|  |
| --- |
| **West Coast Publishing****China 2016****Negative****Edited by Jim Hanson**ResearchersAndrew Durand, Carter Henman, Eric Robinson, Jonathan Barsky, Jonathan Shane, Kendra Doty, Mary Marcum, Matt Stannard, Risha Bhattacharjee, Shelby Pryor, Tom Schally, William James TaylorThanks for using our Policy, LD, Public Forum, and Extemp Materials.**Please don’t share this material with anyone outside of your school**including via print, email, dropbox, google drive, the web, etc. *We’re a small non-profit; please help us continue to provide our products.***Contact us at** jim@wcdebate.com[www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com) |

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

**NEGATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO**

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST NEGATVE**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

**Finding Arguments in this File**

Use the table of contents on the next pages to find the evidence you need or the navigation bar on the left. We have tried to make the table of contents as easy to use as possible. You’ll find scenario/impacts, affirmatives, disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks listed alphabetically in their categories.

**Using the Arguments in this File**

We encourage you to be familiar with the evidence you use. Highlight (underline) the key lines you will use in the evidence. Cut evidence from our files, incorporate your and others’ research and make new files. File the evidence so that you can easily retrieve it when you need it in debate rounds. Practice reading the evidence out-loud; Practice applying the arguments to your opponents’ positions; Practice defending your evidence in rebuttal speeches.

**Use West Coast Evidence as a Beginning**

We hope you enjoy our evidence files and find them useful. In saying this, we want to make a strong statement that we make when we coach and that we believe is vitally important to your success: DO NOT USE THIS EVIDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR YOUR OWN RESEARCH. Instead, let it serve as a beginning. Let it inform you of important arguments, of how to tag and organize your arguments, and to offer citations for further research. Don’t stagnate in these files--build upon them by doing your own research for updates, new strategies, and arguments that specifically apply to your opponents. In doing so, you’ll use our evidence to become a better debater.

**Copying and Sharing West Coast Evidence?**

Our policy gives you the freedom to use our evidence for educational purposes without violating our hard work.

* You may print and copy this evidence for those on your team.
* **You may not electronically share nor distribute this evidence with anyone other than those on your team unless you very substantially change each page of material that you share.**

For unusual situations, you can e-mail us at **jim@wcdebate.com**and seek our consent.

**Ordering West Coast Materials**

**1. Visit the West Coast Web Page at** [**www.wcdebate.com**](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5Chansonjb99%5CDocuments%5C0-West%20Coast%5C00webproducts%5Cpolicy-set%202016%5Cwww.wcdebate.com)

**2. E-mail us at** **jim@wcdebate.com**

**3. Fax us at 877-781-5058**

Copyright 2016. West Coast Publishing. All Rights Reserved.

**Visit our web page!**

[**www.wcdebate.com**](http://www.wcdebate.com)

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

[TABLE OF CONTENTS 3](#_Toc460446215)

[Topic Neg Strategies 18](#_Toc460446216)

[Topic Definitions 23](#_Toc460446217)

[Substantially 24](#_Toc460446218)

[Increase 25](#_Toc460446219)

[Its 27](#_Toc460446220)

[Diplomatic 28](#_Toc460446221)

[Economic 29](#_Toc460446222)

[Engagement 30](#_Toc460446223)

[Engagement 31](#_Toc460446224)

[Diplomatic Engagement 32](#_Toc460446225)

[Diplomatic Engagement 33](#_Toc460446226)

[Diplomatic Engagement 34](#_Toc460446227)

[Economic Engagement 35](#_Toc460446228)

[Economic Engagement 36](#_Toc460446229)

[With 37](#_Toc460446230)

[People’s Republic of China 39](#_Toc460446231)

[Topicality Shells 41](#_Toc460446232)

[Substantially is Without Material Quals: 1NC 42](#_Toc460446233)

[Increase = Not New: 1NC 43](#_Toc460446234)

[Engagement = Must Be Conditional: 1NC 44](#_Toc460446235)

[Limiting “Engagement” Good 45](#_Toc460446236)

[Intent to Define Impact 46](#_Toc460446237)

[Negotiation Education Impact 47](#_Toc460446238)

[China Education Impact 48](#_Toc460446239)

[Government Engagement is Conditional 49](#_Toc460446240)

[Distinct From Appeasement 50](#_Toc460446241)

[Engagement Should Be Defined Reasonably 51](#_Toc460446242)

[Engagement = Must Be Unconditional: 1NC 52](#_Toc460446243)

[Not Conditional 53](#_Toc460446244)

[Engagement = Must Be Positive: 1NC 54](#_Toc460446245)

[Must Specify Engagement: 1NC 55](#_Toc460446246)

[Dialogue Not Enough 56](#_Toc460446247)

[PRC = The Government 1NC 57](#_Toc460446248)

[PRC Does Not Include Taiwan 1NC 59](#_Toc460446249)

[AT: One China Policy 60](#_Toc460446250)

[AT: Taiwan is a State of the PRC 61](#_Toc460446251)

[Neg Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 62](#_Toc460446252)

[AIIB investments will fail 63](#_Toc460446253)

[AIIB doesn’t solve development needs 65](#_Toc460446254)

[AIIB hurts environmental standards 69](#_Toc460446255)

[AIIB multilateralism fails 71](#_Toc460446256)

[China will use the AIIB to support aggression 72](#_Toc460446257)

[AIIB will lower human rights standards 75](#_Toc460446258)

[Lending safeguard policies fail 78](#_Toc460446259)

[Asia development turn 79](#_Toc460446260)

[AIIB safeguards fail 80](#_Toc460446261)

[Neg Military-to-Military Engagement 82](#_Toc460446262)

[No Inherency 83](#_Toc460446263)

[A2: Inherency 84](#_Toc460446264)

[A2: Inherency 86](#_Toc460446265)

[No Solvency 88](#_Toc460446266)

[No Solvency – Military exchanges do not build trust 89](#_Toc460446267)

[No Solvency – Military exchanges do not build trust 91](#_Toc460446268)

[No Solvency – Military diplomatic engagement fails 92](#_Toc460446269)

[No Solvency – NDAA prevents better mil-mil relations 94](#_Toc460446270)

[A2: Maritime Security Adv. 95](#_Toc460446271)

[A2: Maritime Advantage – No Solvency 96](#_Toc460446272)

[A2: Maritime Advantage – No South China Seas war 97](#_Toc460446273)

[A2: Maritime Advantage – No South China Seas war 98](#_Toc460446274)

[A2: Maritime Advantage – No escalation 99](#_Toc460446275)

[A2: Maritime Adv. – “Freedom of navigation” angers China 101](#_Toc460446276)

[A2: Miscalculation Adv. 102](#_Toc460446277)

[A2: Miscalculation Advantage – Maritime engagement turns 103](#_Toc460446278)

[A2: Miscalculation Advantage – No Solvency 104](#_Toc460446279)

[A2: Miscalculation Advantage – Theory is wrong 105](#_Toc460446280)

[A2: Miscalculation Advantage – No miscalc war with China 106](#_Toc460446281)

[A2: Japanese Nationalism Adv. 107](#_Toc460446282)

[A2: Japanese Nationalism 108](#_Toc460446283)

[A2: Relations Advantage 109](#_Toc460446284)

[A2: Relations – Status Quo solves 110](#_Toc460446285)

[A2: Relations – No solvency 111](#_Toc460446286)

[A2: Relations – No downturn / impact answers 112](#_Toc460446287)

[Neg Service Liberalization 113](#_Toc460446288)

[Topicality: Engagement is Binding 114](#_Toc460446289)

[Inherency Answers: China Allows Service Investment Now 115](#_Toc460446290)

[Inherency Answers: China Allows Service Investment Now 116](#_Toc460446291)

[No Solvency: Chinese Banking Barriers 117](#_Toc460446292)

[No Solvency: Economic Gains of Liberalization Exaggerated 118](#_Toc460446293)

[No Solvency: China Won't Sign 120](#_Toc460446294)

[Solvency Claims are Dubious: China Doesn't Allow Access to Foreign Economic Research 122](#_Toc460446295)

[State-Owned Enterprises Case Turn 123](#_Toc460446296)

[State-Owned Enterprises Case Turn: Extensions: Critical to Chinese Economy 124](#_Toc460446297)

[Growth Bad: Kills Environment 125](#_Toc460446298)

[Limited Investment Counterplan Solvency 126](#_Toc460446299)

[Limited Investment Counterplan Advantage: Maintaining Banking Regulation Good 128](#_Toc460446300)

[Limited Investment Counterplan Advantage: Maintaining Banking Regulation Good 129](#_Toc460446301)

[Regionalism Good Argument 130](#_Toc460446302)

[Regionalism Good Extensions: Asian Regional Growth Good 131](#_Toc460446303)

[Neg TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 133](#_Toc460446304)

[AT: Advantage – U.S. China Relations 134](#_Toc460446305)

[1NC – AT: U.S.-China Relations F/L 135](#_Toc460446306)

[2NC UQ: Relations High 138](#_Toc460446307)

[2NC – Relations Resilient 139](#_Toc460446308)

[2NC – Relations Alt Cause 140](#_Toc460446309)

[2NC – Climate Cooperation Solves Aff Impact 141](#_Toc460446310)

[2NC – AT: Interdependence 142](#_Toc460446311)

[AT: Advantage – Trade 143](#_Toc460446312)

[1NC – TPP Trade Scenario F/L 144](#_Toc460446313)

[2NC – AT: Interdependence Solves War 147](#_Toc460446314)

[1NC – TPP Economy Scenario 148](#_Toc460446315)

[2NC – Asia Econ: No Impact 150](#_Toc460446316)

[2NC – AT: Impact – Trade 151](#_Toc460446317)

[2NC – AT: Trade Diversion 153](#_Toc460446318)

[AT: Solvency (Generic) 155](#_Toc460446319)

[1NC – AT: TPP Solvency 156](#_Toc460446320)

[2NC – AT: TPP Solvency 157](#_Toc460446321)

[2NC – AT: TPP Solvency 158](#_Toc460446322)

[Neg U.S. China Counterterrorism Coop 159](#_Toc460446323)

[Topicality: Counterterrorism is Not Diplomatic Engagement 160](#_Toc460446324)

[Russian Relations Disadvantage 161](#_Toc460446325)

[Russian Relations Disadvantage 162](#_Toc460446326)

[Human Rights Disadvantage 163](#_Toc460446327)

[Human Rights Disadvantage 164](#_Toc460446328)

[Inherency Answers 165](#_Toc460446329)

[Solvency Answers 166](#_Toc460446330)

[Solvency Answers 167](#_Toc460446331)

[Solvency Answers 168](#_Toc460446332)

[Conditioning Counterplan Solvency 170](#_Toc460446333)

[Answers to Terrorism Scenario 171](#_Toc460446334)

[Answers to Terrorism Scenario 172](#_Toc460446335)

[Answers to Relations Advantage 173](#_Toc460446336)

[Answers to Relations: No Armed Conflict Over Energy Resources 174](#_Toc460446337)

[Answers to Relations Advantage 175](#_Toc460446338)

[Answers to Relations Advantage 176](#_Toc460446339)

[Answers to Science and Technology Scenario 177](#_Toc460446340)

[CP Pressure CPs 178](#_Toc460446341)

[Strategy Sheet 179](#_Toc460446342)

[1NC Export Controls CP 180](#_Toc460446343)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency 181](#_Toc460446344)

[2NC Export CP – Solvency – AT: Current Controls Fail 182](#_Toc460446345)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency Advocate – “High-Leverage Strategic Harm” 183](#_Toc460446346)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency Advocate – EU and Japan 184](#_Toc460446347)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – AT: Allies Say No – EU 185](#_Toc460446348)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – AT: Allies Say No – Japan 186](#_Toc460446349)

[2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – Allies Say Yes – Japan 187](#_Toc460446350)

[2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA 188](#_Toc460446351)

[2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA 189](#_Toc460446352)

[2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA 190](#_Toc460446353)

[1NC Sanctions CP 191](#_Toc460446354)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – China Complies 192](#_Toc460446355)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – China Complies 193](#_Toc460446356)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – Empirics 194](#_Toc460446357)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – Empirics 195](#_Toc460446358)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP 196](#_Toc460446359)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP 197](#_Toc460446360)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP 198](#_Toc460446361)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – North Korea 199](#_Toc460446362)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Territorial Disputes 200](#_Toc460446363)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Territorial Disputes 201](#_Toc460446364)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: General Sanctions Indicts 202](#_Toc460446365)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: Old Sanctions Indicts 203](#_Toc460446366)

[2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: Old Sanctions Indicts 204](#_Toc460446367)

[2NC Sanctions CP – General – No Link to Politics 205](#_Toc460446368)

[2NC Sanctions CP – Cyber – No Link to Politics 206](#_Toc460446369)

[2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Perm Do Both – General 207](#_Toc460446370)

[2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Perm Do Both – Cyber 208](#_Toc460446371)

[2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Sanctions Bad – AT: Cyber Retal 209](#_Toc460446372)

[2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Sanctions Bad – AT: Trade 210](#_Toc460446373)

[1NC Tariffs CP 211](#_Toc460446374)

[2NC Tariffs CP – Solvency 212](#_Toc460446375)

[2NC Tariffs CP Solvency + Aff Solvency Takeout 213](#_Toc460446376)

[2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – AT: Chinese Lashout – General 214](#_Toc460446377)

[2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – AT: Chinese FoPo Lashout 215](#_Toc460446378)

[2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – US-China Relations Turns 216](#_Toc460446379)

[2NC – AT: Perm Do Both – General 217](#_Toc460446380)

[2NC – AT: Perm – Do the CP – Diplomatic Engagement 218](#_Toc460446381)

[2NC – AT: Perm – Do the CP – Economic Engagement 219](#_Toc460446382)

[1NC Heg NB – Engagement Bad 220](#_Toc460446383)

[1NC Heg NB – Impact 221](#_Toc460446384)

[2NC Heg NB – Engagement Bad 222](#_Toc460446385)

[1NC Solvency Takeout – China Says No 223](#_Toc460446386)

[2NC Solvency Takeout – China Says No 224](#_Toc460446387)

[2NC Solvency Takeout – Chinese Political Reform Advs 225](#_Toc460446388)

[2NC Solvency Takeout – US-China Coop Advs 226](#_Toc460446389)

[2NC Solvency Takeout – Dialogue Fails 227](#_Toc460446390)

[DA China Appeasement DA 228](#_Toc460446391)

[Disad Story… 229](#_Toc460446392)

[1NC Shell—UQ 231](#_Toc460446393)

[1NC Shell—Link 232](#_Toc460446394)

[1NC Shell—Int. Link 233](#_Toc460446395)

[1NC Shell—Impact 234](#_Toc460446396)

[BLOCK EXTs 235](#_Toc460446397)

[2NC—Impact Framing 236](#_Toc460446398)

[2NC—Impact Framing 237](#_Toc460446399)

[2NC—Impact Framing 238](#_Toc460446400)

[Uniqueness Ext. 239](#_Toc460446401)

[Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Laundry List 240](#_Toc460446402)

[Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Asia Pivot 241](#_Toc460446403)

[Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Military 242](#_Toc460446404)

[Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Economic 243](#_Toc460446405)

[US Hegemony Sustainable 244](#_Toc460446406)

[US Hegemony Sustainable 245](#_Toc460446407)

[US Hegemony Sustainable 246](#_Toc460446408)

[Link Ext. 247](#_Toc460446409)

[Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion 248](#_Toc460446410)

[Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion 249](#_Toc460446411)

[Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion 250](#_Toc460446412)

[Link—Top Level—No Condition 251](#_Toc460446413)

[Link—Top Level—Opposite Interests 252](#_Toc460446414)

[Link—Top Level—Military Presence 253](#_Toc460446415)

[Int. Link Ext. 254](#_Toc460446416)

[Int. Link—China Seeks Concessions 255](#_Toc460446417)

[Int. Link—China Seeks Concessions 256](#_Toc460446418)

[Int. Link—China Pockets Concessions 257](#_Toc460446419)

[Int. Link—South China Sea Concession 258](#_Toc460446420)

[Disad Mechanics 259](#_Toc460446421)

[China is a Threat—Military 260](#_Toc460446422)

[China is a Threat—Military 261](#_Toc460446423)

[China is a Threat—Economy 262](#_Toc460446424)

[China is a Threat—Economy 263](#_Toc460446425)

[Neg Answers to Aff Answers 264](#_Toc460446426)

[A/T China Lash Out 265](#_Toc460446427)

[A/T China Lash Out 266](#_Toc460446428)

[A/T China Threat Construction 267](#_Toc460446429)

[A/T Appeasement Effective 268](#_Toc460446430)

[A/T US Won’t Defend Taiwan 269](#_Toc460446431)

[A/T US Won’t Defend Taiwan 270](#_Toc460446432)

[A/T Weak China Better 271](#_Toc460446433)

[Impact Ext. 272](#_Toc460446434)

[Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War 273](#_Toc460446435)

[Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War 274](#_Toc460446436)

[Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War 275](#_Toc460446437)

[Taiwan Impact—Chemical War 276](#_Toc460446438)

[Taiwan Impact—Hegemony 277](#_Toc460446439)

[US/China War Bad—Extinction 278](#_Toc460446440)

[US/China War Bad—Billions Die 279](#_Toc460446441)

[US Hegemony Good—China War 280](#_Toc460446442)

[US Hegemony Good—Great Power Wars 281](#_Toc460446443)

[US Hegemony Good—Stability/ Deterrent 282](#_Toc460446444)

[China Hegemony/ Expansionism Bad 283](#_Toc460446445)

[China Can Be Deterred—A/T Miscalc 284](#_Toc460446446)

[China Can Be Deterred—A/T Miscalc 285](#_Toc460446447)

[Appeasement Bad—Terrorism 286](#_Toc460446448)

[Appeasement Bad—Counter Balancing 287](#_Toc460446449)

[Appeasement Bad—Engagement Bad 288](#_Toc460446450)

[DA US India Relations DA 289](#_Toc460446451)

[Disad Overview 290](#_Toc460446452)

[1NC Shell 291](#_Toc460446453)

[1NC Uniqueness—India 292](#_Toc460446454)

[1NC Uniqueness—China 293](#_Toc460446455)

[1NC Link—Relations 294](#_Toc460446456)

[1NC Impact—Climate Change 295](#_Toc460446457)

[1NC Impact—Extinction 296](#_Toc460446458)

[Shell Optional Cards 297](#_Toc460446459)

[Uniqueness 299](#_Toc460446460)

[US-India Relations High Now - General 300](#_Toc460446461)

[US-India Relations High Now – Military Cooperation 301](#_Toc460446462)

[US-India Relations High Now – Modi 302](#_Toc460446463)

[US-India Relations High Now – Declared Partnership 303](#_Toc460446464)

[US-India Relations High Now – India Government 304](#_Toc460446465)

[US-India Relations High Now – Regional Influence 305](#_Toc460446466)

[A2 Investment Restrictions 306](#_Toc460446467)

[A2 Civil Nuclear Initiative 307](#_Toc460446468)

[China-India Relations High Now – General 308](#_Toc460446469)

[Tensions/ Risk of Miscalc High 309](#_Toc460446470)

[2NC – Relations Strong 310](#_Toc460446471)

[2NC – AT: Alt Causes to Strong Relations 312](#_Toc460446472)

[2NC – AT: Pakistan Hurts Relations 314](#_Toc460446473)

[Links 315](#_Toc460446474)

[US/ China Relations—Zero Sum 316](#_Toc460446475)

[US/ China Relations—Security 317](#_Toc460446476)

[US/ China Relations 318](#_Toc460446477)

[US/ China Relations 319](#_Toc460446478)

[Magnifier—Plan Upsets Allies 320](#_Toc460446479)

[Magnifier—Asymmetry 321](#_Toc460446480)

[Magnifier—Competition 322](#_Toc460446481)

[Magnifier—Border Dispute 323](#_Toc460446482)

[Magnifier—Border Dispute (2) 324](#_Toc460446483)

[Magnifier—Chinese Encirclement 325](#_Toc460446484)

[Magnifier—India Threatened 326](#_Toc460446485)

[Link Magnifier 327](#_Toc460446486)

[2NC – Link: Engagement 329](#_Toc460446487)

[2NC – Link: U.S.-China Relations 330](#_Toc460446488)

[2NC – Link: Perception 331](#_Toc460446489)

[2NC – AT: Alt Causes/China Doesn’t Affect India 332](#_Toc460446490)

[2NC – AT: Empirically Disproven 333](#_Toc460446491)

[2NC – AT: India Doesn’t Perceive Plan 334](#_Toc460446492)

[2NC – AT: Link Isn’t Reverse Causal 335](#_Toc460446493)

[2NC – AT: Relations Not Zero Sum 336](#_Toc460446494)

[2NC – AT: Pakistan Bigger Concern than China 337](#_Toc460446495)

[Impacts 338](#_Toc460446496)

[US-India Relations Good– General 339](#_Toc460446497)

[US-India Relations Good – Climate Change 340](#_Toc460446498)

[US/ India Relations Good—Contain China 341](#_Toc460446499)

[US-India Relations Good – Economy/Trade 342](#_Toc460446500)

[US-India Relations Good– Indo-Pak War 344](#_Toc460446501)

[US-India Relations Good – Regional Stability 345](#_Toc460446502)

[US-India Relations Good – Democracy 346](#_Toc460446503)

[US-India Relations Good – Terrorism 347](#_Toc460446504)

[Impact Magnifier – Spillover/Cyber-Security 348](#_Toc460446505)

[Impact Magnifier – Spillover 349](#_Toc460446506)

[2NC – Terror Impact UQ: Threat High/Real 350](#_Toc460446507)

[2NC – Terror Impact I/L: Relations Key 351](#_Toc460446508)

[2NC – Terror Impact > Extinction 352](#_Toc460446509)

[2NC – Terror Turns: Kritik Impacts 353](#_Toc460446510)

[2NC – AT: Criticisms of Terror Scholarship 354](#_Toc460446511)

[2NC – AT: Impact Defense 355](#_Toc460446512)

[2NC – AT: Impact Defense (Mueller) 356](#_Toc460446513)

[2NC – AT: Terror Scholarship Flawed 357](#_Toc460446514)

[2NC – Impact Container: Coop Solves Laundry List 358](#_Toc460446515)

[2AC – Relations Turns Asian Stability 359](#_Toc460446516)

[2NC – Relations Turns China Containment 360](#_Toc460446517)

[2NC – Relations Turns Democracy 361](#_Toc460446518)

[2NC – Relations Turns Freedom of Navigation 362](#_Toc460446519)

[2NC – Relations Turns Maritime Cooperation 363](#_Toc460446520)

[2NC – Relations Turns Space 364](#_Toc460446521)

[2NC – Add-On: Cyberterror/Cyberwar 365](#_Toc460446522)

[2NC – Add-On: Democracy 367](#_Toc460446523)

[2NC – Add-On: Piracy 368](#_Toc460446524)

[2NC – AT: Indo-Pak War/Relations Bad Turn 370](#_Toc460446525)

[A/T 2AC Answers 371](#_Toc460446526)

[A/T “US/India Relations Resilient” 372](#_Toc460446527)

[A/T “US/India Relations Resilient” 373](#_Toc460446528)

[A/T “US/India Relations Resilient” 374](#_Toc460446529)

[A/T “India Won’t Be Aggressive” 375](#_Toc460446530)

[A/T “India/China Relations Resilient” 376](#_Toc460446531)

[A/T “India/ China Cooperate” 377](#_Toc460446532)

[A/T “India/ China Cooperate” 378](#_Toc460446533)

[A/T L/T—“China Relations Better” 379](#_Toc460446534)

[A/T L/T—“China Relations Better” 380](#_Toc460446535)

[DA US-Japan Relations DA 381](#_Toc460446536)

[\*\*\*Summary\*\*\* 382](#_Toc460446537)

[\*\*\*1NC Shell\*\*\* 383](#_Toc460446538)

[\*\*\*Uniqueness Extensions\*\*\* 388](#_Toc460446539)

[US-China Relations Low – Security Tensions 389](#_Toc460446540)

[US–China Relations Low – South China Sea 390](#_Toc460446541)

[US-China Relations Low – Regional Power Plays 392](#_Toc460446542)

[US-China Relations Low – THAAD 393](#_Toc460446543)

[US-China Relations Low – General 394](#_Toc460446544)

[A2 Peaceful Rise 396](#_Toc460446545)

[A2 Relations High - Downplaying 397](#_Toc460446546)

[US-Japan Relations High – Economic Leadership 398](#_Toc460446547)

[US-Japan Relations High – Diplomacy 399](#_Toc460446548)

[US-Japan Relations High – Southeast Asia 400](#_Toc460446549)

[US-Japan Relations High – Hiroshima Visit 401](#_Toc460446550)

[US-Japan Relations High – Robotics 402](#_Toc460446551)

[A2 Trump Thumps 403](#_Toc460446552)

[A2 Iran Thumper 404](#_Toc460446553)

[\*\*\*Link Extensions\*\*\* 405](#_Toc460446554)

[Link – Economic Blocs 406](#_Toc460446555)

[Link – Trade-Off 408](#_Toc460446556)

[Link – Rebalance 409](#_Toc460446557)

[Link – General 410](#_Toc460446558)

[Link Magnifiers 412](#_Toc460446559)

[\*\*\*Internal Link Extensions\*\*\* 416](#_Toc460446560)

[General Extensions 417](#_Toc460446561)

[Japan Key Regional Player 418](#_Toc460446562)

[\*\*\*Impact Extensions\*\*\* 419](#_Toc460446563)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Asian Stability 420](#_Toc460446564)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Russia War 421](#_Toc460446565)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Disease Spread 423](#_Toc460446566)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Climate Change 425](#_Toc460446567)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Nuke Rearm 427](#_Toc460446568)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Japanese Cybersecurity 430](#_Toc460446569)

[US-Japan Alliance Good – Asian Democracies 431](#_Toc460446570)

[DA Russia DA 432](#_Toc460446571)

[Explanation 433](#_Toc460446572)

[1NC 434](#_Toc460446573)

[Uniqueness 436](#_Toc460446574)

[UQ: China-Russia Coop High – General 437](#_Toc460446575)

[UQ: China-Russia Coop High – Framing 439](#_Toc460446576)

[UQ: Russia Arms Exports to China High 440](#_Toc460446577)

[Links 441](#_Toc460446578)

[Ext: L – Generic 442](#_Toc460446579)

[Ext: L – Generic 443](#_Toc460446580)

[Ext: L – Generic 444](#_Toc460446581)

[Ext: L – Generic 445](#_Toc460446582)

[Ext: L – Generic 446](#_Toc460446583)

[Ext: L – Generic 447](#_Toc460446584)

[Ext: L – Generic 448](#_Toc460446585)

[Internal Links 449](#_Toc460446586)

[Ext – IL: China Key – Russia Econ – General 450](#_Toc460446587)

[2NC IL: China Key – Russia Econ – Arms Sales 451](#_Toc460446588)

[2NC IL: China Key – Framing 453](#_Toc460446589)

[2NC IL: China Key – State Collapse 454](#_Toc460446590)

[Impact – Russia Econ 455](#_Toc460446591)

[Ext: Econ Collapse => Aggression 456](#_Toc460446592)

[Ext: Aggression => Extinction 457](#_Toc460446593)

[2NC I: China Aggression 458](#_Toc460446594)

[2NC I: NK Prolif 459](#_Toc460446595)

[Ext: NK Prolif => Extinction 460](#_Toc460446596)

[2NC I: State Collapse 461](#_Toc460446597)

[Ext: Econ Decline => State Collapse 462](#_Toc460446598)

[I: State Collapse => Miscalc 463](#_Toc460446599)

[Ext: State Collapse => Miscalc 464](#_Toc460446600)

[Ext: Miscalc => Extinction 465](#_Toc460446601)

[Answers to Answers 466](#_Toc460446602)

[A2: UQ OW L – Russia-China Coop Inevitable – Econ Concerns 467](#_Toc460446603)

[A2: Decreased China-Russia Coop = Good 468](#_Toc460446604)

[A2: India Solves Russia Exports 469](#_Toc460446605)

[A2: Russia Econ Collapse Good – Imperialism 470](#_Toc460446606)

[Kritik Orientalism Kritik 471](#_Toc460446607)

[1NC 472](#_Toc460446608)

[Link 478](#_Toc460446609)

[Contact Zone 479](#_Toc460446610)

[Culture 480](#_Toc460446611)

[Chinese Progress 481](#_Toc460446612)

[Economic Development 482](#_Toc460446613)

[Engagement 484](#_Toc460446614)

[Historical Ignorance 486](#_Toc460446615)

[Humanism 488](#_Toc460446616)

[Modernity 490](#_Toc460446617)

[Queer Theory 491](#_Toc460446618)

[Postmodernism 492](#_Toc460446619)

[Privileging Western Scholarship 493](#_Toc460446620)

[Protest/Social Movement 494](#_Toc460446621)

[Impact 495](#_Toc460446622)

[Colonization 496](#_Toc460446623)

[Self-fulfilling prophecy 499](#_Toc460446624)

[Domination 500](#_Toc460446625)

[State of Exception 501](#_Toc460446626)

[Alternative 502](#_Toc460446627)

[Reject 503](#_Toc460446628)

[Solvency 505](#_Toc460446629)

[Decentralized Consciousness 507](#_Toc460446630)

[Block Answers 508](#_Toc460446631)

[AT: Permutation 509](#_Toc460446632)

[Flawed Theory 511](#_Toc460446633)

[Framework 512](#_Toc460446634)

[No orientalism 516](#_Toc460446635)

[Not Monolithic 519](#_Toc460446636)

[Identifying Orient Bad 520](#_Toc460446637)

[Root Cause—Sexual Difference 521](#_Toc460446638)

[Kritik Securitization Kritik 522](#_Toc460446639)

[1NC 523](#_Toc460446640)

[1NC 525](#_Toc460446641)

[1NC 527](#_Toc460446642)

[1NC 528](#_Toc460446643)

[Links 529](#_Toc460446644)

[China – Engagement / Cooperation 530](#_Toc460446645)

[China – Positivist IR scholaship 531](#_Toc460446646)

[China – Knowable Object 533](#_Toc460446647)

[China – “Security interests” 534](#_Toc460446648)

[China - Threat Construction 535](#_Toc460446649)

[China - Threat Construction 537](#_Toc460446650)

[China - U.S. Relations 538](#_Toc460446651)

[China - Space 539](#_Toc460446652)

[China – Powershift Narrative 540](#_Toc460446653)

[Maritime Security 541](#_Toc460446654)

[Maritime Security 542](#_Toc460446655)

[U.S. Hegemony (General) 543](#_Toc460446656)

[U.S. hegemony (China threat) 544](#_Toc460446657)

[Nuclear war escalation scenarios 545](#_Toc460446658)

[Middle East Security 546](#_Toc460446659)

[Climate Change 548](#_Toc460446660)

[Climate Change 550](#_Toc460446661)

[“9/11” 551](#_Toc460446662)

[Fear Appeals Bad 552](#_Toc460446663)

[Alternatives 553](#_Toc460446664)

[Security Cosmopolitanism - Solvency 554](#_Toc460446665)

[Security Cosmopolitanism – Solvency / Governments 555](#_Toc460446666)

[Security Cosmopolitanism – Ontology /War 557](#_Toc460446667)

[Mechanics 559](#_Toc460446668)

[Social Constructions 560](#_Toc460446669)

[A2: “Threats are Real” 561](#_Toc460446670)

[A2: Permutations – Alt. is a Pre-requisite 562](#_Toc460446671)

[A2: Permutations – Mutually Exclusive 563](#_Toc460446672)

[A2: State Good 565](#_Toc460446673)

[Impacts 566](#_Toc460446674)

[Impact Extension – Policymaking / Error Replication 567](#_Toc460446675)

# Topic Neg Strategies

Equipped with a general mapping of possible affirmative cases, we will now discuss core arguments available to the negative that can be used to interact with a variety of different plans. Generally speaking, Neg teams will benefit from challenging not just whether Chinese cooperation on an issue is desirable, but whether the affirmative plan for achieving that cooperation is the best route. This will require a nuanced investigation of foreign policy strategies concerning affirmative advantage areas, and creative applications of the embedded debates over other containment, appeasement, and other contrasting approaches.

#### Counterplans

Pressure/Containment/Sanctions – The negative team may challenge the affirmative solvency mechanism by calling into question the use of positive incentives to bring about desired change from China, rather than encouraging behavior with the use of “carrots” the U.S. could make use of “sticks” e.g. negative inducements or punishments such as sanctions to compel the same action targeted by the plan or something else. These counterplans will vary depending on the incentives used by the Aff and directly clash with their solvency by disputing what China responds to and why. Containment approaches produce many net-benefit options. Appeasement and other similarly reasoned disads will be useful because they interact with the Aff solvency and make comparative claims. If it’s true that leverage is more effective at bringing about change, then it follows that concessions from engagement get pocketed and fail bring about desired changes. These contrasting approaches are also perceived very differently, by China, domestically, and by allies offering numerous net-benefit options.

Process/Agent – Policy wonks, do not be dismayed. Though this an international topic the focus on engagement introduces some interesting debates over political process, as well as questions concerning which agencies and how engagement should be conducted. Diplomacy is multifaceted and meticulous research will reveal detailed options for implementation questions. From the allocation of State Department resources and diplomats, to the role of Executive branch leadership, Neg teams can pose alternatives to normal means plan action—options like Track II diplomatic channels that offer opacity to the process or independent Executive action can offer Aff-specific benefits.

Add Conditions / Unconditional – The nature and function of engagement changes considerably depending on whether it asks for anything in return. Negs may choose to challenge the Aff reliance on offering concessions without making any demands on China, or conversely to argue that inducements will not be successful and have external drawbacks.

Agent/Multilateral – For the most part the Aff is limited to bilateral channels of engagement ignoring or in some cases supplanting the role of multilateral institutions. It can be argued that powerful nations making decisions undermines the framework of international law to offer democratic process and consensus necessary to address truly global problems. Rather than simply making a concession to China on trade, using the World Trade Organization dispute resolution mechanism could be argued as superior to bilateral action. U.S. economic encroachment on southeast Asia, even if welcomed by China, may present drawbacks while integration into ASEAN’s regulatory framework may avoid significant disadvantages to the Aff’s bilateral approach.

#### Disadvantages

Two important notes: 1) The umbrella of possible actions potentially falling within diplomatic and economic engagement are numerous and vary considerably in terms of their characteristics and implications; so generic disad links predicated on solvency mechanisms will generally need to be more specific to the Aff this year. Anticipating not only solvency mechanisms (how we engage), but also the issues over which the Aff is likely to engage will help strengthen these links as they both influence perceptions and political consequences. 2) Since the U.S. is already heavily engaged with China the Neg will need to distinguish the Aff from other forms of engagement in status quo work to generate link uniqueness, i.e. why would other U.S. interactions with China not cause the disad? The following are likely to be core negative disadvantages on this year’s topic.

Appeasement – This argument comes in all shapes and sizes, but centrally objects to the strategy of engagement by suggesting that state behavior is shaped by power and political priorities beyond influence from positive inducements. Thus, offering concessions sets a precedent for foreign policy that is overwhelmingly negative: it emboldens rogue states, etc. by signaling a lack of resolve on key issues. Such action is wavering and submission to things that must be opposed. What’s very strategic about arguments of this variety is that they directly mplicate solvency of the Aff, because it gets at how China and other countries respond.

Allies/Relations – Numerous forms of engagement with China will involve making concessions over things the U.S. has a reason for supporting currently. Amongst those reasons are often security guarantees and other assurances. Engagement may signal an unwillingness to confront China on an issue that might cause an ally to question our commitment defending their security against China. In same cases just warming relations with China can be cause for concern. If the U.S. and China are perceived as aligning that upsets the balance of power in a way that may cause India or Japan to reconsider their strategic priorities in a way that is harmful to international stability and peace.

Politics – There will be windows for Congressional action on important legislative initiatives this year, and during those times this topic is ripe for a good politics disad. While generally bills are much more scarce surrounding an election year, a benefit is that these narrow windows of opportunity mean that conditions have be very precise and establishing a threshold to your link, e.g. how the plan could derail everything is often easier. There’s a surprising convergence of political interests surrounding economic policy with China and excellent evidence suggesting possible horse trading between seemingly disconnected interests like protectionism and immigration, etc. Plans this year can do a lot to impact congressional dynamics and stir up controversy causing particular tradeoffs

Elections – It’s an election year, lucky you. To the extent that foreign policy is publicly perceived, our interactions with China arguably receive the most attention. And during this presidential campaign year China has especially been in the focus of the American public. (If any of this is news to you, please Google search: “Trump saying China”.) This topic holds the potential for excellent elections debates that evolve throughout the year as the political landscape changes. Teams who beyond the surface level polling and thinking can earn a big advantage in these debate—for example, considering how the plan impacts a particular voting demographic or a certain state (California, perhaps) that is capable of swinging an important vote introduces a level of specificity that will be difficult to refute. As always, this disad is easily made a net-benefit to many counterplans that would be interpreted or spun differently by an energized public, and it offers access to very large impacts that can weigh against and interact with the Aff advantages.

Chinese Politics – U.S. engagement presents serious Implications for the domestic political climate of China. Chinese government officials carefully navigate public sentiment with regards to outside influence, and this is especially true of the United States. For many the U.S. is seen in opposition to China’s best interests and association with being favorable to U.S. involvement could be politically damaging. Conversely, U.S. concessions could appear favorably as well by standing up to U.S. interests and winning an issue for China’s sovereign interests.

China Relations – The Aff’s engagement could be argued to harm our relations with China for a variety of reasons. It could be viewed as economic or political coercion, especially if tied to a demand for reform. Improved relations with China could be argued to be bad.

Protectionism – Aff plans that seek to deepen economic relations may remove barriers to trade that shield (or otherwise make less competitive) important domestic industries. A large portion of tension between U.S. and China explicitly concerns trade practices that “disadvantage” the other country. The effect of this action could irreversibly damage an industry essential to a particular impact or the overall function of the U.S. economy.

Diplomatic Focus – Most Affs will require the use of time, attention, and resources of the U.S. State Department that may trade off the need for intensive focus on a different, more exigent issue. Beyond a simple tradeoff Aff plans may prove counterproductive to the diplomatic efforts being pursued elsewhere in the world if they signal different priorities or effect parties geopolitical interests. There are many possible interactions within these arguments for implicating the affirmative case—a collapse is diplomatic credibility resulting from the disad may cause China to lose confidence in us and disrupt solvency of the case. Or a new approach to China may undermine our stance elsewhere that maintains our historic position.

Aid Tradeoff – Economic incentives or the provision of foreign assistance may empty the coffers used for other foreign policy initiatives and cause a tradeoff. These argument are best when specific to the Aff solvency, but are diverse and allow you to introduce a new impact predicated on the tradeoff that the Aff is underprepared to discuss.

#### Impact Turns

Before proceeding it merits mention that this topic accesses very large, complex, and often-contentious issues. Neg teams should not shy away from contesting the advantage areas of the affirmative past the link-level and rather engage in many of the dynamic discussions. For example, whether or not we should eliminate barriers to unrestricted global trade is a heavily contested issue.

#### Kritiks

Security / Threat Construction – Despite the fact that some Affs may wish to foster better, less adversarial relations with China, they will likely rely on justifications for that action that share in the logic used to justify expansionist wars. Securitization is a political decision that discursively constructs certain phenomena as threats to justify their management and extermination. The practice of security constructs threats; the fear of Chinese danger is constituted against the safe and benevolent American empire, becoming the mirror image necessary to reaffirm the necessity of a pax Americana, which can commit acts of violence in the name of ‘global’ order. China isn’t a threat because it’s China, it’s a threat because the military industrial complex needs a threat to justify building more guns. Framing china as a security threat makes it true by forcing them to confront the US. This creates circular reasoning in which we presuppose china is a threat and then get to that conclusion—that justifies power politics and locks war in as the only option by justifying a policy of containment and sanctions which force a Chinese response and escalation.

Orientalism – There are particularly problematic depictions of China that are largely informed by culturally bias ideas that exhibit racial prejudice. This argument seeks to identify, criticize and reject the Aff’s attachment to homogenous understandings of China. By refusing to render China intelligible in Western terms of knowledge, guides us to craft policies that don’t box it into drastic decisions, but lets it coexist with the US on its own terms. This better supports Chinese relations and prevents violence. Through questioning, alternative practices and applications of knowledge reveal themselves in critical encounters. The alt’s attentiveness to cultural misrepresentations and stereotyping acknowledges the failings of realist discourses and pushes us to consider more responsible methods.

Shunning – This argument suggests that individuals and states should be non-cooperative with evil. More specifically, states should refuse to cooperate with human rights violators and abusers. It follows then that the negative could contend that the Aff proposal to cooperate with China despite their objectionable practices with regards to human rights is unethical and prevents the consolidation of a moral order that politically pressures states into accordance human rights norms. This argument is often critical of consequentialist approaches to decisionmaking, and instead maintains that we must promote respect for human life unconditionally and dong so is a priority of the highest ethical order.

Realism / Liberalism Bad – Engagement as a strategy presupposes that states are responsive to economic and diplomatic incentives. The very rationale for economically and/or diplomatically engaging China is tied up in beliefs of liberalism, that economic interdependence or liberal/democratic norms will enhance or fundamentally change our dynamic of competition with China. These assumptions are harmful in that they inform bad policy decisions. China will continue to do what is geopolitically strategic regardless of trade or dialogue, and faith in liberal norms is what is used to justify military expansionism to reshape the Asian sphere. Whether the Aff claims to combat terrorism by spreading liberal values, or dissuade conflict by increasing economic liberalization, this model for international relations incorrectly assesses the decision calculus of states failing to produce any reform and informing dangerous attitudes that lend themselves to imperialist warfighting. Divesting faith from liberalism in favor of realism would produce military restraint and produce a more peaceful world order.

Capitalism/Marxism – Another competing theory of international relations is good ‘ol fashioned Marxism and various other instantiations of anti-neoliberal thinking. These arguments take additional depth from their analysis of the PRC and its mixed-economic system, often termed a “flexodox” by Marxists. The use of economic incentives is simply purchasing short-term political favors without fundamentally challenging the inequality that gives rise to the 1ac impacts in the first place.

**Schmitt –** Policies that break down the distinction between enemies and allies, lead to worse forms of violence because they attempt to universalize the notion of “humanity” itself. It is better, this kritik says, to create clear “lines in the sand” designating some people as allies and others as enemies. Those lines contain war to specific parameters, where the erasure of those lines enables large-scale warfare against anyone deemed a threat to the entire humanistic order. Affirmatives can answer this kritik by arguing that the so-called specific lines between enemy and ally are the true source of the otherization the negative fears; that a permutation is possible that preserves both the friend-enemy distinction and the embrace of liberal internationalist principles; and that Schmitt's role as a jurist of Nazism makes his call for the designation of enemies deeply dangerous.

#### Conclusion

That wraps it up for this topic. Of course, there are countless other arguments you could make that are not discussed here. You are encouraged to do your own research, pursue your own ideas, and get creative! Hopefully this guide has offered you a solid footing on which to proceed.

# Topic Definitions

### Substantially

#### Substantially means considerable in importance

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 [The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, accessed via dictionary.com accessed: 5/14/16.]

Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent: won by a substantial margin.

#### Substantially is without material qualifications

Black’s Law Dictionary ‘14 [Thomson West; 10th edition (May 9, 2014) p. 1597.]

-SUBSTANTIALLY. Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; . in a substantial manner. Kirkpatrick~. Journal Pub. Co;, 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58, 59; Gibson v. Glos, 271 Ill. 368, 111 N.E. 123, 124; Me. Ewen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.App. 694, 139 P. 242, 243. About, actually, competently, and essentially. Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of Washington, 171 Wash. 346, 17 P.2d 886, 887.

#### Substantially cannot be less than 90%

Words & Phrases ‘05 [Vol. 40B, p. 329.]

N.H. 1949. -The Word "substantially" as used in provision of Unemployment Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may transferred to' an employing unit which acquires the organization, -trade, or business, or "substantially" all of the assets thereof, is 'an elastic term which does not include a. definite, fixed amount of percentage, and the transfer does not have to be 100 per cent but cannot be less than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation. R.L c. 218, § 6, subd. F, as added by Laws 1945, c. 138, § 16.-Auclair Transp. v. Riley, 69 A.2d 861, 96 N.H. l.-Tax347.1.

### Increase

#### Increase means to directly augment to make greater

Funk and Wagnalls ’47 [Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. 1947. 1246.]

1. To augment or make greater, as in bulk, quantity, or degree; enlarge; aggravate; extend. II 1 . To become greater, as in bulk, quantity, or number; grow or advance in value, power, or force; be added to or aggravated; multiply; wax.

#### Increases must apply to preexisting assistance

Words & Phrases ‘60 [Words and Phrases Dictionary, volume 20A. p. 381.]

“Increased,” as used in West’s Ann Cal Const art 12, 11, providing that the stock and bonded indebtedness of corporations shall not be increased without the consent of the person holding the larger amount of the stock, does not include or apply to the first creation of bonded indebtedness. To give it such a meaning would be to inject into the provision the word “create.” Union Loan & Trust Co. v. Southern California Motor Road Co., 51 F 840,850

#### Increase means an overall rise in something or to make larger or greater

Encarta World English Dictionary ’99 [Encarta World English Dictionary 1999, St. Martin’s Press: New York.]

Rise in something -- a rise to a greater number, quantity, or degree, or the amount by which something is increased.¶ Becoming or making larger or greater -- the process of becoming or of making something larger in number, quantity, or degree

#### Increase means to make larger or greater

American Heritage Dictionary ’82 [The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Ed. 1982. Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston]

To become greater or larger.¶ To multiply; reproduce. To make greater or larger.

#### Increase means greater in value, amount, intensity or degree

Oxford New American Dictionary ’01 [Oxford University Press. p. 861]

1. v. become or make greater in size, amount, intensity, or degree

2. n. an instance of growing or making greater

#### Increase indicates growth or enlargement

Blacks Law Dictionary ’99 [Blacks Law Dictionary. Ed. Bryan A. Garner. 1999. West Group. St. Paul, Minnesota. 770]

1. The extent of growth or enlargement.

### Its

#### Its is a singular possessive adjective

Merriam-Webster ’14 [www.merriamwebster.com accessed: 5/14/16]

: of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of an action <going to its kennel> <a child proud of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>

#### Its means association with a previously mentioned entity

Oxford New American Dictionary ’01 [Oxford University Press. p. 902]

: belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified.

#### Its indicates possession or relation of something

Encarta World Dictionary ’99 [Encarta World English Dictionary 1999, St. Martin’s Press: New York]

Its: Used to indicate that something belongs to or relates to something.

### Diplomatic

#### Diplomatic means relating to diplomats

American Heritage 2000 [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition 2000 [Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company, accessed at www.dictionary.com accessed: 5/14/16.]

Of, relating to, or involving diplomacy or diplomats.

#### Diplomatic means maintaining good relations

Merriam-Webster No Date [Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomatic, accessed: 5/14/16.]

involving the work of maintaining good relations between the governments of different countries : of or relating to diplomats or their work

#### Diplomatic means international negotiations

Duranti’98 [Luciana Duranti,“Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science,” Scarecrow Press Inc. 1998]

The term diplomatics is a modern adaptation of the Latin res diplomatica, the expression used by the first writer on the subject to refer to the critical analysis of the form of diplomas. The term diplomacy, from the French diplomatie, refers to the art of conducting international negotiations, which result in the compilation of exchange of official documents, namely diplomas.

### Economic

#### Economic means pertaining to the economy.

Random House ’87 [Stuart Flexner, (Editor), RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED, 1987, 618.]

Economic: Pertaining to an economy, or system of organization or operation.

#### Economic means relating to trade

Longman Dictionary ‘5 [Stephen Bullon, (Editor), LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH, 2005, 499.]

Economic: Relating to trade, industry, and the management of money.

#### Economic refers to “material resources.”

Collins English Dictionary 2000 [Sandra Anderson, (Editor), COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED, 2006, 520.]

Economic: Concerning or affecting material resources or welfare.

#### Economic means related to use of income

Oxford Dictionary ‘7 [Maurice Waite, (Editor), OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2007, 322.]

Economic: Relating to economics or the economy of a country or region.

“Economic” means “relating to the production, distribution, and use of income, wealth, and commodities.”

### Engagement

#### Engagement requires positive incentives, not merely interacting

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/13/16]

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on **positive incentives** to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the **distinguishing feature** of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### Economic engagement is in contrast to negative inducements

**Mastanduno 3** (Michael, Government Professor at Dartmouth, The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice, in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, p. 184-5. Accessed: 5/12/16.)

Much of the attention in political science to the question of interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this chapter focuses instead at the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of state craft. Under what circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, that is, the fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy, lead to important and predicable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state? Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as **economic engagement**, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, **positive sanctions**, positive economic linkage, or the **use of economic “carrots” instead of sticks**. Critics of the strategy call it economic appeasement.

### Engagement

#### Promising rewards is “engagement” threatening punishment isn’t

**Borer 4** (Douglas A., Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement”, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf, accessed: 5/8/16.)

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.21 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be **distinguished from other policies** not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the **promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment** to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.22

#### Engagement is distinct from appeasement

**Mastanduno 3** (Michael, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, B.A., Economics and Political Science, and Ph.D., Political Science, Princeton University, “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice,” Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, accessed: 5/12/16)

Our knowledge of the workings of economic engagement is still at a fairly preliminary stage. What we do know thus far leads, at best, to an assessment of cautious optimism. A recent series of case studies suggests that economic engagement can be effective as in instrument of statecraft. States have managed in certain situations to use economic relations to influence the foreign policies even of potential adversaries. Economic engagement is not simply synonymous with economic appeasement. Yet we must also appreciate the difficult conditions that must be met for economic-engagement strategist to succeed. Success requires the precise manipulation of domestic political forces in the target state. It requires some ability to control the effects of interdependence. It requires that domestic politics and foreign policy of a target state be linked in predictable and desirable ways. And the success of this strategy requires the effective management of domestic political constraints in the sanctioning state. These conditions, outlined subsequently, are difficult to meet individually and all the more so cumulatively.

#### Engagement requires positive inducements to behavioral change

**Ikenberry 12** (G. John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Review of “The Logic of Positive Engagement”, Foreign Affairs, January / February, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136888/miroslav-nincic/the-logic-of-positive-engagement-cornell-studies-in-security-aff, accessed: 5/12/16)

When the United States seeks to change the behavior of rival or adversarial states, what are the available tools and strategies? In this provocative study, Nincic observes that American foreign-policy makers tend to resort to **“negative pressures,”** such as the use of **force**, **coercive diplomacy**, and **economic sanctions**. Less appreciated and less understood, Nincic argues, are the tools and strategies of **“engagement,”** policies that use **positive inducements** to alter the incentives and orientations of other states. Nincic is surely correct: policymakers know more about the use of **sticks** than **carrots**. The book seeks to explain the bias in American foreign policy toward threats and punishments and argues that it is a legacy of the Cold War, which taught politicians to worry about charges of appeasement. Nincic also sees biases in the American security-studies community, where, he claims, realist understandings of the world shift attention away from nonmilitary tools of influence. The book’s most useful contribution is to spell out how strategies of engagement and positive inducements can work, using the United States’ experiences with Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria as case studies.

### Diplomatic Engagement

#### Diplomatic engagement is direct, person to person contact through routine government channels

**Thielmann & Seel 12** (Greg & Benjamin, fellows @ The Arms Control Association, “Diplomatic Engagement: The Path to Avoiding War and Resolving the Nuclear Crisis”, https://www.armscontrol.org/files/Iran\_Nuclear\_Brief\_Diplomatic\_Engagement20120104.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16)

It is therefore necessary to re-examine the contribution diplomacy can make, regardless of the characteristics of Iran’s current government. In dealing with a difficult interlocutor such as Tehran, diplomats can provide two vital functions: Gaining knowledge about one’s negotiating partner. By contributing to knowledge of the personalities involved and the societal and governmental context of the issue positions, diplomats can identify and exploit opportunities that might otherwise be missed. As James Dobbins, the lead U.S. negotiator at the 2001 Bonn conference on Afghanistan, said with regard to Iran at a 2009 Arms Control Association panel discussion, “[Engagement] may or may not lead to agreement, but it will always lead to better information, and better information will lead to better policy.” The Iranian political context is exceedingly complicated. The government often sends mixed signals in offering or responding to Regular personal interaction is faster, more nimble, and more targeted than relying exclusively on diplomatic correspondence, third party intermediaries, and occasional high-level encounters. Frequent direct contact is more likely to build relationships of trust and avoid misunderstandings. The Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in late 2001 showed that the United States and Iran could work together constructively in common cause, suggesting that diplomatic dysfunction is not built into the DNA of the two sides (see box, p. 7).

#### Diplomatic engagement refers to the inclusion of states into institutions

**Pan 8** (Zhongqui, professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, ‘China’s Changing Image of and Engagement in World Order’, in Sujian Gao and Jean-Marc Blanchard (eds.) Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy, <http://www.cewp.fudan.edu.cn/attachments/> article/68/Pan%20Zhongqi,%20China's%20Changing%20Image%20of %20and%20Engagement%20in%20the%20World%20Order.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16)

A state’s image of world order and the changes of its image gap are shaped in the process of its engagement in, benefit from, and impact on world order. The ways of engagement are various, with military and diplomatic engagements being two main dimensions. Whether a state prefers to solve international conflicts and conduct international interferences via military means, or inclines to handle international problems and incorporate itself into international institutions by diplomatic means, can serve as an important clue for us to look at this state’s engagement in world order. Generally speaking, if a state engages in world order primarily by military force or emphasizes military participation over diplomatic participation, then this state’s image gap often assumes a tendency of widening. Conversely, if a state engages in world order primarily through diplomacy, then this state’s image gap often assumes a tendency of narrowing. But engagement per se cannot sufficiently present us an accurate description of a state’s dynamic image gap. The key here is what objective impact of a state’s engagement in world order will have on its subjective intention of reducing its image gap. If, through engagement, a state can successfully translate its ideational image into its realistic image without impingement on the basic structure and norms of the present world order, then its engagement will play a positive role in reducing this state’s image gap; if not, it will play a negative role.

### Diplomatic Engagement

#### Diplomatic engagement is reassurance

**Hannah 9** (10/18, John, senior fellow at The Washington Institute, “Assessing Engagement: Strategy, Tactics, and Content”, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-engagement-strategy-tactics-and-content, accessed: 5/12/16)

Thus far, the Obama administration has placed diplomatic engagement at the forefront of America's relations with its adversaries. This strategy is aimed at convincing these adversaries that a genuine alternative path is available to them, assuming they are willing to change their behavior on matters of critical concern to Washington. As the president has repeatedly stated, this path can lead to new relations with the United States based on mutual respect and mutual interests. The Obama administration's strategic shift was heavily influenced by its negative assessment of Bush-era policies. According to this critique, Washington's approach had been too confrontational, antagonizing adversaries and allies alike while failing to achieve U.S. objectives. Whether accurate or not, this widespread narrative had a significant effect on the Obama administration's conception and pursuit of engagement. With respect to Iran, the shift has meant offering an open hand rather than a closed fist. Instead of threatening isolation, punitive actions, and possible military attack, the administration has repeatedly sought to reassure the Islamic Republic of America's benign intentions and desire to engage in direct negotiations as soon as possible. At the same time, high-level U.S. officials have publicly cast doubt on the viability of a military option, objecting to potential Israeli military action in particular.

#### Even if diplomatic engagement is unlimited, diplomatic processes check

**Lee & Hocking 11** (Donna, Pf @ U of Bradford, UK, & Brian, “Diplomacy”, published in Bertrand Bardie, Dirk-Berg Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino (eds.) International Encyclopaedia of Political Science, https://kar.kent.ac.uk/38123/3/IPSA%20Encyp%20Diplomacy%2028%20April.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16)

As the above discussion of the theories of diplomacy indicates, those who study diplomacy remain divided over whether it is essentially a state-based set of political processes or whether it is a set of networked-based political processes. Those who maintain that diplomacy is primarily the pursuit of the foreign policy interests of the state in the international system of states, argue that diplomacy is confined to a quite narrow set of bilateral and multilateral processes of communication, representation and mediation focused on the foreign ministry and its overseas missions. Diplomatic processes continue to exhibit some regularity so that functions, institutions, codes, conventions and cultures of diplomacy are marked by continuity and marginal change, and that diplomatic rules and norms will continue to hold in the future. The obvious casualty in this approach is any in-depth analysis of change in diplomatic structures and processes. By contrast, those who conceptualise diplomacy outside state-centric frameworks tend to emphasise continual change in the conduct and context of diplomacy. The principle objective of network-based approaches is to highlight and analyse the challenges posed to diplomacy by contemporary changes in the international system. Scholars turn to issues of globalisation and regionalisation to emphasise the increasingly complex social, economic and political context of diplomacy (at domestic, regional and international levels). For these scholars, change and transformation in diplomatic process and structures is the central concern of analysis and in this frame diplomacy is seen to have both formal and informal structures. Diplomatic processes are network-based and draw in a range of public and private actors, there is an absence of agreed rules and norms of diplomatic engagement such that new codes and conventions are emerging or in need of development. In short, diplomacy both in terms of the varying processes through which it is effected and the machinery through which it is conducted, are closely linked phenomena which are the subject of differing interpretations. We now examine how these have developed in response to changes in both domestic and international environments.

### Diplomatic Engagement

#### Conditional approach doesn’t work for diplomatic engagement

**Neumann 9** (Ronald, president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, “Assessing Engagement: Strategy, Tactics, and Content”, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-engagement-strategy-tactics-and-content, accessed: 5/12/16)

In general, engagement is just one tool among many in the diplomat's arsenal. The choice of which particular tool to use in a given situation should be guided not by ideology, but rather by the underlying policy objective. Yet the United States too often views diplomatic relations in more simplistic terms: as a reward for a country's good behavior, and as something to take away if a country is misbehaving. This creates a double challenge for policymakers -- it endangers Washington's ability to inform and influence while raising the political cost of reengagement once relations have been cut off. Moreover, by requiring target countries to meet preconditions for reengagement, the United States is essentially demanding concessions before negotiations even begin. Conspicuously, there are no examples in the past two decades of diplomatic history where isolation has led to a breakthrough in the Middle East. Engagement need not be viewed as surrender, however. Other diplomatic tools, including pressure, can be judiciously combined with engagement to secure U.S. policy objectives. The notion that one must choose between negotiations and the use of force is therefore a false dichotomy. Remaining engaged even at the most difficult moments can give Washington options and information it might not otherwise have.

#### Diplomatic discussions alone are not sufficient for engagement

**Alterman 9** (Jon B., Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Defining Engagement”, July / August, http://csis.org/files/publication/0709\_MENC.pdf, accessed: 5/13/16)

For much of last month, dramatic images out of Tehran displaced a brewing debate over “engaging Iran.” Similar debates over engaging Hamas and Hezbollah fell by the wayside, too, and the debate over engaging Syria seemed to have been decided in the affirmative, with the announcement that the United States would return an ambassador to Damascus for the first time in more than four years. Just as the isolation of adversaries lay at the heart of the Bush administration’s strategy in the Middle East, properly calibrating engagement lies at the heart of the Obama administration’s strategy. For advocates, engagement with real or potential adversaries is an elixir that softens hostility and builds common interests. For opponents, it is a sign of surrender to dark forces of violence and hatred. Yet, for all of the passion that the issue of engagement excites, no one seems to want to **define it**. Each side would rather talk about the effects of engagement than the **nature of engagement itself**. Part of the problem is a matter of definition. Refusing to have any official contact with a group or country does not constitute engagement. But what then? **Engagement must mean more than merely holding diplomatic discussions**, but how much more? How should issues be sequenced? Should symbolic statements be demanded at the beginning as a sign of positive intentions, or held to the end as part of a final declaration? Even staunch advocates of engagement differ on these key issues.

### Economic Engagement

#### Economic engagement excludes conditions

**Çelik 11** (Arda Can, Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (*Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies*, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11, accessed: 5/13/16)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies **differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy**. They target to **deepen** the **economic relations** to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However **they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools**, they focus on **long term strategic goals** and they are **not restricted with short term policy changes**. (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be **unconditional** and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

#### Economic engagement can be *either* conditioned or unconditional.

**Kartman 9** (Charles, Former Director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Susan Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), Ho Miu Lam Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego, John Delury, Associate Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 2009 (“North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” Report of an Independent Task Force convened by Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, Available Online: <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/north_korea_inside_out.pdf>, accessed: 5/13/16)

A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.

### Economic Engagement

**Economic engagement can be unconditional**

**Delury 9** (10/2009, John is the associate director of the CCenter on US China Relations, Asia Society. Charles Kartman is the former director of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization. Susan Shirk is the director in the institute on global conflict and cooperation. “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” http://www.slideshare.net/hbroadman/quotnorth-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagementquot, accessed: 5/13/16)

Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now as first steps in a process of phased engagement. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. We do not claim that economic engagement will resolve the nuclear issue, particularly in the near term. But, in the long run, the mechanisms of engagement we recommend would have a positive influence on the environment in which Pyongyang makes its nuclear security calculations—including its weighing of the costs and benefits of its nuclear weapons.

**Economic engagement doesn’t require conditions**

**Delury 9** (10/2009, John is the associate director of the CCenter on US China Relations, Asia Society. Charles Kartman is the former director of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization. Susan Shirk is the director in the institute on global conflict and cooperation. “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” http://www.slideshare.net/hbroadman/quotnorth-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagementquot, accessed: 5/13/16)

A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement

#### Economic engagement means efforts to change the behavior of the target state.

Arda Celik, (Prof., International Studies, Uppsala U.), “ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT POLICIES,” 2011, 11. , accessed: 5/13/16

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behavior which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectedness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behavior of the target state.

### With

#### With implies an involved process which means that China must some how reciprocate action as a result of plan’s offer

Random House Dictionary ’12 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/with / [accessed 5/8/2016])

In some particular relation to (esp. implying interaction, company, association, conjunction, or connection): I dealt with the problem. She agreed with me.

#### With the PRC reflects a conditional approach

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/13/16]

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hope of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### With means as a function word to indicate close association

Random House Dictionary ’06 [random house dictionary 2006. www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/with, accessed: 5/12/16]

Used as a function word to indicate close association: With the advent of the rockets, the Space Age began.

#### With indicates a connective relationship

Funk And Wagnalls ’47 [Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. 1947 p. 2724]

Expressing relations of intimate connection, as in space, time, quality, or condition; with various notions of combined or mutual activity.

#### With is a preposition implying a collective group

Merriam-Webster 2007 [www.merriamwebster.com, accessed: 5/12/16]

1 a : in opposition to : [AGAINST](http://merriamwebster.com/dictionary/against) <had a fight with his brother> b : so as to be separated or detached from <broke with her family>
2 a -- used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement <works with his father> <a talk with a friend> <got into an accident with the car> b -- used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling <get tough with him> <angry with her> c : in respect to : so far as concerns <on friendly

### People’s Republic of China

#### PRC is the sovereign state

Wikipedia ’16 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China [accessed: 5/14/16])

China, officially the People's Republic of China (PRC), is a sovereign state in East Asia. It is the world's most populous state, with a population of over 1.381 billion.[15] The PRC is a single-party state governed by the Communist Party of China, with its seat of government in the capital city of Beijing.

#### PRC is the government of mainland China

The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy 2002 [Third Edition, Edited by E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil. Copyright © 2002 by Houghton Mifflin Company, found online at http://www.bartleby.com/59/13/peoplesrepub.html, accessed: 5/12/16]

People’s Republic of China ¶ The government of China set up in 1949 after the victory of the communist forces of Mao Zedong. The People’s Republic ruled the mainland of China, forcing the government of Nationalist China into exile on the island of Taiwan. For years, many Western nations, especially the United States, refused to recognize the People’s Republic as the government of mainland China; instead, they exchanged ambassadors only with Nationalist China. The United States recognized the People’s Republic as the government of China in 1979.

#### PRC means industries owned by China

DoD ’99 [Department of Defense, Federal Register: February 23, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 35), Rules and Regulations, “Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; People's

Republic of China,” Page 8727-8729, DOCID:fr23fe99-13. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/docs/98d305.txt [accessed: 5/14/16])

225.771 Prohibition on acquisition from the People's Republic of China.

225.771-1 Definition.

``People's Republic of China'' is defined in the provision at 252.225-7017, Prohibition on Award to Companies Owned by the People's Republic of China.

#### People’s Republic Of China Includes Mongolia, Hong Kong, And Tibet

Dictionary of World Politics 2002 [ed. George kurian, “china,”]

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo. People’s Republic of China, is the world’s most populous country and the largest country in Asia proper, extending from the Himalayas north to Siberia. It also includes Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Hong Kong. China also claims Taiwan (which has had its own government since 1949) as a province. The legislature is the unicameral Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui (National People’s Congress), but the more important decision-making body is the Chinese Communist Party, which is the only legal political party. The president is the head of state, and the prime minister is the head of government. The capital is Beijing. More than 90 percent of the country’s people are ethnic Han Chinese, but there are sizable ethnic minorities related to the peoples of Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Korea, and other regions. (See map p. 385.)

# Topicality Shells

### Substantially is Without Material Quals: 1NC

#### A. INTERPRETATION—Aff can not qualify their engagement or assistance

#### Increase is to make greater

Random House Unabridged ‘16.

to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase taxes.

#### And, substantially is without material qualifications

Black’s Law Dictionary ‘14 [Thomson West; 10th edition (May 9, 2014) p. 1597.]

-SUBSTANTIALLY. Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; . in a substantial manner. Kirkpatrick~. Journal Pub. Co;, 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58, 59; Gibson v. Glos, 271 Ill. 368, 111 N.E. 123, 124; Me. Ewen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.App. 694, 139 P. 242, 243. About, actually, competently, and essentially. Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of Washington, 171 Wash. 346, 17 P.2d 886, 887.

#### B. VIOLATION—the affirmative qualifies how they increase engagement by specifying the type and/or amount of foreign assistance offered

#### C. STANDARDS—

#### 1) Limits – there are an infinite number of mechanisms through which the Aff can claim to increase foreign assistance, and this is compounded by the fact that there is no stable definition of what engagement is—our interpretation allows for specific-issue affirmatives with unspecified assistance packages.

#### 2) Predictable Ground – it is impossible for us to generate links to all the possible mechanisms the Aff can use, and they’ll simply spike out of our engagement links by claiming they aren’t specific to the 1ac if they qualify their assistance used for negotiating.

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of jurisdiction, fairness, and education.

### Increase = Not New: 1NC

#### A. INTERPRETATION—“Increase” means to directly augment existing programs

Funk and Wagnalls ’47 [Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. 1947. 1246]

1. To augment or make greater, as in bulk, quantity, or degree; enlarge; aggravate; extend. II 1 . To become greater, as in bulk, quantity, or number; grow or advance in value, power, or force; be added to or aggravated; multiply; wax.

#### B. VIOLATION—The affirmative team creates a new engagement program instead of making an existing program larger.

#### C. REASONS TO PREFER –

#### GROUND—More developed literature on existing programs is far better for aff and neg ground than potential programs, which prevents squirrely affs and bad counterplans.

#### PREDICTABLE LIMITS—Focus on existing programs is the only way to limit the topic. Allowing the creation of new programs eliminates neg offense on case.

#### BRIGHT LINE—Neg interp is the simplest way to evaluate topicality: either you’re an existing program or you aren’t.

Words & Phrases ‘60 [Words and Phrases Dictionary, volume 20A. p. 381.]

“Increased,” as used in West’s Ann Cal Const art 12, 11, providing that the stock and bonded indebtedness of corporations shall not be increased without the consent of the person holding the larger amount of the stock, does not include or apply to the first creation of bonded indebtedness. To give it such a meaning would be to inject into the provision the word “create.”

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of jurisdiction, fairness, and education.

### Engagement = Must Be Conditional: 1NC

#### A. Interpretation: engagement is a conditional quid pro quo arrangement

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16]

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on **positive incentives** to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the **distinguishing feature** of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### C. OFFENSE:

#### 1. GROUND: requiring a return demand guarantees the unconditional counterplan, internal reaction disads to bargaining and kritiks of aid conditionality, which are all key strategies on a foreign policy topic.

#### 2. PREDICTABLE LIMITS: their interp lacks coherence making ANY policy between us and China a form of ‘engagement’ and means that we don’t learn about the internal politics of China

#### 3. LIMITS—there is no definitional limit on what type of engagement can be offered and ‘substantial’ is a vague limiter. Giving negs ‘say no’ ground is the only way to guarantee a viable option.

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness, education, and jurisdiction.

### Limiting “Engagement” Good

#### Our argument is key to research quality and education

Resnick 01 [Evan, Assistant Professor of International Relations, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566. , accessed: 5/12/16]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21 st century.

#### Defining engagement broadly nullifies the term

Resnick 01 [Evan, Assistant Professor of International Relations, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566. , accessed: 5/12/16]

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO BROADLY A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

### Intent to Define Impact

#### Intent to define is important – engagement is used too loosely

Resnick 01 [Evan, Assistant Professor of International Relations, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566. , accessed: 5/12/16]

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment. In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam. Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)

### Negotiation Education Impact

#### Debate and research about negotiations is key to education about engagement strategies which are central to future policymaking and evaluation

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16]

The briskly globalising post-Cold War world of today is arguably more complicated than the globe of a decade or so ago. At the same time, the countries that the US has uniformly labelled as ‘rogues’ have proven to be more varied than such a classification suggests. Given these complexities, and others that are likely to arise, it is no surprise that policies such as containment and tools such as sanctions have been insufficiently nuanced to deal with the multitude of challenges facing the US. This reality demands that policy-makers explore, and, where appropriate, utilise, a greater variety of foreign-policy tools and strategies. Engagement, although often overlooked in favour of punitive policies, has the potential to widen significantly the spectrum of serious policy options. Engagement, however, is clearly not a panacea. Not only are such strategies often difficult to implement domestically, but even with perfectly crafted, managed and executed engagement strategies, there are no guarantees of success. Because engagement relies so heavily on the politics and inclinations of the target country and its willingness to work with the US, the very nature of engagement is more precarious and volatile than other foreign-policy strategies. Nevertheless, a place for engagement strategies exists in the foreign- policy tool kit. In some cases, conditional engagement is an appropriate vehicle for change; in most others, unconditional engagement can be pursued. Despite all the caveats, engagement offers a promising alternative to policies of punishment that have either not achieved their objectives, or have done so only at extremely high costs to the United States and the target country. The posture and policies currently taken by the United States in some of its most problematic relationships — such as Cuba, Iran and Libya — demand reevaluation. Quite possibly, these relationships could be substantially improved if they incorporated varying degrees of engagement. Where the US is already involved in engaging difficult regimes, as with China and North Korea, policy- makers would benefit from a more systematic understanding of engagement strategies in order to ensure the smooth management of many of these still- uncertain partnerships. For all these reasons, engagement strategies should be accorded equal deliberation — if not necessarily adoption — alongside the options of military force, sanctions, covert action and diplomacy.

### China Education Impact

#### All the nuance and education about engagement centers around the reaction of China to the plan

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16]

The briskly globalising post-Cold War world of today is arguably more complicated than the globe of a decade or so ago. Moreover, the countries that the US has uniformly labelled as ‘rogues’ have proven to be more varied than such a classification suggests. Given these complexities, and others that are likely to arise, it is no surprise that policies such as containment and tools such as sanctions have been insufficiently nuanced to deal with the multitude of challenges facing the US. This reality demands that policy-makers explore, and, where appropriate, utilise, a greater variety of foreign-policy tools and strategies. Engagement, although often overlooked in favour of punitive policies, has the potential to widen significantly the spectrum of serious policy options. Engagement, however, is clearly not a panacea. Not only are such strategies often difficult to implement domestically, but even with perfectly crafted, managed and executed engagement strategies there are no guarantees of success. Because engagement relies so heavily on the politics and inclinations of the target country and its willingness to work with the US, the very nature of engagement is more precarious and volatile than other foreign-policy strategies. Nevertheless, a place for engagement strategies exists in the foreign-policy tool kit. In some cases, conditional engagement is an appropriate vehicle for change; in most others, unconditional engagement can be pursued. Despite all the caveats, engagement offers a promising alternative to policies of punishment that have either not achieved their objectives, or have done so only at extremely high costs to the United States and the target country. The posture and policies currently taken by the United States in some of its most problematic relationships – such as Cuba, Iran and Libya – demand reevaluation. Quite possibly, these relationships could be substantially improved if they incorporated varying degrees of engagement. Where the US is already involved in engaging difficult regimes, as with China and North Korea, policymakers would benefit from a more systematic understanding of engagement strategies in order to ensure the smooth management of many of these still uncertain partnerships. For all these reasons, engagement strategies should be accorded equal deliberation – if not necessarily adoption – alongside the options of military force, sanctions, covert action and diplomacy.

### Government Engagement is Conditional

#### Their interp lacks coherence making ANY policy between us and China a form of ‘engagement’ and means that we don’t learn about the internal politics of China

Haas & O’Sullivan 2K [Richard N. Haass, President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Research Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival 42:2. Brookings Institute. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer-haass/2000survival.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16]

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements. Today’s rapidly globalising world, no longer beset by Cold War competitions, creates new possibilities for engagement as a foreign-policy option. In particular, the growing recognition of the drawbacks of punitive policies in this new environment has spurred a search for alternative strategies. There are increasing doubts about the wisdom of using sanctions, particularly when exerted unilaterally in a globalised world economy, to dissuade problem regimes from their agendas. Not only has the record of sanctions in forcing change been poor, but the costs of such policies to civilian populations and American commercial interests has often been substantial. Just as faith in sanctions has been shaken, the limits of military force have been exposed; despite periodic bombings, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and events in Kosovo demonstrate how even the most carefully orchestrated military campaign can result in serious collateral damage. Moreover, the dissolution of Cold War alignments has both opened new opportunities for engagement strategies and created new rationales for them. Due to the heightened economic vulnerability and strategic insecurity of former Soviet allies, the incentives that the US can offer have new potency. At the same time, because America’s allies are freer to shape their foreign-policy agendas subject to their own desires, the US needs to seek out policies with appeal that extends beyond rigid American preferences. During the 1990s, many of America’s closest allies in Europe revealed a preference for using incentives rather than punitive actions to achieve foreign-policy goals.2 Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hope of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

### Distinct From Appeasement

#### Merely removing threats to security or cedeing a sphere of influence isn’t engagement, but appeasement. Engagement must establish and maintain a conditional relationship

Resnick 01 [Evan, Assistant Professor of International Relations, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566. , accessed: 5/12/16]

In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a substantive distinction to be drawn between engagement and appeasement. The standard definition of appeasement-which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"29-is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.30 It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the precise means involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a number of ways.31¶ A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon-consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority. 32 Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).33 A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions-insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state-engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.34 Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

### Engagement Should Be Defined Reasonably

#### Engagement should be defined reasonably

Resnick 01 [Evan, Assistant Professor of International Relations, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Rogue States: Isolation vs. Engagement in the 21st Century (Spring 2001), pp. 551-566. , accessed: 5/12/16]

DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO NARROWLY The third trap that has ensnared numerous scholars is the tendency to needlessly circumscribe the parameters of engagement. This results from attempts to: define engagement as ends rather than means; stipulate the types of states that can engage or be engaged; restrict the types of behaviors that comprise engagement; and limit the types of behaviors that can be modified through engagement. Each of these restrictions hampers the task of evaluating the utility of engagement relative to other policies objectively accurately.

### Engagement = Must Be Unconditional: 1NC

#### A. Interpretation: economic engagement is a series of concessions or inducements with no stated quid pro quo\*\*

**Çelik 11** (Arda Can, Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11, accessed: 5/12/16)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies **differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy**. They target to **deepen** the **economic relations** to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However **they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools**, they focus on **long term strategic goals** and they are **not restricted with short term policy changes**. (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be **unconditional** and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

#### B. Violation—the affirmative is a conditional quid pro quo, they condition the plan actions on China’s \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

#### 1. Context— multiple uses of the term bear out the conditional nature of constructive engagement

#### 2. Predictable limits—conditional fiat incentivizes ‘say no’ affs and bidirectionality. also, there are infinite conditions that can be specified

#### 3. Ground—unconditional plans are critical for negative strategy to guarantee uniqueness for disads and turns because the US has conditional engagement with China in the status quo

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for education and fairness.

### Not Conditional

#### QPQ’s are not engagement

**Smith 5** (Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics, “Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, <http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14> accessed 5/12/16)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19‘**Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking**, by a state or international organisation, **of** perceived **benefits** to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) **to the fulfilment of** economic and/or political **conditions**. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, **engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings**. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy

#### Prefer historical precedent: MFN trading status was given unconditionally

[Stephen Green, writer for Copley News Service in Washington February 13, 1995, Saturday, EARLY AND CITY EDITIONS]

THROUGH THE former policy, known as "constructive engagement," the administration had hoped in vain that American concessions -- most notably unconditional renewal of most favored nation (MFN) trading status -- would bring improvements from China in political freedoms and cooperation in arms control.

### Engagement = Must Be Positive: 1NC

#### A. Interpretation: Engagement uses non-coercive, positive incentives

**Borer 4** (Douglas A., Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Problems of Economic Statecraft: Rethinking Engagement”, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf, accessed: 5/12/16)

The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of appeasement.21 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be **distinguished from other policies** not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the **promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment** to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.22

#### B. Violation: Promising rewards is “engagement”; threatening punishment isn’t

#### C. Standards –

#### 1. Limits – Allowing the Neg containment explodes to topic to anything that might have a positive influence on China. Engagement being positive provides multiple solvency mechanisms that can defended. The resolution is already bidirectional because engagement doesn’t have to be applied in a specific direction—economic engagement is in contrast to negative inducements

**Mastanduno 3** (Michael, Government Professor at Dartmouth, The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice, in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds, Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, p. 184-5. Accessed: 5/12/16)

Much of the attention in political science to the question of interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this chapter focuses instead at the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of state craft. Under what circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, that is, the fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy, lead to important and predicable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state? Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as **economic engagement**, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, **positive sanctions**, positive economic linkage, or the **use of economic “carrots” instead of sticks**. Critics of the strategy call it economic appeasement.

