|  |
| --- |
| **West Coast Publishing****China 2017****February****Edited by Jim Hanson**ResearchersAndrew Durand, Carter Henman, Eric Robinson, Jonathan Barsky, Jonathan Shane, Kendra Doty, Mary Marcum, Matt Stannard, Risha Bhattacharjee, Shelby Pryor, Tom Schally, William James TaylorThanks for using our Policy, LD, Public Forum, and Extemp Materials.**Please don’t share this material with anyone outside of your school**including via print, email, dropbox, google drive, the web, etc. *We’re a small non-profit; please help us continue to provide our products.***Contact us at** jim@wcdebate.com[www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com) |

# Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

# FEBRUARY EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST OCTOBER**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

**Finding Arguments in this File**

Use the table of contents on the next pages to find the evidence you need or the navigation bar on the left. We have tried to make the table of contents as easy to use as possible. You’ll find scenario/impacts, affirmatives, disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks listed alphabetically in their categories.

**Using the Arguments in this File**

We encourage you to be familiar with the evidence you use. Highlight (underline) the key lines you will use in the evidence. Cut evidence from our files, incorporate your and others’ research and make new files. File the evidence so that you can easily retrieve it when you need it in debate rounds. Practice reading the evidence out-loud; Practice applying the arguments to your opponents’ positions; Practice defending your evidence in rebuttal speeches.

**Use West Coast Evidence as a Beginning**

We hope you enjoy our evidence files and find them useful. In saying this, we want to make a strong statement that we make when we coach and that we believe is vitally important to your success: DO NOT USE THIS EVIDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR YOUR OWN RESEARCH. Instead, let it serve as a beginning. Let it inform you of important arguments, of how to tag and organize your arguments, and to offer citations for further research. Don’t stagnate in these files--build upon them by doing your own research for updates, new strategies, and arguments that specifically apply to your opponents. In doing so, you’ll use our evidence to become a better debater.

**Copying and Sharing West Coast Evidence?**

Our policy gives you the freedom to use our evidence for educational purposes without violating our hard work.

* You may print and copy this evidence for those on your team.
* **You may not electronically share nor distribute this evidence with anyone other than those on your team unless you very substantially change each page of material that you share.**

For unusual situations, you can e-mail us at **jim@wcdebate.com**and seek our consent.

**Ordering West Coast Materials**

**1. Visit the West Coast Web Page at** [**www.wcdebate.com**](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5Chansonjb99%5CDocuments%5C0-West%20Coast%5C00webproducts%5Cpolicy-set%202016%5Cwww.wcdebate.com)

**2. E-mail us at** **jim@wcdebate.com**

**3. Fax us at 877-781-5058**

Copyright 2016. West Coast Publishing. All Rights Reserved.

**Visit our web page!**

[**www.wcdebate.com**](http://www.wcdebate.com)

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

[Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China. 2](#_Toc473719839)

[FEBRUARY EVIDENCE FILE INTRO 3](#_Toc473719840)

[TABLE OF CONTENTS 4](#_Toc473719841)

[Affirmative 9](#_Toc473719842)

[Diplomatic and Economic Engagement Good/General 10](#_Toc473719843)

[Diplomatic Engagement Low Now 11](#_Toc473719844)

[Engagement K2 US Leadership in Asia 12](#_Toc473719845)

[Engagement K2 Check Sino-Japan War 13](#_Toc473719846)

[Engagement K2 US-China Relations 14](#_Toc473719847)

[(BIT) Bilateral Investment Treaty 15](#_Toc473719848)

[Inherency 16](#_Toc473719849)

[BIT solves relations 17](#_Toc473719850)

[Climate Change Cooperation 19](#_Toc473719851)

[Climate change coop makes relations resilient and prevents escalation 20](#_Toc473719852)

[Discursive Engagement 21](#_Toc473719853)

[US should adopt different terminology toward China 22](#_Toc473719854)

[Dialogue acts as a confidence-building measure 24](#_Toc473719855)

[Infrastructure Cooperation 25](#_Toc473719856)

[Solvency – Relations internal links 26](#_Toc473719857)

[Space Cooperation 27](#_Toc473719858)

[China is rapidly expanding its civilian space program 28](#_Toc473719859)

[China is developing ASATs 29](#_Toc473719860)

[PAROS Agreement – Inherency 30](#_Toc473719861)

[PAROS Agreement – Inherency / Space militarization now 31](#_Toc473719862)

[PAROS Agreement – Solvency 33](#_Toc473719863)

[Taiwan 35](#_Toc473719864)

[Solvency – Reverse support for Taiwan/Affirm “One China” Policy 36](#_Toc473719865)

[Solvency – Reverse support for Taiwan/Affirm “One China” Policy 38](#_Toc473719866)

[A2: Pressure CPs (hard line on China) 39](#_Toc473719867)

[Permutation: Do plan and CP on other issues 40](#_Toc473719868)

[Permutation: Do Both 41](#_Toc473719869)

[Permutation: Do Both 42](#_Toc473719870)

[Self-fulfilling Prophecy Turn 43](#_Toc473719871)

[Nationalism Turn 44](#_Toc473719872)

[A2: Tarriffs 45](#_Toc473719873)

[A2: Appeasement DA 46](#_Toc473719874)

[Non-Unique 47](#_Toc473719875)

[Negative 48](#_Toc473719876)

[Diplomatic Engagement Bad/Fails 49](#_Toc473719877)

[Trump guarantees BAD diplomacy 50](#_Toc473719878)

[Economic Engagement Bad/Fails 51](#_Toc473719879)

[A2: Theory – Trade Won’t Stop War 52](#_Toc473719880)

[A2: Theory – Trade Won’t Stop War (China) 54](#_Toc473719881)

[Energy cooperation Neg. 55](#_Toc473719882)

[Energy cooperation will fail 56](#_Toc473719883)

[North Korea Cooperation Neg. 57](#_Toc473719884)

[China won’t cooperate on N. Korea / Fails 58](#_Toc473719885)

[China won’t cooperate on N. Korea / Fails 60](#_Toc473719886)

[Special Economic Zones Neg. 62](#_Toc473719887)

[Status Quo solves – US is investing now 63](#_Toc473719888)

[Alternate Causes prevent US investments 64](#_Toc473719889)

[US Investment Turn 65](#_Toc473719890)

[Tigers Neg. 66](#_Toc473719891)

[Alternate Causality – Throughout Asia 67](#_Toc473719892)

[Alternate Causality – Climate change 68](#_Toc473719893)

[Pressure CPs 69](#_Toc473719894)

[Pressure is effective and competitive 70](#_Toc473719895)

[Pressure Good – S. China Seas 71](#_Toc473719896)

[Pressure good – Regime collapse insulator 73](#_Toc473719897)

[Scenario Updates 74](#_Toc473719898)

[US-China Relations 75](#_Toc473719899)

[Brink – Relations are fragile 76](#_Toc473719900)

[China Fears US-Russian Relations 77](#_Toc473719901)

[Impacts - General 78](#_Toc473719902)

[A2: Relations – Non-Unique / Breakdown inevitable 79](#_Toc473719903)

[A2: Relations – Relations are resilient 81](#_Toc473719904)

[A2: Relations – Relations are resilient 82](#_Toc473719905)

[A2: Relations – Too early to tell 84](#_Toc473719906)

[US-India Relations 85](#_Toc473719907)

[DA – US/China relations internal link 86](#_Toc473719908)

[UQ – Relations high now 87](#_Toc473719909)

[Relations key to Asian stability 88](#_Toc473719910)

[UQ – Relations low now 89](#_Toc473719911)

[Allied Confidence 90](#_Toc473719912)

[Hawkish Trump good 91](#_Toc473719913)

[Chinese Economy 92](#_Toc473719914)

[Economy high now 93](#_Toc473719915)

[Economy low now 94](#_Toc473719916)

[Economy low now / unstable 96](#_Toc473719917)

[Economy low now / unstable 98](#_Toc473719918)

[Economy low now / unstable 100](#_Toc473719919)

[China Soft Power 101](#_Toc473719920)

[A2: Economic prowess leads to influence 102](#_Toc473719921)

[China is a military threat 103](#_Toc473719922)

[China is bent on expansionism 104](#_Toc473719923)

[China is a regional threat 105](#_Toc473719924)

[China Regime Collapse 106](#_Toc473719925)

[The Chinese regime is strong now 107](#_Toc473719926)

[Sino-Japanese War 108](#_Toc473719927)

[Brink – Tensions High 109](#_Toc473719928)

[South China Seas 110](#_Toc473719929)

[Status quo is a hardline approach 111](#_Toc473719930)

[Tensions high now / flashpoint for war 112](#_Toc473719931)

[Chinese expansionism – South China Seas 113](#_Toc473719932)

[Impacts 114](#_Toc473719933)

[Trade 115](#_Toc473719934)

[Protectionism Against China Coming Now 116](#_Toc473719935)

[RCEP Inevitable 117](#_Toc473719936)

[US-China War 118](#_Toc473719937)

[No impact - Conflicts won’t escalate 119](#_Toc473719938)

[U.S. Hegemony & Leadership 120](#_Toc473719939)

[Strong Domestic Economy K2 US Leadership 121](#_Toc473719940)

[US military presence good - Impacts 122](#_Toc473719941)

[A2: Drawdown causes China to take over 123](#_Toc473719942)

[US Soft Power 124](#_Toc473719943)

[Diplomatic engagement good 125](#_Toc473719944)

[Trump is undermining US soft power 126](#_Toc473719945)

[Soft Power fails with China 128](#_Toc473719946)

[Aff Answer to Conditions CP 129](#_Toc473719947)

[2AC Conditions Bad Theory (Short) 130](#_Toc473719948)

[2AC Conditions Bad Theory (Long) 131](#_Toc473719949)

[Definitions 132](#_Toc473719950)

[Engagement 133](#_Toc473719951)

[Engagement 134](#_Toc473719952)

[Should 135](#_Toc473719953)

[Resolved 136](#_Toc473719954)

[AT: Condition (Substantive) 137](#_Toc473719955)

[Solvency Deficits 138](#_Toc473719956)

[China Says No 139](#_Toc473719957)

[China Says No 140](#_Toc473719958)

[QPQs With China Fail 141](#_Toc473719959)

[Perm Solves 142](#_Toc473719960)

[Net-Benefit Answers 144](#_Toc473719961)

[AT: CCP Collapse 145](#_Toc473719962)

[AT: CCP Collapse 146](#_Toc473719963)

[AT: Human Rights Reform 147](#_Toc473719964)

[AT: Human Rights Reform 149](#_Toc473719965)

[AT: Agricultural Reform 150](#_Toc473719966)

# Affirmative

## Diplomatic and Economic Engagement Good/General

### Diplomatic Engagement Low Now

#### Trump is already degrading U.S. diplomatic engagement with China

Lee H. Hamilton, Distinguished Scholar, Indiana University, January 2, 2017, “Trump’s Impulsiveness Challenges Are Vital To U.S.-China Relationship,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/trumps-impulsiveness-chal\_b\_13929822.html, Accessed 1-19-2017

Trump has a transactional view of governing, including foreign policy. In his world, everything is a deal; every relationship is tit-for-tat. He suggests using Taiwan as a bargaining chip to force China to give us a break on trade. He is stoking tensions, flirting with major changes (apparently reconsidering the One China policy) in order to gain trade concessions. He is willing to disrupt the relationship without concern about the consequences. The question arises: Is this approach to policy the way to handle this critically important relationship? The U.S. relationship with China, ongoing since 1972 when President Richard Nixon visited China, has included elements of confrontation and cooperation. It is not surprising that a new president might have questions about the relationship and want to put his own stamp on policies. Trump’s willingness to shake up the traditional norms and framework may have some value, and some push-back lets China know that, while we want a stable, mutually beneficial relationship, there are limits to our willingness to cooperate. After all, China, with its rising footprint in the region, significant power and growing activism, does present challenges for U.S. policy. China has largely avoided intervention in other countries’ affairs, however, even as it aggressively pursues its interests and protects its territorial claims. But our engagement with China over a period of decades has served both sides, creating stability in the region, avoiding war and allowing both countries to grow and prosper. Questioning longstanding policy is fair game; creating chaos, resentments and doubt is not.

### Engagement K2 US Leadership in Asia

#### Diplomatic and economic engagement are essential to American leadership in Asia

Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, December 24, 2016, “[Assessing Trump’s Emerging Asia Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/, Accessed 1-2-2017

In a more rivalrous Asia, Trump’s nationalism and determination to restore American strength through economic and military growth could make the U.S. more competitive. However, this is likely to be true only if his administration pursues effective policies to sustain American diplomatic, economic, and military leadership in Asia — including by investing in the alliance relationships that magnify American power and sustain the stability that underwrites pan-Pacific prosperity.

### Engagement K2 Check Sino-Japan War

#### The U.S. should reinvigorate diplomatic engagement with China and Japan to avoid a Sino-Japanese war and global economic downturn

Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, December 12, 2016, “The Risks of an Accelerating Rivalry Between China and Japan,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20667/the-risks-of-an-accelerating-rivalry-between-china-and-japan, Accessed 1-20-2017

For years, the U.S., although a staunch ally of Japan, has served as a mediator between the world’s second- and third-largest economies. Washington has sought to reassure both sides, refusing to take a stand on the issue of ownership of the disputed East China Sea islands even as it has recognized Japan’s administrative control. Despite grumblings from both parties, China and Japan have generally recognized the critical role the U.S. has played in ensuring stability. That support has always been tenuously based on the perception that Washington remains firmly committed and fair in its dealings. Regional ambitions and resentment over U.S. power [have eroded Chinese support for that view](https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-turn-toward-regional-restructuring-counter-intervention-a-review-of-authoritative-sources/). But weakening the U.S. role will remove a critical source of reassurance to Japan and would very likely aggravate Sino-Japanese tensions to a destabilizing degree. Ensuring future regional peace and global economic growth will require a greater effort at diplomatic engagement with the Asian giants than ever before. Whether the U.S. under Trump can resist the allures of retrenchment and invigorate its diplomacy to realize that possibility, though, remains to be seen.

#### Renewed U.S. diplomatic engagement in Asia is crucial to prevent Sino-Japanese escalation

Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, December 12, 2016, “The Risks of an Accelerating Rivalry Between China and Japan,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20667/the-risks-of-an-accelerating-rivalry-between-china-and-japan, Accessed 1-20-2017

However appealing it may be to U.S. voters, the benefits of disengagement from Asia, and from the Sino-Japanese relationship in particular, would pale next to the costs. The global economy can ill-afford conflict in a region of the world that promises to drive future growth. The perils of a rivalry between China and Japan lie in its considerable potential for escalation, and in the fact that it continues to lack reliable mechanisms for restraint. According to a [recent Pew poll](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/09/13/hostile-neighbors-china-vs-japan/), only 11 percent of Japanese respondents expressed a favorable opinion of China, while just 14 percent of Chinese said they have a positive view of Japan. In a 2014 poll, a majority of Chinese said they [expected war with Japan by 2020](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-12/most-chinese-expect-war-with-japan-some-day). With levels of distrust so high, leaders may find little public support for compromise in a crisis. Recognizing the danger, diplomats in both countries have urged [efforts to improve crisis management](https://amti.csis.org/positive-signs-for-crisis-management-in-the-east-china-sea/), but concrete measures [are still largely unimplemented](http://www.janes.com/article/63466/japan-china-agree-to-resume-talks-on-defence-hotline).

### Engagement K2 US-China Relations

#### Cooperation should be the bridge for US-China relations

Jin Liangxiang, PhD, Research Fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, December 15, 2016, “Overcoming the Self-fulfilling Prophecy of China Threat,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/overcoming-the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-china-threat, Accessed 1-29-2017

Cooperation should be the right approach in maintaining the right course of China-U.S. relations. When we talk about and enhance cooperation, confidence will grow, and conflicts will be finally overcome, or at least be prevailed, but if we talk about conflicts too much, cooperation will not be offered and conflicts will be getting worse. Dialogue should always be a way to bridge the understanding gap. For instance, while American interlocutors worried that China would become more assertive when China gets less dependent on the U.S. market as China is cultivating its own domestic market, Chinese scholars expressed that China felt too pressured by the U.S. because of the dependence.

## (BIT) Bilateral Investment Treaty

### Inherency

#### The US is dragging its feet on the BIT with China, which would become the cornerstone of relations

Wang Yiwei, senior fellow of international relations at the Renmin University of China, January 12, 2017, “US president-to-be should cooperate with emerging economies to boost job market,” Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1028493.shtml, Accessed 1-30-2017

The bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the US and China has been in the works for eight years. If passed, the deal, regarded as the cornerstone of their bilateral economic relationship, would give Chinese and US investments better access to each other's markets and is an important means to boost the job market in the US. However, Washington still seems to be reluctant to open its market to Chinese investments. It is not news that China's telecommunications firm Huawei, which had struggled to gain entrance to the US for years, is repeatedly blocked from bidding on projects to partner with or purchase its US counterparts. Washington's reluctance to accept Chinese enterprises will only make the situation worse. More efforts should be devoted to facilitating the BIT negotiations.

### BIT solves relations

#### Economic engagement through a bilateral investment treaty can rejuvenate Sino-US relations and prevent future trade friction

Liu Youfa, a senior adviser at the Indian Studies Center at the Pangoal Institution, a leading China-based think tank. Dr. Liu served as consul general (ambassadorial rank) at the Chinese Consulate General, January 18, 2017, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-future-of-us-china-relations-under-president-trump/, Accessed 1-20-2017

China and the United States are both at a crossroads in terms of sustainable economic development and national rejuvenation. Both countries are under pressure from a sluggish global economy and contracting global trade. Both countries face traditional and non-traditional security threats. Both countries have the obligation to join hands to promote global peace, development, and cooperation. Therefore, the “same boat spirit” should still apply to bilateral relations under President Trump. First, the two countries should carry out more dialogue and communication along with more policy coordination and cooperation. Both countries should adopt the spirit of “give and take” as well as balancing rights and obligations in dealing with bilateral relations. For example, it is a legal obligation for the U.S. side to recognize China’s market status in accordance with the WTO agreement. This should not be held hostage to domestic political concerns. Second, both countries should join hands to build a sustainable relationship based on avoidance of conflict and confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. Therefore, it pays for the two countries to conclude their Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which will allow more Chinese entrepreneurs to set up their businesses in the United States and help create jobs. It is also very much desired for both countries to start negotiation on a free trade agreement, which will help to avoid unnecessary economic friction. Third, both countries should take steps forward and implement reciprocal policy measures to reduce the deficit of mutual trust, which requires both sides to respect each other’s core interests. Both countries should avoid implementing policies at the expense of the other side. Fourth, both countries should further tap into their economic potential by allowing real two-way investment, which would help immediately reduce the trade deficit on the U.S. side. Both countries should build on their cooperation in the areas of clean energy and environmental protection, where the United States has clear technological advantages. Both countries should step up their cooperation in intellectual property rights protection, which would generate new steam for bilateral trade. Both governments could facilitate conditions for joint ventures in the United States, which could produce and market the end products to third-party markets.

#### A bilateral investment treaty with China was serve as a precursor for future economic engagement

Phil Levy, senior fellow on the global economy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, January 24, 2017, “Trade Under Trump,” Real Clear World, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/01/24/trade\_under\_trump\_112186.html, Accessed 1-30-2017

Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with China. China was not a party to TPP talks. The main active negotiation between Washington and Beijing is a treaty to regulate the treatment of investment. (Such a treaty is often a precursor to broader trade talks.) While this could certainly be a vehicle for Trump to make demands of the Chinese, they are sure to demand reciprocity.

## Climate Change Cooperation

### Climate change coop makes relations resilient and prevents escalation

#### Some friction is inevitable, but cooperation on climate change can prevent those from escalating to conflict

[Victor Cha](https://www.csis.org/people/victor-cha), Senior Adviser and Korea Chair at the CSIS, December 15, 2016, “How should we view China's rise?,” Report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-should-we-view-chinas-rise, Accessed 1-28-2017

I do think there is a linear calculation in most of Washington about Chinese power and Chinese intentions. This is not because China is communist, but because China is behaving as most great powers do historically when they rise. So, there will be natural friction, competition that will emerge between the rising power and the hegemon (United States) in the coming two decades. The key for policymakers is to ensure that this competition, which can sometimes be healthy in terms of spurring innovation, does not spiral into military conflict. The greatest areas of most common purpose between a rising China and the United States may be on global issues like climate change, rather than issues in the region.

## Discursive Engagement

### US should adopt different terminology toward China

#### Trump should instruct all US diplomats to use neutral terms in reference to relations with China

June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida and a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Volume 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 87.

“Provocations:” The People's Republic, proclaims its spokespersons, is a peace loving government, wanting nothing more than the space to expand its economy in order to better its citizens’ lives. But, they add, it will be “forced” to fight to protect its interests. Given the PRC's recent expansionist moves, the way out of this dilemma is, of course, to claim that China has indeed been forced. In essence, any aggressive action is a response to the unacceptable behavior of the other side. Expect, therefore, to hear “it's all America's fault. America's fault.” So, bearing these observations in mind, what should your administration do? First, bear in mind that words have meaning. Instruct your policymakers to use neutral terms. Avoid saying, for example, “our Chinese friends.” The Chinese, like Lord Palmerston, but unlike many Americans, are aware that their country has no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. Those who defend the use of the term say it is merely symbolic. Symbolic of what? The Chinese do not believe it, but too many Americans seem to. Similarly, expressions like “strategic partner” and “strategic competitor” imply broad agendas we do not necessarily intend to pursue. Conversely, some words should be avoided because they have too little meaning—“congagement,” “frenemies,” and the like. What may seem clever and catchy may not be helpful.

