear weapons would seem to be an effective deterrent against regime change. After all, other dictatorial leaders who gave up their weapons programs—such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi—paid a high price for those decisions.

### A2: Nukes Adv. – Can’t Hit the U.S.

#### North Korea can’t nuke the U.S.

Charles V. Peña, a senior fellow with Defense Priorities with more than twenty-five years of experience as a policy and program analyst and senior manager, supporting both the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, March 19, 2017, “Can America Deter the Regime Survival Ambitions of a Nuclear-Capable North Korea?,” National Journal, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-deter-the-regime-survival-ambitions-nuclear-19825?page=show, Accessed 3-21-2017

Technically, North Korea is considered a nuclear-capable country because it has conducted several nuclear bomb tests. However, it has not been verified—and many experts are skeptical—that the DPRK has been able to develop an actual nuclear warhead that can fit the payload constraints of a missile, which is easier said than done. Moreover, North Korea does not have the long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capability to reach the United States. So if threat is defined as a combination of intentions and capabilities, North Korea is lacking in the latter.

### A2: Japan Adv. – General Answers / No Prolif

#### There are four types of barriers that prevent Japanese nuclear weapons

Liubomir K. Topaloff, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, April 21, 2017, “Japan’s Nuclear Moment,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-nuclear-moment/, Accessed 4/26/2017

There are a number of predicaments that Japan would have to face if it were ever to develop nuclear weapons, and they all are serious and valid. These challenges are political, financial, technological, and social. It will not be easy for Abe to push through the Diet a bill that would open the door for nuclear armament, even though arguably the Japanese Constitution does not prevent the possession of nuclear weapons, per se. Until recently, however, some believed that destroying the pillars of pacifism in Japan – Article 9 of the Constitution – and having an army that could be deployed beyond the country’s borders was also impossible. They now seem to have been proven wrong. As for the cost, it will certainly not be cheap, either; a few billion dollars just to start. But in light of Trump’s push for Japan to pay more for its security, anyway, it may prove cheaper in the long run for Abe to invest in increasing Japan’s own defense capabilities, rather than paying the money toward a U.S. security umbrella that with every single day becomes more and more unreliable.

### A2: Japan Adv. – NPT Scenario Ans.

#### International nonproliferation mechanisms are unsuccessful. Any success is from direct government-to-government diplomacy

Council on Foreign Relations, Staff Writers, June 25, 2013, “The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Issue Brief, http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984, Accessed 4/28/2017

International instruments for combating nuclear proliferation were largely successful before 1991, but are proving unable to meet today's challenges. Although three states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are known or believed to have acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for five decades following the development of nuclear technology, only nine states have developed—and since 1945 none has used—nuclear weapons. However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation since the early 1990s—Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or Syria—was deterred or reversed by the multilateral institutions created for this purpose. The continued [advancement](http://www.cfr.org/iran/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamic-republic-iran-february-2012/p27467) of Iran's nuclear program—despite the implementation of crosscutting economic sanctions and near universal global condemnation—has elicited serious concerns from states including Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, recent nonproliferation success stories, such as Libya's abandoning its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet successor states except Russia to the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty](http://www.cfr.org/publication/8437/) (NPT) as nonnuclear weapon states, have been the result of direct government-to-government negotiations and pressure rather than action by global bodies.

#### The US is hypocritical on the NPT. We’ve functionally abandoned it

Santo D. Banerjee, Staff Writer, April 21, 2017, “U.S. Accused of 'Blithely Ignoring' NPT Obligations,” In Depth News,

http://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/global-governance/un-insider/1088-u-s-accused-of-blithely-ignoring-npt-obligations

, Accessed 4/28/2017

Veterans For Peace (VFP) has strongly criticised the U.S. refusal to take part in negotiations at the United Nations to ban nuclear weapons and accused it of "efforts to derail the ongoing" talks to "reach an agreement on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons." VFP believes that it would be "diplomatically more prudent" to use the UN talks "as an opportunity to engage Iran and North Korea in discussions to determine if there is some common ground on which to proceed and lessen tensions in the Middle East and the Far East."

In a letter to Ambassador Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, the organisation's president Barry Ladendorf says: "Our government’s duplicity seems to have no bounds. We blithely ignore our treaty obligations under the NPT, now foment the old cry that we cannot trust Iran and North Korea, countries which voted to support the ongoing negotiations, forgetting that we already hold Iran to our own 'test and verify' standards, and seem to be adamant that a treaty banning nuclear weapons be taken off the table." The letter describes Haley's press conference at the start of the first session of UN General Assembly's nuclear ban treaty negotiations on March 27 "a distressing commentary on how the United States has chosen to abandon diplomacy and, in its stead, simply run roughshod over international treaties, rules and established conventions."

### A2: Japan Adv. – Prolif CP

#### Text: Japan should immediately initiate a nuclear weapons development program.

#### The mere initiation of a Japanese nuclear weapons program would convince China to collapse N. Korea peacefully. S. Korea and Japan would jump at the deal, which ends the nuclear weapons program. This solves 100% of the N. Korea advantage and avoids the case turns and U.S. diplomacy DAs

James Van de Velde, Adjunct Faculty at the National Intelligence University, the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, October 1, 2016, “Go Ahead. Let Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/go-ahead-let-japan-south-korea-go-nuclear-17897?page=show, Accessed 4/28/2017

Since the initiation of a Japanese nuclear weapons program would provoke China into concluding that North Korea is far more trouble than it is worth as a buffer against U.S. forces in the South, the people of North Korea would benefit the most, since they suffer daily. The goal is to collapse the Pyongyang regime peacefully, much like the East German regime collapsed. This is also the best means to effect true nuclear counter-proliferation; without it, the world will have to live with one more totalitarian nuclear state—a nuclear North Korea—forever. If the Chinese played chess and not tic-tac-toe on the Korean Peninsula, they would maneuver to collapse the northern regime by first opening Chinese borders (like Hungary did to East Germany) and then provide asylum to the Northern political leadership and general officer corps and ask Seoul to assume economic and political responsibility for the entire Korean people, in exchange for a nuclear-free (and U.S.-military-free) Korean Peninsula. The Koreans (and Japanese) would jump at the deal. And the Japanese nuclear-weapons program would end.