#### 2. Ground – Negs get no guarantee of stable predictable ground if the plan action mechanism is bidirectional – we don’t get engagement bad, relations bad or economy disads and they strip us of containment counterplans

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for ground, fairness, and jurisdiction.

### Must Specify Engagement: 1NC

#### A. Our interpretation is that the Affirmative must specify the type, form, and duration their diplomatic and economic engagement, because there are endless types and talking isn’t enough

**Alterman 9** (Jon B., Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Defining Engagement”, July / August, http://csis.org/files/publication/0709\_MENC.pdf, accessed 5/12/16)

For much of last month, dramatic images out of Tehran displaced a brewing debate over “engaging Iran.” Similar debates over engaging Hamas and Hezbollah fell by the wayside, too, and the debate over engaging Syria seemed to have been decided in the affirmative, with the announcement that the United States would return an ambassador to Damascus for the first time in more than four years. Just as the isolation of adversaries lay at the heart of the Bush administration’s strategy in the Middle East, properly calibrating engagement lies at the heart of the Obama administration’s strategy. For advocates, engagement with real or potential adversaries is an elixir that softens hostility and builds common interests. For opponents, it is a sign of surrender to dark forces of violence and hatred. Yet, for all of the passion that the issue of engagement excites, no one seems to want to **define it**. Each side would rather talk about the effects of engagement than the **nature of engagement itself**. Part of the problem is a matter of definition. Refusing to have any official contact with a group or country does not constitute engagement. But what then? **Engagement must mean more than merely holding diplomatic discussions**, but how much more? How should issues be sequenced? Should symbolic statements be demanded at the beginning as a sign of positive intentions, or held to the end as part of a final declaration? Even staunch advocates of engagement differ on these key issues.

#### B. VIOLATION – The plan only says increase diplomatic and/or economic engagement, this doesn’t say what the actual engagement mechanism used is

#### C. Failure to specify is a voting issue–

#### 1. GROUND – The central part of the plan text is what the mechanism of engagement is, all predictable ground comes from knowing what type of engagement they use, and the links are based on different incentives.

#### 2. PRESUMPTION – the plan is a void for vagueness, without specifying an engagement mechanism, the aff is functionally only diplomatic because it expresses that the US government wants something but doesn’t do anything about, this is a voter for fairness, education, and presumption.

### Dialogue Not Enough

#### Dialogue alone isn’t “engagement” --- topical plans must also provide tangible incentives

**Buszynski 9** (Dr. Leszek, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Professor of International Relations in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan, Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative, Ed. Kim, p. 100-101. Accessed: 5/12/16)

Engagement can have different meanings for the actors concerned and has often been used as an antonym to isolation and containment without clear definition of the obligations for the parties concerned. **Engagement should not be confused with dialogue**, which is compatible with isolation, and according to which economic and political interaction would be reduced to the minimum. Cold war dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union was intended to resolve particular issues, such as the stability of the strategic nuclear balance, but otherwise was not intended to change either one of the parties. Engagement, however, involves **not only** regular dialogue but **incentives** for the target state to change its policies or behavior in desired ways. Those incentives might include the promise of extensive economic aid and investment, humanitarian assistance to alleviate famine and disease, as well as assurances of the target state's security, which might be incorporated in a nonaggression pact or a treaty. The critical issue is how an engagement policy would be related to a target state's nuclear program. Engagement may entail the offering of incentives for the target state to accept international monitoring of its nuclear program, or to surrender it entirely. In this sense engagement may come in three forms: The first is conditional engagement, in which the incentives would follow after the target state has agreed to and accepted international monitoring, or has agreed to dismantle its nuclear program; the second is staged engagement, when the benefits would he offered in phases in response to the dismantling of the nuclear program, which would follow a previously agreed schedule; the third is unconditional engagement, when the target state would receive the benefits first, and then as a product of a general improvement in relations would later surrender its nuclear program.

### PRC = The Government 1NC

#### A. Interpretation: PRC is the government of Mainland China

The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy 2002 [Third Edition, Edited by E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil. Copyright © 2002 by Houghton Mifflin Company, found online at http://www.bartleby.com/59/13/peoplesrepub.html, accessed: 5/12/16]

People’s Republic of China ¶ The government of China set up in 1949 after the victory of the communist forces of Mao Zedong. The People’s Republic ruled the mainland of China, forcing the government of Nationalist China into exile on the island of Taiwan. For years, many Western nations, especially the United States, refused to recognize the People’s Republic as the government of mainland China; instead, they exchanged ambassadors only with Nationalist China. The United States recognized the People’s Republic as the government of China in 1979.

#### B. Violation – The plan pressures an entity that is not the government of mainland china.

#### C. Standards –

#### 1. Contextuality – good definitions of the PRC tell the difference between China as a country and the PRC as the government, this explains why there can be a one China policy, but both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China as two governments.

#### 2. Limits – the resolution is near limitless if affs are allowed to pressure the government, non-governmental bodies in china, and governments outside of china. China has 262 industries that are open to foreign investment

Cheung ‘03 [Shannon, Head of Payments and Cash Management, China, Business Development, http://www.gtnews.com/article/5008.cfm, accessed: 5/12/16]

In March 2002, China issued new guidelines for foreign investors to China's industrial development priorities, replacing those previously issued in December 1997. The 'Directory for Foreign Investment' covers the requirements of China's WTO entry and is characterised by a wider opening of the market to foreign investors in the majority of industries. For example, China increased the number of industries in which foreign investment is encouraged from 186 to 262, while reducing the number of industries restricted from 112 to 75.

#### 3. Predictability – allowing aff’s that don’t pressure the mainland government makes it impossible to predict the object of us engagement, which makes it impossible to have any generic ground – we can’t even have a US-Chinese relations disad if someone besides the government is pressured.

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for ground, fairness, and jurisdiction.

### PRC Does Not Include Taiwan 1NC

#### A. Interpretation – the government of Taiwan is not the PRC

Encarta 2005 [“Taiwan," Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2005, http://encarta.msn.com Microsoft Corporation. Accessed: 5/12/16]

Taiwan, island in East Asia. Taiwan is bordered on the west by the Taiwan Strait, which separates the island from mainland China, on the north by the East China Sea, on the east by the Pacific Ocean, and on the south by the South China Sea. The government on Taiwan also administers the P’enghu Islands (Pescadores), the Chinmen Islands (Quemoy Islands) offshore from the mainland city of Xiamen, and the Matsu Islands offshore from Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province.¶ The government that administers Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China. Leaders of the government moved to the island from the Chinese mainland in 1949, when Communist armies gained control of the mainland and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The government on Taiwan recognizes the mainland city of Nanjing (spelled Nanking in Taiwan) as its official capital, and designates Taiwan’s largest city of Taipei as its temporary capital. The PRC does not recognize the government on Taiwan and considers the island a renegade province. Taiwan recognizes that the Communist government rules the Chinese mainland while the republican government rules Taiwan.

#### B. Violation – Extending engagement to Taiwan is the republic of china, not the people’s republic of china, they are two different governments.

#### C. Standards –

#### 1. Limits – the size of the resolution is effectively tripled if the aff can put pressure on the prc, the roc, or both.

#### 2. Ground – pressuring taiwan kills neg ground, it steals potential counterplan area, changes our politics links, and guts our generic disad ground.

#### 3. Extra topical – even if one part of the plan text is non-topical, it makes the whole thing non-topical.

#### D. This is a voting issue for ground, fairness, and jurisdiction.

### AT: One China Policy

#### One China policy does not mean the us recognizes Taiwan as part of the PRC

Tkacik 2002 [John J, Research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., is a retired officer in the U.S. foreign service, “What the One China Policy Really Means”, 19 September 2002, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ED091902a.cfm, accessed 5/12/16]

"One China" most emphatically does not mean that the United States accepts Beijing's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. What it means is that the U.S. recognizes no more than one Chinese government at a time -- and not multiple regimes -- according to the territory they control. That is what the U.S. did with the two Germanys and may ultimately do with the two Koreas. West Germany used to insist on this approach for itself: the "Hallstein doctrine" forbade recognition of the German Democratic Republic as well as Bonn, a counterproductive approach that was dropped by Chancellor Willy Brandt, a major positive step towards peace in Cold War Europe.

### AT: Taiwan is a State of the PRC

#### Their state analogy is inappropriate, the laws of the PRC are not enforced in Taiwan like US federal laws are enforced in Rhode Island.

#### Extend our Encarta evidence, the ROC and PRC are two different federal governments, the ROC is not a state government.

#### The status of Taiwan’s sovereignty may be up in the air, but it is clear it is not part of the PRC

Ching 2005 [Frank, Hong Kong-based writer and commentator, “Hu's happy enough with Taiwan status quo”, 21 July 2005, accessed 5/12/16]

Has Hu actually managed to find a formula to prevent pro-independence politicians in Taiwan from moving towards independence? One sign may be something that Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan's leader, said recently. Chen, who will serve as President until 2008, said that he would be unable to bring about Taiwan's formal independence in the next three years. After all, he said, his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, was President for 12 years and had failed to achieve Taiwan's independence. But Chen is a wily politician. It is likely that he will try, in his remaining years, to strengthen the sense of Taiwan identity. Already, the Government is asking schools to teach Chinese history as the history of a foreign country, and Chinese culture as foreign culture. Unless there are many more exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, it will be difficult to expect that the island's residents in the future will think of themselves as Chinese rather than as Taiwanese. This tug of war for the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan is likely to continue for many years. In the foreseeable future, however, it appears that Taiwan's status will remain in never-never land: Not quite a fully independent country but also very definitely not a part of the People's Republic of China.

# Neg Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

## AIIB investments will fail

#### Chinese-led investment projects fail

Robert Keatley. Writer at National Interest. April 18, 2015. China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond? Accessed April 21, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666

The Chinese record as a lender to developing nations is spotty at best. Too often it has provided loans to kleptocratic regimes that finance Chinese companies using imported Chinese workers on projects that mainly ship energy and raw materials back to Chinese industry; sometimes bribes grease the way, while the local environment and economy can suffer. Some experts say the Chinese record in Africa, for example, is no better than that of 19th century European colonialists. Other Chinese loans, such as $86 billion to Venezuela, were made primarily for political reasons and may never be repaid. A few countries, most recently Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have canceled Chinese-funded projects on grounds that corruption paved their way and they serve no basic local purpose. During his successful campaign, Sri Lanka’s new president, Maithripala Sirisena, described local Chinese projects as “robbery taking place before everybody and in broad daylight….if this trend continues for another six years our country would become a colony and we would become slaves.” Since taking office, he has suspended work on a $1.5 billion Beijing-funded port project.

#### AIIB is a poor model for development—too reliant on Chinese leadership

Richard Javad Heydarian. Writer at Huffington Post. July 6, 2015. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: China’s Trojan Horse? Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-javad-heydarian/asian-infrastructure-inve_b_7717540.html>

But the Philippines is concerned over the fact that China will still be the largest contributor (30 percent) to the bank’s capitalization, enjoying a whopping 26 percent voting shares. This is almost twice higher than the United States’ voting shares in the World Bank, which is dominated by and hosted in Washington. China also refused to heed Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s call for the the AIIB to be based in Jakarta in order to make it look as neutral and multilateral as possible, but China forged ahead with its decision to place the bank’s headquarters in Beijing, showing how the AIIB will most likely be staffed by numerous Chinese bureaucrats and be under the shadow of Beijing’s leadership. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated Tokyo will “watch it closely, including its actual operations,” reflecting the depth of the Northeast Asian power’s skepticism vis-à-vis China’s intentions. Japan has refused to join the AIIB altogether. Same thing with the United States, which questions the AIIB’s compliance with accepted principles on good governance, transparency, and environmental sustainability, and sees the AIIB as nothing but a Chinese strategy to win friends and loyalty in Asia at its expense.

#### Chinese-led foreign infrastructure development projects have been corrupt and devastating to the environment

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

Project Funder(s) Claimed Negative Effect(s) China-Burma oil and gas pipeline project49 China Development Bank Inadequate confiscation of farmers’ lands; undue harm to the environment; disproportional gains to China and not to host, Burma Financing for Brazilian cattle farmers and meatpackers50 IFC and the Brazilian Social and Economic Development Bank (BNDES) Mass deforestation to clear room for cattle, increased greenhouse gas emissions Tata Mundra thermal power plant (India)51 IFC Deterioration of water quality and, thus, fisherman livelihoods; poor health due to air emissions; destruction of mangroves Patuca hydroelectric project (Honduras)52 Export-Import Bank of China Flooding of national parks and rainforests, loss of indigenous livelihoods.

## AIIB doesn’t solve development needs

#### AIIB won’t make a dent in Asia’s infrastructure needs

Eric Ng. Writer at South China Morning Post. May 31, 2015. ADB, AIIB only able to provide 'fraction' of Asia's energy investment needs. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1813839/adb-aiib-only-able-provide-fraction-asias-energy-investment>

The developing nations in Asia-Pacific are projected to require US$400 billion to US$700 billion in annual investment in the energy sector over the next 25 years, and the Japan-led Asian Development Bank and the new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will only be able to supply a fraction of that, according to an ADB official. Asian countries would also face the challenge in balancing their need for sufficient, secure and environmentally sustainable energy sources as carbon emission-prone fossil fuel would dominate, Zhai Yongping told the Pacific Energy Summit last week. "How much will the ADB be providing each year? US$4 billion," he said of its expected contribution towards the developing nations' investment. "If you put the contribution from the ADB and the new AIIB together, it will not be more than 5 per cent of the investment needed." He was referring to the capital spending required for energy exploration and production, logistics, processing and distribution, which will total about US$10 trillion over the next 25 years. The ADB's projection means private-sector capital, commercial banks and other forms of government capital will provide the bulk of the funding. The estimated US$400 billion annual budget is based on a "business as usual" scenario, while the US$700 billion estimate is based on an "alternative scenario" where more renewable-energy infrastructure is built to help cut carbon emissions from fossil fuel. The estimates did not assume governments in the region would put in place policies to make carbon emissions costly, which he said was necessary "if we want to be serious about [combating] climate change".

#### The AIIB won’t be able to fill the demand of the developing world

Michael Pettis. Research Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 11, 2015. Will the AIIB One Day Matter? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/11/will-aiib-one-day-matter

The world is not starved of capital. In fact it has too much capital. The idea that the AIIB will be important because its accumulation of lending power will give it something important that the world needs is widespread but completely wrong. In fact, the world is satiated with excess savings, to the point where it has driven interest rates in some countries negative. In fact, China and the other founding members of the AIIB who know that they desperately need places to put their money but who do not understand why they have this problem are probably hoping that the bank will be able to increase credible demand for savings by transforming real demand from non-credible borrowers into real demand from borrowers whose credit has been mysteriously enhanced somehow by the AIIB. Management of the regime that governs global trade and capital flows depends not on the support of institutions like the World Bank and the IMF but rather on the willingness to underwrite the costs of trade volatility. The reason the US more than any other country sets the global rules for trade and capital flows is not because the US dominates the IMF and the World Bank, whose financial firepower underpins US power. It is because the US has been willing to absorb the volatility generated by trade policies of other countries, and this willingness is based not so much on the openness of its domestic markets for goods and services to foreign trade (although it is clearly more open than any other major economy) but on the fact that its capital markets are open. This point confuses many analysts, who think of the capital and current accounts separately. The right way for any country that wants to power domestic growth by boosting exports is by increasing productivity. In that case it will export more abroad, but the resulting increase in wealth will also cause it import more, and it will not obviously run either a surplus or a deficit, but rather a trade imbalance close to zero.

#### China is ill-suited to lead high risk development

Michael Pettis. Research Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 11, 2015. Will the AIIB One Day Matter? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/11/will-aiib-one-day-matter

Countries that needed surpluses purchased British government bonds – at England’s great cost, as Keynes tried to explain. Most analysts, even US government officials involved in international trade and foreign policy, simply do not understand how this works, but the confusion this causes does not make the accounting identities any less true. In fact the mechanism has been explained often enough by many economists whose work focuses on the functioning of the global balance of payments, from John Hobson and Charles Arthur Conant at the end of the 19th Century, to Keynes in the 1930s and 1940s, to Jared Bernstein and Kenneth Austin today. Any discussion about how China is going to transform the global financial architecture, in other words, is primarily a discussion about when China will open up its capital markets to unrestricted foreign purchases of domestic assets, especially Chinese government bonds, and its willingness to allow other countries to power domestic growth by accumulating renminbi reserves. This of course also means that the discussion is ultimately about China’s willingness to run large current account deficits to stabilize employment elsewhere. And yet most people on either side of the discussion would probably say that it will be many decade, if ever, before China permits this kind of access to its markets.

#### China’s markets are too volatile to support AIIB borrowers

Michael Pettis. Research Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 11, 2015. Will the AIIB One Day Matter? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/11/will-aiib-one-day-matter

The only countries not reluctant to import the savings of other countries are those who capital exporters shun. These are developing countries who have obvious investment needs but in whom investors are very reluctant to invest because of low credibility. The AIIB has not addressed how it will differ in the way in which it supplies the estimated $8 trillion in infrastructure that Asia needs to ensure that it will be more successful than the many national and multilateral development banks that have made the same and similar promises. And while people like Mahbubani might claim that China’s “spectacular success with developing world-class infrastructure in record time” gives us reason to expect success for the AIIB, the evidence suggests no such thing. While Beijing certainly has in recent years lent aggressively to developing countries, and many analysts at first hailed what they called a novel approach and hard-headed business intelligence, every time a new country, or group of countries, first begins to invest abroad aggressively, we hear exactly the same sorts of things. But every time, as soon as global economic conditions turn, we discover that this most recent wave of investment has been successful largely because of its willingness to misprice risk. Inevitably it is followed by defaults and a very dramatic change in approach. It is too early to tell if China will prove to be the sole deviation from historical precedence, but a very depressing article three weeks ago in the Financial Times suggests that when it comes to lending to developing countries, China’s experiences are turning out to be remarkably consistent with those of its predecessors. It is not easy to lend large amounts to developing countries and get repaid.

#### China won’t be able to work with regulated economies and democracies

Kenneth Rogoff. Former Chief Economist at IMF. April 6, 2015. Here’s how China’s infrastructure bank could fail miserably. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-chinas-infrastructure-bank-could-fail-miserably-2015-04-06

Far too little attention has been devoted to understanding why multilateral development lending has so often failed, and what might be done to make it work better. Multilateral development institutions have probably had their most consistent success when they serve as “knowledge” banks, helping to share experience, best practices and technical knowledge across regions. By contrast, their greatest failures have come from funding grandiose projects that benefit the current elite, but do not properly balance environmental, social and development priorities. Dam construction is a leading historical example. In general, there is a tendency to overestimate the economic benefits of big infrastructure projects in countries riddled by poor governance and corruption, and to underestimate the long-run social costs of having to repay loans whether or not promised revenues materialize. Obviously, the AIIB runs this risk. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the Chinese model of infrastructure development can be exported universally. China’s strong central government overwhelms opposition from people displaced by new roads, bridges, and dams, and for many years ran roughshod over environmental concerns and workers’ rights. The parallels to the old Soviet Union are striking. Some developing countries in Asia work differently. In democratic India, for example, it took eight years to rebuild Mumbai’s airport, because courts forced the government to respect the rights of squatters on its outskirts.

#### The AIIB will be motivated by greed and therefore not effective

Chris Beall. Writer at Rights Wire. July 8, 2015. Usurious counterweights: the human rights impact of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://rightswireblog.org/2015/07/08/usurious-counterweights-the-human-rights-impact-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/

Nobody actually believes that the AIIB is going to be some benevolent people’s lending institution, along the lines of Keynes’ rejected Bretton Woods proposals. Unfortunately, it would take a worldwide catastrophe and a global concentration of priorities on the level of World War II to even narrowly jar open that window again. Instead, the AIIB will be a China-centric international lending body, which will ultimately serve Chinese interests and Chinese dominance in the region. Lest we forget that self-interest is still the crux of the logic of capitalism. Nor does to say that developing nations will benefit from lender competition and choice inherently mean that international human rights will share in this benefit. Even in the absence of an AIIB, China has shown a pretty cold calculus when it comes to with whom it does business. We might question whether we want some particular regimes to be given unrestricted access to capital and the infrastructure that solidifies their political power. Whatever largely unutilized sway the World Bank might have had in attaching rights-focused strings to their lending packages is about to be rendered moot by a competitor with an outright blind regard for their clients’ conduct in the world. China’s own human rights record, especially in terms of rights-focused development, leaves a lot to be desired. This should worry us, even if we admit that the demonstrated concerns of the United States were always more rhetorical than substantive. Likewise, when it comes to the type of industrial development we would like to see in the world. China is perhaps one of the few modern powers with a more reprehensible global warming attitude than that of the United States.

## AIIB hurts environmental standards

#### AIIB will tank environmental standards

Daniel C.K. Chow. Professor at Moritz College of Law. February 25, 2016. Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737888

Nowhere in its Articles of Agreement does the AIIB allude to the doctrine of conditionality. Article 13 does state that the AIIB will ensure that its operation complies with “policies addressing environmental and social impacts,” 223 but Indonesia has reported that the AIIB has already approved a $1 billion loan for coal-fired power plants, 224 projects blocked by the World Bank for their harmful environmental impact.225 The Indonesian government then issued a statement that “AIIB imposes looser environment requirements in disbursing its loans, making it the preferred creditor for financing Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant projects.”226 Sensing the political fallout from such a candid statement, Indonesia retracted this statement and replaced it with the less provocative statement that “AIIB – as opposed to other multilateral lenders like Asian Development Bank or the World Bank – allowed its financing to be used for Indonesia’s coal-fired power plant projects.”227 The Indonesian project prompted a Bank Watch Group to warn that “the new beginnings under way at the AIIB threaten to see a return to the darkest, unregulated days of international development finance.”228 Indonesia’s posture raises the question of whether AIIB’s Asian borrowers would prefer to have looser controls on environmental impacts since coal-fired power plants are far less expensive than alternatives that do less damage to the environment. India, for example, has huge coal reserves and had also expressed the hope that the AIIB will approve loans for India to use its coal-fired power plants, which will put the AIIB in direct conflict with the World Bank. 229 The reaction of Asian nations to what they hope will be looser standards by the AIIB should not be surprising given how developing nations have in the past expressed resentment at the World Bank and IMF’s bullying and arrogance in imposing conditions on loans in ways that humiliated the recipients.230

#### AIIB will start a race to the bottom for environmental standards

Bill Laurance. Professor at James Cook University. April 8, 2016. New development banks propel environmental 'race to the bottom' Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.theecologist.org/blogs\_and\_comments/commentators/2987526/new\_development\_banks\_propel\_environmental\_race\_to\_the\_bottom.html

What will this mean? The global economy has slowed for the moment, giving environmental planners a tiny window of breathing space. But make no mistake, the infrastructure tsunami is still happening. If the global economy rebounds to a degree, the feeding frenzy of projects seen in recent years could easily return. This could be bad news for the global environment and socially disempowered peoples. For instance, a 2009 analysis found that many developing nations had become "pollution havens" for projects funded by China or Chinese investors, who were attracted to nations with weak environmental controls. Notably, other advanced (OECD) economies showed no such tendency. Will other major lenders follow suit? Will there simply be a 'race to the bottom' among big lenders in order to remain competitive? Only time will tell. The other key question revolves around the role of western nations that are parties to the AIIB, such as the EU members and Australia. Do they have enough influence and determination to make a difference? With China, India and Russia holding the biggest shares of the bank's capitalisation, it'll be an uphill battle.

#### AIIB will push other lenders to drop their environmental standards

Bill Laurance. Professor at James Cook University. April 8, 2016. New development banks propel environmental 'race to the bottom' Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.theecologist.org/blogs\_and\_comments/commentators/2987526/new\_development\_banks\_propel\_environmental\_race\_to\_the\_bottom.html

Such fast-tracked procedures would differ from those used by other major lenders such as the World Bank, which after years of criticism have gradually implemented measures designed to limit the environmental and social impacts of its projects. Even these safeguards are often inadequate, as I and others argued in a recent article, but at least they are a big improvement over past practices. When China opened up its AIIB to other countries, 30 nations initially joined as founding members. Many of these are western economies, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Australia and New Zealand. At the time, many observers hoped that the bank's broader membership would encourage the AIIB to moderate its hard-charging stance - perhaps fostering environmental and social safeguards more akin to those of the existing major lenders. But in fact the exact opposite appears to be happening. Rather than the AIIB raising its game, the World Bank recently concluded a review of its environmental standards - a move that has been criticised as weakening its environmental and social safeguards. It is doing so, it says, in order to keep up with "new and varied development demands". This is widely seen as a response to increasing competition with other investors such as the AIIB.

## AIIB multilateralism fails

#### China is using economic and climate multilateralism to make its aggression tolerable

DS Rajan. Analyst at South Asia Analysis Group. February 29, 2016. China’s Selective Approach towards Multilateralism. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1951>

Why the focus in China’s foreign policy turned to protecting “core national interests”? In the words of Chinese experts, the PRC is ‘going global and its international influence are becoming more visible and assertive and the nation’s diplomatic strategies accordingly need to comply with the changes in the international environment and domestic conditions[11]’. Evolving ‘multi polarity’ and ‘multilateralism’ as well as global challenges including climate change and energy security, mark the changes in the external conditions, according to the then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi. The core-interests based foreign policy is giving rise to China’s more and more assertiveness in international relations. Neighbors involved in territorial disputes with China are particularly worried about this trend. A variety of factors seem to be contributing to such assertiveness – (i) Beijing’s growing confidence internationally due to the country’s ability to maintain high growth rates , (ii) China’s feeling that an opportunity has arisen for itself to increase its influence globally as the world balance of power shifts from the West to East and a multi-polar world gradually emerges, (iii) the PRC’s growing need to protect land and sea trade routes in the interest of the much needed import of resources from abroad and (iv) deepening Chinese fears concerning sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang as well as continuing suspicions on US strategy towards Taiwan.

#### China will not soften on territorial issues

DS Rajan. Analyst at South Asia Analysis Group. February 29, 2016. China’s Selective Approach towards Multilateralism. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1951>

The issue of the South China Sea involves a number of States, and is compounded by complex historical background and sensitive political factors. Its final resolution demands patience and political wisdom from all parties concerned. China always maintains that the parties concerned shall seek proper ways and means of settlement through consultation and negotiation on the basis of respect for history and international law. Pending its final settlement, all parties concerned should engage in dialogue and cooperation to preserve peace and stability of the South China Sea, enhance mutual trust, clear up doubts, and create conditions for the eventual resolution of the issue. The unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines will not change the history and fact of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters; nor will it shake China's resolve and determination to safeguard its sovereignty and relevant maritime rights and interests; nor will it affect China's policy and position of resolving the disputes in the South China Sea by direct negotiation and working together with other States in the region to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea”.

## China will use the AIIB to support aggression

#### The CCP will coopt the AIIB and use it for strategic interests

Daniel C.K. Chow. Professor at Moritz College of Law. February 25, 2016. Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737888

The discussion in Part III above that the AIIB might serve as a counterweight to the Washington Consensus assumes that China will dominate the AIIB in the same or even more extreme ways that the United States and its allies have dominated the World Bank and the IMF. The difference is that China will use the AIIB to advance its own policy goals and not the policy goals of the World Bank, the IMF, and the western values relating to the environment, workers’ rights, transparency in governance, and non-corruption in government. The use of the AIIB by the State-Party to further its own goals is another formulation of the U.S. criticism that China will not follow “best practices” in international lending, i.e. the Washington Consensus with its western-laden values. Whether the AIIB follows “best practices” as defined by Washington depends in large part on whether the State-Party will be able to dominate the AIIB or whether other countries can exercise enough control so that power is shared. To analyze how power will be distributed in the AIIB, it is necessary to begin by noting that China proposed the AIIB,192 is its largest contributor,193 holds veto power,194 and that the permanent headquarters of the AIIB are located in Beijing,195 the capital city of China and also the seat of the headquarters of the Chinese government and the Communist Party.196 These facts alone suggest that China will play a dominant role, but there are other factors at play that reinforce the notion that the State-Party will ultimately control the AIIB.

#### AIIB’s leadership was chosen to make it responsive to the CCP

Daniel C.K. Chow. Professor at Moritz College of Law. February 25, 2016. Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737888

The AIIB’s President Jin Liqun is a former finance minister of China and is in all likelihood a senior member of the Party. Although Jin has not trumpeted his Party affiliations, all important positions in China are held by Party officials and it is highly unlikely that Jin, a former finance minister, and hand picked by the State-Party to head the AIIB is not a senior Party official.211 Of course, Jin’s specific position within the elites of the Party is not publically known, a factor that may be raised again in the discussion of transparency, a key World Bank, IMF, and U.S. international trade condition. The powers of the AIIB are vested in the Board of Governors, which consists of representatives from each of the member states.212 The Board of Governors is required to meet once annually.213 The AIIB Board of Governors can delegate the general operational duties of the AIIB to the Board of Directors.214 The Board of Directors consists of twelve directors elected by the Board of Governors.215 Unlike the World Bank and IMF, which have resident directors who live and work in Washington, DC, the Board of Directors of the AIIB consists of non-resident directors.216 The AIIB Board of Directors will meet “periodically throughout the year,” 217 which has been interpreted by the AIIB to mean quarterly meetings.218 The President of the AIIB will recommend one or more vice presidents to the Board of Directors for approval.219 The rest of the officers and staff of the AIIB shall be appointed by the President without consultation. 220

#### It doesn’t matter who joins—the CCP has set up the AIIB to guarantee its interests

Daniel C.K. Chow. Professor at Moritz College of Law. February 25, 2016. Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737888

It should be apparent that the daily operations of the AIIB will be conducted by the President, his management team, and his staff who will live in Beijing and work at the AIIB headquarters on a daily basis. The directors of the AIIB are non-resident directors who will live in their home countries. Contrast this arrangement with that of the World Bank, which has resident directors who meet Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday every week to conduct the daily business of the World Bank.221 The directors of the World Bank are full time employees while the directors of the AIIB will likely serve as directors on a part time basis since they only meet once every three months. If the work of the AIIB directors is similar to the work of directors of large business corporations, the directors’ quarterly meetings will consists of reports by the management and a casting of votes on issues that have been already prepared for discussion by the management team, all handpicked by the President. With the exception of the vice president, the board has no say in the selection of the management and working staff of the AIIB. If the AIIB follows the pattern of other important organizations in China under the leadership of the Party, it seems highly likely that senior management will also be Party members or approved by the Party. This suggests that the Party through the President and his management team could control the day-today operations of the AIIB. The hand of the Party in running the AIIB seems assured, given its control over all major governmental and non-governmental organizations in China and given that the original idea for the AIIB came from the Party’s Central Committee, a group of senior Party leaders.222 The control of the AIIB by the Party represents a first in history: control of a prestigious multilateral institution that consists of all of the closest allies of the United States but of which neither the United States nor Japan, China’s two largest competitors for influence in Asia, is a member. This is a significant diplomatic and political achievement for the State-Party and, at the same time, a setback and embarrassment for the United States.

#### China’s use of the AIIB will shift with its economic interests during trade rebalancing

Michael Pettis. Research Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 11, 2015. Will the AIIB One Day Matter? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/11/will-aiib-one-day-matter

Whatever the outcome, the adjustment period has always overturned the institutions and expectations generated during the growth period. This is why even if China becomes only the second successful case of five in which our predictions about the “rising power” turn out to be correct, it is foolish to assume that the expectations that led to the creation of the AIIB will remain unchanged. China’s priorities will have shifted during its rebalancing to such an extent that today’s goals will not apply to the conditions that accompany its position of dominance. During the adjustment, domestic institutions and political conditions have always been so radically transformed that the country “before” the rebalancing period had a completely different set of objectives and goals from the country “after” the rebalancing period. It is important not to underestimate this point. Regardless of whether or not it becomes the world’s largest economy, the China that emerges from the adjustment of the next decade or two will be a very different China, with different institutions, different objectives, and different priorities. Among the easier predictions, it is a virtual certainty that the imbalances that force China today to recycle massive current account surpluses will have reversed themselves, so that the recycling process will no longer be a major objective.

## AIIB will lower human rights standards

#### The AIIB will lower human rights standards

Nicholas Bequelin. Research Fellow at Amnesty International. January 15, 2016. China’s New Development Bank Needs Better Human Rights Protections. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/chinas-new-development-bank-needs-better-human-rights-protections

China’s own troubling human rights record—not to mention its general treatment of civil society, respect for the environment, and protection of worker’s rights—means there are good reasons to worry about how much the AIIB will concern itself about possible human rights risks associated with its investments. The AIIB’s standard-setting process has been less than encouraging so far. Its draft “Environmental and Social Framework” (ESF), the key document articulating how the bank would “identify and manage environmental and social risks and impacts” of its operations, was lacking in many respects. As Amnesty International pointed out in its detailed submission to the AIIB, the draft ESF made insufficient reference to existing human rights standards; had significant gaps in terms of policies related to resettlement, labor, and gender discrimination; failed to cover the situation of sub-contracted, third-party, and community labor workers; and made all-important gender impact assessments of its operations “desirable” rather than mandatory. Most worryingly, given the track record of many IFIs in the past, the draft failed to provide adequate guarantees on involuntary resettlement.

#### The AIIB is concealing its labor and human rights policies

Nicholas Bequelin. Research Fellow at Amnesty International. January 15, 2016. China’s New Development Bank Needs Better Human Rights Protections. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/chinas-new-development-bank-needs-better-human-rights-protections

Perhaps even more revealing of the AIIB ethos at this point is the way the consultation was conducted: the public consultation was limited to a mere six-week period, conducted only in English, and conducted only through a series of video-conferences. It’s not clear how communities who might have wanted to participate but didn’t have English speakers or broadband Internet access were supposed to participate. NGO calls for making the process meaningful fell on deaf ears. Such arrangements do little to dispel the impression that the AIIB viewed the process as little more than a formality, which in turn raises questions about how seriously the bank plans to undertake meaningful engagement with stakeholders, particularly those who are the most vulnerable and marginalized. As the bank opens for business, the ESF has been finalized but members have yet to see it. Similarly, the disclosure policy and accountability mechanism procedures have been drafted, but no one has seen them.

#### Development projects pose severe human rights risks

Coalition for Human Rights Development. November, 2015. 10 Reasons Why Development Finance Matters for Business and Human. Accessed April 24, 2016. Rightshttp://rightsindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/BHR-and-DFIs-4pgr-final.pdf

The corporate activities financed through DFIs often raise major human rights concerns. These activities include large extractive industry development and cross-border mega-projects, agribusiness development, and land administration reforms. Often these projects take place in countries with a weak rule of law and a poor enabling environment for public participation and human rights enjoyment. Some DFIs actively seek out high-risk sectors and investment environments by design – to provide economic growth and poverty alleviation where other financing options may not exist. Inadequate human rights due diligence and lack of accountability within the institutions, however, then creates the potential for human rights abuses. 3 The IFC’s corporate clients, for instance, have been linked to various human rights abuses in recent years, from forced evictions, to killings.

#### New infrastructure projects will be less accountable to human rights

Nancy Alexander. Writer at Righting Finance. September 3, 2014. The new global drive for infrastructure development: A menace to human rights? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.rightingfinance.org/?p=967

The role of the G20 is key because it not only perpetuates the biases throughout the DFIs and establishes the project preparation system, but also mobilizes long-term finance. That is, once projects are “de-risked”, the G20 mobilizes institutional investors, such as pension funds, which can provide long-term capital while capturing high returns. These private investors depend on hefty public contributions from their host countries (taxpayers and users) to offset their risks. This system can pit investor rights against human rights. Will access to essential services be sacrificed in order to ensure the promised revenue streams for infrastructure investors? Will public funding necessary to fulfill basic human rights be at placed at risk via generous public guarantees to keep investors happy? For instance, will financing for mega-projects squeeze financing for health, education and other rights of citizens? What demands on deregulation and limitations to constitutional guarantees for participation, freedom of assembly and expression, and so on, will we see investors demand in order to consider their investments “safe”? These are not abstract questions but, as our recent book documents, they are very pressing and real concerns clouding the future of entire populations and communities. In 1986, the Declaration on the Right to Development reaffirmed that “the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development.” It is not too late for States to put this basic tenet at the heart of infrastructure development, but it requires new alliances and political muscle to confront a new model that is a menace to human rights.

#### Corporate intermediaries for the AIIB run a high risk of abuses

Inclusive Development International. October 12, 2015. Comments on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IDI-Comments-on-AIIB-ESF.pdf

IDI agrees that strong country and corporate systems are crucial for the management of environmental and social risks, and it is important for development agencies and multilateral institutions to support the strengthening of such systems. However, reliance on client systems in countries with weak rule of law and poor governance risks exposing people and the environment to serious harms. Many countries that may be affected by AIIB operations have weak or incomplete legal frameworks governing compulsory land acquisition in the public interest and provision of fair and just payment of compensation and resettlement support to those affected. Likewise, many also have a disturbing track record of forced evictions leading to homelessness, landlessness and impoverishment, even when laws meant to prevent these harmful impacts and human rights violations are in place. The draft framework does not provide adequate details on how and when client systems will be used or how any gaps in country systems will be addressed to ensure that the objectives of the standards are met and, at a minimum, no harm is done. Clear criteria for the use of client systems that ensure project affected people will be fully protected from adverse impacts, including harms from economic and physical displacement, must be clearly articulated, along with measures for closely monitoring implementation and applying corrective measures whenever necessary to meet the objectives.

## Lending safeguard policies fail

#### Safeguard policies won’t solve anything and will create additional challenges

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

Given the outline above, which briefly highlights some of current safeguard policies in use today, it is helpful to explore the challenges faced during implementation, as well as the views that proponents have regarding safeguard policies and their effectiveness. While borrowers and lenders generally agree that environmental and social protections are beneficial and necessary, safeguard policies face challenges in implementation due to the disparate expectations, resources, and abilities between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers, many of which lag behind their lenders in technical skills and resources, are primarily tasked with the many duties of implementation, which occasionally exceed the local capacity for meeting high, international standards. Additionally, as the timing of safeguard compliance is often expected before funds are dispersed, borrowers find difficulty in financing necessary compliance protocol, exacerbating project design and implementation woes. 35

## Asia development turn

#### Fast economic development in Asia will spark subnational conflicts

Patrick Barron. Analyst at Asia Foundation. August 8, 2014. How do conflicts and economic growth go together in Asia? Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/how-do-conflicts-and-economic-growth-go-together-in-asia/a-17841158>

Subnational conflicts involve violent armed struggles between states and non-state insurgent groups who are trying to gain self-rule - either independence or greater autonomy. They differ from regular civil wars because they don't involve battles for control of the central state. Usually, they occur in the remote peripheries of states, where the majority population is a religious or ethnic minority within the broader country. The economic explosion in China, for example, has been accompanied by deepening unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang. The majority of the people of Thailand's conflict-affected Deep South are Malay-Muslim, while Muslims probably account for only six percent of Thailand's population. Over the past decade, such conflicts have affected over half of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The continent's current most deadly subnational conflicts are occurring in Thailand, India and Pakistan. In many cases, it is the ingredients of the strategies that Asian countries chose to stimulate growth and development that have led to subnational conflicts. These include a strong focus on centralizing power at the expense of power in the peripheries, an emphasis on creating a dominant national culture and identity - sometimes at the expense of minority cultural identities, and an opening up of markets to outside investment - often over-riding traditional claims to land and other natural resources. These policies and practices have generally been quite successful in stimulating growth. But they have also led to resentment in regions that have not benefitted from this growth and/or who perceive their cultures and identities to have been marginalized. The security-focused responses of some Asian countries, who have sent the military in rather than search for solutions to underlying problems, has also led to resentment which has given some conflicts a new lease of life.

## AIIB safeguards fail

#### The AIIB Environmental and Social Framework is weak

Inclusive Development International. October 12, 2015. Comments on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IDI-Comments-on-AIIB-ESF.pdf

The draft ESF recognizes that “environmental and social sustainability is a fundamental aspect of achieving outcomes consistent with [AIIB’s] mandate.”3 The proposed standards are meant to “avoid, minimize or mitigate adverse environmental and social risks and impacts of the Operations.”4 Yet, as currently proposed, the ESF is not fit for purpose. Essential aspects of a solid and coherent set of environmental and social safeguard policies and standards are missing from the proposed ESF. Unless thoroughly revised and augmented, the proposed ESF would fail to ensure that AIIBfinanced operations do no harm. Instead, the AIIB may quickly find itself complicit in forced evictions, violations of the rights of indigenous peoples and environmental degradation, and facing attendant reputational, financial and legal liabilities. By making mega-infrastructure projects possible through its financing, the AIIB, like all development finance institutions, bears a responsibility to protect affected people and must adopt a set of safeguard policies fit to meet this responsibility. The AIIB will not be successful at claiming a place among respected multilateral development finance institutions unless it adopts serious and comparable policies to protect people and the environment from the significant risks of harm posed by the construction of mega-infrastructure and other projects.

#### The ESF’s language is imprecise and unaccountable

Inclusive Development International. October 12, 2015. Comments on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IDI-Comments-on-AIIB-ESF.pdf

The draft framework includes ambiguous language regarding the application of environmental and social standards. The draft states, for example, “AIIB requires each Client to manage the environmental and social issues associated with its Operation in a manner designed to meet the ESSs over a reasonable period of time, as reflected in the agreement between AIIB and the Client.”5 It later states: “AIIB requires the Client to assess and prepare its Operation so that it meets the requirements of the applicable ESSs in a manner and a reasonable time frame acceptable to AIIB.”6 This lack of precision and broad discretion vastly diminishes the accountability of both the client and the AIIB for compliance with the standards and realization of the objectives. Along with many other civil society organizations, IDI has raised the same concerns with the World Bank in relation to a similar formulation in its proposed Environmental and Social Framework, which rolls back thirty years of clear and binding safeguard policies. There are other areas of considerable ambiguity in the draft. For example, it is unclear whether the standards would apply to Category B Operations.

#### Financial intermediaries threaten AIIB safeguards

Inclusive Development International. October 12, 2015. Comments on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IDI-Comments-on-AIIB-ESF.pdf

Over recent years, there has been alarming evidence of the high environmental and social risk associated with financial intermediary (FI) lending. The Oxfam publication, The Suffering of Others: The human cost of the International Finance Corporation’s lending through financial intermediaries, which was co-authored by IDI, describes case after case that illustrates the serious harms that communities can be exposed to through inappropriate lending to FIs.10 The brief paragraph in the draft ESF on due diligence of FIs11 needs to be significantly expanded and strengthened if the AIIB intends to use this indirect and highly risky model of financing. We point you to relevant parts of the IFC’s 2012 Sustainability Framework and ADB’s 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement which we recommend be used as a baseline for AIIB’s policies for all of its FI operations. In addition, it is crucial that AIIB require that all FI clients publicly disclose all sub-projects that receive AIIB financing. Transparency around the use of AIIB funds on the ground is critical to accountability and ensuring the application of the environmental and social standards in practice. The Suffering of Others sets out clear recommendations to the IFC to ensure its financial sector portfolio does no harm, and should also serve as recommendations to the AIIB in formulating its policy on FI lending.

# Neg Military-to-Military Engagement

## No Inherency

### A2: Inherency

#### Sino-U.S. military-to-military exchanges are at an all-time high now and increasing

Kedar Pavgi, M.A., Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, August 4, 2015, “Here’s One Way the US-China Relationship Is Improving,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/08/heres-one-way-us-china-relationship-improving/118865/, Accessed 4-18-2016

Even as tensions in the South China Sea heats up and online thefts increase, military-to-military contacts have been rising for five straight years. There’s plenty of friction between the U.S. and China these days, but at least one aspect of the relationship hasn’t been this strong since the 20th century. Military-to-military contacts — from low-level exercises all the way up to presidential and four-star visits — have been shooting up since 2010, and are on pace to reach historic highs.

#### Sino-U.S. military-to-military relations are high now and the trend will continue

Kyle Churchman, Political and Security Affairs group at NBR, and Yao Yunzhu, currently a Senior Fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science and is Director of its Center on China-American Defense Relations, September 18, 2015, “Building a New Type of U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=607, Accessed 4-19-2016

At the December 2014 Global Times conference in Beijing, you argued that U.S.-China military-to-military relations were in their best shape since the 1990s. What led you to make this assessment, and do you see this positive trend continuing into 2015? The U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has been stable since September 2011, with all the planned exchange programs (more than 60 items in 2014 alone) successfully completed. It is important to recall that interactions between the two militaries were suspended seven different times beginning in the early 1990s. This on-and-off mode of engagement was the result of crises in the bilateral relationship such as the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by a U.S. fighter bomber under NATO command, the 2001 collision of a PLA Navy fighter jet with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft off Hainan Island, and repeated U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Put simply, both sides suspended military-to-military interactions to express displeasure with the other or to respond to provocations. In light of this history, the recent stabilization reveals the importance that Beijing and Washington now attach to constructive and stable military-to-military ties. In addition, some highly visible progress has been made in recent years in developing a healthier military-to-military relationship. For example, both militaries sent troops to each other’s territory for bilateral HA/DR exercises in 2013 and 2015. In 2014, a four-ship PLA Navy flotilla participated in the multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in Hawaii for the first time. In late 2014, the two militaries also agreed to two memoranda of understanding (MOU) that will enhance crisis management and make the waters and airspace in the Western Pacific safer. The PLA and the U.S. military in recent years also have cooperated in training and exercises within multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus. Taken together, these recent developments show that the relationship between the two militaries is becoming more constructive, resilient, substantive, and mature. Accordingly, there is no reason that this positive trend should not continue throughout the remainder of 2015 and beyond.

### A2: Inherency

#### Mil-Mil relations are getting stronger. Both sides see their importance to managing escalation risks

Stratfor.com, Staff Writer, December 4, 2015, “A New High for U.S.-China Military Ties,” https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/new-high-us-china-military-ties, Accessed 4-23-2016

In recent years, the military-to-military relationship has begun to stabilize once again. Although it is by no means back to pre-1989 levels, neither country has canceled major military interactions since 2011. This improvement roughly corresponds with the start of Xi Jinping's tenure as vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, the military's core leadership body, in October 2010. He later became chairman in November 2012. This was an early indication of his interest in strengthening military-to-military relations during his presidency, which began in March 2013. Under Xi, the People's Liberation Army has increased the frequency of joint drills with the U.S. military, culminating in the United States inviting the Chinese navy to participate in RIMPAC 2014, the world's largest multilateral naval exercise. This was a symbolic milestone. The People's Liberation Army also built up its regularized communication mechanisms with the U.S. military, including the army-to-army dialogue that kicked off in November. More critically, the Chinese military made a serious effort to establish and implement crisis management mechanisms. At the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the People's Liberation Army Navy agreed to abide by the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, which establishes common protocols for interactions between naval vessels to reduce accidents. In September, China signed a bilateral agreement with the United States governing air-to-air encounters as well as protocols governing the use of the Defense Telephone Link. The two navies are also set to hammer out a set of rules on ship-to-ship encounters in the near future. What is most notable about these newly stabilized military-to-military ties is that they come during a period of tumult between China and the United States as well as China's neighbors. Under Xi, Chinese incursions in the Japanese-controlled Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have increased. China also [declared an Air Defense Identification Zone](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-new-air-zone-poses-test-rivals) over the East China Sea while [accelerating land reclamation in the South China Sea](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/disputed-waters-south-china-sea-chronology). This is partly due to the fact that the People's Liberation Army itself appears to have shifted its attitudes and now believes that military-to-military ties with the United States can bring it tangible benefits. At the same time, China's top political leadership now recognizes the need for more tools to manage disputes.

#### China is already engaging in joint exercises with the U.S. and regional powers in the South China Seas

South China Morning Post, Staff Writer, August 27, 2015, “Chinese military on charm offensive as it announces joint drills with Malaysia, US and Australia,” http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1853196/chinese-military-charm-offensive-it-announces-joint, Accessed 4-17-2016

The military will hold joint drills with Malaysian forces in the strategic Strait of Malacca next month, the defence ministry said yesterday, as a training exercise launched featuring Chinese, Australian and American troops. Analysts see the developments as a diplomatic move by Beijing to calm suspicions towards the People's Liberation Army as it extends its reach. Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said the drill with Malaysia would involve 1,160 Chinese personnel and two Chinese warships alongside helicopters and transport aircraft. It would focus on disaster relief, search and rescue, and hijack scenarios. The news came as China, Australia and the United States began a joint field survival exercise yesterday in Darwin, Australia, that will last until September 14.

## No Solvency

### No Solvency – Military exchanges do not build trust

#### Multiple engrained factors guarantee strategic mistrust

Zhao Minghao, a research fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing, an adjunct fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, and a member of the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), June 15, 2015, “How to avoid a war between the U.S. and China,”Japan Times, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/15/> commentary/world-commentary/how-to-avoid-a-war-between-the-u-s-and-china/, Accessed 4-19-2016

But strategic mistrust between China and the U.S. extends far beyond maritime issues. Despite troubling situations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, America has remained focused on reshaping its hub-and-spoke alliances into a more networked security system across the Indo-Pacific theater, capitalizing on the web of intra-Asian military ties among old allies and new partners such as India and Vietnam. In particular, the U.S.-Japan alliance is undergoing historic transformation, with renewed guidelines for defense cooperation that allow for greater Japanese autonomy in security affairs — and that present China as the main adversary. Add to that the potential deployment of a U.S.-led missile-defense system in South Korea and the prospect of a U.S. military presence in Vietnam, and it is not difficult to understand China’s anxiety. The U.S. is placing economic pressure on China as well — at a time, no less, when China is struggling to implement risky domestic reforms amid slowing growth. The U.S. recently attempted to block the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and then to stop its allies from joining. Moreover, by repeatedly calling the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership a “strategic” project, it has politicized the trade deal, which, as the economist Arvind Subramanian has pointed out, will place Chinese firms at a disadvantage in the U.S. and in Asian markets. This effort undoubtedly deserves to be described as “containment.”

#### Multiple barriers prevent military-to-military exchanges from changing perceptions

Kedar Pavgi, M.A., Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, August 4, 2015, “Here’s One Way the US-China Relationship Is Improving,” Defense One, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/08/heres-one-way-us-china-relationship-improving/118865/, Accessed 4-18-2016

But even the higher-level relationships remain shallow. China’s “stratified and very centralized decision-making process” keeps its military officers and officials from doing the kind of exchanges that build trust, said Wallace “Chip” Gregson, a retired Marine three-star who served as assistant defense secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs from 2009 to 2011. Nor is there much time to build such relationships, thanks to the U.S. practice of shuffling officials — from the Defense Secretary on down — in and out of office every two to three years. Ralph Jodice, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who served as the U.S. defense attache to China from 2004 to 2007, said Chinese officials had explained to him how they saw their foreign relationships: pengyou, hao pengyou, and lao pengyou — friend, good friend and old friend. The first time a U.S. official visited, they were a pengyou; the second time they were hao pengyou, and the third time they were lao pengyou. The Chinese officials would say that one needed to become an old friend before substantive policy change could happen. “But then they would turn to the PACOM commander and say, ‘You normally only serve as the PACOM commander for maybe 2 years, maybe 3 years, and we might only see you once or twice, so it’s difficult to become old friends,’” Jodice said. “Quantity has a certain quality of its own.” There are other obstacles to an easy relationship. In 2000, Congress outlawed mil-to-mil contacts that might create a national security risk by exposing critical information. U.S. officials routinely bemoan a lack of transparency and reciprocity in exchanges, and an overly staged feel to mutual visits. Then there are the increasing points of friction between the countries: U.S. weapons sales and gestures of support for Taiwan, network breaches and data theft, even [air and sea operations that bring U.S. and Chinese forces into proximity](http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/barack-obama-administration-navy-pentagon-odds-south-china-sea-120865.html).

### No Solvency – Military exchanges do not build trust

#### Both sides will limit engagement to only symbolic gestures out of mistrust

Minxin Pei, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 11, 2015, “U.S.-China Military Exchange Can Help Moderate Rivalry,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/u-s-china-military-exchange-can-help-moderate-rivalry/, Accessed 4-19-2016

To be sure, Sino-U.S. military-to-military (mil-to-mil) exchanges have their critics in both countries. In the U.S., China-hawks see little value in such activities. Instead of moderating the assertive behavior of the Chinese military, they believe that mil-to-mil exchanges may create a facade of friendship and amity between the two armed forces that are actually preparing to fight each other. Even worse, they are afraid that visiting Chinese generals may gain invaluable insights into the U.S. military during their tours of American military installations and units. As a result, the U.S. Congress has imposed a series of restrictions on U.S.-China mil-to-mil exchanges. Ironically, Chinese hardliners have almost identical criticisms of these exchanges and, since the mid-1990s, when these activities began, have worked hard to ensure that mil-to-mil exchanges are limited to symbolic gestures.

#### Military exchanges do not build trust. Even cultural exchanges are met with suspicion

Sean P. Quirk, Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, November 9, 2015, “Reconciling China’s PLAN: Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-intervention-with-tactical-engagement/>, Accessed 4-11-2016

A new era of U.S.-China mil-to-mil exchange should imitate diplomatic meetings as regular, recurring events. Military exchanges between the two countries are currently episodic and highly vulnerable to political and congressional cancellation. The result? The bulk of military unit “exchanges” between the two navies consist of [adversarial shadowing of warships](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ald9931mpxo) and [unsafe military air interceptions](http://www.janes.com/article/54757/pentagon-confirms-rc-135-jh-7-encounter-over-yellow-sea) – antagonistic events that should not form the foundation of our navies’ interactions. When official exchanges do occur, they are beneficial but often heavily scripted and cursory. Port visits by U.S. warships to Hong Kong and mainland China are the most common means of unit-level naval exchange. Yet political sensitivities stymie engagement of much value-added trust, replacing substance with formality. Even the cultural exchanges that are common in all U.S. port visits are uncommon with port calls in China; activities such as crew-to-crew receptions, community service, and athletic games between U.S. and Chinese forces [do occur](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=91501) but are far too rare for the world’s two biggest powers.

### No Solvency – Military diplomatic engagement fails

#### Military-to-military cooperation is a dead end. Both sides continually prepare for conflict

Sean Lyngaas, Staff Writer, October 29, 2015, “Jaded U.S.-China Military Ties Fray in Wake of Recent Tensions,” The Washington Diplomat, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=12652:jaded-us-china-military-ties-fray-in-wake-of-recent-tensions&catid=1537&Itemid=428, Accessed 4-19-2016

Yet all of the dialogue in the world does not change the simple fact that the American and Chinese militaries reflect the views of their respective governments — one of an incumbent world power and the other of an ascendant world power. “The two militaries, to some extent, are preparing for each other, and that’s in multiple domains,” Kamphausen said. “And so how you can conceive of cooperating with a military that you are simultaneously preparing for as an adversary is a huge challenge.”

#### The plan does not solve. 2015 proved we can make progress through diplomacy and still have huge tensions

Zhou Bo, an honorary fellow with Center of China-American Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, PLA, China, January 8, 2016, “[2015 Sino-U.S. Military Relationship and Beyond](http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/2015-sino-american-military-relationship-and-beyond-2/),” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/2015-sino-american-military-relationship-and-beyond-2/, Accessed 4-21-2016

What is the best hope for the Sino-American relationship? The answer: manageable. A major-power relationship, in spite of its importance, is intrinsically volatile and competitive. Rather than gauging how good it will be, it is more important to fathom how less risky it could become. In the year 2015, the Sino-American bilateral relationship unsurprisingly has swung between resilience and vulnerability. The military relationship became more noteworthy in 2015, in that it includes obvious growth in two opposite directions, i.e., more Confidence Building Measures and rising tension between the two militaries in the South China Sea. On the former, a new notification of major military crises is added to mechanism of Notification of Major Military Activities; and the negotiation for an annex for Air to Air Encounter under the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Maritime and Air Encounter is finally completed. In April, PLA Chief of Staff General Fang Fenghui had a video-telephonic conversation with his counterpart, General Martin Dempsey. This is the first video teleconference system between the two countries. In October, the USS Lassen had close-in sail near Zhubi and Meiji reefs while Chinese destroyer Lanzhou and the fuel ship Taizhou stood by, but the Chinese and American ships have kept a safe distance in line with the procedures in Code of Unplanned Encounter at Sea that both navies have agreed to observe.

#### Neither side sees mil-mil relations as key to broader goals

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of Asian Research, September 22, 2015, “Enhancing U.S.-China Military-to-Military Exchanges,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=609, Accessed 4-20-2016

Another challenge is that the two sides have dramatically different views about the goals of a mil-mil relationship. The United States sees the relationship as a means to mitigate tensions and demonstrate American power, perhaps helping build confidence along the way, albeit in a process that assumes enduring U.S. leadership. For the most part, the United States has not yet seen the relationship as one that is broadly able to deliver on addressing shared regional or security issues. For China, the true goals of a mil-mil relationship are to shape U.S. security behavior in ways that enhance broader Chinese deterrent goals. While the PLA still seeks to learn from U.S. experiences in order to aid its own modernization efforts, China believes that Washington gains more from these exchanges than Beijing does, suggesting diminished incentives for cooperation. Put differently, each side has instrumental goals for the relationship; neither sees mil-mil relations as essential to achieving broader regional aims.

### No Solvency – NDAA prevents better mil-mil relations

#### China sees the NDAA as a discriminatory barrier to better mil-mil relations & the NDAA will not change any time soon

Sean Lyngaas, Staff Writer, October 29, 2015, “Jaded U.S.-China Military Ties Fray in Wake of Recent Tensions,” The Washington Diplomat, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=12652:jaded-us-china-military-ties-fray-in-wake-of-recent-tensions&catid=1537&Itemid=428, Accessed 4-19-2016

The Air Force in August issued updated [guidance](http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi16-118.pdf) to personnel reminding them of the importance of, and limits on, contacts with the PLA. “With the rise of [China’s] influence in the international community and the increasing capabilities of the Chinese military,” the mil-to-mil relationship “is becoming more crucial than before,” the directive states. The guidance listed a dozen topical areas in which Air Force personnel are forbidden from communicating with the PLA, including operations related to nuclear weapons, surveillance and reconnaissance, joint war-fighting and space. These no-go zones are not new — they are forbidden by the fiscal 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). When asked if the Pentagon has considered asking Congress to ease some of those restrictions, the U.S. military official who specializes in China said, “It is not something that’s being considered.” “The fact that we have restrictions on what we … will and will not do with the Chinese shouldn’t surprise anybody,” the official added. “It surprises the Chinese and they raise it constantly to us as an obstacle to better mil-to-mil and they see it as somewhat discriminatory against China.”

## A2: Maritime Security Adv.

### A2: Maritime Advantage – No Solvency

#### Diplomatic engagement over maritime issues will fails because it does not resolve the root causes of friction

Peter A. Dutton, Professor and Director of the [China Maritime Studies Institute](https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx) at the [U.S. Naval War College](https://www.usnwc.edu/) and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University and a Distinguished Fellow in the U.S.-Asia Law Institute, January 30, 2015, “MOUs: The Secret Sauce to Avoiding a U.S.-China Disaster?,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/mous-the-secret-sauce-avoiding-us-china-disaster-12154, Accessed 4-19-2016

In conclusion, the policy of attempting to build Chinese habits of adherence to rules of interaction at sea and communication about exercises and intentions is a positive step. But relations between powerful states are not so easily ordered. Sober-minded leaders will observe that while these MOUs help reduce the risk of crisis at sea, they will not eliminate it, because they do not eliminate the divergent security interests that are at the root of the crises. And even as they improve understanding, such insight is no replacement for respect for power. As powerful states, both sides will continue to have reasons to use tactical units assertively to achieve important national objectives—the U.S. reconnaissance operations in China’s EEZ and China’s use of full-spectrum maritime power to increase its control over its claimed islands and waters in the East and South China Seas are two prominent examples. For this reason, the powerful presence of the U.S. Navy in Asia, supported by strengthened allies, partners and friends, remains a surer guarantor or regional stability in the coming decades than political agreements based either on adherence to rules or improved relationships.

#### U.S. & China have fundamentally incompatible views of maritime security

Christopher D. Yung, the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University, September 18, 2015, “Assessing the Sino-U.S. Strategic Interaction in the Maritime Security Domain,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=606>, Accessed 4-20-2016

Finally, the maritime domain challenges U.S.-China cooperation because the two countries have fundamentally different philosophies about the nature and meaning of the sea. China views the sea first and foremost as a means of access through which its enemies can threaten and humiliate it. It was by sea that the British navy dominated China and started the 150 years of humiliation. As a result, China considers it necessary to impose zones or belts of defense in the ocean to prevent hostile powers from gaining access and taking advantage of its resources. While the United States also regards the sea as a potential pathway for threats to the homeland, the maritime domain is more often conceptually seen as a means for the United States to push out and advance its own interests. Thus, one power largely sees this domain as a potential threat, while the other power sees it as an opportunity. This fundamental difference in philosophies shapes how the United States and China look at a range of maritime issues, some of which could be incompatible if the two powers are not creative in their strategic thinking.

### A2: Maritime Advantage – No South China Seas war

#### Common interests will prevent open war in the South China Seas

Jihyun Kim, an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, Summer 2015, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/> Summer\_2015/kim.pdf, Accessed 4-21-2016

Still, the escalation of regional tensions into war with US military intervention is neither inevitable nor desirable for the US and China or other countries in the region. The fact that both Beijing and Washington, along with members of ASEAN, have their common interests in safeguarding the freedom of navigation in the strategically and economically important South China Sea is promising. In fact, these mutual interests have been strong enough to overshadow the conflict-producing aspects of China’s territorial spats with its neighbors or the Sino-US rivalry, caused by alliance politics and mutual suspicions regarding each other’s strategic intensions in the region. As Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong acknowledges, “None of the Southeast Asian countries want to have a fight with China. In fact, China, too, goes considerably out of its way to develop friendly relations with ASEAN.”

#### Strategic ambiguity in the S. China Seas gives countries flexibility that prevents escalation from miscalc

Steven Stashwick, a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, September 25, 2015, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, Accessed 4-11-2016

Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed [narratives of aggression](http://time.com/3904129/south-china-sea-spratlys/), another possible advantage of focusing on “miscalculation” in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from “solving” disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just [how intractable those disputes may be](http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/u-s-china-relations-stop-striving-for-trust/?allpages=yes). Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region’s maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.

### A2: Maritime Advantage – No South China Seas war

#### No South China Seas war. The U.S. should maintain hegemony

Xue Li, PhD, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from Durham University, June 19, 2015, “The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed 4-23-2016

In [a recent piece](http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-should-adjust-its-south-china-sea-policy/) on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, [when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-issues-8-warnings-to-us-surveillance-plane-in-south-china-sea/). However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.

### A2: Maritime Advantage – No escalation

#### Sino-U.S. maritime conflicts are unlikely to escalate

Mark Redden, retired Navy Captain and Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Strategic Research, and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, both part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 2015, “Chapter 10: The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic, Catalyst for Cooperation or Confrontation?,” Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations, p. 104.

Judged objectively in context of the broad U.S.-Chinese relationship, the dangerous military encounters considered in this paper have a much lower risk of escalating into a broader military conﬂict (much less a nuclear conflict) than did U.S.-Soviet incidents during the Cold War. U.S.-Chinese air and maritime incidents have been much less severe, whether measured in terms of loss of life, loss of aircraft, or damage to ships. There is no clear trend toward increasing severity of incidents. (Open-source information does not permit a judgment about trends in the frequency of incidents or close calls.) Maritime incidents involving China have a somewhat different character, in that there are fewer navy-to -navy incidents and more interactions involving Chinese paramilitary assets. The relatively limited losses make the risks in the current situation more tolerable to China.

#### Geographic differences reduce the risk of maritime conflict escalation

Mark Redden, retired Navy Captain and a Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Strategic Research, and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, both part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 2015, “Chapter 10: The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic, Catalyst for Cooperation or Confrontation?,” Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations, p. 104.

Geographic differences also reduce escalation risk. At present, dangerous U.S.-Chinese military interactions are geographically limited, occurring mainly in China’s EEZ or nearby waters (e.g., the Yellow Sea). Conversely, interactions between the U.S. and Chinese navies in distant waters, such as during counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, have been cooperative and professional. This contrasts with Cold War incidents, which were initially limited to areas around the Soviet Union but became global as the Soviet navy’s exercises and operational deployments expanded and were equally contentious in all areas. The underlying Cold War political competition, the clash of ideologies, and the struggle for dominance between two opposed political systems had no geographic bounds. It is unclear whether top Chinese civilian and military leaders share Soviet concern about the increased escalation risks caused by inexperienced commanders and crews operating in distant waters. The cautious, step-by-step approach the PLAN has taken to extra-regional deployments may reflect concern about the quality of naval commanders, but thus far the pace and scope of deployments have been limited enough to allow handpicking of captains and crews.” If PLAN extra-regional deployments increase significantly, there may be more concern about proficiency of, and the potential for less control (and thus greater escalation risk) over, naval assets deployed far from China’s coasts. But at present, these deployments are in cooperative settings where the risk of dangerous incidents with the American military is minimal.

#### Neither side will allow S. China Seas tensions to escalate

Angela Poh, Staff Writer, November 2, 2015, “A big power game in South China Sea,” The Strait Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/a-big-power-game-in-south-china-sea, Accessed 4-23-2016

These are all positive and mature gestures from the US and China, but the South China Sea is rapidly evolving into a big power game. With many other policy priorities, neither the US nor China will allow the South China Sea issue to jeopardise overall bilateral relations. Without a doubt, the US must assure its allies in this region and also continue to assert its freedom of navigation rights in order to avoid giving China tacit consent to changing international norms. China is also certainly unhappy about the US' actions, which it perceives as targeted at China, especially since the USS Lassen incident came so shortly after Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the US. Nonetheless, both sides are keen to not let this issue blow up. What we see, therefore, are the US and China walking a very fine line, and engaging in diplomatic signalling, mixed with friendly gestures to manage the situation.

### A2: Maritime Adv. – “Freedom of navigation” angers China

#### Freedom of navigation claims are a pretext for containment and regional dominance, risking war

Stephen Lendman, Staff Writer, April 2, 2016, “China-US Relations and the South China Sea: President Xi Jinping in Washington,” Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-us-relations-and-the-south-china-sea-president-xi-jinping-in-washington/5517863, Accessed 4-23-2016

Sino/US relations are less than cordial. Beijing justifiably rejects Washington wanting dominion over part of the world not its own – its longstanding imperial agenda, intruding where it doesn’t belong, belligerently at its discretion. Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Issues discussed included Beijing’s sovereignty over its offshore waters and territories, notably its rights in the South China Sea. Obama asserting what he called “significant (US) interests in the Asia-Pacific region” was code language for Washington wanting regional dominance, directly challenging Beijing, including its right to develop and protect its offshore waters and territories. “China will firmly safeguard the sovereignty and related rights in the South China Sea,” said Xi. It “respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight other countries are entitled to under international law, (but does) “not accept any freedom of navigation as an excuse to undermine China’s sovereignty and national security interests.” Washington uses the pretext of “freedom of navigation” to asset its Pacific presence, aggressively advancing its military footprint, risking direct confrontation with China.

## A2: Miscalculation Adv.

### A2: Miscalculation Advantage – Maritime engagement turns

#### Diplomatic engagement to avoid maritime miscalculation makes war more likely because it prevents resolving the underlying causes of disputes

Steven Stashwick, a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, September 25, 2015, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, Accessed 4-11-2016

As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the [perennially-stalled Code of Conduct](http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/for-the-asean-china-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-ninth-time-isnt-the-charm/), the year-old [Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea](http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/564121/navy-leaders-agree-to-code-for-unplanned-encounters-at-sea-at-14th-western-paci.aspx) (CUES), and the bilateral [Military Maritime Consultative Agreement](https://fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-china.pdf) between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation­, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard [to eject fishing vessels](http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/china-philippines-spar-over-south-china-sea-run-ins/) from disputed waters and [island reclamation projects](http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/revealed-chinas-reasons-for-island-building-in-the-south-china-sea/)), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any [legally binding provisions](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579519303809875852).

### A2: Miscalculation Advantage – No Solvency

#### Strategic mistrust is far deeper than the plan can address. The U.S. is systematically moving to contain China now

Minghao Zhao, research fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing and an adjunct fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, June 16, 2015, “Avoiding a Sino-American war,” Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/06/16/2003620797/2, Accessed 4-23-2016

But strategic mistrust between China and the US extends far beyond maritime issues. Despite troubling situations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, America has remained focused on reshaping its hub-and-spoke alliances into a more networked security system across the Indo-Pacific theatre, capitalising on the web of intra-Asian military ties among old allies and new partners such as India and Vietnam. In particular, the US-Japan alliance is undergoing historic transformation, with renewed guidelines for defence cooperation that allow for greater Japanese autonomy in security affairs - and that present China as the main adversary. Add to that the potential deployment of a US-led missile-defence system in South Korea and the prospect of a US military presence in Vietnam, and it is not difficult to understand China's anxiety. The US is placing economic pressure on China as well - at a time, no less, when China is struggling to implement risky domestic reforms amid slowing growth. The US recently attempted to block the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and then to stop its allies from joining. Moreover, by repeatedly calling the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership a "strategic" project, it has politicised the trade deal, which, as the economist Arvind Subramanian has pointed out, will place Chinese firms at a disadvantage in the US and in Asian markets. This effort undoubtedly deserves to be described as "containment". For Chinese policymakers, America is not the status quo power it claims to be. In the face of US attempts to reshuffle regional security and economic arrangements, China feels that it has no choice but to prepare for worst-case scenarios - an approach that is reflected in Chinese President Xi Jinping's so-called "bottom-line concept".

#### War with China is inevitable unless we solve at least 5 scenarios for conflict

Robert Farley, an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, June 9, 2014, “Asia's Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621?page=4, Accessed 4-23-2016

Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war. This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve [disputes in the East and South China Seas](http://finance.yahoo.com/news/japan-says-continue-patrols-china-041327811.html?soc_src=mediacontentsharebuttons), as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure.

### A2: Miscalculation Advantage – Theory is wrong

#### History is on our side. Sino-U.S. miscalculation scenarios are false Cold War thinking

Steven Stashwick, a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, September 25, 2015, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, Accessed 4-11-2016

The threat of “miscalculation” is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of [accidental war theorists](https://books.google.com/books?id=BAkAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA292&lpg=PA292&dq=schelling+accidental+war&source=bl&ots=B27Vt7YfaD&sig=ir4nwECjdfCEOs3JJR3BUOi-baA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBGoVChMI14KY_IvUxwIVhR0eCh1xRQs4#v=onepage&q=schelling%20accidental%20war&f=false) has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations. During the Cold War, policymakers and [scholars](http://www.amazon.com/Inadvertent-War-Europe-Crisis-Simulation/dp/0935371117) worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by [misinterpreted warnings](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter021099b.htm), rogue officers, [technical glitches](http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/04/Close%20Calls%20with%20Nuclear%20Weapons.pdf) in command and control systems, or a lower-level confrontation [spiraling out of control](http://www.amazon.com/Avoiding-War-Problems-Crisis-Management/dp/0813312337). Absent the Cold War’s looming nuclear threat, today’s oft-repeated concerns focus on “miscalculation” causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks by former U.S. Defense Secretaries [Gates](http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2010-0a26/first-plenary-session-722b/dr-robert-m-gates-5086), [Panetta](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19617201), [Hagel](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/world/asia/hagel-criticizes-chinese-navy-citing-near-miss.html?_r=0), and current Defense Secretary [Carter](https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary1-976e/carter-7fa0), as well as Commanders of the [U.S. Pacific Fleet](http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/harry-harris/speeches/2015/03/ASPI-Australia.pdf) and the U.S. [Pacific](http://www.andrewerickson.com/2014/04/statement-of-admiral-samuel-j-locklear-u-s-navy-commander-u-s-pacific-command-before-the-senate-committee-on-armed-services-on-u-s-pacific-command-posture/) [Command](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/12/08/2003549648), and was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the [1996 Taiwan Strait incident](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/scobell.pdf). These concerns are likewise found in too many [op-eds](http://www.cnas.org/media-and-events/cnas-in-the-news/articles/america-and-the-south-china-sea-challenge#.VfCI3vlViko), [reports](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf), [interviews](http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/interview-robert-kaplan/), [commentaries](http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883), and [articles](http://www.morningnewsusa.com/us-china-miscalculation-imminent-in-south-china-sea-2324690.html) to count (see also [here](http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1411/cropsey_rebalance_to_asia_corrected.pdf), [here](http://csis.org/files/attachments/130606_Cronin_ConferencePaper.pdf), [here](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/22/c_134261856.htm), and [here](http://www.cnbc.com/id/44369547), etc.) However, while history shows that [strategic miscalculations](https://books.google.com/books?id=qlNqWJMN_pcC&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=miscalculation+stalin+korean+war&source=bl&ots=o4nZC6CtIu&sig=vZEEPVzTisxe0gDHz-1cWOuJYuU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDEQ6AEwA2oVChMInPv2yvr2xwIVxGweCh1_9gqf#v=onepage&q=miscalculation%20stalin%20korean%20war&f=false) can lead states to war, or [dangerously close to it](http://www.usip.org/publications/looking-back-the-cuban-missile-crisis-50-years-later), evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of control.

### A2: Miscalculation Advantage – No miscalc war with China

#### No chance for miscalculation and war with China

Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, November 6, 2015, “South China Sea tensions unlikely to lead to war,” East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/06/south-china-sea-tensions-unlikely-to-lead-to-war/, Accessed 4-19-2016

Self-interest means China and the United States are unlikely to miscalculate and rush into war. It would be difficult to convince a weary American public to embark on another major overseas conflict. And China’s leadership has an interest in avoiding war so that it can continue to focus on economic development. Despite some assertions otherwise, a rising China does not mean that there is a considerable risk of war as China challenges the dominance of the United States. An increasingly confident China has also recently promoted economic policies designed to strengthen its ties to Southeast Asia, such as its ‘One Belt, One Road’ polices to establish a Maritime Silk Road linking East Asia to the Middle East.

#### There is no risk of a U.S.-China war - economic interdependency checks

Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia with a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from the Australian National University in Canberra, April 2015, “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping,” Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>, Accessed 4-22-2016

Armed conflict between the U.S. and China is highly unlikely in the coming decade. Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic inter-dependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.

## A2: Japanese Nationalism Adv.

### A2: Japanese Nationalism

#### Despite Abe’s new reforms, the Japanese people will never allow the resurgence of militarism

Franz-Stefan Gady, an Associate Editor with The Diplomat and senior fellow at the EastWest Institute, September 16, 2015, “Japan at Peace, The Improbable Military Resurgence,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-09-16/japan-peace, Accessed 4-23-2016

In 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a case for Japan to restore its military capabilities, writing in his book, Determination to Protect This Country, that “if Japanese don’t shed blood, we cannot have an equal relationship with America.” Since then, Abe has sought to revive the country’s defensive capabilities, mostly toward fortifying its claim over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, an island chain in the East China Sea that Beijing says belongs to China. He has requested a record five trillion yen ($42 billion) defense budget for fiscal year 2016 (if approved, it will be Tokyo’s largest in 14 years) and reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense. The efforts have provoked growing alarm. A June 2015 survey found that 57 percent of South Koreans believe that Japan is in a “militaristic state,” and 58 percent said that Tokyo poses a military threat. In comparison, only 38 percent surveyed thought that China was the bigger threat. China, too, is worried. It has [repeatedly warned](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/21/c_134433589.htm) that Abe is leading the country “down a more dangerous path toward militarization.” Whatever Abe’s intentions, however, Japanese militarism was buried for good in August 1945 and will not likely rise again. The reason: the Japanese people.

#### Japan has no interest in nuclearizing

Kyle Mizokami, Co-founder of the defense and security blog Japan Security, October 31, 2015, “China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214, Accessed 4-23-2016

To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here.

## A2: Relations Advantage

### A2: Relations – Status Quo solves

#### The U.S. is systematically deepening engagement, even while calling out on disagreements. This solves their relations impacts

Xinhua News, Staff Writer, September 22, 2015, “US-China relationship not a zero-sum game: Rice,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitus/2015-09/22/content\_21945656.htm, Accessed 4-23-2016

On the eve of the upcoming state visit to the United States by Chinese President Xi Jinping, a top American foreign policy official vowed Monday that the US-China relationship is not a zero-sum game, as the US is "steadily and methodically expanding the breadth and depth of our cooperation with China." "We reject reductive reasoning and lazy rhetoric that says conflict between the US and China is inevitable, even as we've been tough with China where we disagree," US President Barack Obama's National Security Advisor Susan Rice said in a speech on the US-China ties at the George Washington University. Rice noted that, under the Obama administration, the US has "deepened our engagement with China at every level -- maximizing our cooperation on areas of mutual interest while confronting and managing our disagreements." "This isn't a zero-sum game. Our capacity to manage our differences is greater than that," she stressed.

### A2: Relations – No solvency

#### Despite engagement and CBMs, the U.S.-China relationship is continually degrading

Harry Harding, University Professor at the University of Virginia and Visiting Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Fall 2015, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?,” The Washington Quarterly, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Fall2015\_Harding.pdf, Accessed 4-24-2016

No matter how an objective observer would portray these developments, the fact that the two societies interpret them so differently has led the relationship between them to take a turn for the worse. Despite each government’s repeated pledges to seek a stable and collaborative relationship, and despite the numerous bilateral dialogues convened to clarify intentions, provide reassurance, and build trust, mutual suspicion has continued to increase. While not everyone would agree with U.S. Naval War College professor Lyle Goldstein’s assessment that the relationship is near “the brink of disaster,” the consensus is that the relationship between the two countries has been deteriorating and that the chances of conflict, although still low, have been increasing. This feeds the growing perception that the United States’ China policy has failed and thus requires reconsideration and perhaps significant modification.

### A2: Relations – No downturn / impact answers

#### Sino-U.S. relations are resilient by design

[Alan Lee](http://www.ejinsight.com/author/wp_8805/), Staff Writer, January 4, 2016, “2015: A bumpy ride for Sino-US relations,” EJinsight, <http://www.ejinsight.com/20151231-a-bumpy-ride-for-sino-us-relations/>, Accessed 4-23-2016

It was quite a bumpy year for Sino-US relations in 2015 as competition and dispute between the two countries escalated. Yet it appears that Beijing and Washington have reached some sort of an unspoken agreement on risk management: they wouldn’t let their conflicts spin out of control and would make sure their channel for dialogue always remains open.