#### China perceives Trump’s rhetoric as a pretext for war with the US

Will Worely, Staff Writer, January 28, 2017, “China military official says war with US under Donald Trump 'becoming practical reality',” The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-donald-trump-war-us-military-official-practical-reality-president-latest-a7550601.html, Accessed 1-29-2017

War with the US under Donald Trump is “not just a slogan” and becoming a “practical reality”, a senior Chinese military official has said. The remarks were published on the People’s Liberation Army website, apparently in response to the aggressive rhetoric towards China from America's new administration. They communicated a view from inside the Central Military Commission, which has overall authority of China’s armed forces.

#### China perceives “America First” as an open door to become the global economic leader

Josh Chin, Staff Writer, January 23, 2017, “China Says Prepared to Lead Global Economy if Necessary,” Wall St. Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-says-prepared-to-lead-global-economy-if-necessary-1485178890, Accessed 1-29-2017

China is prepared to take the helm of the global economy if Western nations abdicate their leadership role, a top Chinese diplomat said Monday, days after U.S. President Donald Trump pledged in his inaugural address to put “America first.” “If it’s necessary for China to play the role of leader, then China must take on this responsibility,” Zhang Jun, head of the Chinese foreign ministry’s office of international economic affairs, told a small group of foreign reporters in Beijing. Mr. Zhang made the comments following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip last week to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where he delivered [a defense of economic globalization](http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-jinping-defends-globalization-1484654899) in a speech that likened trade protectionism to “locking oneself in a dark room.”

### Dialogue acts as a confidence-building measure

#### Dialogue will allow Sino-US relations to build on confidence measure, while threatening rhetoric makes enemies

Jin Liangxiang, PhD, Research Fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, December 15, 2016, “Overcoming the Self-fulfilling Prophecy of China Threat,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/overcoming-the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-china-threat, Accessed 1-29-2017

This kind of dialogue will certainly lead one to think about issues from the perspectives of the other side, and will contribute to enhancing understanding and building confidence. All in all, China and the U.S. share tremendous common interests and responsibility in maintaining economic prosperity and transnational security across the region. These should prevail over differences between the two. Talking about cooperation will deliver friendship and partnership while talking about conflicts will really create enemies.

## Infrastructure Cooperation

### Solvency – Relations internal links

#### Trump should decenter climate change as the foundation of relations and push massive infrastructure cooperation

Gal Luft, Co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, January 10, 2017, “[A New Way to Hold the U.S.-China Relationship Together](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/10/a-new-way-to-hold-the-us-china-relationship-together-infrastructure-cooperation-not-climate-aiib-end-of-kumbaya/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/10/a-new-way-to-hold-the-us-china-relationship-together-infrastructure-cooperation-not-climate-aiib-end-of-kumbaya/, Accessed 1-29-2017

The Trump presidency hasn’t even begun, and the U.S.-China relationship already seems to be in trouble. Tension is fast building around a slew of issues — particularly trade, Taiwan, and the South China Sea — that are inherently irresolvable, and can, at best, be managed. The Obama administration has parried these problems partly with recourse to climate change, a bonding issue that could be deployed at will when things get dicey. So far, the fast-forming administration of President-elect Donald Trump lacks any such glue. It needs to find some, fast. Massive infrastructure cooperation could be just the thing. Over the past eight years, when things went the wrong way on other issues in the U.S.-China relationship, cooperation on climate change repeatedly injected a degree of calm. For example, in 2014, as tension rose between Washington and Beijing over the latter’s land reclamation efforts in the disputed South China Sea islands, Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping issued their Joint Announcement on Climate Change in Beijing. Later, in September 2015 when the two countries were on the brink of a cyber conflict resulting from what is believed to be a Chinese cyber attack on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management the two leaders diffused the tension by issuing in Washington a [joint statement](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change) on climate change. Indeed, climate change defined the personal relations between the two leaders more than any other issue. Their other meetings — the June 2013 meeting in Sunnylands, the March 2016 meeting in Washington, and the September 2016 meeting in Hangzhou — were all punctuated by some progress on climate change. In fact, out of all the presidential summits that involved both Obama and Xi, climate was the only area in which both sides could claim significant cooperative progress.

#### Centering US-China relations on infrastructure cooperation would transform zero sum relations into real resiliency

Gal Luft, Co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, January 10, 2017, “[A New Way to Hold the U.S.-China Relationship Together](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/10/a-new-way-to-hold-the-us-china-relationship-together-infrastructure-cooperation-not-climate-aiib-end-of-kumbaya/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/10/a-new-way-to-hold-the-us-china-relationship-together-infrastructure-cooperation-not-climate-aiib-end-of-kumbaya/, Accessed 1-29-2017

Exactly one year ago during his speech inaugurating the AIIB, President Xi [pledged](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/16/c_135015661.htm) that “the door of China’s opening up will never shut and China welcomes all countries to ride on its development.” At his inauguration next week President Trump, could answer the call. Centering U.S.-China relations on infrastructure development could fill the vacuum created by the exit of climate, giving the two countries’ leaders a common goal to work toward amidst all their other disagreements. Such commonality of purpose would help transform the discourse from an adversarial, zero-sum-game one into one more conducive to cooperation. The result would not only be a more connected world where more people can have access to energy, communication, and transportation networks — one generating economic activity, prosperity, and growth — but also a U.S.-China relationship that’s more resilient in the face of the many challenges that will undoubtedly come.

## Space Cooperation

### China is rapidly expanding its civilian space program

#### China will continue to expand its space development

Anna Ball, Staff Writer, January 1, 2017, China Space Plan to Develop “Strength and Size,” Voice of America News, http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-five-year-space-plan-released/3657308.html, Accessed 1-2-2017

China wants to develop “strength and size” in its space program, a China National Space Administration official said last week. In the next five years, the country plans to speed up the development of its space program. China wants to become the first country to carry out a controlled landing of a probe on the far side of the moon in 2018. China also has plans to launch its first probe to the planet Mars by 2020. China released an official policy proposal, known as a white paper. The document provides details of China’s plans for space exploration for the next five years. It was released by the State Council Information Office last Tuesday. "To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry and build China into a space power is a dream we pursue unremittingly," the white paper said. China says it will use space for peaceful purposes, to guarantee national security and to carry out new scientific research according to the paper.

#### China is actively advancing toward landing humans on the moon

Anna Ball, Staff Writer, January 1, 2017, China Space Plan to Develop “Strength and Size,” Voice of America News, http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-five-year-space-plan-released/3657308.html, Accessed 1-2-2017

Morris Jones is an independent writer and an expert on the Chinese space program. He is based in Australia. He told VOA that the Chinese have one of the world’s best space programs. He said it was about the same as the European program. “They’re moving ahead very rapidly. They have a very impressive human spaceflight capability. They've recently completed their longest space mission to date, which was roughly a month. And they’re preparing probes to go to the moon and deeper into space.” China conducted its first manned space mission in 2003. Since then, Chinese astronauts have carried out a spacewalk. China also landed a vehicle on the moon in 2013. That was the first time a spacecraft had made a soft landing on the moon since the 1970s. Most recently, two Chinese astronauts stayed aboard China's Tiangong 2 experimental space station for one month. It was the country's sixth and longest space mission. A fully operating, permanently crewed space station is to begin operations six years from now. It is expected to operate for at least 10 years. In the white paper, Chinese officials do not talk about sending humans to the moon, but Jones says that may happen in the future. “What I also think is interesting to consider is the fact that the white paper gives further hints that even beyond landing robot probes on the moon, China is moving steadily in the direction of eventually sending humans there.”

### China is developing ASATs

#### There is no functional difference between BMD systems used now and ASATs and China is advancing its program

Harsh Vasani, a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, January 19, 2017, “How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/, Accessed 1-20-2017

Today’s space-faring nations use their Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems, which include long-range ICBMs, as an auxiliary system capable of destroying space-based assets. The difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a warhead. [China has been making impressive headway in its ICBM program](http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/confirmed-china-is-upgrading-icbms-with-multiple-warheads/) and in theory, these ICBMs can target U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. There have been debates among scholars on the [utility of BMD system as ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1807/1). However, Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation asserts that there is [no meaningful difference between a midcourse ballistic missile defense system and a hit-to-kill ASAT weapon](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1). Weeden argues that “because midcourse ballistic missile systems are intended to destroy warheads traveling at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, all midcourse ballistic missile defense systems have inherent ASAT capabilities.” He asserts that these BMD systems are more effective as anti-satellite weapons than as missile defense systems, since most satellites are easier to detect, track, and target than warheads, which are likely to be accompanied with penetration aids designed to confuse a potential defense. The difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a warhead.

#### China is actively developing ASATs to attack U.S. assets

Anna Ball, Staff Writer, January 1, 2017, China Space Plan to Develop “Strength and Size,” Voice of America News, http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-five-year-space-plan-released/3657308.html, Accessed 1-2-2017

The white paper says that China is committed to the peaceful use of space and opposes a space arms race. Jones disagrees. He says China continues to develop its military space program. “It’s not accurate at all because China has one of the world’s most advanced military space programs. They use space flight for most aspects of their military—communication, surveillance, weather forecasting. But one of the rising trends in China is the fact that they have a very aggressive development program for anti-satellite weapons. They’ve been able to hit satellites in low orbits for quite some time.” Jones says China has the ability to attack satellites in geostationary orbit or ones that are in a lower Earth orbit. That means, “they can probably try to knock out America’s GPS satellites in the event of a war,” says Jones.

### PAROS Agreement – Inherency

#### U.S. disengagement is the fundamental barrier to PAROS, which would prevent space weaponization

Harsh Vasani, a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, January 19, 2017, “How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/, Accessed 1-20-2017

The United States, aware of the enormity of the threat, needs to do a lot more to ensure that space remains a sanctuary instead of turning into a battleground. China and Russia have been pushing for a debate on a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty, which would ensure that states observe a prohibition on space weaponization. Russia and China have also submitted a draft treaty to the UN preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. However, in all likelihood, the United States would not want an arms-control treaty if it means limiting the U.S. National Missile Defense system (which has de facto ASAT applications).Washington withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and went on to develop ground and sea-based missile defenses that can also act as ASAT weapons. So far the biggest boulder to an international treaty bringing more transparency and arms control to outer space is the United States.

#### Trump will continue U.S. hostility toward PAROS

Karl Grossman, professor of journalism at the State University of New York/College of New York, December 7, 2016, “[The Next Frontier: Trump and Space Weapons](http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/),” Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/, Accessed 1-24-2017

Still, no matter the administration, since work at the United Nations began in 1985 on a treaty seeking, as its title declares, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the U.S. has not supported it. Canada, Russia and China have been leaders in urging passage of this PAROS treaty, and there has been virtually universal backing from nations around the world. But by balking, U.S. administration after administration has prevented its passage. With the Trump administration, more than non-support of the PAROS treaty is probable. A drive by the U.S. to weaponize space appears in the offing. The weaponization of space has long been sought by the U.S. military. The U.S. Air Force Space Command and U.S. Space Command (now merged into the U.S. Strategic Command) have repeatedly described space as the “[ultimate high ground](http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=us_military_1952).” There has been continued development of space weapons.

### PAROS Agreement – Inherency / Space militarization now

#### The U.S. is advancing space-based missile defense in the face of the PAROS Treaty. This forces Russia & China into an offensive space race

Andrei Akulav, Colonel, retired, Moscow-based expert on international security issues, January 22, 2017, “Putting Weapons in Space: Top Issue to Face President Trump,” Strategic Culture Foundation, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/01/22/putting-weapons-space-top-issue-face-president-trump.html, Accessed 1-24-2017

With Donald Trump’s views still vague on many critical issues, the new US president has a detailed and ambitious [space policy](http://spacenews.com/trumps-space-policy-reaches-for-mars-and-the-stars/). The ground-based BMD systems, the [X-37B spacecraft](http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/08/23/us-tests-space-weapon-back-star-wars-i.html) and Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) platforms could be repurposed into instruments of war in space. The Russia-China diplomatic [efforts](http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/10/14/russia-china-trying-prevent-war-outer-space.html) to have an international agreement to regulate space activities have been stymied by the United States. The United States has refused to join the [Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Treaty](https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ArmsControl_NEW/nonproliferation/NFZ/NP-NFZ-PAROS.html) (PAROS) of 1967. Last year, Republicans included into the 2017 [defense authorization bill](https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2943/text) a provision to encourage the Defense Department to start a research program for space-based anti-missile systems. In a significant departure from long-standing US policy, lawmakers [voted](https://www.armscontrol.org/print/8354) in December to expand the declared role of US national ballistic missile defenses. The measure states that it shall be «the policy of the United States to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States and its allies against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat». The word «limited» was removed from the definition of US missile defense plans. Nothing gives a reason to believe the program will produce any real results. There will be nothing left for Russia and China but to respond in kind. The cost of the plans will be enormous and the president has declared that he intends to reduce taxes on corporations. The burden will be unbearable at the time the US national debt has risen to $20 trillion. The plans will result in an arms race in space. There will be no winners, only losers.

#### Trump will expand space weaponization with broad support from Congress

Karl Grossman, professor of journalism at the State University of New York/College of New York, December 7, 2016, “[The Next Frontier: Trump and Space Weapons](http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/),” Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/, Accessed 1-24-2017

What kind of space weaponry might scientists and the military sell Trump on? “Under Trump, GOP to Give Space Weapons Close Look,” was the headline of an article last month in [Roll Call](http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-gop-give-space-weapons-close-look), a reliable 61-year-old Washington-based media outlet. The article said “Trump’s thinking on missile defense and military space programs have gotten next to no attention, as compared to the president-elect’s other defense proposals….But experts expect such programs to account for a significant share of what is likely to be a defense budget boost, potentially amounting to $500 billion or more in the coming decade.” Intense support for the Republican president’s plans is anticipated from the GOP-dominated Congress. Roll Call noted that Representative Trent Franks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee and an Arizona Republican, “said the GOP’s newly strengthened hand in Washington means a big payday is coming for programs aimed at developing weapons that can be deployed in space.” It quoted Franks as saying: “It was a Democrat mindset that caused us to step back from space-based defense assets to ostensibly not ‘weaponize space,’ while our enemies proceeded to do just that, and now, we find ourselves in a grave deficit.”

### PAROS Agreement – Solvency

#### Rejecting PAROS means U.S. space warfare against China and Russia is inevitable. The U.S. should back away from space dominance and embrace PAROS

Karl Grossman, professor of journalism at the State University of New York/College of New York, December 7, 2016, “[The Next Frontier: Trump and Space Weapons](http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/),” Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/07/the-next-frontier-trump-and-space-weapons/, Accessed 1-24-2017

“Russia and China for years have gone to the UN pleading with the U.S. to seriously enter negotiations for a treaty to ban weapons in space—the idea being to close the door to the barn before the horse gets out,” Gagnon said. “During Republican and Democrat administrations the U.S. has blocked the development of such a forward-thinking treaty maintaining that there is ‘no problem.’ The military-industrial complex, which views space as a new profits arena, has ensured that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space treaty negotiations were dead on arrival.” “Russia and China will be left with only one option—they will have to respond in kind as the US attempts to ‘control and dominate space’ as is called for in the U.S. Space Command’s planning document Vision for 2020.” Gagnon went on. “The world can’t afford a new arms race nor can the public allow the Trump administration to squander the national treasury on the foolish notion that the U.S. will be the ‘Master of Space.’” [“Master of Space” is the motto of the 50th Space Wing of the U.S. Air Force Space Command.] “The time to speak out against war in space is now—before more money is wasted and the shooting starts.”

#### PAROS reforms are essential to solidifying international space law and prevent an arms race in space

Paul Meyer, Senior Fellow, The Simons Foundation Space Security, October 18, 2016, “Prospects for Progress on Space Security Diplomacy” Presentation at the United Nations General Assembly First Committee UN Headquarters, http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/Prospects%20for%20Progress%20on%20Space%20Security%20Diplomacy%20-%20presentation%20by%20Paul%20Meyer,%20UNGA%20First%20Committee%20side%20event,%20October%2018%202016.pdf, Accessed 1-24-2017

Despite the major role the Outer Space Treaty has played in delineating the scope of permissible action in outer space, the international community has long recognized that it is not sufficient to preserve security in outer space. Via the UN General Assembly resolution on “The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” or PAROS that has been a regular feature of the Assembly’s First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) since the early 1980s important further policy direction has been given. The widely-supported PAROS resolution (only two abstentions and no opposing votes) has long affirmed that “the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space…[and that consequently] there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness”. The resolution goes on to stress the need for “further measures” and for states “to refrain from actions contrary” to the peaceful use of outer space objective. While this policy direction is clear and important regrettably from the perspective of practical diplomacy the PAROS resolution has called on the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group on this item to carry forward this work. It is as if its sponsors have failed to notice that the Conference on Disarmament has been in a state of gridlock for 20 years unable to establish a subsidiary body on space or on any other theme.

#### China and Russia are fully on board with PAROS

Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2017, “Outer Space,” Reaching Critical Will, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space>, Accessed 1-24-2017

Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS):The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponization of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race, emphasizing that this treaty would not limit space access, but would prevent such limitations. In 2006, Russia argued that if all states observe a prohibition on space weaponization, there will be no arms race. Russia and China also support establishing an obligation of no use or threat of use of force against space objects and have submitted a draft treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

## Taiwan

### Solvency – Reverse support for Taiwan/Affirm “One China” Policy

#### The US should reaffirm its “One China” policy. It’s the foundation of relations that make economic and diplomatic engagement with China and Taiwan possible

Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia; Director, China Power Project at the CSIS, January 26, 2017, “Managing Cross-Strait Ties in 2017, Recommendations for the Trump Administration,” Report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/managing-cross-strait-ties-2017?block2=, Accessed 1-28-2017

As Donald Trump’s presidency begins, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the future of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China, which is bound to make managing cross-Strait ties more challenging. The preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remains an important U.S. interest. Responsibility for maintaining cross-Strait peace and stability lies primarily with Beijing and Taipei, but Washington also has a role to play. Most importantly, the United States should do no harm. Radical changes in American policy at this juncture could create instability in relations between Beijing and Taipei. The United States’ “one China” policy is part of the foundation of the U.S.-China relationship that made normalization of diplomatic ties possible. It has served U.S. interests for over 37 years and should not be capriciously discarded. The “one China” policy—the Three U.S.-China Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances—has provided a successful framework for managing U.S. relations with both sides of the Strait. Rather than damaging Taiwan’s interests, the “one China” policy, with its deliberate ambiguity, has enabled the maintenance of a robust U.S. relationship with Taiwan, including extensive diplomatic interaction, strong economic and people-to-people ties, and wide-ranging military and security cooperation.

#### There’s a strong chance for Sino-US conflict over Taiwan. Trump should reverse support for Taiwan

Zha Daojiong, Professor of International Political Economy at School of International Studies, Peking University, January 20 , 2017, “China and Trump: A New Mega-narrative?,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-and-trump-a-new-mega-narrative, Accessed 1-20-2017

Viewed from Beijing, where I am based, it is important to bear in mind that during the entire U.S. presidential campaign season, “Let’s get tougher on China” emerged as a consensus message across the entire U.S. political spectrums. Voices for a reduction of confrontation were few and effectively cast aside. Mrs. Clinton, the Democratic candidate, was reported to want to “ring China with missiles” if her campaign prevailed. Mr. Trump not only spoke of China in relation to the American economy and society in a mode that echoed America’s “Japan-bashing” fever of the 1980s, he also directly touched the most sensitive nerve of the Chinese government and the country’s citizens: America’s position on the status of Taiwan. China, in response, has repeatedly stated that its position on the basis for normal diplomatic ties – foreign governments accept the Chinese government’s positon on ‘One China’ – is not for negotiation. By the way, Chinese appetize for satisfying the incoming Trump team’s demands on other matters may not be that high, either. Few expect Trump to switch his government’s recognition of ‘one China’ from Beijing to Taipei. Under his leadership, the United States is more likely to pursue policies that come across as poking in the eye (or heart) of Beijing. Then, the extent of tolerance on the part of Beijing comes into question. Active conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan seems less distant a prospect. In my mind, the stakes are higher for China than for the U.S. An overwhelming majority of Chinese citizens were able to attain a life better than their parents, thanks to 40 years without a war between China and a major power, America included. War over Taiwan (or indeed the islands and rocks in the East Asian seas) would create at least a 50-50 chance of destroying hope of similar progress for our next generation.