#### Japan should nuclearize now. Waiting for China to pressure N. Korea would take too long without a Japanese nuclear deterrent

Todd Royal, Masters in public policy (MPP) with highest honors from Pepperdine University and Consultant on geopolitics, energy and US state and local government, April 3, 2017, “Japan should acquire nuclear weapons to deter China and North Korea,” Asia Times,

http://www.atimes.com/japan-acquire-nuclear-weapons/, Accessed 4/26/2017

What Japan should [purchase](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-03-15/japans-north-korea-options) from the US are Tomahawk missiles, F-35A fighters, and Lockheed Martin’s precision-guided Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. These preemptive options will work in conjunction with Japan’s destroyers in the Sea of Japan as a first-strike option. Deterrence theory, moreover, states that Japan should procure offensive long-range strategic bombers and establish an ICBM program, thus completing nuclear-triad arsenal. The threat to Japan should outweigh the limits on Japanese use of force against a belligerent North Korea and ever-hostile China. A case can be made that self-defense and preemption are constitutional if the strikes come from weaponry based in Japan. A cruise missile could pass that constitutional roadblock. Deployment of offensive military systems could backfire in Japan’s pacifist society. But the cost of doing nothing outweighs the hope that North Korea will come to its senses or that a US-led surgical strike will stop the hermit regime’s militaristic program. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently said: “Any chance for dialogue (between major powers and North Korea) must be seized, as long as there’s hope.” China already knows the situation is deteriorating, but Beijing still does nothing to rein in North Korea. As 17th-century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes noted: “Without a common power to keep (people) all in awe they are in that condition called warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.” History has proven that national interests, petty rivalries, and unquestionable bitterness will eventually win over a rules-based, orderly system. Even if North Korea were forced by China to negotiate and change its behavior, the process would be slow, difficult and costly. North Korea’s self-perceived grievances and China’s hatred of Japan would seem to resist solution without the existence of nuclear deterrence. In this Hobbesian world of geopolitical-international relations, how do the Japanese live in peace while the North Koreans want to obliterate them? Only a madman wants a Hobbesian world — or as actions by the regime of Kim Jong Un demonstrate, Japan would be wise to arm itself with every weapon possible and let the chips fall where they may.

### A2: Japan Adv. – Prolif CP Solvency Ext.

#### China actively supports the totalitarian N. Korean regime. Japan should immediately begin a nuclear weapons program to stave off N. Korean and Chinese nuclear aggression

James Van de Velde, Adjunct Faculty at the National Intelligence University, the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, October 1, 2016, “Go Ahead. Let Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/go-ahead-let-japan-south-korea-go-nuclear-17897?page=show, Accessed 4/28/2017

Japan ought to become a nuclear-weapons power as soon as possible. South Korea ought to begin a nuclear-weapons program. The North Korean state is a national gulag. The regime is illegitimate, unstable and totalitarian—and a proliferator of nuclear-weapons technology. It brings nothing to the world but misery, widespread death to the Korean people, suffering and political instability. Foolishly, the state is sustained by China, which thinks that it would be better to sustain North Korea than to facilitate its collapse, which might lead to a larger U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But this thinking is politically shortsighted: the collapse of the North Korean regime would allow the Republic of Korea to absorb the North, thereby ending the entire reason U.S. forces are on the Peninsula. American forces would likely leave Korea, not grow, once the Pyongyang regime collapses. Further, it was China that gave North Korea many of the ballistic-missile technologies that it uses to threaten us and our allies. China is not timidly and reluctantly standing with North Korea; it is, as usual, actively contributing to the North Korean mess. China uses North Korea to shove the United States away from Asia and keep Western diplomacy off balance, defensive and uninitiated. Nonproliferation zealots are making sure nuclear weapons now proliferate only to totalitarian states. Despite much rhetoric and sincere, well-intentioned efforts, the United States sat by as North Korea developed its nuclear weapons. It is not too late to disabuse China and North Korea of the idea that nuclear proliferation pays. Japan ought to begin a sincere program to build deliverable nuclear weapons to show China that China’s support to North Korea is counterproductive and strategically naive. The Republic of Korea ought to begin a nuclear-weapons development program.

#### China would cave in if faced with a Japanese nuclear weapons program

Stephen Schwalbe, associate professor at American Public University and Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy from Auburn University, [April 11, 2017](http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/), “Analyzing the Idea of a Nuclear-Armed Japan and South Korea,” In Homeland Security, http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-japan-south-korea/, Accessed 4/28/2017

It is well-known that China is the only country that has any leverage over the North Korean leadership because Beijing provides North Korea with much needed fuel and food on a daily basis. The Chinese leadership finally agrees with the rest of the world that North Korea must end its efforts to develop an operational nuclear weapons arsenal. But Beijing has done little to actually make that happen. Certainly the threat of a nuclear armed Japan and South Korea on its borders is something Chinese leaders absolutely do not want; it is something of a red line for them.

#### A Japanese nuclear weapons program provides leverage on China to act on N. Korea

James Van de Velde, Adjunct Faculty at the National Intelligence University, the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, October 1, 2016, “Go Ahead. Let Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/go-ahead-let-japan-south-korea-go-nuclear-17897?page=show, Accessed 4/28/2017

At present, the Chinese wrongly think that they can tolerate the North’s antics and provocations, because they assume the Kim Jong-un regime is not serious with its threats to start large-scale conflict, and North Korea serves a purpose of keeping the Americans in the South. The North acts out with these threats to secure its continuation and appearance of legitimacy with the rest of the world, seeking a peace treaty/agreement with the United States that will allow it to continue unthreatened and deter Western designs for the Pyongyang regime’s collapse. The Chinese government must conclude that North Korea is far more of a strategic danger to China than a unified and strategically neutral Korea under the governance of Seoul. A Japanese and South Korean nuclear-weapons program would bring a geostrategic situation clearly less favorable to China. At present, politicians in the West are too timid to recommend such a step, and cling to shallow arguments that the world should be rid of nuclear weapons—so that only rogue states will have them.