#### Despite downturns, Sino-U.S. relations will be strong on international issues of agreement

Chen Jimin, Ph.D, is an Associate Research Fellow for the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the Party School of Central Committee of C.P.C., April 22, 2016, “Positive Approaches to the Development of China-U.S. Relations,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/positive-approaches-to-the-development-of-china-u-s-relations/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Certainly, Sino-US relations are complex. An anonymous senior US official said, “Our cooperation is increasing and, simultaneously, our competition is increasing. We will not paper over that fact.” During the meeting, the two leaders discussed the key differences, including human rights, maritime security in the South China Sea and cybersecurity issues related to U.S. business secrets. Nevertheless, the two countries still reached major consensus on many issues with international influence. The two sides issued U.S.-China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation and U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change. Indeed, the approaches to promote bilateral relations can be concluded from the China-US interactions in the nuclear security summit.

# Neg Service Liberalization

### Topicality: Engagement is Binding

#### Engagement is binding

Nik Penhale Smith, Online & Content Marketing specialist, January 6, 2015

"Whatn is Employee Engagement," Effectory International, https://www.effectory.com/thought-leadership/knowledge-center/what-is-employee-engagement/ (accessed 5/31/2016)

engagement (2) a promise, obligation or other condition that binds.

#### Foreign policy context proves: Flexible strategies use different terms; economic engagement is seen to be binding

Tiola Javadi, research associate at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, April 20, 2016

"Indonesia's China Strategy: 'Flexible Hedging'," The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indonesias-china-strategy-flexible-hedging-15843 (accessed 5/29/2016)

Within the context of the U.S.-Chinese rivalry, flexible hedgers opt for flexibility and neutrality, and less of security guarantee or binding economic engagement from intense cooperation with the United States or China.

#### Trade agreements are not binding: Countries can unilaterally withdraw

Julian Ku, professor of law at Hofstra University, February 27, 2008

"Can President Obama Withdraw the U.S. from NAFTA?" Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/02/27/can-president-obama-withdraw-the-us-from-nafta/ (accessed 5/30/2016)

Under NAFTA itself, Article 2205 allows withdrawal “six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties.” As a matter of international law then, there is no problem. But as a matter of U.S. domestic law, can a President withdraw on his own authority, or does he have to get Congressional approval? It seems most likely that this is solely the President’s call, since NAFTA is an executive agreement and not a treaty (and even if it was a treaty, the President probably can withdraw under his own authority).

### Inherency Answers: China Allows Service Investment Now

#### China allows plenty of service investment as per WTO standards

Sheng Bin, Professor, Institute of International Economics, Nankai University Center for Northeast Asian Integration Studies, April 2015

"China's Trade Development Strategy and Trade Policy Reforms: Overview and Prospect," International Institute for Sustainable Development, http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload\_files/Report\_3\_54\_Chinarsquos\_2973653904.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

Given the size of China’s huge market and the Chinese leadership’s stated intention to promote the growth of China’s services sectors, China has consistently pursued the market openings of services by pursuant to its WTO commitments, and deepened regulatory reforms that go beyond the WTO commitments.

#### China has increased service market access across several sectors and greatly reformed its regulations

Sheng Bin, Professor, Institute of International Economics, Nankai University Center for Northeast Asian Integration Studies, April 2015

"China's Trade Development Strategy and Trade Policy Reforms: Overview and Prospect," International Institute for Sustainable Development, http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload\_files/Report\_3\_54\_Chinarsquos\_2973653904.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

China also took steps to implement numerous specific market access commitments pursuant to schedules set forth in the WTO accession agreement, including reducting tariff rates, eliminating non-tariff barriers, and expanding services market access for foreign providers. Specifically, China bound all tariff lines and average applied MFN rate dropped from 15.6% in 2001 to 9.7% in 2005, with the manufactured goods tariffs declining from 14.3% to 8.9%, and agricultural products decreasing from 23.2% to 14.6% during the same period. Some sectors such as automotive and auto parts, textiles and clothing, and IT products were particularly experiencing large tariff reductions. In terms of non-tariff barriers, most of import licenses, import quotas and specific tender requirements were removed before January 2005. Import licensing procedures was simplified, and new import licensing system came in force mainly for the environmental, health and safety purpose. Tariff quotas remained only for certain agricultural products and fertilizer trade. Restrictions on textiles and electromechanical products were also canceled. Furthermore, all trade-related investment measures, including foreign exchange balancing requirements, local content requirements and export performance requirements in previous FDI laws and regulations were completely removed according to the WTO TRIMs agreement. Finally, China made extensive service liberalization commitments beyond the average of developing countries, covering more than 100 sectors over 160 sectors in the GATS list, particularly in the areas of great commercial significance such as banking, securities, insurance, telecommunications, retail and distribution services. National treatment was implemented in all service sectors except for subsidies and restrictions on movement of natural persons for some domestic service providers. All service management agencies were regulated independently from service providers, except express delivery and rail transportation. All of these steps were of great importance to deepen China’s integration into the international trading system, as well as to facilitate and strengthen China’s economic reforms.

### Inherency Answers: China Allows Service Investment Now

#### U.S. had huge service advantage over China

Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador at Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2015

"2015 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," Executive Office of the President of the United States, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/USA/USTR\_Reports/2015/NTE/2015%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

U.S. exports of services to China were $37.8 billion in 2013 (latest data available), and U.S. imports were $14.3 billion. Sales of services in China by majority U.S.-owned affiliates were $39.1 billion in 2012 (latest data available), while sales of services in the United States by majority China-owned firms were $1.7 billion.

#### China has massively liberalized already

Chunding Li, researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research, et al, January 2014

"China's Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements," National Bureau of Economic Research Workig Paper 19853, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19853 (accessed 5/27/2016)

Since 2004, mainland China has issued 41 liberalisation measures covering 18 service areas, and this increased to 338 measures by 2013. Professional bodies of Hong Kong and the regulatory authorities in the Mainland have also signed a number of agreements or arrangements on mutual recognition of professional qualification.

### No Solvency: Chinese Banking Barriers

#### Empirically China makes promises it doesn’t keep in trade negotiations

Leonardo E. Stanley, researcher at CEDES MERCOSUR Economic Research Network, October 2011

"'Smoke but do not inhale': Capital Inflows, Financial Markets and Institutions, a Tale from Three Emerging Giants," The Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP31StanleyOct11.pdf (accessed 5/26/2016)

China’s liberalization path, by contrast, become subtler, despite promises and original agreements. As an example, see at their attitude towards foreign banks entrance despites promises made at the WTO system. In this sense, “if the crisis has transformed the status of emerging-market banks, it has also transformed the role of the state in banking” (Economist, 2010)146.

#### Plan doesn’t solve for capitalization and liquidity requirements for financial services

Leonardo E. Stanley, researcher at CEDES MERCOSUR Economic Research Network, October 2011

"'Smoke but do not inhale': Capital Inflows, Financial Markets and Institutions, a Tale from Three Emerging Giants," The Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP31StanleyOct11.pdf (accessed 5/26/2016)

Notwithstanding promises, the commercial value of their commitments remained conditional on the interpretation and implementation of its obligations (Crosby, 2007). Among others, prudential regulatory measures were widely used to restrict foreigners‟ participation, as for example by imposing high minimum capital requirements and treated all branches as being separate legal entities and not part of a consolidated network. Foreign banks are also subject to excessive liquidity ratios, and seriously limited to engage in RMB lending142. On the other hand, participation in Chinese banks continues to be seriously limited. The foreign strategic investment rules issued by China´s Banking Regulatory Commission continue to limit the participation of foreign banks in local banks to a minority stake: 20% per investor, and an aggregate of 25%. Furthermore, and despite their seat at the Board, foreign investors have little or no ability to influence in the company´s (bank) management (Bell and Chao, 2010).

#### China will excuse barriers as regulatory necessities

Leonardo E. Stanley, researcher at CEDES MERCOSUR Economic Research Network, October 2011

"'Smoke but do not inhale': Capital Inflows, Financial Markets and Institutions, a Tale from Three Emerging Giants," The Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP31StanleyOct11.pdf (accessed 5/26/2016)

In particular, dispute arises on whether Chinese authorities were refusing the entry of foreign rivals or whether foreign banks were expecting a unilateral opening from local ones. China also asserted that some of the actions were undertaken to nurture the country financial regulatory and prudential measures. The approach towards the entry of foreign banks undertake by Chinese financial authorities was not only cautious but strategist, and certainly not given foreign banks room for any dream “to obtain controlling positions in existing banks, accessing infrastructure and customers through branches or subsidiaries on a level playing filed, and in operation independent electronic payment networks” (Crosby, 2007).

### No Solvency: Economic Gains of Liberalization Exaggerated

#### Service liberalization has uncertain effect on capital inflow and risks weakening capital controls

Sasidaran Gopalan, Research Associate at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and Ramkishen S. Rajan, Associate Professor at George Mason University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009

"Financial Sector De-Regulation in Emerging Asia: Focus on Foreign Bank Entry," Working Paper No.76, Institute of South Asian Studies, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19592/ (accessed 5/26/2016)

For a discussion of the nexus between foreign bank entry and Capital account regulation, see Kono and Schuknecht (1999) and Tamirisa (1999). The latter study ﬁnds that while ﬁnancial service liberalization in general has insigniﬁcant effects on capital inﬂows, different modes of entry and different types of ﬁnancial services (e.g. banks versus insurance) could have differential effects on capital ﬂows. There is evidence that the former inevitably leads to de facto weakening of capital controls.

#### China will resist imposition of U.S. trade norms

Nargiza Salidjanova, Senior Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 28, 2015

"China’s Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Trade%20Ambitions%20-%2005.28%2015.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Even if Washington integrates China into higher-standard initiatives on some fronts, China will retain the ability to align with those who oppose aspects of the U.S. agenda, and find ways to undermine the spread of U.S. norms. China has approached trade agreements in a more opportunistic and less consistent manner than the United States, and that is unlikely to change under President Xi. Since the 2013 leadership transition, Beijing is reverting to a policy China used in the late 1990s, when the prospect of joining the WTO served as a conduit for domestic reform. But while the WTO exacted rigorous demands, preferential trade allows China to make concessions incrementally and selectively. This hedging strategy defuses pressure and buys time for China’s new leaders to increase their leverage.

#### China will use banking regulations to slow progress on service liberalization

Sasidaran Gopalan, Research Associate at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and Ramkishen S. Rajan, Associate Professor at George Mason University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009

"Financial Sector De-Regulation in Emerging Asia: Focus on Foreign Bank Entry," Working Paper No.76, Institute of South Asian Studies, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19592/ (accessed 5/26/2016)

The case of China seems to be very different when compared to the experiences of other countries in the region. China has been a relatively late entrant as far as opening up its banking sector for foreign participation is concerned. While most of the other Asian economies undertook more aggressive domestic liberalization than what they have offered under the GATS (noted below), most of the recent developments with respect to foreign bank operations in China have been primarily driven by obligations arising from China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. Though there was a multilateral commitment for a phased expansion of foreign bank access since end 2006 (Leigh and Podpiera, 2006), the penetration level of foreign banks in China remains very small and even insigniﬁcant to some extent as the larger issue of complicated regulatory requirements still persists.

### No Solvency: China Won't Sign

#### No incentive to sign: China only signs bilateral agreements with nations it wants to protect

Nargiza Salidjanova, Senior Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 28, 2015

"China’s Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Trade%20Ambitions%20-%2005.28%2015.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

This paper analyzes China’s preferential trade strategy and rationale. It finds that China has signed trade agreements primarily with countries that are neither significant in the global economy nor vital to China’s export sector. Indeed, several partners enjoy bilateral trade surpluses with China, and have comparative advantages in industries that China may want to protect from outside competition. The way in which China negotiates trade deals is also confounding. Unlike the United States, China appears to lack a modus operandi, so that the scope, strength, and details of its agreements vary widely. Some appear exceedingly generous to the trade partner, while others aggressively promote and protect domestic industries. With respect to services, investment, and other advanced provisions, China tends to fall well short of U.S. standards; yet it also demonstrates greater ambition and flexibility than developing country peers like India and Brazil (see Section 2).

#### China signs bilateral agreements to promote the One China policy, increase its regional leadership, and check Taiwan’s influence

Nargiza Salidjanova, Senior Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 28, 2015

"China’s Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Trade%20Ambitions%20-%2005.28%2015.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Much of China’s preferential trade partnering revolves around the One China policy, countering the “China threat” perception, and assuming regional leadership. China signed FTAs with Hong Kong and Macau soon after the handover of these jurisdictions to the Mainland. China has also sought to constrain Taiwan’s independence by (a) signing trade agreements with countries that recognize the People’s Republic of China; (b) dissuading other countries from signing trade agreements with Taiwan; and (c) signing a trade agreement directly with Taipei but on terms designed to reinforce the non-sovereign status of the Republic of China on Taiwan. China’s trade agreement with ASEAN aimed to counter concerns about China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), while capitalizing on the regional solidarity that followed the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis.

#### China signs bilateral agreements to promote regional cooperation and check U.S. power

Nargiza Salidjanova, Senior Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 28, 2015

"China’s Trade Ambitions: Strategy and Objectives behind China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Trade%20Ambitions%20-%2005.28%2015.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

In its negotiations with potential FTA partners, China appears to prioritize “cooperation” over narrow economic self-interest. This normative approach allows China to justify lower-standard agreements, as well as exploit misgivings some countries have about the United States’ more ambitious agreements.

### Solvency Claims are Dubious: China Doesn't Allow Access to Foreign Economic Research

#### China hides data from economists at global banks

George Chen, Editor for the International Edition of the South China Morning Post, February 18, 2014

"Beijing Giving Foreign Economists Cold Shoulder," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1430072/beijing-giving-foreign-economists-cold-shoulder (accessed 5/27/2016)

Chinese government officials have quietly become more skeptical about foreign banks' research reports and are avoiding senior economists at global banks, partly because of growing mutual distrust over the scale and seriousness of the country's debt problems.

#### Government pressure makes Chinese bankers hide financial information

George Chen, Editor for the International Edition of the South China Morning Post, February 18, 2014

"Beijing Giving Foreign Economists Cold Shoulder," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1430072/beijing-giving-foreign-economists-cold-shoulder (accessed 5/27/2016)

"The general sentiment has clearly changed. The central bank and the regulators are more cautious about what they can tell you," said one of the economists. Another said: "I think it's because the government now has more pressure on it, and some officials may even buy the conspiracy theory that some economists at foreign banks may have close ties with foreign governments so that what you tell them may quickly be passed on to those governments."

### State-Owned Enterprises Case Turn

#### U.S. will use services agreements to push rules disciplining state-owned enterprises

Harold Godsoe, attorney and Foreign Legal Specialist for the Public International Law and Policy Group, 2014

"The Depth of the Trade Services Agreement," Brigham Young University International Law and Management Review, Vol. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol10/iss1/2 (accessed 5/25/2016)

Although many of the TISA Negotiating Parties have called for the removal of barriers to entry for new entrants these requests are contradicted by equally strong calls for deep commitments that WTO members are unlikely to make.100 The United States, for instance, is both anticipating and discouraging China’s accession to TISA with regulatory proposals for rules disciplining state-owned enterprises.

#### Chinese state-owned enterprises critical to Chinese economy—rapid destruction of SOEs is bad, markets are inconsistent and SOEs are essential to economic and social stability

Fan Gang, Director of National Institute of Economic Research, and Nicholas Hope, Director of Stanford Center for International Development, 2013

"The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy," China-United States Exchange Foundation, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf (accessed 5/31/2016)

Given the long history of SOEs and the enormous social responsibilities imposed on them, China’s gradual approach to SOE reform is understandable. Today, deficiencies in China’s market infrastructure continue to prevent the government from fully allowing free market forces to run the economy. The government will continue, therefore, to have an important role to play in resolving these transition problems in China’s development.

### State-Owned Enterprises Case Turn: Extensions: Critical to Chinese Economy

#### SOEs fill employment and social service gaps and are essential to people's livelihoods

Fan Gang, Director of National Institute of Economic Research, and Nicholas Hope, Director of Stanford Center for International Development, 2013

"The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy," China-United States Exchange Foundation, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf (accessed 5/31/2016)

As there was neither private wealth nor any organized structure to take on the huge task at hand, it was the state enterprises that gradually undertook all the nation-building tasks. In addition to their historical function of rebuilding the country, they have been playing an important role in providing for the livelihood of many people. SOEs provide not just employment, but also a range of social services, education, medical care and healthcare and retirement protection.

#### China has reformed and increased efficiency of SOEs—and the reforms caused painful unemployment and restructuring

Fan Gang, Director of National Institute of Economic Research, and Nicholas Hope, Director of Stanford Center for International Development, 2013

"The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy," China-United States Exchange Foundation, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf (accessed 5/31/2016)

Since economic reform and opening-up policies began in 1978, China’s SOEs have undergone a long process of gradual and progressive transformation. To reduce their claim on budgets and/or bank loans, many inefficient and smaller SOEs have been closed down, merged or sold. The resulting unemployment and restructuring problems were painful. The transitional difficulties were made less disruptive because China maintained rapid economic growth and established basic social security, medical services, education, housing and other safety-net arrangements. Concurrently, and more positively, many large SOEs in key and strategic sectors have been successfully transformed, from inefficient production units operating under the state’s economic plan, into profitable, incorporated business entities, for which appropriate corporate governance structures are being gradually implemented.

### Growth Bad: Kills Environment

#### Economic growth in Asia causes massive species extinction

Voice of America, August 18, 2015

"Economic Growth in Asia Threatens Environment," VOA As It Is, http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/economic-growth-in-asia-threatens-environment/2922900.html (accessed 5/30/2016)

Strong economic growth in Asia has lifted millions of people out of poor economic conditions. But some environmental activists say it has also hurt the area’s environment. The International Union for Conservation of Nature met in Bangkok, Thailand recently for three days. The group urged Asian countries to work together to protect the environment. It warned that, if they fail to do so, many plants and animals will become extinct.

#### Economic growth kills China's wetlands

Amy He, staffwriter for China Daily, October 21, 2015

"China's Wetlands Hurt by Economic Growth: Report," China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-10/21/content\_22242352.htm (accessed 5/29/2016)

China's rapid economic development is destroying the country's coastal wetlands, according to a report, and environmental experts blamed a lack of public understanding about what wetlands do for the failure to protect them.

#### Industrialization accelerates climate change and damages air, water, and soil, threatening species

Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, March 8, 2015

"Impact of Business and Industry on the Environment," IMEP, Sviva.gov.il, http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/env\_topics/IndustryAndBusinessLicensing/Pages/EnvironmentalImpactOfBusiness.aspx (accessed 5/29/2016)

Industrialization, while important for the economic growth and development of a society, can also be harmful to the environment. Amongst other things industrial process can cause climate change, pollution to air, water and soil, health issues, extinction of species, and more.

### Limited Investment Counterplan Solvency

#### Limited investment is popular and allows China to maintain regulatory controls

Sasidaran Gopalan, Research Associate at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and Ramkishen S. Rajan, Associate Professor at George Mason University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009

"Financial Sector De-Regulation in Emerging Asia: Focus on Foreign Bank Entry," Working Paper No.76, Institute of South Asian Studies, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19592/ (accessed 5/26/2016)

While the direct participation of the foreign banks as either branches or subsidiaries in the Chinese banking system is insigniﬁcant, indirect participation as investors with minority stakes has been gaining considerable popularity in the recent years (Leigh and Podpiera, 2006). Since 2003 the maximum share a single foreign investor may take in a local bank was raised to 20 percent. The overall maximum foreign shareholding is set at 25 percent. There were about 70 banks with minority stakes in Chinese banks and close to 200 foreign banks had opened up representative ofﬁces in China as of end 2007. The regulations governing the establishment of foreign banks remain quite stringent compared to those of the other countries in the region. Only those foreign commercial banks that have maintained a representative ofﬁce in China for at least two years prior to the application, and have total assets of not less than US $10 billion at the end of the year preceding the application, can apply for establishment of a wholly foreign-funded bank (subsidiary). The same asset requirement applies for the establishment of a Chinese foreign joint-venture bank and the asset requirement is even higher for the establishment of a branch. Foreign banks are encouraged to have local incorporation.

#### Foreign financial companies can enter into limited investment arrangements with Chinese government

Sasidaran Gopalan, Research Associate at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and Ramkishen S. Rajan, Associate Professor at George Mason University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, 2009

"Financial Sector De-Regulation in Emerging Asia: Focus on Foreign Bank Entry," Working Paper No.76, Institute of South Asian Studies, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19592/ (accessed 5/26/2016)

Those banks that do not incorporate locally will be barred from accepting individual deposits of less than Rmb 1 million, (in a way severely limiting the scope of their business). As of end-2007, 24 foreign banks had incorporated locally. It is to be noted that since 2003 the maximum share a single foreign investor may take in a local bank had been raised to 20 per cent. The overall maximum foreign shareholding is set at 25 per cent. At the end of 2007, a total of 25 Chinese commercial banks had entered into partnerships with foreign investors.

#### Limited indirect investment accounted for $118 billion in China in 2013

Ma Guangyua, staffwriter at China Daily, November 7, 2014

"Banking on capital to go global," China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-11/01/content\_18839930.htm (accessed 5/26/2016)

By the end of last year, about 15,300 Chinese investors had set up 25,400 investment entities in 184 countries and regions, with an accumulated net investment of $660.48 billion. In 2013, foreign investors also injected a record $118 billion in indirect investment in China, equivalent to China's outward investment. Despite the fall in the growth of inbound direct investment in recent years, China's outbound investment is still estimated to grow by 10 percent a year in the next decade, which, in turn, is expected to raise the amount of such investment to more than $200 billion in 2020.

### Limited Investment Counterplan Advantage: Maintaining Banking Regulation Good

#### Chinese banking regulations control inflow and outflow now; less oversight could cause financial instability

Eswar Prasad, New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics, Brookings Institute, April 27, 2016

"China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks," Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2016/04/27-china-economy-financial-markets-prasad (accessed 5/30/2016)

China’s government has created a number of schemes that allow for controlled and calibrated opening of the capital account to both inflows and outflows. These schemes have been designed to generate many of the indirect benefits of financial openness (such as domestic financial development and international portfolio diversification) while enabling freer movement of capital. Table 1 contains a summary of the main schemes that have been instituted in recent years to liberalize inflows, outflows, and two-way flows. Rising foreign investments by Chinese households, corporations, and institutional investors have led to major changes in the pattern of China’s overall exports of financial capital. The composition of gross outflows has shifted markedly from reserve accumulation to official and unofficial flows due to both the private and state sectors. This shift is consistent with the government’s stated objective of shifting foreign exchange holdings from the central bank’s balance sheet to those of households, corporations, and state-controlled entities such as the sovereign wealth fund. The objective of “foreign exchange holdings by the people” (rather than the central bank) will have a significant impact on the composition of future capital outflows from China. While the government is providing channels for international portfolio diversification, which is a positive development, there is a risk that lack of effective oversight of domestic securities markets and institutional investors that enable such diversification could portend risks for household and corporate balance sheets.

#### China moving slowly on market-flexibility now

Eswar Prasad, New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics, Brookings Institute, April 27, 2016

"China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks," Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2016/04/27-china-economy-financial-markets-prasad (accessed 5/30/2016)

China has continued to move gradually—and at least in principle—towards a more flexible market-determined exchange rate. On August 11, 2015 the People’s Bank of China (PBC) changed the reference pricing mechanism for the onshore CNYdollar exchange rate, whereby the PBC sets the opening price for trading on the Shanghai China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) each morning. The reference price is no longer delinked from the previous day’s closing price although, with RMB trading now taking place in markets such as London that are in other time zones, the two prices need not necessarily be the same. The key point is that the RMB exchange rate relative to the dollar is now more subject to market forces. This policy change was combined with a 1.9 percent devaluation of the RMB relative to the dollar.

### Limited Investment Counterplan Advantage: Maintaining Banking Regulation Good

#### Continued regulatory controls necessary for controlled liberalization to avoid shocks

SIA Partners, November 14, 2015

"Liquidity Risk Challenges faced by Chinese Banks," Banking and Insurance, http://en.finance.sia-partners.com/liquidity-risk-challenges-faced-chinese-banks (accessed 5/29/2016)

As part of the grand plan to liberalize interest rates, the Chinese government also introduced a formal deposit protection scheme in May 2015. Under this scheme, up to 500,000 RMB deposited by individual or entity in each bank will be insured. This is to establish a legal framework to allow banks to default. Again, this is a dramatic shift in the mentality of both the banks and the public. The idea of “implicit guarantee” on the deposits or central government as last resort to bail out the banks will no longer exist. Both the banks and depositors need to fully evaluate the risks this imposes and demand an appropriate return accordingly.

#### Government is slowly improving regulations

SIA Partners, November 14, 2015

"Liquidity Risk Challenges faced by Chinese Banks," Banking and Insurance, http://en.finance.sia-partners.com/liquidity-risk-challenges-faced-chinese-banks (accessed 5/29/2016)

We believe that this liquidity pressure on the banks will last for a relatively long time due to the economy’s downward pressure and policy changes implemented by the Chinese government. Given the changing economic structure, prevalence of shadow banking, and the anticipated capital outflow, lower banking profits are expected in the future. Chinese banks are already experiencing more volatile and high funding costs, deteriorating asset quality, and smaller net interest margin. These attributes reinforce the need for liquidity risk management strategies within the banks. Policy-wise, in the long term we anticipate that the government will continue to improve regulations in response to the changing economy (the change from a more export-oriented and investment-driven economy to a consumption-based and domestically-driven economy).

### Regionalism Good Argument

#### China has liberalized service for regional partners

Chunding Li, researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research, et al, January 2014

"China's Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements," National Bureau of Economic Research Workig Paper 19853, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19853 (accessed 5/27/2016)

Under the ASEAN – China Trade in Services Agreement, services and services suppliers/providers in the region enjoy improved market access and national treatment in sectors/subsectors where commitments have been made. The Agreement provides for liberalization of substantial coverage of sectors/subsectors especially in more than 60 additional subsectors committed by ASEAN Member Countries which are parties to the GATS/WTO.

#### Asian regional growth key to peace and stability

Meena Singh, Research Scholar, JJT University in India, June 9, 2015

"Growth Triangles of Southeast Asia: Relevance for Peace and Stability," International Journal on Arts, Management, and the Humanities, Vol. 4 no. 1, http://researchtrend.net/vol\_4%202015/11%20MEENA%20SINGH.pdf (accessed 5/31/2016)

One of the major objectives of ASEAN, as stated in the ASEAN Declaration is to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. This requires a fully integrated ASEAN region, consisting of economies that are growing in an environment of peace and stability.

### Regionalism Good Extensions: Asian Regional Growth Good

#### Growth key to regional cooperation and regional diversity

Meena Singh, Research Scholar, JJT University in India, June 9, 2015

"Growth Triangles of Southeast Asia: Relevance for Peace and Stability," International Journal on Arts, Management, and the Humanities, Vol. 4 no. 1, http://researchtrend.net/vol\_4%202015/11%20MEENA%20SINGH.pdf (accessed 5/31/2016)

The Asia and Pacific region has become the most dynamic region in the world today. The region mainly has economies, which have diverse socio-economic and political structures and are primarily heterogeneous in nature. Most of them are now developing fast as a result of rapid economic growth. Increasing efforts have been made to promote regional and sub-regional cooperation amongst the member countries. As a result of these efforts, various developments could be seen in the form of establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and some other more innovative types of cooperative efforts such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), the Southern China Growth Triangle (SCGT) as well as the Singapore- Johor-Riau Growth Triangle (SIJORI GT).

#### Widespread Asian regional growth checks China's downturn

Juzhong Zhuang, Deputy Chief Economist at Asian Development Bank, and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Advisor in the Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department at Asian Development Bank, May 29, 2016

"Asia Growth Pessimism is Not Warranted," OECD Insights, http://oecdinsights.org/2016/05/29/asia-growth-pessimism-is-not-warranted/ (accessed 5/31/2016)

Second, many other Asian economies continue to grow strongly, benefiting from reform efforts. Over time, developing Asia’s growth is likely to be driven by multiple growth centers. Across South and Southeast Asia we have upgraded recent growth forecasts, including major economies such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. India, for example, is the fastest growing major economy and has developed a comparative advantage in services particularly information technology services. The country is presently attempting to foster manufacturing development and linkages to global value chains through a Make in India Program. Likewise, Indonesia is attempting to shift away from a dependence on natural resources into manufacturing development. Growing at 7-8% annually, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar continue to catch up with the rest of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The PRC’s structural transformation also offers new opportunities to other economies, as the country gradually withdraws from low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing industries and its growing middle class demands more quality consumer goods.

#### Strong Asian regional economy important to survive economic shocks

Juzhong Zhuang, Deputy Chief Economist at Asian Development Bank, and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Advisor in the Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department at Asian Development Bank, May 29, 2016

"Asia Growth Pessimism is Not Warranted," OECD Insights, http://oecdinsights.org/2016/05/29/asia-growth-pessimism-is-not-warranted/ (accessed 5/31/2016)

Third, regional economies have learnt valuable lessons from the Asian financial crisis and taken steps to reduce financial vulnerability and bolster resilience to external shocks. Across developing Asia, macroeconomic management has improved, and authorities have intensified the use of macroprudential policies and strengthened the oversight of corporates and financial institutions. Regional integration is increasingly linking markets and production through the spread of global value chains, free trade agreements, foreign direct investment, and greater mobility of skills.

# Neg TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership

## AT: Advantage – U.S. China Relations

### 1NC – AT: U.S.-China Relations F/L

#### Relations strong now – Obama-Xi talks

Shannon Tiezzi, April, 2016, “Obama, Xi Put Positive Spin on US-China Relations,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/obama-xi-put-positive-spin-on-us-china-relations/> (accessed 5/8/16)

Obama began his remarks with Xi by repeating the long-standing position that “the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China.” Xi, meanwhile, reiterated that “it is a priority for China’s foreign policy to work with the United States to build a new model of major country relations, and to realize no conflicts or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.” Both those oft-repeated statements have worn rather thin, thanks in part to increasingly assertive moves in the disputed waters of the South China Sea from Beijing, and increasingly barbed verbal responses from U.S. military officials. Still, the two sides could — and did — point to some positive progress on nuclear security. In a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation, the U.S. and China pledged to deepen cooperation and coordination to prevent nuclear smuggling and increase the security of nuclear materials. At a press briefing, Laura Holgate, added that Washington was “really quite encouraged by the leadership that China is beginning to show in the nuclear security realm.” In another positive step, a new nuclear security Center of Excellence opened in China earlier this month, at a ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. Moniz described the new center, the result of close U.S.-China collaboration, as “a world-class facility for Chinese, regional, and international nuclear security training and technical exchanges.”

#### Alt causes to breakdowns in relations between China and U.S. – elections, perception and internal corruption

Jeffrey Lee, Staff Writer, November, 2014, “Obama Administration Signals Green Light for China to Join TPP Discussions,” Asia Cargo News, <http://www.asiacargonews.com/en/news/detail?id=42> (accessed 4/27/16)

Mo says that one effect of China’s entry is an increase in the trade volume between China and the US, as well as mutual interdependence, which is beneficial to global stability and cooperation. But according to DeGolyer, although the point of the partnership, in theory, is to increase trade, the reality could be slightly different. “In practice, it will likely start with a spate of disputes over the interpretation and application of the rules,” he says. “The China trade picture is more likely to be affected by internal issues much more than external ones in the short and medium term.” Some examples of these internal issues are anti-corruption campaigns, economic or political reforms and the transition to a fully convertible currency hitting investment flows. There are several implications for China if it ends up not joining the agreement. According to a research report by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “virtually all TPP-originated products will qualify for preferential duty treatment in the US,” and as an outsider, “China will almost certainly face a decided deterioration in its overall export competitiveness.” In such a scenario, other countries would benefit. Vietnam, for example, which often supplies cheaper alternatives to China in the apparel, footwear and textile sectors, would increase its shipments and therefore its share of the market, potentially to the detriment of China, says the report. As for the year ahead, DeGolyer says he thinks that there are other factors besides the TPP that will affect trade relations between China and the US. One of these factors will be the results of the American elections. “For example, the Senate seat in Georgia may be affected by outsourcing,” he says. “If the Republicans lose this very red state, I think it will be seen as a loss caused by Republican support of outsourcing jobs overseas.” He adds that there are elections in Washington that will be seen as referenda on coal shipments to China and India. DeGolyer also says recent events might need to be taken into account, referring to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong which was initiated in late September. “The other wild card on trade is what happens with Occupy Central and how it ends.” He says. “If it ends with violence, particularly mainland-driven violence, global consumer reaction to Chinese goods could be quite strong, at least in the short term.”

#### And, status quo solves their impacts

Shannon Tiezzi, Associate Editor at The Diplomat, February, 2015, “Taking US-China Relations Global,” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/taking-us-china-relations-global/> (accessed 5/8/16)

We’re still over six months away from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, but you wouldn’t know it from the number of bilateral meetings being billed as in preparation for Xi’s arrival. The latest, a meeting between U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi in New York City, provides some interesting insights into focal points for the big bilateral summit in September. Both China and the U.S. released reports summarizing the Rice-Yang visit, and the focus was decidedly global. Instead of touching on bilateral subjects, both governments directed attention to U.S.-China cooperation on global issues: the Ebola crisis, the North Korea nuclear issue, the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, and ensuring stability in Afghanistan.The emphasis on Afghanistan is especially interesting, as it marks a new area of cooperation between Washington and Beijing. The Diplomat has previously reported on the signs China is willing to take a more active role in mediating between Afghanistan and the Taliban, including bringing Pakistan to the negotiating table. The U.S. role in all of this has been unclear, with some reports indicating that the U.S. has plans to participate in negotiations with Afghan officials and Taliban leaders – which was denied by U.S. government officials. The prospect of a negotiation process with the Taliban led by China and sanctioned by the U.S. could be a critical development for Afghanistan’s future. Details on possible U.S.-China cooperation on this front remain murky. The statement from National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan made clear that Rice and Yang discussed Afghanistan in their meeting, but did not offer any additional details. The report from China’s Foreign Ministry (translated here by Xinhua) did not mention Afghanistan at all. But given the shared concern for Afghanistan’s stability, the U.S. and China are undoubtedly having serious discussions on how to coordinate their efforts. Official summaries of the meeting paid more attention to a long-time point of emphasis: the North Korean nuclear program. We’ve entered another round of speculation as to when (if at all) North Korea will conduct another nuclear test. When it comes to North Korea, U.S. administrations are always eager to show they have buy-in from China – even if verbal commitments never translate to action (something my colleague Ankit and I discussed in more detail in our latest podcast, featuring Joel Wit). This time around, according to the NSC, Rice and Yang “agreed that North Korea would not succeed in its twin pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.” The Chinese summary, predictably, was far more muted, saying only that “China adheres to the principles of denuclearization and peaceful settlement through dialogue and negotiations.” Yang added his hope “that all related parties will exercise restraint, avoid any irritating rhetoric and acts, and jointly maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.” Taken together, these two reports don’t spark much hope for a breakthrough on how to approach North Korea’s nuclear program. The relative length given to the North Korea issue in each side’s statement shows that both Beijing and Washington are focusing on this issue in the lead-up to Xi’s visit. However, the problem is that the two sides have different goals for what a breakthrough would look like. China wants a return to the Six Party Talks or another form of dialogue, while Washington wants greater Chinese commitment to the sanctions regime and/or a solid North Korean concession on its nuclear program as a precursor to talks. U.S.-China relations have always had a global component, but this trend is only increasing as China becomes more influential on the world stage. In Meehan’s statement, the very second sentence underlines that Rice and Yang “agreed to strengthen coordination on regional and global challenges.” The U.S. and China have different agendas for the international order (see, for example, my piece on China’s vision for the U.N.) but when it comes to various security challenges, whether pandemics like Ebola or the threat of Afghanistan becoming a terrorist haven, there is much common ground.

#### And, No collapse of US-China relations – there is always an incentive for strategic cooperation

Ji Guo, 2015, University of Washington The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, “RETHINKING UNITED STATES MILITARY BASES IN EAST ASIA,” Chapter 6 ‘The PRC and Russia’s Take on US Military Bases in Japan and the ROK,’ <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed 5/8/16)

US military bases in the ROK and Japan stir up an array of political/diplomatic, economic, and security issues in the PRC and Russia. However, they are not as contrary to US interests in the region as one might think, and that in fact, neither the PRC or Russia have sufficient motivation to take action against the bases. In this paper, I will make recommendation as to how the US may better relations with the PRC, reduce blowback, and maintain stability in the region. Section 1: PRC Political Looking back, the relationship between the US and the PRC have long been unstable¶ and unreceptive to change. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the newly founded¶ government actively participated in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Anti-Americanism¶ and anti-capitalism were important components of Chinese politics. The slogans that the¶ PRC government used to propagandize anti-Americanism and to vilify the US were explicit¶ and intense. In the Jie Fang Daily Newspaper, one of the most important political¶ newspapers in the PRC, an article from November 16, 1950 read: To hate and look down upon America is the only feeling that can reflect the lofty¶ spirit of Chinese people. Everyone who loves our country must give up any illusion¶ about imperialist America, and remove the fear toward this evil country as well. Moreover, the ethos that hate the US should be set in order to increase the¶ confidence to defeat the US for Chinese people. (Yang, 1996, P. 236) This kind of hostile policy lasted for over twenty years, until the late 1970s, when Deng¶ Xiaoping’s “open and reform” policy changed the nature of the relationship between the¶ two countries. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the hostility between the PRC and¶ the US significantly diminished, and instead began displaying possibilities for cooperation. As Deng pointed out: “internal reform and external openness is a long term national policy for PRC. Developing the US-PRC relationship is the necessary condition of insisting on this national policy. The direct motivation of the establishment of the US-PRC relations is to create a good international environment for PRC’s domestic development and the policy of reform and open” (Website of history of Chinese Communist Party, 2011). It is not hard to see that having normal and stable diplomatic relations with the US has been a part of the PRC’s developmental plan. Since then, US-PRC relations can be described as “precarious and stable”; the ideological differences and conflicts in certain situations still make this relationship difficult, but at the same time, the relationship has also been relatively stable. As Professor David M. Lampton of Johns Hopkins University stated in the book, The USChina Relationship in the Post-WTO era: “On the one hand, we could say that the relationship between the U. and the PRC is vulnerable, but from the other hand we also could see this relation is pretty adamant. Even as it faced serious challenges such as the event of “Tiananmen Square” in 1989 and the embassy bombing crisis in 1999, the relationship between the US and the PRC has lasted still” (Zhang & Sun, 2002, P. 51).

### 2NC UQ: Relations High

#### Relations high now

Tian Shaohui, April, 2016, “Interview: China-U.S. economic relationship "much more balanced" than 15 years ago -- U.S. expert,” Xinhua, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/03/c_135247677.htm> (accessed 5/8/16)

PHILADELPHIA, April 3 (Xinhua) -- The China-U.S. economic relationship is "much more balanced" today than 15 years ago, as Chinese markets and investments become increasing important for U.S. economic growth going forward, Geoffrey Garrett, dean at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, said Saturday. "I think we're also in a transition, that's an incredibly important transition, to a new normal in U.S.-China relations," Garrett said at the opening ceremony of the two-day Penn Warton China Summit held here with the theme of "China's New Normal," a term often referring to China's transition to slower growth but with higher quality. Garrett said that current U.S. debates on the economic relations with China focus on the American trade deficit with China and U.S. government debt held by China, which are "the old U.S.-China economic relationship" about 15 years ago and are certainly "out of date." In his view, the economic relationship between the world's two largest economies today is "actually much more balanced" than it's been in the past. On the one hand, the emergence of over 500 million middle class consumers in China "has been and will be so important" to the growth of American economy going forward, he argued.

### 2NC – Relations Resilient

#### Relations are resilient

Nuno Moneiro, Dept. of Political Science, 2014, Yale UniversityTheory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (pp. 130-132). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.) (accessed 5/8/16)

Beyond mere numbers, China pursues a national security policy that is defensive in nature and regional in scope. 61 China's geostrategic goals focus on “sustaining a security environment conducive to China's national development.” 63 This aim requires avoiding a crisis over Taiwan as well as furthering Chinese maritime territorial and economic interests in the South and East China seas. China has implemented a strategy of “offshore active defense,” assuming a force posture aimed at regional anti-access area-denial (A2/ AD) goals, capable of denying U.S. access to its region for a limited time in case of a conflict. Yet, U.S.-China relations, although varying in tone, have consistently been positive, reflecting the high potential costs and risks of a competitive relationship between them. During the first two-and-a-half decades of U.S. power preponderance, Beijing's leadership has adopted an overall cooperative posture toward U.S. global leadership. 64

### 2NC – Relations Alt Cause

#### GOP distrust of China kills any chance of a broader alliance

John Feffer, December, 2014, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus, “Backlash in America and Okinawa” <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/666885.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

On Asia, many conservative U.S. commentators are enthusiastic that the Republican takeover will improve the odds for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pump money into containing China. President Obama has generally found opposition to FTAs in his own party’s ranks. The Republicans may be willing to grant the president the fast-track authority he needs to push the agreement through Congress. China, however, already views the TPP as a challenge to its own economic power in the region. The Republicans in Congress have already balked at various U.S.-Chinese initiatives, such as military-to-military cooperation and the recent climate deal. Once in full control of Congress, they may well succeed in undermining whatever small amount of cooperation the U.S. president achieved with Xi Jinping in Beijing at the recent APEC meeting. As a result, East Asia may well return to the heightened tensions of last spring. The attempts at papering over differences at the APEC meeting in Beijing - between Korea and Japan, between Japan and China, and between China and the United States - will disintegrate. Tokyo will continue to try to break out of its Peace Constitution, raising concerns in Seoul and Beijing. Washington, spurred on by congressional hawks, will poke at China, producing a nationalist backlash.

### 2NC – Climate Cooperation Solves Aff Impact

#### Cooperation establishes effective U.S-China relations

Gao Hairan, Deputy Director and Assistant Professor, National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), focuses on China-U.S. relations on climate change and South-South cooperation on climate change, March 17, 2014, “How China and the United States Can Work Together to Tackle Global Climate Change”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, <http://www.fletcherforum.org/2014/03/17/hairan/> (accessed 4/26/16)

As the two top GHGs emitters, economies, and energy users in the world, the actions taken by China and the United States are crucial to the realization of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and sustainable development on a global scale. In 2013, the total fossil CO2 emissions of China and the United States accounted for more than forty percent of world fossil CO2 emissions. Therefore, any successful effort to tackle climate change will need these two countries to work towards a solution either through the UNFCCC process or on a bilateral basis. Meanwhile, it also must be noted that China is different from the United States in various aspects, and should thus bear different responsibilities in tackling climate change. Recognizing the differences between the two countries politically will be helpful for effectively managing those differences, building a constructive partnership, and finding mutually acceptable approaches to cooperation without undermining their respective core national climate-related interests. Cooperation between China and the United States under the UNFCCC could ensure a successful 2015 global pact on climate change and further solidify bilateral cooperation under the current China-U.S. Climate Change Working Group (CCWG). As for the UNFCCC process, both countries should demonstrate their political willingness and commitment to it for the protection of climate as a global public good. In terms of bilateral cooperation, issues of common interest may include short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), shale gas, HFCs, nuclear technology, and the five thematic areas under the CCWG. The two countries must recognize that combating climate change, either through a UN-led multilateral process or on a bilateral basis, is of mutual interest to them, both economically and strategically. By working together, China and the United States may also find new domestic opportunities, such as economic restructuring and rebalancing investment, finance, and trade between them. This could also help ensure energy security and economic prosperity while moving towards a low-carbon development path. China-U.S. cooperation on climate may also contribute to building new models of major power relations between them and mobilizing global political momentum. In this connection, regular, open, and targeted exchange, dialogue and negotiation mechanisms on climate and energy should be further explored and utilized to improve mutual understanding.

### 2NC – AT: Interdependence

#### AND interdependence increases risk- triggers miscalc.

Thomas Wright is a fellow with the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution, Copyright # 2013 Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 36:4 pp. 7–23 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.861706 (accessed 5/8/16)

Senior policymakers seem to believe that interdependence will reduce tensions between the United States and China. Interdependence is the key reason why China’s President Xi Jingping called for “a new model of major country relationship.”7 As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, “Interdependence means that one of us cannot succeed unless the other does as well. We need to write a future that looks entirely different from the past.”8 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang speculated “I don’t believe conflicts between big powers are inevitable…Shared interests often override their disputes.”9 The United States and China are highly interdependent with each other, but they are also geopolitical competitors in the Asia–Pacific.10 To a significant extent, the United States and China are competing for regional influence, including whether the United States can remain the hub of the regional security order, how maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea are to be resolved, and whether the United States can project power quickly into the region. China and the United States are also at odds on several issues that could escalate into a crisis including Taiwan and the future of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S.–China relationship is best understood as one of interdependent competition. It is unique in modern history. We have to look back to the period before World War I for cases of such levels of interdependence between great power competitors. The Western world was largely independent of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, and interwar Europe was much less interdependent than it was a quarter of a century earlier.11 The apparent tradeoff between the common interests generated by interdependence and the tensions stoked by geopolitical competition make it difficult to predict where U.S.–China relations are headed. Even if interdependence continues to grow, it will not remove the causes of U.S.– China security competition. Each side is more likely to believe that the other will compromise on issues where they differ, but they will be unwilling to compromise themselves.12 Take Taiwan as an illustration: it is inconceivable that either China or the United States would abandon their respective positions and accede to the will of the other for the sake of economic inducements. In fact, in practical terms, it is hard to imagine any controversial area where a U.S. president would back down from a formal commitment for economic reasons. Rather, the danger is that Washington and Beijing could miscalculate by assuming that the other side is more commercially minded than they are. So, interdependence and geopolitical competition will continue to exist. When the two come into conflict, geopolitical calculations will be uppermost in policymakers’ minds. The question that they are coming to grips with is: what impact will interdependence have? Does it always help the cause of peace, or are there occasions when it will hurt? The key to understanding the strategic effects of interdependence on the bilateral relationship is to understand that it is not a monolithic force. Some types of interdependence will encourage cooperation and decrease tensions. Others will have the opposite effect, increasing tensions and friction. How can we tell the difference between the two? The positive type of interdependence is one where the benefits are shared and it is difficult for either side to turn it into leverage that can be used to inflict disproportionate damage on the other. To use the language of international relations theory, there is symmetric vulnerability. The negative type of interdependence is one where one side gains disproportionate leverage over the other and could seek to use this leverage as an economic weapon at a time of crisis. If one side has an asymmetric vulnerability that the other side tries to exploit, it might also retaliate in another area— horizontal escalation—in which it holds an asymmetric superiority. This increases the risk of miscalculation and a spiraling crisis.

## AT: Advantage – Trade

### 1NC – TPP Trade Scenario F/L

#### No uniqueness- China’s trade weak now

CNBC, May, 2016, “China trade shrinks in April in troubling sign for economy,” <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/08/china-trade-shrinks-in-april-in-troubling-sign-for-economy.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

China's trade shrank in April in a sign government stimulus is failing to jolt the world's second-largest economy out of a prolonged slowdown. Exports contracted by 1.8 percent from a year earlier to $172.7 billion, falling back into negative territory after March's temporary burst of 11.5 percent growth, customs data showed Sunday. Imports plunged 10.9 percent to $127.2 billion after the previous month's 13.8 percent contraction. Weak demand from consumers in China and worldwide is hampering government efforts to reverse an economic slowdown that dragged growth to a seven-year low of 6.7 percent in the first quarter of the year.

#### Economic interdependence doesn’t solve for war- political rivalries trump

Peter Navarro, professor at the University of California-Irvine, March, 2016, “Crouching Tiger: Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

I’ve talked about the fact that I think China cannot rise peacefully, probably a hundred times; and the argument that is used against me most often is clearly the economic interdependence argument, and it goes like this: The United States and China, and China and its neighbors are all hooked on capitalism and everybody is getting rich in this world of great economic interdependence; and nobody in their right mind would start a war because you would, in effect, be killing the goose that lays the golden egg. So that what is happening here is that economic interdependence has created a situation where it’s a firm basis for peace. I think this is wrong. Let me explain. I think there’s no doubt that there are going to be certain circumstances where economic interdependence will be enough to tip the balance in favor of peace; but I think as a firm basis for peace, it won’t work because there will be all sorts of other situations where politics trumps economics. People who are making the economic interdependence argument are basically saying that economics trumps politics. There are no political differences that are salient enough, right, to override those economic considerations? Again, there will be cases where that’s true. But there will be many more cases, in my opinion, where political considerations are so powerful, so intense, that they will trump economic considerations. And just to give you an example or two. Taiwan: The Chinese have made it clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence now, they would go to war against Taiwan, even though they fully understand that that would have major negative economic consequences for Beijing. They understand that, but they would go to war anyway. Why? Because from a political point of view, it is so important to make Taiwan a part of China, that they could not tolerate Taiwan declaring its independence.

#### Existing free trade agreements solve the impact

BMI Research, April, 2015, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Have Little Impact on China, South Korea and Taiwan,” <http://www.bmiresearch.com/news-and-views/trans-pacific-partnership-will-have-little-impact-on-china-south-korea-and-taiwan> (accessed 4/30/16)

The impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement on China and non-TPP major Asian manufacturers South Korea and Taiwan will be minimal. However, other non-TPP Asian nations (particularly textile manufacturers) and small domestic producers in the TPP countries are likely to lose out significantly. Much has been written about the benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement for the countries in the TPP, with Asian countries set to benefit from increased trade and investment flows. While countries are expected to reap broad-based gains, domestic small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are more likely to lose out as they face increased competition and lack the resources to fully utilise the TPP provisions. Other Asian countries that have been excluded from the TPP will also face increased competition as members gain preferential access to key export markets. However, we expect the overall impact on China (which has been excluded from the TPP) and other major Asian manufacturers (South Korea and Taiwan) to be minimal due to the presence of existing free trade agreements (FTAs) within Asia and the greater Pacific region.

#### No solvency and plan not key– economic loses from diversion aren’t substantial and China has alternative means that parallel the TPP

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Department of Political Science Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University and Mary E. Lovely Department of Economics Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, November, 2015, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Perspectives from China (accessed 4/29/16)

In combination, the three arguments described above are compelling and suggest a clear TPP-bound trajectory for China. Individually, however, each is open to reinterpretation. With respect to the economic logic, we show that the gains from trade, as well as the potential losses from trade diversion, are actually less substantial than might be expected. As for China’s international reputation, while we agree that joining negotiations would provide a credible signal of China’s peaceful aspirations and a better bargaining position on trade and investment, we also point out that China has alternative means by which to influence its neighbors and their negotiations, namely, by offering attractive parallel alternatives to the TPP. Finally, with regards to domestic politics, we agree that joining the TPP would help the regime coordinate reform objectives. But, after examining the actual reform strategies employed by the current leadership, we conclude that comprehensive reform is not their goal, at least not in the short term. Instead, the push for localized Free Trade Zone’s (FTZs) and selective restructuring of state-owned assets suggests a more gradual and politically calculated strategy, a strategy that would be severely compromised under TPP obligations.

#### Their authors have causality backward---war prevents trade

Omar M. G. Keshk 10, senior lecturer in the Political Science Department at, and PhD in Political Science from, Ohio State University; Rafael Reuveny, prof of international political economy and ecological economics at and PhD from Indiana University; and Brian M. Pollins, emeritus Associate Prof of Political Science at Ohio State; “Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country Size, and Measures,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 2010 27: 3, SAGE journals (accessed 5/8/16)

In all, any signal that “trade brings peace” remains weak and inconsistent, regardless of the way proximity is modeled in the conflict equation. The signal that conflict reduces trade, in contrast, is strong and consistent. Thus, international politics are clearly affecting dyadic trade, while it is far less obvious whether trade systematically affects dyadic politics, and if it does, whether that effect is conflict dampening or conflict amplifying. This is what we have termed in KPR (2004) “The Primacy of Politics.” ¶ 7. Conclusion¶ This study revisited the simultaneous equations model we presented in KPR (2004) and subjected it to four important challenges. Two of these challenges concerned The specification of the conflict equation in our model regarding the role of inter- capital distance and the sizes of both sides in a dyad; one questioned the bilateral trade data assumptions used in the treatment of zero and missing values, and one challenge suggested a focus on fatal MIDs as an alternative indicator to the widely used all-MID measure ¶ The theoretical and empirical analyses used to explore proposed alternatives to our original work were instructive and the empirical results were informative, but there are certainly other legitimate issues that the trade and conflict research community may continue to ponder. For example, researchers may continue to work on questions of missing bilateral trade data, attempt to move beyond the near- exclusive use of the MIDs data as we contemplate the meaning of “military conflict,” and use, and extend the scope of, the Harvey Starr GIS-based border data as one way to treat contiguity with more sophistication than the typical binary variable.¶ The single greatest lesson of this study is that future work studying the effect of international trade on international military conflict needs to employ a simultaneous specification of the relationship between the two forces. The results we obtained under all the 36 SEM alternatives we estimated yielded an important, measurable effect of conflict on trade. Henceforth, we would say with high confidence that any study of the effect of trade on conflict that ignores this reverse fact is practically guaranteed to produce estimates that contain simultaneity bias. Such studies will claim that “trade brings peace,” when we now know that in a much broader range of circumstances, it is “peace that brings trade.”¶ Our message to those who would use conflict as one factor in a single-equation model of trade is only slightly less cautionary. They too face dangers in ignoring the other side of the coin. In one half of the 36 permutations we explored, the likelihood of dyadic military conflict was influenced by trade flows. In most tests where this effect surfaced, it was positive, that is, trade made conflict more likely. But the direction of this effect is of no consequence for the larger lesson: trade modelers ignore the simultaneity between international commerce and political enmity at their peril. They too run no small risk of finding themselves deceived by simultaneity bias.¶ Our empirical findings show clearly that international politics pushes commerce in a much broader range of circumstances than the reverse. In fact, we could find no combination of model choices, indicators, or data assumptions that failed to yield the result that dyadic conflict reduces dyadic trade. Liberal claims regarding the effect of dyadic trade on dyadic conflict simply were not robust in our findings. They survived in only 8 of the 36 tests we ran, and failed to hold up when certain data assumptions were altered, and were seriously vulnerable to indicator choices regarding inter-capital distance, conflict, and national size.

### 2NC – AT: Interdependence Solves War

#### Economic interdependence doesn’t solve for war- history proves

Peter Navarro, professor at the University of California-Irvine, March, 2016, “Crouching Tiger: Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

Many people find it hard to believe that countries that engage in security competition also continue to trade with each other economically. But if you look at Europe before World War I— and, indeed, if you look at Europe before World War II, what you see is that there was a great deal of economic interdependence on the continent and with Britain before both world wars. So I believe that if China continues to grow economically, there will still be much economic intercourse between China and its neighbors and China and the United States. And I still think that you will have a lot of potential for trouble between these two countries. And don’t forget, even though you had all this economic intercourse between World War I and World War II, you still got World War I and you still got World War II. If you look at Europe before World War I, there were extremely high levels of economic interdependence between Germany and virtually all of its neighbors, certainly between Germany and Russia, Germany and France, and Germany and Britain, these were the main players. And despite this economic interdependence, these high levels of economic interdependence, you still got World War I.

### 1NC – TPP Economy Scenario

#### No UQ- China’s economy at all-time-low

Mark Magnier, May, 2016, “Chinese Indicators Lag Behind Expectations, Show Economy Struggles,” The Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-industrial-output-growth-moderates-in-april-1463205031> (accessed 5/14/16)

BEIJING—China’s industrial-production and investment data came in below expectations in April, despite Beijing’s aggressive easy-money policies in the first quarter, pointing to continued weakness in the world’s second-largest economy. Industrial output rose 6.0% year-over-year in April, compared with 6.8% growth in March, the National Bureau of Statistics said Saturday. This was below a median forecast of 6.6% growth by 15 economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal. Fixed-asset investment in urban areas grew by a weaker-than-expected 10.5% year-over-year in the January-to-April period, compared with an annual increase of 10.7% for the first three months of 2016. Retail sales—a traditional bright spot—grew by a less-than-expected 10.1% in April compared with a year earlier, slowing from March’s 10.5% year-over-year rise, the statistics bureau said. “We’re seeing that growth engines are losing momentum, and the growth outlook has turned soft as well,” said Commerzbank AG economist Zhou Hao. “It’s clear the government wants to manage down or re-anchor market expectation.”

#### And, no impact and other China trade agreements solve

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Department of Political Science Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University and Mary E. Lovely Department of Economics Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, November, 2015, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Perspectives from China (accessed 4/29/16)

Non-member countries are not affected at all by trade creation, at least not directly. However, as a non-member of the TPP-12, China may lose as a result of trade diversion. As Deardorff (2013) notes, “One does not need subtle theoretical analysis to realize that outside countries are harmed by an FTA, to the extent that the markets for their exports are reduced. This effect of an FTA is arguably more important than any loss to partner countries, since it is both inevitable and potentially large.” Petri, Plummer, and Zhai (2014) estimate welfare losses on the magnitude of US$34 billion by 2025 for China under TPP-12 alone. These losses are 10 large relative to the total gains to the members: an estimated 15% of total gains are offset by trade diversion costs estimated for China. Yet, these losses are small when viewed in the context of China’s economy: by 2025 they are only an estimated 0.2% of China’s baseline GDP of US$17.2 trillion.18 Petri, Plummer, and Zhai also estimate net losses for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. One explanation for the small size of potential losses to China of not joining the TPP initially is that it already has preferential agreements with some of the TPP-12 countries. China has FTAs with the AFTA (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Vietnam) countries as well as with Chile, New Zealand, and Peru. Nearly all exports and imports to those members are already subject to zero tariffs, so that no tariff-related trade diversion will occur.

#### And, chance of war from economic decline, best a recent data

Drezner 12,

Daniel W. Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### 2NC – Asia Econ: No Impact

#### Asia econ alarmism empirically denied

Zhang Jun, Professor of Economics and Director of the China Center for Economic Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, 12/26/14, “China’s Growth Secret,” [www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-economy-resilience-by-jun-zhang-2014-12](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-economy-resilience-by-jun-zhang-2014-12) (accessed 5/8/16)

Many people are profoundly pessimistic about the Chinese economy’s growth prospects, owing to the emergence of massive debt, excessive investment, overcapacity, and so-called “ghost cities” since the 2008 global financial crisis. But these problems are not new. They have, in various forms, affected China’s economy since 1978, and were evident in East Asia’s other high-performing economies – Taiwan, South Korea, and even Japan – during their periods of rapid growth.¶ Nonetheless, in the 35 years since Deng Xiaoping initiated his program of “reform and opening up,” China has recorded 9.7% average annual growth. And it took only 40 years for South Korea and Taiwan to complete their transitions from low- to high-income status.¶ How did these economies manage to grow so fast for so long and overcome the serious problems that they faced along the way? The answer is simple: resilience.¶ Economic development is a convoluted process, full of challenges and risks, successes and failures, external shocks and internal volatility. And adverse effects – such as a rising debt-to-GDP ratio and excess capacity – are inevitable.¶ If a country fails to respond adequately to new challenges as they arise, economic growth and development stall. Many countries in Latin America and South Asia, for example, have become mired in the so-called “middle-income trap,” because they failed to adjust their growth models in a timely manner.¶ East Asia’s economies, by contrast, consistently adjusted their growth strategies and engaged in continuous institutional reform. The aim was not to tackle the problems they faced directly, but to induce new, more efficient activities that would help to turn debt into assets and maximize use of the economy’s capacity.¶ In this sense, East Asia’s economies have embraced the process of “creative destruction” described by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, whereby the economic structure is continually revolutionized from within. Moreover, by implementing incremental reforms that facilitate – and even encourage – the replacement of old, inefficient sources of growth with new, more dynamic ones, they have expedited this process.¶ For example, China’s productivity-enhancing agricultural reforms in the 1980s were spurred partly by growth in the non-agricultural sector, a result of policies aimed at stimulating township and village enterprises. Similarly, in the 1990s, China addressed the buildup of bad debt and unfinished construction projects – the result of state-owned enterprises’ chronic loss-making and excessive property investment, respectively – by implementing institutional reforms that stimulated growth in more dynamic sectors, thereby offsetting the SOEs’ declining return on capital.¶ Resilience has thus characterized the interaction between the government and markets since the introduction of Deng’s reforms. Indeed, according to the late economist Gustav Ranis, the interactive dynamic of policy and market institutions was the key to the success of the East Asian economies. For example, fiscal decentralization in China, spurred by local institutions’ demands for increased autonomy, has helped to fuel regional competition and sustain an increasingly market-oriented economic environment.¶ This interactive dynamic is also reflected in the formation of industrial policies. In China, though clusters of vibrant smaller manufacturers are flourishing, policymakers have done relatively little to promote industrial development and upgrading. This leaves it up to market institutions to guide the process, ensuring that they play a key role in the expanding industrial sectors.

### 2NC – AT: Impact – Trade

#### Trade is irrelevant for war

Katherine Barbieri 13, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict?” Chapter 10 in Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research, google books (accessed 5/8/16)

How does interdependence affect war, the most intense form of conflict? Table 2 gives the empirical results. The rarity of wars makes any analysis of their causes quite difficult, for variations in interdependence will seldom result in the occurrence of war. As in the case of MIDs, the log-likelihood ratio tests for each model suggest that the inclusion of the various measures of interdependence and the control variables improves our understanding of the factors affecting the occurrence of war over that obtained from the null model. However, the individual interdependence variables, alone, are not statistically significant. This is not the case with contiguity and relative capabilities, which are both statistically significant. Again, we see that contiguous dyads are more conflict-prone and that dyads composed of states with unequal power are more pacific than those with highly equal power. Surprisingly, no evidence is provided to support the commonly held proposition that democratic states are less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states.¶ The evidence from the pre-WWII period provides support for those arguing that economic factors have little, if any, influence on affecting leaders’ decisions to engage in war, but many of the control variables are also statistically insignificant. These results should be interpreted with caution, since the sample does not contain a sufficient number wars to allow us to capture great variations across different types of relationships. Many observations of war are excluded from the sample by virtue of not having the corresponding explanatory measures. A variable would have to have an extremely strong influence on conflict—as does contiguity—to find significant results. ¶ 7. Conclusions This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of contiguity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in most instances trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; however, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war. The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade.

**Trade doesn’t solve war**

Benjamin Goldsmith, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, 2012, International Trade and the Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict: More to Fight About, or More Reasons Not to Fight?, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2074894> (accessed 5/8/16)

However, at the stage of conflict escalation, trade interdependence should not have much further role. Factors like interdependence, observable to each side prior to militarized conflict onset, will be discounted by both states after force is threatened, as they engage in crisis communication either leading to escalation to deadly violence, or not. Resolve to fight cannot be observed before force is threatened, but once a militarized crisis begins, each side will try to understand how resolved the other is, while portraying itself as very resolved (Fearon 1995). The level of dependence alone will not provide sufficient information to distinguish states which are genuinely highly resolved, as Georgia seemed to be in its territorial confrontation with Russia, from those which are not. If trade were to play a role in this second stage of the process, it would likely be based on tools which could provide additional ways to communicate resolve. Thus, because interdependence should already be factored into the strategic calculations at the onset stage, its effect on the likelihood of escalation will be minimal.

#### No impact to trade

Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, April, 2014, “Globalisation and war,” <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/> (accessed 5/8/16)

John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, their model failed to take three things into account. First, it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown (here and here) that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in East Asia impossible. ‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.

### 2NC – AT: Trade Diversion

#### No trade diversion- models prove

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Department of Political Science Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University and Mary E. Lovely Department of Economics Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, November, 2015, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Perspectives from China (accessed 4/29/16)

However, while some sectors have migrated away from China, a second look at Figure 2 suggests that this investment diversion cannot be large relative to the total inflow. First, the size of foreign investment flows into China dwarfs flows into any middle or low-income country in the TPP-12. Secondly, the size of these alternative economies is small relative to the size of potentially deflected investment flows. As shown earlier in Table 1, only Mexico has a gross domestic product that exceeded US$1 trillion in 2012, in comparison to FDI inflows to China in the same year of almost US$ 300 billion. Moreover, Mexico is an unlikely alternative for production that will receive further processing in East Asia since it is not within the region. Finally, Mexico’s manufacturing wages exceed those of China.

#### No solvency- trade diversion doesn’t affect China

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Department of Political Science Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University and Mary E. Lovely Department of Economics Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, November, 2015, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Perspectives from China (accessed 4/29/16)

For each of the arguments outlined above, we concede that while extant claims are compelling, they are far from convincing. In particular, we argue that China’s trade losses from not joining are predictable and negligible while its short-term opportunity costs and political liabilities are indeterminate and potentially quite large. With respect to diplomacy, we concede that China’s failure to join the TPP may undermine China’s reputation as a free-marketer, but we also point out that China’s has alternative avenues through which to define its position on free market politics. Finally, while we agree that joining the TPP would serve as a powerful weapon in the current administration’s economic reform efforts, we cannot ignore the valuable patronage and policy space the administration would forfeit should it forgo a piecemeal approach to reform and adopt the TPP’s blanket provisions on trade and investment. While we arrive at an unambiguous conclusion - China will not join the TPP - we should also point out that, from our perspective, this is not a big deal. China is so deeply embedded in the global supply chain, including most of the TPP partners, that it will be indirectly included in the TPP whether or not it is a formal member. As Ikenberry (2014) points out, “The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted.” In the case of the TPP, even though China is not party to the institutions, it is moving along a similar path as it tries to market its own parallel agreements. This does not mean that the TPP partners are better off without having China as a member. They are not. However, losses from trade creation and trade 32 diversion are unlikely to last for long, since China is actively pursuing alternative arrangements with virtually all the TPP member states.

#### Plan doesn’t change Chinese laws

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, 2015, “The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: The TPP is Not the Answer,” <http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/156731/3897641/TPPChinaReport.pdf> (accessed 4/25/16)

The TPP will allow China to reap benefits without even joining. Its rules of origin, lack of rules on currency manipulation and benefits that would apply to Chinese companies operating in any of the TPP countries mean that China has very little incentive to change the mercantilist model that has been undercutting U.S. manufacturers and displacing millions of U.S. jobs for more than a decade. For example, if Chinese intermediate parts are exported to Malaysia for final assembly and export to the United States, those parts can be made far out of compliance with any TPP standards but still receive TPP benefits. China is already deeply integrated into trade and supply chains with all TPP countries—far more deeply than the United States is in many cases. A number of forces are responsible for drawing China closer together with other Pacific economies, including geography and several hundred billion dollars in Chinese foreign investment and development funding. It is difficult to believe that these deep relationships will be undone simply through the conclusion of the TPP, particularly given its porous rules. There is no reason to believe that drawing the Pacific Rim countries away from China is a realistic goal, so long as China continues to offer mutually beneficial trade, investment and supply chain opportunities to those countries. It seems reckless to ask Congress to enter into a deal that has a high probability of undermining U.S. wages, jobs and labor rights—as previous trade agreements have done—especially given that the deal has no real chance of diminishing China’s existing economic influence.

## AT: Solvency (Generic)

### 1NC – AT: TPP Solvency

#### China says no- can’t meet the TPP agreed-upon standards

Gordon G. Chang, October, 2015, “TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-control-pacific-trade-14021> (accessed 5/3/16)

The truth is that China’s leaders know their country has to remain outside the TPP because they cannot sign onto the “high standards” that are incorporated into the structure of the pact. Even if China could somehow meet labor, food safety and environmental rules, it would have to adhere to restrictions on the business activities of state enterprises, which would mean a fundamental change in the Chinese economic model and permit wider internet access, which would strike at the heart of the Communist Party’s quasi-monopoly on information. Furthermore, China would have to further open its services sector. At the moment, Beijing cannot even agree to allow investment in a few protected areas, which has stalled agreement on the long-awaited Bilateral Investment Treaty with the U.S.

#### Takes years for successful implementation- China IP and environmental laws

Nikhil Sonnad and Josh Horwitz, October, 2015, “What China will have to do to join the Trans-Pacific trade club,” Quartz, <http://qz.com/517905/what-china-will-have-to-do-to-join-the-trans-pacific-trade-club/> (accessed 4/27/16)

Even so, no amount of negotiation will bring the TPP’s IP rules to a standard low enough to include China, where piracy is widespread, enforcement is reluctant, and even the state itself is widely believed to play a role in hacking foreign firms. “The crucial issue with China in IP is that the laws may be on paper but not implemented properly in practice,” according to June Park, a fellow at the National University of Singapore, writing in the online journal Asan Forum. “If China intends to join TPP, it will take years for implementation if the current levels of IP protection in China are applied,” she notes. Get serious about the environment Environmental protection is another core part of the TPP. A leak of the draft environment chapter from 2013 highlights the importance of curbing climate change by reducing carbon emissions. It also has several sections devoted to wildlife conservation. China’s leaders have acknowledged pollution reduction as a high priority, both domestically and internationally. It recently pledged to the UN it would cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 60% per unit of GDP by 2020. But it’s not clear if China has the might to win the war on pollution on its own shores, let alone commit to goals and standards set by outsiders. Despite pollution levels falling by an estimated 11% last year, China’s environmental ministry reported that 66 of China’s 74 major cities still fall below the acceptable national standards for air quality. China has also struggled to prove its commitment to conservation. The TPP singles out overfishing as a key area for focus. While conclusive data remains unavailable, research suggests that China is responsible for much of the overfishing in Asia and Africa. As it prepared for an IPO, one fishery even wrote in its prospectus that didn’t fear international restrictions on overfishing because it knew the Chinese government wouldn’t enforce them.

### 2NC – AT: TPP Solvency

#### Inviting China worse for relations and ensures TPP never gets ratified

Sarah Cleeland Knight is an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service, January, 2015, “Keep China out of the TPP party (for now),” Points of Order, <https://pointsoforder.org/2015/01/14/keep-china-out-of-the-tpp-party-for-now/> (accessed 5/7/16)

But from a political perspective, there are at least three good reasons why China shouldn’t be a part of the TPP, at least not yet. The first and most obvious reason for excluding China is balance-of-power politics. The United States is wary of China’s remarkable geopolitical and economic rise and crafting a trade agreement with some of China’s neighbors – including Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore – achieves two goals: 1) it deepens US alliances in the region, alliances that may come in handy in possible, future disagreements with China; and 2) it fosters economic growth among those countries, which, if made stronger, could better balance China’s regional hegemony. The second, less discussed, reason for not inviting China to the TPP is domestic politics. Congress, which will have to pass TPP, has become less enamored with free trade agreements since NAFTA. It has thus far refused to grant President Obama Trade Promotion Authority, which means that both houses of Congress will edit the TPP agreement line by line. U.S. officials will then have to turn around and make sure those changes are acceptable to its TPP partners. The political climate on the Hill is more positive with pro-trade Republicans now in control of the Senate, but Obama’s chief trade negotiator, Michael Froman, is still struggling to convince skeptical lawmakers that TPP is a good deal for the United States. If China were part of the deal, Froman’s job would be that much harder, as anti-China sentiment runs even higher than anti-trade sentiment in Congress. The final reason not to include China in the TPP, and one that has gone largely unmentioned, is that the United States may be able to extract more concessions from China if it is a late entrant. One only has to look at Russia’s Herculean effort to join the World Trade Organization, which finally succeed in 2012, to understand that it is in large countries’ interest to get into trade agreements on the ground floor. Otherwise, extant members can press latecomers for concessions that original members haven’t had to make. The United States and other TPP members would undoubtedly push China hard on issues such as currency manipulation before letting it join the club.

### 2NC – AT: TPP Solvency

#### TPP not effective- no meaningful improvements in standards

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, 2015, “The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: The TPP is Not the Answer,” <http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/156731/3897641/TPPChinaReport.pdf> (accessed 4/25/16)

But from what is publicly known about the TPP, it includes neither meaningful language addressing currency manipulation nor language addressing the level of carbon emissions in member countries. Nor is there reason to believe its labor rights provisions will be a meaningful improvement upon the Bush-era agreements (Colombia, Peru, Korea and Panama).8 While the Bushera agreements made a step forward on enforceability, they did nothing to ensure actual enforcement. The labor framework of prior trade agreements has been ineffective at dealing with labor rights violations in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras and Colombia, even in the context of a U.S. administration committed to labor rights enforcement. The November 2014 GAO report “Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor Commitments, but More Monitoring and Enforcement Are Needed”9 made clear that even the lauded “May 10” language has proved insufficient to ensure effective monitoring and enforcement. Certainly, this problem, left unaddressed in the TPP, will only be compounded by a future administration hostile to labor rights. What the TPP does appear to include, according to press accounts and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) statements, is investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This mechanism undermines the rule of law by granting foreign investors unique abilities to challenge efforts by TPP member governments to protect the public interest. Foreign investors, who are not party to the agreement and take no responsibilities under it, can access private arbitration tribunals directly, without first seeking the approval or consent of their own governments. The grounds the TPP gives foreign investors to challenge government measures at the federal, state and local levels go far beyond actual expropriations or discriminatory measures. Even when measures apply equally to domestic and foreign companies, they can be challenged as violations of broad and ill-defined rights, such as the right to “fair and equitable treatment,” a standard that does not exist under U.S. law.10 Even the libertarian Cato Institute has judged that “investment agreements [that include ISDS] go beyond non-discrimination in ways that no one seems to be able to define clearly, opening up the floodgates for litigation as creative lawyers look for new ways to characterize government actions as inconsistent with international law.”11 By contrast, for example, all provisions for the enforcement of labor rights require action by member governments; neither workers nor unions can enforce the labor rights provisions on their own. The TPP’s ISDS provisions too easily can be used by multinational firms to challenge efforts by TPP member countries, and perhaps eventually by the Chinese government, to develop modern regulatory states in areas such as financial, environmental, public health and labor regulations. ISDS is a provision that tilts the playing field away from workers and consumers and toward business. If applied to China, it could undermine the central U.S. policy goal of encouraging rising incomes and consumption in China.

# Neg U.S. China Counterterrorism Coop

### Topicality: Counterterrorism is Not Diplomatic Engagement

#### Counterterrorism cooperation is not diplomatic engagement—at best engagement is only one subset of counterterrorism

Tina S. Kaidanow, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2015

"Expanding Counterterrorism Partnerships: U.S. Efforts to Tackle the Evolving Terrorist Threat," United States Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/236305.htm (accessed 4/23/2016)

Effective partnering means identifying those actors overseas – some governmental, some non-governmental, and some multilateral – that can make a difference in this decisive battle against the most salient terrorist threats confronting the U.S. and U.S. interests. Partners come with a variety of capabilities and varying amounts of political will, so cultivating them often is not just a matter of diplomatic engagement – which the State Department in particular has the lead role in pursuing – but working with them to develop the technical and practical skills needed to combat violent extremism within their borders and beyond.

### Russian Relations Disadvantage

#### Uniqueness: China and Russia growing closer due to enmity with U.S., but haven’t yet economically integrated

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015

"Will China and Russia Form an Alliance Against the United States," Defense and Security Studies Series, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120393/1/828390282.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

The current close relationship between China and Russia is rooted in the common security threat from the United States in particular and the West in general. Although China and Russia are strengthening their comprehensive strategic partnership with gas and oil deals, arms transfer, military cooperation and mutual international support, economic cooperation between the two countries will face more challenges.

#### China and Russia stepping up anti-terrorism cooperation now

Frances Martel, staffwriter for Breitbart.org, December 1, 2015

"China Vows 'Enhanced Cooperation' with Russia against Terrorism," Breitbart.org, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/12/01/china-vows-enhanced-cooperation-with-russia-against-terrorism/ (accessed 4/23/2016)

Chinese President Xi Jinping announced Monday his nation would work to take on a broader role in the international war against terrorism, promising Russian President Vladimir Putin China would be at his disposal to aid in anti-terror efforts.

#### Negative pressure on China pushes it to integrate with Russia

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015

"Will China and Russia Form an Alliance Against the United States," Defense and Security Studies Series, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120393/1/828390282.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

The future Chinese-Russian relations depend largely on what the United States does. If the United States continuously pushes Russia through NATO and China through its “rebalancing” in the Asia Pacific, it will certainly drive Russia and China closer. The deepening economic and security cooperation between the two nations will not only beef up their military capabilities, but will also create a military platform for alliance formation. In the new geopolitical game the United States, as the still-standing hegemon in the unipolar world, holds the first-move advantage to determine how the game will be played out. If the United States tries to take down both Russia and China simultaneously in the game, it will fall into a self-fulfilling prophecy: successful soft balancing by the Sino-Russian partnership will accelerate US decline rather than conserve US hegemony.

### Russian Relations Disadvantage

#### Bad relations with U.S. encourages transition to full Sino-Russian partnership

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015

"Will China and Russia Form an Alliance Against the United States," Defense and Security Studies Series, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120393/1/828390282.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

When the two countries face a common threat perception, it is more likely that they will establish a “security partnership” so that they can conduct security-related cooperation. The 1996 “strategic partnership” illustrates the logic of this threat-based partnership. When the two countries shared a convergent view on economic interests, they were more likely to establish an “economic partnership” focusing on economic cooperation. The bilateral relations between China and Russia after the 9/11 attacks represent this type of partnership, following on from the loss of convergence of common threat perceptions regarding the United States. Finally, when the two countries held convergent views on both external threats and economic interests, a “full partnership” was more likely, with strengthening cooperation in both security and economic arenas. Sino-Russian relations after the mid-2010s support the logic of this “full partnership”, because both countries have concomitantly faced mounting pressure and threat from NATO, led by the United States.

#### Strong Sino-Russian ties are key to regional and global peace

Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow and resident Russia expert at the American Foreign Policy Council, March 30, 2016

"New Momentum in the Russia-China Partnership," Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 13 Issue 62, "http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=45252&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=ef075e3c928559b196033c610d9f4944#.Vx77CvkrLIU (accessed 4/25/2016)

Notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping recently urged both governments to strengthen communication and coordination in international security and on regional issues (presumably Korea, Southeast Asia, Japan, the Middle East and Ukraine) to achieve political solutions. He also reiterated that bilateral Sino-Russian cooperation plays a key role in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and in the world more generally (China Daily, Xinhua, March 26).