### Solvency – Reverse support for Taiwan/Affirm “One China” Policy

#### Challenging the One-China policy tanks diplomatic relations and risks a US-China war

Xie Tao, professor at the School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, January 18, 2017, “Assessing the China Challenge for Trump’s Presidency,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/18/assessing-china-challenge-for-trump-s-presidency-pub-67690, Accessed 1-30-2017

More importantly, the U.S. president-elect’s actions and comments in late 2016 regarding Taiwan have cast a long shadow over the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. Trump had a phone conversation with the Taiwanese leader, Tsai Ing-wen, a move “unpresidented” since 1972. Unruffled by the torrent of criticism from both Republicans and Democrats for creating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Trump in a Fox News interview [questioned the One China policy](http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/12/11/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process/), the cornerstone of post-1972 U.S.-Chinese relations. Unsurprisingly, the phone call and the interview resulted in a [formal protest from Chinese officials](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/donald-trump-questions-us-commitment-to-one-china-policy), inflamed [Chinese public opinion](http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2016-12/9797239.html), and generated [harsh responses from some Chinese pundits](http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1578922). Beijing has repeatedly made it unequivocally clear that Taiwan is the most important of its core interests. If the incoming U.S. administration actively challenges the One China policy, Beijing will certainly and resolutely strike back, leading to diplomatic confrontations or even military conflicts. If Trump would like to have a war with China to prove the United States is great again, then he should keep testing Beijing’s redline on Taiwan.

## A2: Pressure CPs (hard line on China)

### Permutation: Do plan and CP on other issues

#### Permutation: Do the plan and CP on other key issues. Cooperation is key on shared interests but we can be strong in other areas at the same time. The permutation has a solvency advocate, which is better than the CP alone

Amy Searight, a senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Geoffrey Hartman, a fellow with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, January 27, 2017, “South China Sea Guidelines for the New Administration,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-guidelines-new-administration, Accessed 1-28-2017

\*Pursue Deterrence and Cooperation Simultaneously Although Chinese cooperation is necessary to address some regional and global issues—such as North Korea’s belligerent behavior and climate change—the United States should not be held hostage by concerns that a more robust deterrence strategy will thwart bilateral cooperation. Any temptation to alter U.S. policies in the South China Sea to preserve cooperation with China in other areas is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Cooperation on areas of shared interest is important not only to the United States, but also to China. U.S. leaders should not be afraid of tension in the U.S.-China relationship. The United States can stand firm on its principles and deter China from undermining the regional order while maintaining a productive relationship. Giving ground on vital interests in Asia will not encourage greater cooperation on global issues. Instead, perceptions of weakness may encourage leaders in Beijing to embrace more assertive behavior. In short, adopting a more robust deterrence approach need not prevent cooperation that is in the interests of both countries.

### Permutation: Do Both

#### The US should be willing to the challenge China while pursuing cooperative policies at the same time

Jon Meade Huntsman Jr., former Governor of Utah and US Ambassador to Singapore from 1992 to 1993, and China from 2009 to 2011, Charlene Barshefsky, Former US Trade Representative and Evan Greenberg, Chair of the US-ASEAN Business Council, January 27, 2017, “Trump must reassert US leadership in the Asia Pacific,” PacNet #8, Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-8-trump-must-reassert-us-leadership-asia-pacific, Accessed 1-28-2017

China poses a particular challenge for the United States. The country's spectacular rise to become the world’s second-largest economy in a few short decades has created [huge opportunities](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__csis.us11.list-2Dmanage.com_track_click-3Fu-3D833ec271d60c6750d9c3baaac-26id-3D0164bf022b-26e-3D8ed7f6fb62&d=DwMGaQ&c=lTFYvTKl9NjBtWucofDMxg&r=A0EjRKQJPXd4YAn3fkGa_25wL_p3bD0B5cNWG98J1Z8&m=fMl8aG0Vny57uYOkcHrE1MIsQe289CMt1W6QOl2ZdO4&s=jyZagOzoWCSeDMPYvAFnBvNlqSyhaTh0kHlZ6Ae5ujk&e=) for US exporters and investors. But [as noted](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__csis.us11.list-2Dmanage.com_track_click-3Fu-3D833ec271d60c6750d9c3baaac-26id-3D68c88f10df-26e-3D8ed7f6fb62&d=DwMGaQ&c=lTFYvTKl9NjBtWucofDMxg&r=A0EjRKQJPXd4YAn3fkGa_25wL_p3bD0B5cNWG98J1Z8&m=fMl8aG0Vny57uYOkcHrE1MIsQe289CMt1W6QOl2ZdO4&s=nMMkgjQFADQ719gZ0GGQtxGgLKrtyeUWQMSHM-CFp4Y&e=) in the CSIS report, slowing growth, stalled reforms, and mercantilist policies are creating a more difficult environment in China, while Beijing is pursuing more assertive policies externally. The United States benefits from a cooperative US-China relationship, but this cannot be sustained if it does not advance the interests of both countries. Even while expanding cooperation, Washington must be willing to challenge Beijing where it seeks to undermine the rules-based order or when its actions threaten US interests.

#### We can cooperate on some issues while taking a hard line on others

Amy Searight, senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Murray Hiebert, senior adviser and deputy director of the program, January 17, 2017, “Engaging Southeast Asia: Economic Recommendations for the New Administration,” Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), https://www.csis.org/analysis/engaging-southeast-asia-economic-recommendations-new-administration, Accessed 1-28-2017

A mutually beneficial U.S.-China economic relationship is strongly in U.S. interests. However, the relationship is currently out of balance. The new administration should continue to pursue cooperation with Beijing where possible, while responding forcefully to Chinese practices that harm U.S. interests.

### Permutation: Do Both

#### The US should reaffirm engagement policies while maintaining a firm resolve to mitigate future threats

Jim Steinberg, University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs, and Law, Former Dean, Maxwell School of Syracuse University and former Deputy Secretary of State and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, January 18, 2017, “Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea Showdown?,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-donald-trump-avoid-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown-19099>, Accessed 1-20-2017

For this reason, the Trump administration should explore how the United States and China might work together to stabilize the relationship before launching unilateral policies that would only deepen the spiral of distrust. The new administration should challenge China to reassure the United States and the region with concrete deeds that its intentions are truly peaceful. For example, the administration could step up cooperation on North Korea and agree to a freeze on new military activities in the South and East China Seas. The Trump administration should reaffirm the One China policy and indicate its willingness to explore ways of implementing the rebalance in ways that appear less threatening to China’s security.

Such an approach will not necessarily solve all the problems in the relationship. The new administration must be prepared to demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect its interests and allies by maintaining a robust U.S. military posture, by reaffirming treaty commitments to allies and statutory responsibilities to Taiwan, and by taking effective measures to counter the growing North Korean threat—even if those actions produce Sino-U.S. tensions. The credibility of those actions, and the willingness of others to back the United States despite the risk of tensions with China, will be all the greater if the administration combines resoluteness with reassurance where possible—and leaders in Beijing should do the same. There are opportunities for further collaboration on issues ranging from Korea to the South China Sea, cyber to space, peacekeeping mission to counter-piracy cooperation, and transparency as well as confidence-building measures. The future of these two great nations is not preordained; it is being written in real time. Leaders on both sides need to avoid premature rushes to judgment about the other’s hostile intentions that could become self-fulfilling prophesies.

### Self-fulfilling Prophecy Turn

#### Hardline tactics toward China are creating a self-fulfilling prophecy now. China expects with the US and is preparing now in response

Will Worely, Staff Writer, January 28, 2017, “China military official says war with US under Donald Trump 'becoming practical reality',” The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-donald-trump-war-us-military-official-practical-reality-president-latest-a7550601.html, Accessed 1-29-2017

Mr Trump and members of his administration have consistently voiced a hard line against China. Mr Trump has branded the country a “currency manipulator” and accusing the country of underhand trading and economic tactics. But more significantly in security terms, Mr Trump has also ignored the US’s longstanding ‘One China’ policy, [publicly engaging with the President of Taiwan](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-taiwan-phone-call-long-planned-china-angered-mike-pence-kellyanne-conway-a7456051.html), Tsai Ing-wen, in a move that was hugely antagonising for Beijing. China strongly regards Taiwan as part of its territory and the US has tacitly respected this for decades, but Mr Trump signalled a departure from this policy. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has also advocated a US naval blockade of artificial Chinese islands in the South China Sea – which Beijing could interpret as an act of war. Further suggestions China is preparing for conflict emerged this week, [with unconfirmed reports the military has moved long range missiles](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/china-deploys-long-range-nuclear-cpable-missiles-russian-coast-us-president-donald-trump-a7548296.html) closer to the north east border in Heilongjiang province -- within firing range of the US.

### Nationalism Turn

#### Confrontational policies toward China fuel nationalism. China will not back down

[Ted Galen Carpenter](http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter), a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, January 13, 2017, “Economic Ties May Not Be Enough to Prevent a Crisis in U.S. Relations with China,” [China-US Focus](http://www.chinausfocus.com/), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/economic-ties-may-not-be-enough-prevent-crisis-us-relations-china, Accessed 1-29-2017

For the first time since the rapprochement that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger orchestrated in the early 1970s, an incoming U.S. president seems to be considering translating the China-bashing rhetoric of a presidential campaign into actual policy. Some of the more hawkish Trump advisers appear to take the position that if the United States merely shows “sufficient resolve”—even on the hot-button Taiwan issue, Beijing will simply back down. According to that happy scenario, the economic relationship continues—only on better terms for the United States. It is possible they’re right. But given the nationalist emotions involved, not to mention the strategic/military stakes in China’s immediate neighborhood, it is unlikely that Beijing will back down even over such issues as the East China Sea and South China Sea. It is even less likely that Chinese officials and the Chinese people will do so regarding Taiwan. Trump and his advisers are charting a very dangerous course, and the current bilateral economic links may not be enough to save them from their folly.

### A2: Tarriffs

#### Tariffs on China will decimate U.S. leadership in Asia

Max Boot, [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeane_J._Kirkpatrick) Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the [Council on Foreign Relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations), December 27, 2016, “Donald Trump’s Pivot Through Asia,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/27/the-pivot-to-asia-obama-trump/, Accessed 1-2-2017

So, too, if Beijing proceeds with its RCEP trade accord while Washington makes no attempt to revive the TPP, America’s influence will also decline. Even worse will occur if Trump boosts tariffs and declares a trade war with China — which would amount to a mutual suicide pact, given the extent to which the Chinese and American economies are interconnected. The odds of this self-destructive policy being implemented have now increased with the appointment of arch-protectionist Peter Navarro, who wrongly claims that trade with China is killing the U.S. economy, to lead a new National Trade Council at the White House. Erecting tariff barriers will hurt the U.S. economy and vastly decrease America’s influence in Asia.

## A2: Appeasement DA

### Non-Unique

#### Appeasement is the status quo & that’s good for relations

Teng Jianqun, the Director of the Department of U.S. Studies at China Institute of International Studies, January 26, 2017, “China-US Relations: Get Ready for a Change,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/china-us-relations-get-ready-for-a-change/, Accessed 1-29-2017

The key challenge for both sides is being able to successfully tackle domestic issues and maintain growth. While certain structural obstacles between China and the United States may become more challenging, other issues will retreat to the background. From what we saw during and after the election campaign, Trump will treat the United States essentially as a profit-making enterprise, and his basic policy objective will be to maximize and defend America’s economic interests. Consequently, Trump will likely adopt a bargaining strategy in foreign policy, especially when dealing with China, with the objective of forcing China to give away more interests. As a result, China and the United States will have more fiction in trade. However, Trump will not emphasize democracy and human rights, values often used by the Democratic Party to criticize China. This may incidentally dismantle the ideological obstacle between the two countries. China and the United States may actually see improvement in their relations when both sides get busy in striking business deals.

# Negative

## Diplomatic Engagement Bad/Fails

### Trump guarantees BAD diplomacy

#### Doing the plan under the Trump administration only contributes to the shift in diplomacy toward a zero-sum ideology that guarantees endless warfare

Jon B. Alterman, the director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 21, 2016, “[The Undiplomatic Style of American Diplomacy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/21/the-undiplomatic-style-of-american-diplomacy/),” http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/21/the-undiplomatic-style-of-american-diplomacy/, Accessed 1-28-2017

High-minded appeals to international institutions have lost whatever political appeal they ever had. In the current political environment, in both the United States and abroad, they can help end a political career. Politics are becoming more zero-sum, and the U.S. strategy of appealing to mutual benefit in diplomacy is increasingly at odds with that approach. Diplomacy hasn’t changed much over the years: Leverage always matters, but wins and losses still come most often from a delicate ability to appreciate other points of view. As the gap between politics and diplomacy widens, diplomacy will have to adapt. Some of the zero-sum impulse is likely to cross over into diplomatic work. When it does, the result will not merely be that some countries will chalk up clearer wins. More issues are likely to remain unresolved, and more conflicts are likely to remain unmanaged. The cost of clearer political victories will be more wars raging on with no end in sight.

## Economic Engagement Bad/Fails

### A2: Theory – Trade Won’t Stop War

#### Economic engagement and interdependence with won’t prevent war. History disproves and Pinker is wrong

Joel Einstein, Australian National University, January 17, 2017, “[Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China](http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/),” E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/, Accessed 1-20-2017

The theory that increased economic interdependence reduces conflict rests on three observations: trade benefits states in a manner that decision-makers value; conflict will reduce or completely cut-off trade; and that decision-makers will take the previous two observations into account before choosing to go to war. Based on these observations, one should expect that the higher the benefit of trade, the higher the cost of a potential conflict. After a certain point, the value of trade may become so high that the state in question has become economically dependent on another. Proponents of this theory argue that if two states have reached this point of mutual dependence (interdependence), their decision-makers will value the continuation of trade relations higher than any potential gains to be made through war. It is on this argument that Pinker rests his statement that the economic relationship between the US and China precludes war. One can see evidence of this when analysing US views on China as trade rises. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates that only a minority of Americans see China as a critical threat, compared to a majority in the mid-1990s. This number is even higher when analysing Americans who directly benefit from trade with China. As compelling as this argument may be, high levels of economic interdependence have not always resulted in peace. The decades preceding WW1 saw an unprecedented growth in international trade, communication, and interconnectivity but needless to say, war broke out. This instance alone is not enough to disprove Pinker’s logic. War may become very unlikely but began nonetheless. Let us take two hypothetical scenarios, one in which the chances of war is 80% and the other in which trade has reduced the likelihood of war to 10%. Just knowing that war did indeed take place does not tell us which scenario was in play. Similarly, the fact that WW1 took place gives us no information about whether economic interdependence made war unlikely or not. In fact, evidence even exists to suggest that economic linkages prevented a war from breaking out during the sequence of crises that led up to WW1. However, the fact that a war as detrimental as WW1 could break out despite a supposed reduction of the likelihood of conflict gives us an impetus to examine whether this reduction does take place. Additionally, if this is the case, what variables can weaken this pacifying effect?

#### Trade will not reduce the likelihood of a US-China war. Pinker’s idea is super-misleading

Joel Einstein, Australian National University, January 17, 2017, “[Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China](http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/),” E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/, Accessed 1-20-2017

This essay has shown that the strength of the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is subject to change depending on a series of dynamic variables. It has also demonstrated that the strength of the conflict provoking effects of strategic interests can change depending on whether the strategic interest amounts to a situation of unbearable strategic vulnerability. It has discounted the theory that interdependence leads to a higher chance of conflict through an erosion of credibility. To sum up, trade does seem to reduce the likelihood of conflict but should not be seen as a deterministic factor as strategic interests, and vulnerabilities also have a large effect. There is no hard rule as to what will be the driving factor as the nature of economic interdependence and of strategic factors impact their relative values. Accordingly, Pinker’s statement that the trade between the US and China makes war exceptionally unlikely is simplistic and misleading because it fails to account for a wide array of variables that can radically change the likelihood of a Sino-American war. An intellectually honest thesis would insist upon a comprehensive approach in which the level of economic activity is simply one of many variables that is required.

### A2: Theory – Trade Won’t Stop War (China)

#### Economic engagement and trade will not make China more free. It’s empirically proven

John Pomfret, Staff Writer, December 9, 2016, “Five myths about U.S.-China relations,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-us-china-relations/2016/12/09/beedb888-bccc-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe\_story.html?utm\_term=.3ff2af65830b, Accessed 1-29-2017

MYTH NO. 1 Trade and engagement will set China free. This idea has been a foundational myth of America’s engagement with China almost since President Richard Nixon went there in 1972; it’s been used to justify decades of interaction. On the day China was granted most-favored-nation trading status in Washington in 1980, Rep. Bill Alexander (Ark.), a supporter of President Jimmy Carter, told the House, “Seeds of democracy are growing in China.” Flash forward to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, and Robert Rubin, former treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, assuring Congress that the move would “sow the seeds of freedom for China’s 1.2 billion citizens.” So far, this epochal bet has been a bust. China’s economy has become more open over the past few decades, and personal freedom for average citizens has expanded. But China’s one-party state represses dissent even more severely than it did 30 years ago in the run-up to the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square. A slew of internal Communist Party documents indicates that the level of paranoia about American values encroaching on China is at a crescendo. Meanwhile, Western businesses remain banned from investing in a wide swath of China’s economy, while Chinese firms can often invest in those sectors, including energy and telecommunications, overseas.

## Energy cooperation Neg.

### Energy cooperation will fail

#### Economic and energy cooperation with China through international forums fails without reforms

Evan A. Feigenbaum, Vice Chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in 2007-9, January/February 2017, “China and the World,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/china-and-world, Accessed 12-29-2016

The third challenge for Washington has been Beijing's expectation that its own increased role will naturally reduce the influence of smaller European democracies. China is the world's largest trader, manufacturer, and emitter of carbon and boasts its second-largest economy. Since global economic and environmental problems cannot be solved without its participation, the only way to make existing institutions functional, Beijing argues, is to make them more representative. For Washington, however, rebalancing power in this way poses an uncomfortable tradeoff between liberalism and effectiveness. The more Western-dominated an institution, the more likely it is to have a liberal bias, but the less representative—and perhaps less functional—it will be. One example of this is the International Energy Agency, initially a group of the world's major oil consumers, whose membership and the voting shares of whose members have largely been frozen since the group's founding in 1974. As a result, it does not include China or India, the world's first- and third-largest energy consumers, respectively (although China has signed an association agreement with it, and the group has a program of cooperation with India), and it gives outsize weight to small European states that were major oil importers in the 1970s but no longer are. The result is a less functional institution on issues such as the coordination of stockpiles and technical standards.

## North Korea Cooperation Neg.

### China won’t cooperate on N. Korea / Fails

#### China is an unreliable ally to check North Korea. Multiple factors prevent them from using leverage

[Christopher K. Johnson](https://www.csis.org/people/christopher-k-johnson), Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies at the CSIS, December 15, 2016, “How should we view China's rise?,” Report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-should-we-view-chinas-rise, Accessed 1-28-2017

It would be wrong to think of China as an ally on managing North Korea. China can be a partner, and quite an effective one, with the United States in the few areas where our interests on the Peninsula align, but the fact remains that, while China has absolute leverage over the North in the form of food, energy, and other types of aid, Beijing remains absolutely unwilling to use it. Chinese fears of a regime collapse that precipitates a flood of refugees into northeast China and arguably outdated notions regarding the strategic value of North Korea as a “buffer zone” against U.S. forces in the South seem to be preventing the Politburo from fully grasping how Pyongyang’s advances in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs are dramatically altering the U.S. strategic imperative to get the North to change course.

#### China fears both DPRK regime collapse and American-led containment through unification. It won’t help

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute,January 4, 2017, “What Trump Should Understand about China and North Korea,” [National Interest (Online)](http://www.nationalinterest.org/), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-trump-should-understand-about-china-north-korea, Accessed 1-29-2017

There is no mystery about Beijing’s stance. China is ringed by nations with which it has gone to war, in some cases not that long ago. North Korea isn’t much, but it is the PRC’s only military ally. In 1950 China battled the United States to preserve another Kim regime, that of Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s founding dictator. While Beijing does not want a nuclear DPRK, it wants collapse and chaos, followed by a unified Korea allied with America, even less. Thus, when Washington asks for “help” regarding the North, Chinese officials hear: “Please impose regime change on your ally and deliver the Korean Peninsula to America, so the latter can station troops along the Yalu River and better construct a regional containment system to stifle Chinese influence and threaten Chinese prosperity.” What rational Chinese government would “help” America in that way?

#### China won’t use its influence over North Korea

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, December 6, 2016, “Will China Solve the North Korea Problem? The United States Should Develop a Diplomatic Strategy to Persuade Beijing to Help,” Policy Analysis No. 806, CATO Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/will-china-solve-north-korea-problem, Accessed 1-29-2017

China does possess an unusual degree of influence in Pyongyang, but Beijing fears an unstable DPRK more than a nuclear DPRK. From China’s standpoint, the possible consequences of a North Korean collapse—loose nukes, mass refugee flows, conflict spilling over its border— could be high. The Chinese leadership also blames Washington for creating a threatening security environment that discourages North Korean denuclearization.