### A2: Japan Adv. – Prolif CP Solvency Ext.

#### Japan and major Asian powers don’t think the U.S. would risk nuclear attack to defend Japan. Only a Japanese nuclear deterrent can prevent such attacks and foreign incursions

Anders Corr,  Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and military intelligence for five years, January 31, 2017, “Japan: Go Nuclear Now,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#4a3e0eb17745, Accessed 4/26/2017

Japan supposedly enjoys protection from an American “nuclear umbrella”. But Japanese leaders are unsure that the U.S. would come to its defense in a major war, much less a nuclear war. Russian, Chinese, and possibly even North Korean missiles can deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S., its territories, and its military bases in Asia. North Korea could even put a nuclear weapon in a cargo container and ship it to a U.S. mainland port. In defense of Japan, would the U.S. really strike a major conventional or even nuclear blow against the military forces of one of these authoritarian states, and thereby risk a cold-hearted nuclear counter-attack against Honolulu, San Francisco, New York, or Washington, DC? Such a counter-attack could destroy the U.S. economy for decades, cause a fiscal crisis that would mean decreased military expenditures and military retreat from U.S. forward-deployed positions, and kill millions of Americans. Military and diplomatic analysts in Japan are increasingly unsure that Washington would take this risk after Japan itself may have suffered a conventional or nuclear blow that devastates its military strength as an ally. If Japan questions the willingness of the U.S. to counterstrike a nuclear-armed adversary, then Russia, China, and North Korea are likely questioning Washington’s commitment as well. They may see the current lack of commitment as an opportunity for a preemptive conventional or nuclear strike against Japan’s military. This is not a safe position for any country to be in, especially a country like Japan whose military forces are daily threatened by the aggressive nuclear and other brinkmanship of these same adversaries. Because Russia, China, and North Korea may perceive a lack of U.S. commitment, [Japan needs an iron-clad nuclear deterrent force.](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=Japan%20needs%20an%20iron-clad%20nuclear%20deterrent%20force.) There is no better such deterrent than one that Japan would own and control itself, coupled with a public announcement to reserve the option of using that deterrent force against any state that attacks it or infringes its sovereignty. This is a far stronger and more reliable nuclear deterrent than the current U.S. umbrella.

### A2: Japan Adv. – Prolif CP / Checks China

#### A nuclear-armed Japan would check Chinese hegemony throughout the Asia-Pacific

George Friedman, Xander Snyder, and Cheyenne Ligon, Analysts at [Mauldin Economics](http://www.mauldineconomics.com/), April 18, 2017, “The state of global nuclear weapons today, and why North Korean tests would be suicidal,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/global-nuclear-weapons-and-why-north-korean-tests-would-be-suicidal-2017-4, Accessed 4/28/2017

Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium from civilian uses and already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Estimates of Japan’s breakout time range from six months to several years. Japan’s alliance with the United States has thus far deterred it from developing nuclear weapons because it knows it can rely on the US for defense. However, North Korea’s progress in its nuclear program could drive Japan to reconsider. A nuclear Japan would threaten China’s desired hegemony in the region and force it to proceed with greater caution in its actions in the South China and East China seas.

### A2: Japan Adv. – Prolif Good / Deters Russia, China & NK

#### Japan should nuclearize to act as a deterrent against Russian, Chinese and N. Korean aggression. This won’t cause wildfire proliferation. Even if proliferation happens, it will be from stable democracies which enhances global security

Anders Corr,  Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and military intelligence for five years, January 31, 2017, “Japan: Go Nuclear Now,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#4a3e0eb17745, Accessed 4/26/2017

Some argue that a nuclear Japan will increase pressure on the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). But, the NPT has been a failure for Asian democracies. China, Russia, and North Korea have nuclear weapons, and they are aggressively bullying the region. The reasonable democracies have followed the rules, and as a result are now at risk of war because of these authoritarians’ constant threats against territorial features like the Senkaku Islands. Given that territorial expansion seems to be the mindset of leaders in Russia, China, and North Korea, democracies must defend themselves. Japan cannot continue to risk its sovereignty because of its very well-intended and understandable pacifism. It needs to recognize the reality of increasing Chinese, North Korean, and Russian militarism, and it needs to defend itself with an unquestionable nuclear deterrent. U.S. security is improved when stable democracies like the UK, France, and India have obtained a nuclear deterrent. It keeps them safe from their enemies, and through our alliances, strengthens the U.S. Yet when the UK, France, and India initially developed nuclear deterrence in 1952, 1960, and 1974 respectively, the U.S. was not fully cooperative. We now have the benefit of close security cooperation with these strong nuclear democracies, which act as important counterweights against Russia and China. Their nuclear deterrents allow them to forward deploy their forces for global peacekeeping, and against piracy and terrorists, while at the same time remaining unintimidated by authoritarian regimes. [Germany, Poland and South Korea should also obtain nuclear weapons.](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=Germany%2C%20Poland%20and%20South%20Korea%20should%20also%20obtain%20nuclear%20weapons.) These frontline regional powers need them as a deterrent against authoritarians, war and regional instability. The threat of war is real, given China’s violation of Philippine sovereignty with the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, and Russia’s occupation of Ukraine in 2014. These two occupations, which still go militarily unchallenged, instantiate an unfortunate lack of resolve by the United States to back up its obligations to the Philippines per the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, and to Ukraine under the Budapest Agreement of 1994. It is precisely because the U.S. did little to defend these countries when arguably obligated to do so by solemn agreements, that Japan now questions U.S. resolve to risk nuclear war to defend Japan from China, Russia, or North Korea. If Japan goes nuclear, it will not cause non-nuclear authoritarian countries to do the same. While some countries like China and North Korea hype a threat from Japan in their state-run media, no serious analysts see Japan as an aggressive power. It is a democracy with a pacifist constitution. It has experienced the horrors of nuclear war as has no other country. Vietnam, for example, will not see a Japanese nuclear weapon as a threat. Rather, it will see a Japanese nuclear weapon as stabilizing Asia through a check on China, Vietnam’s main threat. Such a weapon could even allow Japan to increase economic and military aid to Vietnam in the safety of knowing that China would be less likely to retaliate. Australia, South Korea and Taiwan might go nuclear, but not from fear of Japan. In fact, Japan’s going nuclear might decrease the probability of these countries going nuclear because they would feel safer with Japan’s new nuclear check on China. If they did go nuclear, however, they would be additional bulwarks against authoritarian aggression in Asia and thereby increase stability in the region. They are well-developed democracies that would maintain security procedures such that nuclear weapons did not fall into the hands of extremists. As responsible democracies, they can be counted on to only maintain their nuclear deterrent for defensive purposes.