### Human Rights Disadvantage

#### China uses terror threat to excuse its anti-encryption and other repressive measures

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

China has used its assertion that IS and Al-Qaeda are linked to a rising number of violent incidents in China to justify the adoption in December 2015 of controversial counter-terrorism legislation. It requires technology firms to help decrypt information and allows the military to venture overseas on counterterror operations.188 The legislation, said Mei Jianming, director of the Counter-terrorism Research Center at the People's Public Security University of China, “took the growing influence of Islamic State into consideration after it planned to recruit Muslims from all ethnic groups in China, posing new challenges for the country.”189 “We are very worried about this. We are worried that young Chinese will go through Turkey to Syria and then come back to China,” Pan Guang said.

#### China will use concerns about antiterrorism to justify violent repression of Uighurs

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010

"U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report RL33001, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Xinjiang has a history of unrest dating back before September 2001, particularly since the unrest in 1990. The PRC charges Uighurs (or Uyghurs) with violent crimes and “terrorism,” but Uighurs say they have suffered executions, torture, detentions, harassment, religious persecution, and racial profiling. Human rights and Uighur groups have warned that, after the 9/11 attacks, the PRC shifted to use the international counterterrorism campaign to justify the PRC’s long-term cultural, religious, and political repression of Uighurs both in and outside of the PRC.

#### Chinese treatment of Uighars violates non-refoulement and the Convention Against Torture

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010

"U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report RL33001, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Critics say China compelled extraditions of Uighurs for execution and other punishment from countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Nepal, and Pakistan, raising questions about violations of the international legal principle of non-refoulement and the U.N. Convention Against Torture. On December 19, 2009, Cambodia joined this list when it returned 20 Uighurs who fled Xinjiang after the unrest in July 2009. The State Department, up to even the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, opposed Cambodia’s return of these “asylum seekers” and urged China to ensure transparency, due process, and proper treatment for them. On April 1, 2010, the State Department announced that on March 19, the United States told Cambodia of a suspension in the shipment of 200 trucks and trailers that were to be provided as Excess Defense Articles. On January 18, 2010, Burma reportedly deported 17 Uighurs and 1 Han to the PRC.

### Human Rights Disadvantage

#### China uses “terrorist” label to oppress Tibetans and Uighurs

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

China‘s policies for domestic security and counterterrorism reflect a critical security interest in maintaining control over the ethnic minority groups in its western steppes. The PRC has tended to selectively label incidents of violence involving Tibetans and Uighurs as ‘terrorism’, but not similar attacks committed by Hans. In March 2008, the PRC called the Tibetan Youth Congress “terrorist” after a riot and crackdown in Lhasa. And in July 2009, the Chinese government claimed that the ethnic clashes in Xingjian were orchestrated from abroad and were therefore terrorist attacks on China.

#### Collapse of human rights norms causes global WMD conflict

William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, 2004

"Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation," Penn Law Legal Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1960&context=faculty\_scholarship (accessed 4/25/2016)

Evidence from the post-Cold War period indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

### Inherency Answers

#### U.S. and China have cooperated on terrorism since 2001

Matthew P. Sprenger, Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army National Guard, March 2013

"The Energy Puzzle Between the United States and China," Strategy Research Project, Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA589488 (accessed 4/22/2016)

Since September 11, 2001 the U.S. and China “Have effectively collaborated to solve or manage regional and global threats and challenges.” Their collaboration has included such efforts as counter-terrorism measures, nuclear proliferation efforts again North Korea and pandemic issues such as SARS in 2003 and later the avian flu.

#### U.S. and China cooperating on nuclear terrorism now

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 25, 2013

"U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress," Congression Research Service h Service 7-5700, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Downloads/ADA585310.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

Involving potential cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and counterterrorism, the Departments of Energy and Defense agreed to establish a Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in China during the visit of PRC leader Hu Jintao in January 2011. The PRC agency in implementing the agreement is the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA).

### Solvency Answers

#### China will be a bad partner on terror: It conflates terrorism with political activity, and protects actual terrorists through its Security Council powers

Andrew Small, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 24, 2015

"Is China a Credible Partner In Fighting Terror?" Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-paris-us/ (accessed 4/23/2016)

There clearly are reasons to doubt China’s credibility as a partner in fighting terror. Its unwillingness to draw clear lines between the terrorist, the political activist, and the aggrieved citizen makes certain forms of cooperation — such as detailed intelligence sharing — very problematic. Beijing’s repressive behavior in Xinjiang actively is worsening the conditions in which terrorist threats are liable to grow. And Beijing is willing to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to extend protection to members of specific terrorist organizations — such as Lashkar-e-Taiba — when it has political reasons to do so.

#### No solvency—U.S. skepticism can’t be overcome by cooperation, and this will undermine effective partnership—and will spillover to climate change and other disputes

Eric Hundman, doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Chicago, November 24, 2015

"Is China a Credible Partner In Fighting Terror?" Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-paris-us/ (accessed 4/23/2016)

The question of whether China can be a credible partner for the United States is critical — China’s credibility not only will impact the effectiveness of any efforts to cooperate with the United States on terrorism, it also will affect cooperation in other areas where the two share interests, such as climate change, territorial disputes, and trade. However, China’s credibility is not just about China’s actions — it also rests on U.S. perceptions of those actions. In the case of fighting terror, these perceptions hinge on the degrees to which (1) the two countries agree on the nature of terrorism and (2) the United States trusts that China’s ultimate intentions are benign. Given increasing concerns about China’s rise, prospects that the United States will view China as a credible partner in fighting terror appear dim.

#### China won’t cooperate—belligerence on Syria proves

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Cooperation has so far been complicated by major policy differences symbolised by the frequent blocking of resolutions regarding Syria by China and Russia that have largely rendered the United Nations Security Council impotent. Like Russia, China’s approach to the resolutions was rooted in a sense that the United States had abused a 2011 UN Security Council resolution authorising humanitarian intervention in Libya to pursue the toppling of Qaddafi.

### Solvency Answers

#### No solvency: U.S. and China will disagree on what terrorism is

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

A growing rift has developed between China and the US over what constitutes terrorist behavior. What China labels “counterterrorism”, the US increasingly considers human rights abuses. Differing security priorities and the inherently ambiguous nature of terrorism complicate cooperation.

#### No solvency: Too much rivalry over Southeast Asia, China won’t cooperate on antiterrorism there

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor at East-West Center, March 2006

"Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, http://apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

At some level, China and the USA are competing for influence in Southeast Asia. China has consciously and assiduously worked to convince the sub-region that the PRC poses no “threat” either strategically or economically. Beijing welcomes opportunities to juxtapose itself favorably against the United States before a Southeast Asian audience. Beijing’s New Security Concept, for example, formally promulgated at a 1997 ASEAN meeting, calls for replacing the “Cold War mentality” (including U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region) with a new international order based on cooperative security, multilateral dialogue, and peaceful resolution of international disputes (Taiwan, as an “internal Chinese matter,” does not count here). Many countries in the sub-region are uncomfortable with the idea of U.S. forces attacking suspected terrorist bases in their neighborhoods and are unwilling to offer their territory as staging areas for American troops. Beijing would be unlikely to join or even endorse a U.S.-sponsored anti-terrorist activity or operation in the sub-region that large numbers of Southeast Asians viewed as heavy-handed, both because China perceives the threat as less compelling and because the Chinese would see another opportunity to score public relations points against the Americans.

### Solvency Answers

#### China is indifferent to counterterrorism in Southeast Asia

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor at East-West Center, March 2006

"Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, http://apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

Beijing is not likely to take a leading role in either promoting or opposing counter-terrorism activities in Southeast Asia, but will rather fall in line with the prevailing sentiment in the subregion. Washington should not count on China to help pressure Southeast Asian countries to take measures that are advocated by the USA but are domestically unpopular. It has been difficult for China to oppose the presence of U.S. forces in Central Asia without appearing unsupportive of the WOT. In the case of Southeast Asia, however, China can maintain a low profile while relying on other countries to insist on limits to American involvement.

#### Southeast Asia is key to Sino-U.S. rivalry and China’s rising hegemony

Hung Ming-Te, doctoral candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics (GIOIP), National Chung Hsing University, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu, doctoral student at GIOIP, 2011

"Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since 9/11," Political Perspectives volume 5 (3), http://china.praguesummerschools.org/files/china/2china2012.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia may be a precursor to more serious challenges against US interests in Asia. By insisting that Washington limits its activities in the South China Sea, it seems that Beijing intends to consolidate its influence in the region. If China can successfully keep the US from increasing its presence in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s balancing strategy might be disrupted and Beijing could attain a position of hegemony. With ASEAN as the center of regional integration, under China’s leadership, East Asia may become a regional bloc with the US role greatly diminished. How the United States’ more proactive approach to improving relations with Southeast Asia will affect the structure of East Asian politics is unclear. As long as China continues to expand in power and the US continues to invest efforts in response to China’s rise, Southeast Asia will be the critical region where Sino-US competition will unfold.

#### China behaves carelessly—will be drawn into Middle East and North African conflicts, and is careless with its military bases

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

The tilt highlights the inevitability of China being drawn into the myriad of Middle Eastern and North African conflicts and rivalries. Besides, China is positioning itself for far closer security and military cooperation with regional forces on the basis of its recent anti-terrorism law that allows the Chinese military to stage overseas counter-terrorism operations provided it has the agreement from the relevant country. This is also true for China’s abandonment of its rejection of foreign military bases with the establishment of a naval and logistics facility in Djibouti.

### Conditioning Counterplan Solvency

#### U.S. should condition cooperation on China’s information sharing, rewriting its counterterrorism law, and allowing free media access to its operations. Dialogue prior to these gestures is counterproductive

Sophie Richardson, China Director of Human Rights Watch, August 6, 2015

"China-U.S. Dialogue: Counterterrorism or Counterproductive?" Human Rights Watch Dispatches, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/dispatches-china-us-dialogue-counterterrorism-or-counter-productive (accessed 4/23/2016)

But there seems to be little reason for the US to proceed until China takes some meaningful steps, including providing information about prosecutions, radically rewriting the draft counterterrorism law, ensuring terrorism suspects have lawyers of their own choosing, allowing free media access to regions where “terrorist” attacks have taken place, and ceasing its hunt for refugees. Holding formal dialogues while Chinese counterterrorism laws and practices are heading in the wrong direction is simply counter-productive.

#### Conditional engagement changes regime behavior and works especially well with authoritarian regimes

Richard N. Haas, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Summer 2000

"Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies," Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf (accessed 4/25/2016)

The best potential candidates for conditional engagement are often those countries where decision making is the most concentrated. Promising partners in engagement must not only be willing to commit their governments to undertake a contractual relationship, but must be to do so as well. This distinction, while having little relevance for relations with US allies whose populations expect and generally support cooperation with the United States, is an important one when addressing engagement with ‘rogues’ or other problem regimes. The fact that some regimes may be willing, but not able, to cooperate with the West implies that certain types of regimes do make better candidates for engagement than others.

### Answers to Terrorism Scenario

#### Threat of terrorism exaggerated

Dick Meyer, Scripps Washington Bureau reporter, September 11, 2015

"Is the Terrorism Threat Exaggerated?" Newsday, http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/is-the-terrorism-threat-exaggerated-1.10832611 (accessed 4/25/2016)Just ask John Mueller. A political scientist at Ohio State University and a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute in Washington, Mueller is the opposite of Chicken Little in the counterterrorism world; he is the guy who year after year points out that the sky is not falling. The threat of terror, he told me, "is massively exaggerated in both the public and official mind." The facts are indisputable. The risk of death by terrorist act is infinitesimal.

#### Risk and maginitude of terror attack is infitesimally low

Jonathan Kay, Editor-in-Chief of the Walrus, April 15, 2016

"The Terrorist Threat Has Been Exaggerated," MacDonald-Laurier Institute, http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/the-terrorist-threat-has-been-exaggerated-jon-kay-on-the-great-canadian-debates-in-toronto/ (accessed 4/25/2016)

Yes, the terrorists succeeded in Paris and Brussels. But the prediction that mass Islamist slaughter would become a daily occurrence within Western nations—which was in wide circulation in those fearful days after 9/11—never came to pass. Here in Canada, the death toll from Islamist terrorism since 9/11 has been precisely three. Single traffic accidents sometimes claim more lives than that.

### Answers to Terrorism Scenario

#### Terror hawks ignore the evidence

Dick Meyer, Scripps Washington Bureau reporter, September 11, 2015

"Is the Terrorism Threat Exaggerated?" Newsday, http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/is-the-terrorism-threat-exaggerated-1.10832611 (accessed 4/25/2016)But the Terror Hawks hype ever-new existential threats: The Islamic State is an imminent threat to the homeland, Iran is teetering on nuking the non-Muslim planet, and wily hackers can paralyze America with a few strokes. And we can't even tell you about the disasters we secretly thwarted. Proof and perspective are scarce. Collective phobia is immune to evidence.

#### Paris attacks prove terrorists won't get weapons of mass destruction

Timothy Lynch, associate professor of foreign policy at University of Melbourne, November 16, 2015

"Paris attacks are tragic, but global war on terror is working," The Age, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/paris-attacks-why-massacres-show-the-global-war-on-terror-is-working-20151115-gkzlm6.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

Appalling though the co-ordinated Paris massacres were, they demonstrate the underlying success of counter-terrorism since September 11, 2001. Blaming Western foreign policy or French secularism for the actions of the killers is to misunderstand what the global war on terror has thus far largely succeeded in doing: keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.

### Answers to Relations Advantage

#### Cooperation on terrorism doesn’t solve relations

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010

"U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report RL33001, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

In the long term, counterterrorism was initially thought by some to hold strategic implications for the U.S.-PRC relationship. However, it has remained debatable as to whether such cooperation has fundamentally transformed the relationship, while critics have been concerned about compromises to other U.S. interests. Policymakers watched to see whether Beijing’s leaders used the opportunity to improve bilateral ties, especially on weapons nonproliferation problems. In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush expressed his expectation that “in this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity.” Nonetheless, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified to Congress in February 2002, that the 9/11 attacks did not change “the fundamentals” of China’s approach to us.

#### Chinese concerns about U.S. encirclement cancel out increased relations

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010

"U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report RL33001, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

The PRC’s concerns about domestic attacks and any links to foreign terrorist groups, U.S.-PRC relations, China’s international standing in a world dominated by U.S. power (particularly after the terrorist attacks), and its image as a responsible world power helped explain China’s supportive stance. However, Beijing also worried about U.S. military action near China, U.S.-led alliances, Japan’s active role in the war on terrorism, greater U.S. influence in Central and South Asia, and U.S. support for Taiwan—all exacerbating long-standing fears of “encirclement.”

### Answers to Relations: No Armed Conflict Over Energy Resources

Matthew P. Sprenger, Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army National Guard, March 2013

"The Energy Puzzle Between the United States and China," Strategy Research Project, Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA589488 (accessed 4/22/2016)

The answers to the question posed above could be that; China will acquire/find its energy needs through agreements with Russia (pipelines); Africa, (natural gas development); Iran, (oil imports); China’s own natural gas development on the mainland and in the shallow waters in the South China Sea. An armed conflict could occur amongst the littoral states regarding natural gas exploration and claims. However, there are too many hindrances to China prosecuting a full out conflict with these states.

#### China won’t go to war over oil

Matthew P. Sprenger, Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army National Guard, March 2013

"The Energy Puzzle Between the United States and China," Strategy Research Project, Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA589488 (accessed 4/22/2016)

With China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil, and its contentious environment, the question remains, what action would China take to defend its interests and its alliances with Iran? In the event of a U.S./Iranian conflict, would China intervene and establish a military alliance with Iran? Most likely, this scenario would not evolve into an armed conflict between the three nations.

#### China won’t initiate armed conflict over natural resources

Matthew P. Sprenger, Lieutenant Colonel in United States Army National Guard, March 2013

"The Energy Puzzle Between the United States and China," Strategy Research Project, Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA589488 (accessed 4/22/2016)

The energy puzzle between the U.S. and China is shaping up to be a slowly building relationship on trust, mutual understanding, open communication and healthy competitiveness. However, “there is a desperate need for a confidence building process.” Based on China’s strategic/military doctrine, it does not appear that they are poised or have a desire for an armed conflict with the U.S. over rights to natural resources.

### Answers to Relations Advantage

#### No impact: China won’t backlash—they prefer the U.S. to be hostile

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

Yet Chinese policymakers are more impressed by policies and behaviors that they perceive as less benevolent. The American military is deployed all around China's periphery, and the United States maintains a wide network of defense relationships with China's neighbors. Washington continues to frustrate Beijing's eaorts to gain control over Taiwan. The United States constantly pressures China over its economic policies and maintains a host of government and private programs that seek to influence Chinese civil society and politics.

#### China will reassert its imperial ambitions

Melanie Hart, Director of China Policy at Center for American Progress, September 29, 2015

"Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China," Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China Relations, AmericanProgress.org, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Chinese leaders are also demonstrating a new assertiveness on foreign policy issues. That is partly because they recognize that their upper-middle-income status and overall economic strength bring new capabilities; it is also because Beijing wants to use foreign policy to shore up political support at home and support the nation’s economic transition. For example, Beijing’s new Belt and Road initiative is primarily an economic growth strategy. Chinese leaders hope to improve regional economic integration and create new markets for Chinese products, thus giving the Chinese economy new legs to stand on as it move through the transition phase. On regional maritime issues, many Chinese scholars argue that their nation has too long bided its time and watched other nations make territorial gains at China’s expense. They believe that since China now has the capabilities to push back and assert its territorial claims, Beijing has a responsibility to do so.

#### U.S. policymakers solve for dips in relations from behind the scenes

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

Of course, there are also those in Congress, think tanks, the media, and academia who support positions favorable to China, on the basis that cooperation is important for American farmers, exporters, and banks, and for Wall Street, or that issues such as North Korea and climate change are more important than disputes over rights or religion. Those advocates may be more powerful in the long run than those critical of China, but they tend to work behind the scenes.

### Answers to Relations Advantage

#### Cooperation on terrorism doesn’t strengthen relations—Taiwan and other issues overwhelm solvency

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015

"Will China and Russia Form an Alliance Against the United States," Defense and Security Studies Series, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120393/1/828390282.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

Nevertheless, China’s support for the US War on Terror did not change Chinese leaders’ threat perception of the United States, especially on the Taiwan issue. Unlike Chechnya and the related terrorist activities for Russia, the Taiwan issue is in a different category than global terrorism. While Putin might share a similar feeling against terrorism with the United States, Chinese leaders were more concerned over what the United States would do after its victory over terrorism. The superior US military capabilities shown in both the Kosovo War and the anti-terrorism campaign deepened Chinese leaders’ threat perceptions regarding the United States; therefore, China started to increase its defence budget after the Taiwan crisis and continued to do so into the 2000s to modernise its military capabilities (He, 2009)

#### Chinese hardliners outnumber proponents of good relations—they’ll encourage leadership to behave belligerently

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

A small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts who have closely studied the United States argues that Chinese and American interests are not totally at odds. In their view, the two countries are sufficiently remote from each other that their core security interests need not clash. They can gain mutual benefit from trade and other common interests. But those holding such views are outnumbered by strategists on the other side of the spectrum, mostly personnel from the military and security agencies, who take a dim view of U.S. policy and have more confrontational ideas about how China should respond to it. They believe that China must stand up to the United States militarily and that it can win a conflict, should one occur, by outpacing U.S. military technology and taking advantage of what they believe to be superior morale within China's armed forces. Their views are usually kept out of sight to avoid frightening both China's rivals and its friends.

#### Chinese analysts perpetuate an “us versus them” mentality of the U.S. among Chinese leaders

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

Beijing views this seemingly contradictory set of American actions through three reinforcing perspectives. First, Chinese analysts see their country as heir to an agrarian, eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defense-minded, nonexpansionist, and ethical. In contrast, they see Western strategic culture-especially that of the United States-as militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish.

### Answers to Science and Technology Scenario

#### Sino-U.S. tech cooperation already outpaces the rest of the globe

Richard P. Suttmeier, professor of political science at the University of Oregon, September 11, 2014

"Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First Century?" U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

Measured by co-authored scientific research papers, U.S. collaboration with China now exceeds collaboration with traditional partners such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. China and the United States have become each other’s main partner in scientific collaboration.

#### Alternate cause: export and trade differences block tech cooperation

Lan Xue, Professor and Dean of School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, and Denis Simon, Vice Provost, International Strategic Initiatives and Foundation Professor of Contemporary Chinese Affairs at Arizona State University, 2013

"U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation," ChinaUSFocus.com, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part-02-Chapter-122.pdf

Current differences in understanding and perspective regarding trade protection and export restrictions, in particular, are specific barriers between the two countries that could become a more serious bottleneck to meaningful, sustained cooperation.

#### Economic growth is unsustainable and leads to resource collapse

Paul Gilding, author of "The Great Disruption" and former CEO of Greenpeace International, Ecos Corporation and Easy Being Green, June 22, 2011

"Save the global economy, save the planet," CNN http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/21/gilding.environment.economy/ (accessed 4/25/2016)

If serious growth returns, the resulting resource price surge, particularly oil, will soon kill it again. As a result, what we are facing is not a few bad years of slow growth, but a fundamental shift -- the end of cheap resources and an environment in a state of collapse. Even the normally cautious International Energy Agency is sounding the alarm, with talk of impact in a few years.

# CP Pressure CPs

### Strategy Sheet

#### Pressure counterplan(s) are a strong tool in the negative arsenal on the China topic. Rather than passing a plan that offers China positive diplomatic or economic incentives to change its behavior, the negative can argue that China is less likely to respond to positive incentives and that adopting a pressure-based strategy would be a better method for resolving issues in the US-China relationship. The CPs in this file are primarily built around two core topic advantage areas – (1) Chinese military adventurism and expansion, (2) cyber-hacking crimes relating to intellectual property, and (3) North Korea. The Sanctions CP applies to all three of these areas and could be expanded to apply more generically to other topical issues, as well; the Export Controls CP is built to solve advantages relating to the Chinese military and the Tariffs CP is meant to address cyber/IP advantages. All three strategies are similar insofar as they are meant to inflict political and economic costs to force China to restrain its behavior, rather than offering a positive incentive to do so.

#### There are multiple benefits to this type of CP. First, the negative can make arguments about US hegemony and the harm that engagement could do to American leadership and credibility. Second, the negative can make a more specific argument about the signal that engagement might send to one of our American allies in the region and why pressure might reassure that ally. Third, the negative can argue that the CP is better than the aff because a softer stance on China would be politically unpopular, potentially affecting the passage of other pieces of legislation or providing a swing issue in the upcoming presidential election. Finally, the negative can read evidence alongside this strategy that can be used to take out affirmative solvency, even if the CP does not get extended in later speeches.

### 1NC Export Controls CP

#### Sample text: The United States federal government should create a system of export controls blocking Chinese imports of arms and dual-use goods capable of inflicting high-leverage strategic harm and institute diplomatic negotiations with the European Union and Japan with the goal of expanding these export controls into a multilateral export regime.

#### The CP solves – it limits critical military tech and hinders China’s pursuit of regional dominance

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

Create, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, a new technology-control regime vis-à-vis Beijing. Washington should pay increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weaponry and militarily critical technologies. Although the United States certainly should lead the West in expanding international trade, this policy ought not to be extended to the point where it actually undermines American power and erodes Washington’s ability to discharge its fundamental obligation to guarantee Asian and global security and meet the Chinese challenge. The virtues of enhanced trade with China “must not obscure the reality that deepening globalization increases Beijing’s access to sophisticated weaponry and its associated elements,” including through dual-use technologies.44 Such acquisitions can undermine any American success in balancing China’s rise with decisive and dangerous consequences. Today, such capabilities obviously do not reside solely in the United States—they can be found in many nations, especially Washington’s European and Asian allies. The United States should encourage these countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “high-leverage strategic harm.”45 To establish a new technology regime toward China, Washington should enter into an immediate discussion with allies and friends with the aim of tightening restrictions on the sales of militarily critical technologies to China, including dual-use technologies. This will obviously not be easy to accomplish, but the effort should get under way immediately.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency

#### Overhaul and multilateral extension of the export control regime solves Chinese military modernization – impact is miscalc and power wars

Larry M. Wortzel, Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and Carolyn Bartholomew, Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2006, “China’s Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.16-17.06HearingT.pdf

The lack of transparency related to China’s military modernization raises the possibility for miscalculation and conflict. The United States needs to understand China’s strategic intentions and their connections to China’s military modernization. The Commission recommends that Congress urge the Administration to press Beijing to reveal those intentions and connections. To facilitate this, the Commission recommends that Congress work with the Administration to encourage effective confidence building measures between the U.S. Department of Defense and China’s Ministry of Defense. Such actions will reduce the possibility for conflict borne from misunderstanding. 2) The Commission recommends that Congress enact a new Export Administration Act (EAA) to clarify U.S. export control policy and the U.S. approach to multilateral export control regimes. The EAA should take into account new national security threats, unique U.S. technological advances, and global trade developments since the expired EAA was enacted in 1979. It also should establish strengthened penalties against violators. 3) In order to achieve their objectives, U.S. export controls must be part of a multilateral system in which U.S. allies are participating and to whose standards and requirements the allies are adhering. The Commission recommends that Congress urge the Administration to engage in more vigorous diplomatic activity at high levels in order to obtain the multilateral cooperation that is a prerequisite for effective global export controls.

### 2NC Export CP – Solvency – AT: Current Controls Fail

#### Strong consensus for increasing export controls – current controls fail because they are unilateral and don’t account for new tech – CP solves both issues

Earl Blumenauer, US Representative from Oregon and JD from Lewis and Clark Law School, March 2006, “China’s Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.16-17.06HearingT.pdf

I appreciate those who have taken a serious look at export control regimes including the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, House Select Committee on U.S. National Security, and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (the Cox/Dicks Committee), and the Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls for U. S. National Security. They've all concluded that we need a new paradigm for export controls. I fear that our current system is based on a Cold War template that predates the technological revolution and the global integration of the last 20 years. It certainly doesn't reflect the reality today of how much dual use technology is already widely available and available from foreign companies. In this way, unilateral controls are often ineffective and reward foreign competitors at the expense of U.S. companies. Intel has the largest concentration of its employees in the world in our community, and I've had examples from executives there who talk about some of the bizarre things that have been required to comply with export controls.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency Advocate – “High-Leverage Strategic Harm”

#### Applying export controls capable of inflicting high leverage strategic term solves – cuts off all potentially destabilizing technology – DOD agrees

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

The United States should encourage these countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “high-leverage strategic harm.”45 (Text of footnote 45 begins here) A 1990 U.S. Department of Defense policy persuasively argued this should be the benchmark for deciding whether a particular military technology should be considered destabilizing.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency Advocate – EU and Japan

#### We should engage with the EU and Japan on export controls

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, 12-13-2010, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china#\_ftn44

This suggests that, unless carefully thought out, any U.S. attempt to impose unilateral export controls on the PRC would likely fail to prevent Beijing from obtaining comparable technologies from U.S. competitors, while costing American manufacturers jobs and sales. On the other hand, a clear set of controlled exports might allow the U.S. to present European and Japanese exporters with an opportunity to expand their participation in the U.S. defense market in exchange for tighter controls over the listed technologies and processes.

\*\* Also AT: EU + Japan will say no to the CP

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – AT: Allies Say No – EU

#### EU will say yes – clearly demarcating banned tech solves concerns and they want more integration into US defense markets

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, 12-13-2010, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china#\_ftn44

Further complicating the situation are China’s relationships with American allies. China has extensive economic ties with the U.K., Germany, France, and many other Western nations and poses less of a security challenge to them. Not surprisingly, China is not one of the “countries of interest” in the Wassenaar Arrangement. Indeed, few states are likely to press for applying the agreement to the PRC in absence of a pressing threat from Beijing.[5] “None of the participants in the [Wassenaar] process appears to favor the types of strong controls—and U.S. dominance—that existed under CoCOM.”[6] This suggests that, unless carefully thought out, any U.S. attempt to impose unilateral export controls on the PRC would likely fail to prevent Beijing from obtaining comparable technologies from U.S. competitors, while costing American manufacturers jobs and sales. On the other hand, a clear set of controlled exports might allow the U.S. to present European and Japanese exporters with an opportunity to expand their participation in the U.S. defense market in exchange for tighter controls over the listed technologies and processes.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – AT: Allies Say No – Japan

#### Japan will say yes – fear of a rising China outweighs other concerns

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this document. This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own economic growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strategic implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corrosive strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only reinforce our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively dealing with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a revised U.S. grand strategy toward China.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – Solvency – Allies Say Yes – Japan

#### Japan will say yes – clearly demarcating banned tech solves concerns and they want more integration into US defense markets

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, 12-13-2010, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china#\_ftn44

This suggests that, unless carefully thought out, any U.S. attempt to impose unilateral export controls on the PRC would likely fail to prevent Beijing from obtaining comparable technologies from U.S. competitors, while costing American manufacturers jobs and sales. On the other hand, a clear set of controlled exports might allow the U.S. to present European and Japanese exporters with an opportunity to expand their participation in the U.S. defense market in exchange for tighter controls over the listed technologies and processes.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA

#### China can’t domestically compensate for export controls – CP disrupts Chinese development and procurement

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Steven Colley, MA Candidate in Public Policy at Harvard University and former researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 10, 2015, “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis,” http://csis.org/files/publication/150901\_Chinese\_Mil\_Bal.pdf

In broad terms, it does appears [sic] that China no longer relies on weapons imports to modernize its army. China has shown the ability to develop indigenous weapons systems without outside assistance. Examples of advanced indigenous weapons systems include the J-10 and J-20 aircraft. The PLAN also operates advanced, indigenously-designed surface combatants such as the Luyang guided missile destroyer and the Jiankai guided missile frigate. However, a sudden cessation of imports would certainly significantly delay weapons development and procurement.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA

#### We control scholarly consensus and empirics – only the CP prevents China from destabilizing Asia – they can’t develop the tech themselves

David Shambaugh, Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2-23-2005, “Don’t Lift the Arms Embargo in China,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2005/02/23china-shambaugh

Fifth, in an interview with the Financial Times last week, France's Minister of Defense, Michèle Alliot-Marie, presented a new argument in favor of lifting the embargo: Since China's domestic military industry will be capable of producing "exactly the same arms" that France has within five years, maintaining the embargo is pointless and "lifting it could be better protection for us than maintaining it." This is the most ludicrous rationale of all. With a few exceptions—ballistic missiles, inertial guidance systems, diesel propulsion and a new generation of tanks—virtually all foreign experts on the Chinese military recognize that China's indigenous military—industrial complex lags 10 to 20 years behind the state of the art. It is also indisputable that the lack of Chinese access to Western arms markets has demonstrably slowed China's domestic arms manufacturing capabilities. Whatever modern conventional weapons China's military has were sold to it by Russia, not manufactured in China. Even Russia has been very careful not to sell China the latest generation of its weaponry, and Moscow has not transferred the means of production to China, thus ensuring a dependency on Russian spare parts and new systems. At the end of the day, Europe must have a very clear answer to a simple question: Why is it in Europe's strategic interest to accelerate the modernization of China's military? Answer: It is not. Moreover, one does not hear China's Asian neighbors clamoring for the lifting of the embargo. Far from it. A China possessing real power projection capabilities would radically change and destabilize the East Asian security environment. This is also of deep concern to the United States. From the American perspective, none of these arguments touch the real issues: maintaining the security of Taiwan and preventing China from possessing European arms that might be used against American forces. This is the argument that animates the debate in Washington, and against which ultimate European actions will be judged. Lifting the arms embargo on China is ill-advised. If anything, it needs to be strengthened. Both Europe and America can continue to enjoy robust relations with Beijing while maintaining their respective arms embargoes. China will just have to live with it until it comes to terms with Tiananmen and stops putting military pressure on Taiwan.

### 2NC Export Controls CP – AT: Domestic Tradeoff DA

#### It’s specifically true for dual-use goods – Chinese reliance proves they need those to make domestic arms production effective

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Steven Colley, MA Candidate in Public Policy at Harvard University and former researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 10, 2015, “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis,” http://csis.org/files/publication/150901\_Chinese\_Mil\_Bal.pdf

The DoD 2015 white paper also states that China still seeks to supplement technology shortfalls through dual-use goods and reverse engineering: 341 “Key areas where China continues to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts through targeted foreign technologies include engines for aircraft, tanks, and naval vessels; solid state electronics and microprocessors, guidance and control systems, enabling technologies such as cutting-edge precision machine tools, advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment, and computer-assisted design, manufacturing, and engineering. China often pursues these foreign technologies for the purpose of reverse engineering or to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts.

### 1NC Sanctions CP

**Sample text: The United States federal government should apply targeted sanctions to Chinese individuals, companies, and agencies involved in** (ex: economic espionage/maritime territorial disputes/violating sanctions placed on North Korea)

#### CP solves the aff – limited, conduct-related sanctions force China to moderate its behavior

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 2-23-2016, “The Right Way to Sanction China,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

Over the last five years, the United States has struggled to influence Chinese behavior. Washington’s responses to Beijing’s increasingly assertive activities—ranging from economic espionage to artificial island construction—have been largely ineffective. Yet U.S. leaders are now considering a new option: economic sanctions. Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship is “too big to fail” and that Washington therefore has little economic leverage with Beijing. Indeed, U.S. policymakers should be realistic that extensive sanctions against China would be unwise and infeasible. Nevertheless, certain limited, conduct-based sanctions may be able to shape Chinese behavior at an acceptable cost. The surprising aspect of the debate in Washington over whether to sanction China is that it took so long to emerge; within the last decade, the United States has sanctioned every one of its major national-security concerns other than China. Iran, Russia, North Korea and terrorist groups have found themselves facing not only U.S. unilateral sanctions, but extensive international sanctions regimes. Acknowledging the need for more effective policy options, President Barack Obama issued an executive order providing the Treasury Department authority to sanction state and nonstate actors—including Chinese entities—engaging in malicious cyber activity. Last year, the administration threatened to impose sanctions on a number of Chinese persons in the lead up to President Xi’s state visit. Likewise, various presidential candidates have suggested that the United States impose sanctions against Chinese agencies or businesses involved in cyber attacks against economic targets. Yet China is not Russia or Iran, and trying to impose an extensive sanctions regime on Beijing would be both unwise and ultimately ineffective. Given China’s global economic importance—notwithstanding its recent economic troubles—U.S. policymakers would struggle to attract the international support required to implement an extensive sanctions regime in response to cyber attacks or regional coercion. In addition, unlike the Russian or Iranian economies, which are dependent on energy exports, the Chinese economy is highly diversified and would be much more resilient to sanctions. Even if such sanctions could be constructed, China has the economic heft and political influence to hit back and do real damage to both U.S. companies and broader U.S. interests. If Beijing viewed extensive economic sanctions as an effort to undermine the economic basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule—particularly in the aftermath of China’s recent economic stumbles—Beijing’s response could be highly escalatory. In short, China’s global importance and its enormous economy inoculate it against the type of extensive sanctions levied on Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, the United States has a set of more targeted economic options for shaping Chinese behavior. These options would need to be limited and designed to deter or reverse specific destabilizing activities undertaken by Chinese individuals, companies or agencies. While these options are far from perfect, they may provide policymakers better responses than threatening to use military force—or watching idly as China alters the status quo.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – China Complies

#### The CP imposes reputational costs – China will comply to avoid being seen as an international pariah

Ellen Nakashima, national security reporter at the Washington Post, 8-30-2015, “U.S. developing sanctions against China over cyberthefts,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/administration-developing-sanctions-against-china-over-cyberespionage/2015/08/30/9b2910aa-480b-11e5-8ab4-c73967a143d3\_story.html

The expected sanctions move will send two signals, a second administration official said. “It sends a signal to Beijing that the administration is going to start fighting back on economic espionage, and it sends a signal to the private sector that we’re on your team. It tells China, enough is enough.” The sanctions would be a second major shot at China on the issue. In May 2014, the Obama administration secured indictments on economic spying charges against five Chinese military members for hacking into the computer systems of major U.S. steel and other firms. “The indictments were a strong move,” said Rob Knake, a former White House cyber official and currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “This is going to be an even stronger move. It’s really going to put China in the position of having to choose whether they want to be this pariah nation — this kleptocracy — or whether they want to be one of the leading nations in the world.” Some officials within the government urged caution, arguing that sanctions would only create unnecessary friction. But everyone is on the same page now, officials said. [In a world of cybertheft, U.S. names China, Russia as main culprits] “Let’s be honest, I can see the White House saying, ‘Let’s not do [sanctions] while the head of state is here,” one administration official said. “I can see maybe they’d shift the timing by a few days . . . but I can’t imagine they’d shift the overall decision.” In particular, officials from national security agencies, as well as at Treasury, which is the lead agency on economic sanctions under the executive order, have been eager to push ahead. The administration’s goal is to impose costs for economic cyberspying. And the best strategy for doing that, officials said, is to use a variety of tools — indictments, sanctions, maybe even covert cyber actions.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – China Complies

#### China is afraid of sanctions – they’ll back down

Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, Co-Chair of the Hoover Institution’s Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law, and editor in chief of Lawfare, and (quoting a Lawfare podcast interview with) James Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-5-2015, “James Lewis on the China Cyber Deal,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/james-lewis-china-cyber-deal

What's more, Lewis contends that the administration very skillfully used the threat of sanctions to pressure the Chinese into making this fateful commitment. And remarkably, he argues as well that commentators have grossly underestimated as well the impact of the PLA indictments, which were widely dismissed as mere theater: “One point, if you were going to go back and correct the record, which a number of pundits in the blogosphere should probably do, one point you’d want to pay attention to would be the benefit of the indictments. Because the indictments were exceptionally painful for the Chinese. And when they were told, and the White House with some surprising skill was able to leak the threat of sanctions ... when [the Chinese] were told, okay, sanctions, they did not want to go through the pain of indictments again. And of course, as Americans, we clearly understand the difference between sanctions and indictments, but the Chinese don’t. It’s a very different system. . . . When they saw another thing coming down the pike, they remembered the pain of indictments. . . . [T]he psychological effect on the Chinese [of the indictments] was profound. It affected the PLA. The PLA felt like it’d been outed. It lost prestige both with other agencies in China and internationally. That was the effect. . . . It was clever to use [sanctions] to gain leverage in these talks. It was a moment when you had a number of things [happening.] The Chinese really wanted a happy outcome to the summit, and they made that point repeatedly. They were worried about the sanctions in part because of the indictment experience. They knew that Americans were angry over OPM and that there were even discussions of possible retaliation for OPM. And all of those things put pressure on them in a way.”

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – Empirics

#### Targeted sanctions are effective – Iran and Russia prove – old indicts are wrong

Peter D. Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, and Eric B. Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 6-15-2015, “The Sanctions Myth,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sanctions-myth-13110?page=show

These new forms of economic statecraft have proven powerful. For example, as a partial result of the sanctions, economists are predicting that the Russian economy will shrink by 3.5–4 percent in 2015 and continue contracting in the medium term. Likewise, the Iranian economy is suffering from significant inflation, and according to the Treasury Department, sanctions on the Iranian petroleum industry cost the country $40 billion in revenue in 2014. Policy makers, seeing the sophisticated nature and powerful impact of these sanctions, have concluded that these new tools of coercion are different from—and a marked improvement on—prior forms of economic punishment. For example, in a December 2014 speech, David S. Cohen, then the under secretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, noted that we have been able to move away from clunky and heavy-handed instruments of economic power. . . . All of us in this room remember how sanctions used to consist primarily of trade restrictions or wholesale bans on commercial activity. . . . These embargoes rarely created meaningful pressure. Sanctions that focus on bad actors within the financial sector are far more precise and far more effective than traditional trade sanctions. This perspective is echoed in the 2015 National Security Strategy, which makes clear that these targeted economic sanctions are an effective tool for dealing with threats to the United States and its allies and friends.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – General – Empirics

#### Sanctions can coerce China – empirically successful

David Gompert, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Distinguished Visiting Professor for National Security Studies at the United States Naval Academy, and Hans Binnendijk, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Adjunct Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, 3-22-2016, “Time for Washington to Amp Up the Power to Coerce,” http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/time-for-washington-to-amp-up-the-power-to-coerce/

For the United States, the mounting costs and risks of waging war are increasing the importance of its ability to thwart hostile states without attacking them — what we call the “power to coerce.” Meanwhile, globalization of trade, investment, banking, information, media and energy is expanding the options for U.S. power to coerce, especially against nation states that depend on access to these global markets and systems — such as Russia, Iran and China. For its part, the United States is comparatively, though not entirely, invulnerable to coercion, giving it an asymmetric advantage that it could more fully exploit. Unlike “soft power,” which is meant to cause other nations to like us more, or be more like us, the power to coerce can work against aggressors. While it cannot always substitute for hard military force, the power to coerce can raise the threshold for war as a last resort. The term power to coerce describes techniques that not only have the potential to avoid the use of military force and other existing forms of deterrence, but also to stop, reverse or at least punish transgressions short of force. Developments in recent years, regarding Iran, Russia, Arab dictatorships and others, illuminate both the utility and the limits of the power to coerce. Among the most promising U.S. options in this area are financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition to autocratic regimes and offensive cyber operations. Cutting off access to the global inter-banking network can visit severe and radiating economic pain, and can be calibrated according to the target’s response. Since 2001, with al-Qaeda initially in its crosshairs, the U.S. government has honed its ability to find, track, disrupt and seize financial assets and flows, and to enlist the participation of key states with major banks — which is all it takes to succeed. U.S.-led denial of access to finance and capital markets has become a coercive strategy of choice and seems to have contained Russian intervention in Ukraine and forced Iran to accept limits on its nuclear weapons program.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP

#### Targeted sanctions solve cyber/IP – sends a strong signal to violators, financial costs will deter further cyberattacks

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 3-13-2016, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

Although erecting extensive sanctions against China would be unwise and infeasible, more limited sanctions may be a better means of shaping Chinese behavior. In particular, measures designed to deter internationally-recognized “bad conduct” by Chinese individuals, companies, and agencies—particularly those who commit economic espionage—could be effective, in part because they could garner international support and would signal that stealing U.S. intellectual property has financial consequences. The United States has already raised concerns about cyber espionage against private corporations, and the Department of Justice has indicted five Chinese military hackers. U.S. officials have pointed the finger at China for some of the most egregious cyber attacks in recent years—including the massive hack of the Office of Personnel Management in which Chinese persons stole security clearance information for over twenty million U.S. citizens. Although President Obama and President Xi announced a “common understanding” that neither government would engage in cyber economic espionage, early reports suggest that government-sponsored Chinese hackers have continued what has been called “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” Chinese actors engaged in theft of U.S. intellectual property could be designated under existing U.S. authorities, which would effectively prevent them from doing business in U.S. markets or with U.S. companies. Although this punishment might not force domestically-focused Chinese companies to change their behavior, it would send a signal to companies with a U.S. presence that engaging in such activity entails significant risks, as U.S. regulators would be able to impose hefty fines on such companies.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP

#### Targeted sanctions pressure China into ending cyberattacks on the US

Anders Corr, PhD in Government from Harvard University, MA in International Relations from Yale University, and international political analyst at Forbes, 2-13-2016, “Sanction China for its Support of North Korea… And So Much More,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/13/sanction-china-for-its-support-of-north-korea-and-so-much-more/#21b30615316a

Most of China’s non Hong Kong international trade is still in dollars. Money will still move China. Economic sanctions are justified, and we have a window of opportunity in which they will still work. The U.S. should immediately impose tough economic sanctions on any entity, including Chinese individuals and state-owned enterprises, that illegally does business with North Korea. But we should go further. Until China stops claiming international waters and the territory of its smaller neighbors, halts its cyberattacks on U.S. companies and government agencies, and ceases enabling North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, Congress should enact targeted economic sanctions and travel bans on Chinese military, government, and financial officials and organizations most responsible for the region’s destabilization and cyberattacks on the U.S. Sanctions should target Chinese entities doing business in North Korea, contracting with state-sanctioned cyber-criminals, dredging islands, and drilling for oil in the South China Sea. China’s energy, banking, defense, shipping, and mineral importers and exporters are fair game and should be targeted. The U.S. effectively sanctioned a Chinese bank, Banco Delta Asia, in 2005 for facilitating North Korean money laundering. It can and should be done on a much, much larger scale. Economic sanctions against China should be extended, deepened, and broadened, including by all NATO members and U.S. allies in Asia. We want and need China as a trading partner and responsible member of the international community. We want peace with China and North Korea. But that peace must be accompanied by a just, safe, and democratic international order. Achieving this won’t be easy. And if we don’t take concrete action now — such as economic sanctions — it will be too late. To get there, we will need to stand on principle. It will take individual and collective acts of courage.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Cyber/IP

#### Only sanctions stop Chinese cyber aggression – diplomacy fails

Elizabeth Simson, staff writer at the Daily Signal, 7-18-2013, “Confronting Chinese Cyber Espionage,” dailysignal.com//2013/07/18/confronting-chinese-cyber-espionage/

The U.S. and China opened high-level security and economic discussions last week in Washington, and critical cybersecurity concerns are on the agenda. The Administration’s diplomatic efforts on cybersecurity, however, have so far failed to deter aggressive Chinese cyber attacks against the U.S. public and private sectors. Over the past year, several reports have been released that outline the scope and scale of Chinese hacking against the U.S. government and private-sector companies. While this naming and shaming is the first step, more must be done to prevent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and other cyber entities from continuing their cyber attacks on the U.S. Indeed, without any real pushback from the U.S., the Chinese have no incentive to change their bad cyber behavior, and politely asking them to stop is unlikely to be effective. Larry M. Wortzel—an expert on the Chinese military, security, and politics—testified recently that military entities in China are using advanced cyber-technology to conduct large-scale cyber-espionage against the U.S. The goal of these operations, he stated, is to gain strategic advantages and to infiltrate sensitive defense networks. As recent cyber attacks on Nortel and Lockheed Martin demonstrate, Beijing is able to take advantage of foreign information and innovation without the financial costs of research and development. The ultimate goal for China, Wortzel testified, is to achieve the offensive capability to shut down U.S. ports and compromise critical infrastructure. This is a genuine threat to national security, as China has already demonstrated this ability: In 2011, NASA revealed that Chinese hackers were able to gain “full functional control” over one of its critical mission systems. Before further damage is done, the Obama Administration and Congress should act to deter aggressive nations such as China through financial, legal, and travel sanctions.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – North Korea

#### Targeted sanctions pressure China into ending support for North Korea

Anders Corr, PhD in Government from Harvard University, MA in International Relations from Yale University, and international political analyst at Forbes, 2-13-2016, “Sanction China for its Support of North Korea… And So Much More,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/13/sanction-china-for-its-support-of-north-korea-and-so-much-more/#21b30615316a

Most of China’s non Hong Kong international trade is still in dollars. Money will still move China. Economic sanctions are justified, and we have a window of opportunity in which they will still work. The U.S. should immediately impose tough economic sanctions on any entity, including Chinese individuals and state-owned enterprises, that illegally does business with North Korea. But we should go further. Until China stops claiming international waters and the territory of its smaller neighbors, halts its cyberattacks on U.S. companies and government agencies, and ceases enabling North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, Congress should enact targeted economic sanctions and travel bans on Chinese military, government, and financial officials and organizations most responsible for the region’s destabilization and cyberattacks on the U.S. Sanctions should target Chinese entities doing business in North Korea, contracting with state-sanctioned cyber-criminals, dredging islands, and drilling for oil in the South China Sea. China’s energy, banking, defense, shipping, and mineral importers and exporters are fair game and should be targeted. The U.S. effectively sanctioned a Chinese bank, Banco Delta Asia, in 2005 for facilitating North Korean money laundering. It can and should be done on a much, much larger scale. Economic sanctions against China should be extended, deepened, and broadened, including by all NATO members and U.S. allies in Asia. We want and need China as a trading partner and responsible member of the international community. We want peace with China and North Korea. But that peace must be accompanied by a just, safe, and democratic international order. Achieving this won’t be easy. And if we don’t take concrete action now — such as economic sanctions — it will be too late. To get there, we will need to stand on principle. It will take individual and collective acts of courage.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Territorial Disputes

#### Targeted sanctions solve – punishing involved Chinese parties de-escalates disputes – they’ll respond to pressure – independently incentivizes China’s government to back down

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 3-13-2016, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

At the moment, U.S. officials do not have existing mechanisms to sanction businesses engaged in bad behavior in maritime disputes. Yet, there are several tempting targets for sanctions, most notably China Communications Construction Company Dredging (CCCCG), which conducted dredging at disputed South China Sea features, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which moved an oil rig into waters disputed with Vietnam. Further, China has reportedly invited private or semiprivate firms to invest in building the infrastructure on a number of these reclaimed islands. U.S. officials could obtain the legal authority necessary to sanction CCCCG , CNPC or other Chinese entities if the president were to declare a national emergency related to China’s destabilizing actions in the region. This would no doubt be seen as a significant escalation. Nevertheless, sanctioning entities involved in construction or development in disputed areas could alter their calculus, disincentive destabilizing conduct and thereby decrease tensions in the long-term. Detailed understandings of these firms and their domestic political connections within China would be required, but there are reasons to believe that they might be responsive to outside pressure. For example, CCCCG and CNPC are already listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and CCCCG was reportedly planning a new listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. However, CCCCG has delayed its initial public offering in Hong Kong, allegedly because the Exchange asked a number of questions about dredging activities in the South China Sea. CCCCG or CNPC could find their business partnerships damaged and their ability to deal in U.S. dollars curtailed if they were added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals List. This would in turn harm the companies’ value, affect their ability to raise funds and impact their operations. Such efforts might not stop Chinese coercion in the South China Sea, but they would impose a cost both on the Chinese companies involved and on Beijing’s reputation.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – Territorial Disputes

#### Targeted sanctions pressure China into ending maritime disputes

Anders Corr, PhD in Government from Harvard University, MA in International Relations from Yale University, and international political analyst at Forbes, 2-13-2016, “Sanction China for its Support of North Korea… And So Much More,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/13/sanction-china-for-its-support-of-north-korea-and-so-much-more/#21b30615316a

Most of China’s non Hong Kong international trade is still in dollars. Money will still move China. Economic sanctions are justified, and we have a window of opportunity in which they will still work. The U.S. should immediately impose tough economic sanctions on any entity, including Chinese individuals and state-owned enterprises, that illegally does business with North Korea. But we should go further. Until China stops claiming international waters and the territory of its smaller neighbors, halts its cyberattacks on U.S. companies and government agencies, and ceases enabling North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, Congress should enact targeted economic sanctions and travel bans on Chinese military, government, and financial officials and organizations most responsible for the region’s destabilization and cyberattacks on the U.S. Sanctions should target Chinese entities doing business in North Korea, contracting with state-sanctioned cyber-criminals, dredging islands, and drilling for oil in the South China Sea. China’s energy, banking, defense, shipping, and mineral importers and exporters are fair game and should be targeted. The U.S. effectively sanctioned a Chinese bank, Banco Delta Asia, in 2005 for facilitating North Korean money laundering. It can and should be done on a much, much larger scale. Economic sanctions against China should be extended, deepened, and broadened, including by all NATO members and U.S. allies in Asia. We want and need China as a trading partner and responsible member of the international community. We want peace with China and North Korea. But that peace must be accompanied by a just, safe, and democratic international order. Achieving this won’t be easy. And if we don’t take concrete action now — such as economic sanctions — it will be too late. To get there, we will need to stand on principle. It will take individual and collective acts of courage.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: General Sanctions Indicts

#### Indicts of extensive sanctions don’t apply – our targeted sanctions are effective

Leland R. Miller, Chief Executive Officer of China Beige Book International, a data analytics and investment advisory firm focused on the Chinese economy, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-26-2015, “Rethinking U.S. Economic Policy Toward China,” in Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World, http://www.choosingtolead.net/rethinking-us-economic-policy-toward-china

Moreover, even skeptics should recognize that articulating an exclusionary policy toward China invariably does more harm than good. Welcoming China’s future participation may or may not incentivize reform, but it would undermine Beijing’s paranoid narrative that TPP is intended as an anti-China alliance, helping ease the future accession of our allies in Korea, Taiwan, and across Southeast Asia. That said, while broad economic warfare rarely serves U.S. interests, targeted economic solutions—such as tighter export controls on sensitive technologies or sanctions on individual companies or persons that break U.S. laws—can serve U.S. interests. The Blair-Huntsman report offers some excellent proposals in this regard, particularly for combating the theft of intellectual property (IP): denying products that contain stolen IP access to the U.S. market; restricting use of the U.S. financial system to foreign companies that repeatedly steal IP; and revising the approval guidelines for approval by the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and for foreign companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: Old Sanctions Indicts

#### Targeted sanctions work – distinct from older policies

Peter D. Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, and Eric B. Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 6-15-2015, “The Sanctions Myth,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sanctions-myth-13110?page=show

The new sanctions are better than the old ones in several ways. They are more precise than the “comprehensive” sanctions of the 1990s and are thus more likely to hurt legitimate targets and less likely to hurt innocent bystanders. They are also more effective than the “smart” sanctions (such as travel bans) of the early 2000s, and so less likely to feel like token symbols substituting for real pressure. Their greater effectiveness comes from the way they harness the United States’ position as the leader of the global financial system; through a number of mechanisms, the sanctions prevent rogue actors from accessing the U.S. financial system and force legitimate financial institutions to abandon any business with targeted countries and individuals.

### 2NC Sanctions CP Solvency – AT: Old Sanctions Indicts

#### We’re better at applying sanctions – increases effectiveness

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, 3-3-2014, “The Power of Sanctions Against Putin on Ukraine,” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/

I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin knows it. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on.

### 2NC Sanctions CP – General – No Link to Politics

#### There’s massive bipartisan support for targeted sanctions

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, February 2011, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/News%20Images/Drezner\_Sanctions.pdf

The bipartisan consensus within the US foreign policy community in favor of targeted sanctions has also deepened over time. Rose Gottemoeller (2007 ⁄ 2008: 109), now US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, concluded in early 2008 that smart sanctions ‘‘had been honed through the ‘war on terror’, and sanctions are hitting their targets among corrupt elites more often.’’ Juan Zarate (2009:55), a deputy national security advisor in George W. Bush’s administration, argued that the tools of financial statecraft ‘‘provide the United States and its allies the best source of diplomatic leverage to affect regimes’ behavior and calculus.’’ Loeffler (2009:110) concludes, ‘‘it is hard to imagine any serious foreign policy issue down the line in which financial tools would not be or should not be considered as part of a comprehensive strategy.’’ US policy journals are replete with essays arguing in favor of financial statecraft as the best policy lever available to the United States (Bracken 2007; Liss 2007 ⁄ 08; Eckert 2008).

### 2NC Sanctions CP – Cyber – No Link to Politics

#### CP is politically popular – lots of Congressional support for cyber sanctions

Katie Bo Williams, staff writer at The Hill, 9-3-2015, “Lawmakers press Obama to sanction China,” thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/252720-lawmakers-press-obama-to-sanction-china

The president has been under increasing pressure to take a more offensive stance on cyber espionage where China is concerned, with rhetoric amongst D.C. lawmakers reaching a fever pitch in the wake of the OPM hack.

### 2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Perm Do Both – General

#### Perm removes the CP’s teeth – China needs to think we’re willing to jeopardize relations for sanctions to work – the plan counteracts that signal

Tal Kopan, staff writer at CNN, 9-16-2015, “President Obama talks tough on China cyber sanctions ahead of state visit,” www.cnn.com/2015/09/16/politics/president-obama-china-white-house-sanctions/

President Barack Obama signaled a readiness to slap Beijing with sanctions over their alleged rampant hacking of American companies on Wednesday, continuing to ramp up pressure ahead of the Chinese president's state visit to Washington. Speaking at the Business Roundtable in Washington on Wednesday, Obama seemed to personally address the issue of sanctions for the first time. The White House had previously confirmed they were in the works. "We are preparing a number of measures that will indicate to the Chinese that this is not just a matter of us being mildly upset but is something that will put significant strains on the bilateral relationship if not resolved," Obama warned, though he didn't specifically use the term sanctions. "And that we are prepared to take some countervailing actions in order to get their attention."

### 2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Perm Do Both – Cyber

#### Sanctions solve Chinese cyber-attacks but the plan’s engagement undermines the clear and unwavering signal of the CP

Katie Bo Williams, staff writer at The Hill, 9-3-2015, “Lawmakers press Obama to sanction China,” thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/252720-lawmakers-press-obama-to-sanction-china

Reps. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and J. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) on Thursday called on President Obama to impose economic sanctions on China “to let the world know that state sponsored hacking will have tangible repercussions.” In a letter to the White House, Wilson and Forbes pointed to mounting evidence of Beijing’s active promotion of cyber espionage, specifically its alleged hack on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The congressmen said the White House has pursued an “incoherent deterrent strategy” when it comes to state-backed cyber espionage. While Obama authorized additional sanctions for certain North Korean officials in response to the attack on Sony Pictures, the representatives said he has taken no such action against the five Chinese military hackers indicted on economic espionage charges in 2014. Some observers say it’s unlikely the five members of the People’s Liberation Army charged in 2014 will ever see the inside of a U.S. court room, and that the purpose of the indictments was simply to send a diplomatic warning. “A clear and unwavering line needs to be drawn by your Administration in protecting the intellectual property and personal data of U.S. based companies, as well as government data and personnel information,” Wilson and Forbes wrote. The representatives’ call comes in the wake of recent White House leaks that revealed the administration is developing possible economic sanctions to use as a tool to deter China cyber spying. The unnamed White House sources suggested that those sanctions would most likely be targeted at Chinese companies, not Beijing — and that the OPM hack would not be one of the actions subject to sanctions. Policy experts say there is a critical distinction between hacking for commercial gain and hacking for traditional intelligence purposes. Most reports indicate that the sanctions would address only the former. The president has been under increasing pressure to take a more offensive stance on cyber espionage where China is concerned, with rhetoric amongst D.C. lawmakers reaching a fever pitch in the wake of the OPM hack. “One of the conclusions we’ve reached is that we need to be a bit more public about our responses, and one reason is deterrence,” a White House official told The New York Times in an oft-quoted interview on administration policy. “We need to disrupt and deter what our adversaries are doing in cyberspace, and that means you need a full range of tools to tailor a response.” “We strongly urge your Administration, in consultation with the Treasury Department, to apply punitive economic sanctions to entities and individuals conducting cyberattacks to punish and deter such action,” Wilson and Forbes wrote.

### 2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Sanctions Bad – AT: Cyber Retal

#### Turn is non-unique – sanctions won’t increase cyber attacks and deter future attacks

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 3-13-2016, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

Targeted sanctions might prove attractive to other developed economies suffering from persistent Chinese cyber espionage. Moreover, Chinese groups already conduct sustained cyber attacks on U.S. businesses, so sanctioning a number of these actors might not substantially change the frequency or fierceness of intrusions. China could take action in other domains, but targeted designations could set U.S. red lines and make clear that the United States and its partners are willing to take a more forceful stance to uphold norms of good conduct in cyberspace.

### 2NC Sanctions CP – AT: Sanctions Bad – AT: Trade

#### No trade impact from targeted sanctions

Daniel W. Drezner, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Fall 1998, “Serious About Sanctions,” http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/Course%20Readings/Drezner.pdf

Flawed argument #3: Sanctions hurt U.S. trade. Business groups claim that because the United States imposes so many sanctions, American firms are put at a disadvantage compared to foreign competitors. They cite a recent study from the Institute for International Economics (IIE) that estimates the costs to U.S. exports resulting from sanctions at $15-19 billion, and a loss of 200,000 jobs in the export sector.(6) Furthermore, critics contend that sanctions render U.S. firms "unreliable suppliers", thus permanently weakening U.S. exports. Anecdotal evidence for this claim abounds. The U.S. grain embargo of the Soviet Union is cited as having had a devastating impact on U.S. agriculture. One study pegged the cost at $7 billion, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that farm incomes dropped by 40 percent in 1980.(7) Furthermore, after the lifting of the grain embargo, the Soviet Union continued to rely primarily on non-American sources for food imports, thus deepening the losses still further. A closer look at the evidence casts doubt on these claims. First, as noted above, most U.S. sanctions do not impinge on bilateral trade. Second, the IIE study makes the convenient but dubious assumption that U.S. firms are unable to redirect exports toward non-sanctioned countries. Note the irony: pessimists assume that sanctioned countries can redirect their trade at will, but that the United States cannot. Consider the grain embargo in this light. Because Argentina and other countries were willing to export to the Soviet Union, it would appear that U.S. exporters were badly hurt. In fact, U.S. grain exports rose 37 percent in the fiscal year after the embargo, and the U.S. share of global grain exports rose by 3 percent. The United States simply expanded into new markets, such as China and Mexico, that other grain exporters had abandoned in order to service the Soviets.(8) The U.S. agriculture sector did suffer significant costs, but these costs were not equal to the total value of the reduced exports or even close to it. If widespread assumptions about the ability of sanctioned countries to redirect their trade are applied to U.S. exporters, the total costs to the United States of sanctioning falls from $15-19 billion to a range of $3-4 billion annually. Finally, even the authors of the IIE report admit that there is no statistical evidence to support the "unreliable suppliers" argument. Trade levels for the year following the end of economic sanctions show no significant reduction in the volume of trade. In some instances the trade levels show a significant increase three to four years after the sanctions are lifted. Sanctions may impose costs on some U.S. firms, but they do not seriously harm America's trade position overall or in the long run.

### 1NC Tariffs CP

#### Sample text: The United States federal government should impose tariffs on Chinese-origin imports to raise 150% of all American losses from Chinese IP theft in the previous year.

#### CP solves – incentivizes China to crack down on IP theft – even if China retaliates, there’s no impact

Dennis C. Blair et al, former Director of National Intelligence and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., former Ambassador to China, former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, and former Governor of Utah, Craig R. Barrett, former Chairman of the United Nations Global Alliance for Information and Communication Technologies and Development, former appointee of the President’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, and former Chairman and CEO of Intel Corporation, Slade Gorton, former Senator of Washington and member of the 9-11 Commission, William J. Lynn III, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and CEO of DRS Technologies, Deborah Wince-Smith, President and CEO of the Council on Competitiveness, and Michael K. Young, former Deputy Under Secretary of State and President of the University of Washington, May 2013, “The IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,” http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip\_commission\_report\_052213.pdf

Recommend that Congress and the administration impose a tariff on all Chinese-origin imports, designed to raise 150% of all U.S. losses from Chinese IP theft in the previous year, as estimated by the secretary of commerce. This tariff would be subject to modification by the president on national security grounds. The argument for this proposal is that only by seriously limiting the U.S. market for Chinese goods and services will sufficient incentive be created for Chinese authorities to systematically reduce IP theft. The method proposed to accomplish that goal is to impose the calibrated tariff just described. While such action would allow retaliation, the huge Chinese trade surplus with the United States could cause the retaliation to be ineffective. Chinese exports to the United States are between three and four times the dollar value of U.S. exports to China.

### 2NC Tariffs CP – Solvency

#### Changing China’s cost-benefit analysis through pressure is the only way to make them crack down on cyber crimes

Gordon G. Chang, JD from Cornell Law School and Asia analyst at the World Affairs Journal, 10-23-2014, “Only Tariffs Will Stop China’s Cyber Attacks,” http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/only-tariffs-will-stop-chinas-cyber-attacks

We should not be surprised by Beijing’s refusal to talk. China each year steals something in the vicinity of $100 billion of US intellectual property—or perhaps more—much of it using Internet connections. Washington, however, has so far not found the right mix of policies to get the Chinese to stop the practice. The Justice Department indicted five officers of the People’s Liberation Army for cyber theft in May, but it’s unlikely that any of the quintet will ever be transported to the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to stand trial. There is, unfortunately, only one way to stop the hacking of Apple’s iCloud and the intrusions into the networks of American foundations, charities, NGOs, governments, utilities, and companies. And what is that? Impose costs on China that are in excess of the benefits it receives from its crimes in cyberspace. A good starting point is the recommendation (pdf) of the Blair-Huntsman Commission of an across-the-board tariff on Chinese goods. That’s the “positive action,” to borrow Yang’s words, that can get Beijing to end its predatory practices. Do that, and Yang will fly to Boston and plead for an appointment to discuss cyber issues with Kerry. Don’t do that, and America will continue to bleed.

\* Note: Yang Jiechi is a Chinese State Councillor

### 2NC Tariffs CP Solvency + Aff Solvency Takeout

#### Tougher across-the-board economic responses are key – China empirically takes advantage of diplomatic engagement without pressing for cyber reforms

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, February 2013, “Chinese Cyber Attacks: Robust Response Needed,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/chinese-cyber-attacks-robust-response-needed

Go beyond the usual diplomatic responses. Given the commercial activities being affected by the Chinese actions, commercially related responses should rank as high as diplomatic ones. For example, if Chinese companies are benefiting from information extracted by this unit, are they essentially trafficking in stolen goods (in this case, intellectual property)? Would that make their directors subject to criminal charges, their foreign assets susceptible to seizure? How should this affect their ability to be listed on not just American but Asian or European stock exchanges? China’s actions fundamentally jeopardize the international rule of law in a variety of business contexts; it should not be able to benefit from its brazen flouting of those rules. Actually take a tougher line on China. The Obama Administration has actively sought out the Chinese military to cooperate on cyber issues and even engaged in joint “war games” together.[8] One can only imagine how Chinese officers viewed the gullibility of their American counterparts in such “cooperative” sessions, even as they were targeting them from Shanghai. Similarly, Secretary of State John Kerry’s comments questioning the need for a U.S. “pivot” to Asia, in the belief that it somehow antagonizes China, raises doubts about his understanding of how extensive China’s efforts have been. An Integrated Response The Chinese response to the controversy thus far has been one of “woxing, wosu” (我行我素): ignoring the American reaction. If American decision makers were expecting the Chinese to be ashamed of their actions, they are sadly mistaken (especially since the Chinese apparently view such actions as legitimate). In order to make clear to Beijing that their actions are in fact illegitimate, there needs to be an extensive, integrated response. Just as Chinese cyber activities are not limited to the U.S. or solely targeted against military and national security systems, the response needs to be multilateral and comprehensive, involving not just all the elements of government but the private sector as well.

### 2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – AT: Chinese Lashout – General

#### China won’t lash out or escalate – Chinese leaders don’t want to push other Asian nations closer to the US

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relationship, including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American business in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma.

### 2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – AT: Chinese FoPo Lashout

#### Chinese aggression isn’t reactive and it’s inevitable absent the CP

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, Winter 2015, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness,” https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27433/uploads

There are at least two major difficulties with the claim that China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas has been merely reactive rather than assertive. First, cutting into the narrative of an ongoing dispute at one point, rather than another, can produce dramatic shifts in perspective as to which side is most at fault. Thus, Beijing presents its own recent actions as a response to Japan’s purchase of the Senkakus. But Tokyo’s decision to take this step was driven in turn by China’s escalation of the dispute over the islands, extending back at least to the 2010 fishing boat incident.13 Similarly, the April 2012 dispatch of the Philippines naval frigate that so incensed Beijing was a reaction to the deliberate intrusion of Chinese fishing vessels a few days earlier into waters claimed by Manila, made worse by the discovery that they had been violating Filipino law by harvesting endangered clams, sharks, and corral.14 Second, even if China was provoked in these or other instances, it did not necessarily have to respond as aggressively as it did. In recent years, Beijing has repeatedly chosen to escalate ongoing disputes rather than wind them down. This pattern is so obvious that analysts have come up with a label to describe it: Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt calls it “reactive assertiveness.”15 As a report by the International Crisis Group explains, under this approach “Beijing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change the facts on the ground in its favour.”16

### 2NC – AT: Pressure Bad – US-China Relations Turns

#### China will still cooperate on existential issues – survival and self-interest outweighs anger towards US actions

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition— would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power.

### 2NC – AT: Perm Do Both – General

#### Perm links to the net benefits – attempting to increase engagement trades off with the signal of allied reassurance generated by the CP

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through “strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy toward China.

### 2NC – AT: Perm – Do the CP – Diplomatic Engagement

#### Coercive measures like the CP are distinct from diplomatic engagement

Barry Blechman, PhD in International Relations from Georgetown University, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, and formerly worked in the Departments of State and Defense and at the Office of Management and Budget, Daniel Brumberg, Senior Adviser to the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the US Institute of Peace, and Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Democracy and Governance Program at Georgetown University, and Steven Heydemann, PhD in political science from the University of Chicago and special adviser to the Initiative on Security and Reform in the Arab World at the US Institute of Peace, 2010, “Engagement, Coercion, and Iran’s Nuclear Challenge: Report of a Joint Study Group on US-Iran Policy,” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Engagement\_Coercion\_and\_Irans\_Nuclear\_Challenge.pdf

4. The P-5+1 talks provide the appropriate initial venue for discussing the nuclear issue and for advancing additional measures. But Washington should be prepared also to pursue direct talks with Tehran in appropriate bilateral forums. US diplomats in third nations and in multinational organizations should interact with their Iranian counterparts in the normal course of business. 5. While pursuing diplomatic engagement, Washington should continue to sustain the sanctions and other punitive measures that clearly and effectively signal to Tehran a real geo-strategic, diplomatic, and economic cost for failing to cooperate on the nuclear issue. These measures should be pursued through prudent actions rather than through a language of confrontation, threats, or insults. Threats and coercion will be far more effective if they are implicit rather than explicit: a key element of over-all US policy, but not the sole basis of that policy.

### 2NC – AT: Perm – Do the CP – Economic Engagement

#### Economic engagement must expand economic ties – excludes negative actions like the CP

Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Scott L. Kastner, Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, November 2004, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=75C3049617276909DAB613712DFC6DCA?doi=10.1.1.496.7734&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and to effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the study of international relations. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about the frequency with which strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers.1 However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

### 1NC Heg NB – Engagement Bad

#### Positive engagement with China undermines US leadership – pressure-based balancing reassures allies and prevents China rise

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

The principal task that confronts U.S. grand strategy today, therefore, is adapting to the fundamental challenge posed by China’s continuing rise. Integration, the prevailing U.S. approach toward China and the one followed assiduously since the 1970s, has undoubtedly contributed to China’s rise as a future rival to American power. None of the alternatives usually discussed in the debates in Washington and elsewhere about how to respond to China’s growing strength satisfy the objective of preserving American primacy for yet another “long cycle” in international politics. These alternatives, which include embracing and participating with China, accommodating Beijing through some kind of a Group of Two (G2) arrangement, or containing China à la the Soviet Union, all have severe limitations from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and could in fact undermine the larger goal of strengthening Washington’s preeminence in the global system.33 Accordingly, the United States should substantially modify its grand strategy toward China—one that at its core would replace the goal of concentrating on integrating Beijing into the international system with that of consciously balancing its rise—as a means of protecting simultaneously the security of the United States and its allies, the U.S. position at the apex of the global hierarchy, and the strength of the liberal international order, which is owed ultimately to the robustness of American relative power.

### 1NC Heg NB – Impact

#### Hegemony solves nuclear war – only engagement prevents multipolar wars – uniquely true in Asia

Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN and former Director of Policy Planning at the Defense Department, 2-8-2011, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,” http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

### 2NC Heg NB – Engagement Bad

#### Engagement emboldens China and causes allies to doubt our security commitments – tanks leadership in Asia

Charles L. Glaser, Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University and Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Spring 2015, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation,” file:///Users/rtuuser/Downloads/isec\_a\_00199.pdf

Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it were to convince China that the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital national interests, leading China to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. This danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia. Accommodation might also raise serious concerns among U.S. allies—most importantly, Japan—about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, thereby undermining alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of the United States. Finally, ending the United States’ commitment to Taiwan could sacrifice important U.S. nonsecurity interests, including support for democracy and individual liberties, with no guarantee of benefits in return.

### 1NC Solvency Takeout – China Says No

#### The CCP will reject the plan – deeply skeptical of any American initiatives

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

China’s Communist rulers remain threatened by U.S. campaigns in support of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities, all of which are viewed in Beijing as thinly veiled attempts at either fomenting secession or engineering regime change. In an effort to ensure that American democratic values and policies do not undermine the CCP’s hold on power, Chinese rulers have prosecuted a multipronged ideological campaign that includes a strident defense of sovereignty and a concerted rejection of all foreign interest in the nation’s internal affairs, intense surveillance of suspect domestic groups and nongovernmental organizations operating in China, and focused propaganda efforts to amplify Chinese nationalism and mobilize public support in defense of the regime and the state.16

### 2NC Solvency Takeout – China Says No

#### China says no – China wants to unilaterally expand its power and will reject inclusion into a US-based system – ignore optimistic assessments

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

The six strategies discussed here reflect differing assumptions about the sources of Chinese conduct and the likely impact of US behaviour upon it, as well as on the actions of other Asian nations. The first three options rest on what appear increasingly to be overly optimistic assessments of the likely extent of the ambitions of the current Communist regime and the degree to which it can be placated or appeased. As regards ‘enhanced engagement’, the notion that the regime wants nothing more than to be accepted as a full-fledged member of the prevailing American-led order does not comport well with the evidence of recent Chinese behaviour; it also reflects a certain lack of imagination and historical perspective. Rising powers typically want to change things for reasons of pride and prestige, as well as rational material calculation. Their leaders believe that prevailing structures, put into place when they were relatively weak, are inherently unfair and disadvantageous. But they also chafe against having to accept rules and roles that were designed by others; they want to make their own mark and to receive the deference to which they believe themselves entitled.41

### 2NC Solvency Takeout – Chinese Political Reform Advs

#### Engagement can’t lead to Chinese reforms or checks on aggression – empirics – China has become less liberal alongside more engagement

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

The goals of this mixed strategy have been to ‘tame’ and ultimately to transform the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Through balancing, the United States aims to uphold its alliances and to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression or attempts at coercion. At the same time, through engagement, Washington has sought to encourage China’s full incorporation into the existing international system, in the anticipation that its leaders will come to see their interests as lying in preserving and strengthening that system rather than seeking to challenge or overthrow it. Although, in recent years, they have become somewhat more circumspect in stating this goal directly, since the early 1990s US policymakers have also continued to hope that, in time, China’s domestic political institutions would evolve toward something more closely resembling those of a liberal democracy. This is not a process to which the United States has sought to contribute directly, but rather one that it has attempted to encourage by indirect means, including the promulgation of ideas and, above all, the promotion of trade. Thus, since the early 1990s, one of the primary justifications for deepening economic engagement has been the claim that expanding trade and investment would accelerate growth, thereby hastening the emergence of a reform-minded Chinese middle class. Albeit with occasional shifts in rhetorical tone and emphasis, and comparatively minor adjustments in the blend of engagement and balancing, for the past quarter-century successive US administrations have continued to adhere to the same basic approach. In the last several years, however, questions have emerged about the adequacy and long-term durability of this strategy. While China is obviously far richer today than it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it is no more democratic. Indeed, to the contrary, the elevation of Xi Jinping to the status of China’s paramount leader in 2012 has been accompanied by a wide-ranging crackdown on dissent, a further tightening of controls over access to the internet, and new restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organisations, especially those suspected of trying to strengthen civil society in order to promote human rights and social justice. Despite decades of deepening engagement, China appears, if anything, to have moved further away from meaningful political reform. Meanwhile, fuelled by rapid economic expansion, the nation’s military capabilities have grown to impressive dimensions. Among other developments, the deployment by China of so-called ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) forces has raised serious questions about the future willingness and, perhaps, the ability of the United States to project power into the Western Pacific. Especially in light of the fiscal constraints under which it now labours, it is not obvious that the United States can continue to play its accustomed role in preserving a favourable balance of power in East Asia.

### 2NC Solvency Takeout – US-China Coop Advs

#### Scholarly consensus goes neg – Chinese suspicion of the US has increased alongside engagement

Harry Harding, University Professor at the University of Virginia and Visiting Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Fall 2015, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Fall2015\_Harding.pdf

No matter how an objective observer would portray these developments, the fact that the two societies interpret them so differently has led the relationship between them to take a turn for the worse. Despite each government’s repeated pledges to seek a stable and collaborative relationship, and despite the numerous bilateral dialogues convened to clarify intentions, provide reassurance, and build trust, mutual suspicion has continued to increase. While not everyone would agree with U.S. Naval War College professor Lyle Goldstein’s assessment that the relationship is near “the brink of disaster,” 16 the consensus is that the relationship between the two countries has been deteriorating and that the chances of conflict, although still low, have been increasing. This feeds the growing perception that the United States’ China policy has failed and thus requires reconsideration and perhaps significant modification.

### 2NC Solvency Takeout – Dialogue Fails

#### Dialogue fails – China pockets concessions and it won’t shift Chinese policy

Michael R. Auslin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar in Asian Studies and Director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 3-4-2014, Hearing on “Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia”, Testimony before The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030414\_Testimony%20-%20Michael%20Auslin.pdf

Nor is there much reason to be confident about the trajectory of China. Unlike his immediate predecessors, President Xi Jinping has consolidated his power in his first year in office. He appears to have better control over the military than former president Hu Jintao ever did, and has streamlined his country’s national security decision-making process. He now has nine full years to push forward not only his program for domestic economic reform, which the United States should welcome, but also his national security objectives, which increasingly seem to be at odds with a stable Asia-Pacific region. President Xi’s first year saw new and destabilizing acts, such as the establishment of the East China Sea air defense identification zone. Provocations over the Senkakus also increased, with reports of Chinese fighter jets being sent near the area and an instance of a Chinese naval vessel locking its firing radar on a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense ship. If these are any indications to go by, President Xi is comfortable pushing the boundaries of provocative behavior. That is the reason the trend line in Asia is negative, and is not improving despite regular high-level U.S.-Chinese interaction, such as the Sunnylands summit between Presidents Obama and Xi last year and Vice President Biden’s visit to Beijing last December. It appears that the Chinese government has calculated that it can continue its assertive, even coercive, actions in the face of America’s protestations that it is rebalancing to the Pacific. Tensions are running high enough in Northeast Asia to cause Prime Minister Abe to remark at Davos earlier this year that Sino-Japanese relations are in a pre-1914 stage. As of now, it does not seem that Washington has come up with a successful policy that can encourage Beijing to act in a constructive manner on security issues, while continuing its integration into the world economy. Not surprisingly, many believe this is the greatest foreign policy challenge our country will face in the coming generation.