### China won’t cooperate on N. Korea / Fails

#### China has no real leverage over North Korea. Any attempt to coerce N. Korea could easily backfire

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 19, 2017, “Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/19/managing-asia-s-security-threats-in-trump-era-pub-67746, Accessed 1-30-2017

First, China’s level of actual influence over North Korea is at best unknown but almost certainly far less than what it enjoyed in the past and is probably declining. Today, Beijing’s relations with the Kim Jong-un regime are tense and in many respects unfriendly. While at times publicly extolling the long-standing party and government ties between China and North Korea, the Chinese leadership in fact regards Kim as provocative, dangerous, and generally untrustworthy. He has purged and executed Beijing’s closest North Korean interlocutor and repeatedly ignored China’s urgings to comply with a series of UN Security Council resolutions. As a result, unlike his predecessors, Kim has yet to visit Beijing and has never met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Although a security treaty still formally binds the two countries, Chinese officials have repeatedly suggested that Beijing does not regard itself as required to support Pyongyang in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, Beijing has steadily agreed to increasingly more onerous sanctions against the North, including the curtailment of a significant portion of its trade. Given all these factors, it is highly likely that any high-pressure Chinese effort to persuade or compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons would fail, and would be met with defiance and hostility instead. In the past, Pyongyang has shown itself quite capable of enduring huge deprivations while remaining resolute and aggressive, given the repressive controls that the thuggish North Korean regime exercises over the populace and the military. One might argue that, under the above option, Beijing would be required to physically invade and overthrow the regime to halt its nuclear program, and that the United States should encourage or even try to compel such an action. But this is highly unlikely to occur, as Beijing knows such an act would almost certainly result in a war on the peninsula, and could possibly trigger the use of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons, assuming they are usable. Beijing would certainly prefer that, if unavoidable, Washington should bear the enormous onus of initiating a war on the Korean Peninsula. It most definitely will not do so, regardless of the pressure Washington brings to bear.

#### China is more than unhelpful when it comes to North Korea

Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute,January 4, 2017, “What Trump Should Understand about China and North Korea,” [National Interest (Online)](http://www.nationalinterest.org/), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-trump-should-understand-about-china-north-korea, Accessed 1-29-2017

The PRC also has shown its displeasure in other ways. China has consistently pushed the North to eschew nuclear weapons, forgo testing and participate in international negotiations. President Xi has met several times with South Korea’s president, but not once with the North’s Kim Jong-un. The latter hasn’t even been invited to visit the PRC. The diplomatic “cold shoulder” is a common technique that President Trump is likely to be practicing soon. It’s certainly true that China has been unable to rein in the DPRK. And Beijing obviously has not done all that it could to pressure the Kim regime. But misstating China’s current policy isn’t likely to make Beijing be more helpful. Why single out the PRC when U.S. ally South Korea not that long ago was shipping money and other forms of aid to the North?

#### China won’t cooperate over North Korea. It violates UN sanctions for coal, which fuels N. Korean missile development

Oki Nagai, Staff Writer, January 28, 2017, “China imported more North Korean coal in 2016 amid sanctions,” Nikkei Asian Review, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/China-imported-more-North-Korean-coal-in-2016-amid-sanctions, Accessed 1-30-2017

China imported 12.5% more North Korean coal last year at $1.18 billion worth despite United Nations sanctions, casting doubt on its overtures toward cooperation with the Trump administration. Economic research specialist CEIC Data calculated the sum based on Chinese customs statistics. Import volume -- a statistic unaffected by fluctuations in coal prices -- climbed 14.6% to a record 22.49 million tons. Traders apparently abused a loophole in the U.N. sanctions allowing some coal sales not intended for military purposes. China started curbing its North Korean coal imports in April following a Security Council resolution. But imports have been growing since August on a year-on-year basis, with November and December figures more than double year-earlier levels. North Korea's coal exports bring in badly needed foreign currency, funding the country's nuclear and missile development.

## Special Economic Zones Neg.

### Status Quo solves – US is investing now

#### The door for US companies is already open. There’s no need for the plan

ITI Manufacturing, Staff Writer, December 13, 2016, “Special Economic Zones & China Manufacturing,” http://www.itimanufacturing.com/chinese-manufacturing-news/special-economic-zones-china-manufacturing/, Accessed 1-28-2017

The tremendous growth of foreign investment in China manufacturing would not exist if it were not a win-win for both China and foreign businesses and manufacturers. Today, China is emphasizing the production of high-quality products manufactured with advanced technologies. US Companies who have not considered China manufacturing in the past, may now want to take advantage of the opportunities to advance and expand business revenue due to this win-win scenario.

### Alternate Causes prevent US investments

#### Most US firms did not invest in China last year because they reduced investment globally, not lack of access to China

Kenneth Rapoza, Staff Writer, January 27, 2017, “China Economy Becoming More Strict, 'Less Open',” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/01/27/china-economy-becoming-more-strict-less-open/#3f4e32bc768f, Accessed 1-29-2017

Foreign companies said economic reforms have had "limited impact" on their bottom line. Some 56% said they were not seeing any effects from open market reforms in China. Everyone agrees that their number one challenge in China today is competing with local Chinese companies. When asked why companies reduced investment in China in 2016, 31% said it was due to increasing market restrictions. The same number said it was due to investment cut-backs worldwide and not because of changes in Chinese economic policy. Those were the two top reasons for reductions in capital expenditures in China by U.S. firms last year. Concerns over tighter market access suggest increasing competition by local firms, market saturation, and Beijing and provincial governments favoring Chinese enterprises.

### US Investment Turn

#### The plan makes US companies more vulnerable to a down Chinese economy

Elizabeth Gurdus, Staff Writer, January 25, 2017, “China is becoming 'increasingly risky' because of its economy, Goldman Sachs wealth manager says,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/25/china-is-becoming-increasingly-risky-because-of-its-economy-analyst.html, Accessed 1-29-2017

A major risk to U.S. markets is looming, and it's bigger than headlines and President Donald Trump's tweets, Goldman Sachs' Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani told CNBC on Wednesday. The threat is the Chinese economy, the Goldman Sachs Private Wealth Management chief investment officer told "[Squawk on the Street](http://www.cnbc.com/squawk-on-the-street/)." "We use the term that China could 'submerge' under the burden of its own debt," Mossavar-Rahmani said. "If you look at any of the debt measures in China, they're tremendously high."

## Tigers Neg.

### Alternate Causality – Throughout Asia

#### Tiger farms fuel poaching and exist throughout Asia & SE Asia

Rachael Bale, Staff Writer, September 29, 2016, “The World Is Finally Getting Serious About Tiger Farms,” National Geographic, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/09/wildlife-watch-tiger-farms-cites-protections/, Accessed 1-29-2017

Tiger farms, which also exist in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, have long been suspected of feeding the international black market for illegal wildlife products. Last Friday, the first day of the conference, conservationists praised Laos for its [announcement](https://eia-international.org/groups-welcome-intention-laos-phase-tiger-farms) that it was “looking for ways to phase out tiger farms.” The facilities breed tigers at an intensive rate, and the animals are believed to be slaughtered so their parts can sold to be made into wine, pseudo medicine, luxury home decor, and more. Tiger farms are also suspected to fuel the poaching of wild tigers, which still face serious threats of their own. “Trade in parts and derivatives of captive-bred tigers perpetuates the desirability of tiger products, in turn stimulating poaching of wild tigers,” says Debbie Banks, of the Environmental Investigation Agency, a London-based NGO. There are an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 captive tigers on farms in Asia and Southeast Asia, compared to only about [4,000 left in the wild](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/04/160410-tiger-numbers-rise-wwf-conservation-double-population/) (though this may be an [overly generous estimate](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/04/160420-tigers-conservation-trafficking-world-wildlife-fund-panthera/)).

#### Habitat loss is killing tigers across Asia now

Save Wild Tigers, Staff Writer, 2017, “Threats,” http://www.savewildtigers.org/the-facts/threats-tigers, Accessed 1-29-2017

An increase in human populations throughout tiger range countries has resulted in tiger habitats being reduced. Over the past 100 years, tiger habitats have dwindled as they've been overtaken by agriculture, plantations, timber logging, human settlements and access routes. Only 7% of the tiger’s historical range is intact today and tiger habitats are left in isolated areas. This results in small pockets of tiger habitat surrounded by human populations. Not only can this result in human/tiger conflicts as tigers roam to find new habitats, but it can also result in inbreeding in small populations which can reduce genetic diversity.

### Alternate Causality – Climate change

#### Climate change makes large-scale tiger deaths inevitable

World Wildlife Federation, Staff Writer, October 2, 2016, “The Effects of Climate Change,” https://www.wwf.org.uk/updates/effects-climate-change, Accessed 1-29-2017

Many of the world’s threatened species live in areas that will be severely affected by climate change. And climate change is happening too quickly for many species to adapt. Here are just a few examples of how climate change may increase the challenges we’re already facing in our conservation work. Tigers Tiger numbers in the wild have declined to as few as 3,200, largely due to poaching and habitat loss. Climate change is likely to result in increasing sea levels and further risk of fire in the already fragmented habitats where tigers live.

#### Climate change is a multi-level assault on tiger populations

Defenders of Wildlife, Staff Writer, 2017, “Threats to Tigers,” <http://www.defenders.org/tiger/threats>, Accessed 1-29-2017

As [climate change](http://www.defenders.org/climate-change/climate-change-101) continues to warm the planet, tigers are feeling the heat. As we see ocean levels rise, tigers are losing habitat due to costal erosion in areas like India's Sundarban islands. As rising sea levels claim more habitat and sea water moves up river, naturally fresh water is becoming more saline, or more highly concentrated with salt. These factors are forcing the tigers to move northward towards areas more heavily populated by humans and increasing the likelihood of animal/human conflicts.

## Pressure CPs

### Pressure is effective and competitive

#### The US has a host of effective diplomatic and economic tools of coercion to stabilize the regional order

Amy Searight, a senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Geoffrey Hartman, a fellow with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, January 27, 2017, “South China Sea Guidelines for the New Administration,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-guidelines-new-administration, Accessed 1-28-2017

U.S. policy in the South China Sea has been overly reliant on military options, which may not always be the most effective response. Diplomatic, informational, legal, and economic responses are currently underrepresented in U.S. China policy, and their incorporation into the policy toolkit will be important for successfully dissuading China over the long term. For example, targeted sanctions on Chinese companies involved in destabilizing activities could be considered. The United States has leverage over China in areas not directly related to the South China Sea and may have to consider using or threatening to use these tools to stabilize the regional order.

### Pressure Good – S. China Seas

#### The US should take a hard line on Chinese adventurism in the S. China Seas, which is inevitable in the status quo

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Volume 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), pp.

Diffident diplomacy and strategy discourage few. America and her allies’ failure to push back against Chinese advances opened space for Beijing to act in a consequence-free—and, thus, risk-free—environment. The Obama administration’s initial responses to China’s assertiveness appeared muted and halfhearted, reinforcing Beijing’s perception that unilateral changes to the status quo would go unanswered, or, at a minimum, that it would incur no serious penalty for adventurism. Such expectations emboldened Beijing to redouble its efforts, entrenching its strategic position in the South China Sea. What, then, should the new U.S. administration do to repair the damage done? Above all, top officials must welcome risk. Risk is—or should be—a reciprocal thing, not something China imposes on an inert United States. The incoming U.S. administration must regard risk as an unavoidable facet of great power relations. Only the daring compete successfully. Such competition requires that the United States take risks even as it manages the risks thrust upon it by an increasingly domineering China. Being venturesome, though, is not the same as being reckless. In its simplest form, risk is the possibility that something unpleasant, undesirable, or even dangerous will happen. It can be manufactured through deliberate actions. Imposing risk on Chinese leaders could prod them to think twice before acting or even to forego aggression altogether. Through conscious strategic moves, Washington can and must manipulate risk to convince Beijing that future provocations in the South China Sea will elicit reactions and outcomes that set rather than advance China’s political goals.

#### The US must reverse current ineffectiveness and challenge China’s assertiveness in the S. China Seas. This will inevitably challenge US interests. Failure to take a hard stance undermines the entire alliance system and weakens US leadership

Amy Searight, a senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Geoffrey Hartman, a fellow with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, January 27, 2017, “South China Sea Guidelines for the New Administration,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-guidelines-new-administration, Accessed 1-28-2017

A critical and early Chinese test of U.S. resolve is likely to come in the South China Sea, where Washington has struggled to respond effectively to assertive Chinese behavior. Enduring U.S. interests—freedom of navigation and overflight, support for the rules-based international order, and the peaceful resolution of disputes—are at risk in the region. U.S. goals to uphold regional alliances and partnerships, defend international rules and norms, and maintain a productive relationship with China remain valid. China has seized the initiative in the South China Sea, however, and the United States needs to revamp its strategy to reverse current trends and escape the trap of reactive and ineffectual policymaking. U.S. responses to China’s South China Sea activities have been insufficient to alter China’s behavior and have fed the narrative that China is pushing the United States out of the region. Countering China’s efforts has become a key test of perceived U.S. commitment to many in the region. If Chinese coercion goes unchallenged by the United States, it will send a dangerous signal about the strength of the U.S. alliance system and lessen the appeal of the United States as a security partner.

### Pressure good – Regime collapse insulator

#### Hardline policies toward China only empower hardliners

Eric Gomez, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, January 25, 2017, “US Withdrawal from TPP: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Gift for China?,” [The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-withdrawal-tpp-geopolitical-geoeconomic-gift-china, Accessed 1-29-2017

There is great risk associated with pushing hard against Chinese security interests while scrapping multilateral agreements like the TPP that emphasized U.S. soft power in the Asia-Pacific. In [Foreign Policy, Hunter Marston spells out the danger](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/23/trump-has-nothing-to-offer-asia-except-threats/) of Trump’s hard power approach to U.S.-China relations, “Bereft of trade incentives and heavy on military posturing, a Trump strategy of peace through strength will only empower Chinese hard-liners and increase the chances of a superpower conflict.”

# Scenario Updates

## US-China Relations

### Brink – Relations are fragile

#### US-China relations are on the brink—Only economic and diplomatic engagement prevent conflicts in E. Asia and massive poverty reduction

Jim Steinberg, University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs, and Law, Former Dean, Maxwell School of Syracuse University and former Deputy Secretary of State and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, January 18, 2017, “Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea Showdown?,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-donald-trump-avoid-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown-19099>, Accessed 1-20-2017

Many scholars and policymakers would agree. But while there is ample reason to be concerned about trends, we would contend that the state of U.S.-China security relations is a glass half full. It is important that both sides make maximum efforts to stabilize the security relationship, lest tensions in both the economic and security dimensions feed on each other, and the risks of rivalry and conflict deepen. Until recently, there was considerable bipartisan continuity in U.S. policy towards the PRC. The pillars of this policy have included support for economic engagement and diplomatic partnership with China, combined with ongoing security commitments to regional allies, a capable U.S. military presence to back up those commitments, robust trade and investment relations, and involvement in range of multilateral institutions. This strategy served U.S. interests well for decades—helping pull the PRC away from the Soviet Union and thus accelerating the end of the Cold War. It also preserved security for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and East Asia. The peaceful regional environment provided a context for China’s leaders to launch a strategy of “reform and opening up,” which lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty and contributed to regional and global economic growth as transnational supply chains offered consumers lower prices for tradeable goods.

#### U.S.-China relations are fragile and just a Trump tweet away from escalation

Lee H. Hamilton, Distinguished Scholar, Indiana University, January 2, 2017, “Trump’s Impulsiveness Challenges Are Vital To U.S.-China Relationship,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/trumps-impulsiveness-chal\_b\_13929822.html, Accessed 1-19-2017

Is Trump signaling a real shift? And if so, what it will be? Does he want to abandon the One China policy, a bedrock principle of American foreign policy? And replace it with what? Does he want to provoke a trade war? The relationship is fragile as well as of paramount importance. The future of the world, in no small measure, depends on the stability of U.S.-China relations. Trump’s vague tweets, with few details, sow confusion and escalate risks, such as when China flew what was described as a nuclear-capable bomber across Taiwan and disputed areas of the South China Sea. All this means that America must be clear, consistent and forceful in maintaining our vital interests in the region. So, from my perspective, Trump’s statements are worrisome. He needs to reassure our allies that America will maintain open commerce and trade, continue pragmatic relations, calm tensions and uphold global standards of conduct between nations.

### China Fears US-Russian Relations

#### China perceives stronger US-Russian relations as the pretext for an anti-China alliance

Catherine Wong, Staff Writer, January 18, 2017, “Trump diplomacy: how will it affect China?,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2062525/trump-diplomacy-how-will-it-affect-china, Accessed 1-25-2017

Yan said the US would add Russia to the list of countries it hoped would help contain China – currently including Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore and Vietnam, among others – and ramp up the security pressure over Taiwan and North Korea. “As the US is losing its advantage over Southeast Asia, Trump will focus more on America’s advantage over East Asia, with Taiwan being important leverage,” he added. Yan said China’s relations with Russia, one of its closest security partners, would be put to the test, with Trump’s flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin sparking concerns among Chinese experts over the possibility of a US-Russia alliance against China.

### Impacts - General

#### Strong relations with China are essential to world peace

Ma Mengli, Staff Writer, January 11, 2017, “Commentary: Expanding cooperation with China important political legacy for U.S.,” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/11/c\_135974203.htm, Accessed 1-30-2017

If the past eight years offer any guide to the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump, who made unfounded claims against China during the general election last year, nurturing mutual trust and knowing where to draw the line are essential for the world's most important bilateral relationship. Ties between China and the United States must be rooted in trust and respect, vibrant trade cooperation, and a firm belief that the two great powers can co-exist peacefully. World peace relies on their ability to do so.

#### Sino-US cooperative relations are essential check regional conflicts

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 19, 2017, “Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/19/managing-asia-s-security-threats-in-trump-era-pub-67746, Accessed 1-30-2017

These key priorities or interests are made even more important by the fact that East Asia houses the most highly populated, rapidly developing major state in the world: China. Given its size, location, growing impact on the region and the world, and in some ways problematic stance toward the three security challenges discussed herein, pragmatic, cooperative U.S. relations with China will almost certainly become increasingly critical to the continued protection of all of Washington’s security interests in Asia. Indeed, the tenor of Washington’s relations with Beijing will largely determine whether Asia remains peaceful and productive or a growing source of tension and rivalry, and hence a drain on resources and a potential trigger of conflict.

### A2: Relations – Non-Unique / Breakdown inevitable

#### Trump will soon ramp up naval forces in E. Asia to challenge China. This will destabilize relations and undermine US credibility

[Bihu Ray](http://www.ibtimes.sg/reporters/bihu-ray), Staff Writer, January 24, 2017, “South China Sea: Under Trump, a war with China is inevitable, experts say,” International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.sg/south-china-sea-under-trump-war-china-inevitable-experts-say-6807, Accessed 1-29-2017

Military experts said if both these superpowers stay armed to teeth against each other, a dangerous escalation is certain. Moreover, Reuters reported that aides have said that Trump is planning a major naval build-up in East Asia to challenge China's dominance in the area. Washington-based South China Sea expert Mira Rapp-Hooper at the Center for a New American Security said, as reported by Reuters: "The Trump administration has begun to draw red lines in Asia that they will almost certainly not be able to uphold, but they may nonetheless be very destabilizing to the relationship with China, invite crises, and convince the rest of the world that the United States is an unreliable partner."

#### Sino-US bi-lateral conflicts are inevitable

Liu Youfa, a senior adviser at the Indian Studies Center at the Pangoal Institution, a leading China-based think tank. Dr. Liu served as consul general (ambassadorial rank) at the Chinese Consulate General, January 18, 2017, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-future-of-us-china-relations-under-president-trump/, Accessed 1-20-2017

The political cycles in the United States have become “roadblocks” for bilateral relations. During their campaigns, most presidential candidates use “China bashing” tactics in order to attract media attention or win votes. Likewise, when these president-elects get to the White House, they always experience a “learning curve” that sees them eventually deviate from campaign politics and party politics and bring U.S.-China relations back to the right track. The above scenario, repeated over and over, has always resulted in fluctuations in the bilateral relationship, and will continue to be a source for misunderstanding and even conflicts. It is noteworthy that the two governments very often butt heads on many issues because of the lack of common understanding or benchmarks on the issue at stake.

#### US-China competition will intensify, preventing progress in security & economic issues

Teng Jianqun, the Director of the Department of U.S. Studies at China Institute of International Studies, January 26, 2017, “China-US Relations: Get Ready for a Change,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/china-us-relations-get-ready-for-a-change/, Accessed 1-29-2017

In light of the above, I make the following predictions regarding China-U.S. relations under Trump. First of all, competition between China and the United States in the realms of security and the economy will intensify. China will not halt its pace and wait for the United States to adjust its strategy. Trump, on the other hand, will be eagerly looking for ways to “make America great again.” The resulting competition will make it more difficult for the two sides to cooperate on security and economic issues.

### A2: Relations – Relations are resilient

#### Relations are resilient and there’s no risk of a trade war for three reasons

Wu Zhenglong, a senior research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies, January 20, 2017, “What Does Trump’s “America First” Outlook Mean for Sino-US Ties?,” China-US Focus,

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-does-trumps-america-first-outlook-mean-for-sino-us-ties, Accessed 1-29-2017

After decades of joint efforts, the two countries have laid a solid foundation for a steady development of their relationship. First, the Chinese and American economies are highly complementary to each other. A trade war could only result in both sides wearing each other out. Second, the public in the US are strongly in favor of a good bilateral relationship and fully aware of the importance of the “one China” principle. They have expressed opposition to Trump’s various abnormal behaviors on the Taiwan, trade and South China Sea issues. Last, the Sino-US relationship has become one with global implications. The two countries have achieved significant progress in cooperation on such issues as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and global epidemic prevention and begun coordination in the cyber world, polar areas, deep sea and outer space.