#### Japan should go nuclear now to fend off Russian, Chinese and N. Korean aggression

Anders Corr,  Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and military intelligence for five years, January 31, 2017, “Japan: Go Nuclear Now,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/31/japan-go-nuclear-now/#4a3e0eb17745, Accessed 4/26/2017

Japan needs nuclear weapons. Surrounded by authoritarian threats, including Russia, China, and China’s close ally, North Korea, [Japan would make all democracies safer by protecting itself with a nuclear weapon.](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=Japan%20would%20make%20all%20democracies%20safer%20by%20protecting%20itself%20with%20a%20nuclear%20weapon.) [A stronger Japan will check China’s expansion and free U.S. military resources for deployment elsewhere.](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=A%20stronger%20Japan%20will%20check%20China%E2%80%99s%20expansion%20and%20free%20U.S.%20military%20resources%20for%20deployment%20elsewhere.) [Russian](http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/01/25/norad-responds-russian-bombers-zoom-japan.html) and [Chinese](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/china-send-nuclear-armed-submarines-into-pacific-us) nuclear-capable forces surround Japan with threatening patrols that ring the country by air and sea. [Over the last nine months through December, the Japanese air force was forced to scramble jets against mostly Chinese, but also Russian, air incursions a record](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=Over%20the%20last%209%20months%2C%20Japan%20scramble%20jets%20against%20Chinese%20and%20Russian%20air%20incursions%20a%20record%20883%20times.) [883 times](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/21/national/japan-scrambled-jets-approaching-aircraft-record-883-times-nine-months-incidents-involved-china/). [North Korea](http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/21/asia/japan-north-korea-shinzo-abe/) regularly threatens Japan and its allies with lurid language of nuclear attacks and storms of fire. [Dozens of North Korean missile tests took place near Japan over the last couple years, with some hitting Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=Dozens%20of%20DPRK%20missile%20tests%20took%20place%20near%20Japan%20over%20the%20last%20year%2C%20some%20hitting%20Japan%E2%80%99s%20EEZ.)  North Korea has even threatened a nuclear attack on [U.S. bases](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-threatens-to-strike-us-bases-in-japan-2013-3) in Japan. [It is time for Japan to say, enough. To protect itself, Japan needs to go nuclear now.](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fanderscorr%2F2017%2F01%2F31%2Fjapan-go-nuclear-now%2F&text=It%20is%20time%20for%20Japan%20to%20say%2C%20enough.%20To%20protect%20itself%2C%20Japan%20needs%20to%20go%20nuclear%20now.)

# Impacts, Answers & Uniqueness

## Kritik Issues

### Discourse Matters to Policymaking

#### Words matter in diplomacy with China and affect policy outcomes

June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida and a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Winter 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 87

So, bearing these observations in mind, what should your administration do? First, bear in mind that words have meaning. Instruct your policymakers to use neutral terms. Avoid saying, for example, “our Chinese friends.” The Chinese, like Lord Palmerston, but unlike many Americans, are aware that their country has no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. Those who defend the use of the term say it is merely symbolic. Symbolic of what? The Chinese do not believe it, but too many Americans seem to. Similarly, expressions like “strategic partner” and “strategic competitor” imply broad agendas we do not necessarily intend to pursue. Conversely, some words should be avoided because they have too little meaning— “congagement,” “frenemies,” and the like. What may seem clever and catchy may not be helpful.

## Economic Issues

### U.S. Economy Impacts – U.S. Global Leadership

#### A strong economy is the essential internal link to all modelling scenarios. A failing economy makes us less persuasive internationally

Kori Schake, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches “Thinking about War” at Stanford University, Winter 2017, “National Security Challenges,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), pp. 8-9.

The second domestic dimension is the federal budget share allotted to diplomacy, intelligence, and the military. These account for about 25 percent of federal spending overall, and approximately half of discretionary spending. Unless modifications are enacted to entitlement programs—medical and retirement programs—they inexorably will crowd out discretionary spending. Moreover, the sequester locked in a distribution of discretionary spending between domestic and national security that is unlikely to be overturned; it has become settled law, in all probability. Revising the distribution would require one political party to decimate the other in Congress, since Democrats remain wedded to preserving the domestic side of the equation, Republicans the national security side. Or it would require a president limber enough to find trade space that takes the two sides out of direct competition and enables a bargain extending to other issues. Affordability of our national security also has international dimensions. America’s economic vitality and our ability to resolve our political problems are major attractions for other countries to adopt our practices. They want the success we have, even if they have reservations about the political and social effects that accompany that success. When we fail to be a model for other countries to emulate, it becomes more difficult for us to gain acceptance by other countries for what we are trying to achieve internationally. Opinions on the state of our Union range from seeing us as a subject for ridicule to grieving the decline of a great nation. Repairing our image—not necessarily as a beneficent or likable power, but minimally as a successful one—is an important contributor to keeping our foreign policy affordable.

### Chinese Economic Weak Now

#### China’s economy is unstable and has systemic problems

Shailaja Neelakantan, Staff Writer, April 22, 2017, “China's financial trends are 'dangerous and unsustainable'', says International Monetary Fund,” Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/chinas-financial-trends-are-dangerous-and-unsustainable-says-international-monetary-fund/articleshow/58312249.cms, Accessed 4-30-2017

Still, the IMF said China's financial trends are unstable. The reasons? "China's economy remains beset by many distortions, such as an excessive role of the state, large resource misallocation in many areas, state owned enterprises that lack budget constraints and financial discipline," said Markus Rodlauer, deputy director of IMF's Asia and Pacific Department. "When this would unravel in some way or another, nobody can predict," Rodlauer said, adding that for now, in the near term, the trend is somewhat sustainable.