# DA China Appeasement DA

### Disad Story…

#### This disadvantage is best read against affirmatives that claim large strategy shifts towards China. Essentially, this disad impact turns the aff’s internal link thesis by saying that instead of seeking greater cooperation with China, the US should instead move toward competition with China for regional hegemony and influence. The story of the disad is as follow. Uniqueness, the US and China only cooperate in areas of mutual interest and even then, only in limited capacities. The US is displaying military might in the Asia Pacific; mainly through naval buildup.

#### Link, there are two ways to spin the link. First, if the plan is a unilateral concession in the hopes China will take a desired action, the Neg should argue that China will not do what the US wants, and instead this just makes the US look weak which encourages Chinese aggression. Second, if the plan requires a quid pro quo—that China take an action in exchange for the US doing something—the Neg should argue this gives China the opening to extract additional concessions from the US. Mainly, the Neg should claim China will require the US to remove its naval presence in the Asia Pacific in order for China to cooperate. Spinning that China gets the upper hand in the negotiating process is essential.

#### The impact claim is simple: when the US appeases China by seeking cooperation instead of competition over regional influence and hegemony, it emboldens China to do bad things. The Neg could argue this appeasement leads to emboldening other US adversaries to take action against the US; nations such as Iran, North Korea, or rogue elements. Further, the Neg could argue that appeasement emboldens China to militarily reclaim Taiwan.

#### There are a couple of Neg tricks as well. First, the uniqueness to the disad is a solvency deficit to the aff. If competition between the US and China is increasing in the squo, it’s a reason China would say “no” to the offer of the plan. The Neg can always argue that unless the US removes its naval presence in Asia Pacific, China will never cooperate fully with the US. Also, even if this doesn’t lead to war with China, the loss of military presence in Asia will independently collapse hegemony. Further, in the instance the Neg reads a Taiwan impact scenario, and the Aff claims the US would never defend Taiwan against China, the Neg can win that failure to defend Taiwan collapses US credibility with allies which crushes US hegemony.

### 1NC Shell—UQ

#### UNIQUENESS: Despite the U.S. and China cooperating on issues now, the U.S. is taking a hardline military approach against China

Agence France Presse (AFP), International news organizations headquartered in Paris, France, March 31, 2016, “China to US: 'Be Careful' in South China Sea,” Miliary.com, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/03/31/china-us-be-careful-south-china-sea.html> (accessed April 22, 2016)

Beijing's defence ministry on Thursday warned the [US Navy](http://www.military.com/navy) to "be careful" in the South China Sea and slammed a newly signed agreement between Washington and the Philippines. Earlier this month, Manila agreed to give US forces access to five military bases, including some close to the disputed South China Sea, where tensions have risen over Beijing's assertion of its territorial claims. China claims virtually all the South China Sea despite conflicting claims by Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines, and has built up artificial islands in the area in recent months, including some with airstrips. Washington has since October carried out two high-profile "freedom of navigation" operations in which it sailed warships within 12 nautical miles of islets claimed by China. Asked about a recent report on US patrols in the sea, defense ministry spokesman Yang Yujun told a briefing on Thursday: "As for the US ships which came, I can only suggest they be careful". The [agreement between Washington and Manila](http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/03/19/us-philippines-announce-locations-covered-by-defense-pact.html) applies to the Antonio Bautista Air Base on the western island of Palawan, directly on the South China Sea. Asked about the deal, Yang said: "To strengthen military alliances is a reflection of a Cold War mentality". "It is in the opposite direction of the trends of the era for peace, development and cooperation," he said, adding bilateral military cooperation "should not "undermine a third party's interests". Washington regularly accuses Beijing -- which says it has built runways on and deployed unspecified weapons to islands in the South China Sea -- of militarizing the area. Beijing denies the accusations and says US patrols have ramped up tensions. "Now, the United States has come back, and is reinforcing its military presence in this region and promoting militarisation in the South China Sea," Yang said.

### 1NC Shell—Link

#### LINK: The plan fosters cooperation and appeasement at a time when the U.S. should be shoring up competition against China

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he was senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, ” Carnegie Endowment, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf> (accessed April 22, 2016)

The long-term U.S. effort to protect its vital national interests by integrating China into the international system is at serious risk today because Beijing has acquired the capacity, and increasingly displays the willingness, to pursue threatening policies against which American administrations have asserted they were hedging. Nevertheless, these same U.S. policymakers have continued to interact with China as if these dangerous Chinese policies were only theoretical and consigned to the distant future. In short, successive administrations have done much more cooperating with China than hedging, hoping that Beijing would gradually come to accept the United States’ leading role in Asia despite all the evidence to the contrary, not least because cooperation was so much less costly in the short term than military, geoeconomic, and diplomatic hedging. China has indeed become a rapidly growing economy, providing wealth and welfare gains both for itself and for American citizens, but it has acquired the wherewithal to challenge the United States, endangering the security of its allies and others in Asia, and to slowly chip away at the foundations of the liberal international order globally. In other words, China has not evolved into a “responsible stakeholder” as then Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick called on it to become.37 Instead, in recent decades Beijing has used the benign U.S. approach to the rise of Chinese power to strengthen its domestic economy, and thus the CCP’s hold on power, to enhance its military capabilities and increase its diplomatic and geoeconomic sway in Asia and beyond, all while free-riding on the international order and public goods provided by the United States and its allies. Therefore, the United States should become more strategically proactive in meeting the Chinese challenge to U.S. interests and less preoccupied with how this more robust U.S. approach might be evaluated in Beijing. (The PRC apparently will remain convinced that Washington is practicing a containment policy no matter what policies the United States pursues.38) This means reconfiguring U.S. grand strategy toward China in the following four ways with consequent and systematic policy implementation: The United States should vitalize the U.S. economy at home, construct a new set of trading relationships in Asia that exclude China, fashion effective policies to deal with China’s pervasive use of geoeconomic tools in Asia and beyond, and, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, create a new technology-control mechanism vis-à-vis China.39 The United States should invest in U.S. defense capabilities and capacity to enable the United States to defeat China’s emerging antiaccess capabilities and permit successful U.S. power projection even against concerted opposition from Beijing. The United States should reinforce a new set of trusted strategic relationships and partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific region that include traditional U.S. alliances but go beyond them, pursuing as an explicit policy the objectives of both strengthening Asian states’ ability to cope with China independently and building new forms of intra-Asian strategic cooperation that do not always involve, but will be systematically supported by, the United States. The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies and to reassure U.S. allies and friends in Asia and beyond that its objective is to avoid a confrontation with China.

### 1NC Shell—Int. Link

#### INT LINK: Appeasing China emboldens them to invade Taiwan

Bruce Jacobs, Emeritus professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University, November 1, 2015, “Appeasement will only encourage China,” Sydney Morning Herald, <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-only-encourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html> (accessed April 22, 2016)

China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately claim that Taiwan was Chinese. In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These four years were perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28 (February 28, 1947) massacres. The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988. Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against native Taiwanese. Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power. The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Ching-kuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population. All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies. The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming involved in a war. History has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later. Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without international protest. The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu, want to maintain the status quo – that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly. We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic countries have become aware of the risks.

### 1NC Shell—Impact

#### IMPACT: China invading Taiwan causes nuclear war

[Hugh White](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/hugh-white), Professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, May 5, 2015, “Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808> (accessed April 22, 2016)

After a decade of relative harmony, tensions between Beijing and Taipei are rising again. As Taiwan's leaders and voters face big choices about their future relations with China, America must think carefully about its commitments to Taiwan. Would America be willing go to war with China to prevent Taiwan being forcibly united with the mainland? J. Michael Cole, responding in The National Interest to a [recent op-ed of mine](http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/invitation/story/the-harsh-reality-taiwan-faces-20150415) in Singapore's Straits Times, [expresses a widely held assumption](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-let-china-swallow-taiwan-12708) that it would, and should. To many people it seems self-evident that America would honor the commitments enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act. But the TRA was passed in 1979, when China's GDP was 1/20th the size of America's, its place in the global economy was miniscule, its navy and air force were negligible, and its prospects for progress depended completely on America's goodwill. So back then a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much more to lose than America. Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered. These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict.

## BLOCK EXTs

### 2NC—Impact Framing

#### The aff can’t ever solve larger grand strategy conflicts with China—the disad solves key US power projection and crafts the best foreign policy approach

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he was senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, ” Carnegie Endowment, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf> (accessed April 22, 2016)

In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamental trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is caution and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplomacy in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic paradigms, but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental change in the relationship.” The Obama administration has clearly pursued a policy approach far different than the one recommended in this report. To be clear, this involves a more fundamental issue than policy implementation. All signs suggest that President Obama and his senior colleagues have a profoundly different and much more benign diagnosis of China’s strategic objectives in Asia than do we. Like some of its predecessors, the Obama administration has not appeared to understand and digest the reality that China’s grand strategy in Asia in this era is designed to undermine U.S. vital national interests and that it has been somewhat successful in that regard. It is for this overriding reason that the Obama team has continued the cooperate-but-hedge policy of its predecessors, but with much greater emphasis on cooperating than on hedging. Many of these omissions in U.S. policy would seem to stem from an administration worried that such actions would offend Beijing and therefore damage the possibility of enduring strategic cooperation between the two nations, thus the dominating emphasis on cooperation. That self-defeating preoccupation by the United States based on a long-term goal of U.S.-China strategic partnership that cannot be accomplished in the foreseeable future should end.

### 2NC—Impact Framing

#### Neither the US nor China will make meaningful concessions—the plan is insufficient to boost cooperation; prefer the disad’s impact framing

[Ryan Pickrell](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/ryan-pickrell), Has a Master’s degree in International Relations, he is currently pursuing a PhD in International Relations and Diplomacy at Central China Normal University in Wuhan, Hubei, China. He is in the third year of his degree program, and his research is primarily focused on Sino-American relations, specifically the respective grand strategies of China and the United States and the impact of these strategies on the Asia-Pacific region and the Sino-American relationship, October 26, 2015, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168> (accessed April 22, 2016)

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.

### 2NC—Impact Framing

#### China doesn’t follow through on deals with the U.S.—we always end up conceding more than China does

The Economist, Economic news and analysis outlet, November 15, 2014, “Dealing with denial,” The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21632508-americas-concessions-are-more-real-chinas-dealing-denial> (accessed April 23, 2016)

America’s concessions are more real than China’s. Five years ago next month, disagreement between America and China, the world’s biggest greenhouse-gas emitters, scuppered the UN’s Copenhagen climate-change conference. On November 11th Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping announced a deal on carbon emissions. This is welcome, with two caveats: China has not conceded much, and Congress will do its best to prevent America from delivering what the president has promised. Because America is responsible for a far larger share of the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere than China, it was bound to accept sharper cuts. Even so, it has made big concessions. America had previously signed up to a cut of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. This looks achievable because emissions are already falling. The new agreement is for a 26-28% cut by 2025, which would require a doubling in the pace of cuts after 2020. China has agreed that its emissions will peak in 2030, and that the percentage of non-fossil fuels in its energy consumption will rise to 20% by 2030. Just getting a date out of the Chinese is an achievement, but American negotiators had been aiming for 2025. More important, the date the Chinese have agreed to may not be so different from what would have happened without a deal. Earlier this year He Jiankun of Tsinghua University reckoned that China’s carbon emissions would peak by “around 2030”, as economic growth is slowing and urbanisation will have mostly run its course by then. The agreement gives both sides plenty of wriggle room, referring to the countries’ “best efforts” and their intentions to reach their targets. Because it is not a treaty, it does not have to be ratified by Congress. But for America to meet its new targets, both Congress and the Supreme Court would have to leave the federal government’s current efforts to cut carbon emissions, which involve issuing regulations under the Clean Air Act, well alone.

## Uniqueness Ext.

### Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Laundry List

#### Little US/ China cooperation now—differences on counter terrorism and human rights stunts cooperation

Andi Zhou, Program Coordinator for the China, East Asia and United States Program, working out of the [EastWest Institute’s New York Center](http://www.ewi.info/), March 11, 2016, “Can China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Save the US in Afghanistan?,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-save-the-us-in-afghanistan/> (accessed April 22, 2016)

First, China’s policies toward its Uyghur population have long raised human rights concerns in Washington, and the United States’ refusal to label all Uyghur unrest as “terrorism” has frustrated China in bilateral discussions. The U.S. has also [hesitated](http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/can-the-u-s-and-china-cooperate-to-fight-terrorism/) to expand counterterrorism cooperation with China for fear that China would use its newfound capabilities to persecute the broader Uyghur population. Second, China has been reluctant to act in Afghanistan on issues that lack direct implications for its concerns about Xinjiang. On top of a general predilection for non-interference, China views the U.S. nation-building misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan as a cautionary tale. With its hands full of problems both domestically and in its immediate neighborhood, China [fears getting sucked into a quagmire](http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2012-10/3193760.html) in some far-flung land. In short, China viewing Afghanistan as an extension of its Uyghur concerns limits both U.S. and Chinese willingness to cooperate in Afghanistan. The United States would balk at involving China in any way that helps China shore up its domestic position against Uyghur discontent, and China would be loath to lend a hand in any way that doesn’t. For the United States and China to get on the same page about Afghanistan, China must be convinced that its interest in Afghanistan goes beyond its domestic concerns.

### Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Asia Pivot

#### Asia Pivot prevents meaningful US/China cooperation now

Maral Noori, Program specialist at USIP, Daniel Jasper, Public education and advocacy coordinator for Asia at the AFSC, and Jason Tower, East Asia Quaker International Affairs representative at the AFSC, August 24, 2015, “Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation,” United States Institute of Peace, <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/24/overcoming-barriers-us-china-cooperation> (accessed April 22, 2016)

In 2011, U.S. president Barack Obama announced plans to "pivot" toward Asia. In 2012, Chinese president Xi Jinping expressed his hope for "a new type of relationship" with the United States. A lack of strategic trust between the two countries, however, prevents critically needed productive cooperation. This Peace Brief addresses the misunderstandings behind this mistrust and a possible way to move beyond them. The United States has urged China to take on greater international responsibility and to leverage its rise to power by adhering to international law and urging its strategic partners to do the same. However, Beijing’s adherence to its principle of noninterference has drawn sharp U.S. criticism, as has its tendency to support incumbent governments in contentious states. Beijing is presenting a more flexible and proactive foreign diplomacy. At the same time, it is concerned about U.S. military policies and diplomatic campaigns seemingly targeted at containing China or undermining Chinese efforts to influence global institutions. Identifying common ground is more imperative than ever if what Beijing calls a "new type of major country relations" are to be manifest in cooperative frameworks, policies, and joint initiatives. Washington and Beijing need to build strategic trust, overcome domestic policy hurdles, demonstrate their willingness to participate as leaders in the international community, and better coordinate to fill gaps in global governance and development issues.

### Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Military

#### China stepping up competition against the US now—cooperation not the focus

[Morgan Chalfant](http://freebeacon.com/author/morgan-chalfant/), Reporter at the Washington Free Beacon, January 5, 2016, “Top Navy Admiral Cites Increasing Competition from Russia, China,” Free Beacon, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/top-navy-admiral-cites-increasing-competition-from-russia-china/> (accessed April 21, 2016)

The U.S. military is facing increased competition from Russia and China and will need to innovate in order to address its competitors despite tight budget restrictions, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson wrote in a Navy strategy [document](http://news.usni.org/2016/01/05/document-cno-richardsons-new-u-s-navy-guidance) released Tuesday. Richardson specifically pointed to Russia and China as nations that are competing with the U.S., citing the advancement of their military and technological capabilities and their specific focus on vulnerabilities of American capabilities. “For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers,” Richardson wrote in the document entitled “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” “Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end war fighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological, and information systems.”

### Uniqueness—Little Cooperation Now—Economic

#### US/ China competition high now—economic sectior

Zheng Yu, Scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, February 23, 2016, “Competition between China and US primarily economic,” China Daily, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-02/23/content_23599604.htm> (accessed April 19, 2016)

First, in his 2016 State of the Union address, US President Barack Obama, who has always been rather discreet, said in a rather high-profile manner, "The United States of America is the most powerful nation. Period. It's not even close." Second, after the Taiwan leader election, US officials repeated the one-China policy while expressing concerns over cross-Straits stability. These two things suggest that the US remains confident in its own strength, and military confrontations to pin down Chinese development and stability are not part of the US' strategic considerations. Instead, the US regards economic competition as the primary area of competition between the US and China for global leadership. In international-trade rulemaking, the US kept one step ahead of China by successfully inking the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations with 11 countries on Feb 4. For China, the free-trade agreements signed with the Republic of Korea on June 1 and Australia on June 17 helped create two major breaches in the wall of US-made trade rules. In international finance and trade, the two countries also had their own respective gains. As the US economy continues to improve, the international status of the US dollar has been further consolidated, with substantial increases in the exchange rate against major currencies, including the RMB. Meanwhile, the Chinese manufacturing industry has shown remarkable international competitiveness. In the area of domestic economic or national strength development, an important area of China-US competition, the US has performed better. The Obama administration's policy of bringing manufacturing back to the US has produced visible results, leading to effective technological progress, a steady increase in employment and an appreciating dollar.

### US Hegemony Sustainable

#### US primacy will continue into the foreseeable future. We’re too far ahead now

Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Chairman of the WEF’s Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government, April 30, 2015, “American hegemony or American primacy?,” World Finance, <http://www.worldfinance.com/home/american-hegemony-or-american-primacy> (accessed April 19, 2016)

No country in modern history has possessed as much global military power as the US. Yet some analysts now argue that the US is following in the footsteps of the UK, the last global hegemon to decline. This historical analogy, though increasingly popular, is misleading. Britain was never as dominant as the US is today. To be sure, it maintained a navy equal in size to the next two fleets combined, and its empire, on which the sun never set, ruled over a quarter of humankind. But there were major differences in the relative power resources of imperial Britain and contemporary America. By the outbreak of World War I, Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in terms of military personnel, fourth in terms of GDP, and third in military spending. The British Empire was ruled in large part through reliance on local troops. Of the 8.6 million British forces in WWI, nearly a third came from the overseas empire. That made it increasingly difficult for the government in London to declare war on behalf of the empire when nationalist sentiments began to intensify. By World War II, protecting the empire had become more of a burden than an asset. The fact that the UK was situated so close to powers like Germany and Russia made matters even more challenging. For all the loose talk of an ‘American empire’, the fact is that the US does not have colonies that it must administer, and thus has more freedom to manoeuvre than the UK did. And, surrounded by unthreatening countries and two oceans, it finds it far easier to protect itself. That brings us to another problem with the global hegemon analogy: the confusion over what hegemony actually means. Some observers conflate the concept with imperialism; but the US is clear evidence that a hegemon does not have to have a formal empire. Others define hegemony as the ability to set the rules of the international system; but precisely how much influence over this process a hegemon must have, relative to other powers, remains unclear. Still others consider hegemony to be synonymous with control of the most power resources. But, by this definition, 19th century Britain – which at the height of its power in 1870 ranked third (behind the US and Russia) in GDP and third (behind Russia and France) in military expenditures – could not be considered hegemonic, despite its naval dominance. Similarly, those who speak of American hegemony after 1945 fail to note that the Soviet Union balanced US military power for more than four decades. Though the US had disproportionate economic clout, its room for political and military manoeuvre was constrained by Soviet power. Some analysts describe the post-1945 period as a US-led hierarchical order with liberal characteristics, in which the US provided public goods while operating within a loose system of multilateral rules and institutions that gave weaker states a say. They point out that it may be rational for many countries to preserve this institutional framework, even if American power resources decline. In this sense, the US-led international order could outlive America’s primacy in power resources, though many others argue that the emergence of new powers portends this order’s demise. But, when it comes to the era of supposed US hegemony, there has always been a lot of fiction mixed in with the facts. It was less a global order than a group of like-minded countries, largely in the Americas and Western Europe, which comprised less than half of the world. And its effects on non-members – including significant powers like China, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet bloc – were not always benign. Given this, the US position in the world could more accurately be called a ‘half-hegemony.’ Of course, America did maintain economic dominance after 1945: the devastation of WWII in so many countries meant that the US produced nearly half of global GDP. That position lasted until 1970, when the US share of global GDP fell to its pre-war level of one-quarter. But, from a political or military standpoint, the world was bipolar, with the Soviet Union balancing America’s power. Indeed, during this period, the US often could not defend its interests: the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons; communist takeovers occurred in China, Cuba, and half of Vietnam; the Korean War ended in a stalemate; and revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were repressed. Against this background, primacy seems like a more accurate description of a country’s disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft. The question now is whether the era of US primacy is coming to an end. Given the unpredictability of global developments, it is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively. The rise of transnational forces and non-state actors, not to mention emerging powers like China, suggests that there are big changes on the horizon. But there is still reason to believe that, at least in the first half of this century, the US will retain its primacy in power resources and continue to play the central role in the global balance of power. In short, while the era of US primacy is not over, it is set to change in important ways. Whether or not these changes will bolster global security and prosperity remains to be seen.

### US Hegemony Sustainable

#### US hegemony is high and sustainable now—multiple reasons

[Salvatore Babones](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/salvatore-babones), An associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney. He is a comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the social sciences. June 11, 2015, “American Hegemony Is Here to Stay,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089> (accessed April 19, 2016)

When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This “unipolar moment” lasted a mere decade. September 11, 2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American leadership. Now, America’s internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated. America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come.

### US Hegemony Sustainable

#### US will remain the global hegemon—China can’t overtake the US now

Ian Bremmer, PhD and M.A. from Stanford University in Political Science, May 28, 2015,“These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World’s Only Superpower,” Time, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/> (accessed April 19, 2016)

A ‘superpower’ is a country that wields enough military, political and economic might to convince nations in all parts of the world to do things they otherwise wouldn’t. Pundits have rushed to label China the next superpower—and [so have](http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-3-balance-of-power-u-s-vs-china/) many ordinary Americans—but the rumors of America’s decline have been greatly exaggerated. In the key categories of power, the U.S. will remain dominant for the foreseeable future. These facts show why America is still the world’s only superpower, and why that won’t change anytime soon. 1. Economics China’s economy is growing at an impressive rate. But it’s not just the size of an economy that matters—it’s also the quality. According to the World Bank, GDP per capita in the US was $53,042 in 2013; in China it was just $6,807. In other words, little of China’s dramatic economic growth is finding its way into the pockets of Chinese consumers—the byproduct of an economy driven by massive state-owned enterprises rather than private industry. China’s headline growth may be higher, but it’s the U.S. economy that’s allowing its citizens to grow along with it. And crucially, the American economy remains the bedrock of the global financial system. Over 80% of all financial transactions worldwide are conducted in dollars, as are 87% of foreign currency market transactions. As long as the world continues to place such faith in America’s currency and overall economic stability, the U.S. economy remains the one to beat. America’s military superiority remains unrivaled—full stop. The US accounts for 37% of global military spending, and spends more than four times what China, the world’s No. 2 spender, does on its military. The U.S. dominates across land, sea, air and space. America’s Middle East misadventures gave the U.S. military a black eye, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan speak more to the changing nature of warfare than declining U.S. military superiority. Terrorists and guerilla fighters give conventional military powers fits by design. The U.S. must ultimately learn to scale down to better meet those challenges. Nevertheless, while conventional military strength might not deter terrorists, it still does a terrific job of deterring hostile nations. Political power comes in many dimensions. For the U.S., foreign aid is an effective way to cement its political clout globally. In 2013, the U.S. doled out $32.7 billion in financial assistance; second was the UK at $19 billion. Turns out that money buys strong political cooperation from countries in need. But in order to have political power abroad, you must first have stability at home. The U.S. has the oldest working national constitution in the world, as well as strong institutions and rule of law to accompany it. While far from perfect, the governing document created by America’s founding fathers has evolved along with its people. The numbers show the enduring attraction of this system: 45 million people living in the U.S. today were born in a foreign country. That is more than four times higher than the next highest country. For many people around the world, America remains the ideal place to start a new life. Of the 9 largest tech companies in the world, 8 are based in the U.S. Give the growing importance of the technology sector, that’s a big deal. For decades America worried about energy dependency, yet today America is the world’s No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, in large part due to the development of hydraulic fracturing, a product of public research and private energy. America’s research universities and scientific institutions are best in class, allowing the nation to focus its ingenuity where it’s needed most. And America is spending the money to keep its comparative advantage intact: 30% of all research and development dollars are spent in the U.S.

## Link Ext.

### Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion

#### China perceives US weakness—they’ll invade Taiwan if they think the US is too politically weak to respond

[J. Michael Cole](http://thediplomat.com/authors/j-michael-cole/), Editor in chief of [thinking-taiwan.com](http://www.thinking-taiwan.com/). He is a former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa and was a deputy news editor and journalist at the Taipei Times from 2006-2013, July 6, 2012, “Time To End U.S. 'Ambiguity' on Taiwan,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/time-to-end-u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

The question, therefore, is what Beijing will do when it realizes that growing economic interaction will not translate into support for unification. Coercion, or use of force, could then become more appealing to the Chinese Communist Party, especially if it believes it can do so at a relatively low cost — in other words, if it is convinced that the U.S. will not intervene. [A lot of publicity has surrounded the ongoing U.S. strategic “pivot” to Asia](http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in/), which for the most part [many would argue was prompted by developments in the South China Sea](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11152948) and calls by some of the claimants, principally the Philippines and Vietnam, for U.S. assistance in countering a resurgent China. Publicly, while Washington has re-emphasized its engagement with allies in the region, from Japan to Australia, in most instances Washington has omitted mentioning Taiwan as a regional partner. This was ostensibly to avoid undermining warming ties between Taipei and Beijing. A number of factors, however, cast serious doubts on t[he wisdom of excluding Taiwan from the “pivot.”](http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/13/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/) Among them is the fact that Beijing may be using the South China Sea disputes, which it can wage at relatively low cost [by relying mostly on maritime surveillance ships and fishing vessels](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/small-stick-diplomacy-the-south-china-sea-6831?page=show), as a distraction or a sideshow, while continuing to build up its military forces facing Taiwan. Were the U.S. to reorient its military predominantly for the purposes of addressing a South China Sea contingency (e.g. by favoring deployments in Southeast Asia or as far south as Australia), it could find itself unprepared, if not unable, to deal with an attack on Taiwan. Through its belligerence in the South China Sea — an area whose importance is only secondary to its goal of unification with Taiwan — China has also repeatedly and unapologetically displayed its fixation on “history,” often at the expense of international law or multilateral approaches to conflict resolution. While this intransigence bodes ill for the possibility of resolving sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, it portends even more ominously for China’s approach to political negotiations with Taiwan, which in turn could make the military option more likely at some point in the future.

### Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion

#### China pays attention to US signals of strength—they will base their military action on US power displays

[Damon Linker](http://theweek.com/author/damon-linker), Senior correspondent at TheWeek.com. He is also a consulting editor at the University of Pennsylvania Press, and a former contributing editor at The New Republic, March 21, 2014, “What would America do if China invaded Taiwan?,” Indian Strategic Studies, <http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/2014/03/what-would-america-do-if-china-invaded.html#more> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Every time the president allows a stated line to be crossed — as he did in [Syria](http://theweek.com/article/index/243660/why-syria-may-be-obamas-gravest-foreign-policy-blunder-ever) last year over Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons, and now again with Russia's actions in Ukraine — he signals that American security commitments may be hollow. The overall importance of such signaling in international relations is a contentious topic among those who study foreign affairs. But there is one potential theater of conflict in the world where we can be quite certain that America's recent actions — or rather, inactions — have been very closely noted: the Taiwan Straits. Ever since Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government fled Mao Zedong's communist takeover of mainland China in 1949, relocating to the island of Formosa (henceforth renamed Taiwan), the United States has tacitly guaranteed the island's security. The arrangement became more explicit with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which included a commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island. Over China's strenuous objections — the People's Republic considers Taiwan to be its sovereign territory — we've backed up that pledge by selling the Taiwanese government significant numbers of weapons over the years, most recently a $5.8 billion [package](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/china-expresses-anger-over-latest-us-arms-sales-to-taiwan.html) of military hardware in 2011. So what happens if China, having noted our reluctance to stand up to Assad and complete unwillingness to challenge Moscow militarily, decides to test us by taking Taiwan?

### Link—Top Level—Weakness= Taiwan Invasion

#### China would view American weakness as an opening to reclaim Taiwan

[Stephen Paul Brooker](http://www.valuewalk.com/author/stephenbrooker/), International Relations Writer, Researcher, and Consultant, October 17, 2015, “Who Would Win In A China-Taiwan Conflict? [Part One],” Value Walk, <http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/10/china-vs-taiwan-conflict-1/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

A decision by Beijing to wage conflict against Taiwan would require a situation drastically different from that today. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense in its annual report on mainland China this year lists six possible scenarios where [Beijing would invade Taiwan](http://focustaiwan.tw/news/afav/201508310024.aspx) under: Taiwan declares independence or takes steps toward de jure independence; Taiwan obtains nuclear weapons; foreign forces interfere in Taiwan’s affairs; [foreign troops](http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/10/russia-sell-mi-35-helicopters-afghanistan/) are deployed in Taiwan; domestic unrest in Taiwan; or cross-strait negotiations on eventual reunification are delayed by Taiwan. Additionally, many feel that a sudden shift in domestic politics in China, a belief that an invasion would not be countered by the U.S. or a militarily advantageous opportunity presenting itself to China might also lead Beijing to this course of action. Regardless of the fact that only [22 countries recognize Taiwan](http://dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/pages/taiwan-country-brief.aspx) as the sole legal government of China, any conflict launched against Taiwan by China will not be well received by the world and Beijing will have to be prepared for the diplomatic fallout. The direct economic costs to China and Taiwan of such a conflict, even in limited military scenarios would be immense and the global economy would be affected as well. Just as important would be the high cost in human life.

### Link—Top Level—No Condition

#### China exploits the U.S. when they think they can get away with it—the plan creates an opening for them to extract concessions

John Hayward, Political commentator and writer for Breibart news, September 23, 2015, “Cyber-War Surrender: Obama Will Bow to China’s Dictators,” Breibart, <http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/09/23/cyber-war-surrender-obama-will-bow-chinas-dictators/> (accessed April 23, 2015)

Perhaps events during President Xi’s visit will surprise us, but from here it looks very unlikely that China will agree to admit what it has done. We’ve already had Cyber Pearl Harbor with the OPM hack. Even if China signs a no-hacking pledge and lives up to it, they’ve already pocketed electronic intelligence advantages that will last for years. They would be calling the game after scoring multiple unanswered touchdowns. Austin provocatively sees the current state of affairs with China as the result of a foreign policy failure that reaches all the way back to President Nixon’s fabled opening to China. For decades the West has helped build China’s economy and political stature, believing not only that a prosperous China would make a profitable trade partner. That plan, supposedly, was that prosperity would erode Chinese authoritarianism, leaving Beijing a better fit for the Western idea of liberated nations living peacefully together in a global marketplace. That’s… not quite how it worked out. Austin says there’s been too much carrot and not enough stick – too much indulgence of Chinese misbehavior, too obvious an appetite for a piece of that growing Chinese economic pie. “The result? A China that feels no compunctions about rampant spying on American private business and citizens. A China that increases its military budget every year for a quarter-century, building weapons designed specifically to attack U.S. forces. A China that bullies and coerces neighbors over disputed maritime territory and builds islands to extend its power projection capabilities… yet the U.S. president continues to act as though it is business as usual with a China whose troubling behavior grows commensurate with its objective strength.” It’s true the West finds itself in a difficult position for dealing with China, because “no sane observer wants conflict to break out between China and the United States,” said Austin. China aggressively exploits that situation for advantage, confident it can bluff and bully its way out of anything less than the dreadful conflict nobody in the Western world wishes to provoke, while simultaneously signaling their willingness to fight and win every sort of war – economic, electronic, or even naval in the seas between China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Austin compares a prospective U.S.-China cyberspace treaty to last century’s Kellogg-Briand Pact, a “noble gesture that optimistically ignored reality and trusted in the goodwill of those whose actions undermined the security we sought to protect in the first place.” The Kellogg-Briand Pact ostensibly outlawed war. It was signed in 1928, so you can see how well that worked out. Some argue that in practice, the Pact made the incredible carnage of the Second World War more likely, because it prevented sincere and naive signatories from recognizing and responding to aggression. In everything from international treaties to gun-control legislation, we can see how laws against aggression tend to bind the peaceful, and thus give genuine aggressors easier prey. One other thing about trusting the “goodwill” of a nation like China: they understand that goodwill, like any other commodity, becomes more precious when the supply is short. Everything China has done throughout this first, undeclared cyber war, along with its posture in real-world conflict areas, sends the message that their goodwill is scarce, and thus commands a high price. Conversely, no-one worries much about making Obama’s United States angry any more. Who wins face-offs in this lopsided competition?

### Link—Top Level—Opposite Interests

#### The US must craft a strategy of countering China’s rise. China’s strategic interests are the opposite of the US

[Hugh White](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hugh-white), Professor of Strategic Studies, National University of Australia, June 20, 2015, “America’s China Consensus Slowly Unravels,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hugh-white/america-china-consensus_b_7096986.html> (accessed April 19, 2016)

So what should America do? Rudd says America and China can resolve the tensions caused by China’s ambitions through diplomacy. The two powers can and should negotiate in a spirit of “constructive realism,” deepening cooperation where their interests coincide while quarantining and managing the issues on which they disagree. It’s a nice idea, but Rudd’s account of it evades the hard question: is America willing to deal with China in the way he proposes? His model implies a complete transformation in the nature of U.S.-China relations so that they become true partners in regional leadership. But his prescription will only work if America is willing to deal with China as an equal, which is of course incompatible with the old model of U.S. regional leadership in Asia. Yet Rudd does not acknowledge this in his report. No doubt he understands that it is something his American audience will not want to hear, but until this issue is squarely addressed, America’s debate about China will keep on missing the mark. Blackwill and Tellis do not make this mistake. They say upfront that perpetuating U.S. primacy is America’s primary strategic objective, and they urge America to build up its economic, military and diplomatic position in Asia to preserve it from China’s challenge. This is, in effect, a policy of containment. Any accommodation of China’s ambitions is ruled out. They are rather glibly optimistic about what this policy would require. They call for the strengthening of America’s economy, military power and diplomacy to counter China’s rise, and a “geo-economic” counter-offensive against China’s growing economic sphere of influence, without saying how all this might be done. This suggests they do not really understand how radically China’s rise has shifted the distribution of power. But more importantly, Blackwill and Tellis are optimistic about how China would respond. They say America could continue cooperating with China where that suits U.S. interests, while relentlessly resisting China’s ambitions to build a new regional order. Their policy prescription assumes that China will be happy to continue working with the U.S. on these terms. In other words, their prescriptions assume what their analysis disproves: that China is not really serious about challenging U.S. primacy after all. If that was true, America could follow Blackwill and Tellis’ prescription to resist China’s challenge and preserve its primacy without running the risk of disrupting its relationship with China, which is what Americans want to hear. This brings us to point where Blackwill and Tellis converge with Rudd. Both reports evade the fact that strategic rivalry between America and China is ultimately caused by their fundamentally incompatible aims in Asia. America’s primary aim is to retain leadership in Asia, and China’s is to displace it.

### Link—Top Level—Military Presence

#### China considers the U.S. to be strong now—loss of U.S. naval presence in Asia Pacific crushes that perception

[Lyle J. Goldstein](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/lyle-j-goldstein), Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute(CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI, January 28, 2016 “Does China Think America Is in Decline?,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/does-china-think-america-decline-15042> (accessed April 23, 2016)

It has been fashionable in national security circles over the last several years for U.S. experts on Asia-Pacific security to claim that Chinese strategists perceive the U.S. to be in decline. As Daniel Blumenthal queried Ambassador John Bolton at a [November 2015 forum](https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/151119-AEI-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdf) at the American Enterprise Institute: “I don’t mean to ask such a leading question… Do you think China perceives us as… declining…?” Predictably, Bolton answered in the affirmative and went on to explain that the U.S. confronts a grave credibility problem. A similar line of thinking seems also to undergird [more centrist appraisals](http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/pushing-back-against-chinas-strategy-ten-steps-for-the-united-states/) in Washington that highlight China’s “brimming confidence” as part of the problem confronting U.S. national security policy. To be fair, there has been [some evidence from Chinese sources](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35241&cHash=db..#.VqQbiWcU-po), particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, for that line of reasoning. But even during that unstable time, key Chinese sources, including analyses by military experts, [did not forecast any diminution](http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7bf69ea901015isf.html) of America's military advantage. Undoubtedly, sound U.S. policy toward China will take account of how Chinese strategists assess American power. Indeed, the prevailing wisdom that China perceives U.S. frailty seems to form an important tenet of the logic of those arguing for more robust U.S. military deployments to the western Pacific, lest Beijing sense that Washington is weak in either resolve or capabilities. However, a spate of new Chinese analyses from 2015 seem to call into question these assumptions regarding Beijing’s view of the emerging balance of power. A series of articles and two fora were published on the subject of hypothetical “U.S. decline” during 2015 by the two major Chinese journals Contemporary International Relations and The Chinese Journal of American Studies. This edition of Dragon Eye will examine these discussions with the hope of shedding additional light on current Chinese perceptions of America’s trajectory.

## Int. Link Ext.

### Int. Link—China Seeks Concessions

#### Chinese negotiators will always seek concessions from the US

Robert Culpepper, Ph.D and professor of Management at Stephen F. Austin State University, April 1, 2012, “Negotiations Between Chinese and Americans: Examining the Cultural Context and Salient Factors,” Jim’s Journal, http://www.jimsjournal.org/21%20Robert%20Culpepper-2.pdf (accessed April 19, 2016)

Zhengti guannian is the complete or whole thinking that is customary within the Chinese culture (Graham & Lam, 2003). This involves thinking about the whole country and not the individual business, or individual person. The major Chinese industries are state owned and have to think about how their actions might affect the other state owned enterprises. This style of thinking seems to frustrate most westerners, but it has brought good things to the Chinese, who seem to get extra concessions out of the Americans just before they announce their decision to accept or reject the deal.

### Int. Link—China Seeks Concessions

#### Chinese negotiators are able to extract concessions from the U.S.

Alfred D. Wilhelm Jr, Former Army attaché in Beijing, Ph.D. in political science, 1994, “The Chinese at the Negotiating Table,” Defense Technical Information Center, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279207.pdf> (accessed April 19, 2016)

From the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until the normalization of relations with the United States in 1979, there were no official relations between the two countries. Yet for most of this period more substantive diplomatic interaction took place between these two major powers than between China and the Western nations that normalized relations with the PRC earlier. Furthermore, most of this interaction culminated at the negotiating table. The results of these negotiations have frustrated most informed American observers over the years in one of two general ways. Although the United States has been the greater political, economic, and military power, to some observers the Chinese somehow seemed to extract concessions from the United States disproportionate to their apparent power. Particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, the success of the Chinese was credited to their adherence to the "unscrupulous tenets of Marxism-Leninism Maoism." Although today ideology is less frequently credited for the successes of Chinese negotiators, some American observers believe that the Chinese approach to negotiations continues to enable China to benefit most from the Sino-American relationship.

### Int. Link—China Pockets Concessions

#### The plan lacks a meaningful condition on US capitulation—Chinese diplomats get the upper hand against US diplomats when there are no strings attached

Andrew Hupert, Managing Director of China Solved, a professional training organization dedicated to helping Westerners become more successful and effective when doing business in China, July 14, 2014, “General Principles are the Terms and Conditions page of Chinese Negotiation,” China Solved, <http://chinasolved.com/2014/07/general-principles-are-the-terms-and-conditions-page-of-chinese-negotiation/> (accessed April 21, 2016)

Westerners in China often make important concessions without even knowing it. It’s common for Chinese negotiators to frame their position with a discussion of “general principles”. Westerners tend to shrug them off with vague agreement – particularly since these conversations tend to be phrased in vague, wooden rhetoric like “harmony and shared responsibility”. It all sounds like meaningless propaganda to us, and it mixes easily with the toasts, proverbs, unfamiliar historic references and folksy anecdotes that characterize a boozy banquet night in Shanghai or Beijing. Western negotiators tend to focus on transactions, and aggressive negotiators will make every effort to control the negotiating agenda and nail down concrete deal points – but the Chinese side never gives up on their deal points or general goals, regardless of the appearance of compromise or concession. The 6th SED – Strategic and Economic Dialogue – between the US and China wrapped up last week, and US diplomats seemed to just be discovering something that Western managers have known for a long time — Chinese negotiators pay lip service to contentious issues, but don’t really change their objectives or behaviors. [The FT reported on American officials’ dismay that their efforts to influence China’s aggressive behavior in South China Sea has been ineffective](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2176dea-0732-11e4-81c6-00144feab7de.html#ixzz374nodcKV): “In June 2012, senior US and Chinese officials met in a hotel in southern Virginia to discuss a dangerous two-month stand-off taking place in the South China Sea. At the time, dozens of government vessels and fishing ships from China and the Philippines were massed in the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal, a reef 120 nautical miles from the Philippines’ coast claimed by both countries. A naval conflict seemed a real possibility. With typhoon season fast approaching, the US tried to broker a resolution. By the end of the meeting between Kurt Campbell, then the top US diplomat for Asia, and Fu Ying, China’s vice foreign minister for Asia, the US side believed they had an agreement for both sides to withdraw. The following week, the Philippines ships left the Scarborough Shoal and returned home. The Chinese, however, stayed in the area.” Are Chinese Negotiators Liars? American and European negotiators who focus on transactions and believe that contracts control actions often conclude that their Chinese counterparts are just lying when they go back on agreements or ignore their own promises. The Chinese side, however, feels that they are staying true to the goals and negotiating frameworks that the Westerners already agreed to. 1. Have your own “general principles” and start by negotiating them in-house with your own people. You know in advance that the Chinese are going to make a play for your assets and IP. What are you going to do about it? Building on a strong foundation. 2. Avoid timing difference that have you injecting real assets now and them performing services later. Develop incremental strategies and flexible tactics. Chinese negotiators who violate contract terms don’t show up with guns and masks like cartoon villains. It will be a battle of inches over years – precisely the kind of conflict that Americans lose. What is your plan for when they start swiping the coffee money and letting quality slide by 0.5% per order? You need to prepare a response for low-intensity conflict. 3. Best efforts promises are worse than meaningless – they compel you and require real concessions, but don’t constrain the Chinese side. Focus on objective benchmarks and formal recognition of compliance & completion.

### Int. Link—South China Sea Concession

#### China will use the plan as an opening to negotiate the US giving up naval presence in the South China sea—it’s a top level issue in negotiations now

Christopher Harress, Defense reporter for International Business Times, September 24, 2015, “Xi Jinping White House Visit: South China Sea Dispute Will Be Central To Talks With Obama,” International Business Times, <http://www.ibtimes.com/xi-jinping-white-house-visit-south-china-sea-dispute-will-be-central-talks-obama-2112481> (accessed April 24, 2016)

While Obama will likely discuss the South China Sea with Xi at the state dinner, diplomatic efforts aimed at getting China to stop building its artificial islands and allow freedom of navigation have so far been fruitless, according to Cheng. The available options open to the U.S. include the White House authorizing the Navy and Air Force to conduct flights over the artificial islands to test China's resolve, which would be in line with comments made by Defense Secretary Ash Carter in May when he said that the U.S. military “will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.” But since those comments, the U.S. has done nothing. Arizona Sen. John McCain has said the White House's reluctance in sending navy ships into the region has been a "dangerous mistake that grants de facto recognition of China's man-made sovereignty claims." McCain made the remarks last week at a Senate Armed Services [committee hearing](http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ccb4ed69e7c34baa8386c024974c63ff/mccain-navy-should-ignore-chinas-claims-south-china-sea) held ahead of the Chinese president's visit, adding that the U.S. must assert its rights of navigation forcefully. However, Obama has so far prevented his navy Pacific Command from doing that, fearing igniting a conflict in the region, according to Cheng, who said that few other options exist other than probing the waters. “After the Xi-Obama summit the administration could move for a full court press against China. It could authorize flights and ships to go within 12 miles, it might impose sanctions on cyber violations and press the Chinese on international property rights,” said Cheng. “But we have little evidence that the Obama administration is willing to undertake the consistent, persistence and resolute action before he leaves office in 2017.”

## Disad Mechanics

### China is a Threat—Military

#### Experts agree, China is a threat to the United States

Matt Vespa, Associate Editor at Townhall.com. He previously worked for CNSNews.com and was the recipient of Americans for Prosperity Foundation's 2013 Andrew Breitbart Award for Excellence in Online Activism and Investigative Reporting, November 6, 2015, “Yes–China Is A Threat To U.S. Interests,” Town Hall, <http://beta.townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2015/11/06/yeschina-is-a-threat-to-us-interests-n2077199> (accessed April 21, 2016)

The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) hosted a two-day forum about China, its socioeconomic state, and its role in world affairs. One of the main areas of interest and concern is whether China’s economic and military rise threatens America’s national interests. VOC invited three experts, Dr. Yu Maochun, professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Dr. Christopher Ford, Chief Investigative Counsel for the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, and Dr. Michael Auslin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, to discuss whether they thought China is going to challenge American interests in the region–all three said yes. Dr. Maochun started off by saying that U.S. interests in Asia are maintaining peace and security in the region. Whether we like it or not, the United States has been acting in a world’s policeman capacity for the better part of the 20th century. In Asia, the enforcement of that role hasn’t been unilateral, but a complex web of alliances that keep the region stable. Dr. Maochun listed the Japan-South Korea-American alliance as the one that best captures this web. China’s goal is to disrupt this multilateral arrangement. So far, China has succeeded in muddying the relationship between [Japan and South Korea](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-japan-south-korea-do-the-politically-impossible-13211), who just recently held “two-plus-two” talks with their respective foreign and defense ministers [for the first time](http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/after-5-years-japan-south-korea-hold-security-dialogue/) in five years. Yet, it’s not just these two countries; China is hard on all of the U.S.’s east Asian allies, said Dr. Maochun, especially Japan and the Philippines. Concerning global commerce, freedom of navigation is key. That is a national security priority for the U.S. in the region. Now, China isn’t going to reach parity with the United States militarily. That would take decades. The U.S. has the largest navy in the world, unrivaled when it comes to our aircraft carrier fleet, and better technological advancements in weaponry. China is instead looking for unconventional ways to disrupt U.S. capabilities. One of them is having the ability to shoot down high-altitude satellites, which the American military is dependent on for its operations. Russia isn’t too far behind on having that same capability as well. Yet, Maochun added that the Chinese are eons ahead when it comes to cyber warfare. Dr. Ford went further into the psyche of the Chinese state, warning that a rather virulent jingoistic nationalism is inherent within the minds of the country’s governing body regarding the advancement of their global return agenda. He noted that the Chinese Communist Party seeks to return to the prestige the country once had, ending the period, where they feel, was dotted by having their power and global standing being taken away. This “status centrality,” as Ford said, is coupled with the notion that the country really isn’t accustomed to the dynamics and dialogue associated with international affairs. In doing so, that means China could be characterized as a wealthy, but cranky neighbor.

### China is a Threat—Military

#### China is actively seeking to undermine key sites of US power projection such as the Asia Pacific

[James Jay Carafano](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/james-jay-carafano), Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy at the Heritage Foundation, February 7, 2015, “Wake Up, America: China Is a Real Threat,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-real-threat-12204> (accessed April 21, 2016)

Between complacency and confrontation there is a responsible way forward that keeps the Asia-Pacific a big enough place to accommodate the vital interests of both Beijing and Washington. The heavy lifting will have to be done by the United States. That's okay. The work will make America a stronger nation and a better Asian ally. In the last decade, the Chinese regime has shown itself to be anti-democratic, no friend of free markets, a first-class cyber bully and more interested in rewriting or ignoring international norms than in respecting them. Left unchecked, the Beijing method of managing international relations is not likely to make the world a better or safer place. If America didn't share the same neighborhood with China, it might well ignore Beijing's behavior and let others deal with it. But China and the United States are stuck with each other. Unfortunately, the current U.S. China policy isn't working. That’s why China thinks its U.S. policy is working—and Beijing's goal is to diminish and marginalize Washington's influence in the Asia-Pacific.

### China is a Threat—Economy

#### China is an economic threat to the U.S.—they can wreck the U.S. economy by dumping bonds

Thomas Heffner, Staff writer for Economy in Crisis economic news and analysis outlet, November 25, 2015, “China Is a Serious Threat to the U.S. Economy,” Economy in Crisis, <http://economyincrisis.org/content/china-is-a-serious-threat-to-the-u-s-economy> (accessed April 21, 2016)

China now has accumulated $3.8 trillion in convertible currency reserves. This has happened through their escalating balance-of-trade surpluses with America – they sell to us much more than we sell to them. In the process, China has been instrumental in putting many of our American manufacturers out of business. With this huge stockpile of money and the leverage it gives them, they are threatening to dump these bonds and our U.S. dollar on the market. If they take this irresponsible action, it would immeasurably devalue the worth of our money, send the cost of goods skyrocketing, and cripple our economy. This condition has been building up for a long time and puts America in a precarious and vulnerable position, as we have been producing less each year and have increasingly been surviving on imports.

### China is a Threat—Economy

#### China can easily create a toxic economic environment collapsing the U.S. economy

[Matt Egan](http://money.cnn.com/author/matt-egan/index.html), Staff writer on CNN Money's markets and investing team, January 4, 2016, “Why China is still the biggest threat to U.S. stocks,” CNN Money, <http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/04/investing/china-biggest-threat-to-us-stocks/> (accessed April 21, 2016)

If you're looking for a reason to be scared of stocks in 2016, look no further than China. It took no time at all for fears about China's economic slowdown and market gyrations there to put U.S. investors in a bad mood this year. The [Dow](http://money.cnn.com/data/markets/dow/?iid=EL) [dropped as much as 467 points](http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/04/investing/stocks-markets-dow-china/index.html?iid=EL) before recovering from the lows and ending the day down 276 points. And [Nasdaq](http://money.cnn.com/data/markets/nasdaq/?iid=EL) lost 2% on Monday, the first trading day of 2016, after [stocks in China crashed overnight.](http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/04/investing/china-stocks-pmi-factory-halted/index.html?iid=EL) The fact that 2016's first big panic attack is being fueled by China is fitting. Most investing professionals [recently surveyed by CNNMoney](http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/21/investing/stocks-markets-2016-china/?iid=EL) listed China as the biggest risk to U.S. stocks. "Let's face it, any negative vibe out of China has global ramifications. That's just the world we live in now," said Joseph Quinlan, chief market strategist at U.S. Trust, Bank of America's private wealth arm. After years of rapid growth, China is the world's second-biggest economy. Its explosive expansion lifted many other economies, [especially Latin American countries](http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/30/news/economy/emerging-market-outlook-2016/index.html?iid=EL) that make the raw materials Beijing consumes. But now that China is maturing into a more developed market, its appetite for raw goods has eased considerably. But that's raised concerns that its economy is slowing at a much faster pace than previously thought. That's why investors were alarmed when a new private report showed China's manufacturing sector contracted in December following two months of stabilization. The [Shanghai Composite plummeted nearly 7%](http://money.cnn.com/data/world_markets/americas/?iid=EL) in response and that wave of selling spread overseas, sending the Dow diving below the 17,000 level for the first time since October. The reaction to the manufacturing report, released by Chinese media group Caixin, also showcases investors' [lack of confidence in China's official economic reports.](http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/19/investing/china-economy-gdp/?iid=EL) The government's manufacturing gauge, which focuses on large enterprises, painted a rosier picture than the Caixin report. "Investors are concerned about the likelihood of smoke and mirrors that surround the official economic data," said Sam Stovall, managing director of U.S. equity strategy at S&P Capital IQ. If China is indeed slowing dramatically faster than investors realize, there is a risk the global economy could be dragged into a recession. A global recession would likely kill the bull market in U.S. stocks, which are trading at expensive valuations despite logging their [worst year since 2008](http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/31/investing/stocks-market-end-of-2015/index.html?iid=EL). The [S&P 500](http://money.cnn.com/data/markets/Sandp/?iid=EL) is trading at 18.2 times trailing profits, which is above the five-year average of 15.6, according to FactSet Research.

## Neg Answers to Aff Answers

### A/T China Lash Out

#### No China lash out—they’ll cooperate on big mutual interests and won’t go to war over US hardline approaches

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he was senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, ”Carnegie Endowment, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf> (accessed April 21, 2016)

Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relationship, including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American business in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma. Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition— would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power. In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to overturn the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescriptions contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not “treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national interests, a reasonable and responsible objective.

### A/T China Lash Out

#### Tensions will remain high, but no miscalc or war from US presence in South China sea

[Guy Taylor](http://www.washingtontimes.com/staff/guy-taylor/), National Security Team Leader at The Washington Times, overseeing the paper's State Department, Pentagon and intelligence community coverage, The Washington Times February 23, 2016 “Pentagon bracing for rising Red tide as China pursues power grab in East Asia,” Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/china-bent-on-hegemony-in-east-asia-navy-adm-harry/?page=all> (accessed April 19, 2016)

While he did not explicitly name the U.S., [Mr. Wang](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/wang-yi/) suggested that it is among those guilty of engaging in increased military activity in the South China Sea. “It’s important to notice that in recent decades some countries have illegally occupied [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/)’s reefs and atolls and have engaged in large-scale military constructions not only of radars, but also of missiles and all kinds of cannons and artilleries,” he said. The two diplomats appeared to make progress on another front, emerging from private talks Tuesday afternoon saying they had made progress on a [U.N.](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-nations/) resolution aimed at curbing [North Korea](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/north-korea/)’s nuclear programs. [Beijing](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/), the North’s main ally and economic lifeline, resisted past efforts by the U.S. and its allies to crack down too hard on [Pyongyang](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/pyongyang/). The South China Sea dispute was clearly a hot topic on Capitol Hill and in the Wang-[Kerry](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/john-f-kerry/) discussions. [Beijing](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/)’s recent deployment of surface-to-air missiles, its installation of radar facilities and its construction of airstrips on territorially disputed islands are flat-out changing “the operational landscape in the South China Sea,” Adm. [Harris](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy-adm-harry-harris-jr/) said. His testimony added bite to [Mr. Kerry](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/john-f-kerry/)’s own assertion, during a separate hearing Tuesday morning, that the Chinese muscle-flexing has only added to already seething friction over the overlapping claims to control large parts of the South China Sea. [Beijing](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/beijing/) claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, through which more than $5 trillion in global trade passes every year. While most analysts say the latest developments are unlikely to trigger a direct military confrontation, unease has spread in [Washington](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/washington/) since last week, when reports emerged that the Chinese military had deployed anti-aircraft missiles on the Paracels Islands chain.

### A/T China Threat Construction

#### Our threats are accurate—We’re not demonizing China, but they have foreign policy goals explicitly against the goals of the U.S.

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he was senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, ” Carnegie Endowment, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf> (accessed April 21, 2016)

Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommendations in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions. Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we certainly do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances, not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor. Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behavior is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being socialized into the international system and it is far too early for Washington to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance toward Beijing. The issue here is how long the United States should pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protecting U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change), Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about; in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”58 “Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.- China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American strategic primacy in Asia.

### A/T Appeasement Effective

#### Appeasing China has empirically failed—it only makes them want more

Marco Rubio, Former Senator from Florida, August 27, 2015, “How My Presidency Would Deal With China,” Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-my-presidency-would-deal-with-china-1440717685> (accessed April 21, 2016)

President Obama has continued to appease China’s leaders despite their mounting aggression. In addition to his insufficient responses to economic and national-security concerns, he has ignored the Chinese government’s mass roundups of human-rights advocates, oppression of religious minorities, detention of political dissidents, ever-tightening controls on the Internet, and numerous other human-rights violations. He has hoped that being more friendly with China will make it more responsible. It hasn’t worked. The U.S. must continue to pursue cooperation with China when possible, but we can no longer succumb to the illusion that more rounds of cordial dialogue with its rulers will effect a change of heart. That is why President [Xi Jinping](http://topics.wsj.com/person/J/Xi-Jinping/6475)’s visit to Washington next month should not be canceled, but rather downgraded to a working visit from a state visit. This is an opportunity to speak bluntly to this authoritarian ruler and achieve meaningful progress, not to treat him to a state dinner.

### A/T US Won’t Defend Taiwan

#### The US would defend Taiwan if China attacked—legal obligations and its key to US credibility with allies

Rowan Allport, Senior Fellow at the Human Security Centre, July 29th, 2015, “The Taiwan Problem,” Human Security Centre, <http://www.hscentre.org/security-and-defence/taiwan-problem/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Chief amongst China’s problems is that of US intervention in any conflict with Taiwan. During the latter stages of the Chinese Civil War, the US supported (albeit half-heartedly) the Nationalist faction against Mao’s Communists. When the latter succeeded in forcing the Nationalists to abandon the mainland and take refuge in Taiwan, a combination of recriminations in Washington over the ‘loss’ of China, and Mao’s intervention in the Korean War, led to the US providing a huge amount of aid and military support to the island and the signing of the [Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-American_Mutual_Defense_Treaty). Although 1979 saw the US make a strategic decision to recognise the Communist government in Beijing as the legitimate rulers of China – an act which led to the termination of the mutual defence agreement – the passing by the US Congress of the [Taiwan Relations Act](http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html) in the same year ensured that the US was to remain a key ally to Taipei. Whilst the Act fails to reach the stature of a mutual defence pact, it does require the US to “…make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”, and affirms that it is US policy to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”. Although these are not air-tight commitments to provide Taiwan with any weapons it wishes or to go to war on its behalf, the broad duties these pledges imply – together with the wider question of how the US could possibly maintain strategic credibility if it stood by and let the PLA steamroller the country into submission – means they do not lack significance. As a result, one of China’s principle goals in invading Taiwan would be to do it at a speed sufficient to head-off any countermeasures from US forces and to present a fait accompli to Washington.

### A/T US Won’t Defend Taiwan

#### US would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack

Global Security, Leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security, November 24, 2014, “China's Options in the Taiwan Confrontation,” Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Although it is unlikely that China would initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of a conventional invasion of Taiwan, it is possible that Taiwan would initiate the use of chemical weapons in respose to such an invasion in the event that a purely conventional military response appeared inadequate. In any event, if Beijing's amphibious assault did not spontaneously collapse, such an invasion would almost certainly provoke an American intervention sufficient to terminate hostilities on terms unfavorable to Beijing, unless Taiwan collapses before America can intervene.

### A/T Weak China Better

#### It’s better to challenge China now—the theory of a weak China being more dangerous is wrong

[Sam Roggeveen](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/profile.aspx?id=Sam%20Roggeveen), Was a senior strategic analyst in Australia's peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments, where his work dealt mainly with nuclear strategy and arms control, ballistic-missile defence, North Asian strategic affairs and WMD terrorism. Sam also worked on arms control policy in Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs, and as an intelligence analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation, March 15, 2016, “Obama on China, weak and strong,” Lowly Interpreter, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/03/15/Obama-on-China-weak-and-strong.aspx> (accessed April 24, 2016)

But there is room to quibble with Goldberg's interpretation that Obama thinks 'the challenge posed by China’s rise requires constant attention'. After all, elsewhere in the article, Obama seems to say that his main concern is not China's rise but its potential failure: 'we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China'. Moreover: If China fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organizing principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a country its size in maintaining the international order; if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres of influence—then not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are going to come. It's possible Obama is eliding his true feelings here. Obama may not actually believe that 'we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China', but he may calculate that it would be impolite to say otherwise. An admission that China's rise, which has lifted so many millions out of poverty and is a boon to US exporters, has a strategic downside would be like saying that it is in America's interest for China to remain poor and therefore weak. If he does believe it, then perhaps Obama is not the master strategist I took him for. Yes, a flailing, weakened China could lash out and destabilise the region in a desperate resort to aggressive nationalism. But is that really a greater concern to America than a country which challenges long-held US dominance and is potentially seeking to redraw the strategic geography of the Asia Pacific with Beijing at its centre?

## Impact Ext.

### Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War

#### US/ China war over Taiwan causes nuclear war

David Lampton, Director of China studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Accessed April 17, 2016, “Interview With David Lampton,” Public Broadcast Service, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/interviews/lampton.html> (accessed April 17, 2016)

How dangerous is the Taiwan issue? ... prior to the World Trade Center bombing and its aftermath, if you look around the world today and asked where in the world could two major nuclear powers come into conflict, I would have said that the only probable place -- and it is probably still the only probable place -- where two big nuclear powers could come into conflict would be the Taiwan Strait. In effect, the prevention of Taiwan going independent is absolutely critical to the legitimacy of the Chinese communist regime. Chinese leaders believe that, if they were to let Taiwan go independent and not respond, they would probably be overthrown by their own nationalistic people. Therefore, I think they would be willing to engage in what we might call "self-defeating military adventures" in order to prevent that result, even if they knew they were going to lose. So in my view, the key problem for the United States is how to deter the PRC from using force against Taiwan. We have to be very clear about that, because I think the United States would intervene if force were used under most circumstances I can imagine. But on the other hand, we have to deter Taiwan from engaging in such risky behavior that they precipitate an attack that will be destabilizing to Asia, destroy the Taiwan economy and drag the United States into a regional conflict.

### Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War

#### The US would defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion—escalates to nuclear war

William Lowther, Staff writer for the Taipei Times news, September 20, 2015, “US group outlines Taiwan defense scenarios,” Taipei Times, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/09/20/2003628130> (accessed April 17, 2016)

The US could defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack, but defeating a Chinese invasion force is likely to become increasingly difficult in coming years, a report from the RAND Corporation said. “As long as the Chinese economy continues to grow faster than that of the US and Beijing continues to make military modernization a priority, the challenges facing US military planners in Asia will grow more severe over time,” the report said. The 400-page report was released just one week before Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is to arrive in the US for a state visit and a summit with US President Barack Obama, which might ensure that its contents are given close attention in Beijing. In the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, US commanders would probably be unable to find the basing required for US forces “to prevail in a seven-day campaign,” said the report, titled The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power. It predicts they would prevail in a longer campaign, but this would entail leaving ground and naval forces vulnerable to Chinese air operations. The report said that given the size and technical sophistication of the US arsenal, together with the accumulated experience and resiliency of its military personnel and commanders, the US remains capable of fighting and winning a protracted air and naval battle against China. The report examines what RAND analysts consider to be the two most likely war scenarios: an attack on Taiwan and occupation of the disputed Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島). “The Spratly Islands scenario would be easier, requiring roughly half the forces of the Taiwan scenario,” the report said. An invasion could be brought about after a more assertive China moves to isolate Taiwan further on the world stage, inadvertently pushing Taipei toward de jure independence, the report said. Chinese leaders would then decide to occupy the nation by force, prompting Taiwan to appeal for US help, the report said, adding that “given the ambiguous circumstances of conflict, Washington decides to use military force to protect the island.” The scenario assumes that, as tensions mount, both sides prepare militarily. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could deploy additional combat and support aircraft to the Nanjing Military Region, deploy its most advanced submarines and move forces out of garrison to forward staging areas. The US might then react by moving additional aircraft and ships to the region and raise alert levels. Politically, the scenario assumes that the US is allowed to operate freely from bases in Japan, the PLA is permitted to strike US bases in Japan and US forces are allowed to attack nonstrategic targets in China. The report said little in detail about the role of Republic of China forces in defending Taiwan. “Taiwanese ability to extend the duration of a contest has a substantial impact,” it said. “To the extent that Taiwan can prolong the duration of the conflict, US force requirements could be eased.” “It is easier for the US to employ its air and naval power to influence events on the ground in a longer war than in a shorter one. The US should strongly encourage Taiwan to undertake defense reforms that will maximize its odds of avoiding quick defeat,” the report said. According to the report, China would aim to disrupt US forward operating bases near the conflict zone, primarily through missile strikes, while attempting to sink US aircraft carriers or push back their areas of operation using submarines, missiles and air attacks. The US would seek to gain air superiority through both air-to-air battles and by penetrating Chinese airspace to strike air defense targets and command-and-control facilities. “The US would also seek to destroy Chinese surface assets, including forces dedicated to The US would seek to gain air superiority through both air-to-air battles and by penetrating Chinese airspace to strike air defense targets and command-and-control facilities. “The US would also seek to destroy Chinese surface assets, including forces dedicated to landing operations and surface action groups operating in an air defense or anti-submarine capacity,” the report said. “It would likely also undertake limited counter-space and cyber operations, especially if it were attacked first in those domains.” “Neither side would look to use nuclear weapons at the start of hostilities, but the security of nuclear forces would weigh heavily on leaders’ minds during a conflict and under some circumstances pressures could build to cross the nuclear threshold,” it said.

### Taiwan Impact—Nuclear War

#### Conflict over Taiwan escalates to nuclear war—each considers their actions rational

Charles Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, March/ April 2011, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war (accessed April 17, 2016)

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Taiwan Impact—Chemical War

#### Taiwan would defend itself from a Chinese invasion with chemical weapons

Global Security, Leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security, November 24, 2014, “China's Options in the Taiwan Confrontation,” Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Although it is unlikely that China would initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of a conventional invasion of Taiwan, it is possible that Taiwan would initiate the use of chemical weapons in respose to such an invasion in the event that a purely conventional military response appeared inadequate. In any event, if Beijing's amphibious assault did not spontaneously collapse, such an invasion would almost certainly provoke an American intervention sufficient to terminate hostilities on terms unfavorable to Beijing, unless Taiwan collapses before America can intervene.

### Taiwan Impact—Hegemony

#### Even if the US won’t go to war over Taiwan, failure to protect Taiwan collapses US hegemony

Damon Linker, Senior correspondent at TheWeek.com. He is also a consulting editor at the University of Pennsylvania Press, and a former contributing editor at The New Republic, March 21, 2014, “What would America do if China invaded Taiwan?,” The Week, <http://theweek.com/articles/448962/what-america-china-invaded-taiwan> (accessed April 17, 2016)

So what happens if China, having noted our reluctance to stand up to Assad and complete unwillingness to challenge Moscow militarily, decides to test us by taking Taiwan? On one level, going to war with a major world power of 1.35 billion people in order to defend an island on the other side of the planet sounds crazy — a quintessential act of imperial overreach. That's certainly my initial reaction, since I'd prefer to see the U.S. playing a more modest role in world affairs more generally. What better way to downscale our global commitments than to back away from this East Asian relic of Cold War brinksmanship? But before we make that move, we need to be clear about the stakes — and the likely consequences. The United States has made a lot of blunders — and done a fair amount of geopolitical mischief — over the years. But all told and weighed against the realistic alternatives, our military hegemony since the end of World War II has been salutary, minimizing cross-border conflicts and enforcing order across large swaths of the globe. The Pax Americana isn't just a propaganda slogan. If we allowed China to take direct control of Taiwan (even if the mainland promised to treat it as a semi-autonomous region, like Hong Kong), it would signal once and for all the end of this American-dominated era and the start of another. Coupled with our passivity in the face of Russia's recent actions, we would swiftly find ourselves in a world where nations revert to acting as they have for much of human history: freely invading each other's borders and fighting wars in the pursuit of national self-interest, with no overseeing hyperpower imposing global peace and order from above.

### US/China War Bad—Extinction

#### US/ China war causes extinction

Anatol Lieven, Professor in the War Studies Department at King’s College and Senior Fellow at New America Foundation, June 12, 2012, “Avoiding US-China War,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html> (accessed April 17, 2016)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

### US/China War Bad—Billions Die

#### A US/ China war kills billions and wrecks the global economy

[Harry J. Kazianis](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis), Recently served as Executive Editor of The National Interest, is a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the [Center for the National Interest](http://www.cftni.org/) and a Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute, and is the former Editor of [The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/), February 20, 2015, “Revealed: Why China Would Lose a War against America,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/revealed-why-china-would-lose-war-against-america-12288> (accessed April 17, 2016)

Let’s not mince words: [a U.S.-China war would be hell on earth](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250). [It would likely start World War III](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/debating-strategy-world-war-iii-8941). Millions— maybe billions— of people would die [if nuclear weapons were ever used in such a conflict](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-china-americas-nuclear-nightmare-11891). The global economy would likely face ruin— that’s what happens when the world’s biggest economic powers start shooting at each other. Thankfully the chances are remote it will ever happen. Yet, the threat of such a conflict remains thanks to the many different pressure points in the U.S.-China relationship. Forget the challenge of ISIS, Ukraine, Syria or whatever the flavor of the moment is. The U.S.-China relationship— and whether it remains peaceful or not— is the most important challenge of our time. Period. Several days ago I examined in a short piece on these digital pages [how China could do great damage to U.S. and allied military forces](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/exposed-chinas-super-strategy-crush-america-war-12267) in a war. Thanks to over twenty years of large scale investments, the PRC has gone from being a third-rate military that could project very little offensive punch to arguably the second most powerful military machine on the planet. And with an emphasis on weapons systems that embrace [anti-access/area-denial military doctrine (A2/AD](https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=95)), [China seems to be developing the tools](http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/18/chinas_muhammad_ali_military_strategy__107631.html) it needs if war with America did ever come to pass. Beijing’s motto these days: be prepared.

### US Hegemony Good—China War

#### US hegemony is key to deter conflict in the South China sea—solves war with China

[Mark Thompson](http://time.com/author/mark-thompson/), Staff writer for Time magazine, February 24, 2016, “U.S.-China Showdown Keeps Inching Closer,” Time, <http://time.com/4236409/united-states-china-south-china-sea/> (accessed April 17, 2016)

While the U.S. has repeatedly called for diplomacy to settle multiple disputes over islands sprinkled across the South China Sea, China is unilaterally staking its claims by moving military gear to a growing number of them. It has been dredging the sea bottom to enlarge islets, and has built a 10,000-foot runway on one of them. Its goal is clear: to lay claim to 90% of the South China Sea, a vital commercial waterway that carries $5 trillion in annual trade. Regional powers—including Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam—are nervously, and so far vainly—waiting for the U.S. to do something to thwart the Chinese advance. China’s latest moves echo its pattern of asserting itself even as it appears to be currying favor with Washington. Five years ago, Beijing flew its top-secret J-20 stealth fighter while then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates was in Beijing. In 2013, the U.S. says a U.S. Navy cruiser almost collided with a Chinese warship that cut across its bow in the South China Sea while Vice President Joe Biden was in the Chinese capital. Last summer, a flotilla of five Chinese ships made an unprecedented trip into the Bering Sea off the coast of Alaska, while Obama was visiting the state. Last week, the U.S. confirmed that China has deployed HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile batteries to Woody Island in the South China Sea as Obama was meeting with Southeast Asian leaders in Palm Springs, Calif. And on Tuesday, the Pentagon said the Chinese air force had dispatched J-11 and JH-7 warplanes to the same island, as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in the middle of a visit to Washington. “The fact is there have been steps by China, by Vietnam, by others that have unfortunately created an escalatory cycle,” Secretary of State John Kerry said during a press conference with Wang on Tuesday. “What we’re trying to do is break that.” Wang said nations in the region could settle their own differences. “There have not been any problems with freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,” he said. This is happening as much of Washington’s national-security apparatus is focused on the war against ISIS and the increasing momentum of an anti-U.S. alliance among Syrian dictator Bashar Assad and his Iranian and Russian partners. But U.S. Navy officials, who have ruled the seas off China’s coast for more than 70 years, are increasingly sounding the alarm. “China’s intent to militarize the South China Sea is as certain as a traffic jam in D.C.,” Admiral Harry Harris, chief of U.S. Pacific Command, told the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. “I need weapon systems of increase lethality that go faster, go further and are more survivable.,” he added. “I’m comfortable where we are today, but today we’re not at war, and I think an important point.”

### US Hegemony Good—Great Power Wars

#### US Leadership solidifies international peace – Current policies prove retrenchment incentivizes great power wars

Robert J. Bresler, Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy, June 24, 2015, “Obama-led US withdrawal has destabilized the world,” Lancaster Online, <http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html> (assessed April 19, 2016)

American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and assist in economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power war, achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective. Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of American support. Hence, China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa; the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military swallows the country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. When the Obama administration made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obama’s withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obama’s rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of devolution and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.

### US Hegemony Good—Stability/ Deterrent

#### Hegemony acts as a global deterrent—it produces stability through maintaining globalization

Ryan Jacobs, Graduate from University of North Carolina in International Studies, June-27, 2014, “Why U.S. Hegemonic Power is Essential for Future Global Stabilization,” Academia.edu, <https://www.academia.edu/7784026/Why_the_U.S._Hegemonic_Power_is_Essential_for_Future_Global_Stabilization> (accessed April 17, 2016)

In contrast, the political structure of a hegemony primarily differs from an empire on the notion of the political power having final authority. Also, a hegemony is not a political unit that rules over another unit that is "separate and alien to it." The Online Etymology Dictionary defines the term "hegemony", "(1560s)from Greek hegemonia "leadership, a leading the way, a going first;" also "the authority or sovereignty of one city-state over a number of others," as Athens in Attica, Thebes in Boeotia; from hegemon "leader," from hegeisthai "to lead," perhaps originally "to track down," from PIE \*sag-eyo-, from root \*sag- "to seek out, track down, trace". Originally of predominance of one city state or another in Greek history; in reference to modern situations from 1860, at first of Prussia in relation to other German states. 4 This leadership, and authority is commonly utilized to influence others to develop similarly in order to create a stable, international relationship. Presently, as the hegemonic power, the United States seeks to produce democracy and capitalism; which focus on human rights and free trade. Another interesting explanation of a hegemonic power is illustrated by Italian Marxist Gramsci in 1971, as "the supremacy of a social group manifest(ing) itself in two ways, as' domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'" and "the 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent." 5 In addition, addressing the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (HST) is imperative for this research. HST is based on the idea that the international system can only remain stable if there is a single dominant state that regulates the interactions of other states in the system. The hegemonic power must have the power, will and commitment to enforce the rules. It must also be perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. The capability rests upon three attributes: a large, growing economy; dominance in a leading technological or economic sector; and political power backed up by projective military. 6 The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics from Mount Holyoke College, Vincent Ferraro cites four nation-states that have been hegemonic powers: Portugal, Holland, Britain (at two points in history); and of course, the United States (to present day). After World War II, when the United States was recognized as the hegemonic power by its Western allies, international stability has relied upon U.S. dominance. Therefore states that threaten the stability of the western hegemonic power also fulminate global stability. It is essential that the United States continues to play the predominant international role that it does today for many years to come. As technology is rapidly expanding, one of the most important areas that U.S. involvement is necessary is communications. "The United States technological assets-including its leadership in piloting social networking and rapid communications-give it an advantage, but the Internet also will continue to boost the power of nonstate actors. In most cases, US power will need to be enhanced through relevant outside networks, friends, and affiliates that cancoalesce on any particular issue. Leadership will be a function of position, enmeshment, diplomatic skill, and constructive demeanor." 7 Furthermore, future global stabilization requires the U.S. to advance developments in other facets of technology (weaponry, transportation, etc.), as it will be crucial for defense and peacekeeping operations, as well. With the strengthening of international law, and success of the United Nations (U.N.), the U.S. would have the capability of assuring such stability. This would constitute the U.S., enshrined in democracy; as not only one of the beneficiaries of global stability, but also a body politic that exemplifies durability over time.

### China Hegemony/ Expansionism Bad

#### Chinese hegemony destabilizes Asia—their quest for power creates instability throughout the region

Gopal Ratnam, Staff writer for Bloomberg, May 31, 2014, “Hagel Says China’s Actions in South China Sea Destabilizing,” Bloomberg, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-30/abe-offers-japan-s-support-to-southeast-asia-on-sea-disputes> (accessed April 19, 2016)

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel today spelled out a series of Chinese actions in parts of the disputed South China Sea and said they were destabilizing the region, drawing a rebuke from a Chinese General. While China has said it wants a “sea of peace, friendship and cooperation,” in recent months it “has undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South China Sea,” Hagel said in prepared remarks at the annual Shangri-La security conference in Singapore. “It has restricted access to the Scarborough Reef; put pressure on the long-standing Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal; begun land reclamation activities at multiple locations; and moved an oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands” off the coast of Vietnam, Hagel said, listing for the first time Chinese infractions in the region that are alarming Southeast Asian nations. The stepped-up U.S. comments follow Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s appeal for a “stronger voice” from the U.S. against China after clashes between coast guard vessels near the rig placed in contested waters. The Philippines, dwarfed militarily by China, has sought support from the U.S. and the United Nations to counter China’s encroachment into shoals off its coast. Under President Xi Jinping, China has taken a more assertive approach to its territorial claims. During a visit to Beijing in April, Hagel was told by his counterpart, General Chang Wanquan, that China would make “no compromise, no concessions” in disputes with Japan and the Philippines. In Singapore today, Hagel said the U.S. “will not look the other way when fundamental principles of international order are being challenged” including moves by China to restrict overflight or freedom of navigation.

### China Can Be Deterred—A/T Miscalc

#### Low risk of miscalculated war between U.S. and China or China and Japan

Zach Beauchamp, Editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org, February 7, 2014, “[Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China](http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-war/),” Think Progress, <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-war/> (accessed April 17, 2016)

China’s been out of the news lately — the State of the Union only have mentioned it twice — but America’s allies are getting antsy about it. Just this Wednesday, Filipino President Benigno S. Aquino III compared China to Nazi Germany, telling the world to “remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II” when it thinks about Chinese territorial claims in Asian waters. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently reached back to the other world war, repeatedly warning the Davos summit in January that East Asia, much like Europe pre-World War I, was a violent tinderbox primed to explode after one bad incident. Of the two, Abe’s comparison is by far more reasonable, and he did dispatch a deputy to say Japan “[absolutely](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/abe-comparing-china-to-pre-world-war-one-germany-fuels-tensions.html)” did not beleive war was coming, but the damage was done. Asia experts are warning about the risk of a “[new Cold War](http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/02/04/an-east-china-sea-update/)” between Japan and China — and others are terrified by the prospect of a [hot one](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/03/china-japan-dispute-diaoyu-senkaku-islands). This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely. One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn. The [main source of tension](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/11/26/2996981/52s-china-japan/) is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are [other potential flashpoints](http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/08/3036271/ieodo-socotra-suyan-boom/), the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but [China claims them](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139), and the Chinese military has made [increasingly aggressive noises](http://www.reuters.com/investigates/china-military/) about the islands of late. But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “[preemption temptation](http://saideman.blogspot.com/2014/01/pre-empting-preemption.html);” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place [over the islands](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/19/national/china-has-no-clash-policy-in-place-for-japan/).