#### Relations are resilient. Diplomatic and economic cooperative channels have a solid foundation

Tao Wenzhao, Researcher for the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 3, 2017, “China-US Relations in 2016,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-us-relations-in-2016, Accessed 1-20-2017

Over years, Xi and Obama facilitated the countries’ historic partnership in leading the global response to climate change, making it a significant pillar of bilateral ties. After ratifying the Paris Agreement, both leaders have promised to continue taking forceful moves at home to promote transition to green, low-carbon, climate-adaptive economies at both domestic and international levels. In 2016, all exchange mechanisms between the two countries functioned well. In the past seven years, China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue has proven critical for expanding cooperation, managing differences. The 8th China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and 7th China-US High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange were held in Beijing on June 6 and 7. In his opening speech, President Xi reviewed progress in endeavors to formulate a new type of major-country relationship, emphasizing adherence to the direction no matter what changes take place in international relations.

### A2: Relations – Relations are resilient

#### Sino-US relations are resilient. Multiple factors prevent relations from disruption, even with Trump

Wu Zhenglong, senior research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies, January 20, 2017, “What Does Trump’s “America First” Outlook Mean for Sino-US Ties?,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-does-trumps-america-first-outlook-mean-for-sino-us-ties, Accessed 1-20-2017

After Trump takes office, China and the US will see more trade frictions between them. The new president is likely to take harsher moves against China on such issues as tariffs and exchange rates. Bilateral relations may get rocky to a certain degree. China is surely not afraid of the possible scenario. It will not swallow the bitter pill in front of any attempt to harm its interests; instead, it will definitely hit back to protect its own interests. Meanwhile, it is confident and capable enough to handle any twists and turns in Sino-US relations. After decades of joint efforts, the two countries have laid a solid foundation for a steady development of their relationship. First, the Chinese and American economies are highly complementary to each other. A trade war could only result in both sides wearing each other out. Second, the public in the US are strongly in favor of a good bilateral relationship and fully aware of the importance of the “one China” principle. They have expressed opposition to Trump’s various abnormal behaviors on the Taiwan, trade and South China Sea issues. Last, the Sino-US relationship has become one with global implications. The two countries have achieved significant progress in cooperation on such issues as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and global epidemic prevention and begun coordination in the cyber world, polar areas, deep sea and outer space. All these constitute the basis and general trend of the Sino-US relations, which will not be disrupted simply because of the appearance of a new boss in the White House. What’s more, China is gaining greater initiative in its relations with the US, thanks to its growing strength. For the bilateral relationship, Trump’s idea of “America first” has both pros and cons. China can study the characteristics of his way of governing and take corresponding measures. The negative may thus be changed into a positive for better cooperation.

#### As long as cooperation remains an option, Sino-US relations will remain resilient

Wu Zhenglong, a senior research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies, January 20, 2017, “What Does Trump’s “America First” Outlook Mean for Sino-US Ties?,” China-US Focus,

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-does-trumps-america-first-outlook-mean-for-sino-us-ties, Accessed 1-29-2017

What’s more, China is gaining greater initiative in its relations with the US, thanks to its growing strength. For the bilateral relationship, Trump’s idea of “America first” has both pros and cons. China can study the characteristics of his way of governing and take corresponding measures. The negative may thus be changed into a positive for better cooperation. In his telephone conversation with Trump, President Xi Jinping pointed out that “cooperation is the only right option for China and the US.” This remark best encapsulates the history of the bilateral relationship and charts the orientation of its development. One has reason to believe that so long as both sides give up the mentality of zero-sum rivalry and persist in cooperation, the Sino-US relationship will come through the current period of uncertainty and maintain the momentum of steady and healthy development.

### A2: Relations – Too early to tell

#### It’s too early to make predictions about relations

Gary Roughead, the Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, Navy Admiral served as the 29th chief of naval operations after holding six operational commands, January 4, 2017, “What is the future of the U.S.-China relationship?,” Stanford News, http://news.stanford.edu/2017/01/04/stanford-experts-debate-future-u-s-china-relationship/, Accessed 1-29-2017

From my perspective, it’s a bit too early to say how that relationship will shape up. Clearly the early comments that were made and Trump’s phone call with Taiwan really put the relationship in the spotlight. The new administration is still building its team, and his national security leadership has yet to set an approach and priorities and to formulate policies. I think it will take some time until we see a more coherent approach that highlights the policies that will be put in place when it comes to U.S.-China relations. Trump’s picks for state, commerce and defense positions are key players here.

#### US-China rivalry is inevitable but carries huge potential for cooperation

Jin Liangxiang, PhD, Research Fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, December 15, 2016, “Overcoming the Self-fulfilling Prophecy of China Threat,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/overcoming-the-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-china-threat, Accessed 1-29-2017

Recent experience of engaging with U.S. scholars again elicited some of my humble thinking about China-U.S. relations. While China and the U.S. have positive relations in dealing with transnational threats, the two will also have to avoid geopolitical confrontations. The U.S. side should in particular overcome the self-fulfilling prophecy of China threat. There is huge potential of cooperation between China and the U.S. in a large variety of transnational security issues from fighting terrorism and piracy to jointly dealing with environment pollution, cyber hacking and natural disasters. All these challenges need joint efforts of the countries in the region, and the cooperation between China and the U.S. in particular. Cooperation between the two will benefit not only themselves but also the region.

## US-India Relations

### DA – US/China relations internal link

#### US-China-India relations are a delicate balance. A US tilt either way escalates regional fears and undermines US leadership in Asia

Mohan Malik, professor in Asian security at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Spring 2016, “Balancing Act: The China-India-U.S. Triangle,” World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/balancing-act-china-india-us-triangle, Accessed 1-20-2017

The U.S.–China–India triangular relationship is a strategic Rubik’s Cube. All three need each other. For China, its economic relationship with the United States is vitally important as its biggest export market. For India, its ties with the United States facilitate its rise as a major power and augment its position in Asia. For its part, Washington does not want a single power to dominate the Asian continent and its adjoining waters and supports the rise of several powers, India chief among them, with the United States acting as an “engaged offshore power balancer.” For China, the United States is the principal strategic adversary; for India, it is China. India’s deterrence capabilities are China-centric, while those of China’s are U.S.-centric. The U.S. interests require it to cooperate with China on some issues and with India on others, and sometimes with both. How China and India manage their differences on their border dispute, trade imbalance, Tibet, Pakistan, regional integration, and the UN Security Council reforms will have significant implications on the United States’ place in Asia.

In the triangular power balance game, Beijing fears India’s participation in the U.S.–Japanese containment of China. Conversely, India fears a Sino-U.S. alignment that would allow Beijing to curb the growth of Indian power or lead to U.S. acknowledgment of the South Asia/Indian Ocean region as China’s sphere of influence. All three countries benefit from a degree of competition but lose if competition turns into overt rivalry and confrontation. Strained U.S.–China relations make India the “swing state” in the triangle but tense India–China relations would put the United States in a pivotal position. Whether India enters into a soft or hard alignment with the United States (and Japan) will be determined by Beijing’s willingness to accommodate India’s rise and aspirations. A major rupture in the U.S.–Chinese or Indian–Chinese relations alone will crystallize fluid relationships into rigid alignments. A strong, prosperous India would checkmate China and prolong U.S. primacy underpinned by shared values and interests. In contrast, a weaker, subdued, and isolated India would hasten the arrival of a Sino-centric regional order.

### UQ – Relations high now

#### US-India relations are strong under Trump

The Times of India, Staff Writer, January 25, 2017, “Donald Trump calls PM Modi, says India a 'true friend'; extends invitation,” Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/trump-calls-modi-says-india-a-true-friend-invites-pm-modi-to-us/articleshow/56769802.cms, Accessed 1-30-2017

Describing India as a "true friend" of the US, President Donald Trump invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit the country later this year, the [White House](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/White-House) said after both leaders spoke over phone and discussed issues such as trade, defence and terrorism. Trump spoke to Modi on Tuesday night over phone, four days after he was sworn-in as the 45th President of America. "During a call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, President Trump emphasised that the US considers India a true friend and partner in addressing challenges around the world," the White House said in a readout of the call. "President Trump looked forward to hosting Prime Minister Modi in the US later this year," the White House said. The two leaders discussed opportunities to strengthen the partnership between the US and India in broad areas such as the economy and defence.

### Relations key to Asian stability

#### Any departure from Indo-US relations tanks America’s ability to create stability in Asia

Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Fellow of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2017, “Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus: Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration,” Asia Policy v 23, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/AsiaPolicy23Tellis.pdf, Accessed 1-30-2017

The challenges posed by China’s rise and its assertive behaviors thus implicate the core issues of political order throughout the Indo-Pacific region, a part of the world to which the United States simply cannot be indifferent without suffering grave risks to its own standing in international politics. Coping with these problems will require the Trump administration not only to strengthen existing U.S. alliances but also, and more importantly, to recommit itself to preserving, as Condoleezza Rice once phrased it, “a balance of power that favors freedom” in Asia. An integral component of that effort involves the unstinting U.S. support of India’s rise to power. Any alternative approach to New Delhi will not only fail to produce the best outcomes for the United States; it will also make the task of improving bilateral relations akin to the labors of Sisyphus.

### UQ – Relations low now

#### Trump’s foreign policy view makes India nervous, undermining relations

Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Fellow of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2017, “Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus: Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration,” Asia Policy v 23, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/AsiaPolicy23Tellis.pdf, Accessed 1-30-2017

The variety of positions expressed by Trump suggests that the potential threat to the continuing transformation of U.S.-India relations comes less from his views on India—which are probably unsettled—than it does from his iconoclastic convictions about the relationship between the United States and the world. Throughout the campaign, Trump emphatically affirmed his opposition to the existing international order, arguing that the United States, far from being its beneficiary, was in fact its principal victim. To remedy the inconveniences flowing from this pernicious “globalism,” his America-first campaign promoted an agenda that rejected multilateral free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, demanded that allies bear a greater share of the burdens associated with their defense, and eschewed U.S. military intervention in virtually all instances other than to avert direct threats to the U.S. homeland. While many elements of this nationalist agenda are understandable—even defensible—the worldview it represents diverges from that which initially cultured the evolving U.S.-Indian partnership. Going back to the earliest years of the George W. Bush administration, the United States’ rapprochement with India was premised on the assumption that the principal strategic problem facing both countries consisted of the rise of China and the threat it posed to both U.S. primacy and Indian security—not to mention the safety of the United States’ other Asian partner and allies—simultaneously. Since it was assumed that the United States would subsist as the principal protector of the liberal international order, and the Western alliance system in particular, even in circumstances where the containment of China was impossible because of the new realities of economic interdependence, the Bush administration slowly gravitated toward a strategy of balancing China by building up the power of key states located on its periphery.

## Allied Confidence

### Hawkish Trump good

#### A hawkish Trump will renew faith in American power projection among allies

Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, December 24, 2016, “[Assessing Trump’s Emerging Asia Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/, Accessed 1-2-2017

Perhaps the most significant potential shift in U.S. policy concerns China. Trump takes a more hawkish line than Obama does on China’s militarization of the South China Sea, military buildup, and unfair trade practices. Indeed, Trump may be compensating for Obama’s unduly passive response to China’s aggressive behavior in maritime Asia — reflected in China’s brazen seizure on Dec. 15 of a U.S. underwater surveillance drone — by adopting a tougher stance that pushes back against Beijing’s efforts to enforce an Asian Monroe Doctrine. Trump has also promised to ramp up U.S. defense spending after its relative decline during the Obama years. His advisers have criticized the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” as more talk than action and have pledged to rectify this by substantially increasing the U.S. military presence through an accelerated naval buildup. The combination of standing up to China’s neo-imperialistic behavior and expanding America’s ability to project power could reassure Asian allies who lately have questioned U.S. staying power in their region.

#### Trump has reassured Japan that we support the alliance

Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, December 24, 2016, “[Assessing Trump’s Emerging Asia Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/assessing-trumps-emerging-asia-policy/, Accessed 1-2-2017

Trump’s appreciation of the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance has also increased since he questioned its utility on the campaign trail and suggested Tokyo might be better off acquiring nuclear weapons to defend itself. Central to this reappraisal was his meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Nov. 17, Trump’s first with a world leader. Abe left the meeting reassured that the president-elect would continue to support the alliance after explaining Japan’s role as a model host for U.S. forces stationed on its territory and its efforts at self-strengthening through military and economic reform.

## Chinese Economy

### Economy high now

#### Even if stats are inflated, the construction boom will keep the economy afloat

[Reuters](http://fortune.com/author/reuters/), Staff Writer, January 8, 2017, “China Is Confident the Economy Grew Over 6% in 2016,” Fortune, http://fortune.com/2017/01/08/chinese-economic-growth-2016/, Accessed 1-29-2017

China's economy expanded at a steady 6.7% in the first three quarters last year, and Zhu said he was confident the growth rate would have reached the same level or more in the fourth quarter of 2016. Zhu's remarks were made at a forum held by Tsinghua University in Beijing. China, which had been aiming for a 6.5-7 % economic growth for 2016, boosted government spending, saw a housing rally and record high levels of bank lending last year, which, however, also led to an explosive increase in debt. Many analysts believe growth was lower than official data suggests, but acknowledge that the construction boom significantly underpinned the economy.

### Economy low now

#### 2017 will be a rough year for the Chinese economy. Twin threats will cause massive financial volatility

Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, December 22, 2016, “Cracks in the Chinese Powerhouse,” The Cipher Brief, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/asia/cracks-chinese-powerhouse-1094, Accessed 1-20-2017

The surprising strength of populist, anti-globalization leaders in the industrial West has underscored the declining prospects for the middle and working classes in the United States and Europe. By contrast, Asian elites and middle class workers are widely regarded as the largest beneficiaries of [economic globalization](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/business/economy/more-wealth-more-jobs-but-not-for-everyone-what-fuels-the-backlash-on-trade.html). Despite enviable growth rates, however, Asian economies have their own worries. China’s economy has manifested troubling signs in the form of two major, inter-related threats. First, mounting public and private debt has raised the risk of a financial crisis and of dramatically slower growth rates. Chinese debt has accumulated a dizzying 465 percent over the past decade, and totaled nearly [250% of GDP in 2015](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-18/china-corporate-debt-window-closing-quickly-imf-paper-says). Servicing the debt will consume a growing part of the country’s resources and is already exacerbating [financial volatility](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1663.pdf). Worried about the size and pace of credit expansion, the IMF has called the resolution of Chinese debt an [urgent](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16270.pdf) task. Second, the country’s adherence to an increasingly inefficient mode of economic growth threatens long-term growth. China powered its phenomenal rise on the backs of exports and investment. But this approach has grown less effective as world demand has fallen and capacity grown redundant. More debt is now required to generate less and less growth. According to economist Ruchir Sharma, China now borrows [six dollars to generate one dollar in GDP growth](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-07/china-s-gdp-is-managed-india-s-shows-incompetence-sharma-q-a).

#### The Chinese economy is vulnerable. Even a small trigger could set off a destabilizing chain of political and social instability

Eswar Prasad, the Tolani Senior Professor of trade policy at Cornell University, New Century Chair in international economics & senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, January 13, 2017, “Column: Is China’s economy a house of cards?,” PBS News, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-chinas-economy-house-cards/, Accessed 1-29-2017

There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the brittleness of China’s economy. Moreover, its political structure appears to have become even more rigid under President Xi Jinping, raising the risk that political and social stability might unravel suddenly and dramatically if adverse shocks to the economy or other events were to break the Communist Party’s tight control of society and the state. Indeed, one could make a plausible argument that a relatively modest trigger could set off a destabilizing chain of events. President-elect Donald Trump’s threats of setting off a trade war could be one such trigger that hurts exports, creates more bad loans and causes economic disruption. On the other hand, Western prognostications of the likelihood of such disastrous outcomes are probably overstated. It is quite likely that the government will, in fact, be able to manage the economic, social and political tensions it faces — although the lack of flexibility in China’s economic and institutional frameworks means that there are likely to be many missteps and stumbles along the way. No matter what happens with China’s growth, one thing that is certain is that the economy is in for a wild and interesting ride in the years to come.

### Economy low now / unstable

#### China will hit zero growth by 2020

Peter Buxbaum, Staff Writer, January 9, 2017, “Is China’s Economy Stagnating?,” Global Trade, http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/chinas-economy-stagnating, Accessed 1-29-2017

The [global financial crisis](http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/commentary/economic-consequences-of-chinas-slowdown) of the last decade dealt a double blow to the Chinese economy. As foreign demand dropped Beijing embarked on a huge stimulus through state-run banks on top of an earlier public investment surge. “Loans grew 32 percent in 2009 alone, even as profit opportunities vanished,” says the paper. “At this point the stagnation path became clearly visible.” Since that time, economic developments in China have not been favorable. It’s money supply is 75 percent larger than that of the U.S. in a smaller economy. Industry overcapacity ballooned from three sectors in 2003 to 19 in 2013. China’s national debt is over $25 trillion and growing. Two-thirds of that volume has been accumulated in the past nine years. China’s capacity to innovate has also been compromised through top-down government programs. “It is highly unlikely the government will be able to anticipate years of change in computing, telecom, energy, and elsewhere,” says the report.

[Intellectual property protections in China](http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/china-market-economy) are still not advanced, creating a disincentive to innovate. State-owned enterprises still dominate some two dozen industries. Pro-market reforms since 2013 have been anemic at best. “Absent powerful pro-market reform that is nowhere in sight,” the paper concluded, “true economic growth will halt by the end of this decade…”

#### Multiple structural factors guarantee a major Chinese economic slowdown risking collapse

June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida and a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Volume 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 85.

A major factor in China's impressive rise has been its dependence on export and investment. Unfortunately, this was accompanied by the creation of excess productive capacity and low efficiency of capital utilization, meaning that the trajectory is unsustainable over the long run. As the World Bank warned in a major 2012 report, unless comprehensive structural reforms can be implemented, the result is apt to be at best stasis as a middle-income economy, and at worst financial collapse. But the beneficiaries of the export-and-investment model constitute powerful vested interests who will resist meaningful restructuring. Other factors that will constrain growth, which is already slowing, are the cumulative effects of environmental destruction, income inequality, inadequate attention to product quality, reliance on a dwindling pool of young low-wage workers, and the effect of substandard working conditions.

#### The Chinese economy will slow for next few years and US trade friction is inevitable

Nectar Gan, Staff Writer, January 26, 2017, “Hard times ahead for China’s economy, says Alibaba tycoon,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/26/hard-times-ahead-for-chinas-economy-says-alibaba-tycoon.html, Accessed 1-29-2017

China's short-term economic outlook will be "tougher than expected" and trade friction was inevitable with the U.S., Alibaba executive chairman Jack Ma said as China was reported to be lowering its growth target for this year. "In the coming three to five years … the economic situation will be even more arduous than everyone had expected," said the e-commerce billionaire on Wednesday at an annual meeting of the General Association of Zhejiang Entrepreneurs, a private business association that he chairs.

### Economy low now / unstable

#### Multiple factors will continually drag down the Chinese economy with persistently on the brink

Eswar Prasad, the Tolani Senior Professor of trade policy at Cornell University, New Century Chair in international economics & senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, January 13, 2017, “Column: Is China’s economy a house of cards?,” PBS News, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-chinas-economy-house-cards/, Accessed 1-29-2017

The Chinese economy faces several daunting risks. The first is a surge of capital flowing out of China — basically, people taking their money out of the country — which could destabilize the financial system as well as the overall economy. The second is a set of concerns about China’s financial system as it is now, including the potential instability of the banking system (too many bad loans), wild swings in the stock market and the size of the shadow banking system (informal banking institutions that are not well regulated). The third set of risks is related to more fundamental aspects of China’s economy, political structure and policymaking. These include the possibility of a dramatic growth slowdown, political instability fed by the government’s desire to further tighten its control and policy missteps. These risks do not fall into neat silos of course, and feedback loops among them could create even greater uncertainty. For instance, a slowdown in economic growth could lead to a surge in corporate bankruptcies and worsen the problem of nonperforming loans in the banking system, which in turn could trigger more capital outflows. China also faces a difficult and risky transition from a largely command-driven economy to a more market-oriented one. Indeed, many of the reforms and measures taken to promote the international role of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, have created their own risks for the economy.

#### Chinese economic slowdown to 4% growth is structurally inevitable

Eswar Prasad, the Tolani Senior Professor of trade policy at Cornell University, New Century Chair in international economics & senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, January 13, 2017, “Column: Is China’s economy a house of cards?,” PBS News, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/column-chinas-economy-house-cards/, Accessed 1-29-2017

China’s slowing growth after 2013 has fueled even greater pessimism about the country’s prospects. Crystallizing this view, Lant Pritchett and Lawrence Summers of Harvard make a strong case, based on empirical analysis of historical growth patterns of a large sample of countries, that no economy can escape “regression to the mean.” Fast-growing economies will eventually slow down, for one reason or another, especially if they have weak public institutions, high levels of corruption and are not democratic — all of which are true of China. They conclude: “China’s experience from 1977 to 2010 already holds the distinction of being the only instance, quite possibly in the history of mankind, but certainly in the data, with a sustained episode of super-rapid growth [more than 6 percent per annum] for more than 32 years.” They argue that the most likely scenario is that China’s growth is likely to slow to around 4 percent. Most growth forecasts for China tend to be conditioned on certain assumptions about policies, with more optimistic forecasts being predicated on continued reforms. Pessimists make an even stronger argument: that the rebalancing and economic transformation desired by the government will necessitate a slowdown. Michael Pettis of Peking University and I debated this through an exchange of open letters organized by Bloomberg News in March 2015. Pettis took the view that fixing the debt overhang and shifting away from credit-financed, investment-led growth would require growth to drop to 3 to 4 percent per year.