#### 3 majors barriers prevent Chinese economic expansion and global influence

Zhang Xiaotong, Associate Professor of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Wuhan University and a research fellow at the Collaborative Innovation Centre for Territorial Integrity and Maritime Rights and James Keith, McLarty Associates, a strategic business consulting firm, and former U.S. diplomat and US Ambassador, Spring 2017, “From Wealth to Power: China’s New Economic Statecraft,” Washington Quarterly, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Spring2017\_Zhang-Keith.pdf, Accessed 4/26/2017

The Chinese leadership’s approach to retilting the international economy to better reflect China’s stature is linked to the state of the domestic economy. China’s economic growth—based on fixed asset investment, the main engine of wealth creation—has decelerated over the past three years **and entered into a “new normal,”** to use a popular term. This new phase represents a downshifting from a high-speed growth pattern of 1992–2012 toward a sustainable, mid- to high-speed growth rate with higher efficiency and lower costs. There is considerable debate about the degree to which China can succeed in this economic restructuring. The economic slow-down has incurred three main challenges **for China’s ambitious agenda of economic statecraft,** which significantly constrains the translation of China’s wealth into power and global influence. First, there is an increased concern within China about whether the country is overstretched and over-ambitious, in particular in advancing Xi’s ambitious BRI initiative, covering over sixty countries and regions along the land and maritime silk roads. In a period of reform and slower growth, Chinese leaders are managing a phase of slower accumulation of national wealth and fewer economic resources at the disposal of the Chinese leadership to devote to economic diplomacy. Professor Shi Yinhong, a renowned Chinese scholar of international relations, warned against a potential “strategic overdraft” and suggested “strategic conservatism.” In short, can China afford these foreign economic policy initiatives, given challenges at home? Second, as a consequence of a weaker domestic economy, central authorities are demonstrating increased concern for potential labor unrest. China’s economic policy has evolved from Keynesian-style stimulus to supply-side reform— first introduced on November 10, 2015, at the 11th Central Finance and Economics Leading Group Meeting—featuring structural change aimed at cutting over-capacity through market allocation of resources (e.g. closure of zombie companies and resolution of extensive bad debt in the Chinese system) as well as consumer demand driving higher quality but lower rates of GDP growth. It remains very difficult for the Communist Party to accept large lay-offs of the scale associated with the then-Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s economic reforms from 1998–2002. This is because the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party largely derives from its delivery of exceptional record of economic growth and poverty-reduction. Given preoccupation with the short-term domestic consequences of structural reform, large-scale economic statecraft programs (which are by their nature medium- to long-term projects) may prove difficult to implement. Third, there is increased domestic resistance to the economic liberalization that is necessary to achieve the goals of Xi’s economic statecraft. For Xi, maintaining a minimal level of economic power is a prerequisite to redefine China’s leading role in the global economy. That in turn is one persuasive rationale for the bold economic reforms announced at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013. Implementation of those reforms is deemed necessary by the central authorities, for both domestic and international reasons, but implementation has been so slow as to raise questions among businessmen and investors. Are the third plenum reforms to be implemented or not? Recent artificial stimulus to spur demand in the domestic economy has occurred on a much smaller scale than in 2008–09, but it is nevertheless read broadly as a signal that China is willing to live with overcapacity and inefficient allocation of resources for the time being.

### Chinese Economic Weak Now

#### Excess manufacturing capacity, low efficiency and the absence of structural reforms will constrain China’s economy at best and total collapse at worst

June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida and a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Winter 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 85

A major factor in China’s impressive rise has been its dependence on export and investment. Unfortunately, this was accompanied by the creation of excess productive capacity and low efficiency of capital utilization, meaning that the trajectory is unsustainable over the long run. As the World Bank warned in a major 2012 report, unless comprehensive structural reforms can be implemented, the result is apt to be at best stasis as a middle-income economy, and at worst financial collapse. But the beneficiaries of the export-and-investment model constitute powerful vested interests who will resist meaningful restructuring. Other factors that will constrain growth, which is already slowing, are the cumulative effects of environmental destruction, income inequality, inadequate attention to product quality, reliance on a dwindling pool of young low-wage workers, and the effect of substandard working conditions.

#### Chinese economic growth is cooling off

Jethro Mullen, Staff Writer, March 5, 2017, “China expects slower economic growth of about 6.5% this year,” CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/04/news/economy/china-gdp-growth-target/, Accessed 4-30-2017

China expects its growth engine to continue to cool off after decades of breakneck expansion. The government said Sunday that it's targeting growth of "around 6.5% or higher if possible" in 2017. That's below [the rate of 6.7%](http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/19/news/economy/china-fourth-quarter-gdp-economic-growth/?iid=EL) at which the world's second-largest economy grew last year, the slowest pace in more than a quarter century. But it's right in line with the forecasts of many economists.

#### Multiple factors are cooling off the Chinese economy

Katie Allen, Staff Writer, April 30, 2017, “Chinese economy cools as key sectors continue to slow,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/30/chinese-economy-cools-as-key-sectors-dip-in-april, Accessed 4-30-2017

China’s economy has shown more signs of cooling with key barometers from its manufacturing and services sectors dipping in April. The latest data comes as [Beijing attempts to rein in a booming property market and rapid credit growth](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/03/chinas-economy-concerns-mount-as-thousands-gather-for-congress). Two surveys on Sunday suggested activity in the world’s second largest economy eased back in April. Manufacturing slowed more than expected as demand was hit by government moves to curb risks associated with a run of high borrowing in [China](https://www.theguardian.com/world/china). The National Bureau of Statistics’ official purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of factory activity fell to a six-month low of 51.2 in April from a multi-year high of 51.8 in March. That was above the 50-mark separating growth from contraction but missed forecasts for a reading of 51.6 in a poll of economists by Reuters.

#### China can’t outpace the US economy for at least 10-15 years

Akshay Shah, Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University, specializing in economics, March 17, 2017, “These Charts Show Why China’s Economy Won’t Overtake America’s Anytime Soon,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-economy-america\_us\_58c98e4ae4b0cb7d28ce673f, Accessed 4-30-2017

Nevertheless, the prospects for China’s economic growth are brighter than America’s; over time, China is likely going to continue to rise relative to the U.S. The key lesson from 2016 is that this trend is no longer going to be smooth and steady ― it might take longer than analysts currently expect. Going forward, there could be more years, similar to 2016, when America’s GDP grows faster than China’s. The 2016 reversal, along with potential for further weakness in the yuan, will push back estimates of when China’s dollar GDP will surpass America’s. It is likely to occur sometime between 2027 and 2033, not between [2018](http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/04/29/global-economic-news-china-will-surpass-the-u-s-in-2018/#2ee80293474b) and [2026](http://www.businessinsider.in/Chinas-GDP-is-expected-to-surpass-the-US-in-11-years/articleshow/47807930.cms), the prevailing forecast. In other words, the U.S. will likely remain the largest economy in the world for at least the next 10 to 15 years.