### China Can Be Deterred—A/T Miscalc

#### Chinese and US military official can keep the peace—no miscalc coming

[Jennifer Peters](https://news.vice.com/contributor/jennifer-peters), Staff writer for Vice News, September 5, 2015, “How the US and Chinese Navies Are Trying to Avoid Accidentally Starting World War III,” Vice, https://news.vice.com/article/how-the-us-and-chinese-navies-are-trying-to-avoid-accidentally-starting-world-war-iii (accessed April 17, 2016)

As China celebrates its victory over Japan in World War II with a much-hyped Victory Day parade, it's continuing to drift toward a new conflict in the South China Sea. But promising new developments in the relationship between the US and Chinese navies appear to be keeping things calm — at least for the moment. Last year, China and the US brokered an agreement between 21 Pacific nations that set up guidelines for unplanned encounters between the countries' ships. As it turns out, one of the most contested bodies of water in the world had almost no well-defined rules. This left plenty of room for misinterpretations and overreactions. And in this precarious part of the world, a misinterpretation or overreaction could realistically spark World War III. Commentators have [attributed](http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/navy/2015/08/25/navy-china-us-chief--naval-operations-cno-greenert-richardson-wu-shengli-russia-iran-relations-cues-encounters--sea/32354479/) the success of the deal to the amicable relationship between outgoing US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jon Greenert and Admiral Wu Shengli, the commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army Navy. But it's important to note that their partnership is all business.

### Appeasement Bad—Terrorism

#### The US must send signals of strength—appeasement leads to terrorism

Ryan Mauro, Professor and the National Security Analyst for the Clarion Project, December 18, 2014, “US Appeasement of Iran, Cuba, N. Korea Shows Terror Works,” Clarion Project, <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/us-appeasement-iran-cuba-n-korea-shows-terror-works> (accessed April 22, 2016)

The U.S. handling of Iran, North Korea and Cuba sends an unmistakable message that harboring of terrorists is acceptable and cyber terrorism works. The Iranian cyber campaign has been going on for years and is ongoing. The lack of a response not only encourages Iranian aggression further, it likely encouraged North Korea to believe it could do the same with impunity. When President Obama [said](http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/12/17/transcript-president-obamas-remarks-on-cuba/) the U.S. would review Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, he did not mention the reasons why Cuba has been on that list since 1982. The messaging infers that there’s no reason for Cuba to be on the list. Cuba continues to harbor a terrorist with American blood on her hands, along with other terrorists. The Raul Castro regime must hand over these terrorists and end any support for Hezbollah and other terrorists, including those that reside in Venezuela. Hollywood’s appeasement of North Korea is sure to encourage further acts of cyber warfare and threats of terrorism. All hostile actors will now conclude that they can veto the decisions of the mightiest of American businesses. Bin Laden referenced the U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon and Somalia and limited retaliation after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings until the day he died. This shows it can take decades to reverse the damage caused by appeasement.

### Appeasement Bad—Counter Balancing

#### US weakness triggers aggression from rising rivals—appeasement causes counterbalancing

Tom Rogan, Writer and a contributor to The McLaughlin Group. He holds the Tony Blankley Chair at The Steamboat Institute, December 21, 2015, “The Pentagon’s Groveling Apology to China for Flying Near a Contested Island,” National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428821/us-apologizes-b-52-south-china-sea-signals-american-weakness> (accessed April 22, 2016)

Regardless, this incident encapsulates President Obama’s foreign-policy absurdity. After all, while China carves its empire, Obama continues to claim that his China policy is successful. This success is proven, he says, by China’s pledge to try to cap its carbon emissions by 2030. It’s an unbinding, unenforceable pledge from a socialist kleptocracy. Nevertheless, the true absurdity of Obama’s delusion is clear only in the light of history. Imagine if President Truman had allowed Stalin to seize Berlin in 1948 in return for Stalin’s pledge to try to hold free elections in 1964. On the contrary, consider how President Truman actually dealt with Stalin during the 1948–1949 Berlin crisis (in which Stalin blockaded Berlin’s western zones). Vastly outgunning U.S. forces in Germany, the Soviets threatened war. But when the question arose of whether or not the United States was going to stay in Berlin, Truman declared: “No discussion . . . we are going to stay — period.” He launched the Berlin airlift and put his faith in American deterrent power and American values. And he won the day. Of course, today, many would castigate Truman’s blunt speak as gung-ho idiocy, unbefitting of “smart power” and nuanced American leadership in a complex world. But Truman knew that the conduct of an effective statesman isn’t just about dealing with the moment, but also about anticipating the horizon. General Clay, commanding U.S. forces in Berlin during the crisis, also understood this truth. Consider Clay’s cable to Washington at the start of the crisis: “We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.” Truman knew that if the United States abandoned the small territory of Berlin, that action would eviscerate American credibility around the world and the Soviets would gain the strategic upper hand in the Cold War. Allies would doubt America’s word, and our adversaries would know America’s weakness. Sadly, last week’s B-52 incident proves that President Obama does not grasp that purpose and credibility are essential components of an effective foreign policy. And American enemies are taking advantage: In 2016, expect historic foes China and Russia to strengthen their alliance against us.

### Appeasement Bad—Engagement Bad

#### US shouldn’t be so eager to engage China—we must counter China’s strategic moves in Asia instead of always cooperating

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, January 24, 2014, “Meeting the Challenge of Chinese Expansionism on the East Asian Littoral,” Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/01/the-challenge-of-china-s-expansionism-in-east-asia-and-us-policy-responses> (accessed April 20, 2016)

Rethink inviting the PRC into RIMPAC. The incorporation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the RIMPAC multilateral military exercises, with no promise of reciprocal access for the U.S. military to Chinese exercises, makes the U.S. appear over-eager to engage Beijing. In this case, it also exposes the forces of friends and allies to massive Chinese intelligence penetration—as though the U.S. cares more about currying favor with Beijing than cooperating with Tokyo, Canberra, or Seoul. Continuing to do so in the wake of the USS Cowpens incident potentially signals Beijing that even dangerous behavior on their part has no downside consequence. Given China’s dangerous conduct, serious consideration should be given to suspending the invitation. In light of Beijing’s growing assertiveness, the U.S. needs to make clear to both the PRC and its allies that it will maintain a firm, reliable presence in the region and that this extends beyond mere rhetoric. Moreover, given China’s economic prowess, it is essential that any American response encompass not only military measures but the full array of diplomatic and positive economic levers as well.

# DA US India Relations DA

## Disad Overview

#### This is an India relations disadvantage. The story is as follows:

#### Uniqueness—The United States and India cooperate over a range of important issues now. We work with India on issues ranging from democracy promotion, global economic growth, non-proliferation, counter terrorism, global stability, cyber security, and climate change. These cooperative endeavors are going well. Bilateral relations between the US an India are high now.

#### The second layer of uniqueness deals with China. While the US cooperates with China on lots of things in the status quo, the basis of the relationship is at-arms-length due to military posturing in the South China Sea.

#### Link—India, China, and the US have a delicate trilateral relationship. Specifically, India is sensitive to how close US/China relations are at any given time. India fears actions, like the plan, that bring the US and China closely together, because they believe the US and China will conspire to freeze them out of the relationship; and consequently the business of running the global order. The plan crushes US/ India relations.

#### Internal Link—When relations are high, the US and India can and do cooperate on preventing climate change. This is an essential partnership for preventing warming.

#### Impact—Unchecked climate change will cause global extinction.

## 1NC Shell

### 1NC Uniqueness—India

#### US/ India relations are peaking at an all-time high—military interests and diplomatic agreements

[All India](http://www.ndtv.com/india-news), Indian news outlet, April 12, 2016, “US Nears Military Breakthrough With India As Relations Warm,” All India, <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/us-nears-military-breakthrough-with-india-as-relations-warm-1394740> (accessed May 26, 2016)

The United States and India are close to a breakthrough on a defense logistics deal that has taken more than a decade to negotiate, a reflection of closer ties as China's military muscle grows. The so-called Logistics Support Agreement will be signed in a matter of weeks, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told reporters in New Delhi on Tuesday. The deal, first proposed in 2004, allows for cashless transactions for services such as refueling for military vehicles, aircraft and warships. "All issues on the logistics agreement have been resolved," Carter said in a briefing alongside Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar. India and the U.S. are strengthening defense ties as China increases its assertiveness in waterways throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama administration also sees India as a large market for military goods, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi is looking to attract arms makers to create manufacturing jobs. India and the U.S. plan to start dialogues on maritime security and submarine technology, Parrikar said on Tuesday. The two sides will also continue cooperation on a new aircraft carrier as part of efforts to integrate high-technology Indian companies into the global supply chain, he said. "I'm confident that the India-U.S. relationship will be one of the key global partnerships of this century," Parrikar said. "Defense cooperation is a central pillar of India's multi-faceted relationship with the U.S."

### 1NC Uniqueness—China

#### US/China relations are low now—various points of diplomatic and military tension

Bill Gertz, Editor, columnist and reporter for The Washington Free Beacon and The Washington Times, February 22, 2016, “Blurred Lines — China’s competition with US resembles low-level warfare: Gertz,” Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2016/02/blurred-lines-chinas-competition-with-us-resembles-low-level-warfare-gertz/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

The era of US government policies designed to play down or dismiss growing strategic challenges from China seems to be ending. For the first time in years, the nation’s most senior intelligence official revealed that China now poses a regional security threat engaged in hostile activities that blur the line between war and peace. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, testified before the US Senate that the threat from Beijing is not limited to the large-scale buildup of both strategic nuclear and conventional forces. It includes new forms of competition involving information operations, cyber attacks, intelligence activities and other non-kinetic forms of warfare. Clapper warned that China, along with Russia, is challenging the US for regional power and influence in ways that will increase competition, especially in vital sea lanes in Asia where trillions of dollars of commerce could be threatened. To avoid triggering a shooting war with US, the Chinese are engaging in new types of low-level conflict. “They will almost certainly eschew direct military conflict with the US in favor of contests at lower levels of competition — to include the use of diplomatic and economic coercion, propaganda, cyber intrusions, proxies, and other indirect applications of military power — that intentionally blur the distinction between peace and wartime operations,” Clapper said of China and Russia in his prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 9. The assertion that China is blurring the line between war and peace in competing against the US received little attention. But it is the first time a public intelligence assessment so starkly cast China’s relations toward the United States in such a harsh light.

### 1NC Link—Relations

#### The plan upsets the delicate balance between US/China/ and Indian relations. India can only tolerate lukewarm US/China relations or risk being shutout of the equation

[Tanvi Madan](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/madant), Fellow in the [Project on International Order and Strategy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/international-order-strategy%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy) program at the Brookings Institution, and director of [The India Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/india%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), January 20, 2015, The U.S.-India Relationship and China,” The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-china-madan>, (accessed May 26, 2016)

Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflict—though in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. Each also recognizes that China—especially uncertainty about its behavior—is partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of China’s rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhi’s own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)—and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the other’s willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question whether the quest for “strategic autonomy” will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting India’s rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and development aren’t mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationale—and India’s importance—fades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the other’s relationship with China being too hot or too cold—the Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one of Washington’s rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. However, both India and the U.S. do share an interest in managing China’s rise. Neither would like to see what some have outlined as President Xi Jinping’s vision of Asia, with a dominant China and the U.S. playing a minimal role. India and the U.S. recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asia—it is the nature of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss China—and the Asia-Pacific broadly—more willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial level and including Japan on a more regular basis in India-U.S maritime exercises.

### 1NC Impact—Climate Change

#### US/ India relations are key to effectively combat climate change

[Neena Shenai](https://www.aei.org/scholar/neena-shenai/), Staff writer at the AEI, November 18, 2009, “The Critical U.S-India Relationship,” American Enterprise Institute, <https://www.aei.org/publication/the-critical-u-s-india-relationship/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

The United States and India also have critical roles and mutual interests in the future of global climate change policy as the world’s second- and fourth-largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, respectively. Without commitment by both countries, there is unlikely to be even a basis for discussion at next month’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen or beyond. Despite vastly different levels of development, both countries remain ambivalent about how to address any potential economic and political trade-offs associated with emissions cuts. A closer look at the state of climate change discussions in the United States and India is revealing: In the United States, even though President Obama has publicly declared climate change a priority, he has been unable to establish a domestic consensus. The House of Representatives passed a cap-and-trade bill in June, but legislation remains stalled in the Senate. It is highly unlikely at this time that the United States would agree to any multilateral framework that did not address the environmental obligations of developing countries—as this was one of the main U.S. objections to the Kyoto Protocol. The House bill and the pending Kerry-Boxer bill in the Senate notably identify this concern and include border tariff provisions on goods imported from countries, such as India and China, with insufficient climate change policy protections. Meanwhile, India has already strongly staked out its position. Prime Minister Singh has commented on the need for global climate change policy, but has made clear that developed countries should take responsibility for their previous emissions and that developing countries should not be forced to accept emissions cuts at the expense of their economic growth and development. Moreover, India has been actively building coalitions with other developing countries to assemble a united front vis-à-vis developed countries. Perhaps most strikingly, India recently signed a memorandum of understanding on climate change policy with China. The U.S. and Indian positions on climate change seem irreconcilable. However, bilateral cooperation on cleaner energy sources could constitute a key incremental step for reframing this issue. As less than 50 percent of India’s rural households have electricity, the country’s thirst for power is certain to grow substantially. Although discussions surrounding the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, signed last year, did not focus solely on the environmental benefits of nuclear power, its contribution to India’s search for non-GHG emitting technologies should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the agreement still remains unimplemented. The Indian parliament is yet to approve legislation granting civil liability protection to U.S. energy companies; disagreements remain over interpretations of certain U.S. regulations; and a bilateral agreement on the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is still under negotiation. It is rumored that some breakthroughs may be announced during Prime Minister Singh’s visit.

### 1NC Impact—Extinction

#### Unchecked climate change causes extinction

[Terry Mejdrich, Freelance writer & former science teacher](https://www.grandrapidsmn.com/users/profile/Nyla), January 3, 2016, “Climate Change and Human Extinction,” Grand Rapids Herald Review, <http://www.grandrapidsmn.com/opinion/columnists/climate-change-and-human-extinction/article_ab73abaa-afe4-11e5-95f1-5fcb375d705c.html> (accessed May 26, 2016)

A consortium of scientists recently warned of mass extinctions, including humans, as a result of climate change. Is this really possible? About two years ago in one of my columns I wrote that attempting to curb global warming was ‘futile’ in the sense that we think we can stop and eventually reverse it. Despite that statement it needs to be emphasized that every attempt should be made to reduce green house gases, primarily carbon dioxide and methane as well as industrial pollution, even though the damage to climate stability has already been done. Taken in total, what we have done so far to stem climate change is too little and too late. There is no overarching commitment by the masses that manifests in significant action to make the necessary changes, i.e. it has not taken on the urgency of a ‘religious’ fervor. A lot of talk and some non-binding accords, yes, as well as good intentions but the ‘road to ruin is paved with good intentions.’ Nature’s man-enhanced feed back loops (due to fossil fuel dependence and primarily CO2 emissions) are well established and have been more or less irreversible for a decade or longer. What are feed back loops? An example is accelerating melting of permafrost in the Polar Regions. Melting permafrost releases carbon dioxide and methane both of which increase the temperature of the atmosphere, which increases melting permafrost. In oceans methane hydrates (essentially a solid substance made of water ice and methane gas) are melting faster as oceans get warmer, which increases the rate of melting methane hydrates. Increased temperatures reduce the amount of ice and snow, which reflect heat. Exposed ground and water absorb heat thereby adding more heat to the atmosphere. In each case and in combination the increased heat serves to create conditions that produce more heat in a continuous cycle. This is called a feedback loop. The climate is an intricate system with self-correcting mechanisms and so it takes careful study and measurements to discover trends. Once these trends become established patterns, it is beyond our technology to stop or reverse them. Human activities have steadily increased earth’s average temperature and the rate of change has not been ‘linear’. Rather the rate itself is increasing. This is why computer climate change models in the past were so far off, being far too conservative. The feedback loops mentioned (methane and CO2 from melting permafrost, release of methane hydrates in the oceans, increased exposed land and water which absorbs rather than reflects the sun’s rays) were under valued quantities in the computer models. What these early models predicted to happen in a hundred years or longer will now likely happen in a few decades. Climate change deniers are sometimes ridiculed but this merely deflects attention from the truth: All of us share the responsibility for climate change. But we are also the victims on a runaway train. We can see that our actions will lead to an unpleasant end but we can’t easily get off or correct the problem. That’s because it is a cultural problem requiring a cultural change and that is extremely difficult with entrenched fossil fuel dependence and economic interests and controls. Further, modern civilization and out of control population growth cannot be sustained long term even without global warming. Rising oceans will force human migrations in the millions inland with vastly increased competition for food and resources. We will eat other species to extinction as we’ve done in the past but with much greater frequency. At that point many ecologists and biologists believe the human population, too, will collapse.

## Shell Optional Cards

#### Relations are fine now- China is the strongest tie

The Economist, April, 2016, “Warming relations between India and America A suitable boy?,” <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy> (accessed 5/27/16)

Yet disdain for America is weakening. The latest agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a “joint strategic vision” for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the kinds of goods that India’s armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate India’s plans (see article) for strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18. The trigger for all this is the growing boldness of China. With a GDP that is now five times India’s, the regional heavyweight has courted India’s smaller neighbours with aid. Chinese warships now regularly push into the Indian Ocean, and the Chinese government has sought to build a network of bases or, at the least, friendly ports extending from Myanmar to Pakistan to Djibouti. India has mostly stayed aloof from troubles outside its immediate waters. When American officials jumped the gun in February by claiming that India would join patrols in the South China Sea, where China is pressing maritime claims over the objections of everyone else, India issued a vigorous denial. But Chinese pressure closer to home raises alarms. It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and “carry a bigger load”. They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America’s Pacific Command (responsible, he said, for American military operations “from Hollywood to Bollywood”), described expanded military co-operation with India as “arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century”.

#### Strong U.S-India relations key to solve terrorism

Stephen Biegun, 2010, ““U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue” The Opportunities and Risks of Met and Unmet Expectations in U.SS.-India Defense Cooperation,” Aspen Strategy Group, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/ASG_Biegun_Opportunities_Risks.pdf> (accessed 5/26/16)

U.S.-Indian cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts, which expanded rapidly in the wake of last year's horrendous attacks in Mumbai, represents an established area of growing defense cooperation between the two countries. The recent Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in the United States is a vivid reminder that terrorism is a transnational threat—a young, affluent Nigerian, educated in Britain, trained and likely armed in Yemen, took a flight from Lagos, was screened in Amsterdam and sought to explode his device in the air over Detroit, Michigan. And, just recently, co-conspirators in the Mumbai attacks were arrested—in Chicago, Illinois. In order for the U.S. and India to truly cooperate in combating the threat of transnational terrorism, the two nations will need to undertake a high level of diplomatic, intelligence and defense cooperation on a worldwide basis.

#### Terrorist attack in India causes nuclear war

David Barno and Lt. General in the US Army (ret.), Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the School of International Service (SIS) at American University and Nora Bensahel, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, Distinguished Scholar in Residence at SIS, November, 2015, “The Pink Flamingo of the Subcontinent: Nuclear War between India and Pakistan,” <http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-pink-flamingo-on-the-subcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/>) (accessed 5/28/16)

Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of the weapons — a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states — last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.

## Uniqueness

### US-India Relations High Now - General

#### US-India relations high – collaboration over international affairs and maritime issues

Rupakjyoti Borah, Research Fellow with the Tokyo-based Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, May 6, 2016, “5 Reasons Why India Agreed to a Logistics Agreement with the United States,” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/5-reasons-why-india-agreed-to-a-logistics-agreement-with-the-united-states/> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

Second, relations between India and the United States have dramatically improved since the end of the Cold War. In 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to visit India twice during his presidency when he was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations on January 26. During his visit, the two sides released a joint statement where they affirmed “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.” This in itself is very significant since New Delhi had studiously avoided getting entangled in the South China Sea imbroglio. In the recent years, India has become one of the biggest purchasers of U.S. military hardware, a sea change from the times when the country used to source the majority of its defense needs from Russia. Third, maritime collaboration between India and the United States has been increasing. The commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B Harris, went on record to say that that Beijing was building “a great wall of sand” in the South China Sea. At the Raisina Dialogue in India in March this year, Harris floated the idea of cooperation between India, Japan, Australia, and Japan in the maritime realm. This could be a throwback to the times when these four countries had come together to form what was dubbed the “Quadrilateral Initiative,” thought the project was rolled back in the light of protests from Beijing, in a classic case of the baby being thrown out along with the bath water. Besides, India’s ties with U.S. allies in the region, like Japan and Australia, have also improved by leaps and bounds since then. Fourth, India now aspires to play a greater role in international affairs. New Delhi is angling to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition, India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has rapidly moved away from its traditional stance of non-alignment to one of multi-alignment. By signing the logistics support agreement, New Delhi also stands to gain by gaining access to U.S. military facilities.

### US-India Relations High Now – Military Cooperation

#### US-India relations growing – military cooperation proves

TC, Tripura Correspondent with BD News – Bangladesh Newspaper, May 14, 2016, “US-India Military Relations Growing Fast: US Consul General” <http://bdnews24.com/neighbours/2016/05/14/us-india-military-relations-growing-fast-us-consul-general> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

“It’s true that US and India military relations are growing very quickly and the United States is happy to have this new working relationship with the Indian military,” said US Consul General Craig Hall speaking to reporters after meeting with Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar on Friday. Denying that Indo-US military power is necessary for a balance of power in the region, especially in view of the growing military power of China, Crain said: “From the US perspective we don’t think of it in terms of balance of power but rather as a natural friendship between the Indian and US militaries.” He added, “We are both very big and diverse democracies, facing very similar global hindrances, so it’s natural that our two militaries should develop their relationship.” Craig was on his maiden two-day familiarization tour of the lone left-ruled Indian state surrounded by Bangladesh from three sides. On the issue of US concern about the growing Islamic radical forces in Bangladesh, the US envoy said, “The US and India have shared interest in combating terrorism and radicalism anywhere in the world. Because India has such a good relationship with Bangladesh, if there is a problem there India and Bangladesh can discuss it, and the US can help if necessary.” The US consul general had a half-hour meeting with the Tripura Chief Minister. He said the US and Tripura could cooperate on various sectors like higher education, regional connectivity and economic ties. The US consul general also made a courtesy call on Governor Tathagata Roy and had positive discussions on the future of US-India relations, including Tripura’s development potential. As part of his outreach, Consul General Hall visited the Akhaura border post and witnessed the ‘Beating Retreat’ ceremony. He also visited Tripura University, the Government Museum at Ujjayanta Palace and the Tripura Sundari temple.

### US-India Relations High Now – Modi

#### Modi and Obama empirically boosting India-US relations

C. Raja Mohan, Director Carnegie India, January 29, 2015, “India-US Relations: Modi and Obama Begin New Chapter,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/29/india-us-relations-modi-and-obama-begin-new-chapter> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

But India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Barack Obama ended their second summit meeting in less than four months by proclaiming that a new chapter has begun in bilateral relations. This time around there is good reason to be a lot less sceptical about the ambitions of the two leaders to change the nature and direction of India-US relations. A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control. The principal reason for optimism has been the change of Indian attitude towards America under Modi. While both Obama and his predecessor George W Bush were eager to transform the partnership with India, the United Progressive Alliance government in Delhi (2004-14) was ambivalent. While Modi’s predecessor Manmohan Singh presided over some path-breaking initiatives in the nuclear and defence domains with the US during 2005, the leadership of his party, Congress, appeared reluctant to embrace America. Modi, despite his personal problem with America’s decade-long denial of a visa when he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat, put the United States at the centre of his domestic and foreign policy strategies. Obama, too, was quick to see the opportunity to advance the partnership, and invited Modi to the White House immediately after India’s general election last year. When Modi surprised him with an invitation to be the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations this year, Obama readily agreed. If the first summit between the two leaders last September arrested the drift in the bilateral relationship, the second one has set the stage for building a more expansive partnership in the coming years. The new personal rapport with Obama has helped Modi to find a decisive resolution to some of the outstanding issues with America. Modi also set new strategic goals, including more effective cooperation with America in securing the balance of power in Asia and defeating terrorism in the South Asian subcontinent and beyond.

### US-India Relations High Now – Declared Partnership

#### US-India cooperation has transformed – newly declared global strategic partnership

Kanwal Sibal, Dr. Sibal served as Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey, February 9, 2016, “What to Expect from US-India Relations in 2016” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

India-U.S. ties have been transformed in recent years, best exemplified with the newly declared global strategic partnership between the two countries. Yet, what is the reality of the partnership in terms of achievements on the ground? And, what could be the future expectations? For starters, the United States’ Pakistan policy remains a problematic issue. The objective of the two countries to advance regional security together is impeded by the continuation of U.S. military aid to Pakistan. This is done through presidential waivers to overcome the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, which requires Pakistan to act verifiably against terrorist groups on its soil before U.S. aid can be released. Furthermore, the United States does not consider the Taliban as a terrorist organization. The U.S. is, in reality, engaged in an effort to accommodate the Taliban politically in Afghanistan in a Pakistan-brokered deal, which is a risk to India’s security. It is thus difficult to see how, in these circumstances, the counter-terrorism partnership between India and the U.S. can be a defining one for the 21st century. U.S. President Barack Obama’s affirmation in 2010 that “the United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member” was viewed as a major evolution in the U.S. position. Yet up to now, the United States has not clearly defined its position on the expansion of the United Nations Security Council, due to the fact that U.S. openness to India’s hope for permanent membership on the council remains at a declaratory stage.

### US-India Relations High Now – India Government

#### Indian government empirically prioritizes US-Indian Relations

Vivek Mishra, Research Scholar at JNU, November 2014, “Indo-US Relations: After Narendra Modi’s Visit” <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB257-Vivek-IndoUS.pdf> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

The new government in New Delhi provides the US and India the chance to press the reset button and turn “areas of contention into areas of collaboration,” to quote a US official. However this approach is not going to be easy. Both governments will have to walk a tight rope in securing political and economic confidence while making certain compromises. However, there has been a breakthrough with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US. The challenge now is to consolidate this breakthrough. The bilateral relationship got a new direction after the July 2009 joint statement by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Government of India highlighting the areas that the two countries would focus on. The bilateral relationship rode on immense confidence in the aftermath of the framework agreement of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal for at least more than half a decade. With a new government at the helm, and with Narendra Modi having made the first crucial visit, it is opportune to analyse and prioritise the issues that are current or potential opportunities and roadblocks in the bilateral relationship. Such a perspective assumes importance vis-à-vis the 2013 diplomatic row between New Delhi and Washington, when many thought the government-to-government relations had reached its nadir. It was certainly a setback that brought the mutual relationship and confidence to a halt. Resultantly, there has been a limbo in many areas of mutual partnership, including the defence and trade sectors that have formed the bedrock of the bilateral relations for some time now. With the recent developments, the diplomatic row of 2013 now seems to be history. In the middle of this tumultuous diplomatic phase, Washington seems to have made a conscious effort to establish good diplomatic faith with New Delhi. The US took a big step in asking one of its most experienced and senior diplomats to step aside in the interest of better relations with India. Modi’s promise that he would not let the history of his personal equations with the US get in the way of better bilateral relations was another mature political enunciation.

### US-India Relations High Now – Regional Influence

#### US and India cooperating against Chinese assertiveness

Sohail Mahmood, Independent Politics and Security Analyst, March 5, 2016, “United States-India Relations: An Assessment of Contemporary Developments,” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/united-states-india-relations-assessment-contemporary-mahmood (Accessed 5/27/2016)

Thus, the United States was keen to do business with India. India also was competing with China for influence in the region. On another level, both are becoming increasingly wary of growing Chinese assertiveness in the region and have expressed their desire to balance it. On March 2, 2016 it was announced by the United States military that it, India, and Japan will hold naval exercises in waters off the northern Philippines near the South China Sea this year. The proposed area lies just northeast of the South China Sea, where the U.S. has spearheaded efforts to patrol waters near where China was building airstrips lighthouses and ports to assert its claims. The move would likely further raise tensions with China. Last year, India and the United States had expanded their annual naval drills in the Bay of Bengal to include Japan after a gap of eight years. Very recently, the rhetoric against China by senior United States officials had increased significantly. In a thinly veiled attack on China, Admiral Harry B. Harris, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, had said that:[29]

### A2 Investment Restrictions

#### Despite India investment restrictions, US and India relations are good

Kori Schake, research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and Anja Manuel, co-founder and principal at the consulting firm RiceHadleyGates LLC, May 24, 2016, “How to Manage a Rising Power – or Two” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/china-india-rising-powers/484106/> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

The British-American alliance was by no means inevitable just because the United States was a like-minded state. It is true that China, and to some extent India, have taken actions that harm the American economy, making cooperation harder. China coddles its “national champions,” permits cyber-spying on U.S. companies, and recently passed a vaguely worded law requiring tech companies to decrypt sensitive user data, and thus expose their users to Chinese government spying when asked. India restricts investment in many sectors, including insurance, petroleum refining, banking, and air transport. Through the World Trade Organization and diplomacy, Washington has ways to combat these practices, and impose consequences when China or India breaks trade rules. Despite these frustrations, American trade with and investment in China and India is already helping all three economies grow. Chinese investment has directly created more than 80,000 jobs in the United States, with $58.7 billion invested between 2013 and 2015 alone. American exports to China indirectly support hundreds of thousands more jobs in the United States. Indian foreign direct investment is thought to have created at least 90,000 direct jobs in the United States in total; the Indian tech industry alone is estimated to have indirectly supported more than 400,000 U.S. jobs in 2015. Economic cooperation benefits all three.

### A2 Civil Nuclear Initiative

#### Mutual understandings resolve American concerns over India’s Nuclear Liability Act

C. Raja Mohan, Director Carnegie India, January 29, 2015, “India-US Relations: Modi and Obama Begin New Chapter,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/29/india-us-relations-modi-and-obama-begin-new-chapter> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

If wrapping up the unfinished business of civil nuclear cooperation showcased Modi as the problem-solver, his quest for common ground with Obama on climate change suggested Delhi was no longer shackled by sterile slogans of the past. The outlines of a mutual understanding on implementing the civil nuclear initiative emerged in the last few weeks, as Delhi opened purposeful negotiations with the US on resolving three issues at hand—American concerns about India’s Nuclear Liability Act, India’s demand for a quick closure on the terms of international safeguards, and Washington’s support for India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Although a nuclear deal that satisfied both sides was on the cards, few observers in Delhi were prepared for the developments on climate change, which has long been a site of confrontation between India and the United States. If the virtuousness of India’s international policies has been measured in the past by their political distance from the United States, Modi promised to “cooperate closely” with America to conclude an ambitious global climate agreement at the end of this year in Paris. With Obama standing next to him at the joint press appearance, Modi said India’s problem was not about resisting pressure from America on climate change. Sovereign India was confident enough to handle it, Modi suggested. India’s real pressures today, Modi said, were about protecting the environment for future generations of Indians from the threats of climate change and global warming. His new approach to climate change is centred on deepening bilateral cooperation with the US on renewable energy and developing cooperation with Washington in multilateral forums. Under Modi, Delhi’s entrenched ‘Third World-ism’ is yielding place to the idea of India as a responsible power.

### China-India Relations High Now – General

#### India and China relations are improving – recent cooperation proves

Xinhua, Xinhuanet News, May 27, 2016, “China, India Pledge to Boost Partnership,” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/27/c_135391411.htm> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with visiting Indian President Pranab Mukherjee on Thursday, pledging to boost the strategic and cooperative partnership between the two nations. Hailing the development of the bilateral ties in recent years, Xi said the two sides should stick to the theme of neighborly friendship and reciprocal cooperation to cement the China-Indian relationship and benefit the people of the two countries. Xi proposed the two sides consolidate political trust by maintaining strategic communication between state leaders and making use of various bilateral dialogue mechanisms, and tap the potential for practical cooperation on railways, industrial park, smart city, new energy, environmental protection, information technology, human resources, industrial capacity, investment, tourism and services. The Chinese president looked forward to closer cultural and people-to-people exchanges as well as law-enforcement and security cooperation between the two countries. "The two sides should appropriately address our differences," Xi said, adding that the Chinese side is appreciative of India's adherence to the one-China policy. Xi suggested China and India support each other in regional and international affairs and work together to make successes of this year's Group of Twenty summit and BRICS summit.

### Tensions/ Risk of Miscalc High

#### Structural issues keep the risk of miscalculation and conflict between India/ China high

Matthew Southerland, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, Iacob Koch-Weser Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade, and Angela Zhang, Research Intern, Security and Foreign Affairs, December 22, 2014,“China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite Growing Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China-India%20Relations--Tensions%20Persist%20Despite%20Growing%20Cooperation_12%2022%202014.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2016)

Despite growing bilateral cooperation between China and India, sources of tension in the relationship remain and in some cases are becoming more pronounced. In the security realm, continued occurrences of Chinese soldiers crossing into disputed areas of the China-India border and China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean are sources of friction in China-India relations. In the economic realm, India has a large trade imbalance with China, due to the distortionary effects of China’s economic policy, Chinese competitiveness in export-oriented industries, and India’s economic and institutional problems. Meanwhile, the 2012-2013 leadership transition in China and the 2014 election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India have increased potential for bilateral cooperation. The two countries seek to work together on a growing number of issues, including stability in Afghanistan and climate change. In addition, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, China pledged to invest in Indian industrial parks and high-speed rail infrastructure. China and India also are collaborating in multilateral forums and institutions, such as the summits of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the new BRICS development bank. Although both governments seek to reduce tension in the relationship, the potential for competition, miscalculation, and conflict between the two countries persists. For the United States, Prime Minister Modi’s election and India’s evolving strategic calculations have important implications for U.S. security interests, and may present opportunities for greater U.S.-India military and security cooperation. The United States also could cooperate with India to promote a greater balance of economic power in the Asia Pacific region, encourage improved market access in China, promote Chinese compliance with its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, and enhance global energy security.

### 2NC – Relations Strong

#### Relations strong now- recent defense ties

Priyanka Mogul, May, 2016, “Modi in US: America elevates defence relations with India on par with Nato and Israel,” International Business Times, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/modi-us-america-elevates-defence-relations-india-par-nato-israel-1561066> (accessed 5/27/16)

The US House of Representatives approved legislation that is set to elevate its defence ties with India. The move on 20 May puts the south Asian country on par with Nato allies, as well as Israel, in terms of defence equipment sale and technology transfer. The amendment on "Enhancing Defence and Security Cooperation with India" was approved weeks before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's scheduled visit to the US on 8 June. While there, Modi will become the fifth Indian prime minister to address a joint meeting of the US Congress, with the last one taking place in 2005 by Manmohan Singh. Speaking about the amendment to the National Defence Authorisation Act, Congressman George Holding said: "It seeks to promote greater defence trade and encourage additional military cooperation between the United States and India. "I believe that by requiring our government to take actions such as strengthening defence, technology and trade Initiative and encouraging combined military planning with India, we can make certain that the US-India defence relationship endures."

#### Relations strong now and the partnership is key to maintain peace

Sumit Kumar, Pondicherry University, May, 2016, “How Modi changed the India–US relationship,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/> (accessed 5/27/16)

In the first two years of the Modi government, India and the United States have taken calibrated efforts at the highest political level to transform bilateral relations. It was in this context that the visit of United States Defense Secretary Ash Carter to India on 10–13 April assumed huge significance. His visit symbolised the deepening defence ties between the two countries, with the Modi government agreeing in principle to sign three ground-breaking agreements. The current era of US–India relations began after the Clinton administration’s containment policies failed to isolate India following its 1998 nuclear tests. India emerged from these sanctions a resurgent country under the leadership of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The United States then adopted a policy of accommodation towards India, with the two countries transforming their estranged relations into a strategic partnership. When Modi came to power, he did not allow his personal differences with the United States to dictate bilateral ties. Instead, Modi decided to redirect efforts to sustain and deepen ties. This quickly became evident when Modi made a state visit to the United States in September 2014 on the invitation of President Obama. Subsequently, Obama became the first US president to be the chief guest at the Republic Day Parade in New Delhi in January 2015. Defence cooperation has been a pillar of the two countries’ burgeoning relationship. There is a growing sentiment among US security officials and experts that, given its economic slowdown as well as security crises in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East and other regions, it is not possible for the United States alone to ensure peace and security. It needs to engage rising powers like India.

#### Relations strong now- Carter visit

Carla Babb, April, 2016, “US Defense Chief Visits India Amid New High in Bilateral Relations,” Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com/content/carter-visits-india-amid-new-high-in-bilateral-relations/3278304.html> (accessed 5/29/16)

The visit aims to demonstrate the priority that the defense department has placed on the Asia-Pacific region. Carter has touted the U.S.-India relationship as a “strategic handshake,” one that is “destined” to be among the most significant partnerships of the 21st century. “As the United States is reaching west in its rebalance, India is reaching east in Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi’s 'Act East' policy that will bring it farther into the Indian and Pacific Oceans,” Carter said. Clad told VOA the pivot has been a good way to formally display the “inside-our-government attitude” that gives Asia the priority many felt it deserved.

### 2NC – AT: Alt Causes to Strong Relations

#### No- relations are strong due to promoted cooperation over China

South China Morning Post, April, 2016, “Eyes on China: US defence secretary Ash Carter visits India on mission to draw militaries closer,” <http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/1935071/eyes-china-us-defence-secretary-ash-carter-visits-india-mission> (accessed 5/27/16)

US Defence Secretary Ash Carter began a three-day visit to India on Sunday, seeking to advance a relatively new defence relationship with a country Washington sees as a counterweight to the growing power of China. In a sign of the importance Carter places on improving defence ties with India, the visit is his second in less than a year, and it kicks off in Goa, the west coast home state of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. For India, closer US defence ties would bring greater access to American technology, and it too has been alarmed by China’s naval forays in the Indian Ocean. But India has been historically wary of drawing too near to any one country. “India’s very reluctant to be seen as too close to the United States, but the Pentagon is very bullish on this relationship,” said Shane Mason, a research associate at the Stimson Center in Washington. It is also a favoured initiative of Carter, who established a special cell within the Pentagon last year to promote cooperation with India. India disappointed by sale of United States’ F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan “There’s no question about where the United States-India relationship is going,” Carter said on Friday, at a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. “We can control and influence the pace, and I want to do that.”

#### Relations strong now, but need to continue on that trajectory

NDTV, November, 2015, “Indo-US Relations Are Strong, Says Indian Ambassador Arun K Singh,” <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indo-us-relations-are-strong-says-indian-ambassador-arun-k-singh-1242294> (accessed 5/27/16)

WASHINGTON: Asserting that the Indo-US ties are strong, Indian Ambassador to the US Arun K Singh has said that education sector is the area where bilateral relationship must get stronger. Addressing a gathering of students at Wright State University in Ohio yesterday, Mr Singh said that relations between India and the US are strong and getting stronger.

### 2NC – AT: Pakistan Hurts Relations

#### U.S. more concerned with India than Pakistan- sees Pakistan as collateral damage

Munir Akram, April, 2016, “The Indo-US alliance,” Dawn, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1252498> (accessed 5/29/16)

It is not merely that Pakistan suffers ‘collateral damage’ from the US arming of India against China. The US has imposed — formally and informally — severe and discriminatory restraints on Pakistan’s acquisition of advanced and dual-use technologies and weapons systems from the US or allied sources. It opposes Pakistan’s defensive responses to India’s build-up: fissile material production, theatre nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Pressure has even been exerted on China not to transfer advanced weaponry and technologies to Pakistan. Unless this dynamic is changed, Pakistan’s capabilities for conventional defence and nuclear deterrence against India could be significantly eroded. The latest confirmation of the Indo-US alliance comes at a time when Pakistan’s limited convergence with the US on Afghanistan may be fading. According to Indian press reports, Ashton Carter conveyed to the Indians that the US has given up on Pakistan’s cooperation to stabilise Afghanistan, and wants India to play a larger role there.

## Links

### US/ China Relations—Zero Sum

#### India fears being cut out of the trilateral relationship—US/China relations increases are zero sum with India

Sanjaya Baru, Political commentator and policy analyst, currently serving as Director for Geo-Economics and Strategy at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 10, 2011, “Sanjaya Baru: China, India and the US,” Business Standard, <http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/sanjaya-baru-china-india-and-the-us-111101000043_1.html> (accessed May 26, 2016)

Far too many analysts and commentators around the world view the China-India-[United States](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=United+States) trilateral relationship as a zero-sum game. This view is promoted by the fact that on several recent occasions, when two of the three have come together, the third has been worried about losing out. When the US and [China](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=China) issued a joint statement with a shared view of South Asia, during US President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in 2009, [India](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=India) was upset. When China and India stood as one at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2010, the US was upset. When the US and India come together on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, China is upset. This paradigm shaped Chinese response to the India-US agreement on cooperation in civil nuclear energy and US-India maritime exercises in the Indian Ocean. It shaped many Indian anxieties in the aftermath of the trans-Atlantic financial crisis when US analysts began to float the ‘G-2’ theory of a condominium between China and the US aimed at ‘managing’ the global economy. So dominant was this view within the corridors of the US state department in the early days of [Hillary Clinton](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Hillary+Clinton) and in the year after the Lehman collapse of September 2008, that one of Ms Clinton’s aides, former US deputy secretary of state Jim Steinberg told this writer in September 2009 that India should just stop whining about US-China relations, grow up and come to terms with it. Mr Steinberg equated early 21st century China to early 20th century United States and the US to early 20th century Britain. A view that this newspaper’s columnist Arvind Subramanian has echoed in his book on the eclipse of the US dollar by China’s Yuan and the growing ‘economic dominance’ of China. While Washington DC is now conflicted on how to deal with a rising China, both those who think China can be a friend and those who think China will be an enemy advocate policy options that India cannot feel too comfortable with. Similarly, in China there are the US-haters who see India as an American cat’s-paw and US-lovers who like the G-2 idea of working with the US to run the world, and view India as a supplicant at their shared high table. All these ‘zero-sum game’ views have the common failing that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. If things can go wrong, they will. China, being the fastest rising power with more at stake, has the highest stake in stability but will be most prone to making mistakes, if it believes its own fears. I say this because a recurring theme of Chinese interlocutors in bilateral diaologues that I have been involved in over the past three years has been that the US and India are ‘ganging up’ against China. But India, too, can make mistakes if it does not have a realistic view of China-US relations.

### US/ China Relations—Security

#### India fear close US/China relations—the plan triggers India’s security concerns

[Mingjiang Li](http://www.amazon.com/s/ref%3Ddp_byline_sr_book_1?ie=UTF8&text=Mingjiang+Li&search-alias=books&field-author=Mingjiang+Li&sort=relevancerank), Associate Professor and Coordinator of China Program in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and [Kalyan M. Kemburi](http://www.amazon.com/s/ref%3Ddp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8&text=Kalyan+M.+Kemburi&search-alias=books&field-author=Kalyan+M.+Kemburi&sort=relevancerank) , Associate Research Fellow in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2014, “New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for the Asia Pacific (Politics in Asia),” Google Books, pp 223 (accessed May 24, 2016)

Seen from India, Obama’s Asian policy seemed to turn the full circle. From the initial enthusiasm for a G-2, the Obama administration is now widely seen as signalling its commitment to a long-term role in Asia. The new US policy of a ‘pivot to Asia’ was backed by a US military strategy that called for rebalancing US military forces towards a stronger Asian presence. As part of the new strategy, the US is strengthening its traditional alliances in Asia, developing new military partnerships with India, Indonesia and Vietnam, and pressing for a sustainable military engagement with China. In deﬁning the new American defence priorities following the political decision on the ‘pivot to Asia’, the Pentagon declared that the US is ‘investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider" of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” During his visit to Delhi in June 2012, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta described India as the ‘lynchpin' of US military strategy in Asia.” India was concerned at the beginning of the Obama Administration about a potential Sino-US condominium, but was now compelled to face up to the potential consequences of Sino-US rivalry in Asia and its own role in it. To make matters worse, in Obama’s second term, Washington has begun to downplay the military dimension of the pivot to Asia and to emphasize the importance of a more intensive engagement with Beijing." While the last word on the pivot has not been heard, coping with the volatility in Sino-US relations is likely to endure as one of the biggest challenges to India's national security strategy in the coming years.

### US/ China Relations

#### US/China relations stunt US/India engagement—empirically proven

Evan A. Feigenbaum, Senior associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Vice chairman of the Paulson Institute, an independent center, PhD in Chinese politics, September 22, 2015, “U.S.-India Ties in the Age of Xi Jinping,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xi-jinping/ii7f> (accessed May 26, 2016)

When Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Washington this week, the United States and India will have an opportunity to assess—and then bolster—their nascent cooperation in Asia. The fact is, this triangular relationship matters. It has often been argued that the United States and India don’t “need” China as a rationale for cooperation. Two continental-sized countries, with deep maritime traditions and a diverse array of energy, economic, and security interests, have numerous reasons to cooperate and coordinate. But there can be no denying that China looms large in the strategic calculations of both countries. For one thing, China’s growing strength confronts Washington and New Delhi with sometimes distinct, but increasingly shared, strategic and economic challenges. So too does the prospect of Chinese weakness—for example, if Beijing fails to shift toward a new economic model as its current approach runs out of steam. The good news is that the United States and India have recognized the potential for cooperation in Asia—partly, it should be acknowledged, because they share interests and concerns about what kind of power China might become. Much has been made of the joint statement on cooperation in the Asia-Pacific issued during President Obama’s January visit to India. But that emphasis on the Pacific is not new. It dates back over a decade, so there is depth and longevity to the issues and concerns that have fostered a growing alignment of interests. As early as November 2001, U.S.-India joint statements emphasized “common goals in Asia.” A landmark 2002 speech by then-Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill positioned Asian geopolitics squarely at the center of the argument for strengthened partnership: “Peace within Asia—a peace that helps perpetuate Asian prosperity—remains an objective that a transformed U.S.-India relationship will help advance.” So China is important to U.S. and Indian calculations about the Pacific—and to their calculations about one another’s interests, intentions, and goals. Why is China so central? Start with economics. Asia’s relationship to the world economy has changed dramatically since the mid-2000s. For decades, G-7 countries beat a path to Asia’s door. But the other foot now wears the shoe as many economies, including Western economies, increasingly rely on Asian industrial and household consumers. Asian countries have become much more than traders. They are investors, builders, lenders, and, in some areas, a growth engine. China is a central player in this Asian drama. Indeed, for all its challenges, including a pronounced economic slowdown, China is the top trading partner of more than sixty countries, many of them in Asia. Overcapacity and slackening Chinese demand have rocked numerous economies, especially commodity producers. But If China succeeds in rebalancing its economy toward a new model, it will foster some new demand drivers, for example through the accelerated growth of household consumption. Nor is China’s slowdown, or its recent stock market turbulence, likely to alter its increasingly central role as an investor and builder of infrastructure. These could ultimately change Asia’s economic face, not least in South Asia, as Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative converges with other efforts, including a $40 billion Silk Road Fund and the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Bank, both of which India has joined as a founding member. China’s foreign and economic policies are converging in unprecedented ways. Beijing burned a sizeable chunk of its $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves amid the summer’s market turbulence. But it retains reserves—some now being recycled into investments offshore—larger than the nominal GDPs of India, South Korea, and Thailand combined, and equivalent in size to the world’s fourth-largest economy. China’s abundance of capital is an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy: it will continue to leverage state-backed financial vehicles for economic and strategic ends. Now, take security. From the maritime commons to the cyber domain, U.S.-China security competition has become increasingly intense. But India, along with some others in Asia, shares elements of these American concerns. Washington and Beijing have some clashing security concepts in Asia, not least in the South China Sea. So too do New Delhi and Beijing in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. These are just some of the issues on the agenda for Xi’s state visit to Washington. But here’s the catch: some issues on that agenda could bring Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart as American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges between the United States and India. One example of the former involves domestic investment rules in China. Beijing has deployed regulations and standards as a non-tariff barrier—to the detriment of U.S. and Indian investment alike. But an example of the latter involves intensifying climate change coordination in the run-up to December’s multilateral negotiations in Paris: the United States and China are moving into alignment on climate, even as New Delhi stands apart and flirts with seeking exceptional treatment. That points to a challenge that the United States and India must now confront: At the strategic level, China’s rise has brought Washington and New Delhi closer. But at the tactical level—and sometimes, even at the strategic level—U.S. and Indian goals and choices are not always in alignment. One problem is political. It is difficult to imagine a major East Asian security contingency—Taiwan, Korea, the South or East China Seas—to which U.S.-India operational coordination would be relevant. India would almost certainly keep itself aloof, influenced by many of the same Indian voices that helped to scuttle refueling support of the United States in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Another problem involves Indian perceptions of American ambivalence about India-China security tensions. The United States, for its part, would likely try to remain aloof from a blowup on the India-China border, not wishing to be caught in the middle. That would, predictably, raise hackles in New Delhi about U.S. “unreliability,” further fueling Indian skepticism of America’s China policy. Washington encountered precisely this suspicion full force in 2009, when it issued a U.S.-China joint statement that included references to South Asia. Many in India choked on this statement—first, because they suspected a U.S.-China condominium on New Delhi’s security equities; second, because few, if any, in India regard Beijing as a neutral party in South Asia; and third, because many fret that Washington could sideline New Delhi, working against Indian interests in pursuit of expanded U.S.-China cooperation.

### US/ China Relations

#### US/China relations trade off with US/ India relations

Daniel Twining, Director and senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 4, 2016, “India’s Heavy Hedge Against China, and its New Look to the United States to Help,” Korea Economic Institute of America, <http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/indias_heavy_hedge_against_china.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2016)

India is engaged in a heavy hedge against China—although its history of non-alignment, traditional rhetoric of anti-Americanism, the dominance until recently of analysts’ tendency to view India’s security mainly in terms of its subcontinental competition with Pakistan, and the tendency for emerging market analysts to hyphenate India and China as rising economies can obscure this reality. Tactical cooperation in climate change talks and BRICS summits should not confuse us into seeing any kind of emerging India-China alignment in global affairs. Strategic rivalry of a quiet but steady nature characterizes their ties, to the point where it affects their relations with third countries: India’s relations with Russia have cooled substantially since President Putin’s tilt toward Beijing in the wake of Russia’s isolation from the West over Ukraine. India-China relations will be determined in part by how the United States navigates between them in pursuit of its national interests. The United States has a key role to play in India’s heavy hedge. Historically, India has sought to balance China alone and, when necessary, in combination with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India has little history of participating in the kind of alliances the United States has constructed in the Asia-Pacific, but tightening Indo-U.S. alignment tests that history and enables India to hedge more readily against daunting strategic competition from China, which many Indians believe to be pursuing a conscious strategy of encircling India on land and at sea while working to diplomatically contain its influence in leading international clubs. U.S. strategic partnership with India should be a stabilizing factor in this equation as a hedge against Chinese hegemony in Asia, the emerging order’s pivot of wealth and power.

### Magnifier—Plan Upsets Allies

#### Strong US/China relations upsets US allies including India

François Godement, Director of the Asia Centre at Sciences Po, November 16, 2009, “Obama in Asia – Part I,” Yale Global, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obama-asia-part-i> (accessed May 26, 2016)

PARIS: The specter of the G2 – a China-US condominium – is haunting European governments as much as the specter of revolution haunted its courts in the days of Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto. As President Barack Obama mentions a “strategic partnership” on the eve of his departure for Beijing, anxiety is mounting. The words haven’t been used officially since 1996, when then Secretary of State Warren Christopher talked about a “partnership” but rejected the “strategic” adjective promoted by a public Chinese display in Shanghai. What the concern about G-2 shows, though, is insecurity among major countries in the absence of a clear architecture of power. Of course, every official or officious spokesperson in America or China will deny that the G2, a creative acronym coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski, bears any semblance with reality. Indeed, the Obama administration has initially chosen to emphasize “multiple partnerships”, breaking with some of the language of its predecessors. Its most decisive international actions so far have been gestures to reach out towards difficult partners, such as Russia over the issue of anti-missile defense and forward basing of interceptor radars, or partners where there was no established channel of dialogue: Iran, Burma, Sudan. Washington has also reconfirmed the strategic partnership started with India by the 2008 nuclear agreement, a heritage guaranteed to annoy China, and which goes far towards explaining Beijing’s various gestures of irritation at New Delhi. The Chinese could not have failed to notice that there are many holdovers from the Bush era in the area of defense and even at the State Department, and no significant cut in defense spending has been announced. For their part, Chinese leaders and experts abstain from any emphasis on bilateral Sino-American cooperation. About global economic governance, for example, they either point out America’s responsibility in sparking the 2008 global crisis, or they encourage a more systemic reform of the international economic system. Neither they, nor the US, talk very openly of the role that the world’s two intertwined giants might take together in solving their mutual imbalances, and the implications for third parties. Beijing is still full of hard-line realists in think tanks or the press, who point out strategic disagreements with America. There is also a revival in China of the five principles of pacific coexistence as a guiding principle for foreign policy. This revival serves as a bulwark against what China feels are incessant calls for increased responsibilities and burden sharing. As China’s footprint widens, it is indeed called to take a leading role in resolving problems from North Korea to Iran, from climate change to public governance in Africa. On president Obama’s visit, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been added to this long list. So even if Chinese experts talk of a long-term decline of American influence and strategic leverage, they are the first to point out, defensively, that the US is still in the driver’s seat. Clearly, China prefers to sit back and eventually criticize from a distance. This is consistent with its long-standing strategic conservatism, but also with the view that the burden on the West is increasing with time. Offering good offices between parties, or perhaps whispering some realist advice to a rogue state, seems to be the extent of China’s strategic cooperation. On North Korea, China has simply not changed its basic stance, not even after two nuclear tests. On Taiwan, where America has rooted for a government that is now more in sync with Beijing than ever, there has been no let up in China’s missile deployment across the Taiwan straits. In South Asia and about AfPak – today’s hot war – there is no sign of movement by China beyond communiqués on terrorism. Quite the contrary, China criticizes some aspects of the US military presence, and has pushed on a U.N. enquiry into civilian deaths from aerial strikes in Afghanistan. On Iran, there remains political advocacy and shyness about sanctions, a cocktail not so different from the North Korean case, and with more business interests. On China’s forward deployment of ships to the Somali coast, it hasn’t led to more cooperation or coordination with other nations. Not be forgotten either the incident with the USS Impeccable in March 2009 off the coast of Hainan which served to remind that China disagrees with pervasive US military presence in its neighborhood. In sum, beyond praise about Barack Obama from high-brow Chinese experts, and a blanket call by the new administration for a “comprehensive relationship”, there is simply no basis for a strategic convergence between the US and China. So why is it that the G2 is such a specter in the room, mentioned at every conference and by many officials outside the United States? Well, for one, appearances matter. At the Pittsburgh G20 summit, President Obama usually addressed President Hu Jintao before anybody else during the leaders’ meeting. And when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Beijing, the Chinese government upgrades the relations with the US as “our most important relationship”. But the talk about G2 is also fuelled by their own angst about their weakness. Europe is on temporary hold because of its eight year long institutional debate. Japan is suffering through a dual crisis – economic recession and political uncertainty. Russia is still resource-rich, but its financial crisis has instilled a new modesty. India hasn’t ridden the crisis as China did. Only Brazil, besides China, is clearly gaining ground in these testing times.

### Magnifier—Asymmetry

#### Threat perceptions go one direction—India fears China’s rise but China doesn’t fear India because of asymmetry

Tien-sze Fang, Assistant Professor, Center for General Education, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, 2013, “Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations,” Oxford Scholarship Online, http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198095958.001.0001/acprof-9780198095958

The rise of China and India are undoubtedly a major feature of contemporary global politics. The relationship between the two rising Asian powers will not only exert a profound and far-reaching influence over Asian security, but is also seen as a decisive factor of reshaping international order. To provide a new perspective for understanding India–China relations, this book draws on evidence from interactions between China and India over the past few years to make an empirical case for the existence and impact of asymmetrical perceptions of threat between the two countries. The major issues of China–India relations, including the nuclear issue, the boundary problem, the Tibet issue, regional competition and cooperation, and their relations in the global context, are examined. The book observes that the Sino–Indian relations have been constrained by the asymmetry between their threat perceptions: India tends to be deeply apprehensive of threats from China, while China appears comparatively unconcerned about threats from India. This asymmetry, the book concludes, has made it difficult for China and India to forge shared knowledge and to set a common agenda around which their expectations could converge. India will be on a perennial quest for changes in Sino-Indian relations, such as a final resolution of the border issue and securing more credible nuclear deterrent against China. On the contrary, China will be in favour of the status quo, and feel no urgent need to sort out the disputes. As a result, the asymmetry in threat perceptions has been a destabilizing factor in India– China relations.

### Magnifier—Competition

#### India and China are in constant conflict—politically, economically, and militarily positioning for dominance in the region

[Harsh V. Pant](http://thediplomat.com/authors/harsh-v-pant/), Professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London, December 11, 2014, “India and China Slug It Out in South Asia,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/india-and-china-slug-it-out-in-south-asia/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

This water diplomacy underlines the power struggle between China and India, which is rapidly shaping the South Asian strategic landscape. Last month the summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Nepal was also marked by [this Sino-Indian contest](http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/china-makes-inroads-into-indias-backyard/), where India had to work hard to block China’s entry into the grouping. For a long time, the dominant narrative of SAARC has been how the India-Pakistan rivalry has hampered its evolution into anything of significance. That is now rapidly losing its salience with China’s growing dominance of the South Asian landscape. China entered into SAARC as an observer in 2005, supported by most member states. India could do little about it and so acquiesced. Now, much to India’s consternation, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal are supporting China’s full membership in SAARC. China’s rising profile in South Asia is not news. What is astonishing is the diminishing role of India and the rapidity with which New Delhi is ceding strategic space to Beijing on the sub-continent. Even as China is becoming the largest trade partner of most states in South Asia, including India, New Delhi is busy repeating the old mantra of South Asia being India’s exclusive sphere of influence. Of course, no one even takes note of it anymore. Pakistan’s “all-weather” friendship with China is well-known, but the reach of China in other South Asian states has been extraordinary. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka view India as more interested in creating barriers against their exports than in spurring regional economic integration. India’s protectionist tendencies have allowed China to don the mantle of regional economic leader. Instead of India emerging as facilitator of socio-economic development in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan, China’s developmental assistance is having a larger impact. China’s strategy toward South Asia is premised on encircling India and confining her within the geographical coordinates of the region. This strategy of using proxies started off with Pakistan and has gradually evolved to include other states in the region, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. China is entering markets in South Asia more aggressively through both trade and investment, improving its linkages with South Asian states through treaties and bilateral cooperation. Following this up by building a ring of road and port connections in India’s neighborhood and deepening military engagements with states on India’s periphery, China has firmly entrenched itself in India’s backyard.

### Magnifier—Border Dispute

#### India and China are in the middle of a tense territorial dispute

PTI News, international news organization, April 20, 2016, “India, China hold new round of talks to resolve border dispute,” The Indian Express, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-china-hold-new-round-of-talks-to-resolve-border-dispute/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

India and China today held the 19th round of talks to resolve the vexed border dispute amid a growing discord between the two nations over Beijing blocking India’s bid to get JeM chief Masood Azhar banned by the UN. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval held the annual talks with Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi to discuss the road ahead to resolve the dispute which has bedevilled bilateral ties. Besides the border issue, Doval and Yang, the designated Special Representatives, also have a larger mandate to discuss all contentious bilateral, regional and international issues. Considering their mandate, the second attempt by Beijing in an year to block India’s bids to get the Pakistan’ terror group’s leaders banned is expected to figure in the talks. Last month, China had vetoed India’s bid to get the Pathankot attack mastermind designated as terrorist by the UN Sanctions Committee, maintaining that the case “did not meet the requirements” of the Security Council. The Chinese action evoked a strong reaction in India which said that it was “incomprehensible” that while Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was banned by the UN, its chief was not.

### Magnifier—Border Dispute (2)

#### Chinese nationalism and aggression will prevent the resolution of the border dispute

Elizabeth Roche, Staff writer for Live Mint news, January 11, 2016, “Rising Chinese nationalist sentiments may hinder China, India in solving border dispute,” Live Mint news, <http://www.livemint.com/Industry/0od9fEF40HUOlVo7AULTeP/Rising-Chinese-nationalist-sentiments-may-hinder-China-Indi.html> (accessed May 26, 2016)

Rising Chinese nationalist sentiments could hinder China and India from finding a solution to their decades old border dispute, experts on relations between the two Asian giants said at a seminar over the weekend. According to Ranjit S Kalha, a former Secretary in the Indian foreign ministry and who led India’s negotiating team in the Boundary Sub-Group from 1985 to 1988, the two countries, despite numerous rounds of discussions over decades, are yet to come to a basic understanding of “where the boundary should lie. ..until and unless we have that understanding, you cannot translate it onto a map.” The two countries fought a brief but bitter war in 1962 and have been attempting to demarcate their borders since then – with no success. China claims 90,000 sq. km of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh and occupies around 38,000 sq. km in Jammu and Kashmir, which India claims as its territory. Also, under a China-Pakistan boundary agreement signed in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq. km of Indian territory in PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) to China, the Indian foreign ministry says. While the India-China boundary has been largely calm, thanks to pacts signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005, both sides frequently accuse the other of incursions. One such incursion in April took a serious turn when Chinese soldiers intruded some 20 kilometres inside Indian territory leading to a three-week-long stand-off between the neighbours and threatening to derail a visit in May by China’s newly installed leader Li Keqiang. But the situation was resolved and Li’s visit went ahead. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in October, the two countries also signed a border defence mechanism agreement to ensure that potentially volatile situations are defused quickly. However, there was another intrusion in September 2014 that took place during a visit to India by Chinese president Xi Jinping. The intrusions did not disrupt the visit but led to prime minister Narendra Modi to underline the need to speed up the boundary talks.

### Magnifier—Chinese Encirclement

#### China is working to encircle India—India considers them a threat

The American Interest, news and political analysis outlet, March 12, 2016, “Is China Encircling India?,” The American Interest, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/12/is-china-encircling-india/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

New Delhi has long worried that Beijing is [establishing](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/22/china-seychelles-indian-fears-encirclement) a “string of pearls” to encircle India in the Indian Ocean. One of the projects stirring those fears was a “port city” in Sri Lanka. Yet the development, which was embroiled in various controversies, [looked](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/01/09/a-snag-in-chinas-string-of-pearls-strategy/) like it might die after Sri Lanka’s former China-friendly president lost his election last year. A year later, the new president has put it [back on track](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/11/china-to-build-vast-controversial-port-city-in-sri-lanka). The Guardian: President Maithripala Sirisena had suspended the contentious $1.4bn plan to build on reclaimed land next to Colombo’s main harbour shortly after taking power in January last year. But the port city, initiated by Chinese president Xi Jinping in September 2014 and expected to include housing, a marina and a Formula One racetrack, was again given the green light on Thursday. “The cabinet committee on economic management has recommended allowing resumption of the project subject to limitations and conditions stipulated in the EIA (environmental impact assessment),” the government said in a statement. It did not say what the conditions were, but official sources told AFP that Chinese investors were given permission to resume work on the project without any major modifications. In 2010, China [financed](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/18/port-sri-lanka-india-china) another deepwater port in Sri Lanka which had India’s analysts squirming. So far, India’s response to Colombo’s decision has been muted. But we imagine officials in New Delhi aren’t happy. In the past year, we haven’t heard so much about India’s “string of pearls” worries. That could be about to change.

### Magnifier—India Threatened

#### India views China as a main threat to their security

David M. Malone, Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, is president of Canada’s International Development Research Centre, and Rohan Mukherjee, Senior research specialist at Princeton University, February-March 2010, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Princeton University, <https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Survival%2052-1%2012%20Malone%20and%20Mukherjee_0.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2016)

Not much has changed in the rhetoric of Sino-Indian relations since Mao Zedong, speaking in 1951 in honour of the first anniversary of India’s constitution, declared that ‘excellent friendship’ had existed between the two countries ‘for thousands of years’.1 Yet few of the lofty proclamations made by Indian and Chinese leaders over the years truly reflect the reality of relations between the neighbours. It is surprising that two states with such a rich and sometimes fractious history, including a border conflict in 1962, should have what appears to be a largely reactive relationship. But neither has developed a grand strategy with regard to the other. An unshakeable and largely unprofitable preoccupation with the past on the Indian side, and an equally intense preoccupation with domestic consolidation on the Chinese side, have left the relationship under-tended. It might best be seen as one of geostrategic competition qualified by growing commercial cooperation. And there is some asymmetry: China is a more fraught subject in Indian national debates than India is for China. China does not appear to feel threatened in any serious way by India, while India at times displays tremendous insecurity in the face of Chinese economic success and military expansion.

### Link Magnifier

#### China could be a huge test for US-India Relations – growing tensions

Kanwal Sibal, Dr. Sibal served as Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey, February 9, 2016, “What to Expect from US-India Relations in 2016” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

In the past, the United States had virtually no defense ties with India. Today, apart from a renewed Defense Framework Agreement, the U.S. has become a large supplier of defense equipment to India, and even the biggest in the last few years, with contracts worth almost $13 billion. In addition, the largest number Indian joint military exercises are with the United States. Robust language has appeared in joint India-U.S. statements in 2013, 2014, and 2015 on defense cooperation. However, so far, less than expected progress has been made in the area of defense manufacturing under the so-called Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). During Obama’s visit to India, four “pathfinder” projects under the DTTI rubric involving relatively minor technologies were announced. Contacts between the two sides under this U.S. initiative continue. Two other projects of note, one on aircraft carrier technology and the other on jet engine technology, are also under discussion. U.S.-China tensions are growing, and, India too has longstanding disputes with China. The 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region specifically addresses maritime territorial disputes involving China and, among other things, affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and freedom of the air throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. U.S. trade and financial relations with China are vast; India too seeks stable and economically productive ties with China. India has the difficult task ahead of managing the China threat by both engaging closely with the United States and reaching out to China. At the same time, the credibility of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and the Pacific is yet to be tested.

#### US strategy was to make India a player to counterbalance China

Jaideep Prabhu, Author/Writer at Firstpost, December 21, 2015, “Growing India-US Relations: New Delhi’s Defence Doctrine Must Match its Muscular Foreign Policy,” <http://www.firstpost.com/world/growing-india-us-relations-new-delhis-defence-doctrine-must-match-its-muscular-foreign-policy-2553514.html> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

The United States' approach to India underwent a sea change during the presidency of George W Bush. Although the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 would end up absorbing much of the administration's energy, Bush and his team had come to office with the aim of curbing the rise of China. The White House moved from the previous regime's view of China as a strategic partner to one where the Asian giant was a strategic competitor. The neo-conservative world view, as David Frum, speechwriter for Bush, later explained, sought close ties with India and a pragmatic relationship with China that combined economic engagement with military containment. Part of the US' strategy was to make India a part of the international system and midwife its rise as a counterbalance to China. The India-US nuclear deal was part of that plan, as was the DTTI. As Philip Zelikow, a counselor for the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, had said, the goal was "to help India become a major world power in the 21st Century". File image of US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. PTIFile image of US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. PTI From the US point of view, however, defence relations could have developed much quicker had India accepted what the Pentagon calls "foundational agreements". These pacts, typical military alphabet soups like the LSA (Logistics Sharing Agreement), Cismoa (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement), and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation), facilitate military-to-military cooperation primarily at a tactical level, although they can be developed further into strategic cooperation.

### 2NC – Link: Engagement

#### India sees strong U.S. engagement with China as bolstering their international stature- fractures relations

Teresita C. Schaffer, October, 2010, “The United States and India 10 Years Out,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_10YearsOut_Schaffer.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

How a more direct challenge from China affects U.S.-India relations depends on how confident India feels that the United States will back it up. The “China connection” has always been an unspoken foundation of U.S.-India relations. Both countries want to engage China and neither wants to treat it as an enemy, but both see it as a potentially dangerous strategic competitor. If New Delhi sees Washington as responding to China’s forward thrusts with quiet firmness, Chinese assertiveness could result in closer and more candid strategic coordination between India and the United States. On the other hand, if the United States is seen as enhancing China’s international stature or giving it special standing in the management of world problems – the Indian shorthand for this is “creating a G-2” – India will work hard to put more substance into its relations with Japan and Russia, to create other balancing relationships in Asia.

### 2NC – Link: U.S.-China Relations

#### India perceives U.S. relations with Beijing as zero sum with its own

Mohan Malik, October, 2004, “India-China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete,” Asia’s Bilateral Relations, <http://apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/India-ChinaRelationsMalik.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

India and China have long been suspicious about the other’s relationship with the United States and see it in zero-sum terms. For the first time in decades, both are simultaneously working to establish a multidimensional engagement with Washington. However, Beijing is concerned about a shift in the regional balance of power in view of Indo-U.S. strategic engagement and is proactively wooing India to prevent Washington and New Delhi from coming too close for China’s comfort. While championing multipolarity and opposing the growing U.S. unilateralist policies, both India and China remain suspicious of each other’s long-term agenda and intentions and attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. Interestingly, both are also courting the United States, each one seeking to move closer to Washington, albeit temporarily. How India and China resolve their differences on Pakistan, border dispute, and the UN Security Council expansion will have significant implications for Asia and America’s place in it. Other issues that will determine the nature of the India-China-U.S. triangular dynamics include India’s economic prospects, proliferation and terrorism, and geopolitical contest between the United States and China, and China and India.

### 2NC – Link: Perception

#### Plan flips India’s perceptions- empirics prove

Venu Rajamony Visiting Fellow, CSIS, March, 2002, “India-China-U.S. Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making,” <http://venurajamony.com/indiachinaustriangle.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

India has always seen a close U.S. – China relationship with misgiving and suspected that it might adversely affect her interests. This is because the pattern of prior ‘triangular’ dynamics saw the United States and China colluding against India. For example, there was a virtual entente between the United States and China during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, with the United States encouraging China to open a second front against India. Similarly, the United States chose to ignore Chinese nuclear and missile supply to Pakistan in the eighties because both were allies in battling the Soviets in Afghanistan. Further, as recent as in 1998, the two countries adopted a Joint Communiqué condemning Indian nuclear tests and using language that was seen in India as a U.S. attempt to confer upon China a supervisory role in South Asia. The improved relations India enjoys with both the United States and China today reduces the reasons for concern on India’s part. India, however, will remain watchful of the U.S. – China relationship.

### 2NC – AT: Alt Causes/China Doesn’t Affect India

#### India perceives China as its biggest threat- no alt causes

Baladas Ghoshal, Director (Academic), Society for Indian Ocean Studies, New Delhi. Until recently, he was ICCR Chair in Indian Studies at the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow. He is Honorary Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi. He is a former Professor of Southeast Asian and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013, “China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications,” Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses Monograph Series, <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph26.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

While the focus of this paper is on China’s perception of India’s LEP, it is also pertinent to discuss the Indian perception of China, for the image of one influences the other and are mutually reinforcing in terms of actions and responses. While the LEP is only a part of India’s overall and broader foreign policy approaches where multiple factors and determinants work in the making of the policy, China, undoubtedly is an important input in that process. Indian images of China are, therefore, essential not only in understanding the LEP and its drivers, but also for understanding the ‘why and what’ of China’s perception of that policy and the way it interprets it. India and China are large countries in Asia, neighbours to each other, are (heirs to rich and ancient civilizations), and naturally have strategic ambitions to play a critical role in the emerging political, economic and security architecture of Asia. The Indianperception of China is overwhelmingly influenced by its humiliating defeat in the 1962 war resulting from border disputes between the two countries. As a result, a confrontationist and belligerent image of China has inevitably been fixed in the minds of most Indians. This is further reinforced by China’s actions in the post-independence period, as it preferred to use military power extensively in pursuit of its geopolitical aims, examples being Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, the conflicts on the Sino-Soviet borders, the war with India in 1962, China’s open espousal of the Pakistani cause during 1965 in what was a purely bilateral conflict, its invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and finally China’s recent actions in the South China Sea. The continuing border dispute between the two countries together with China’s rapid growth in military power understandably has created anxieties in the minds of the Indian policy makers as well as the Indian public, about the future relationship. It is no wonder then that many strategic thinkers in India consider China to be the major future threat to India.16 The humiliation it suffered at Chinese hands nearly 50 years ago still haunts many Indians, both policymakers and public. A tradition of strategic mistrust of China is deeply ingrained in the minds of most Indians. India sees China as ‘working to undermine it at every level: by pre-empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan’.17 Even Chinese scholars like Zhang Guihong recognise that India has a discernible ‘lack of security trust’ in Chinese intentions.

### 2NC – AT: Empirically Disproven

#### Empirics prove the link- India suspicious of close U.S.-China ties

Venu Rajamony Visiting Fellow, CSIS, March, 2002, “India-China-U.S. Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making,” <http://venurajamony.com/indiachinaustriangle.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

A brief word may be in order on how India views U.S.-China relations. India has always seen close U.S. – China relations with misgiving and feared that they might adversely affect her interests. This is because there is a history of the United States and China colluding against India, and such collusion has in the past seriously undermined India’s security. Some of these prior instances are: 1. 1971 India – Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh Over 30 years have passed since the 1971 India – Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh. However, the U.S. action of sending the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal to threaten India as well as the U.S.- China collusion of the period remain seared in Indian memories. In India’s perception, the 1971 war was imposed on her. She was responding to a situation created as a result of a military dictator in Pakistan refusing to accept the popular mandate of the people in the first ever free elections in the country, a consequent nationalist uprising in then East Pakistan, a genocide by Pakistani forces and a flow of over 10 million refugees into India. In the United States, there was amongst public opinion and in the Congress, significant sympathy and support for India. However, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, ignored these sentiments and instead saw Indian action as an effort to “punish Pakistan for being a friend of China and a friend of the U.S.”59 Calling upon the Chinese to join hands with the United States in seeking the “maximum intimidation of Indians,” 60 he went to the extent of encouraging China to open a second front with India and provided the assurance that the United States would checkmate the Soviets if they sought to involve themselves in the crisis. To quote Kissinger’s words to the then Chinese Ambassador to the U.N. Huang Hua, “The President wants you to know that it’s of course up to the People’s Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the U.S. would oppose the efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic”. 61 As back up to the above encouragement, the U.S. was prepared to even provide the Chinese with satellite pictures on the disposition of Soviet forces62. It also kept China in the picture on the veiled threats it was issuing to the Soviets, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean, and U.S. efforts to encourage middle eastern governments to provide American arms to Pakistan (in violation of U.S. laws).63 According to William Burr, the editor of the Kissinger Transcripts: · “With the U.S. public generally supporting India and the cause of Bangladeshi independence, Nixon and Kissinger secretly and deceptively tilted policy towards Pakistan, in part because of President Yahya Khan’s important role in facilitating communications with Beijing during 1970 and 1971.” · “Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger saw India as a Soviet proxy and believed incorrectly that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi aimed to destroy West Pakistan in order to humiliate the government that had helped to forge U.S. – China relations”. · “Nixon and Kissinger sought to demonstrate their reliability to the Chinese as a prelude to Nixon’s talks with Zhou and Mao.” 64

### 2NC – AT: India Doesn’t Perceive Plan

#### Yes- India keeps close watch over U.S. preferential treatment of China

Teresita C. Schaffer, October, 2010, “The United States and India 10 Years Out,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_10YearsOut_Schaffer.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

India and U.S. security perspectives on East Asia will remain closely aligned. Ten years hence, India will be more fully integrated into Asia than it is now. India’s leadership will continue to see China as their primary strategic challenge. Its foreign policy will seek friendly engagement with China, and this will lead to instances where India draws closer to China on certain global issues (as happened, for example, at the climate change meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark). But India’s leaders are acutely conscious that an assertive China will challenge India’s security and economic interests. India will compensate through growing economic and political ties with Japan, Korea and the ASEAN countries, which will also make it more of a player on the larger Asian scene. This approach has strong parallels with the way the United States looks at China. It will also, however, make India especially sensitive to any suggestion that the United States is giving preference to China in its approach to Asian security and institutions.

#### India closely watches U.S.-China relationship

Venu Rajamony Visiting Fellow, CSIS, March, 2002, “India-China-U.S. Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making,” <http://venurajamony.com/indiachinaustriangle.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

In short, there persists within India the impression that both when U.S. – China relations are at their height and when they are in decline, both countries try to find common cause by “ganging–up” against India. The recent improvement in India’s relations with the United States as well as China reduces the cause for such concern on India’s part. India, however, is likely to remain watchful of the U.S. - China relationship, especially in view of its “roller –coaster” nature.

### 2NC – AT: Link Isn’t Reverse Causal

#### Yes it is- China-India security dilemma makes all perceptions of increasing U.S. engagement a threat that affects their policies

Baladas Ghoshal, Director (Academic), Society for Indian Ocean Studies, New Delhi. Until recently, he was ICCR Chair in Indian Studies at the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow. He is Honorary Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi. He is a former Professor of Southeast Asian and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013, “China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications,” Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses Monograph Series, <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph26.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

Their bilateral relationship is also overlaid with their relationship with third countries. It can be seen in the case of India’s growing strategic ties with the United States, Japan and with the ASEAN (particularly with Vietnam}; and in the case of China, its ongoing robust defence and nuclear relationship with Pakistan and its increasing strategic and economic influence in other South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. This heightens each other’s suspicion and acts as an input in their respective policies and actions. China has deep suspicions and is wary of the perceived strategic calculations behind India’s increasing ties with the United States and Japan, which seeks, as per the Chinese perception to soft-balance5 and hedge against a rising China.6 In turn, India is concerned over a Sino-Pak entente that heightens its security predicament and brings the worst-case scenario of the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China even as it actively seeks dialogues with both, to diminish the chances of such a dire scenario. One Chinese assessment concludes that the Indian military sees Pakistan as the main operational opponent and China as a potential operational opponent. It also describes the Indians as seeing China and Pakistan as closely aligned in threatening India.7 Both states, therefore, see each other as a threat, partly because of their bilateral power equations vis- à-vis the other, but also because of the various relationships and understandings that each state has made with the states surrounding the other. This exacerbates security dilemma, perceptions of threat and so forth, leading to mutual perceptions of encirclement by each other.