#### The Chinese economic model is broken. The impacts of high growth are getting worse

Suisheng Zhao, Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, January 29, 2017, “China's economic model cracking under pressure,” Australian Financial Review, http://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/chinas-economic-model-cracking-under-pressure-20170129-gu0u0a, Accessed 1-29-2017

As China's economy slows the costs of rapid economic growth are becoming less and less bearable, even to those who have benefited from its fruits. The existing model does not fit China anymore. This is shown by the growing numbers of China's new rich who are choosing to live abroad and take their money with them. Students are flocking to the West for a liberal college education.

### Economy low now / unstable

#### Multiple factors will drag down the Chinese and global economies in 2017

Niu Li, Director of the Macro-economy Studies Office at the Economic Projections Department of the State Information Center, January 6, 2017, “The Future of China’s Economy,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-future-of-chinas-economy, Accessed 1-29-2017

In 2017, global economic growth will still remain weak. Uncertain factors such as the election campaigns in some countries, anti-globalization sentiments and geopolitics will have a bigger impact on economic recovery. China’s economy will still face greater downward pressure because of the lack of new factors to support domestic growth, a bigger financial risk, low private investments and the low growth of residential income. Of course, China’s economy will run within a reasonable range, supported by the new fast-growing economic momentum, improved enterprises’ benefits, the need of inventory replenishment in the industrial area and the exiting room for macro regulation policy. China’s economy is expected to attain a 6.5% growth, given China’s potential economic growth, the demand change, more dividends released by the coming CPC’s 19th National Congress and the deepening reform.

#### China’s economy is slowing and headed for stagnation

Peter Buxbaum, Staff Writer, January 9, 2017, “Is China’s Economy Stagnating?,” Global Trade, http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/chinas-economy-stagnating, Accessed 1-29-2017

It is also well known that China’s economy has slowed in recent years—although still growing at comparatively robust rates—according to official numbers—as has its trade volumes. All of this leads some to conclude that China’s economic trajectory will involve transformation into a healthier and very large economy. Others, pointing to mounting debt and demographic deficits see an inevitable economic crisis for the People’s Republic. But a recent paper authored by scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, says that the “preponderance of evidence is for stagnation.”

## China Soft Power

### A2: Economic prowess leads to influence

#### Chinese soft power is ineffective. Trade does not translate to influence

[Robert Daly](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/robert-daly#sthash.p7ZiNPxr.dpuf), Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, December 24, 2016, “China’s Soft Power Strategy: Five Minutes with Robert Daly, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, http://journal.georgetown.edu/chinas-soft-power-strategy-five-minutes-with-robert-daly/, Accessed 1-20-2017

When China speaks of soft power, the gold standard is the United States. China would like to have what we have, which is readier sympathy and interest, along with readier acceptance of our policies and self-concepts around the world. China is getting wealthy, but it’s also finding that it cannot simply buy friends. Most countries in the world have China as their major trading partner, but there hasn’t been a corresponding uptick in impressions of China. No country looks to China for social, cultural, and political models, and even though they trade with China, many nations find its political system abhorrent. They do not accept China in accordance with China’s self concept… China is tired of being “the bad guy” and is unwilling to change or adapt to meet what is accepted as the standards of modernity. It is caught in a struggle in which it has very few tools, other than simple pocket book diplomacy.

## China is a military threat

### China is bent on expansionism

#### Snatching the Navy drone was a signal of deterrence against U.S. checks on Chinese expansion

David D. Chen, Staff Writer, January 3, 2017, “How China’s seizure of a naval drone could set a precedent for nabbing a satellite in orbit,” Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3134/1, Accessed 1-20-2017

China’s mid-December abduction of a US Navy unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) as the vessel was returning to its mothership after a scientific excursion showed that China is willing to play hardball with US hardware. In previous confrontations, China took custody of an EP-3 reconnaissance plane and its crew in 2001, and has harassed multiple unarmed US Navy survey ships with dangerous maneuvers. As part of its “peaceful rise”, China has focused on gaining ground in new domains of strategic interest outside of its traditional focus. As a result, it has adopted assertive and asymmetric strategic postures in the maritime, cyber, and space domains. Lessons that China learns in one domain tend to find their way into others. In June 2016, China launched Aolong-1, the first of a planned series of satellites equipped with a robotic manipulator, purportedly for the purpose of capturing and de-orbiting space debris. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy destroyer that picked up the UUV in the South China Sea is tasked with and equipped for submarine recovery operations, a similarly benign mission with apparent dual-use utility. Being robotic, the UUV made for an easier, less risky, target. China learned quickly after the EP-3 incident that holding US personnel hostage for however long a period had a highly escalatory effect and was a public relations liability. A drone, though, is simply hardware, sending the desired message to the United States—and to South China Sea claimant nations—without the wetware liability. China demonstrating its willingness to assert itself in contested domains, using tools it has developed for peaceful uses, means its assets in orbit must receive renewed scrutiny. China’s predominant doctrine for space remains a theory of “space deterrence,” its aim to hold an adversary’s space assets at risk for asymmetric advantage. What better way to send a deterrent message in space than by grabbing a high-value satellite for some period of time, potentially under the pretext of “safety of flight,” similar to the justification used by the PLA Navy in the South China Sea?

#### China’s military prowess is growing & becoming more confident toward adventurism

Teng Jianqun, the Director of the Department of U.S. Studies at China Institute of International Studies, January 26, 2017, “China-US Relations: Get Ready for a Change,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/china-us-relations-get-ready-for-a-change/, Accessed 1-29-2017

While a growing economy continues to lend support to the projection of its national power, China’s military strength has also grown prodigiously. New fighter jets and warships as well as a newly re-branded rocket force are all indications of the remarkable increase in China’s military power. China is also more self-assured when faced with internal and external challenges, showing stronger resilience toward changes in external circumstances. In other words, we are witnessing a confident China ready to pursue more aggressive policies supported by its rising national power even as the United States’ position becomes ever more precarious.

### China is a regional threat

#### U.S. pivot to Asia was a failure. China will assert regional leadership and the U.S. cannot stop them

Max Boot, [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeane_J._Kirkpatrick) Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the [Council on Foreign Relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations), December 27, 2016, “Donald Trump’s Pivot Through Asia,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/27/the-pivot-to-asia-obama-trump/, Accessed 1-2-2017

President Barack Obama will have to wait until after he leaves office to see if some of his most touted foreign policy achievements — such as the opening to Cuba and the Iranian nuclear deal — survive his presidency. But even before he exits, it is already obvious that his signature policy in East Asia, the “pivot” or “rebalance,” is deader than a dodo. And, no, it’s not just resting; it’s nailed to the perch. China’s brazen seizure of a U.S. underwater drone on December 15 in international waters makes that clear. That China handed it back a few days later hardly makes up for this act of thievery without any conceivable legal justification, given that the area in the South China Sea where the drone was taken is outside even the fanciful limits claimed by Beijing in its “nine-dash line.” Unless this was an insubordinate act of a lowly naval captain (which no one in Beijing has suggested), it was a message that China can do what it wants in the Western Pacific and the United States can’t stop it. That message is communicated even more potently by China’s ongoing efforts to fortify its man-made islands in the South China Sea, transforming them into unsinkable weapons platforms for threatening the U.S. Navy and the navies of neighboring states. Obama’s Pacific pivot was designed, in part, to move greater American military and diplomatic muscle into the region to stop this Chinese power grab, but it has singularly failed to achieve any significant results.

## China Regime Collapse

### The Chinese regime is strong now

#### Party restrictions are keeping a lid on domestic instability

Suisheng Zhao, Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, January 29, 2017, “China's economic model cracking under pressure,” Australian Financial Review, http://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/chinas-economic-model-cracking-under-pressure-20170129-gu0u0a, Accessed 1-29-2017

The Chinese government has deployed more coercive measures to maintain social stability. China's spending on domestic security outstripped the defence budget for the first time in 2009 and has continued to hit new heights since then, showing the rising costs of maintaining stability. Xi has clamped down on social media, shutting accounts of labour activists, deleting news reports and monitoring chat forums. The state has also prohibited workers from establishing independent labour unions, severely persecuted activists and detained human rights lawyers.

## Sino-Japanese War

### Brink – Tensions High

#### War is brewing in E. Asia. Japan and China are building up forces for a zero-sum conflict

Jason Blazevic, Staff Writer, January 12, 2017, “Sino-Japanese Tensions Rising in the East China Sea,” Utah Standard News, https://www.utahstandardnews.com/sino-japanese-tensions-rising-east-china-sea/, Accessed 1-27-2017

Policymakers and military leaders in China believe that control of the continental shelf and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, as well as, reunification with Taiwan, is essential for defense of the sea lanes and energy resources from an increasingly powerful Japan and its ally, [the US](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf). As such, President Xi Jinping has called for a more modern navy to protect resource development and distant sea lanes as a matter of national security. Military growth, decreasing pacifism, and status quo challenges could greatly magnify tension in the East China Sea in 2017. Such related actions taken by either government may cause more reactive and dangerous policies and strategies built on suspicion, competition and war. A zero sum contest could be the result, which would be devastating for the region and the world.

#### Disputes over EEZs are magnified by every other Sino-Japanese conflict

Jason Blazevic, Staff Writer, January 12, 2017, “Sino-Japanese Tensions Rising in the East China Sea,” Utah Standard News, https://www.utahstandardnews.com/sino-japanese-tensions-rising-east-china-sea/, Accessed 1-27-2017

Chinese military operations in the East China Sea have greatly increased since 2012 causing much concern for Japan. Their concerns are seen through the recent passage of policy such as, the first ever National Security Strategy, the creation of the National Security Council and the increase of the military budget for the fifth straight year to $[44 billion](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/22/with-historic-defense-spending-boost-japan-turns-further-away-from-pacifism-tensions-south-china-sea-senkaku-islands-dispute/?utm_content=buffer114a7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer). The sea is of paramount concern for policy makers and military leaders of both states and they are looking out for shifts in the strategic balance caused by an increasingly powerful China and a decreasingly pacifistic Japan. The escalating dispute is centered upon Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which China extends to the Okinawan trough and Japan extends halfway between the Ryukyu islands and the Chinese mainland. The EEZ dispute is magnified by energy resources, sea lanes vital for trade and energy, and the strategic Senkaku/Diaoyu islands neighboring Taiwan at the southern end of the sea. Both China and Japan import the majority of their oil from the Middle-East and Africa via the sea lanes of the contested sea. China and Japan’s reliance upon imported oil has intensified fear of threats to nearby sea lanes and territorial and resource [claims](https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PR150206_A_Tale_of_Two_Conflicts.pdf).

## South China Seas

### Status quo is a hardline approach

#### Trump will take a hard line on the S. China Seas emphasizing aggressive military policies

Eric Gomez, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, January 25, 2017, “US Withdrawal from TPP: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Gift for China?,” [The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-withdrawal-tpp-geopolitical-geoeconomic-gift-china, Accessed 1-29-2017

If scrapping U.S. participation in the TPP is good news for China, it seems to be the only good news since Trump’s election. Trump’s statements as president-elect signaled an antagonistic shift in the U.S.-China relationship. On the [Taiwan issue](http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/15/china-hits-back-at-trump-says-one-china-policy-is-non-negotiable.html) Trump said that he would consider dropping the long-standing One China policy. He appointed [Peter Navarro](http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21715017-there-are-reasons-be-worried-about-head-donald-trumps-new-national-trade-council-peter), an [intensely anti-China](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/politics/peter-navarro-carl-icahn-trump-china-trade.html) economist, to head the new [National Trade Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_National_Trade_Council). Finally, in his only press conference as president-elect, Trump said that China “[has taken total advantage of [the United States]”](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-transcript.html) economically and in the South China Sea. Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, said in his [confirmation hearing](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-us.html) that China’s island-building in the South China Sea must stop and China’s “access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Tillerson’s comment did come after some [five hours of testimony](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/13/is-tillerson-willing-to-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/) and could have been considered a mistake. However, on the same day that Trump withdrew from TPP, White House press secretary [Sean Spicer said in a press briefing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/24/is-trump-ready-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea-or-is-his-team-just-not-being-clear/?utm_term=.7d5bacd65c8b), “The U.S. is going to protect our interests [in the South China Sea]… we’re going to make sure that we defend international territories from being taken over by one country.” President Trump wants to back up his “[peace through strength](https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy)” foreign policy with an [expanded U.S. Navy](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-donald-trump-navy-expansion-20170108-story.html) and [U.S. Air Force](https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/donald-trump-air-force).

### Tensions high now / flashpoint for war

#### Tensions are running high in the S. China Seas with a China versus Taiwan & Japan conflict likely

Panos Mourdoukoutas, Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics at LIU Post in New York. I also teach at Columbia University, January 2, 2017, “South China Sea: Japan And Taiwan Send Their Own Strong Messages To Beijing,” Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/02/south-china-sea-japan-and-taiwan-send-their-own-strong-messages-to-beijing/#5daa1d7a116b>, Accessed 1-27-2017

Tensions are rising in South China Sea, with blunt messages flying back and forth between China, on the one side, and Taiwan and Japan on the other. Financial markets do not seem to be that concerned, at least for the time being. Last week, Taiwan sent a blunt message to China by preparing its military forces to fend off Beijing’s threats. Taiwan [defense](http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/108831/20161228/east-china-sea-one-china-policy-taiwan-china-dongsha-island-liaoning-china-taiwan-war.htm) minister Feng Shih-kuan told Taiwan Central News Agency last Tuesday that the “enemy’s threats are increasingly expanding” as he issued out orders for the military to step up training exercises. “We must always maintain combat preparedness,” Feng stated. And urged all senior military commanders to be ready to defeat the enemy, Beijing, that is.

### Chinese expansionism – South China Seas

#### China is advancing its maritime paramilitary forces are breakneck speed to dominate the S. China Seas

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Volume 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), pp. 95-96.

Even as the PLAN bulks up on more—and more capable—platforms, China’s maritime paramilitary forces are growing and modernizing at a breathtaking pace. According to the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, China is pursuing “the largest MLE [maritime law enforcement] modernization effort in Asia.” China’s MLE fleet “is likely to increase in size by 25 percent and is larger than that of all of the other claimants combined.” The China Coast Guard enjoys a sizable and growing advantage in bulk—even apart from its other advantages. Its largest cutter outweighs a U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser by over 2,000 tons, meaning it displaces fully 20 percent more than an American capital ship. This cutter is a vessel that could be outfitted with heavy weaponry should Beijing choose. It carries a large crew, letting it outmatch rival coast-guard ships in manpower terms. Even its sheer mass represents an advantage: the China Coast Guard commonly uses its cutters to block opponents from waters, islands, or rocks they hope to reach. In maritime tactics as in football, a beefy blocker is a formidable blocker. This shift in the maritime balance is already being felt throughout Asian waters. China’s warships, for instance, habitually shadow American combatants patrolling or transiting the South China Sea. These largely unreported peacetime encounters—some testier than others—have become the new normal.

### Impacts

#### A miscalc war over the S. China Seas is likely in the status quo

[Bihu Ray](http://www.ibtimes.sg/reporters/bihu-ray), Staff Writer, January 24, 2017, “South China Sea: Under Trump, a war with China is inevitable, experts say,” International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.sg/south-china-sea-under-trump-war-china-inevitable-experts-say-6807, Accessed 1-29-2017

"The South China Sea is definitely a flashpoint because it is the area where we might find US aircraft and warships actually clashing with Chinese aircraft and warships and the possibility of an unintended shoot down of an aircraft or sinking of a ship I think is quite high," Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute said, according to ABC News. Military observers the world over are seriously talking about a war between the two super powers. Though no one says a pre-meditated war between China and the US is a possibility, there is a great risk of a crisis being mishandled, leading to military escalation. "The whole situation is quite combustible. I'm not going to say yes or no but the war is likely a self-fulfilling prophecy. If at this current stage the Trump administration will continue to push China into a confrontation, I think war is likely," Sow Keat Tok, a China expert from Melbourne University told ABC.

#### Chinese expansionism jeopardizes the SLOCs and international freedom of navigation in the S. China Seas

Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College and James Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, 2017, “Managing Sino-American Relations,” Orbis, [Volume 61, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/science/journal/00304387/61/1), p. 93.

Freedom of the sea represents the most fundamental principle underlying the liberal system of trade and commerce—the system the U.S. Navy has underwritten since vanquishing Japan in 1945. To use Clausewitzian parlance, the value of the political object is virtually boundless for the United States—implying that any administration should invest generously in preserving it, for as long as it takes. Compromise on the commons and the edifice of U.S. foreign policy and strategy starts to crumble. For its part, China has vowed to nullify freedom of the seas in select waters and assert its sovereignty. Most notably, it claims “indisputable sovereignty”—de facto ownership—within the “nine-dashed line” enclosing most of the South China Sea. Sovereignty connotes a monopoly on force within certain geographical boundaries. This boundary would mean that Beijing's domestic laws would prevail within 80-90 percent of this vital maritime thoroughfare. Merchants would need China's permission to enter and exit and would be subject to Chinese law within the South China Sea. Freedom of the sea would exist no more.

## Trade

### Protectionism Against China Coming Now

#### The status quo will enact protectionist policies toward China. This leads to a global trade war and crashes both countries’ economy

Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, December 22, 2016, “Cracks in the Chinese Powerhouse,” The Cipher Brief, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/exclusive/asia/cracks-chinese-powerhouse-1094, Accessed 1-20-2017

Although it remains to be seen what policies he may pursue, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president could exacerbate China’s situation. Trump’s election is illustrative the spreading disenchantment with economic globalization in the industrial West. With Britain’s looming exit from the European Union and nationalist European parties poised to make larger electoral gains, the trend shows little sign of abatement. China’s continued dependence on exports to these countries renders the country highly vulnerable to the types of [protectionist policies](http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/11/14/how-far-can-trump-go-on-chinese-trade-policy/#50815f153281) advocated by President-elect Trump and other nationalist European leaders. Whether President-elect Trump chooses to pursue tariffs once in office is unclear. But if he chooses to do so, China could retaliate with its own tariffs. The result could be a global trade war that damages growth for all. According to some experts, tariffs enacted against China and Mexico could [permanently lower U.S. annual GDP](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) by $100 billion a year and could cost China [5% of its GDP](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-15/how-trump-s-china-trade-war-could-play-out-quicktake-q-a). Grimly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts continued stagnation in advanced economies, which it warned could increase the appeal of anti-trade policies.

### RCEP Inevitable

#### No TPP means the RCEP is inevitable and will exclude the US

Bhavan Jaipragas, Staff Writer, January 9, 2017, “As Trump kills the TPP, can China-backed RCEP fill the gap?,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2060041/trump-kills-tpp-can-china-backed-rcep-fill-gap, Accessed 1-25-2017

But leading trade experts are urging governments in trade-hungry Asia-Pacific nations from Singapore to Vietnam to quickly end their hand-wringing over the wasted effort, and instead conclude alternative deals without the US and its new protectionist leader. Emerging at the top of the alphabet soup of potential trade pacts is the pan-Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which excludes the US and until recently played second fiddle to the soon-to-be-killed Pacific Rim pact. Experts say the RCEP can now be the centrepiece of 21st century free trade, a title they previously bestowed on the TPP.

#### Currently, China will pursue trade pacts that exclude the U.S., but will include our allies

Max Boot, [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeane_J._Kirkpatrick) Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the [Council on Foreign Relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations), December 27, 2016, “Donald Trump’s Pivot Through Asia,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/27/the-pivot-to-asia-obama-trump/, Accessed 1-2-2017

Another building block of the rebalance was Obama’s commitment to a free trade system that would bring the nations of East Asia, minus China, into closer alignment with Washington. But the 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership was already in trouble before the election, having been rejected by both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Following Trump’s victory on a protectionist platform, congressional leaders decided not to bring it up for ratification during the lame-duck session. This leaves the way clear for China to push its competing free trade treaty — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) — which excludes the United States. Close U.S. allies, including Australia, South Korea, and Japan, have all expressed an interest in joining the Sino-centric RCEP.

#### The RCEP is inevitable in the status quo

Bhavan Jaipragas, Staff Writer, January 9, 2017, “As Trump kills the TPP, can China-backed RCEP fill the gap?,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2060041/trump-kills-tpp-can-china-backed-rcep-fill-gap, Accessed 1-25-2017

“Concluding RCEP is critical for supporting trade growth and deepening supply chains in Asia amid rising protectionist sentiments and TPP uncertainties,” Ganeshan Wignaraja, an adviser with the Asian Development Bank, told This Week in Asia. “An RCEP agreement seems probable in 2017 due to intensified negotiations,” he said. Edmund Sim, partner at the multinational trade and investment law firm Appleton Luff, said the pact would “primarily benefit the manufacturing sector by eliminating tariffs on trade within the Asian supply chain and simplifying the rules governing preferential trade in goods”.