### Trade Turn – Strong Chinese trade allows their military build-up

#### Strong trade is the fundamental reason China will become a global power and challenge the United States. That causes retaliatory military build-ups that risk conflicts across the globe

Malia Zimmerman, Staff Writer, March 15, 2017, “China next US threat? Beijing beefs up military to protect trade,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/15/china-next-us-threat-beijing-beefs-up-military-to-protect-trade.html, Accessed 3-22-2017

“The great Achilles heel of China is trade—especially natural resources that come via sea and into its ports—and a big reason it will inevitably become a globally deployed military power,” said Harry Kazianis, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Defense Studies for The Center for the National Interest. “Beijing’s armed forces are working to slowly but surely reinforce and protect its overseas hubs as well as trade routes that move from Europe, the Middle East and Africa and into China’s territorial waters.” With China’s military becomes a stronger global force, experts say the new threat could prompt the United States to beef up its own armed services. “The biggest change is that America and China’s potential flashpoints will not be so fixed in one region, but will take on a global dimension,” Kazianis said. Washington will compete strategically not just in the volatile chessboard of the Asia-Pacific with Beijing, but very soon in the Indian Ocean, in the Middle East, off the coast of Africa and potentially in the Atlantic, he said.

### US-China Trade War Impact

#### A US-China trade war would cripple both economies and global growth

Catherine Wong, Staff Writer, March 2, 2017, “Trade war between US and China threat to global economy, says Australian trade minister,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2074185/trade-war-between-us-and-china-threat-global-economy, Accessed 3-22-2017

A trade war between the United States and China would pose a threat to the global economy, ­Australian trade minister Steven Ciobo warned. Such a turn of events “would do nothing except cripple economies and hurt global growth”, ­Ciobo, Australia’s minister for trade, tourism and investment, warned during a visit to China last week. “That’s not where Australia sees our future. Our future [is charted] through important engagement with key growth markets,” he said. Ciobo led a delegation of ­business leaders to Beijing and Shanghai, where they met senior Chinese executives and government officials, including Xu Shaoshi, who has since stepped down as head of the National Development and Reform Commission. Ciobo also discussed Beijing’s ongoing market reforms, saying he was optimistic about further liberalisation.

## A2: Human Rights Credibility

### US Credibility Low Now

#### The U.S. is steadily losing international human rights credibility now

Hannah Beech, Staff Writer, March 21, 2017, “Rex Tillerson’s Deferential Visit to China,” The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rex-tillersons-deferential-visit-to-china, Accessed 3-21-2017

That global moral authority has, traditionally, been taken up by the United States—even if it was often undercut by Washington’s support of dictators and invasions of sovereign nations. But the new Administration does not seem eager to assume such leadership. Every year, the State Department releases a human-rights report that records abuses around the world. Yet, earlier this month, for the first time in years, the new Secretary of State declined to personally present the report. Tillerson has also threatened to pull the U.S. out of the United Nations Human Rights Council. “The U.S. is hemorrhaging credibility because it is not standing up strongly for its values of human rights and democracy,” Nicholas Bequelin, the East Asia director for Amnesty International, told me. “The worst thing is that this is a self-inflicted injury because it is the U.S. that is choosing not to herald the values it has promoted since the end of the Second World War.”

## Military Modernization (China)

### China is expanding its naval power

#### China is beefing up its maritime forces

Malia Zimmerman, Staff Writer, March 15, 2017, “China next US threat? Beijing beefs up military to protect trade,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/15/china-next-us-threat-beijing-beefs-up-military-to-protect-trade.html, Accessed 3-22-2017

China is boosting its military capabilities, troop numbers and design and its reach to “defend” its “maritime rights,” to protect its assets in the China Sea, and as one Chinese military expert said, in case of war with Taiwan. The status of the navy will be more important than ever, said Liu Xiaojiang, a former navy political commissar, at the March 5 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. “Besides its original missions of a possible war with Taiwan, maritime defense in the East and South China seas, it’s also foreseeable that the PLA Navy’s mission will expand overseas, including protection of China’s national security in the Korean peninsula, the country’s maritime lifelines, as well as offshore supply deports like in Djibouti and Gwadar port in Pakistan,” Liu said, the South China Morning Post reported.

### A2: China Can’t Match the U.S.

#### Claiming that China can’t match the US overall power is misleading. The US wouldn’t commit all of its forces in an East Asian conflict

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, Winter 2017, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), pp. 94-95.

In short, China and the United States appear to have reached fixed, indivisible, irreconcilable positions to which they are committed ardently. The Weak Can Win The outcome of this conflict is not predestined in the superpower’s favor. Beijing could prevail even if China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains inferior to the U.S. military overall. How so? Because it is inconceivable that any U.S. President would deploy the entire military to the Western Pacific, even if the region boasted sufficient bases to host such a vast expeditionary force. Washington will execute only a partial commitment of forces. In reality, a fraction of the U.S. Navy confronts the combined might of the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Force. China’s coastlines now bristle with anti-ship missiles, combat aircraft, and missile-toting submarines and patrol craft. This adds up to a dense thicket of “anti-access” defenses designed specifically to punish U.S. and allied forces cruising offshore. It is misleading in the extreme, then, to compare the entirety of the U.S. armed forces with the PLA in its entirety. The two militaries will never meet in all-out combat, and, thus, comparing force structures in toto is meaningless for strategy making purposes. The only comparison that matters is between the forces likely to be on the scene for high-seas encounters that are likely to take place. It is far from obvious, in this situation, who would triumph if the stronger force pits part of its strength against the whole of a weaker force. Engaging in a military conflict on a faraway battleground against a well-armed foe is usually a close-run thing. Geography has only compounded the strategic quandary before U.S. commanders. After all, any probable fight will erupt in the Western Pacific, where the strong are thousands of miles from home while the weak bestride their own ground. Distance is no small matter.