### 2NC – AT: Relations Not Zero Sum

#### Relations are perceived as zero-sum

Wu Lin, FDI Associate, and Li Fujian, FDI Visiting Fellow, September, 2013, “India-China Relations: How Can They Be Improved?,” Future Directions International, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/india-china-relations-how-can-they-be-improved/> (accessed 5/24/16)

We believe that China and India should become strategic partners in the true sense, rather than viewing each other as hostile competitors. Currently, it seems that a certain degree of asymmetry exists in China’s and India’s perceptions of each other. In particular, India does not trust China politically and views it as a competitor. In contrast, to the extent that India features in Chinese strategic thinking, it is viewed more as a development partner, rather than a competitor. These different views affect the efficiency of co-operation, which has already led to misunderstandings between the two and some estrangement. Therefore, to achieve fully the goal of co-operation based on common interests, China and India should first adjust their view of each other’s role in their foreign policy, by viewing each other as real strategic partners, beyond mere rhetoric. On the regional level, China and India are stakeholders in maintaining regional peace, stability and prosperity. They should go beyond zero-sum thinking and employ a co-operative attitude to resolve their differences and address common regional challenges. Globally, they should play a greater role in the process of reforming global governance.

### 2NC – AT: Pakistan Bigger Concern than China

#### India perceives China as a much bigger threat than Pakistan

Baladas Ghoshal, Director (Academic), Society for Indian Ocean Studies, New Delhi. Until recently, he was ICCR Chair in Indian Studies at the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow. He is Honorary Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies New Delhi. He is a former Professor of Southeast Asian and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2013, “China’s Perception of ‘Look East Policy’ and Its Implications,” Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses Monograph Series, <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph26.pdf> (accessed 5/24/16)

However, this is an ‘asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions’ of the other; whereby ‘Indians tend to be deeply apprehensive regarding China. Chinese, on the other hand, tend not to perceive a serious threat and find it difficult to understand why Indians might find China and its actions threatening’.8 Susan L. Shirk, a Professor at the University of California at San Diego, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State citing Chinese sources also claims, ‘There is a marked asymmetry in the mutual perceptions of India and China. For India, China looms large as an economic and political rival and as security threat. But for China, India merits little attention and, even after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, is not taken seriously as a security threat. Indian polices toward China are broadly debated and handled at the highest level of the political leadership, in contrast to Chinese policies toward India, which are ignored by the public and managed by the foreign affairs and military bureaucracies’.9 This asymmetry is quite understandable in view of not only a wide gap in their economic and military strength and past history of aggression against India, but also due to unequal projection of power in each other’s backyard and the resultant security concerns it causes to each other. China’s projection into South Asia is far more substantial and complicating than India’s projection into East Asia, and its ability to create instability and upset the regional balance in South Asia far outweighs that of India in East Asia.10 In 2009, the then Indian Air Force Chief Fali Homi Major called China a more real and potent threat to India than Pakistan. ‘. . . China is a totally different ballgame compared to Pakistan. We know very little about the actual capabilities of China, their combat edge or how professional their military is…they are certainly a greater threat’.11 India’s lingering fears about Pakistan are increasingly being eclipsed by its ever-growing alarm about China. Delhi’s concern about Beijing persisted through 2010 and 2011 at the highest levels. At a combined commanders’ conference in September 2010, the three service chiefs declared that China constitutes more of a long-term threat than Pakistan.12 Such sentiments were voiced again in early 2011 when Indian media reports quoted an anonymous top army official saying that while Pakistan can be ‘handled’, China ‘remains [the] real long-term threat’.13 For India, China poses an existentialist threat and therefore, ranks much higher in security consideration and planning than India does in China’s perception. For China, the US and Japan rank much higher in shaping its security concerns.14 Ashley Tellis, an influential Indian-American policy analyst, however, asserts that Beijing has paid New Delhi more geostrategic attention than it has been willing to publicly admit. Accordingly, the purported Chinese ‘neglect’ of India must be judged a myth.15

## Impacts

### US-India Relations Good– General

#### US-India relations solve South Asian war, economic growth, and terrorism

ASTF, Asia Society Task Force, January 2009, “Delivering on the Promise: Advancing US Relations with India,” <http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/DeliveryOnThePromise_USRelationsWithIndia.pdf> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

India matters to virtually every major foreign policy issue that will confront the United States in the years ahead. A broad-based, close relationship with India will thus be necessary to solve complex global challenges, achieve security in the critical South Asian region, reestablish stability in the global economy, and overcome the threat of violent Islamic radicalism which has taken root across the region and in India. The members of this Task Force believe that the US relationship with India will be among our most important in the future, and will at long last reach its potential for global impact—provided that strong leadership on both sides steers the way. We have reached a moment with India in which we can pursue an agenda for cooperation, not wallow in past contention. We now better understand each other’s global foreign policy and security goals as we both strive for peace and prosperity for our citizens. With India, we can harness our principles and power together to focus on the urgent interconnected challenges of our shared future: economic stability, expanded trade, the environment and climate change, innovation, nonproliferation, public health, sustainability, and terrorism. Cooperation in each of these areas would have been unimaginable a decade ago, but today mark a baseline for what the US and India can, and should, undertake together. We have traveled far in a few short years with India, and the signposts on either end of this past decade best mark the path. In May 1998, we placed sanctions on India for its nuclear tests; a decade later, following difficult bilateral and complex multilateral negotiations, we completed an historic cooperation agreement with India on civil nuclear energy. As the center of economic gravity has shifted east, India is emerging as a key player in global business, binding India and the US together in a way that did not exist before. More soberly, after differing for decades over counterterrorism priorities, the United States has vocally supported India’s concerns over the use of Pakistani territory by jihadist groups. At heart, the new relationship rests on a convergence of US and Indian national interests, and never in our history have they been so closely aligned. Precisely because the United States and India share a core set of values—democracy, unity in diversity, and strong but civilian-controlled militaries—and because they will only grow more important in the coming years, a closer relationship with India will have strategic impact. As we confront the complex global security challenges before us, we will have to rely upon the strength of these values to find durable solutions on a global scale. A special, 8 strong, and broad-based relationship with this country of great strategic significance is now in our “vital national interest,” to quote former Under Secretary of Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns.

### US-India Relations Good – Climate Change

#### Strong US-India relationship allows for global cooperation on climate change

Richard Verma, Ambassador Richard Verma at IIT-Madras, July 14, 2015, “The United States and India: a Relationship on the Move,” <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/608608/the-united-states-and-india-a-relationship-on-the-move.aspx> (Accessed 5/29/2016)

3. Climate and clean energy may be the most critical area that unites us in the years ahead We are committed to sharing our experiences, our technology, and our financing possibilities to help India meet its aggressive renewable targets, to combat air pollution and to lessen the impact of temperature increases upon India. We have brought billions to the table in low-cost clean energy financing, and we will continue to help sponsor and bring clean energy solutions to market. We were pleased last week to establish a joint US/India multimillion dollar fund to support bringing green power to Indian communities that have none. South India has an especially significant role to play in India’s quest to achieve 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022. Here in Tamil Nadu, there is a strong commitment to clean energy with twice as much installed wind capacity as the next Indian state. Both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have significant solar potential as well. Our civil nuclear cooperation also continues to move ahead – the Indian Government has committed to ratify the international convention ensuring liability for nuclear accidents is channeled to operators, not suppliers; they have moved out aggressively on establishing an insurance pool; and our companies are working closely with NPCIL, India’s nuclear power company, on ensuring these government to government commitments make their way into commercial contracts. And we continue to have excellent discussions with India on the leadership role it intends to play in the Paris climate talks. The Prime Minister himself said he needs no convincing on the impacts of climate change, and we are hopeful that India will chart a compelling way forward that reduces its dependence on carbon-based sources of energy and embraces the huge opportunities available in today’s green economy. We will continue to do our part in facilitating the financing and technology necessary to help facilitate this critical transformation. 4. We have established important mechanisms to discuss our disagreements For all that we have in common, we are not the same countries, nor do we aspire to be. There is bound to be some dissonance in our partnership. But what I have seen – and what I will continue to work on – is that we are talking at all levels and on a regular basis – not only on those areas that unite us, but on those areas that may continue to divide us. And, this is the hallmark of a durable and mature partnership. That’s why all these dialogues and working groups are so important – they help regularize our relationship, they build trust, and they help provide an outlet when disputes may arise, and that’s a good thing.

### US/ India Relations Good—Contain China

#### US/India relations are key to contain China and prevent them from obtaining regional dominance

[Paul J. Leaf](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/paul-j-leaf), Attorney in Los Angeles, and a former editor of the Stanford Law Review, September 15, 2014, “With China on the Rise, America Must Woo India,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-rise-america-must-woo-india-11275> (accessed May 26, 2016)

The competition between the United States, Japan and China is heating up. All three countries are aiming to woo India—a country whose uncommitted partnership will help to define Asia’s balance of power. At meetings on September 29 and September 30 between President Barack Obama and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, Washington must reinvigorate the countries’ recently strained ties, make up ground lost to Beijing in courting New Delhi, and supplement Tokyo’s progress in drawing New Delhi closer. There are many motivations for wooing India. It has the world’s second largest population and is [projected](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-to-become-worlds-most-populous-nation-around-2028-UN/articleshow/20586377.cms?referral=PM) to surpass China’s by 2028. As measured by GDP, India’s economy is the third largest in Asia. New Delhi fields the world’s second largest army, its military budget exceeds $38 billion (up 12 percent over the previous year), it is [expected](http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end) to become the world’s fourth largest defense spender by 2020, and it has been the world’s top arms importer since 2010. India is enhancing its power-projection capabilities, including by developing long-range nuclear missiles and manufacturing indigenous nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. The country shares a 2,500-mile border with China and sits near critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, through which over 80 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes, along with almost one third of global trade. Given its strength and location, India can shape Asia’s balance of power in favor of or against China, depending on whether it deepens its cooperation with the United States and China’s competitors.

### US-India Relations Good – Economy/Trade

#### US-India relations bolsters trade – key maritime security over corridors

Vivek Mishra, Research Scholar at JNU, November 2014, “Indo-US Relations: After Narendra Modi’s Visit” <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB257-Vivek-IndoUS.pdf> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

Many US and Indian interests converge when it comes to the Indo-Pacific corridor. Both have enormous trade passing through this area and both are keen on seeing a rule-based maritime order and safe sea lanes for trade. For this, an increased participation of the Indian Navy is required. The Indian Navy could work with the US Pacific Command fleet in maritime patrol, search, rescue and surveillance on the Indo-Pacific corridor. The reconnaissance aircraft P-8I Poseidon that India has imported from the US could be used for the same and the US bases in Guam and Diego Garcia could provide support facilities in such joint operations. Both India and the US can focus on the security and safe passage of maritime trade that passes through this area, and the US has shown interest that India takes lead in this. The ball is in the present government’s court and it will be in India’s long-term strategic interest to respond in a manner that projects a more responsible role for India, especially in protecting SLOCs. The US has been pressing for a ‘code of conduct’ in the South China Sea against the Chinese push for their version of laws. Drawing from the South China Sea experience and the problems that have arisen between China and its neighbours, India along with the US could push for a universal ‘code of conduct’ for the Indo-Pacific area and the larger Pacific Ocean. The previous government in India embarked on this idea but it remained restricted to the first few steps and could not really take off in the intended sense. The UPA government in India opened up a credit line worth US$1 million to Vietnam to buy four patrol boats that is likely to guard the Indo-Pacific corridor. The last government also initiated the US-2 Amphibious aircraft deal with Japan. Both these deals are intended for the Indo-Pacific economic corridor but have not been fully accomplished. A uniform international law in this area would serve the Indian and the US governments well to implement a coherent maritime security paradigm. Corroborating the expectations of Indo-US cooperation in the strategic area of the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Jonathan Greenert said that the US would like to see this cooperation extend to India's participation in exercises in the Western Pacific region, where China is becoming more assertive. This expectation stems from US’ understanding that the new full majority government in India with a leader like Modi at the helm will ensure that the security agencies are well-controlled and monitored. Greater control over national security would mean the likelihood of new forays by its security agencies backed by an outreaching government.

#### Strong US-India ties would benefit global trade

Richard Verma, Ambassador Richard Verma at IIT-Madras, July 14, 2015, “The United States and India: a Relationship on the Move,” <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/608608/the-united-states-and-india-a-relationship-on-the-move.aspx> (Accessed 5/29/2016)

The United States and India look forward to a day very soon when, for the first time, we establish secure phone lines between our respective National Security Advisors, as well as between the President and Prime Minister, further opening key channels of communication on sensitive issues. All these moves point to stronger and closer ties strategically that will benefit not just our two countries, but for the global commons and for the rules based international order we are committed to upholding. 2. The economic, trade and commercial picture is improving While economic reform measures may not often move as fast as some want, there has been steady progress in our commercial, trade and investment relationships, which bring significant benefits to both our countries. Two-way trade numbers are up, and have surpassed $103 billion, and increasingly Indian companies are opening and investing in the US. Foreign direct investment in India from American investors is on the rebound, and we’ve seen a very positive “race to the top” in the Indian states trying to compete for American investment, as they tout new regulatory reforms and improvements in the ease of doing business. And, some critical sectors like insurance and mining have become more open in recent months to outside ownership and investment. We are in intensive consultations over a bilateral investment treaty; we have similarly intense discussions on food security at the WTO; and we have established robust dialogues and information sharing mechanisms on finance and tax. In fact, this past week, India signed a bilateral agreement with us to share information to deter and detect tax evasion and money laundering. The dialogues and information exchanges are imperative to resolving old disputes, like longstanding tax cases, while also ensuring our commercial connections grow stronger to help power both our countries’ growth. We are also lining up to support India’s priorities in developing India’s infrastructure for the 21st Century and helping to deal with the massive urbanization challenges confronting the country in the years ahead. We are a close partner in the Smart Cities campaign and in three cities in particular we are bringing our financing, technology and expertise to bear to help plan and design more modern, safe and sustainable living spaces. We are also committed to supporting India’s plan to greater digitize its government services and delivery of benefits. Again, we believe our technologies and expertise will play a key role in this effort.

### US-India Relations Good– Indo-Pak War

#### US-India relations are key to stopping an Indo-Pak war

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow at Saban Center for Middle East Policy, December 18, 2006, “India and the United States: A New Era,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2006/12/18india-riedel> (Accessed 5/27/2016)

Now that President Bush has built on this foundation, he should use the new strategic partnership to move beyond crisis management between India and Pakistan to try to help the two countries resolve the underlying issue that has brought them repeatedly to conflict: Kashmir. America has avoided dealing with the Kashmir issue for decades, both because of its complexities and because India opposed outside involvement, preferring to deal bilaterally with Pakistan. This approach has not worked; the problem has gotten worse and has repeatedly taken the subcontinent to the brink of disaster. Now is the time for quiet American diplomacy to exploit our stronger ties with India and our improved relations with Pakistan since 9/11 to try to resolve the Kashmir quarrel. It is in the self interest of all three nations to do so. The timing is particularly fortuitous since India and Pakistan have begun their own bilateral dialogue to improve relations since they were last at the brink of war in 2003. That dialogue has already produced some modest confidence-building measures in Kashmir but has not really engaged the underlying issues. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf says he is ready to engage India on Kashmir and has put some interesting ideas on the table. He should be tested now by both the U.S. and India. Helping him resolve Kashmir would also help him end Pakistan's long relationship with jihadist terror groups which have dangerous relationships with al-Qaeda. If Kashmir moved toward peace, Pakistan could more easily put those groups out of business and isolate al-Qaeda. A deal should not threaten India's territorial integrity; rather it should focus on improving the Kashmiri's lives.

#### US support for India will benefit India-Pakistan relations

Richard Fontaine, president of the Center for a New American Security, December 30, 2015, “The US Can Thaw India-Pakistan Relations,” <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-can-thaw-india-pakistan-relations-1451495145> (Accessed 5/29/2016)

A relaxation of tensions—and even a resolution to decades-long disputes—would be welcomed by Washington. Yet the Obama administration should resist any urge to intervene directly in the talks. Messrs. Modi and Sharif will seek general international support, but they do not require an American mediator. Washington can be helpful in two ways. First, the U.S. can press Islamabad to finally crack down on Lashkar e-Taiba, the group that carried out the Mumbai attacks and continues to plot anti-India violence. Another Mumbai-style attack courts catastrophe; at a minimum it would spoil any efforts at a broader peace. Already, Lashkar founder Hafiz Saeed has criticized Prime Minister Sharif and warned that he should not sacrifice Kashmir for better ties with Mr. Modi. Second, the U.S. can urge Pakistan to allow trans-shipment of Indian goods across its territory. Currently, trucks laden with goods from Afghanistan deliver their wares to India and must return empty. By blocking India’s route into Afghanistan, Pakistan has encouraged India to develop the Chabahar port in Iran in order to access Central Asian markets. Permitting trans-shipment would increase economic connectivity between India and Pakistan, and could even one day result in construction of the oft-discussed Trans-Afghanistan natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India. In the meantime, the right American response is one of quiet support. The path ahead is difficult, and if past is prologue, it may end in deadlock. Yet by taking this bold step, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers may have delivered much-needed good news to their countries and the world.

### US-India Relations Good – Regional Stability

#### US-India relations are key to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region – maritime security

Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Secretary at Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, February 5, 2015, “The United States and India: A Future of Friendship,” <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2015/237274.htm> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

For the first time in our bilateral relations, there can be no doubt about the strength of our joint strategic vision. Our two countries are indispensable partners in promoting peace, prosperity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We are drivers of growth across the region and around the world. And we are net providers of security, together ensuring freedom of navigation and safeguarding maritime security. These values are clearly reflected in our Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, leaving no doubt about our commitment to a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Asia in the 21st century. Our leaders also outlined their pledge to bring our citizens together from across the spectrum of human endeavor, formally elevating our partnership in the Delhi Declaration of Friendship. In addition to more frequent summits between our leaders, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi will establish a secure hotline so they can talk in real-time about pressing regional and global challenges. As the President said during his visit, the progress we have made across every aspect of the relationship demonstrates that the United States and India are not just natural partners – but that America can be India’s best partner. The visit also marked historic progress on resolving lingering challenges, while laying the foundation to advance our greatest opportunities. During Prime Minister Modi’s unforgettable visit to Washington back in September, the President and the Prime Minister established a joint Contact Group to advance implementation of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation (or “123”) Agreement, set into motion nearly a decade ago by their predecessors President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. This historic agreement would not have been possible without the tireless work of many people in this room today.

### US-India Relations Good – Democracy

#### US-India relations promote democracy

Sohail Mahmood, Independent Politics and Security Analyst, March 5, 2016, “United States-India Relations: An Assessment of Contemporary Developments,” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/united-states-india-relations-assessment-contemporary-mahmood (Accessed 5/27/2016)

The relationship between the United States and India, the world's largest two democracies collectively housing over a billion and a half people, may turn out to be the world's most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century. They share strategic interests but, more significantly, they share deep-seeded values underpinning their common experience of democratic governance amidst multihued social and cultural diversity…. While there are other models of governance vying for influence in the world today, India's success -- in close partnership with the United States -- is a strong demonstration that a democracy entrenched in liberal universal values can be a global recipe for developmental success. India and the U.S. as natural partners can make that happen, and that is why the U.S.-India relationship is critically significant for the world at large and for promoting America's cherished democratic values…The two nations can cooperate in strategic areas where their interests coincide, such as in the complex field of counter-terrorism, where much progress is under way. But they can do so, situation-wise, as strategic partners, utilizing mutual cooperation depending on evolving circumstances, and not as allies in any formal sense of the term. The key to unlocking the potential of this relationship lies more in the adjective 'natural' than in the word 'allies.' It is natural for the world's largest two democracies to draw close to each other. They each have a written constitution that promises rights to citizens, like freedom of expression and religion, the right of habeas corpus, and a right to vote in free and regular elections. And they share far more in value preferences than just social diversity and tolerance of internal dissent…India today is engaged in the world's most extraordinary democratic experiment. If the Indian adventure in democracy, with its burden of grinding poverty and illiteracy and fractiousness, succeeds in producing stable, widespread and more or less equitable prosperity in the next decade or two, it will be a spectacular triumph for the values that India and the U.S. share. That is where the U.S. could become a true natural ally by throwing its mighty support behind efforts to strengthen India's democratic system even as it learns lessons in democratic governance from a billion-strong nation at a very different level of socio-economic development.

### US-India Relations Good – Terrorism

#### US-India cooperation provides security and counter-terrorism efforts

Vivek Mishra, Research Scholar at JNU, November 2014, “Indo-US Relations: After Narendra Modi’s Visit” <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB257-Vivek-IndoUS.pdf> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

Security & Counter-terrorism Ever since 9/11 both India and the US have embarked on security cooperation like never before. The cooperation that began with the “war against terror” has only grown, particularly with new and divergent modes of threat facing both the countries. In fact security cooperation has been one of the hallmarks of bilateral cooperation. Although the UPA government seized the opportunities to cooperate with the US the last decade, much more needs to be done. The government in India should take the opportunities provided by a willing US and explore likely new areas of cooperation the field of security. The US has recently hinted that it would provide an exhortative ground for new cooperation with India in the area of security. It recently described cooperation in security as, "a central element of the broad US-India strategic partnership" and pledged that it looked forward to work with the new government in New Delhi. The consecutive meetings of John Kerry and Chuck Hagel with India’s National Security Adviser points to important aspects of homeland security as a common agenda for both governments.

### Impact Magnifier – Spillover/Cyber-Security

#### US-India relations are modelled – sends a signal

Arun Mohan Sukumar, heads the Cyber Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, May 24, 2016, “Where are US-India Cyber Relations Headed?” <https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-are-us-india-cyber-relations-headed> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

If India and the US are able to transform their convergence in policy positions into tangible cooperation in cyber security and the digital economy, this would send a clear message to developing countries. It would mean that digital spaces can be effectively secured while accounting for the freedoms of expression and commerce on the internet. And for many economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America that are struggling to protect their digital networks, it would be worth replicating a successful model of cooperation between India-US. Regulators across the world—most notably in the European Union—are contemplating data localization as the answer to increased cyber vulnerabilities. Without a comprehensive digital trade regime, emerging economies have little incentive to calibrate market regulations that promote innovation and also support local language content. The consequence would be a fragmentation of the internet, not of its infrastructure, but along political and economic fault lines. While India-US cooperation is not the solution to all these problems, it is a first step in demonstrating that comprehensive cyber engagement between emerging and advanced digital economies is possible.

### Impact Magnifier – Spillover

#### Better communications between the US and India benefits all within

Tridivesh Singh Maini, policy analyst associated with The Jindal School of International Affairs, August 8, 2015, “US-India Relations: Beyond the Prism of National Capitals” <http://www.theglobalist.com/india-modi-us-foreign-policy-china/> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

Fourth, there are a number of leaders of Indian origin who are playing an active role in public life in the United States and are keen to rekindle ties with the land of their origin. One such person is Nikkey Haley Randhawa, Governor of South Carolina, who originally hails from Punjab. During a visit to Punjab last year, she met with leaders of the state and sought to promote closer ties between the two states. Some of the areas explored were education, skills training and potential investments by South Carolina in Punjab. Such leaders should help in fostering ties between their respective states in the United States and their land of origin. For mutual benefit In conclusion, it would be fair to say that such interactions are important for more than one reason. First, they help in enhancing the constituency for a better relationship between both countries. Second, with increasing links, the benefits of better relations with the United States will accrue to a larger number of Indian states, and not just to those that have already benefitted. Third, Indian states are beginning to play an important role both politically and economically and in this context, sub-national linkages make sense.

### 2NC – Terror Impact UQ: Threat High/Real

#### Terror threat in India high and real and India can’t deal with the threat alone

Harsh V. Pant, January, 2016, “India’s Terror Dilemmas: Responding to the Pathankot Atrocity,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/indias-terror-dilemmas-responding-to-the-pathankot-atrocity> (accessed 5/29/16)

India faces a structural problem given its location in one of the world’s most dangerous neighborhoods – South Asia – which is now the epicenter of Islamist radicalism. India’s neighbors harbor terrorist networks and use them as instruments of state policy. The tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which have long been outside the realm of effective control, have become a breeding ground for Islamist radicals. And now the rise of the Islamic State is rapidly changing the dimensions of global terror. India began dealing with the threat of terrorism long before it reached Western shores. The terror saga in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is more than three decades old. But until September 11, the West viewed the Kashmir problem through the lens of India’s inability to improve its human rights record. The threat spiked in the early 1990s; Mumbai witnessed multiple terror strikes in 1993, and then, in November 2008, jihadists, aided and abetted by Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), openly confronted the might of the Indian state under the full glare of the global media. In the wake of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the Indian government took some initial steps toward a more robust counterterrorism policy. But even since then, deadly attacks on high value targets in India have continued. From left-wing extremism to right-wing religious fundamentalism, the Indian State continues to face multiple challenges that threaten to derail the story of a rising India. India remains a strong society with a weak state, unable to harness its national power for national purpose. Despite perfunctory denunciations across the political spectrum, no consensus exists on how best to fight terrorism and extremism. Vote-bank politics have created an environment in which political and religious polarization has been so complete as to render effective action against terrorism impossible.

### 2NC – Terror Impact I/L: Relations Key

#### Relations key to terrorism and the threat is real

Dr. Amit Kumar is the President of AAA International Security Consultants LLC, Virginia (USA) and a Visiting Fellow at the Society of Policy Studies, New Delhi, February, 2016, “Stronger US-India Cooperation Critical To Counter Terror Financing – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/25022016-stronger-us-india-cooperation-critical-to-counter-terror-financing-analysis/> (accessed 5/27/16)

Given the breadth of the issue, it would be wise for a country like India to learn from the counter terror mechanisms that have been put in place by nations like the USA. In the same breath, it will be critical for countries like US to keep a major economic giant and emerging power like India in tow when defining and churning measures to check rising terrorism and the means that make it possible for it to be exported to different parts of the world. Thus, a Centre for US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation to strongly advocate India’s unique counterterrorism needs and perspectives in the US Congress, US media, and the US security industry should be established on an urgent basis. Another valuable purpose of setting up this Centre would be to encourage foreign direct investment into India by US counterterrorism equipment and hardware manufacturers and in due course to the manufacture of such equipment and hardware in India. The mere hiring of lobbying firms in Washington DC or the institution of Joint Working Groups (JWGs) does not by itself appear to be producing any major traction in tangibly advancing India’s counterterrorism interests in the US; this Centre would add great value to the existing JWG mechanism and not work at cross-purposes to it. A challenge that has become graver since 9/11, terrorism and its proliferation through illicit money exchanges and counterfeit currency circulation are issues that have left no part of the world untouched by their presence. Given the expanse of the concern involved, while it would certainly take more than a handful of measures to nip them in the bud, a strong beginning will certainly go a long way in addressing the issue .

#### Strong U.S-India relations key to solve terrorism

Ashok Sharma, November, 2015, “The United States and India: A Vital Partnership, ,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, <http://journal.georgetown.edu/the-united-states-and-india-a-vital-partnership/> (accessed 5/26/16)

The increased significance of U.S.-India relations also relies on factors beyond economic considerations. During their latest roundtable discussion, Prime Minister Modi and President Obama assessed the progress of their countries’ strategic partnership in the security realm, stressing the need to focus on clean energy, climate change, and defence issues. The emerging strategic geometry in the Asia-Pacific region has aligned the interests of the United States and India over the past decade. Also, the radicalisation of Muslim youths by terrorist groups has become one of the most challenging security problems facing both countries. Despite their counter-terrorism cooperation and measures, both countries remain vulnerable to terrorist organizations such as the Taliban and ISIS, which continue to radicalise Muslim youths and commit terrorist attacks on foreign soil. [vii] The partnership is particularly significant within the emerging 21st century power politics. China remains a concern of both countries. While America’s concerns emanate from China’s presence in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, India’s concerns stem from China’s encirclement strategy and nuclear defence partnership with Pakistan. More than half of China’s arms exports currently go to Pakistan — an alarming statistic for India. Sino-Pakistani bonhomie is also threatening to U.S. interests in the region. The Pakistani Government’s links to terrorist organisations and its growing nuclear and defence ties with China are also sources of alarm for the United States.

### 2NC – Terror Impact > Extinction

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

Owen B. Toon, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: <http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf> (accessed 5/29/16)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

### 2NC – Terror Turns: Kritik Impacts

#### Turns case—successful attack would reverse any social change the aff creates

Sara Robinson, 2010, social futurist, Why Are Conservatives Targeting Muslims? And Why Now?” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-robinson/why-are-conservatives-tar_b_737007.html> (accessed 5/29/16)

Having identified such a great potential target, the next logical step was to whip up public outrage and give people emotionally satisfying reasons to adopt this group as a worthy object of hate. Fortunately for the right wing, conservative PR folks have made an art form out of creating calculated, protracted media crises that drag on for weeks, during which they get to suck up all the news time and create "teachable moments" that put some new agenda item on dramatic public display. Take two past examples: Terry Schiavo and the Minutemen. Both were ginned-up controversies carefully designed to create a public crisis around a new right-wing political initiative.The goal in both cases was to create a public outcry that someone in a back room somewhere hoped would galvanize the nation into mass political action. Sometimes this works; sometimes, it doesn't. Schiavo was a spectacular failure. Americans of all persuasions took one look at that situation and recoiled: it turned out nobody in the country wanted Congress and/or the Southern Baptists making their end-of-life decisions for them. But the Minutemen's summer campouts on the border succeeded in bringing immigration and border security to the front burner, ultimately feeding into the militancy of the Tea Party and leading to the building of the border wall. And that's what the Ground Zero Mosque tantrum was -- yet another conservative PR confection designed to put a new boogeyman on the public agenda. (And the media, as usual, went right after the fake throw -- again. My dog is too smart for that trick, but our corporate media can be counted on to go for it every time.) The Right Wing has put us on notice that after nine years, they've abandoned Bush Era restraint here Islam is concerned, and are now declaring the entire Muslim world to be the new Devil who will fill that yawning void at the center of their cosmology. As a target, Muslims were just too tempting to resist any longer. They can be killed with impunity. They can be used to justify endless war. As a demon, they’re likely to have tremendous staying power: after all, in the white, straight, Christian enclaves where most American conservatives live, Muslims are far rarer on the ground than even gays, Latinos, or liberals.

### 2NC – AT: Criticisms of Terror Scholarship

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – prefer our specific scenario

Michael J. Boyle, April, 2008, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64 (accessed 5/29/16)

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. **A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’**. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. **These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines** – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – **and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods** (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) **persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.**

### 2NC – AT: Impact Defense

#### High risk of nuclear terrorism – feasible and it escalates

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, September, 2012, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html (accessed 5/29/16)

At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device. Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶

### 2NC – AT: Impact Defense (Mueller)

#### Mueller wrong- nuclear terrorism is feasible, cheap- experts agree

Peter D. Zimmerman, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Fall 2009, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” <http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/volume4/01-Do_We_Really_Need_to_Worry_Some_Reflections_on_the_Threat_of_Nuclear_Terrorism.pdf> (accessed 5/29/16)

Assembling a team of scientists and technicians is likely to be far easier than Mueller supposes. The Manhattan Project was the most exciting, and indeed glamorous, scientific project of the first half of the twentieth century, led by a constellation of great scientists. Many physicists, even today, fantasize about following in their footsteps.13 I give this one an 85-95 percent chance, at least. 14 In any event, Mueller makes elementary mistakes in risk analysis at the conceptual level: He decides on a path to the goal of a nuclear device, and then decides that it is either the only, or the easiest, or the most favorable route. Along the way his analysis is flawed. Mueller suggests that smugglers would be more likely than not to turn in the nuclear gang to the authorities. But as Matt Bunn of Harvard has pointed out14, Al Qaeda and Mexican drug lords routinely manage to move sensitive materials and people across borders, even those of highly developed countries such as the United States. Successful smugglers-for-hire generally do not betray their customers; the penalties for betrayal probably range from a severe beating to barbaric torture followed by a gruesome death. In his articles and presentations on the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, Prof. Mueller frequently lashes out at those who refuse to set the likelihood of such acts at 1 in a million, or less. We are “alarmists”. And we are “imaginative”.15 According to Mueller, my colleague, Jeffrey Lewis, and I indulge in “worst case fantasies”.16 Mueller seems never to have talked with anybody who actually built a nuclear weapon, for his understanding of the components of a simple device makes it seem far more complex than it is. Nor can I share the results of my conversations with weaponeers except to say that they do not consider the construction of certain kinds of nuclear weapons to be beyond the skills of the kind of 20-person group Lewis and I envisioned. Lewis and I carefully assessed the budget for a nuclear terrorist, and arrived at a figure of $10 million. Mueller waves our extensive effort away with the comment that $10 million isn’t enough to corrupt three people.

### 2NC – AT: Terror Scholarship Flawed

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid

Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, April, 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64 (accessed 5/29/16)

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism** implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

### 2NC – Impact Container: Coop Solves Laundry List

#### U.S.-India relations key to solve laundry list of impacts- terrorism, prolif, maritime trade, piracy, and HADR- turns the aff

Gurmeet Kanwal is a Delhi-based adjunct fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October, 2015, “Next Steps in the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership: Defense Cooperation Must Be Taken to a Higher Trajectory,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/next-steps-us-india-strategic-partnership-defense-cooperation-must-be-taken-higher> (accessed 5/27/16)

Now the United States expects “India to become a net provider of security” in the region, but the expectations have not been stated in specific terms. When asked, U.S. officials normally point to India joining international counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts; sharing intelligence; upholding the rules and norms governing maritime trade; providing help to the littoral states to meet their security needs; helping to counter piracy and narcotics trafficking; and, continuing to take the lead in humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the region. While all of these expectations are unexceptionable, and India has been contributing extensively to achieving these common goals, there is little understanding of the extent of cooperation expected from India in terms of “hard” military power. The United States had requested India to send an infantry division to Iraq during the war in 2003. India declined to do so as it was not a vital national interest.

### 2AC – Relations Turns Asian Stability

#### Strong U.S.-India relations key to Asian stability- turns case

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan in 2012, July, 2014, “India-US Strategic Dialogue: Focus on the Big Picture,” Observer Research Foundation, <http://www.orfonline.org/research/india-us-strategic-dialogue-focus-on-the-big-picture/> (accessed 5/30/16)

India too is uncertain of China. While there have been repeated rhetoric from the Chinese side on how important this bilateral relationship is, its actions raise questions, be it the Chinese map displaying the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory or the stapled visa issue. However, unlike other Asian countries that have supported the US rebalancing, India is still shy of openly embracing the US. Thus, New Delhi is finding its own ways of sending the message that US-India relations are important, particularly in the context of Asian stability. India’s new formulations and platforms such as acceptance of the US-Japan-India trilateral is a case in point. Expansion of this network to include Australia or Singapore and emergence of a new quadrilateral cannot be ruled out. Similarly, the track II engagements among the US, Australia and India could gain traction and become a more formal initiative in the coming years.

### 2NC – Relations Turns China Containment

#### U.S.-India cooperation key to China containment – turn the aff

Ajaya Kumar Das is a Researcher at the Guangdong Institute for International Strategies (GIIS), Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, P.R. China, May, 2016, “Can India Balance Between China and America?,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-india-balance-between-china-america-16137> (accessed 5/25/16)

While the answer is yes, India will also find itself in a position, as it forges strategic ties with the United States, where it must also keep its relations with China from worsening. Contrary to the comparison that China has solid relations with Pakistan despite its close military relationship with the United States, the growing Indo-U.S. strategic partnership must account for China—particularly since both share a geopolitical objective to prevent any Chinese dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and as strong like-minded states in Asia like Japan could also attempt to contain its rise.

### 2NC – Relations Turns Democracy

#### Relations key to global democratic transitions

Interviewee: Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Eleanor Albert, November, 2015, “The Promise of a U.S.-India Partnership,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/india/promise-us-india-partnership/p37240> (accessed 5/26/16)

As India moves away from nonalignment it has begun a process of “structural realignment” with the United States that could enormously boost the economic and security interests of both sides, says a new CFR Independent Task Force report. Improved bilateral relations between the world’s two largest democracies would also help counter authoritarian trends advanced by Beijing and Moscow, says Joseph S. Nye, co-chair of the task force and professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School. “A growing Indian economy provides benefits for the health of the world economy, as well as the United States through bilateral trade and investment,” says Nye. The report argues that U.S. and Indian interests are in a process of “structural realignment.” Why is this important? If you look at the trends in the world, both China and Russia are running in an authoritarian fashion. There’s a concern about a closer relationship between China and Russia that would strengthen authoritarian points of view. India and the United States are both democracies and the extent to which Indian and American interests and values coincide is crucial to countering this authoritarian tendency. It is in the interests of the United States to see a world in which democratic societies prosper. India is the world’s largest democracy, and the ability of the United States and India to work together will boost the climate for democratic ideas. Both countries will also reap the benefits that come from closer bilateral economic and defense ties.

### 2NC – Relations Turns Freedom of Navigation

#### U.S.-India relations key to freedom of navigation – turns the aff

Sumit Kumar, Pondicherry University, May, 2016, “How Modi changed the India–US relationship,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/> (accessed 5/27/16)

Unlike the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the Modi government has shown a desire to work with the United States in ensuring freedom of navigation and flight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea. This shift in India’s stance is critical as it reflects the government’s determination to take a firm stance on China. This understanding has been reinforced by the Modi government’s special attention to developing triangular and quadrilateral coalitions with the United States, Japan and Australia as a part of its regional security strategy. Both the United States and India have made significant progress on the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, an undertaking aimed at reducing the barriers to defence technology cooperation and trade. The countries are also holding talks on the supply of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets for the Indian Air Force. These defence deals would give a significant boost to the ‘Make in India’ program.

### 2NC – Relations Turns Maritime Cooperation

#### Strong U.S.-India relations key to maritime cooperation – turns the aff

Abhijit Singh, October, 2015, “A Shared Destiny in the Asian Commons: Evaluating the India-U.S. Maritime Relationship,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <http://www.idsa.in/idsanews/AbhijitSinghsArticleonIndia-USMaritimeRelationshipPublishedinNBR> (accessed 5/26/16)

Despite irritants, then, the India-U.S. maritime partnership remains on an upward trajectory. This has been a few years in the making, but the broad convergence of values and interests between India and the United States has coalesced into a strong consensus on strategic principles. Now more than ever, there is a sense of common purpose and shared destiny in the Asian commons. The leading maritime power in South Asia and the preeminent power in the Indian Ocean have moved to forge a maritime pact to protect themselves from the high winds gathering in the east.

#### U.S.-India relations key to maritime cooperation

AFP, April, 2016, “US, India agree to strengthen maritime cooperation,” The Express Tribune, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1083427/us-india-agree-to-strengthen-maritime-cooperation/> (accessed 5/27/16)

Carter is in New Delhi to bolster a strategic relationship Washington considers crucial in the face of what it sees as China’s rising assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea. “Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of maritime security,” said a joint statement issued after Carter held talks with Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. India, US closer to pact to share military logistics: officials The two sides “reaffirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea,” said the statement. Washington has increasingly turned its focus to Asia as it tries to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, and is eager for India to play a greater role in its network of regional defence alliances. Regional superpower China is expanding its deep-water naval presence and staking a claim to disputed areas of the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

### 2NC – Relations Turns Space

#### Strong U.S.-India relations key to space cooperation- turn the aff

Prakash Chandra, September, 2015, “India-US space cooperation set to reach new heights,” Hindustan Times, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-us-space-cooperation-set-to-reach-new-heights/story-M3Aym5IbhRsQJYowCs6hSP.html> (accessed 5/26/16)

Washington, however, acknowledged this only in 2004 and India-US ties improved as civilian space programmes were made part of the India-US Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) agreement. Since then, both sides have collaborated on climate change research and utilised data from remote sensing satellites for weather forecasting, disaster management support and education. And Isro now launching American satellites certainly marks a dramatic upswing in bilateral space cooperation. India and the US could use their resources and capabilities to make a positive difference in areas like space situational awareness (SSA) — so crucial for spaceflight safety and for preventing collisions in space (a risk realistically portrayed in the Oscar-winning film Gravity). Stronger India-US space ties bode well for multilateral cooperation, too, what with over 50 space agencies across the globe eager to participate in space exploration. Formulating much-needed space laws needs strong leadership and Isro’s impeccable credentials could see India play a major role in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

### 2NC – Add-On: Cyberterror/Cyberwar

#### Strong U.S.-India Relations key to cyber cooperation

Arun Mohan Sukumar, heads the Cyber Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, May, 2016, “Where Are US-India Cyber Relations Headed?,” Lawfareblog, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-are-us-india-cyber-relations-headed> (accessed 5/26/16)

The US-India cyber relationship is as much a marker of global governance of common digital spaces as it is about core bilateral economic and security engagements. In 2015, India signaled its willingness to accept rules of the road as set forth by the United States by making an unqualified endorsement of “multi-stakeholder” internet governance. Having defended this position at the 2015 BRICS heads of state summit in Ufa, Russia and, more recently, at the foreign ministers meeting of the Russia-India-China trilateral, New Delhi demonstrated that this political commitment can weather diplomatic headwinds. If India and the US are able to transform their convergence in policy positions into tangible cooperation in cyber security and the digital economy, this would send a clear message to developing countries. It would mean that digital spaces can be effectively secured while accounting for the freedoms of expression and commerce on the internet. And for many economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America that are struggling to protect their digital networks, it would be worth replicating a successful model of cooperation between India-US. Regulators across the world—most notably in the European Union—are contemplating data localization as the answer to increased cyber vulnerabilities. Without a comprehensive digital trade regime, emerging economies have little incentive to calibrate market regulations that promote innovation and also support local language content. The consequence would be a fragmentation of the internet, not of its infrastructure, but along political and economic fault lines. While India-US cooperation is not the solution to all these problems, it is a first step in demonstrating that comprehensive cyber engagement between emerging and advanced digital economies is possible. Of course, this is by no means an easy task. The US-India relationship has its own set of weighty concerns to tackle and could benefit from sustained engagement on both sides. The bilateral cybersecurity dialogue was intended to occur annually, but has been convened twice in four years—indeed it has only truly picked up steam since 2014. The US-India Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies (WG-ICT) has met since 2005, but is in need of a fresh and forward-looking agenda to address the future of private sector cooperation.

#### And, Cyber-Attacks are highly likely- terrorists are highly motivated

Dr. Steven P. Bucci is IBM's Issue Lead for Cyber Security Programs and a part of the Global Leadership Initiative, the in-house think tank for IBM's public-sector practice, 2009, “The Confluence of Cyber Crime and Terrorism,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-confluence-of-cyber-crime-and-terrorism> (accessed 5/29/16)

Some have opined that cyber attacks are not suitable as terror tactics because they lack the drama and spectacular effect of, say, a suicide bomber. This does not take into account the ability of the terrorists to adapt. As our intelligence and law enforcement agencies continue to effectively combat the terrorists, they will continue to evolve. The terrorists' old methods will be augmented and improved. They will need to develop more imagination and versatility if they are to conduct successful operations. This evolutionary capability has not been in short supply among the terrorist leadership. They will not define "spectacular" so narrowly. Imagine the operational elegance of simply hitting the return key and seeing thousands of enemies die a continent away, or watching a bank go under due to the destruction of all its data by an unknown force. This will be enormously attractive to terrorist groups. Additionally, the combination of cyber methods and kinetic strikes could be spectacular regardless of one's definition.Criminals, for their part, are motivated by greed and power. **Few** of the **leaders** **of** the **enormous cyber organized crime world would hesitate at selling their capabilities to a terrorist loaded with cash. That** fact, **combined with** the **ever-growing terrorist awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, makes this set of scenarios not just likely, but** nearly inevitable.

#### Nuclear Escalation is a Guaranteed Response

Sean Lawson is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, May, 2009, “Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation,” <http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477> (accessed 5/29/16)

Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded.  But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern.  It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary.  What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks.  Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space.  The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary.  But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war.  But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains?  It retaliates.  But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked.  Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker.  Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.”  And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents.  From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts.  WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’.   They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects.  For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible.  It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7]

### 2NC – Add-On: Democracy

#### Relations key to global democratic transitions

Gautam Adhikari is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, September, 2015, “The United States and India: The Vital Importance of a Natural Partnership,” The Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gautam-adhikari/modi-united-states-visit_b_8178382.html> (accessed 5/27/16)

Indeed, the continuing success of India’s efforts to eradicate poverty and sustain high rates of economic growth while strengthening governance within its impressive democratic framework is of great importance for the future of global stability and expanding prosperity. While there are other models of governance vying for influence in the world today, India’s success — in close partnership with the United States — is a strong demonstration that a democracy entrenched in liberal universal values can be a global recipe for developmental success. India and the U.S. as natural partners can make that happen, and that is why the U.S.-India relationship is critically significant for the world at large and for promoting America’s cherished democratic values.

#### Effective democracy promotion is key to solve global conflict

Mark Lagon, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, <http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090> (accessed 5/8/16)

Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.

### 2NC – Add-On: Piracy

#### U.S.-India relations key to maritime cooperation

Kevin Knodell, May, 2016, “China's Worst Nightmare: Is a U.S.- India Military Alliance Brewing?,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-worst-nightmare-us-india-military-alliance-brewing-16301> (accessed 5/26/16)

Washington and New Delhi are getting a lot more serious about military-to-military ties. As the United States and India become more wary of an increasingly assertive China, the two countries are gradually edging closer together. On May 16, American and Indian officials met for a “maritime security dialogue” in New Delhi. “The dialogue covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime security development in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as well as prospects for further strengthening cooperation between India and the United States in this regard,” stated an Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release. Washington and New Delhi are also close to formalizing a historic military cooperation agreement hazily called the “Logistics Support Agreement” — or LSA. The agreement would allow the two militaries to use each other’s land, air and naval bases for resupplies, repairs and conducting operations.

#### And, piracy key threat in Indian Ocean to maritime security

PTI, February, 2016, “PM Modi flags sea-borne terror, piracy as threat to maritime security,” Indian Express, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-modi-flags-sea-borne-terror-piracy-as-threat-to-maritime-security/> (accessed 5/30/16)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Sunday flagged the threat of sea-borne terror and piracy as two key challenges to maritime security even as he pitched for respecting freedom of navigation against the backdrop of South China sea dispute. In an apparent reference to the audacious 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, Modi said, the threat of sea-borne terror, of which India has been a direct victim, continues to endanger regional and global peace and stability. He said piracy, too, remains a strong challenge against the backdrop of Somali pirates targeting merchant vessels, including those of India. Addressing the valedictory function of International Fleet Review, the Prime Minister also made a veiled reference to the South China Sea dispute, saying countries must “respect and ensure freedom of navigation and cooperate not compete”. He said after hosting the 3rd India-Africa Summit and the India-Pacific Island Cooperation, the country would now host the first-ever global maritime summit in April. Referring to his government’s ambitious Make in India initiative, Modi said 37 of the Indian warships participating the Fleet Review were made in India and their numbers will surely rise. He said the nation’s ability to reap economic benefits from the oceans rested on our capacity to respond to the challenges in the maritime domain. “The threat of natural disasters like tsunami and cyclones is ever present. Man-made problems such as oil spills, climate change continue to risk the stability of the maritime domain,” the Prime minister said. He said a peaceful and stable maritime environment is critical for regional and global security.

#### And, escalation of piracy collapses the global economy

Frederic Wehrey is a senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, Combating Unconventional Threats in the Gulf <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/06/combating-unconventional-threats-in-gulf> (accessed 5/29/16)

**On the issues of piracy** and terrorism **there is general agreement** **between the US, the EU and the GCC** **over the severity and immediacy of the threat**. **Attacks** targeting the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb (BAM) **could block significant oil transports and** **severely damage the** regional and **global economy**. **Almost all of the trade between the EU and China, Japan, India and the rest of Asia passes through Bab el-Mandeb and up to 30 percent of the world’s oil – including all of the oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf heading west – passes through the Horn of Africa every day**.5 Additionally, about 17 million barrels (more than 18 percent of daily worldwide oil demand) transit the Strait of Hormuz daily.6 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has indicated its intent to close BAM and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) conducted an attack in the Strait of Hormuz in July of 2010 and may attempt to launch similar attacks in the future. There have also been indications that AQAP would like to advance their alliance with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab in order to carry out maritime attacks.7

#### That causes nuclear war

Matthew Burrows, counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, and Jennifer Harris, April, 2009 , member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf> (accessed 5/29/16)

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will likely be** a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become **self-radicalized**, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower **in an economic downturn**. **The most dangerous casualty** of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence **would** almost certainly **be the Middle East.** Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider** pursuing their own **nuclear** ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. **The lack of strategic depth** in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of** Iranian **intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises**.

### 2NC – AT: Indo-Pak War/Relations Bad Turn

#### No Indo-Pak war – Indo-Pak decision makers have extensive experience in preventing escalation

Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Centre and co-editor of Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, January, 2014, “Perils of punditry,” Dawn, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1080538/perils-of-punditry> (accessed 5/29/16)

U.S. commentary on nuclear developments in Pakistan and India is usually not well received on the subcontinent. One reason is that cautionary messages sound hypocritical. Pundits from a country that has been guilty of wretched nuclear excess are on thin ice when passing judgement on nuclear arsenals that may barely extend into three digits. Another reason has to do with the etiquette of pointing out shortcomings. It’s OK when a Pakistani or an Indian writes about negative developments at home, but when a US commentator writes about similar failings, he or she is perceived to demonstrate an anti-Pakistan or an anti-Indian bias. Even when negative foreign commentary is based on inarguable facts, it still feels like piling on. US commentators are therefore labelled as either anti-Pakistan/pro-India or anti-India/pro-Pakistan. Once affixed, these labels are hard to remove. In addition, Indian strategic analysts are annoyed because China doesn’t figure nearly enough in US commentary. From an Indian perspective, US analysts seem fixated on the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, when India’s primary threat emanates from China. This critique has merit because China is a far more formidable competitor to India than Pakistan. But China, unlike the Soviet Union and the US, hasn’t made the mistake of equating strategic power with the size of its nuclear arsenal. Instead, Beijing is moving slowly on its nuclear programmes while focusing on weapon systems that are more likely to be used in combat. In contrast, Pakistan places a very high priority on its nuclear programmes which, for now, keep pace with India. Within a decade, China’s nuclear capabilities will certainly warrant more attention. In the near term, the nuclear competition that matters most is between Pakistan and India, which remain one severe terrorist incident away from a confrontation. Another complaint — perhaps most annoying to Pakistani and Indian analysts — is that US commentators keepharping on problems of escalation control and deterrence stability, as if leaders on the subcontinent lack sensitivity to these dangers**.** Indian and Pakistani decision-makers have indeed been mindful of escalatory dangers during prior crises and during the Kargil war

## A/T 2AC Answers

### A/T “US/India Relations Resilient”

#### US/India relations not resilient—India can choose to go its own way, they’ve done it before

[Paul J. Leaf](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/paul-j-leaf), Attorney in Los Angeles, and a former editor of the Stanford Law Review, September 15, 2014, “With China on the Rise, America Must Woo India,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-rise-america-must-woo-india-11275> (accessed May 26, 2016)

While in many respects, India is a natural U.S. ally, its partnership should not be assumed. These democracies’ overlapping interests include avoiding a hostile Chinese rise, maintaining open sea-lanes to meet their energy needs and combatting terrorism. But New Delhi’s history of nonalignment dampens its willingness to militarily partner with other countries. After all, India seeks favorable relations with all countries to maximize its benefits from each, and Modi came to office promising significant economic development after India’s average annual growth dipped from approximately 9 percent for over seven years to under 5 percent since 2012. Given doubts about U.S. security commitments in Asia and India’s deep economic ties to China (which is New Delhi’s largest trade partner and a growing investment source), these preferences are amplified vis-à-vis anti-China coalitions. Indeed, during the recent summit between Modi and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, the leaders struck economic deals, but failed to finalize pending security agreements. Perhaps Modi sought to encourage Chinese investment in his country and avoid upsetting Chinese president Xi Jinping before his scheduled India visit later this month. However, as happened during the Cold War, when China threatened India and the United States supported India’s arch rival, Pakistan, India’s security environment can cause it to tilt to one side of a rivalry, even if it eschews formal alliances. (India’s lean towards the Soviet Union remains relevant. India backed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, [and it bought most of its arms from Russia until recently](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-rising-military-might-made-the-usa-11253).) New Delhi’s position on banding with other countries against Beijing is thus malleable—fluctuating based on, among other factors, the degree of Chinese encroachment in India’s sphere of influence. China and Japan know this, and so they compete for India’s favor. For instance, Japan committed this month to investing nearly $34 billion in India; it is involved in almost seventy infrastructure projects there (with more being negotiated); and Modi and Abe upgraded their countries’ relationship to a “special strategic” partnership. Meanwhile, despite recent Chinese-Indian standoffs, their deployment of additional troops and weapons near their contested border, China backing Pakistan and a growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, Beijing and New Delhi enjoy increasingly productive ties. Between 2003 and 2012, the countries’ trade surged on average 30 percent each year. In 2007, their armies conducted their first joint military exercise, which was duplicated in 2008 and last year. [Another joint exercise is planned for November.](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-China-joint-military-exercise-on-counter-terrorism-on-Pakistan-border-in-November/articleshow/37650954.cms) And this past February, China offered to fund Indian infrastructure development with $300 billion in loans. These trends will likely sharpen once Modi and Xi meet later this month.

### A/T “US/India Relations Resilient”

#### India/US relations aren’t resilient—they’re not bound by an alliance; it’s a relationship of convenience

[Charles R. Kaye](http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/charles-r-kaye/b5407), Co-Chief Executive Officer, Warburg Pincus, and [Joseph S. Nye Jr.](http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/joseph-s-nye-jr/b1330), Distinguished Service Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2015, “Working With a Rising India,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/india/working-rising-india/p37233?co=C007301> (accessed May 27, 2016)

Because India does not seek an alliance with the United States and closely guards its policy independence, U.S.-India relations will not resemble those Washington has with its conventional allies. For that reason, the Task Force recommends that "U.S. policymakers [should] explicitly emphasize a 'joint-venture' model for U.S.-India relations, focused on a slate of shared pursuits on which interests converge—and with clear mechanisms for coordinating and managing the known and expected disagreements." The bipartisan Task Force is chaired by Charles R. Kaye, co-chief executive officer of the private equity firm Warburg Pincus and former chairman of the U.S.-India Business Council, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. Directed by CFR Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia [Alyssa Ayres](http://links.cfr.mkt5175.com/ctt?kn=1&ms=NDk5ODQwNDgS1&r=MTcwNzA3OTEyNzAxS0&b=0&j=ODAxNDA4MjQ2S0&mt=1&rt=0), the Task Force is composed of sixteen prominent experts from government, academic, nonprofit, and other sectors.

### A/T “US/India Relations Resilient”

#### No resiliency—it’s a “not-quite” alliance

[Alyssa Ayres](http://www.cfr.org/experts/india-pakistan-economic-development/alyssa-ayres/b9237), Senior Fellow at CFR for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, May 26, 2016, “U.S. Relations With India,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/india/us-relations-india/p37905> (accessed May 27, 2016)

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 24, 2016, Alyssa Ayres discussed areas of progress and the importance of managing expectations in U.S.-India relations. Drawing on recommendations made by the [2015 CFR Independent Task Force on U.S.-India Relations](http://www.cfr.org/india/working-rising-india/p37233?co=C007301), Ayres recommended reframing the bilateral relationship as a joint venture instead of as a not-quite alliance, arguing that such a shift would allow for increased cooperation in areas of convergence without letting differences undermine progress.

### A/T “India Won’t Be Aggressive”

#### India is building its military capabilities and boosting defense spending now

Matthew Southerland, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, Iacob Koch-Weser Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade, and Angela Zhang, Research Intern, Security and Foreign Affairs, December 22, 2014,“China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite Growing Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China-India%20Relations--Tensions%20Persist%20Despite%20Growing%20Cooperation_12%2022%202014.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2016)

The election of Prime Minister Modi, India’s evolving strategic calculations, and the growing Indian economy and role in global energy markets have important implications for U.S. security and economic interests and may present opportunities for greater U.S.-India cooperation. Prime Minister Modi has shown support for the U.S.-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), an initiative that supports efforts for defense technology co-development and co-production, priorities for India as it seeks to build its indigenous defense industry. The two sides held the initiative’s first meeting in September 2014. Subsequently, the joint statement of Prime Minister Modi and President Obama during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States in September endorsed the DTTI’s creation of a new task force to decide the technologies and projects for which the United States and India will engage in co-development and co-production. 102 Furthermore, the Modi Administration’s proposed increase in defense spending, due in part to China’s military modernization, could be a boon for the U.S. defense industry as India seeks to upgrade its military systems and platforms, acquire new capabilities, and strengthen its relationship with the United States. 103

### A/T “India/China Relations Resilient”

#### Both sides have strategic reasons to counter each other

Harsh V. Pant, Professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King's College London, Winter 2012, “The Pakistan Thorn in China—India—U.S. Relations,” The Washington Quarterly, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19515/uploads> (accessed May 27, 2016)

Yet, China’s relationship with India has been very turbulent recently, impeding the realization of these and other mutual interests. At the global level, their rhetoric is all about cooperation, and indeed the two sides have worked together on climate change, global trade negotiations, and in demanding that global financial institutions be restructured in light of the global economy’s shifting center of gravity. The case for Sino-Indian cooperation has been built by various constituencies to offer a counterweight to U.S. global and regional hegemony. China is a rising power that sees the United States as the greatest obstacle to achieving its preeminent position in the global political hierarchy. As a consequence, it realizes the importance of cooperating with other major powers like India to check U.S. expansionism in the world, even if only in the short term. India has different considerations, because it is still a long way from becoming a challenger to U.S. global predominance. Nevertheless, it has always tried to voice the concerns of the so-called developing world, strongly arguing for respecting the sovereignty of all countries and opposing the use of force in international politics. Concerns that the United States had become too powerful and unilateral, and that a unipolar U.S.-dominated world would not be in the best interests of weaker states like India, has made the idea of Sino-Indian partnership attractive to certain sections of the Indian strategic elite. India and China took strong exception to the U.S.-led air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, the campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, and more recently the Western intervention in Libya, arguing that they violated the sovereignty of these countries and undermined the authority of the UN system. Both also favor more democratic international economic regimes. They have strongly resisted efforts by the United States and other developed nations to link global trade to labor and environmental standards, realizing clearly that this would put them at a huge disadvantage to the developed world, thereby hampering their drive toward economic development, the number one priority for both countries. Nevertheless, buoyed by the perception in the early months of the Obama administration that Washington planned to make its ties with China the centerpiece of its foreign policy in light of growing U.S. economic dependence on China, Beijing has displayed a distinctly aggressive stance toward India. Even though Beijing has solved most of its border disputes with other countries, it is reluctant to move ahead with New Delhi. China took its territorial dispute with India all the way to the Asian Development Bank in 2009, where it blocked an Indian application for a loan that included development projects in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China continues to claim as part of its own territory.

### A/T “India/ China Cooperate”

#### India is one of China’s main economic competitors—they’re a key heg against China’s military and political dominance in Asia

[Dmitry Bokarev, Staff writer for the New International Outlook political commentary outlet,](http://journal-neo.org/author/dmitry-bokarev/) February 22, 2016, “Who Can Restrain China’s Military Ambitions?,” New International Outlook, <http://journal-neo.org/2016/02/22/who-can-restrain-china-s-military-ambitions/> (accessed May 27, 2016)

For a long time now China has been Asia’s leading economy. Its influence and growing ambitions worry many neighbouring countries. At the same time, in recent years, United States influence in the Asia Pacific region has decreased noticeably. Therefore, Washington needs strong Asian partners, who can assist in restraining the growth of China’s power. For their part, countries that are unhappy about China’s expansion have been forced to undertake their own efforts to counter the pressure from the Middle Kingdom. The recent escalation of territorial disputes over the ParacelIslands and Spratly Archipelago, which are claimed simultaneously by China and Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, have intensified the fraught atmosphere. Many negotiations are currently being held on creating anti-Chinese coalitions in the Asia Pacific region, led by the USA. Moreover, the talks concern military and not economic cooperation. China’s main competitors in Asia are India and Japan, which are the second and third largest Asian economies respectively. While deepening and broadening their collaboration, these two countries are quite able to “catch up with and overtake” China. Some people are of the opinion that the USA is counting particularly on them, hoping to form an anti-Beijing coalition. The recent exercise Malabar 2015, with participation of naval forces from the USA, India, and Japan just added fuel to the fire. These countries already tried to conduct similar exercise in 2008, but cancelled them due to active protests from the Chinese side. In 2015, however, the exercise was held, and this attests to the participating countries’ concern over China’s policies which, in recent months, have been characterized by active military reforms with a goal of strengthening the country’s military preparedness and expanding its military presence beyond mainland China’s borders.

### A/T “India/ China Cooperate”

#### India and China view each other as a threat—their policy approaches escalate the risk of miscalculation

Vasantha R. Raghavan, Lt. Gen. is of India’s leading military strategic thinkers. He served in the Indian Army for thirty seven years and retired as the Director General of Military Operations in 1994, March 25, 2014, “How India & China see each other,” The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/books/books-reviews/how-india-china-see-each-other/article5827120.ece> (accessed May 27, 2016)

International relations theories during the Cold War were largely predicated on the global matrix of two super powers setting the context for relations amongst smaller powers. The end of Cold War and emergence of new powers have tested and stretched the theoretical framework. It is still a work in progress and the series of writings related to South Asia, led by Oxford International Relations in South Asia Series, has made a valuable contribution in the field. The book under review is remarkable in Sino-Indian relations being addressed by a Taiwanese diplomat-scholar. Taiwan has a unique relationship with China based on a mix of historical animosity, national identity, economic and power asymmetry and the dominant influence of United States. Unlike the mainstream neo-realism or neo-liberal streams of international relations analysis, this book attempts a constructivist understanding of the relations between India and China. The author, who was based in India, makes a fascinating analysis of the mutual threat perceptions of the two countries. It is interesting that both the stronger and weaker player in the Sino-Indian dyad, see the other as a threat to its interests. The analysis covers the four major dimensions of the two states’ troubled relationship, viz; nuclear issues, Tibet, border problem and regional competition. Perceptions and misperceptions of threat become a variable in the strategic policies of states. International relations theorists have long analysed threat perceptions as the estimated intent and capabilities of the adversary state. Based on such analysis, not always wise or right, states adopt countermeasures to cope with the perceived threat. These have often taken the form of balancing, through internal strength, either military or economic or both, or external partnerships with allies. Some other states try ‘band wagoning’ by joining another power while some others seek a constructive engagement through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to reduce the threat. The book puts out the view, not surprisingly, that the weaker of the two will attempt to reduce the asymmetry by improving its capabilities. This is what in fact India is doing militarily albeit slowly and by building a network of cooperative relationship with other states extending from the Asia Pacific to Indian Ocean. As the author argues, this in itself can be a trigger for perceptional misunderstanding.

### A/T L/T—“China Relations Better”

#### We should sacrifice relations with India for an untrustworthy nation like China

Russ Read, National Security and Foreign Policy reporter for the Daily Caller, February 25, 2016, “US Admiral Isn’t Buying China’s Attempts To Downplay Militarization In The Pacific,” The Daily Caller, <http://dailycaller.com/2016/02/25/us-admiral-isnt-buying-chinas-attempts-to-downplay-militarization-in-the-pacific/> (accessed May 27, 2016)

China’s foreign minister and the U.S. commander of the Pacific both spoke Thursday on military expansion in the South China Sea, yet their statements made it clear the two nations continue to be at odds over China’s military build-up in the area. While speaking at an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi downplayed China’s military build up in the Pacific, emphasizing the idea that expansionism is contradictory to Chinese identity. “Some friends in the United States are worried and view China as the real major adversary of the US; they fear it will replace US. This argument has strategic mistrust and suspicion behind it,” said Wang. “Confrontation [between the US and China] would be a lose-lose situation; there is no reason to enter such a zero sum game.” Wang’s comments focused on countering the idea that China will overtake the U.S. as a world superpower, and included a call for a peaceful solution to disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea. “The general situation there is stable; no commercial vessel has complained that its freedom of navigation has been jeopardized,” said Wang, assuring the audience that China’s build-up in the area is not an attempt to limit the freedom of navigation of international vessels. “China’s position is that we want a peaceful resolution.” Harris took a different stance on what he believes is the true Chinese intention for the South China Sea. During a briefing to the Pentagon press corps, U.S. Navy Adm. Harry Harris reassured reporters the U.S. is a Pacific nation, and will therefore be a Pacific power and continue asserting itself in the South China Sea. “I am of the opinion they are militarizing the South China sea,” said Harris to reporters. He noted that China is responsible for changing the operational landscape of the area by creating 3,000 acres worth of military bases, none of which existed before China’s island-building campaign.

### A/T L/T—“China Relations Better”

#### The US and China relations will remain low—new trade war in the squo overwhelms any chance of effective engagement

Michael Snyder, J.D. from Florida School of Law and publisher of The Economic Collapse Blog, May 27, 2016, “The Relationship Between The United States And China Is Officially Going Down The Tubes,” Freedom Outpost, <http://freedomoutpost.com/the-relationship-between-the-united-states-and-china-is-officially-going-down-the-tubes/> (accessed May 27, 2016)

What happens when the two largest economies on the planet start fighting a trade war with one another? Well, we are about to find out. As you will see below, the U.S. has gone “nuclear” on China in a trade dispute over steel, and the Chinese response is likely to be at least as strong. Meanwhile, events in the South China Sea have brought tensions between the Chinese government and the Obama administration to a boiling point. The Obama administration strongly insists that China does not have a legal right to those islands, and in China there is now talk that it may ultimately be necessary to confront the United States militarily in order keep control of them. Most Americans may not realize this, but the relationship between the United States and China is officially going down the tubes, and this is likely to have very significant consequences during the years to come.

# DA US-Japan Relations DA

## \*\*\*Summary\*\*\*

This disadvantage will apply to most affirmatives on the topic. The premise is that the United States and China relationship trades off with the United States and Japan’s relationship. Specifically, that United States and China’s relationship is bad for the United States and Japan’s relationship in that Japan perceives it as encroachment. The encroachment argument is based off of China’s history of economically bullying Japan out of gaining influence in the region, such that it appears the United States is taking sides to form a regional bloc. This causes regional instability among Asian countries that escalates.

## \*\*\*1NC Shell\*\*\*

#### Alliance is strong - The US and Japan are coordinating efforts in Southeast Asia

Satu P. Limaye, Director of the East-West Center in Washington and Senior Advisor at the CNA Corporation, and Tsutomu Kikuchi, Professor of International Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Department of International Politics, Aoyama-Gakuin University, Tokyo, March 14, 2016, “US-Japan Relations and Southeast Asia,” <https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/report/160314_Project_Report_US-Japan_and_SEA.pdf> (Accessed 4/19/16)

Until recently, Southeast Asia has not been a region of focus for the US-Japan relationship. A new era of more coordinated, sustained, and combined commercial and security involvement by the US and Japan in Southeast Asia may be at hand. Five drivers are creating the new era in US-Japan ties with Southeast Asia. First, both countries have tremendous commercial stakes in the region and thus an interest in a stable security environment. Second, Southeast Asia’s importance to the Asia-Pacific region and the globe is increasing. Third, there is increased regional integration among North America, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia through multilateral architecture and robust trade, production and supply chain networks. Fourth, Washington and Tokyo see Southeast Asia as a key region for increasing their bilateral cooperation, including through the 2015 revised defense guidelines. Fifth, China’s assertiveness is also driving mutual Southeast Asian, American, and Japanese interest in enhanced engagement.

#### US-China relationship causes Japanese aggression harming US-Japan security in the region

Kaya Forest, American Thinker Staff Writer, and Sierra Rayne, American Thinker Staff Writer, March 20, 2016, “Japan’s Security Concerns and the Need for a Revitalized U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” <http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/03/japans_security_concerns_and_the_need_for_a_revitalized_us_nuclear_deterrent.html> (Accessed 4/17/2016)

The implication is that threats to its security today will lead Japan to reconsider its nuclear strategy in the future. Japan perceives China as one of its greatest security threats. As China continues to modernize and expand its military, the threat becomes more acute. North Korea's ongoing tests of nuclear devices and delivery vehicles have also altered the strategic dynamics in the East Asia region. Exchanging basing rights for security and protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII, any significant change in the United States' commitment to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound implications for Japan's defense policy. A strengthened U.S.-China relationship and the ongoing buildup of nuclear weapons capacity by North Korea may call into question whether the U.S. will continue to exert dominance in East Asia to the extent needed to adequately defend Japanese interests. Japan began researching nuclear weapons development during WWII. Today, with one of the world's most advanced civilian nuclear power programs and a highly technologically sophisticated society, many believe that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months should it choose to do so.

#### Japan wants to be US most significant partner in the region, China’s economic bullying threatens the US-Japan alliance

Arthur Herman, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Lewis Libby, Senior VP at the Hudson Institute, March 30, 2016, “Don’t Abandon Japan,” <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/433464/united-states-japan-relations-china-economic-bullying> (Accessed 4/17/2016)

As a vital ally in Asia and a bulwark against China, it needs our support, not decades-old calumnies. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, arriving in Washington this week for President Obama’s nuclear-security summit, is America’s strongest ally in Asia — a region crucial to America’s future. Since taking office, Abe has pursued politically risky policies that have steadily bolstered not just Japan’s, but also America’s position in Asia. So he must be puzzled to find himself at the center of a U.S. political dispute. Battling for votes, the Trump presidential campaign suggests that Japan is an economic and military drain on the U.S. After criticizing China, the campaign smacks Japan. Such overheated rhetoric is as outdated as it is misguided. In the last few years, Abe has labored mightily to reinflate his currency, to restrain risky regional disputes that also endanger U.S. interests, to raise Japanese defense spending, to adopt new defense guidelines increasing Japan’s regional and global security burden, and to bend his country’s U.S.-inspired post-war constitution to enable Japan to defend U.S. ships and troops in the event of an attack. In the process, he has sought to jump-start Japan’s stalled national economy — the third largest in the world — and to push trade deals advancing Western resilience against China’s economic bullying. He has done all this even as China’s military probes Japan’s southern boundaries and northern Japan recovers from a tsunami-related nuclear-plant disaster. Instead of the Japan, Inc. that scared Congress and labor unions in the 1980s and 1990s and inspired fearmongering books like Clyde Prestowitz’s Trading Places, Japan now struggles with an economy that has persistently underperformed for two decades, ironically due to many of the same misguided Keynesian policies that President Obama has used to leave the U.S. economy stuck in low gear since the 2008 financial crisis. Today’s leading economists, as well as Prestowitz’s newest book, Japan Restored, argue that Japan’s economic revival would help America and the world. Instead of being the fearsome economic predators of 1990s myth, Japanese companies like Honda, Nissan, and Toyota have opened auto plants in the U.S. that have created more than 1.3 million jobs through 2013, and have become innovative partners in new manufacturing areas like robotics. Even more important, as an economic rival, Japan has been supplanted by a far more menacing competitor, namely China. While some aspects of our trade deficit with Japan could stand some correcting, the deficit with China has ballooned to $365.7 billion, a new record. Chinese cyberattack and commercial cybertheft endanger both Japan and the United States. Furthermore, unlike Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, China is also a threatening geopolitical competitor. China’s $1.4 trillion “One Belt, One Road” program for financing massive infrastructure projects — from harbors and high-speed trains to oil and natural-gas pipelines that will connect China with the rest of the world — aims to displace U.S. influence worldwide, not just in Asia. Its aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas threaten freedom of navigation and could recklessly spark armed conflict. Meanwhile, China has never applied its considerable leverage to reverse the irresponsible international misbehavior, provocative missile programs, and outrageous nuclear-proliferation activities of its client state, North Korea. Japan lies at the forefront of such challenges. So over the past decades it has spent billions annually — at times covering the majority of U.S. costs — to support U.S. bases in Japan, bases that are the bedrock of America’s position in Asia. Japan has sent ground troops to Iraq and contributed to Western efforts in Afghanistan, and it remains a foremost funder of international economic development. But its current prime minister wants to do more to meet and to deter the challenges from China and North Korea and to be America’s true strategic partner in East Asia. Notably, he has steadily increased Japan’s defense budget — indeed, the defense budget for fiscal year 2016 will be Japan’s biggest since World War Two. In working for these changes, Abe specifically argued that Japan needed to be able to come to the aid of the U.S. in a conflict, and to provide real capabilities when it did. In connection with this week’s summit, Japan has sought to counter the threat of nuclear blackmail in Asia — a current focus given North Korea’s recent provocations. Japan may be America’s single most significant partner in deploying missile-defense systems, including co-development of the updated Aegis and SM3 anti-ballistic programs. For Japan, these have been historic steps. In short, Japan has been the kind of powerful democratic ally, and Abe the kind of prime minister, that America has wanted and needed for a long time to maintain peace and collective security in the region.

#### US-Japan alliance prevents Japanese aggression and ensures regional stability/peace

Bhubhindar **Singh**, Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore, January **2015**, “The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy” <http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_Singh_January2015.pdf> (Accessed 4/17/16)

The continued resilience of the U.S.-Japan military alliance is a third reason to support the conclusion that the expansion of Japanese security policy would be a source of stability. The United States has served as a key source of regional stability and provider of security guarantees for Japan through the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two states (revised in 1960). Buttressed by strong domestic support in Japan, this alliance became a pillar of Japanese security policy throughout the Cold War, and this continues to be the case today (especially outside Okinawa). A key aspect of the treaty was the stationing of U.S. troops in a network of military bases in Japan in exchange for the United States’ security guarantee. This arrangement has anchored the U.S. military presence in the region and provided a critical source of regional stability by reassuring allies, deterring adversaries, facilitating the United States’ ability to project force abroad when called on to do so, and guaranteeing the freedom of the global commons.27 Apart from their role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the region, the U.S. military presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance also serve as an important check against any expansion in Japanese security policy that could destabilize the region. This is especially important for reassuring Japan’s neighbors, who harbor a strong sense of suspicion and mistrust of Japan stemming from their colonial history. The United States is cognizant of this dynamic. Thus, even though Washington supports Japan implementing a more activist security policy, it is also in the U.S. interest to ensure that this development contributes positively to regional and global security.

#### Asian conflict causes nuclear escalation

Shar **Adams**, Reporter for the Epoch Times, Citing Desmond Ball, Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, October 13, **2014**, “Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror”, <http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror/> (Accessed 4/17/16)

The world may be focused on the “war on terror”, but the arms build up in North-East Asia poses a far greater threat to global stability, says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball’s expertise in command and control systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his concerns about North-East Asia. “North-East Asia has now become the most disturbing part of the globe,” Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an exclusive interview. China, Japan and South Korea – countries that are “economic engines of the global economy” – are embroiled in an arms race of unprecedented proportions, punctuated by “very dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, there are no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation in Asia. “Indeed, the escalation dynamic could move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict, including nuclear conflict,” said Prof Ball. “It is happening as we watch.” Arms Race Military spending in Asia has grown steadily over the last decade. According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report, China is now the world’s second largest military spender behind the United States, spending an estimated $188 billion in 2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the world’s top 10 military spenders. When North Korea and Taiwan are included, North-East Asian countries constitute around 85 per cent of military spending in Asia. But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the acquisitions. “The primary reason now for the acquisitions, whether they are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, is simply to match what the other [countries] are getting,” he said. While he believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military modernisation, he says it is China’s military provocation of countries across Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since China lay claim to all of the South China Sea, it has escalated territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. What started with skirmishes between locals and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial grabs – island building on contested rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: “China is looking to expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully formed artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its military strength in the South China Sea.” According to Filipino media, the artificial island falls within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Prof Ball says China’s behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but “in the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing” compared with conflicts in North-East Asia, where China and Japan are contesting claims over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyus by China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: “We are talking about actual footsteps towards nuclear war – submarines and missiles.” Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the point where sometimes there are “at least 40 aircraft jostling” over the contested area, he said.

## \*\*\*Uniqueness Extensions\*\*\*

### US-China Relations Low – Security Tensions

#### US-China Relations are bad now – increased security tensions

Jim Caton, JD from Wayne Law School and Legal Reader Staff Writer, April 17, 2016, “The Coming War with China,” <http://www.legalreader.com/coming-war-china/> (Accessed April 17, 2016)

Hillary Clinton will not talk about it. Bernie Sanders will not talk about it. Donald Trump and Ted Cruz will not talk about it. But they know. Looming on the horizon of the next presidential administration is the ominous and growing possibility of war with China. For the past year, the United States has been challenging China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, where China has been piling sand upon reefs to create new islets. These islets, the U.S. claims, are intended for military use. In October of 2015, and again in January of this year, the U.S. sent naval destroyers within the twelve-nautical-mile limit of Chinese-administered islets. These provocative moves were carried out in the name of the principle of “freedom of navigation.” This past week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter paid visits to India and the Philippines, shoring up military relations and issuing statements that both made promises of military aid and implied that heightened U.S. military activity in the region was simply a response to Chinese territorial aggression. On Friday, after witnessing the closing of a joint U.S.–Philippines military exercise, Carter went for a cruise on the aircraft carrier John C. Stennis as it sailed near waters claimed by China. Asked whether the carrier’s presence in the South China Sea should be viewed as a provocation of China, Carter replied, “We have been here for decade upon decade. The only reason that question even comes up is because of what has gone on over the last year, and that’s a question of Chinese behavior.” He added, “What’s new is the context and tension that exists, which we want to reduce.” The Secretary did not elaborate on how violating China’s territorial claims with warships was calculated to reduce that tension. Nor does Carter seem to appreciate the irony of U.S. warships policing Chinese militarism in the South China Sea. Perhaps the Secretary would welcome a Chinese fleet to monitor U.S. influence in the important international shipping lanes of the Caribbean. In fact, tension in the region has been rising since 2011, when President Obama announced his “pivot to Asia,” a realignment of U.S. global military might aimed at securing U.S. military and economic dominance in the Asian Pacific. In particular, the U.S. has during those five years worked closely with the governments of India, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan to bring about both renewed militarization and anti-China sentiment in those countries. The inclusion of India in the U.S.’s anti-China collection of nations, however, reveals Washington’s objective to be more than just the “freedom of navigation” of the South China Sea. The aim actually appears to be no less than the military encirclement of China. The dangers of this strategy are readily apparent, but they were made explicit in a particularly chilling way in Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent visit to Japan.