## US-China War

### No impact - Conflicts won’t escalate

#### Conflicts won’t escalate to a US-China war. Even a blockade wouldn’t cause war

Anders Corr, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, January 28, 2017, “Is War Against China Justified?,” Forbes,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/01/28/is-war-against-china-justified/#4f2dec5774fb, Accessed 1-29-2017

War is by no means inevitable. That a U.S. blockade would cause armed clashes is a very small probability. Given armed clashes, the probability of a significant escalation, much less a broader war, is small still. The probability that a blockade escalates to a major war is therefore minuscule. China has had near-continuous modern border disputes, with just a few becoming violent. Militarized border disputes with Russia (1969) and Vietnam (1979), for example, did not escalate into nuclear war, despite China and Russia being nuclear powers, and an alliance between Russia and Vietnam. If military action did take place, China would seek to de-escalate quickly, because U.S. nuclear technology dominates the upper rungs of the escalation ladder. Herman Kahn’s theory of escalation dominance predicts that in war, a clearly weaker party backs down first and early. That there is a low probability of a blockade escalating into a war satisfies, for a blockade, that the means is proportional to the end and that there is a reasonable chance of success. All major requirements of a just war, in the case of a blockade, are therefore fulfilled.

## U.S. Hegemony & Leadership

### Strong Domestic Economy K2 US Leadership

#### A strong economy at home is essential to US leadership in the Asia-Pacific

Jon Meade Huntsman Jr., former Governor of Utah and US Ambassador to Singapore from 1992 to 1993, and China from 2009 to 2011, Charlene Barshefsky, Former US Trade Representative and Evan Greenberg, Chair of the US-ASEAN Business Council, January 27, 2017, “Trump must reassert US leadership in the Asia Pacific,” PacNet #8, Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-8-trump-must-reassert-us-leadership-asia-pacific, Accessed 1-28-2017

In the face of these opportunities and challenges, the Trump administration can – and must – reassert US leadership in the Asia Pacific. Job one is to strengthen the foundations of our own economy, through tax and regulatory reform, infrastructure investment, better education and training, and more spending on basic research. Economic muscle at home is of profound importance to Asia, which equates economic strength with security and the projection of power.

#### Boosting the US economy is crucial to prevent a power vacuum in Asia

Jon Meade Huntsman Jr., former Governor of Utah and US Ambassador to Singapore from 1992 to 1993, and China from 2009 to 2011, Charlene Barshefsky, Former US Trade Representative and Evan Greenberg, Chair of the US-ASEAN Business Council, January 27, 2017, “Trump must reassert US leadership in the Asia Pacific,” PacNet #8, Center for International and Strategic Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-8-trump-must-reassert-us-leadership-asia-pacific, Accessed 1-28-2017

A key finding of our report was that a successful strategy requires Washington to work more closely with our treaty allies in the region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as partners such as India and Singapore. The administration must also coordinate closely with the US private sector. And it must develop effective messages that explain the importance of the Asia Pacific to the American people. Implementing this kind of strategy is complicated by the popular preference to rebuild at home rather than lead abroad. But this is a false dilemma: America’s domestic prosperity is inextricably linked to our international leadership. A vacuum of US leadership in Asia filled by less benevolent players would take decades to reverse – and at a huge economic cost by way of lost markets and legitimacy.

### US military presence good - Impacts

#### US military presence in the Asia-Pacific is crucial to long-term economic growth and preventing terrorism and WDM proliferation

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 19, 2017, “Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/19/managing-asia-s-security-threats-in-trump-era-pub-67746, Accessed 1-30-2017

At the broadest level, the increasingly critical economic importance for the United States of the Asia-Pacific region as a market, investment destination, and source of capital and technology, combined with the fact that the region contains several close, long-standing democratic friends and allies, provides the rationale for a continued strong, active U.S. security presence. The purpose of that presence should be to maximize the conditions for long-term, beneficial Asian economic growth; to prevent the emergence of a hostile force that could use Asia’s strengths to threaten America; to keep open highly beneficial trans-Asian trade, investment, and technology routes to other regions; to support the security and prosperity of regional friends and allies; and to prevent the region from becoming a source of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and other global threats.

### A2: Drawdown causes China to take over

#### A US draw-down in Asia won’t lead to disaster. Regional maritime powers would coalesce to check China

Mohan Malik, professor in Asian security at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Spring 2016, “Balancing Act: The China-India-U.S. Triangle,” World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/balancing-act-china-india-us-triangle, Accessed 1-20-2017

A possible but unlikely future would be one in which the United States pulled back strategically from Asia as China rose to global leadership. More plausible is that buoyed by technological breakthrough in 3D manufacturing and the vast shale gas reserves, future economic growth could come from the United States as Chinese economy undergoes a serious downturn. Far from reducing its footprint or walking away from the Asia-Pacific region, Washington would continue to practice “power-balancing” strategy as it has vital economic and strategic interests at stake in the region. Faced with an aggressive China, Asia’s major maritime and democratic powers—Japan, Australia, and India—will work in a more synchronized manner in a quadrilateral grouping with the United States. They will be backed by middle powers (South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) which are increasingly voicing their concerns about Chinese maritime behavior. They will closely cooperate with each other to promote and defend a rules-based order that does not advantage big and powerful nations at the expense of small and weak states. Over time, various bilateral, trilateral (e.g., Japan–Vietnam–the Philippines, the United States–Japan–India, Australia–Indonesia–India, India–Japan–Vietnam), and informal multilateral efforts to constrain China could coalesce into a maritime coalition or the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership” (i.e., an “Asian NATO” by another name).

## US Soft Power

### Diplomatic engagement good

#### US diplomatic engagement with China is essential to soft power. Diplomacy helps infuse cultural influence to foster soft power

[Robert Daly](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/robert-daly#sthash.p7ZiNPxr.dpuf), Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, December 24, 2016, “China’s Soft Power Strategy: Five Minutes with Robert Daly, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, http://journal.georgetown.edu/chinas-soft-power-strategy-five-minutes-with-robert-daly/, Accessed 1-20-2017

Soft power diplomacy and cultural diplomacy is part of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy means government-directed outreach through various kinds of products and channels, some of which are cultural, and not to foreign governments, but to foreign publics. This is why the American Government brought the Alvin Ailey dance group to Beijing, for example. American public diplomacy in China isn’t that important anymore, because our cultural influence has been marketed and commercialized. The Chinese pay for the things they want – and they want a lot and pay a lot for it. What matters, therefore, is broad engagement. Programs like Alison Friedman’s Ping Pong Productions are key. Keeping the channels of engagement open is critical because soft power is not wielded as a tool of diplomacy in the way that economics or the military are.

The dynamics through which soft power influences or works are catalytic. You can catalyze change, but you can’t direct it, so you catalyze change simply by keeping American examples, American institutions, media, corporate, artistic and American culture present to the Chinese people: fashion, food, songs, ways of thinking. And that is done through a broad policy of engagement. Soft power doesn’t make the Chinese more like us, and that is not the goal of soft power diplomacy or even of our cultural interaction. We shouldn’t want the Chinese to be more like us. We should want the Chinese to be fully themselves, and we must recognize that they cannot be fully themselves until they are freely themselves. And when that happens, they’ll have more cultural influence in the United States.

### Trump is undermining US soft power

#### Trump foreign policy is the antithesis of soft power

Joe Crowe, Staff Writer, December 29, 2016, “WashPost: Trump Aims for 'Peace Through Strength,' Not 'Soft Power',” Newsmax, http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/trump-aims-peace-strength/2016/12/29/id/766078/, Accessed 1-30-2017

President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy plans include using tough talk and acts to gain "peace through strength," but that is a different tactic in policy that both Democrats and Republicans have used for decades, according to an analysis in [The Washington Post.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-focus-on-peace-through-strength-over-obamas-soft-power-approach/2016/12/28/286770c8-c6ce-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63_story.html?utm_term=.6f3c14e8bffd) Diplomats have depended on "soft power," which avoids conflict, according to the report. Critics of Trump's plan argue that America is supposed to lead with Democratic values and work on issues together with other countries, not engage in tough rhetoric. "If your slogan is 'America first,' other people will think, 'What about me?'" Joseph Nye, Bill Clinton's former assistant secretary of defense, said. "Soft power" can be more effective in diplomacy and in determining that other nations perceive that the U.S. promotes human rights and ideals. Trump has rarely mentioned such topics, instead appearing skeptical about international agreements that President Barack Obama's administration has put together with Iran and Cuba.

#### Trump’s Twitter diplomacy undermines soft power

Joseph Nye, professor at and former dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, January 16, 2017, “Joseph Nye: Trump's tweets harm US soft power,” Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw.com/en/joseph-nye-trumps-tweets-harm-us-soft-power/a-37143074, Accessed 1-30-2017

I still believe that the US has lost soft power as a result of the campaign and the quality of the discourse in politics. And I think that continues when you look at the way Trump has continued to use Twitter for provocative statements designed to manipulate the press. Many of these don't create attraction or admiration for the US. On the other hand the fact remains that despite the political differences, which are quite considerable, the US is a stable society which has a transition of power by ballots not bullets. I think that has some effect of enhancing American attractiveness. But, by and large, I think the poor quality of the discourse has probably hurt American soft power.

#### Trump’s confrontational approach signals an end to soft power

David Nakamura and Juliet Eilperin, Staff Writers, December 29, 2016, “Trump to focus on ‘peace through strength’ over Obama’s ‘soft power’ approach,” Eashington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-focus-on-peace-through-strength-over-obamas-soft-power-approach/2016/12/28/286770c8-c6ce-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63\_story.html?utm\_term=.8d9216514e48, Accessed 1-30-2017

If Trump follows through with this confrontational approach, it will represent a sharp break with the multifaceted foreign policy strategy that both Democratic and Republican presidents have practiced for decades, including reliance on what diplomats call “soft power” to achieve objectives and avoid conflict. Instead, Trump views foreign policy as largely transactional, aides say, and his goal is to win — by speaking loudly and carrying a big stick.

### Soft Power fails with China

#### Anti-U.S. xenophobia is inevitable in China

James Palmer, Asia Editor, December 24, 2016, “[What China Didn’t Learn From the Collapse of the Soviet Union](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/what-china-didnt-learn-from-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union/),” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/24/what-china-didnt-learn-from-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union/, Accessed 1-2-2017

In Beijing, American promotion of democracy and human rights is seen as just a tool to ensure U.S. dominance and one that therefore has to be constantly resisted. “[Peaceful evolution](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/beijings-peaceful-evolution-paranoia/),” the nationalist tabloid Global Times proclaimed, was just another name for color revolution. Even seemingly harmless cultural products have been caught up in this. Zootopia, a recent Disney animated children’s film, explained a People’s Liberation Army newspaper, was an [American plot](http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/04/07/disneys-animated-film-zootopia-is-a-u-s-propaganda-tool-chinese-professor-says/) to weaken China’s morale. The hostility toward the color revolutions and the chaos they’ve unleashed has thus been projected backward. The Soviet fall, once seen at least in part as a result of the Communist Party’s own failings, has become reinterpreted as a deliberate U.S. plot and a moral failure to hold the line against Western influence. That has ended what was once a powerful spur to reform — meaning that, barring a major change in leadership, the likely course of Chinese politics over the next few years will be further xenophobia, even more power to the party, and an unwillingness to talk about the harder lessons of history.

# Aff Answer to Conditions CP

### 2AC Conditions Bad Theory (Short)

#### Perm – Do both.

#### Perm – Do the CP. It’s plan plus.

#### They should lose for reading a conditions CP – it’s unfair and not competitive.

#### a) Fairness – they can concede “say no” to win a link to their net benefit. Forces the aff to defend contrived normal means and lets them win on any risk of an artificial net-benefit.

#### b) Infinitely Regressive – Justifies literally any condition and is both textually and functionally plan plus – legitimizes counterplans like delay or conditioning the plan on space. Lit doesn’t check, the bar is set too low

#### c) Education – Conditions CP’s are a generic shortcut to avoid talking about the aff – other counterplans and reading the net-benefit as a DA solve neg fairness and education.

### 2AC Conditions Bad Theory (Long)

#### Perm do the CP – Aff fiat isn’t certain – the CP adds that in, its not an intrinsic part of our plan text – the res doesn’t require it.

#### Perm do the plan and condition the plan – its not intrinsic – the CP is 2 planks – key to check the germaneness of the net benefit – not DA to intrinsicness because we don’t claim any add-ons.

#### Decision tree perm – the US should condition the plan – if China says no, the relevant actors will determine that they will pass the plan. Not severance because the people presenting the conditions never have to formally decide their exact position on an issue.

#### Perm – pass the plan then negotiate with China/ request that China \_\_\_\_\_\_\_. None of their evidence says we need to condition the plan – only that the U.S. must make a demand before they do what we want them to do. Plus the positive gesture of the plan means they’ll agree.

#### They should lose for reading a conditions CP – it’s unfair and not competitive.

#### a) Fairness – they can concede “say no” to win a link to their net benefit. Forces the aff to defend contrived normal means and lets them win on any risk of an artificial net-benefit.

#### b) Infinitely Regressive – Justifies literally any condition and is both textually and functionally plan plus – legitimizes counterplans like delay or conditioning the plan on space. Lit doesn’t check, the bar is set too low

#### c) Education – Conditions CP’s are a generic shortcut to avoid talking about the aff – other counterplans and reading the net-benefit as a DA solve neg fairness and education.

## Definitions

### Engagement

[These are definitional support of “Perm: do the CP”]

#### Engagement can be conditional

Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k [Richard and Meghan,\*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf, Accessed: 7/26/2016.]

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### Their interpretation of “engagement” eliminates affirmative ground

Borer ‘4 [Dr. Douglas A. Borer, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College PhD, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the US Army War College, “Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement,” Chapter 12, U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf, Accessed: 7/28/16.]

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement. 21 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more. 22

### Engagement

#### Condition engagement is the most predictable interpretation

Wanee ‘11 (Professor at UT Knoxville, “ Old actors, New Drama: Chinese Engagement with Africa and the Implications for the United States, http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2432&context=utk\_chanhonopro, Accessed: 7/31/16.)

Beyond the dual-standard of non-interference versus accountability, critics also ponder the feasibility of non-interference. In any relationship, expectations exi st: “[...] the Chinese do not seem to make governance worse, and although it is popularly believed that aid come s with ‘no strings attached,’ economic engagement usually does come with conditions, some of it even (indirectly) governance-related.” 76 In some areas of engagement, sacrifices will ensue from either party. China cannot ignore the repercussions of its actions if it seeks to achieve global clout, and naturally, expectations will result from economic engagement. Though the Chinese do not seek to sway their African counterparts into performing based on Chinese persuasion, the non-interference policy may recede a bit in the future as relationships become more complex. China will face challenges in maintaining support for its partnerships if it scales back its non-interference policy.

### Should

#### Should means desirable or recommended, not mandatory

Words and Phrases ‘2 (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373)

Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey the idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq.----Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857

#### Even if they win that other parts of the resolution indicate certainty of timeliness of the plan’s passage, the word “should” means that all of the resolution is still not mandatory.

#### “Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate

AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,” http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html, Accessed: 7/26/16.)

**'shall' describes something that is mandatory**. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement \_will\_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. Should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).

#### “Should” doesn’t require certainty

Black’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

**Should**. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often interchangeable with the word “would,” it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.

### Resolved

#### “Resolved” doesn’t require certainty

Webster’s 9 [Merriam Webster 2009. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved]

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): **re·solved**; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : **consult, deliberate**

#### Resolved doesn’t mandate immedicacy

PTE 9 [Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009. http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

**Resolve**: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, **to determine after reflection**; as, to resolve on a better course of life.”

#### And, even if not grammar means don’t defend resolved

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000

[http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm]

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

## AT: Condition (Substantive)

### Solvency Deficits

#### Delay—takes a long time for China to comply with the condition and have it verified, risks advantage impacts in the interim.

#### Doesn’t solve the net-benefit—conditioning a single policy doesn’t establish precedent, China will abandon efforts on the next policy

#### No durable condition—China can reneg immediately after the plan

#### No warrant as to why the plan is the necessary carrot and no evidence linking it to the condition—peculiarity of the offer alone means they’ll say no, prejudice their ‘say yes’ evidence because it doesn’t assume the CP

#### No verification means neither plan or condition happen—the timeframe and criteria for fulfillment of the condition will be disputed, and even if they agree to some reform there’s no risk of China submitting to external verification

### China Says No

#### No solvency—China perceives CP as “western infiltration” and rejects reform

Han ’16 [Bochen Han, editorial assistant at The Diplomat, interviewing Dr. Eva Pils, PhD in law from University College London, Reader in Transnational Law at King's College London, "China's Human Rights Lawyers: Political Resistance and the Law", The Diplomat, thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinas-human-rights-lawyers-political-resistance-and-the-law/, Accessed: 7/5/16]

[Han:] What are the dominant trends among the Chinese society’s reaction to the rights lawyers? Does the concept of ‘human rights’ carry much traction with the average Chinese?¶ [Pils:] I think that like in other countries we would need to differentiate between citizens who have confronted government abuse and rights violations, and those who have not. What rights lawyers have told me suggests that the people who form their usual clientele have become more rights-conscious over the past one or two decades. Several narratives from the late 1990s were about clients who didn’t know what ‘torture’ (xingxun bigong 刑讯逼供 or kuxing 酷刑) meant, for example; who might have no idea at all that the law prohibited beating criminal suspects. Today more ordinary people seem to be aware of their rights.¶ With regard to the wider population, I am not sure. Perhaps ‘human rights’ today carries as much traction with the average Chinese as it does with the average Briton or American; but how much is that? It is especially hard to tell in China, not only because the opportunities for research that might help answer this question are limited but also because of censorship and limited information available to Chinese citizens. The government censors media reporting bad news about itself. It has also publicly denounced rights lawyers and human rights themselves as tools of western infiltration under the name of ‘so-called universal values.’ But then again it continues to use ‘human rights’ in a positive way on some occasions. And, obviously the Internet has diversified the sources of information available to ordinary citizens. I imagine that Chinese citizens have been receiving mixed messages and it is not easy to figure out how they respond to that.¶ [Han:] How do you assess the progress of a top-down, controlled and incremental rule of law reform in China today? Do you see any hope for the reduction of repression in light of recent legislative reforms that have moved in the direction of increased liberalization? What about President Xi Jinping’s announcement to establish a “rule of law” by 2020?¶ [Pils:] The hope of incremental liberalization through top-down legal reforms was extremely important in the post-Mao era but today, in my view, it is very nearly dead. Under Xi Jinping especially, the law has been changed to accommodate rather than curb power abuses. Law is not seen as imposing limits on the power of the government; rather, it is an expression of the power of the ruling Party, including ruthless power to control its own bureaucracy. This is not to deny, of course, that there are occasional welcome changes, for example, the decision to abolish the feared “re-education through labor” system in 2013. But such changes generally look better on paper than in reality and do not address the central challenge of power abuse. For example, the government continues to lock people up under numerous forms of detention without due – or simply without any – legal process. The Party’s vision for 2020 is therefore Party rule by law, at best – legal rules used when it serves power-holders, and disregarded when it does not.¶ And, the Party keeps widening the circles of people it targets. It has turned on itself through the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign and it is going after more and more groups in civil society, treating human rights advocates, especially, as enemies. Starting with the detention of Lawyer Wang Yu, her husband and sixteen-year old son in the night of July 9, 2015, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on rights lawyers. Most recently, this widening crackdown has also affected labor activists; and repression is now expanding beyond China’s borders. It is a sad but apt illustration of the more repressive, dual-state system the leadership wants to create.