### Freedom of Navigation is Key To Hegemony

#### Freedom of the seas is the cornerstone of US foreign policy

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, Winter 2017, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 93

Now, apply this Clausewitzian precept to the U.S.-China competition. What do Americans want in maritime Asia? The Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (2015)4 is refreshingly frank about U.S. objectives: The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the AsiaPacific region. And because the region—stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean—is primarily water, we place a premium on maintaining maritime peace and security. To that end, the Department of Defense has three maritime objectives in the Asia-Pacific region: to safeguard the freedom of the seas; deter conflict and coercion; and promote adherence to international law and standards. “Freedom of the sea” is a phrase drawn from international law. It establishes the principle that beyond coastal states’ “territorial seas” and “exclusive economic zones” (EEZs) in which a state enjoys exclusive rights to harvest natural resources, the sea is a “commons,” an expanse that belongs to everyone and no one. Freedom of the sea represents the most fundamental principle underlying the liberal system of trade and commerce—the system the U.S. Navy has underwritten since vanquishing Japan in 1945. To use Clausewitzian parlance, the value of the political object is virtually boundless for the United States—implying that any administration should invest generously in preserving it, for as long as it takes. Compromise on the commons and the edifice of U.S. foreign policy and strategy starts to crumble.

#### Diplomacy should be matched with greater naval deterrence in the Far East. Only greater strength prevents a Chinese victory & guarantee freedom of the seas

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, Winter 2017, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis, [Vol. 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 92

Candid diplomatic talk backed by force will grant the U.S. and its allies their best chance to uphold the freedom of the seas—the principle on which the U.S.-led system is founded—in the Far East. It behooves the incoming administration to recognize how high the stakes are. Bear in mind that the lesser power need not defeat a stronger antagonist militarily to win in political terms, the only terms that matter. It can dishearten the foe or drive the costs of competition so high that the foe cuts its losses—retiring from the field and leaving the weak as the victor. China can win in these terms even if it remains militarily weaker and, therefore, the United States must take seriously the threat and reinforce—and perhaps reconfigure—the U.S. Pacific Fleet and associated joint forces in East Asia. The United States must approach this dilemma with sobriety and candor to rebuild its military capabilities, therefore, leaving no doubt in Chinese minds who would win a military engagement. Prospects for deterrence will brighten as the American margin of supremacy grows. Speak softly and flourish the big stick!

## US-China Relations

### Relations High Now

#### Trump and Xi just agreed to wide-ranging cooperation

CCTV.com, Staff Writer, April 7, 2017, “China, US agree to expand cooperation in trade, infrastructure and energy,” http://english.cctv.com/2017/04/07/VIDEaYFZ57zGtEzmM63gj8Df170407.shtml, (Ellipses in original), Accessed 4-30-2017

China's President Xi Jinping has met with US President Donald Trump, at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. Just hours ago, the Chinese president had extended an invitation to Trump to pay a state visit to China later this year. The two leaders have agreed to expand cooperation in various fields including trade, infrastructure, energy, and regional security. A meeting between leaders of the world's two largest economies... coming together in a bid to chart the course of bilateral ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping, alongside Madam Peng Liyuan and the Chinese delegation, arrived in Florida on Thursday, for the first meeting between the Chinese president and US President Donald Trump. President Xi said he has kept in close contact with Donald Trump via telephone and letters, and added that he is ready to work with his US counterpart Donald Trump to push forward China-US relations from a new starting point. After meeting with Trump at his Mar-a-Lago estate, President Xi said "there are a thousand reasons to make the China-US relationship work, and no reason to harm it."  Xi added that ever since the normalization of China-US relations, 45 years ago, bilateral ties have made great progress and brought enormous and pragmatic benefits to both nations' peoples, in spite of occasional ups and downs. The Chinese president said it takes political resolve and historical commitments from leaders of both countries to enhance the bilateral relations in the 45 years to come. President Xi said a strong and friendly relationship between China and the US, is in line with the interests of the people of both countries, and cooperation is the correct, and only choice for China and the US. Xi also proposed to maintain high-level communication between China and the US, while utilizing dialogue to promote cooperation in fields of trade, cyber security, and infrastructure.

#### The recent Tillerson visit was a big boost for relations

Goh Sui Noi, China Bureau Chief, March 21, 2017, “Boost for China in Sino-US ties,” Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/boost-for-china-in-sino-us-ties, Accessed 3-21-2017

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's first trip to China would have brought relief to the Asian power's leaders as it has generated a friendly atmosphere for a summit between the two countries' presidents, which may take place next month. His conciliatory remarks when he met Chinese leaders were a far cry from those of President Donald Trump, who had accused China of things including "raping" the United States with its unfair trade policy. With bilateral ties off to a rocky start after Mr Trump's election last November, the Chinese have pulled out all the stops to bring ties back to an even keel, including inviting Mr Trump's daughter Ivanka to a Chinese New Year do at its Washington embassy. But critics in the US are already saying that Mr Tillerson has conceded too much ground in his remarks in Beijing by mouthing China's characterisation of Sino-US ties - something which the previous US administration had rejected. He spoke about the two sides building a relationship based on "the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation", which are concepts of a "new type of major power relations" the Chinese put forth in 2010. But "mutual respect" meant that the US should respect China's core interests and major concerns including Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea. Chinese experts are surprised by Mr Tillerson's remarks, saying they were welcomed by China. But the comments were slammed by US analysts, who said they meant acceptance that China would not compromise on these issues.

### Relations Low Now

#### The Trump/Xi meeting only entrenched mistrust, not progress in relations

Graham Webster, a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, April 10, 2017, “A False Start for Trump and Xi,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-10/false-start-trump-and-xi, Accessed 4-25-2017

When Chinese President Xi Jinping set out to visit [U.S. President Donald Trump](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-13/trump-time) in Florida last week, the meeting’s potential for drama was clear. During Trump’s campaign for the presidency, he accused China of economically exploiting the United States. As president-elect, he suggested that his administration would call into question the United States’ “one China” policy toward Taiwan—a long-standing pillar of [the relationship between Beijing and Washington](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/how-china-and-america-see-each-other). (Trump later reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to the policy at Xi’s request.) And just before the summit, Trump remained critical of Beijing, [writing](https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/847573220417044480) on Twitter that he expected a “very difficult” meeting and [telling](https://twitter.com/markknoller/status/850070191895662592/photo/1) reporters en route to Florida that China had treated the United States “unfairly.” Considering this backdrop, the first U.S.–Chinese presidential meeting of the Trump administration went remarkably smoothly. There were no major blunders in protocol, and Trump even mustered some self-effacing humor, saying that he’d “gotten nothing, absolutely nothing” out of Xi at a dinner early in their talks. The friendly atmosphere and lack of speed bumps, however, doesn’t mean that the meeting produced major progress. Thanks in part to the Trump administration’s lack of preparation, the summit accomplished little aside from allowing the two leaders and their teams to get acquainted. Although the meeting did produce three notable outcomes—related to trade, the structure of bilateral diplomacy, and [North Korea](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-13/trump-and-north-korea)—those results did little to move bilateral ties forward and may have entrenched distrust between the two sides over North Korea.