### China Says No

#### China says no—they resent meddling in their internal politics

Peerenboom ‘5 [Randall, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 38, Issue 1, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=cilj

On the other hand, the Chinese government regularly issues reports chock-full of statistics showing considerable progress on a wide variety of fronts, and proudly claims that Chinese citizens enjoy more rights than ever before.5 While not denying that much remains to be done, the government maintains its critics are biased, human rights are being misused for political purposes, and China is being subjected to a double standard.6¶ Many Chinese citizens feel the same way. They too see the human rights policies of Western countries, particularly the U.S., as hypocritical and hegemonic power politics. 7 Chinese citizens are particularly sensitive about infringements on China's national sovereignty in part because of decades of bullying by foreign imperial powers.8 But many also feel that China today is being held to a different standard than are other countries. The U.S. and other Western powers sit idly by while gross violations of human rights occur in Burundi, Colombia, Nigeria, Uganda, India, Saudi Arabia, and countless other countries, and yet are quick to criticize China even though most Chinese enjoy more extensive freedoms and a better standard of living than ever before. Behind the double standard, they suspect, lies the desire of the U.S. and other developed countries to contain China and prevent it from emerging as a rival superpower.¶ The very fact that government leaders and Chinese citizens feel China is being held to a double standard, whether or not it is true, has several negative consequences for human rights. The steady stream of criticism leveled at Beijing has led to testy relations between China and U.N. rights bodies, the U.S. and other countries, and international human rights NGOs. The government is often quick to assume a defensive posture, stonewalling or defending its record at length in the face of criticism rather than exploring constructive ways to improve the current situation. 9 Beijing has also been reluctant to allow visits by inspectors from the U.N. or other countries, and has imposed restrictions on those visits it does authorize. 10 At times, the reaction has been even more hostile and antithetical to progress on rights issues. In response to the annual U.S. State Department report, which the State Council has denounced as "an amateurish collection of distortions and rumors" driven by "anti-China forces who don't want to see the existence of an increasingly wealthy and developed socialist state,"" China now issues its own critical report on the rights situation in the United States. 12 In addition, China has cancelled bilateral dialogues on human rights as well as programs on rule of law in response to the attempts to censure it in Geneva.¶ Apart from the negative government reaction, the public's support for international reform efforts has also been weakened. Many citizens are suspicious about the motives of NGOs. Even reform-minded academics often find that NGOs lack an adequate understanding of the situation in China, and that their proposals for reform are out of touch with the existing norms or simply infeasible given China's current conditions. Public opinion about America, seen as the leader of Western critics, has undergone a dramatic shift in the last twenty years, from wildly supportive to highly critical. 13 Sometime in this century China will emerge as a major economic, political, and ultimately military power capable of challenging U.S. hegemony. Instilling a feeling of resentment and hostility in Chinese citizens who believe China is being treated unfairly diminishes the likelihood of a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the superpowers.¶ The feeling that China is being subjected to a double standard has led to a growing nationalism. 14 While nationalism may take the form of pride in one's culture and country, in China nationalism is often based on a more negative feeling of resentment. The resentment stems from a general sense that China, this once great civilization, is being denied its rightful place in the world. Ironically, applying a double standard to China feeds a trend to emphasize the distinctiveness of China, and of Asian countries more generally, as evidenced in the debate over Asian values. The growing desire for Asian countries to affirm their unique identities and stake out their own turf within the normative universe of human rights challenges the fundamental pretense of universalism on which the human rights regime is founded. 15

### QPQs With China Fail

#### QPQs with China fail

Dueck ‘15 [Colin, Associate Professor in George Mason University's School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs, “The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today,” p. 65-66.]

The next category of concern, including major authoritarian powers that pursue a mixture of rivalry and cooperation with America, includes China and Russia. These governments continue to view the United States under Obama as a strategic threat to their stature and integrity, but they pursue some cooperation with Washington in areas such as trade and arms control while simultaneously pursuing geopolitical competition with the United States. Their common interests with Washington are more extensive, and their hostility toward the United States less profound, than is the case with Iran or North Korea. Nevertheless the governments of China and Russia, like most governments overseas, are largely indifferent to Obama's personal charms. They are interested in whether he concedes to their interests and priorities, not in his personal background as such, or in any vision he might have for a more liberal international order. In cases where Obama gives Moscow or Beijing most of what they want, as he did, for instance, in the 2009—2010 New START negotiations with Russia, then naturally they are happy to accept the concession, and even to offer a modest quid pro quo. But in cases where he offers accommodating or hopeful gestures, yet runs up against the perceived vital national interests of either power, then they simply decline to offer any reciprocal and proportionate accommodation. Neither power, for example, has any intention of surrendering its nuclear arsenal, no matter what Obama says or does in 'elation to his goal of nuclear zero. Nor has either power offered genuinely full cooperation with regard to Iranian or North Korean nuclear proliferation. Chinese and Russian leaders are not especially impressed by Obama. If anything, they are encouraged by the implication of long-term US strategic withdrawal under his leadership, because it leaves them stronger within their own neighborhoods. In this case, as in many others, American strategic disengagement is not interpreted as transformational benevolence, but as a sign of weakness.

### Perm Solves

#### Permutation do the plan and push for reform—the CP alone is guaranteed to fail because it’s too inflammatory, the US must be more flexible

Min ’11 [Chen Min, former editorial writer for Southern Weekend newspaper and managing editor of China Reform magazine, translated by David Liu, "Why China Won't Listen", New York Times, Nov 15 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/why-china-wont-listen.html?\_r=0, Accessed: 7/25/16.]

The Chinese government often tolerates, and even encourages, abuses of power and extrajudicial punishments by law enforcement officials. These are the underlying evils that sustain a regime that values its own preservation above all else, including human rights and the rule of law. But how is this possible in a world where outsiders feel free to criticize China’s human rights record? Why does the Chinese government respond to some forms of protest, while stonily ignoring others? The answer can be found in the way the Chinese leaders, at all levels, think about their authority, their reputations and their power. Consider the case of Chen Guangcheng, a human rights advocate who has been under house arrest with his family in Shandong Province. Recently, the public received news that his 6-year-old daughter would be allowed to leave the house to attend school, a concession that seemed to signal more lenient treatment. But then, on Oct. 23, a group of Internet activists who had set out to visit him were brutally attacked by a local mob. Witnesses who described the attack on the Internet said it appeared to have been well planned — a sign that Mr. Chen’s ordeal was not yet over. Why won’t the authorities simply let Mr. Chen and his family go? The most critical reason is mianzi, or “face,” as it is usually translated in English. The authorities know that what they have been doing is unjust and illegal. But they saw the gathering of activists as an affront, and responded harshly because the government could not afford to lose face — which would undermine its power in the public’s eyes. Petty cruelties and crackdowns are everyday occurrences in today’s China. Officials, especially low-level ones, have never cultivated respect for the rule of law, due process or habeas corpus. If they were held accountable for strictly following the law in all cases, most would probably lose their jobs, bringing the state apparatus at the local level to a halt and endangering the system of government control. That is why, even though the powerful know what lesser officials do, they usually turn a blind eye — as long as they can cover up the misdeeds and the public doesn’t become outraged. When public outrage does ensue, another mechanism of control — intervention by senior officials — sometimes occurs. That happened in September 2010 after a man set himself on fire to protest a building demolition in Jiangxi Province. High-level leaders fired a party boss and mayor for negligence. But the case of Mr. Chen evidently didn’t qualify for such intervention, because another rule of power in China came into play: Never seem to bend to the demands of foreign powers. In such cases, it is the central government that digs in its heels, and the louder the outcry grows, the worse the situation becomes. In the government’s eyes, there is a stark difference between a homegrown problem like the one in Jiangxi and a case like Mr. Chen’s, in which the government perceives foreign meddling. Congress has passed an amendment expressing support for Mr. Chen, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently criticized his house arrest in a speech. China saw these developments as an intolerable slap in the face. Beijing does not indiscriminately reject all such “interference”; China and the United States conduct a dialogue on human rights through diplomatic channels. But Chinese leaders believe such dialogue belongs behind closed doors. The Chinese are saying to Americans, if you grant me face, I can be reasonable; if solving the problem will help me, I’ll consider it. But don’t expect me to make concessions under pressure. Such concessions would call into question the regime’s legitimacy. And once the issue is survival, the government is in effect cornered, leaving it no choice but to resort to drastic measures from which nothing — sense, humanity or law — can dissuade it. The problem turns into one of “sovereignty,” which in the Chinese government’s vocabulary means the absolute, non-negotiable right to rule over a billion subjects. When sovereignty is in play, there is no longer a right or wrong side of an issue, just winning or losing. A similar logic was involved 22 years ago at Tiananmen Square. The protesters there asked for nothing more than dialogue, but the government stubbornly refused because it didn’t want to set a precedent. To Chinese leaders, “governing” means absolute control. Allowing the people to become a rival to the government might bring down the system. The same is true in Mr. Chen’s case, but with an important difference: in 1989, the government refused to set a precedent of yielding to popular demand at home. Today it refuses to set a precedent of yielding to American pressure. China and the United States have been discussing human rights issues for so many years that it is baffling that American leaders remain so clueless about the Chinese government’s mind-set. Previous high-profile cases were resolved behind the scenes. Mr. Chen’s case should have been approached this way, too — not through public pressure. I welcome American politicians’ concerns about China’s human rights situation. But I have one request: please be a bit more considerate, a bit more flexible, and a bit more tactful about our leaders’ mind-set. That way, you — and we — might have more success.

## Net-Benefit Answers

### AT: CCP Collapse

#### CCP stable and resilient

Bell ’15 [Daniel A. Bell, a chair professor of the Schwarzman Scholars program at Tsinghua University in Beijing and the director of the Berggruen Institute of Philosophy and Culture, "Chinese Democracy Isn't Inevitable", The Atlantic, May 29 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/chinese-democracy-isnt-inevitable/394325/, Accessed: 7/5/16.]

The flaws in China’s political system are obvious. The government doesn’t even make a pretense of holding national elections and punishes those who openly call for multiparty rule. The press is heavily censored and the Internet is blocked. Top leaders are unconstrained by the rule of law. Even more worrisome, repression has been ramped up since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, suggesting that the regime is increasingly worried about its legitimacy. Some China experts—most recently David Shambaugh of George Washington University—interpret these ominous signs as evidence that the Chinese political system is on the verge of collapse. But such an outcome is highly unlikely in the near future. The Communist Party is firmly in power, its top leader is popular, and no political alternative currently claims widespread support. And what would happen if the Party’s power did indeed crumble? The most likely result, in my view, would be rule by a populist strongman backed by elements of the country’s security and military forces. The new ruler might seek to buttress his legitimacy by launching military adventures abroad. President Xi would look tame by comparison.

### AT: CCP Collapse

#### No CCP collapse

Bell ’12 (Daniel, Professor of International Political Philosophy at Tsinghua, “Why China Won't Collapse (Soon)”, 7-9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/chinese-government-legitimacy\_b\_1658006.html, Accessed: 7/12/16.)

 Or so we are told. Such predictions about the collapse of China's political system have been constantly repeated since the suppression of the pro-democracy uprisings in 1989. But the system didn't collapse then, and it won't collapse now. The key reason such dire predictions are taken seriously -- especially in the West -- is that non-democratic regimes are seen to lack legitimacy. A political regime that is morally justified in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab Spring has shown. But this view assumes the people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the large majority of Chinese people support the single-party state structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many large scale surveys into the legitimacy of Chinese political power and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus: the degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people from telling lies and the results are always the same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of government. The central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus. How can it be that the Chinese government managed to achieve a high level of political legitimacy without adopting free and fair competitive elections for the country's leaders? However paradoxical it may sound to Westernears, the Chinese government has succeeded by drawing upon sources of non-democratic legitimacy. The first source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed performance legitimacy, meaning that the government's first priority should be the material well-being of the people. This idea has long roots in China -- Confucius himself said the government should make the people prosperous -- and the Chinese Communist Party has also put poverty alleviation at the top of its political agenda. Hence, the government derives much, if not most, of its legitimacy by its ability to provide for the material welfare of Chinese citizens. It has substantially increased the life expectancy of Chinese people, and the reform era has seen perhaps the most impressive poverty alleviation achievement in history, with several hundred million people being lifted out of poverty. The second source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed political meritocracy: the idea that political leaders should have above average ability to make morally informed political judgments.It too has deep historical roots. In Imperial China, scholar-officials proved their ability in a fair and open examination system, and consequently they were granted uncommon (by Western standards) amounts of respect, authority, and legitimacy. Political surveys have shown that Chinese still endorse the view that it is more important to have high-quality politicians who care about the people's needs than to worry about procedural arrangements ensuring people's rights to choose their leaders. In recent decades, the Chinese Communist Party has increased its legitimacy by transforming itself into a more meritocratic political organization, with renewed emphasis on examinations and education as criteria for political leadership. The third source of non-democratic legitimacy is nationalism. An important part of legitimacy can be termed "ideological legitimacy": the regime seeks to be seen as morally justified in the eyes ofthe people by virtue of certain ideas that it expresses in its educational system, political speeches, and public policies. The CCP was of course founded on Marxist principles, but the problem is that few believe in the communist ideal anymore. Hence, the regime has increasingly turned to nationalism to secure "ideological legitimacy". Nationalism has more recent roots in China: in Imperial China, the political elites tended to view their "country" as the center of the world. But this vision collapsed when China was subject to the incursions of Western colonial powers in the mid-twentieth century, leading to a "century of humiliation" at hands of foreign powers. The CCP put a symbolic end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers with the establishment of a relatively secure state in 1949 and it constantly reminds Chinese of its function as protector of the Chinese nation. In short, it should not be surprising that the CCP is widely seen to be legitimate in the eyes of the people, and barring unforeseen events there is no reason to expect imminent collapse of the regime. But the key word is "imminent". In the absence of substantial political reform, China'snon-democratic sources of political legitimacy may not be sustainable in the long term.

### AT: Human Rights Reform

#### US human rights promotion fails—hypocrisy and conflicting messaging

Bequelin ‘13 [Nicholas, East Asia Director at Amnesty International, based in Hong Kong. A former Visiting Scholar at The China Center, Yale Law School, and previously at Human Rights Watch, he obtained his Ph.D. in History from the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS), Paris, in 2001, and is a graduate in Chinese from the School of Oriental Languages and Civilizations, Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/, Accessed: 7/29/2016]

First, what is most important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect, with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the C.I.A. renditions.¶ Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights.¶ Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police.¶ Fourth, the U.S. must forge partnerships and coordinate more effectively with other rights-respecting countries in their effort to press China on specific issues and cases. There has been very little said by any head of state about the fact that China is the only country in the world that holds a Nobel Peace Laureate in prison (while his wife is imprisoned at her home outside of any legal procedure.)¶ Finally, the U.S. must be ready to take steps when the situation demands it. For instance, given China's absolute refusal to engage on any issue related to the situation in Tibetan areas, the U.S. must be ready to upgrade its contacts with the Dalai Lama, and encourage other countries to do so.¶ The United States does more to raise human rights issues with China than any other country, but it often conveys the implicit message that it does so out of moral convictions, not out of well-understood national interest and concern for human rights globally, and that greatly diminishes the effectiveness of such statements.

#### US HR promotion fails

Guangcheng & McMillan-Scott 13 - \*Chinese human rights activist, \*\*Vice-President of the European Parliament for Democracy & Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations

Chen, Edward, China: The West Needs to Promote Both Trade and Human Rights, Huffington Post, http://new.www.huffingtonpost.com/chen-guangcheng/china-trade-human-rights\_b\_3443081.html, Accessed: 7/28/2016.]

Western governments must also guard against hypocrisy by addressing their own human rights problems. The recent revelations over U.S. online surveillance, as well as longstanding issues such as Guantanamo Bay and drone strikes, all give ammunition to the Chinese regime, which now publishes its own highly critical annual human rights reports on the United States. The failure of Western countries to condemn the human rights abuses of close allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also gives rise to accusations of double standards. Such hypocrisy must be addressed if the West is to be truly credible in its efforts to promote human rights abroad.

### AT: Human Rights Reform

#### Tons of barriers to Chinese reforms

Lubman ‘99 [Stanley B., Senior Fellow, The Honorable G. William and Ariadna Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law; Distinguished Lecturer in Residence, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao, Stanford University Press, Google Books, p. 312-313.]

The difference between Chinese and Western ideas—and ideals—of law has long vexed Sino—Western relations generally, and different ideas about rights under law will continue to trouble Sino-American relations. American policy—makers who wish to press China to move more deci-sively toward the rule of law should take into account the constraints on capacity to change its legal institutions, which stem not only from the determination of the CCP to retain its rule and power, but from the lasting influences of tradition and the pre—reform Communist past, limited resources, and structural developments in state—society relations that have been caused by economic reform. Awareness of these ought to temper American impatience and help place law-related issues in perspective. ¶ Moreover, the United States obviously lacks the power to muster inter- national support for a policy of aggressive pressure the Chinese government to modify Chinese institutions. As one China specialist has noted, when the United States has threatened sanctions because of trade, military sales, and human rights issues, "in almost every instance the other G—7 countries have not supported threats (which) has made Washington claim that it is acting behalf of widely accepted international norms ring hollow."" ¶ The United States should no longer pursue rights—related issues as publicly or as sanctimoniously as it has done in recent years. Its past pressure for condemnation of the PRC by the United Nation Commission Human Rights has produced noisy posturing by both nations. It should, however, quietly but insistently remind the Beijing leadership that the world is watching its treatment of its own people, and that foreign images of China are Shaped in large part by perceptions of Chinese democracy. Rather than projecting American due process ideals, the United States should appeal to the concepts articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that are not rooted in any particular philosophy, ideology, or social system.60 ¶ Many observers over years have pointed out that US policy has been equivocal toward some of the most important international covenants that express the human rights that it condemns China for denying to its citizens. The United States signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992 only after insisting on many reservations, and (like China) it has not signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which would also express American willingness to recognize concepts of human rights that go beyond the legal and political rights that are at the core of American policy. If the United States is to be credible and not merely moralistic, it should improve its own record. 61 ¶ Chinese legal culture is surely relevant to American insistence on rights—based changes in Chinese behavior. In the mouths of moralistic critics of China, "human rights" has become a slogan that allows no room for ' 'the burden of the past which any major change in the character of the Chinese rights system will have to overcome."62 William Alford points out the narrowness of American rights-based arguments, noting that it reminds many Chinese of one hundred fifty years of exploitation and bullying by the West. Nineteenth-century Chinese perceptions that law was used as a weapon to justify violating Chinese sovereignty still echo in Chinese memories. To the extent that US policy projects or relies on American visions of how a legal system ought to work, it may generate resistance and resentment of a powerful Western nation hector.¶ The conduct of the Chinese Party-state is unlikely to change significantly in response to foreign pressure unless rights—consciousness among Chinese rises considerably above its present level. The Sino—American dis— agreement on protection of the intellectual property of Americans is suggestive here. Absent what William Alford has described as "a belief that individuals are endowed with rights that they are entitled to assert even with respect to those in positions of American pressure on China to toughen its laws on intellectual property protection is unlikely to succeed. Alford further points out that "massive threats" to bring about changes in the internal laws of another country are "incapable of generating the type of domestic rationale and conditions needed to produce enduring change."64 He argues that the "institutions, personnel and values needed to undergird a rights—based legality" must support the laws themselves, and his argument applies to human rights as well as other legal issues. The forces supporting legality to which Alford refers can come, most importantly, from within China itself. The quotation from Montesquieu at the head of this chapter carries a lesson that seems apposite today.

### AT: Agricultural Reform

#### China won’t liberalize their agriculture – they are too sensitive to possible farmer revolts and don’t trust U.S. commitments

Joan McEntee, chairwoman of the China Group in the Washington DC office of the law firm Baker, Donelson, Bearmen, Caldwell & Berkowitz, former Deputy to the chief of Staff for VP George H.W. Bush, interviewed by Forbes.com, August 04, 2008, Q&A: China Post Doha. Accessed: 7/26/16.

What prompted China to reverse at the last moment its decision to support the compromise deal on import-surge thresholds, the issue that killed any hope of a Doha deal, and to do so so publicly? There was a tsunami of possible reasons. First, though China's economic interests could have been aligned with the U.S. position, the appearance of abandoning its farmers is something that China is sensitive about. When American farmers get upset, they get their senator to put in a bill--or vote for another presidential candidate; in China, the government continues to worry about the potential social unrest if farmers revolt against economic positions taken by the government. Second, China is paying much more than lip service to expanding its influence and economic interests into the less-developed areas of India, Africa and even South America. Third, even though the more politically sophisticated Chinese partially comprehend protectionist rhetoric during U.S. elections, statements by candidates about reneging on agreements such as [the North American Free Trade Agreement], of all things, made the Chinese question U.S. commitment to open trade. Many Chinese leaders have said that if the U.S. is contemplating giving up on Canada and Mexico, what real hope is there for China? They also remember the decision on steel the U.S. took early in this Administration, the increases in anti-dumping suits and the threats of increased export controls after the election. In the West we dismiss such comments as campaign silly-season, but Chinese diplomats cannot always communicate that to their leadership successfully. Fourth, China weighed its self-interest, its increasing economic power and lack of trust in the U.S. on trade--and voted for protectionism.

#### Conditions fail – we need to remove our subsidies before China will negotiate with us.

Mark Lange is a journalist and a former presidential speechwriter, 4-30-2008, “The only way to alter China’s hand in Darfur” http://features.csmonitor.com/olympics08/2008/04/30/the-only-way-to-alter-chinas-hand-in-darfur/#, Accessed: 7/26/16.]

If the Bush administration is looking for a legacy making move, the famously siloed departments of State, Treasury, and the US Trade Representative (USTR) could quietly offer meaningful incentives for China to play a more active role in resolving the Darfur crisis. China has a significant interest in even modest changes to US and EU farm subsidies, for example, to make its food exports more attractive. Those subsidies are widely considered excessive. USTR has already urged “ambitious cuts” in subsidies to revive trade talks – cuts that could be applied as part of an economic brake lever on mass slaughter. We have similar openings in trade and currency negotiations, peaceful technology transfer, scientific collaboration, environmental control technology, bioscience, and technical assistance on any number of fronts – some or all of which, negotiated deliberately, can align China’s economic interests with the West’s agenda in Darfur. Attempts to gain cooperation through humiliation feel righteous, but won’t deliver results. Only when we positively address China’s economic self-interest, and its desperate need for energy, will the West find the humanitarian solution it seeks.