#### China perceives US relations as deteriorating

Wei Zongyou, Professor at the Center for American Studies and a research fellow at the Center for Taiwan Studies, Fudan University, Spring 2017, “China’s Maritime Trap,” The Washington Quarterly, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Spring2017\_Wei.pdf, Accessed 4/26/2017

China also sees its relations with the United States deteriorating. The United States has growing concerns about China’s assertive behaviors in the East and South China Seas, as well as its long-term intentions. An increasingly confident China could aim to dislodge U.S. influence and establish its own hegemony in the region. In a speech before the Economic Club of Washington, then-U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter listed both China and Russia as two of the five major challenges the United States is facing in the rapidly changing post-Cold War landscape, and warned that “Russia and China have become much more hostile of late,” and “[d]espite all their differences, Russia and China pose some very similar threats.” Donald Trump’s Secretary of State, Rex W. Tillerson, even threatened during his January 2017 confirmation hearing that the United States would block China’s access to the islands it built in the South China Sea.

#### Relations are only surface level. There are deep divides in core interests

J Berkshire Miller, director of the Council on International Policy, March 5, 2017, “Beijing looks for edges on cooperation with Trump,” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/beijing-edges-cooperation-trump-170302100148062.html, Accessed 4-30-2017

While compartmentalised cooperation is likely - and indeed prudent - the notion of a grand bargain between the US and China is doubtful for a number of reasons. First, the range of strategic differences between Beijing and Washington is so wide-ranging and deeply ingrained, that it continues to be difficult to acknowledge and acquiesce to each other's "core interests". Second, many of Washington's most important allies and friends in the region - including [Japan](http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/japan.html) and South Korea - are wary of the notion that Trump might be willing to make a compromise on security interests in the region for a selection of economic sweeteners that Beijing might propose to curry favour with Washington. Indeed, it seems dubious to think that Trump might take a lighter touch on these matters and recent evidence suggests the opposite.

### Relations Not Zero-Sum / No Internal Link

#### US-China relations and global influence are not zero-sum. A rising China can complement US interests

Zhang Xiaotong, Associate Professor of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Wuhan University and a research fellow at the Collaborative Innovation Centre for Territorial Integrity and Maritime Rights and James Keith, McLarty Associates, a strategic business consulting firm, and former U.S. diplomat and US Ambassador, Spring 2017, “From Wealth to Power: China’s New Economic Statecraft,” Washington Quarterly, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Spring2017\_Zhang-Keith.pdf, Accessed 4/26/2017

We do not accept the contention that confrontation between China and the United States is ideologically or economically inevitable. Americans will disagree with the prevailing popular Chinese view of an America in decline, but that disagreement should not be misread. The U.S. position is explicitly not zero-sum, i.e. it is not necessary for the United States to be in decline as China rises. The United States can and does affirm its continuing role and presence in the western Pacific and sees itself as a Pacific power; that affirmation of a strong U.S. role does not preclude China’s rise. On the contrary, as China’s role in the regional economy and political evolution grows, mutual interests between China and the United States should increase, as for example in the peaceful resolution of threats to stability emanating from the Korean peninsula. The fundamental American approach to the rise of emerging economies in the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods has been to promote them, as one can see in the success of the liberal economic order in promoting transformation of the Japanese, Korean, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singaporean, Malaysian, Thai, and Indonesian economies, to take just a few historical examples. Yes, the relative distance between the United States and developing countries has shrunk; that is primarily a matter of the rise of emerging economies, not U.S. decline.

## US-Japan Alliance

### Strong Now

#### The US-Japan-S. Korean alliance is strong now

Justin McCurry, Staff Writer, April 6, 2017, “Trump tells Japan 'all options on the table' in face of North Korea provocation,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/trump-japan-all-options-north-korea-provocation>, Accessed 4-26-2017

In a telephone call on Thursday morning, Trump told the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, that “all options are on the table” – including military action – to address provocations by [North Korea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/north-korea). Trump “made clear that the United States will continue to strengthen its ability to deter and defend itself and its allies with the full range of its military capabilities”, the White House said in a statement about the 35-minute call. “The president emphasised that the United States stands with its allies Japan and [South Korea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/south-korea) in the face of the serious threat that North Korea continues to pose.”

#### The US-Japan alliance is the only thing preventing Japanese proliferation and US commitment is strong

Andrea Berger, a Senior Research Fellow specializing in nuclear policy at the [Royal United Services Institute](https://www.rusi.org/), September 20, 2015, “Pacifism bill: Why Japan won't build a nuclear weapon quickly,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/, Accessed 4/28/2017

The second is the country's closest ally, the United States, who is similarly attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of Japan's alliance with the United States that the former has even less of an incentive to build a nuclear weapon. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa are a visible reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it.

#### N. Korean nuclear advances do not undermine US alliances in E. Asia, which far outweigh

Daniel Bob, Director of Programs and Senior Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, January 24, 2017, “[Encouraging Japan to Go Nuclear Won’t Denuclearize North Korea](http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/),” 38North.org, http://38north.org/2017/01/dbob012417/, Accessed 4/26/2017

That said, beyond speculation about Kim Jong Un’s rationality, there is no reason to believe that North Korea’s advances in nuclear-armed missile capabilities will undermine the effectiveness of America’s current policy of deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States and extended deterrence of attack against Japan, South Korea and other allies. Large numbers of American troops in both Japan and South Korea reinforce the US commitment that an attack on either country would meet the same response as an attack on the United States. Theater missile defenses in Northeast Asia, the US national missile defense system and an American nuclear arsenal that dwarfs that of North Korea provide further surety against the DPRK threat.