### US–China Relations Low – South China Sea

#### US-China relations bad now – tensions over South China Sea

Dan Lamothe, graduate of journalism programs at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and the University of Maryland-College Park and staff writer for the Washington Post, April 8, 2016, ”Pentagon Chief Postpones Visit to China as Tensions Simmer in South China Sea,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/08/pentagon-chief-postpones-visit-to-china-as-tensions-simmer-in-south-china-sea/> (Accessed 4/14/2016)

Pentagon chief postpones visit to China as tensions simmer in South China Sea. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter at a news conference in Washington last year. He will not visit China in his upcoming trip to Asia. (Cliff Owen/AP). Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter will embark on a trip in coming days that will focus heavily on China’s influence across Southeast Asia, including the disputed South China Sea. But the secretary’s travel itinerary won’t include a key player in that discussion: China itself. The trip will include visits to India and the Philippines before Carter pivots to the Middle East with stops in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said in a statement Friday. The Pentagon has sought to strengthen relationships with India and the Philippines as China expands its military and puts a variety of new equipment and weapons in the South China Sea, including surface-to-air missiles and advanced radar.

#### South China Sea contributing to rapidly rising tension

Felix K. Chang, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 3, 2016, “South China Sea Escalation: Relations Between China and the United States,” <http://www.fpri.org/2016/03/south-china-sea-escalation-relations-china-united-states/> (Accessed 4/15/16)

While tensions have rapidly risen in recent months, the escalation in words and actions between China and the United States started years ago. Many Chinese cite 2010 as a turning point. During that year’s ASEAN Regional Forum, Southeast Asian leaders publicly rebuked China over its assertiveness in the South China Sea. Not believing that they would do so on their own accord and witnessing then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s behavior at the forum, China came to believe that the United States orchestrated the criticism. From that, China concluded that the United States had abandoned its long-held position not to take sides in the South China Sea dispute and had chosen to interject itself into it. Certainly by late 2014, the United States had decided to challenge China’s actions. Diplomacy had failed to deter China from incrementally elbowing its Southeast Asian neighbors out of the South China Sea. Indeed, China had become even more assertive, violating the spirit of the ASEAN code of conduct that it signed in 2002. Rather than refraining from actions that may change the status quo, China stepped up its military presence, increased the number of its coast guard patrols, and even encouraged its fishermen to fish in the South China Sea with subsidized fuel. That eventually led to a months-long standoff between Chinese and Philippine naval vessels near Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

#### United States reaction with South China Sea bolstering US-China tensions

David Trujillo, CPUSA National Labor Commission Member, April 19, 2016, “Tensions Remain High in the South China Sea,” <http://peoplesworld.org/tensions-remain-high-in-the-south-china-sea/> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

China is unilaterally staking its claim to the islands by moving military gear into the area. It has been dredging the sea bottom and has built a 10,000 foot runway on one of the islands that it developed. China claims "indisputable sovereignty" over the territory. It should be understood that this is considered one of the most vital shipping lanes in the world. The South China Sea is also critically important to both global trade and to China's continuing development. China's argument is that it has no intention to militarize the region. It claims it has no reason to disrupt one of its own crucial arteries of trade. This remains to be seen. In addition, the response of the United States has increased this tension. According to the Times, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is patrolling in the South China Sea. One carrier has conducted flight operations, training and is working with the military forces of regional allies like the Philippines. The U.S.' interference only makes the issue more complex.

### US-China Relations Low – Regional Power Plays

#### US-China relations strained over regional power plays - Predictive

Rod Lyon, fellow at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist, November 25, 2015, “The U.S.-China Relationship: War, Peace or Just Troubled Times Ahead?,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-china-relationship-war-peace-or-just-troubled-times-14444> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

The recent freedom of navigation operation undertaken by the USS Lassen [4] in the South China Sea advertises a new sharper edge to U.S.–China relations. Some analysts have begun to write about a ‘tipping point’ in the relationship (see here [5] and here [6]); media reports sometimes talk of a relationship in crisis [7]. It’s not that bad—yet—but things are getting more serious. To see why, we need to look at the broader regional landscape and then fit U.S.–China relations into that. The U.S.–China bilateral relationship is undoubtedly the region’s most important, but Asia’s no G2—it’s a large theatre with no common front line and a high level of economic interdependence. Indeed, we’re moving into a world of uneven multipolarity in Asia. It’s easiest to see the shift by using a long baseline: compare the relative weightings of the major players in 1995 with what they are now. In 1995 U.S. preponderance was so marked that all other players looked like minions. But 20 years later we see an Asia characterized by a number of strong players: China, Japan and India in the top tier; South Korea, Australia, Indonesia in the second tier; and a range of regional states—like Vietnam—in fast-growing Southeast Asia.

#### China’s aggressive posture threatens the US

Aaron Kliegman, Media Analyst for the Washington Free Beacon and a Master's Degree Candidate in Johns Hopkins's Global Security Studies Program in Washington, D.C., March 27, 2016, “Thinking about the Unthinkable in the Far East,” <http://freebeacon.com/culture/thinking-about-the-unthinkable-in-the-far-east/> (Accessed 4/21/2016)

The central question that Navarro, a professor at the University of California-Irvine, seeks to answer in his book is whether China will soon go to war. This question stems from the apparent contradiction that the country is quickly and earnestly developing offensive military capabilities and strategic doctrine while claiming that it “seeks only a peaceful rise.” In essence, Crouching Tiger is really asking if China and the United States specifically will go to war, although the book also examines the possibility of conflict with other countries in the Far East and Southeast Asia (which, in most cases, would inevitably involve the United States anyway). To answer this question and analyze the full consequences of China’s expansionism, Navarro structures his book as a “geopolitical detective story” to solve the mystery of the country’s intentions. Each chapter begins with an important question followed by different possible answers that cover a range of opinions in the field. This process resembles a trail of clues that contribute to a full picture of whether conflict is likely to take place. One necessary distinction that must be made, what Navarro calls a “deep perceptual divide” between Washington and Beijing, is whether “China’s expansionism constitutes the offensive behavior of an aspiring regional hegemon [what the U.S. and many Asian countries think] or simply the legitimate defensive actions of a country seeking to defend its trade routes and guard its homeland [what China claims].”

### US-China Relations Low – THAAD

#### China’s position on THAAD is detrimental to US-China Relations

Rod Lyon, fellow at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist, February 23, 2016, “The Hard Truth about THAAD, South Korea and China,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295> (Accessed 4/21/2016)

Second, let’s turn to the U.S.–China issue. China worries primarily about the system’s surveillance capabilities. It’s not concerned that a THAAD missile battery in South Korea could intercept a Chinese strategic missile bound for continental America—that’s not a realistic scenario. Rather, it’s concerned that THAAD’s radar might be able to offer early tracking data to other parts of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system—in particular to the Ground Based Interceptors responsible for defending the U.S. homeland—thus degrading China’s ability to target the United States. Its anxiety is a classic case of a security trilemma, where actions taken by one country in response to the actions of another—here the deployment of enhanced U.S. BMD capabilities to offset North Korea’s growing missile capabilities—complicate relations with a third player. Still, China’s scarcely the first country to feel threatened by a ballistic missile defense radar. Russia worked itself into a tizzy—not entirely without cause—when George W. Bush’s administration proposed deploying a X-band radar in Europe to support a regional ballistic missile defense system against Iran. China’s right to believe that THAAD surveillance data could be transferred to other BMD assets protecting CONUS. Indeed, one of THAAD’s missions would be to strengthen U.S. defenses against the possibility of North Korean ballistic missile attack on CONUS. So it has to be able to transfer data to CONUS-based radars and interceptors. But the United States already has a THAAD battery deployed on Guam, two AN/TPY-2 radars deployed in Japan (at Shariki and Kyogamisaki), space-based assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land-based radars in other parts of the Pacific theatre. Would a THAAD deployment in South Korea change much? The short answer is that it could improve early tracking of some Chinese missiles, depending on their launch point. Still, that might not make actual interception of those missiles much easier. ICBM warheads move fast. And sophisticated penetration-aids help to confuse missile defenses.

###  US-China Relations Low – General

#### US tension with China – public criticism and aggressive responses prove

Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, April 23, 2016, “Obama’s Cautious and Calibrated Approach to an Assertive China - Analysis,” <http://www.eurasiareview.com/23042016-obamas-cautious-and-calibrated-approach-to-an-assertive-china-analysis/> (Accessed 4/21/2016)

With rare exceptions, Obama avoided publicly discussing differences with China during his first six years in office. Since his April 2014 trip to Asia, he became more outspoken about Chinese behavior on the above issues impacting the order in Asia and other American interests. Xi has publicly ignored the complaints which lower-level officials continue to dismiss. During his March 31 meeting with Obama, Xi emphasized a purported “new model of major country relations” with the United States. American critics increasingly accuse Xi playing a double game at America’s expense. Following a strained US-China summit in Washington in September 2015, Obama has had less to say publicly about China. Rather, he and his lieutenants took stronger actions. For example: much stronger pressure than seen in past targeted sanctions, notably indictments in May 2014 against Chinese military officials to compel China to rein in rampant cyber theft of US property; stronger pressure to compel China to agree to international sanctions against North Korea; active US military deployments in the South China Sea, along with blunt warnings by US military leaders of China’s ambitions, following China’s continued militarization of disputed South China Sea islands, despite a promise by Xi during the September summit not to do so; more prominent cooperation with allies Japan, the Philippines and Australia along with India and concerned Southeast Asian powers that strengthen regional states and complicate Chinese bullying; the abrupt decision in March 2016 halting access to American information technology that seriously impacted China’s leading state-directed electronics firm ZTE – after reports that ZTE had agreed under US pressure to halt unauthorized transfers to Iran of US-sourced technology and then continued such transfers through secret means; the unprecedented US-led rebuke of negative Chinese human rights practices in a joint statement to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2016 that was endorsed by Japan, Australia and nine European countries. However, recent developments suggest that the significance of these steps was less than first appeared. The public pressure in two of the areas subsided once arrangements were made to start bilateral talks on cyber theft and China went along with tougher UN sanctions against North Korea. The abrupt treatment of ZTE was reversed after a few days of secret consultations, allowing US suppliers to continue shipments to ZTE. The rebuke in the Human Rights Council turned out to be a one-time occurrence. Meanwhile, the so-called Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations became more sensitive following the landslide election in January of Democratic Progressive Party, DPP, candidate Tsai Ing-wen and a powerful majority of DPP legislators. Rather than do anything that might “rock-the-boat,” the Obama government has carefully avoided controversy and endeavored to sustain peace and stability through cross-strait dialogue. In sum, the Obama government’s greater resolve against China’s challenges seems to focus on the South China Sea disputes and related American maneuvering with Japan, Australia, India and some Southeast Asian nations to respond to China’s destabilizing and coercive measures. US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris have repeatedly spoken of China’s “aggressive” actions and what Harris calls Chinese “hegemony in East Asia.” They and others point to US military plans “to check” China’s advances through deployments, regional collaboration and assistance to Chinese neighbors. American officials also expect a Chinese defeat in a ruling later this year at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, undermining the broad and vague Chinese claims used to justify expansion in the South China Sea.

#### Relations strained over posturing and US Rules

Shen Dingli, Deputy Director of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, March 29, 2016, “Expert: How dare U.S. accuse China of exercising "Might Is Right"?” <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-03/29/content_6981913.htm> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

In her recent address about "Indian Ocean-Asia Pacific maritime security" in Australia, Scott H. Swift, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, accused some country of militarizing the region without giving names, and said "Might Is Right" is coming back to that region. Western media said Swift was accusing China. Is that the truth? "Might Is Right" has nothing to do with China Let's review the U.S. actions and we can see that it is the best illustration of this statement made by the high-ranking U.S. military official. When the U.S. invaded Iraq with neither evidence nor authorization, wasn't it "Might Is Right"? When it continued to sell weapon to Taiwan after admitting that the Mainland China is the only legitimate representation of China, wasn't it "Might Is Right"? When it has implemented a half-century-long sanction on Cuba just because that country insists on following its own path of development, that’s downright "Might Is Right". On the other hand, China hasn't accomplished cross-Strait reunification yet because of factors including America's intervention, its legitimate assertions on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands have encountered military threat from the United States, and its islands in the South China Sea continue to be encroached upon by certain countries. All these indicate that "Might Is Right" has nothing to do with China. But the author isn't surprised by what Swift said. Such groundless accusation of China playing "Might Is Right" is aimed to stress the international rules dominated by the U.S. Recently the U.S. government has repeatedly emphasized that international relations must be based on rules, and the U.S. president Barack Obama said several times that the rules must be decided by the U.S. instead of China.

### A2 Peaceful Rise

#### China’s peaceful rise posture is undermined by its actions

Stewart M. Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance, April 12, 2016, “Surface Tension: Chinese Aggression Roils Southeast Asian Waters,” <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2016/04/12/surface-tension-chinese-aggression-roils-southeast-asian-waters/> (Accessed 4/24/2016)

In telling the Group of Seven (G7) yesterday to butt out of its controversial maritime claims in East Asia, China has doubled down on an historic strategic blunder. Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea is especially imprudent. By refusing to compromise on its outrageous sovereignty claims, the government of Xi Jinping discredits its “peaceful rise” rhetoric and complicates efforts by member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to “triangulate” between China and the United States. Continued Chinese muscle-flexing will only undermine support for president Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative and push regional fence-sitters into the U.S. embrace. The most promising outcome for all concerned would be a face-saving climb-down by China. Under this scenario, Beijing would promote détente rather than confrontation—without explicitly abandoning its jurisdictional claims. These are the main takeaways from a week’s worth of discussions with officials, policy analysts, and academics in China, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

### A2 Relations High - Downplaying

#### China’s aggressive policies are causing US backlash – relations are tanking and the president/media are downplaying

John Davidson, Senior Correspondent at The Federalist and Senior Fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, April 12, 2016, “How China’s Expansionist Foreign Policy Threatens the Globe,” <http://thefederalist.com/2016/04/12/china-expansionist-foreign-policy/> (Accessed 4/13/2016)

The U.S. Government Isn’t Taking China Seriously I spoke with Dr. Arthur Waldron, a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and a member of the highly classified Tilelli Commission, which evaluated the China operations of the CIA from 2000 to 2001. He told me China’s foreign policy shifted sharply in 2008. “It is now aggressive and expansionist,” he said, and if it doesn’t change, “it’s going to lead to war.” China’s foreign policy shifted sharply in 2008. It is now aggressive and expansionist. Waldron believes our inability to respond to China’s new posture has been a long time in the making. Under President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it was thought that the United States would partner with China as a strategic ally against the Soviet Union. For decades, we treated China as our most important Asian partner. But in recent years, the U.S. intelligence community has been astonished at the kind of aggressive intelligence operations China has launched at the United States, the vast number of people involved, and the sensitive targets they have chosen. “We haven’t figured out how to react,” Waldron said. “One reason is that the administration is completely divided between people who are still holding the torch for a partnership and people who have had the scales fall from their eyes, and have realized that what we have now is something else. We can’t change their policy, but we can change ours.” For its part, the Obama administration has worked to downplay concerns about China within the armed forces, and even imposed an unofficial gag order on military leaders over making South China Sea comments ahead of a nuclear summit in Washington that ended on April 1. Waldron believes that China didn’t anticipate such strong resistance to its expansionist policy from other Asian countries, and that there might be an opportunity “for both sides to figure out whether we want to have another world war. This may be a pivot point.” A recent editorial in the U.S. edition of the state-sponsored China Daily was rather blunt about where China stands: “Washington should know that the more provocative moves it makes against China, the more counter-measures Beijing will take,” the editorial stated. “Such an undesirable cycle may push both sides nearer confrontation and cause both to prepare for the worst-case scenario, potentially making it self-fulfilling.”

### US-Japan Relations High – Economic Leadership

#### US-Japan relations rebounding over China aggression and economic motivations

Matthew P. Goodman, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy and Senior Adviser for Asian Economics, and David A. Parker, CSIS Published, February 26, 2016, “Global Economics Monthly: The United States and Japan: From Unnatural Intimacy to Natural Allies,” <http://csis.org/publication/global-economics-monthly-united-states-and-japan-unnatural-intimacy-natural-allies> (Accessed 4/17/2016)

The relationship has since rebounded. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance—both its security and economic dimensions—a top policy priority. Visiting Washington less than two months after regaining the prime ministership in December 2012, Abe gave a speech at CSIS in which he declared that “Japan is back,” hailed the alliance as the bedrock of peace and prosperity in Asia for over half a century, and announced his intention to bring Japan into the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). On a state visit to Washington two years later, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister ever to address a joint session of Congress, while Washington and Tokyo unveiled revised defense guidelines that significantly expanded the geographic scope of bilateral security cooperation. Another major step forward came in the fall of last year, as the United States, Japan, and 10 other Asia-Pacific countries announced the successful completion of the TPP negotiations—a de facto U.S.-Japan free trade agreement. These advances were in part the result of a shift long underway in the bilateral relationship toward one of greater equality, underpinned by the converging economic interests of the world’s two largest market economies and shared values between two democracies. Shifts in the external environment, especially a new assertiveness on the part of a more powerful China, provided another key impetus. These factors will likely continue to push in the direction of closer U.S.- Japan cooperation. Nonetheless, there are risks ahead that could undermine the strength and unity of the partnership.

### US-Japan Relations High – Diplomacy

#### US-Japan relations strong and getting stronger

Drew Jackson, Reporter at BG News, March 28, 2016, “Panel Discusses US, Japan Relations,” <http://www.bgnews.com/campus/panel-discusses-us-japan-relations/article_9354ad8a-efe0-11e5-9c1d-7fd386aaec3c.html> (Accessed 4/19/2016)

Ambassador Shuji Shimokoji, former Ambassador of Japan to Panama and Venezuela, led a panel where more than a hundred University students were in attendance Friday, March 18. The Walk in U.S., Talk on Japan Event was hosted by the Asian Studies Program and sponsored by Japan’s prime minister in hopes of strengthening the relationship between the U.S. and Japan for the future. Shimokoji focused the educational seminar on further deepening understanding about Japan, bringing awareness to the strong economic ties and promoting business, international education and cultural exchange between Japan and the Midwest. “We are traveling across the United States to invite Americans to Japan, we want to bring awareness to the importance of the exchange of diplomacy, as well as serious matters like the security cooperation expansion,” said Shimokoji. The seminar was geared towards the history between America and Japan in relation to trade and how they have benefitted one another in their past and present. Shimokoji briefly introduced his panel and then each panelist came to the podium with passion and personal experience on Japanese culture and U.S. relations. The panel consisted of five ordinary citizens of Japan who came from different backgrounds, each bringing culture, personal examples and experiences of their beliefs and culture in relation to the U.S. and Japan allies. Shimokoji said, “The United States and (the) Japanese work together and benefit one another through their economy. They must work together for safety and security issues.” Hirokichi Nadachi shared how the U.S. and Japan became close allies and about their shared values through his personal experiences. “Together we can strive to improve our world,” said Nadachi. Toshiyuki Miyaki expressed the evolution and development of the U.S. and Japan’s current relationship along with the importance of that relationship improving, and how each country has helped one another and joined together.

### US-Japan Relations High – Southeast Asia

#### Alliance is strong - The US and Japan are coordinating efforts in Southeast Asia

Satu P. Limaye, Director of the East-West Center in Washington and Senior Advisor at the CNA Corporation, and Tsutomu Kikuchi, Professor of International Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Department of International Politics, Aoyama-Gakuin University, Tokyo, March 14, 2016, “US-Japan Relations and Southeast Asia,” <https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/report/160314_Project_Report_US-Japan_and_SEA.pdf> (Accessed 4/19/16)

Until recently, Southeast Asia has not been a region of focus for the US-Japan relationship. A new era of more coordinated, sustained, and combined commercial and security involvement by the US and Japan in Southeast Asia may be at hand. Five drivers are creating the new era in US-Japan ties with Southeast Asia. First, both countries have tremendous commercial stakes in the region and thus an interest in a stable security environment. Second, Southeast Asia’s importance to the Asia-Pacific region and the globe is increasing. Third, there is increased regional integration among North America, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia through multilateral architecture and robust trade, production and supply chain networks. Fourth, Washington and Tokyo see Southeast Asia as a key region for increasing their bilateral cooperation, including through the 2015 revised defense guidelines. Fifth, China’s assertiveness is also driving mutual Southeast Asian, American, and Japanese interest in enhanced engagement.

### US-Japan Relations High – Hiroshima Visit

#### Kerry’s visit and rumors of Obama’s are strengthening US-Japan relations into the future

Robert Siegel et al, NPR Host, April 11, 2016, “Secretary Of State John Kerry Makes Historic Visit To Hiroshima,” <http://www.npr.org/2016/04/11/473850529/secretary-of-state-john-kerry-makes-historic-visit-to-hiroshima> (Accessed 4/19/16)

In Japan today, John Kerry said it was gut-wrenching - Hiroshima. The secretary of state is the highest-level serving U.S. official ever to visit the city's Peace Park and Museum. Kerry joined other foreign ministers at the museum, which features stories of some of the 140,000 people who died from the atomic bomb blast more than 70 years ago. (SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING) JOHN KERRY: Going through this museum was a reminder of the indisputable truth that war must never be the first resort. SIEGEL: Kerry's visit has been talked about as a possible precursor to a visit by President Obama next month. For more on what that could mean for the U.S. and for Japan, we're joined by Sheila Smith. She is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome to the program. SHEILA SMITH: Thank you. SIEGEL: No sitting U.S. president has visited Hiroshima out of fear that such a visit would be seen as an apology. Jimmy Carter went there after he was no longer in office. Has thinking on that changed in recent years? SMITH: I think so. I think today, especially with President Obama, this question of a visit to Hiroshima is not just about the war and the past. But it's really - as Secretary Kerry suggested, it's really about the future. And President Obama, in his speech in Prague early in his tenure as president, pointed out the moral responsibility of the United States in addressing the proliferation dilemma. And in doing so, I think he has opened the way for a visit to Hiroshima.

### US-Japan Relations High – Robotics

#### US-Japan alliance cooperating now over robotics/economy

James Schoff, Sr. Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Sr. Advisor for East Asia Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, March 15, 2016, “Robotics Diplomacy and the US-Japan Alliance,” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/robotics-diplomacy-and-the-us-japan-alliance/> (Accessed 4/17/16)

Another interesting outgrowth from the DARPA Robotics Challenge is the follow-on hire of its American program manager by Toyota Research Institute to lead its new research and development enterprise funded largely by the Japanese automaker (and with an office in Silicon Valley). The Institute’s purpose is to help bridge the gap between fundamental research and product development, and it benefits from membership on its advisory board by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos and former U.S. Navy Secretary Richard Danzig. One should not assume that simple geographic proximity or Board presence will help the allies accomplish their bilateral cooperation objectives given the private interests at stake, but such cross-fertilization can yield mutual benefits if policymakers cultivate an appreciation for collective interest while respecting the companies’ confidentiality needs. After all, a sustained allied edge in the defense arena has shown over time to support stability and economic growth that benefit all involved. In terms of outreach to the private and academic sectors, the Japanese government is moving in a similar direction of the U.S. Defense Department, albeit at a slower pace due to deeper political sensitivities in the country. Still, the government’s fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan, released in December 2015, highlighted a wider connection between the nation’s technical prowess and national security than ever before, paving the way for stronger cooperation on defense-related research and development among universities and private companies. The Defense Ministry, for example, is collaborating on projects with Tokyo Denki University on controlling unmanned aerial vehicles, with Panasonic on technology for wireless undersea transmission of electric power, and the Kanagawa Institute of Technology on strengthening ultrafine carbon fibers. Meanwhile, the United States and Japan have a long-standing bilateral mechanism called the Systems and Technology Forum to facilitate collaboration on defense-related technologies and system interoperability, although its record of achievement is modest due to past trade tensions and bureaucratic inertia. The United States and Japan included in their 2015 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation an emphasis on defense equipment and technology as a “bilateral enterprise,” and each country is making efforts to strengthen ties with the private sector is this area as well, but the way forward on both counts is unclear. Despite all of the connections between the allies’ robotics and defense communities, as well as the spirit of shared national interests, it is inherently difficult to use a government-led process as a way to engineer bilateral technical breakthroughs. In addition, enthusiasm by non-defense companies for military associations will likely remain muted. Sustained leadership and flexibility on these issues in Washington and Tokyo, however, can produce positive results over time. The DARPA Robotics Challenge was one creative initiative that sparked new relationships and pushed the state of the art forward, but other efforts can be made.

### A2 Trump Thumps

#### Trump comments won’t sway Japan’s commitment to US-Japan alliance

Ayako Mie, previous special correspondent to the Washington Post, Japan Times Staff Writer, March 28, 2016, “Suga to Trump: U.S.-Japan Alliance to Stay,” <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/28/national/politics-diplomacy/suga-to-trump-u-s-japan-alliance-to-stay/> (Accessed 4/13/2016)

In response to eyebrow-raising positions recently espoused by Republican U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga reaffirmed Monday that Japan’s three nonnuclear principles and the Japan-U.S. alliance remain the cornerstone of its diplomacy. Trump, the front-runner in the turbulent U.S. election, is threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan and said he is open to Japan developing its own atomic arsenal. “Whoever becomes president of the United States, the Japan-U.S. alliance, based on the bilateral security agreement, will remain the core of Japan’s diplomacy,” Suga told reporters. “We will maintain the three nonnuclear principles that prohibit Japan from owning, developing and transporting a nuclear arsenal.” Suga also emphasized that the government will not react to every comment made by a U.S. candidate who has not been nominated. Suga’s comments came after The New York Times on Saturday reported on Trump’s “America First” policy, under which the U.S. would not maintain military bases abroad unless allies like Japan or South Korea pay more to retain them.

### A2 Iran Thumper

#### Iran Deal progression removes a thorn in the side of US-Japan relationship

Craig Kafura, research associate for public opinion and foreign policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, March 1, 2016, “The Iran Deal and the US-Japan Alliance,” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-iran-deal-and-the-us-japan-alliance/> (Accessed 4/18/16)

Most commentary about the nuclear deal with Iran focuses on the implications for the region and U.S. allies in the Middle East and Europe. But it also removes a thorn in the side of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Tokyo’s role as a major importer of Iranian oil meant its cooperation was a key piece of the sanctions campaign against Tehran. Yet that cooperation did not come easy: it required repeated U.S. pressure and was a consistent cold spot in an otherwise warm U.S.-Japan relationship. Japan is the third-largest oil importer in the world, behind only the United States and China. And for decades Iran was one of its key sources of crude oil – but the U.S.-driven sanctions campaign would change that. At its peak in 2003, Japan imported 17 percent of its crude petroleum from Iran. A year later, Japan’s state-backed energy group, INPEX, signed a contract with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to develop the Azadegan oil field and its estimated 36 billion barrels of oil. With every barrel from the field going straight to Japan, Azadegan alone was predicted to provide 6 percent of Japan’s oil imports each year. With Japan’s interests and investments in Iran, Tokyo was reluctant to join the U.S. in its sanctions campaign, despite repeated and consistent pressure from American officials. Shinzo Abe, then Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Koizumi administration, doubted that sanctions would be effective. Without the broader concerted action desired by Japan, sanctions seemed only to endanger Japan’s own resource security at potentially little benefit. And worse, China could leap ahead of Japan in developing Iranian oil fields, potentially blocking Tokyo from future development projects. However, containing Iran’s nuclear program through economic sanctions was a key U.S. priority. Japan was stuck between the rock of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the hard place of its own energy interests. The Azadegan project, never liked by Bush administration officials, was the first casualty of the sanctions campaign. After Japan spent months trying to find a middle way – neither bowing to U.S. pressure nor proceeding with the Azadegan project – Iranian officials curtailed INPEX’s role, cutting its stake in the field from 75 percent down to a mere 10 percent. INPEX finally quit the project altogether in 2010. Making the loss even harder to swallow was who Iran turned to next: China’s state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which promptly moved to fill the vacuum left by Japan’s absence. As the sanctions campaign against Iran tightened in the 2010s, Japan once again came under pressure from the U.S.. Hoping to avoid a hard target for import cuts, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda signed off on new financial sanctions in December 2011, freezing assets of organizations and individuals linked to Iran. This wasn’t enough. After several months of talks between U.S. and Japanese officials, a compromise emerged. Tokyo agreed to further reduce its oil imports from Iran, but was one of a select group of countries given waivers to continue importing some oil from Iran. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement called Japan’s actions “especially noteworthy” in light of the “extraordinary energy and other challenges” facing Japan. As Clinton acknowledged, Japan’s decision to cooperate with the U.S./EU sanctions campaign came at a difficult time for Tokyo: the 3/11 disaster and subsequent shutdown of Japan’s nuclear power plants put the need for energy imports front and center. But despite Japan’s need for energy, and its longstanding interests in Iran, sanctions had strong public backing. According to the 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey, 94 percent of Japanese opposed Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, and six in ten of those opposed favored tougher international sanctions on Iran. That public support, and the repeatedly-renewed waivers exempting Japan from a total shutoff from Iranian oil, helped cushion the blow of Japanese participation. The successful conclusion of the P5+1 talks with Iran, and the subsequent lifting of sanctions, has come as a relief to Japan. The end of the sanctions campaign has reopened Japanese investment opportunities in Iran, allowing Japanese firms to compete with their Chinese rivals. And earlier this month, Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida and Iran’s minister of economic affairs and finance Ali Tayybnia met in Tokyo to sign a bilateral investment agreement between the two nations.

## \*\*\*Link Extensions\*\*\*

### Link – Economic Blocs

#### China’s economic leadership threatens Japan due to blocs of economic influence

Paola Subacchi, Director of International Economics Research at Chatham House, March 31, 2015, “The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance” <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/the-aiib-is-a-threat-to-global-economic-governance-china/> (Accessed 4/16/2016)

But even if the AIIB’s creation is in China’s interest as the new regional power, the move does little to respond to the need to improve multilateralism and to strengthen global economic governance. In fact, it may do the opposite. The risk now is the creation of two blocs of economic influence in Asia: one led by China and the other by the United States and Japan. Demand for infrastructure investment is large enough to accommodate both — even a third development bank could probably find demand — but this is not the point. At stake is good governance and multilateralism — for instance, in a world of fragmented governance what would be the incentive for Congress to finally approve the IMF reform? In addition to fragmented institutions and governance, the AIIB could present a risk of establishing divergent investment standards — a risk already significant in trade as China has reacted to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which it is not part, by accelerating its own trade arrangements in the region. Can the rest of the world — not only the United States — afford to leave China to set up its own standards on both trade and investment? The concern here is not on the quality of these standards — and the assumption is not that Chinese-set standards are by definition inadequate. It is on maintaining a harmonized, consistent, and multilateral framework of rules and standards that help integrate, rather than fragment, the world economy.

#### China has a strategy of forming economic trade blocs

Hitoshi Tanaka, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., August 4, 2015, “The Next Step for the US-Japan Alliance,” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japan-alliance/> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) presents a litmus test of how the region will react to the rise of China. Major democratic economies (including Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) have signed on as founding members. The two prominent absences are the US and Japan. Japan should join the AIIB promptly for three reasons. First, by participating in its formative period, Japan will be better positioned to promote high performance standards on governance and transparency from within. Second, Japan’s participation is important in order to foster ADB-AIIB cooperation. While China can self-finance its own infrastructure development, it continues to go through the ADB (including US$1.49 billion in 2014) because of the accompanying expertise, quality control, and environmental standards it brings. ADB-AIIB cooperation would help to establish similar measures in the AIIB, thereby improving its ultimate impact. Third, the AIIB calls for a 25/75 percent split of funding between extra-regional and regional members. The addition of Japan, Asia’s second largest economy, would diversify the sources of Asian funding and mitigate the risk of Chinese dominance. On mega-regional trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) risk dividing the region into competing US- and China-led trade blocs if not carefully managed. In moving toward final TPP and RCEP agreements, it is important that a pathway be created allowing for their future amalgamation as a steppingstone toward the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. Over the long term, the TPP should be utilised as a vehicle to stimulate cooperation with China. As such, it should include an open accession clause to establish a clear and transparent process by which China (and other RCEP members) can join the TPP in the future after reaching predetermined economic benchmarks. At the same time, the RCEP should be utilised as a vehicle not just to deepen economic integration among the ASEAN+6 countries but also to bridge the gap between advanced and developing countries within the region.

### Link – Trade-Off

#### Tighter US-Japan alliance hurts US-China and China-Japan Relations

Mel Gurtov, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University and Editor-in-Chief of Asian Perspective, May 5, 2014, “Obama's Japan Visit and US-Japan-China Relations: A Missed Opportunity for Conflict Prevention,” <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obamas-japan-visit-and-us-japan-china-relations-missed-opportunity-conflict-prevention> (Accessed 4/24/2016)

President Obama has forfeited an opportunity to influence the course of the China-Japan dispute. Before, during, and at the end of his trip, he not only reiterated the US position, adopted in 1971 as it prepared for reversion of Okinawa to Japan, that “administrative rights” over the islands belong to Japan even though sovereignty remains undetermined. He also reaffirmed the interpretation that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty binds the United States to protect Japanese claims to the Senkakus along with the rest of the Ryukyu island chain. (Nothing was mentioned publicly about longstanding US use of two atolls in the Senkakus as a firing range.) And Obama applauded the notion that Japan should play a larger security role in Asia-Pacific, saying (in a written response to questions from Yomiuri Shimbun) that he agreed with Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on the need to “deepen the coordination between our militaries, including by reviewing existing limits on the exercise of collective self-defense,” and hoped Japan’s military would “do more within the framework of our alliance” (http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001227627). The Joint Statement published as Obama’s visit concluded only mentioned China once—a throwaway line: “The United States and Japan recognize that China can play an important role in addressing all of these challenges [in the Middle East and Ukraine], and both countries reaffirm their interest in building a productive and constructive relationship with China” (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac). The document thus confirmed to one and all not only that the United States is hardly neutral on the territorial dispute, but also that a tighter US-Japan alliance is the preferred strategy for dealing with China. Serious problems lie ahead for both US-China and China-Japan relations and the peace of the Asia-Pacific region.

#### As the US moves away from China it moves towards Japan

Akio Takahara, professor in the Faculty of Law at The University of Tokyo, September 9, 2015, “Are Japan-China Relations Sweetening or Souring?” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/09/are-japan-china-relations-sweetening-or-souring/> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

Third, China is facing difficulties promoting its ‘new type of major country relations’ with the United States. The two countries agree to cooperate and expand their mutual interests in economic, environmental and other areas, but strategic competition is intensifying in the Western Pacific and extending into areas such as cyberspace and space. The tense relations with the US helped prompt China to refocus on neighbourhood diplomacy and ‘rebalance’ toward Japan. Fourth, Xi Jinping has consolidated his domestic power base through his anti-corruption campaign and by heading newly established policy-making institutions. He has no reason to worry about domestic criticism if he adjusts his attitude towards Japan. While a ‘soft’ policy toward Japan has traditionally been an easy target for political rivals to criticise the Party leadership, Xi has already established his power and authority, and his image of a tough leader. All the above factors still remain in place. The two governments continue to seek the next opportunity for their leaders to meet. But there are some signs that promoting relations further will not be an easy process. For example, the Chinese media continues to bitterly criticise Abe. When Xinhua News reported Abe’s April 2015 visit to the United States, it headlined with ‘ridiculous performance’, even though the event taking place only a few days after Abe’s second, amicable meeting with Xi in Indonesia. In June, Abe sent a goodwill message to the Chinese people in an interview with Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, but this was treated extremely lightly in the mainland media. This move was counterproductive diplomatically. Abe’s intention was to reciprocate Xi’s unprecedented, friendly message to a delegation of over 3000 Japanese at a convention in Beijing in May.

### Link – Rebalance

#### Japan is a supporter of US Response to China – but is spooked by signals of American disinterest

Walter Lohman, Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, March 29, 2016, “After the Rebalance to Asia,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/03/after-the-rebalance-to-asia> (Accessed 4/19/2016)

The regional response to U.S. policy is critical feedback. U.S. interests are immutable and the broadest strokes of strategy only slightly less permanent. Regional responses to the U.S. policy, however, are keys to adjusting tactics and shaping new approaches going forward. Responses to the Obama Administration’s rebalance can be characterized in two ways: support/facilitation and hedging. The supporters/facilitators are most prominently Japan, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines. After all, they are actually facilitating major parts of the rebalance. Each from a slightly different strategic angle, their governments have prioritized response to the China challenge. (South Korea is also a major supporter/facilitator of the U.S. presence, but its overwhelming interest is in cooperation vis-à-vis the threat from North Korea.) This does not mean they will buy wholesale U.S. policy prescriptions. It means they all want and expect more U.S. presence in the Asia–Pacific over the long term. The Japanese are on the most concerned end of the supporter/facilitator spectrum. With Chinese incursions continuing regularly around the Senkakus, the challenge is proximate and immediate. As a result, the Japanese are prepared to be fuller partners in the alliance, as illustrated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s defense reforms. It is constrained only by its awareness of constraints imposed by memories of the Pacific War. Japanese policymakers know to be nuanced in applications of Japanese assets to trouble spots like the South China Sea. They also know that the context of the U.S.–Japan alliance is critical to the way its increased energy is perceived in the region. Defense of its interests are, therefore, dependent on a healthy U.S.–Japan alliance and continued U.S. commitment to the region. This also means Japan is easily spooked by signals of American disinterest.

#### Japan requires a commitment to rebalancing – requires US leadership

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, May 4, 2015, “Why Japan’s alliance with the US is the key to stability in Asia” <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/why-japans-alliance-with-the-us-is-the-key-to-stability-in-asia/> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

In short, Japan is in the midst of a far-reaching transition to a more open future. We are determined to press ahead with the structural reforms needed to succeed. But reform requires the continuation of the peace and security that is the bequest of US leadership. My grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, chose the path of democracy and alliance with the US when he was Prime Minister in the 1950s. Together with the US and other like-minded democracies, we won the Cold War. I intend to stick to that path; indeed, there is no alternative to it. Our two countries need to make every effort to strengthen our ties. This is why I support America’s strategic “rebalancing” to enhance peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will support this effort first, last, and throughout. Japan is doing so by deepening its strategic relations with Australia and India, and we are enhancing our cooperation with the ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea. Adding these partners to the central pillar of the US-Japan alliance will strengthen stability throughout the region. And now Japan will provide up to $2.8 billion dollars to help improve US bases on Guam, which will have even greater strategic significance in the future.

### Link – General

#### China is a challenge that can undermine US-Japanese Relations

Hitoshi Tanaka, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., February 15, 2016, “Six Challenges for US-Japan Cooperation in Asia,” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/15/six-challenges-for-us-japan-cooperation-in-asia/> (Accessed 4/24/2016)

Indonesia’s decision in September 2015 to choose China over Japan to build a high-speed train line between Jakarta and Bandung is illustrative of what is at stake. The US$5.5 billion Chinese proposal was attractive given that it required neither financing nor a loan guarantee from the Indonesian government. But many questions remain regarding the transparency of the proposal and the ability of China to meet international standards, including on labour and environmental regulations. It is thus critical that the United States, Japan and the broader international community engage with Chinese-led economic initiatives to help steer China toward a greater embrace of international best practices. The TPP has an open-accession clause to create a clear and transparent process through which other countries — including China, Indonesia and South Korea — can join in the future. The United States and Japan should actively promote the expansion of TPP membership, especially to these countries. Third is the need to demilitarise the South China Sea. The construction of artificial landfill islands by China in the South China Sea has set back efforts to peacefully negotiate a diplomatic resolution to existing territorial disputes. The potential for the future construction on the artificial islands, as well as high-profile attempts by the People’s Liberation Army Navy to enforce no-fly zones, risks further militarising the South China Sea. Further military build-up in the South China Sea will undoubtedly feed regional tensions and increase the risk of accidental conflict. Until a diplomatic resolution can be peacefully negotiated between China and the ASEAN countries, it is vital that all parties be alert to China’s incremental changes. At the same time, the United States and Japan must coordinate and cooperate to persuade China that freedom of navigation, in what is a vital sea route for international commerce and the energy security of East Asia, is in the shared interest of all. The fourth challenge is that of North Korea. On 6 January 2016, North Korea tested a nuclear device for the fourth time — the second under Kim Jong-un’s leadership. This time, the international community must go beyond business-as-usual measures to deal with the North Korean nuclear program. In order to truly alter North Korea’s behaviour, economic sanctions, including financial sanctions, will need to be strengthened. Beijing has a big role to play. Irrespective of its apparent change in attitude after the third North Korean nuclear test in 2013, China has continued to provide substantive assistance to North Korea. For any form of sanctions to be effective, though, the international community as a whole, including China and Russia, must fully back them. South Korea, Japan and the United States must deepen cooperation and adopt a unified approach on sanctions policy as well as on joint contingency planning. The three nations also need to consult with China and Russia to form a united front to apply greater pressure on North Korea. An immediate restart of the denuclearisation process under the Six-Party Talks may be difficult, but without the right measures to pressure and isolate North Korea, nothing will be achieved.

#### US-Japan alliance impacted by Japan’s rivalry with China

Nick Bisley, executive director of La Trobe Asia and professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, Australia, May 1, 2015, “China, Be Afraid: The Mighty U.S.-Japan Alliance Is Going Global,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-be-afraid-the-mighty-us-japan-alliance-going-global-12784> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Perhaps the most striking of these is that the alliance is now explicitly global in scope. The alliance has evolved from a key part of US Cold War strategy and it’s now an instrument conceived at the global level. In part this is driven by recognition that security threats to Japan and the US are not constrained by geography and that arrangements to defend these interests must have a global remit. In relation to “emerging threats” to Japan’s security, the Guidelines explicitly say that such “situations cannot be defined geographically.” This is a nod to the 1997 Guidelines that were controversial precisely because of a geographic reference to activity, which annoyed China. And the logical consequence of a conceptual rather than geographic approach to security threats is the need to position the alliance in global terms. Going global also reflects Japan’s larger aims to see itself as a significant international player. Abe has travelled extensively to spread the message not only that Japan’s economy was back in business but also that it has a global role. But this vision is driven not only by Abe’s ambitions for Japan. It also reflects the reality that its rivalry and competition with China—whose rise is the primary driver of the revised Guidelines—is playing out internationally. (Recommended: 5 Japanese Weapons of War China Should Fear) Yet the Guidelines also reflect an underlying tension in Japan’s long-term strategic thinking between an ambition to have global weight and an economic and demographic reality that is loaded against realizing such a goal. Many of the areas in which Japan and the US cooperate occur on the global stage—these include PKOs, HADR, maritime security, noncombatant evacuations, ISR, training and logistics as well as multilateralism. But the reality is that Japan’s defense capacity is severely constrained. There’s not a great deal Japan can actually do that far from its shores.

### Link Magnifiers

#### China and Japan relations are on a collision course – security concerns trump economic dependence

Ming Wan, professor and associate dean at the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, Winter 2016, “Sino-Japanese Relations During the Obama Presidency,” <http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-post-obama-world/sino-japanese-relations-during-the-obama-presidency/> (Accessed 4/17/2016)

Two developments in Sino-Japanese relations since 2010 are particularly salient. Military conflict is now imaginable. Both the Japanese and Chinese governments have openly multilateralized their disputes, which makes them harder still to manage. The official relationship has warmed a bit. Chinese president Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe met at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing in November 2014. It was an awkward meeting, vividly captured on camera. However, it allowed the high-level official exchanges to resume. Some Western media again termed the Xi-Abe summit as “ice-breaking,” and yet the Sino-Japanese relationship is now in a different cycle from that between 2006 and 2010. The two countries remain set on a collision course. Nothing substantive has changed. Both sides are strengthening their military capabilities and readiness. The South China Sea has become a particular point of contention. Both sides are making diplomatic moves to check on each other. History is back on the diplomatic agenda. To a large extent, the two governments are resorting to kabuki-like theatrics with each other in their top-level dialogues. This is the best they can do at this point. The confrontation between China and Japan could be far worse. They have restrained themselves because of the inherent danger in outright hostility and because they are woven in a web of economic and person-to-person ties. If we were to simply examine the flow of goods and people, we might as well conclude that the two countries are integrating with each other. Yet clashing national identities and material interests have more than offset the integrating potential of economic ties. Security concerns still trump economic calculations. At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the long-term effect of economic and individual ties. China and Japan are important for each other economically, particularly for Japan. Based on data from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, figure 2 shows how Japan has become highly dependent on the Chinese market. This dependence has actually increased from the 2006–10 period to slightly over 20 percent of its total trade at present. In addition, Japan has been promoting tourism with China as the most important target source.

#### Tensions between China and Japan are high – economic build-up

C. Raja Mohan, Leading Analyst on India Foreign Policy, November 24, 2015, “Raja-Mandala: Japan’s Counter to China’s Silk Road,” <http://carnegieindia.org/2015/11/24/raja-mandala-japan-s-counter-to-china-s-silk-road/ipgs> (Accessed 4/18/16)

The unfolding economic rivalry between China and Japan is great news for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has put building world-class infrastructure at the centre of his domestic agenda. If he can get New Delhi’s domestic act on infrastructure right, Modi will be able to mobilise unprecedented support from China and Japan. Even more important, Japan’s new activism will allow Delhi to mitigate some of the perceived threats from China’s growing economic presence in the subcontinent and beyond. If China is seen as limiting Delhi’s room for manoeuvre in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, Japan promises to create new opportunities for leading regional economic integration in its neighbourhood. China’s new infrastructure drive has been backed by the establishment of the $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Beijing has also earmarked a $40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund. It has also set up the New Development Bank under the banner of the five-nation forum, BRICS, with an initial capital of $50 billion. As Xi put his personal and political prestige on the belt and road initiative, India found itself between a rock and a hard place. Given its historical rhetoric against Western financial institutions, Delhi was quick to join the AIIB and helped found the BRICS bank. But when it came to Beijing’s proposals to develop infrastructure linking the subcontinent to China, Delhi was deeply discomfited. It was also reluctant to accept Chinese funding to develop major infrastructure projects in India. Modi has altered some of this by becoming more open to Chinese investments and asking them to undertake a feasibility study on a high-speed train corridor between Chennai and Delhi. If the essence of India’s economic ambivalence towards China endured, Abe might now be able to put Delhi out of its strategic misery. Last May, Abe announced that Tokyo will invest $110 billion to promote “quality infrastructure” in Asia over the next five years. If Japan’s dollar volume matches that of China, note Abe’s attempt to differentiate from China with the emphasis on “high quality”. Japanese officials believe that the quality of Chinese infrastructure is inferior to that in Japan. They also argue that the hidden costs of Chinese proposals will come to haunt many of the projects being launched under the Obor initiative. Analysts in Tokyo point to the debate in Sri Lanka, where the new government in Colombo has sought to review the terms and conditions of the various mega projects that the Rajapaksa regime had signed with Chinese companies. Addressing this weakness, Abe is highlighting the importance of “sustainable infrastructure development”. In a series of visits to various regions across Asia, Abe has been pitching for Japan’s project exports. While it has lost some big deals to Beijing, Tokyo has begun to edge out Chinese competition elsewhere. In Indonesia, it lost a bid to develop a high-speed rail line between Jakarta and Bandung. In Bangladesh, Japan won a port at the Matarbari island on the southeastern coast. Refusing to join the China-promoted AIIB, Japan is trying to rejuvenate the Asian Development Bank that it has led for many decades. In Kuala Lumpur over the weekend, Abe outlined a plan to liberalise the ADB’s terms of lending. While China is relatively new to infrastructure development beyond its borders, Japan has been at it for many decades. Japanese technology and finance have been at the forefront of building road and rail corridors and airports, including in China. Japan’s overseas assistance arm, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (Jica), has supported many such projects in India, including the Delhi Metro and the Delhi-Mumbai corridor. While Jica’s activity has been expansive, Tokyo lacked a larger strategic framework to guide its infrastructure promotion. But Japan’s traditional development aid has now acquired a strategic dimension under Abe, as he tries to fend off China’s drive to expand its economic and political influence in Asia.

#### Chinese-Japanese relations are at a tipping point

Takuya Karube, Kyodo News Staff Writer, March 8, 2016, “China Blames Japan for Slow Improvement in Bilateral Ties,” <https://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2016/03/401107.html> (Accessed 4/19/16)

China's foreign minister on Tuesday blamed the Japanese government for the lack of substantial progress in mending testy bilateral ties, attributing the root cause to Tokyo's misconception of the rise of the world's second-largest economy. "There are signs of improvement in China-Japan relations, but there is little ground for optimism," Wang Yi told a press conference in Beijing on the fringes of the annual session of the National People's Congress, China's top legislature. "On the one hand the Japanese government and leaders constantly say nice things about wanting to improve relations and on the other they deliberately make trouble for China," Wang said, accusing it as Tokyo's typical "double-dealing." Wang did not elaborate as to which Japanese actions have gotten on China's nerves. "Of course we want to see China-Japan relations to truly improve," he said, but pointed out that the underlying problem is that "some politicians in Japan have the wrong perception about China." In the face of China's growing prowess on the world stage, he urged Japanese leaders to rethink seriously whether they will regard its neighboring country as "a friend or an enemy, as a partner or a rival."

#### US-Japan Alliance strengthening against the independent China

James Wertsch, vice-chancellor, international relations, at Washington University in St Louis, and Shen Dingli, associate dean, Institute of International Studies, at Fudan University, and Swaran Singh, professor of diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, February 12, 2016, “Obama must find ways to enhance Asean unity amid growing tensions over South China Sea,” <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1912335/obama-must-find-ways-enhance-asean-unity-amid-growing> (Accessed 4/24/2016)

Each of these players has so far managed with hedging rather than confrontation, and Asean has provided the cushion for their occasional brandishing. This may not last forever. A less united Asean means the US, Japan and India are emerging as the new Asean+3. But such alienation will make China too powerful and independent a player, something Asean is meant to help avoid. Obama’s vision weighs heavily towards deepening engagement with all Asian countries. This has already delivered outcomes like the successful conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a historic climate agreement with China, new guidelines for the US-Japan alliance and a defence deal with the Philippines that gives US forces access to eight bases.

#### China’s posture makes Japan feel vulnerable within the US-Japan alliance

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Ian E. Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, February 9, 2016, “The US-Japan Alliance,” <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Regional Security Environment Changes in the East Asian security landscape have shaped Japan’s defense approach and apparatus. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and repeated ballistic missile tests have heightened the sense of threat in Japan. China’s military advances and increasingly bold maritime activities have also exacerbated Japan’s sense of vulnerability, particularly since confrontation over a set of islets in the East China Sea began to escalate in late 2010. Aside from such threats, Japan has also developed defense partnerships in the region, often working through the U.S.-Japan alliance. The strong ties and habits of cooperation between the American and Japanese defense establishments complement existing and emerging security partnerships. The April 2015 joint statement released by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Japanese counterparts (the so-called 2+2 meeting) praised progress in developing trilateral and multilateral cooperation, specifically with Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. 11 The U.S.-Japan alliance has been a vehicle for enhancing security ties with Southeast Asian countries, especially since maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas began to intensify in the late 2000s. Some analysts see these bilateral and multilateral links among U.S. allies and partners as beneficial to U.S. security interests by both enhancing deterrence and perhaps lessening the sense of direct rivalry with potential adversaries.12

## \*\*\*Internal Link Extensions\*\*\*

### General Extensions

#### The Japan alliance safeguards stability

Randall Schriver, President and CEO Project 2049 Institute, April 2015, “China’s Military Developments and the US-Japan Alliance,” [www.project2049.net/documents/2015\_China\_US\_Japan\_Capstone.pdf](http://www.project2049.net/documents/2015_China_US_Japan_Capstone.pdf) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Focusing on the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance In light of China’s expanding capabilities, and the operational scope of its military operations, the U.S. and Japan have taken concrete steps to prepare for various contingencies that may arise from shifts in the regional military balance. In particular, China’s buildup of A2AD capabilities is intended to restrain U.S. and Japanese activities in the East and South China Seas and the Western Pacific. China’s increasing scope of activities in these areas threatens to erode the regional security status quo and raises the likelihood of what Japanese strategists have referred to as “grey zone” contingencies. In order to address these situations, Japanese strategists debate how and where to place their military assets. For example, should Japan deploy its assets closer to areas of possible contingencies to deter China’s “creeping expansionism,” or should it pull its assets back to protect them from attack? These are questions that occupy a large part of the Japanese strategic discourse today. In response to incidents related to Chinese claims over the Senkaku Islands, Japan has released two important strategic documents in the past five years. The first was the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, which prioritized the development of “dynamic deterrence” and the use of ISR assets to deter Chinese expansionism. In 2013, Japan introduced plans to develop a “dynamic joint defense force” for gray zone deterrence. In addition to utilizing ISR assets, the 2013 NDPG included plans to develop air and maritime superiority and strategic transportation capabilities for island defense. The U.S.-Japan alliance has taken steps to address regional security trends. The 2014 decision by Washington and Tokyo to revise their 1997 bilateral defense guidelines will prioritize the implementation of a seamless alliance structure through peacetime, grey zones, and full military contingencies. By comparison, whereas the U.S.- ROK alliance is centered on a single, integrated command structure, the U.S.-Japan alliance has no such mechanism or permanent body. The 1997 bilateral defense guidelines included a bilateral institutional coordination mechanism, but the shortfall of this mechanism was apparent in 2011 when it could not be activated during the Great East Japan Earthquake since this natural disaster did not directly involve the defense of Japan. Dr. Tai Ming Cheung presents at public conference at University of California in San Diego (UCSD) on March 24, 2015. Panelists from left to right: Akira Marusaki, Hiroko Maeda, Randy Schriver, Brad Kaplan, and Ian Easton. 8 The revision of the 1997 bilateral defense guidelines will also introduce new operational domains for alliance cooperation, such as cyber, space, missile defense and counterA2/AD. Additionally, the revision may help clarify how the Japanese relaxation of arms export bans and changed interpretation to allow Japan’s exercise of collective self defense will affect U.S.-Japan alliance operations. Once the revision is finalized this spring, the U.S.-Japan alliance will be well-prepared for the current and future regional strategic landscape. In addition to bilateral alliance cooperation, Japan’s international outreach has complemented the U.S. “strategic rebalance” to Asia. Prime Minister Abe has visited all 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). His efforts to strengthen ties with Australia and India bring benefits for the U.S.-Japan alliance. U.S.- Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-India cooperation have created greater opportunities for the U.S. and Japan to align their strategic priorities in Asia. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance has a proven track record of effectiveness and resiliency, the lack of a robust political and security relationship between Tokyo and Seoul could pose challenges for the alliance. Fraught ties between Japan and South Korea complicates U.S. defense planning and hinders the U.S. ability to engage in robust U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation. While there have recently been modest advances in U.S.- Japan-South Korea cooperation, the possibility for close trilateral security coordination in the near future is not as promising as U.S. defense planners would prefer. Going forward, the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain indispensable for safeguarding security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century. Beijing should realize that it has a critical stake in the success of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has grounded the regional stability that fostered China’s meteoric economic growth. China’s military modernization and the uncertainty behind Beijing’s intentions require the U.S.-Japan alliance adapt to these shifts in the regional strategic landscape. The U.S. and Japan must continue to strengthen their alliance coordination, share a comprehensive China strategy, and share a long-term vision of order in the region. By aligning capabilities, operations, and strategic outlook, the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain the bedrock of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

### Japan Key Regional Player

#### Japan is increasing security focus in the region – the dynamic is changing

Richard Javad Heydarian, Specialist in Asian Geopolitical/Economic Affairs, April 6, 2016, “The New Japanese Assertiveness In Asia Pacific,” <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/japanese-assertiveness-asia-pacific-160405103357842.html> (Accessed 4/18/16)

Unlike any of its predecessors in recent memory, the Abe administration has made a concerted effort to simultaneously deepen Japan's economic presence across Asia and to pursue expanded security cooperation with like-minded nations. It has also reached out to estranged neighbours such as South Korea by trying to address its historical grievances. Without a doubt, the rise of China and its maritime ambitions have served as a primary motivation for a re-energised Japanese foreign policy. Lost status Abe wasted no time underlining the significance of his charm-offensive across Southeast Asia. "Currently, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is going through a dynamic change," Abe declared before his visit across Southeast Asian countries in 2013. "During this [strategic] change, having closer relations with [Southeast Asian] countries contributes to the region's peace and stability and is in Japan's national interest."

## \*\*\*Impact Extensions\*\*\*

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Asian Stability

#### US-Japan alliance is key to Asian stability

David Envall, Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University and Kerri Ng, PhD Candidate in the Department of International

Relations at The Australian National University, May 2013, “Okinawa, the US–Japan Alliance, and Asia-Pacific Security”, <https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/14634/1/Envall%20and%20Ng%20Policy%20Background%20Paper%2011%202013.pdf> (Accessed 4/17/16)

THE “PIVOT” AND “DYNAMIC DEFENSE” The importance of the US–Japan alliance, and of Okinawa, has been recently underscored by American and Japanese attempts to re-focus their attention on the new challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. For the US, such efforts have emerged in the form of the “pivot strategy,” while Japan’s approach is encapsulated in the “dynamic defense” concept. The pivot strategy has been a prominent feature of Barack Obama’s administration since 2010. Its main aim is to resuscitate America’s military, economic, and political engagement of the region. A crucial aspect of the policy is to reinforce the US–Japan alliance within the wider context of strengthening and diversifying Washington’s regional strategic partnerships (Clinton 2011). Despite projected reductions in US spending on defense via sequestration, the alliance remains the “cornerstone” of stability in Asia and the focus of significant plans for US expansion of regional cooperation, including joint intelligence sharing, surveillance, reconnaissance, and missile defense (Clinton 2011; Panetta 2012).

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Russia War

#### US-Japan alliance strength is key to effective G7 negotiations with Russia - solves Russia war

Joshua Walker, Ph.D. is a Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Truman National Security Project, and Hidetoshi Azuma, Adjunct Fellow at the APCO Institute, March 1, 2016, "Thinking The Unthinkable: Can Japan Bring Russia Back To The G7?", [www.warontherocks.com/2016/03/thinking-the-unthinkable-can-japan-bring-russia-back-to-the-g7/](http://www.warontherocks.com/2016/03/thinking-the-unthinkable-can-japan-bring-russia-back-to-the-g7/) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

For Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 2016 is a special year. As the chairman of the G7 summit, he aims to showcase Japan’s global leadership. The prime minister’s diplomatic zest is well-known and largely fueled by his “Abe Doctrine.” This doctrine promotes an ambitious, multi-vector foreign policy that has made him the most traveled Japanese leader in history. In just three years, Prime Minister Abe has visited more than 63 countries and held more than 400 summits. Yet the one legacy item Abe seems most intent on securing will not be available to him at the G7: Russo–Japanese rapprochement. This overshadows all aspects of the prime minister’s remaining foreign policy energy. Russia has a long running territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands and has never officially signed a peace treaty ending World War II which Abe would like to rectify after over 70 years. But Russia is also at odds with the West over Ukraine (which got Russia booted from what was the G8) and Syria. As such, rapprochement with Russia is an increasingly controversial proposition for a staunch U.S. ally. Nonetheless, despite concerns in Washington, Tokyo’s enthusiasm for overtures with Moscow is actually nothing new and has reinvigorated the two countries’ high-level interactions in recent months. Abe sees an opportunity to be the only G7 leader capable of maintaining friendly channels with Putin. Indeed, Abe virtually has carte blanche over the direction of the conference as his G7 chairmanship offers considerable authority regarding membership and agenda setting. However, inviting Putin to the G7 summit does not seem to be in the cards given the state of international affairs. Yet this has not dampened Abe’s ambitions to bring Putin back in from the cold to the G7. Abe has announced an “unofficial” summit with Putin this coming May in Sochi. The optics, symbolism, and timing of this visit are significant. The summit will be held shortly before the G7 summit on the idyllic Kashiko Island. And it may be quickly followed by a visit by Putin to Tokyo right after the G7 given Abe’s deep desire to serve as a bridge for Russia’s re-entry to the international community. However, engaging with the Kremlin is easier said than done. For this has the potential of inadvertently hindering Japan’s solidarity with other G7 members, particularly with the United States, while working to Russia’s advantage. Therefore, effective communication with both Washington and Moscow will be key. If Abe can pull this off, it will not only solidify Japan’s ascension as a global power, but may also limit the deepening of hostilities between the West and Russia in what has been called by none other than Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev as a new Cold War. To ensure this, Abe should consider the seemingly impossible balancing act of inviting Putin to Japan with allies’ concerns over its overtures to the Russian bear in advance of the G7 summit in May. From Japan with an Olive Branch Historically, Japan has viewed Russia as key to its maritime-centric strategy. As the first Asian power to beat a European power in the Russo–Japanese war at the turn of the 20th century and having ended World War II on opposite sides there is healthy respect in both countries for each other. Yet for Abe, Russia is more personal than geostrategic. Abe’s father, Shintaro Abe, who served as the foreign minister in the 1980s, enjoyed warm personal relations with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. However, the elder Abe’s untimely death in 1991 cut short his efforts for détente with Moscow. In his 2013 interview with the Russian state media TASS, the junior Abe revealed that achieving Russo–Japanese rapprochement was his late father’s “dying wish.”

#### Russian war escalates and becomes nuclear causing extinction

Ben Farmer, Telegraph Defence correspondent, February 20, 2015 "Russian Tensions Could Escalate Into All-Out War, says Nato General", [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11425393/Russian-tensions-could-escalate-into-all-out-war-says-Gen-Adrian-Bradshaw.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11425393/Russian-tensions-could-escalate-into-all-out-war-says-Gen-Adrian-Bradshaw.html%2C) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilise the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyse Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.”

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Disease Spread

#### Strong US-Japan alliance key to preventing disease spread

Susan Hubbard, Senior Associate in JCIE's New York office and former program director for East Asia at Columbia University's Center for International Conflict Resolution, and Eriko Sase, Research fellow at Takemi Program in International. Health at Harvard School of Public Health, December 2011, "Revitalizing US-Japan Collaboration on Global Health," [http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/USJapanPapers/Sase.pdf,](http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/USJapanPapers/Sase.pdf%2C) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

While the high prevalence of life-threatening diseases, unstable governance, and poverty will inevitably make aid to Africa—and particularly subSaharan Africa—an ongoing priority, the US-Japan partnership should also regard Asia as an important region from a political and public health perspective. President Obama stated in November 2011 that Asia Pacific will be a top priority in US security policy in the coming years given the military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.30 Likewise, US-Japan partnership in global health should place more emphasis on work in Asia. Southeast Asia, which had about 3.3 million new cases of tuberculosis in 2009, accounts for roughly 35 percent of global incidents.31 HIV infection rates as a percentage of the population are much lower in Asia than in Africa, but given the size of the populations in some Asian countries, the total numbers are similarly staggering. The number of people living with HIV/AIDS is estimated to be 2.7 million in India, which has a total population of 1.2 billion. Similarly, it is estimated that 700,000 of China’s roughly 1.3 billion residents are living with HIV/AIDS.32 In addition, the persistence of several “fragile states” in Asia threatens regional efforts to fight communicable diseases. In December 2009, nine cases of H1N1 were reported in North Korea, which was forced to accept an offer of support from South Korea to provide flu vaccines for its population.33 Communicable diseases can travel easily across national boundaries, so it only takes one country to jeopardize regional efforts to fight their spread. Conclusion During a November 2010 speech, President Obama referred to the two countries’ 50-year alliance as an “indestructible partnership” based on “equality and mutual understanding” and called the United States and Japan “partners in Asia and around the world.”34 In today’s world, such an alliance cannot be limited to partnership on traditional security. Health challenges have the potential to threaten the lives and livelihoods of large numbers of people throughout the region and around the world. At the same time, the growing threat of emerging infectious diseases drives home the threat of a possible new pandemic devastating lives and economies. Global health is, therefore, an essential area for US-Japan partnership. Global health has enjoyed increasing prominence in both countries’ development agendas, in part because of the growing threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases even in high-income countries, as well as the uncertain impact of the unprecedented double burden of communicable and noncommunicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries. It is now time for the US-Japan partnership to accelerate systematic collaboration and actively promote global health. As the global health community is increasingly recognizing that we need to move beyond a debate between emphasizing either disease-specific initiatives or health system strengthening, there is an opportunity for these two major donor countries to demonstrate how success in one area can be leveraged for success in the other, creating a win-win situation. The United States and Japan should continue to support the training of health professionals, particularly of those working at the community level, in order to build robust health systems that can deal with both communicable and noncommunicable diseases and provide adequate health services beyond the 2015 target date for achieving the MDGs. By combining their efforts, the United States and Japan can take steps to help prevent the proliferation of serious diseases and public health emergencies at the earliest possible stage.

#### Disease spread causes extinction

Karl-Heinz Ignatz Kerscher, Professor and Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014 (92 Seiten), “Space Education,” <http://www.grin.com/de/e-book/269345/space-education> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Climate Change

#### US-Japan cooperation necessary to resolves issues of climate change – empirical cooperation proves

Molly Elgin-Cossart, Senior Fellow with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress, and Brian Harding, Director for East and Southeast Asia for the National Security and International Policy team, and Aarthi Gunasekaran, Research Assistant with the National Security and International Policy team, April 27, 2015 “Mindful of Both Past and Present Challenges, Japan and the United States Must Work Together to Achieve a Progressive Future, ”[https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/04/27/111819/mindful-of-both-past-and-present-challenges-japan-and-the-united-states-must-work-together-to-achieve-a-progressive-future/](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/04/27/111819/mindful-of-both-past-and-present-challenges-japan-and-the-united-states-must-work-together-to-achieve-a-progressive-future/%29) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Another major objective for Prime Minster Abe will be to focus public attention on Japan’s global citizenship since World War II and to cast a forward-looking agenda for bilateral cooperation. While the focus for Prime Minster Abe and President Obama will likely be acute challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, they also should use this moment to think about how the United States and Japan can collaborate to promote inclusive prosperity and environmental stability not just in Asia but also globally. Given the two nations’ shared values and a commitment to human rights, human security, democracy, economic opportunity, and confronting climate change, this should be natural. With both nations wielding substantial clout in the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the G-7, the G-20, and other critical elements of the global order, it is also practical. Elevating collaboration in these forums as a top pillar in bilateral relations should be a priority for both sides. Investing in people and prosperity The United States and Japan have contributed substantially to economic development worldwide, as well as to the global good. The United States was pivotal in establishing international institutions such as the United Nations, and it is the world’s largest contributor of official development assistance globally. Following World War II, Japan was a major recipient of international assistance but became a donor nation within a decade. Today, Japan is the world’s fifth-largest bilateral aid donor, the largest contributor to the Asian Development Bank, and a generous funder of multilateral initiatives such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Fund and the U.N. Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict initiative. These efforts are vital to preserving the security, rights, and freedom of people worldwide. Japan and the United States have been leaders in not only the quantity of assistance but also the quality. Their commitment to ending poverty and promoting health, food security, and other essential needs has been vital to global growth and progress. However, a new approach is needed: 21st century challenges—including ending extreme poverty, more broadly sharing the benefits of globalization, and combating climate change—demand 21st century solutions. Despite great progress, significant challenges remain, and business as usual will not offer solutions. The challenge for global development is threefold: Ensure the rights and dignity of each and every person. Help economies move from poverty to prosperity. Work together to prevent and mitigate the effects of catastrophes—which know no borders—from pandemics to violent extremism to the effects of climate change and other environmental crises. Shared values—including individual rights, building inclusive and prosperous economies and societies, and providing for the global good—unite the United States and Japan and provide the foundation to tackle these challenges together. From Southeast Asia to Africa, the potential for joint investment is great. Crucially, the United States and Japan also realize that there is work to do at home too. Japan has unveiled ambitious plans to increase the number of women in its workforce, and the United States has taken significant steps toward universal health care and reducing carbon emissions. These domestic initiatives are integral to a new approach to development that sees development less as charity and more as sustainable global progress. Investing in the planet In the past decade, natural disasters have been on the rise in the Asia-Pacific region, which presages the impacts of climate change and other environmental problems, such as deforestation, in the coming decades. Agricultural productivity is at risk; rising sea levels threaten to displace more and more people; and food and water scarcity coupled with pandemic exposure have the potential to create a global public health crisis. If the United States and Japan are serious about fostering another 70 years of growth and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, climate change mitigation and resilience, as well as sustainable natural resource management, must be at the heart of bilateral cooperation. In terms of cutting emissions, the United States has already unveiled its international commitment and has reduced the carbon intensity of its energy consumption by 8 percent since 2005. Japan is expected to pledge a target 20 percent emission reduction by 2030 based on 2005 levels during the June G-7 summit. While dramatically reduced nuclear energy use in Japan makes aggressively reducing domestic emissions extremely challenging, the $4.5 billion that the United States and Japan have pledged to the Green Climate Fund will help developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change and further reduce carbon pollution. Technology, research, and technical assistance are other areas where the United States and Japan can make a great difference. Delivering advanced low- and zero-carbon energy technology from sources such as wind, solar, and nuclear power for future generations has great potential as an area of cooperation for globally shared prosperity and environmental security. Conclusion The United States and Japan cannot tackle the global challenges of the 21st century alone. Both have extensive partnerships and influence in regional and international bodies—from the United Nations to the G-20 and G-7, the Arctic Council, and the multilateral development banks. In the near term, Japan will lead the G-7 in 2016, an opportunity that offers tremendous potential. Working through these forums, the United States and Japan can collaborate with other nations to take action to build inclusive prosperity and tackle climate change. 2015 presents a particularly important opportunity to marry progress on climate, environment, and development with progress on both the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate Conference of the Parties.

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Nuke Rearm

#### US-Japan alliance prevents rearm

Daniel Flores, M.A. Stanford University, Security Studies, June 2014, "The Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The US Commitment to Japan." [https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:hp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid%3Ahp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara examine the basic issues concerning a potential Japanese nuclear arsenal.1 They consider the factors that may “propel Japan along the path toward acquisition of nuclear weapons”.2 In their assessment, North Korea and China are the most serious threats to Japanese security. The progress of North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs caused great alarm among Japanese policymakers. The launch of a missile which flew over the Japanese mainland in 1998 was particularly distressing, as it was “the first occasion in the postwar period in which [the Japanese] really felt their country was being immediately threatened by a hostile external power”.3 Continuing military buildup and the modernization of nuclear forces in China pose the threat of Chinese aggression in the region, especially when it comes to disputed territories in the East and South China Sea. If these security threats worsen, the two authors believe Japan is more likely to seek to develop a nuclear arsenal. Campbell and Sunohara connect this to the US-Japan alliance, noting that US policy with respect to China and North Korea are vital to Japan’s security. Furthermore, they stress that “the [nuclear] guarantee, and the Japanese-American security alliance in which it is embedded, provides the most important reason why Japan has not sought to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability”.4 They do not hypothesize much as to the future of any state’s policy nor argue what factor might ultimately determine Japan’s nuclear policies, so we must turn elsewhere for this sort of analysis. Yuri Kase examines the strategic thinking of Japanese policymakers. He does so by carefully examining what is perhaps the most important piece of available evidence on Japanese nuclear weapons policy, the 1968/70 Internal Report.5 This is a report commissioned by the Japanese government to analyze the potential costs and benefits of developing nuclear weapons. It is so-called because it consists of two halves completed in 1968 and 1970 respectively. The first half is on economic and technical factors, the second on strategic and political factors. Kase focuses on the second.6 He believes that analysis of this report is important because (1) its gives a frank assessment from non-governmental experts (2) it is the most regularly cited report on Japanese nuclear weapons policy and (3) was written at an important time for Japan’s security.7

#### Rearm destroy regional stability and cooperation

Daniel Flores, M.A. Stanford University, Security Studies, June 2014, "The Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The US Commitment to Japan." [https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:hp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid%3Ahp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

According to Kase, the authors of the report highlight two major disadvantages to a Japanese nuclear arsenal. First, it could contribute to regional instability and thereby threaten Japan’s security. Japan would risk starting a regional arms race and being perceived as a security threat by other states in the region. Due to its small land mass and high population density, Japan would be especially vulnerable to a preventive nuclear strike if it acquired a nuclear arsenal. Second, there could be severe diplomatic consequences. The alliance with the US could be significantly harmed and Japan would lose the benefits of its non-nuclear status on the world stage. The report did identify some potential benefits to a Japanese nuclear arsenal but they were found to not outweigh the costs. An entire section of the report is devoted to the Chinese nuclear threat and found that Japan’s best option to defend itself against that threat was not a nuclear arsenal of its own but reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. While nuclearization might boost national morale and quench nationalist sentiment, the effects would be fleeting. Ultimately, the report concluded that “it would be unwise for Japan to develop nuclear weapons due to technological, strategic, diplomatic, and political constraints...Japan’s security would best be attained through a multi- dimensional approach including political and economic efforts, and not through a traditional militaristic, power-based approach”.8 Kase believed that the report’s logic for the most part still held true when has writing (2001). In his assessment, Japan is thus unlikely to reverse its non-nuclear weapons policy as long as two factors remain constant (1) the Japanese public’s anti-nuclear sentiment and (2) the US-Japanese Security Treaty.9 10 Matake Kamiya’s11 analysis is in very much the same vein as that of Kase. He agrees that Japanese nuclearization could trigger a dangerous nuclear arms race: “in a worst-case scenario, prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to accelerate their nuclear development or go nuclear as well- ultimately reducing regional and global security”.12 He also notes that it would negatively affect relations with the United States: “US leaders do not want to see Japan become a major military power, much less a nuclear power”.13 Kamiya builds upon Kase’s work by fleshing out a factor that Kase only briefly discusses. He discusses what Japan has to lose on the international level by jeopardizing its status as a non-nuclear state. Japan is highly dependent on good trading relations to support its economy; it imports 80% of its energy and 60% of its dietary calories.14 Since the end of World War II, Japan has endeavored to present itself as nation of peace to its neighbors, including extensive efforts to legally limit its military capabilities. Nuclearization would render these efforts moot and draw suspicion, if not outright backlash, from Japan’s neighbors. Kamiya finds that by refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons, Japan has won respect and political influence on the international stage. Its non-nuclear status is among the reasons why Japan has gained the support of many countries for addition to the UN Security Council as a permanent member. Therefore, acquiring a nuclear arsenal “would only undermine Japan’s international position and the reputation it has built for itself thus far”15

#### Rearm causes Chinese aggravation and Senkaku conflict

Sean **O’Malley**, Assistant Professor of International Studies at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea, **2015**, “Can Military Normalization in Japan and Opcon Transfer in South Korea Enhance Regional Stability? A Conflict Management Framework for Rivalry Dyads." http://www.academia.edu/12537278/Can\_Military\_Normalization\_in\_Japan\_and\_Opcon\_Transfer\_in\_South\_Korea\_Enhance\_Regional\_Stability\_A\_Conflict\_Management\_Framework\_for\_Rivalry\_Dyads (Accessed 4/23/2016)

THE JAPAN-CHINA DYAD AND MILITARY NORMALIZATION We have already determined that China and Japan may be locked in a status dilemma. In fact, status may be the root cause for military normalization in Japan. Some press is devoted to the idea that the Abe Shinzo administration and its conservative allies in Japan are pushing for military normalization to recap- ture Japan’s sovereignty and end the humiliation of an imposed constitution that limits military action (Takahashi 2013; Lind 2014). Although this is certainly the case in some respects, military normalization began entering the mainstream after the first Persian Gulf War, when Japan was accused of “checkbook diplo- macy”, unbefitting the second biggest economic power in the world. Other actors, particularly the US, felt Japan should be contributing not just money but also men and material to the war effort and to the maintenance of world peace more generally. This perception of inferior status began a process of reinterpretation of Article 9 that continues today. Nonetheless, the catalysts fueling normalization today are the very real security challenges of a nuclear armed North Korea and a rising China (Yuzawa 2014; Atanassova-Cornelis 2010). Military normalization is a moniker to describe a number of legal and military policies that taken together stretch the limits of Article 9. Ultimate normalization of sovereignty in the anarchic international system would be a constitutional revision to Article 9 to allow full flexibility of military force for offensive and defensive purposes. This goes beyond the reinterpretation of Article 9, as a constitutional referendum must be held, gaining a majority of public support, and both houses of the Diet must uphold the referendum by a two-thirds vote, to change the constitution in democratic Japan. The likelihood of a referendum is not like- ly at this time (see Tsuruoka and Kujiraoka 2014; Inoue and Gough 2014; Iinuma 2014; Michishita 2014). Military policies, on the other hand, have continued unabated for some time, with notable expansion in the use of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Military doctrine has seen a shift from the Basic Defense Force doctrine, in place since 1976, to the Dynamic Defense Force doctrine of 2010, to Abe’s new “proactive pacifism” (Fouse 2011; Miller 2014). Changes in doctrine have been accompanied by a legal process and legal changes that enable the SDF to operate regionally and globally. These include the Higuchi Report (1994), which argued for a more active military role overseas; the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines (1997) and the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” (1999), which enabled Japan to take greater security measures during a crisis in NE Asia; the “Law Concerning Ship Inspection Activities in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” (2000), which enabled joint inspections by Japan and the United States of shipping on the high seas; special emergency laws allowing the SDF to provide non-combat roles and support overseas in response to terrorism; Prime Minister Aso Taro’s anti-piracy legislation (2009), which reinterpreted the “maritime police clause” of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Act; and the reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow collective self-defense by the Abe administration in 2014 (see Kim 2011; Taylor and Walsh, 2014). The legal shifts have allowed for the building of a Japanese defense base overseas in Djibouti, peace-keeping operations in the South Sudan, military non-combat missions to Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, to name some of the most high-profile operations. Japan’s changes in policy lead to discord in the Japan-China rivalry dyad in two distinct issue areas: the territorial dispute over the Senkakus/Diaoyus and diplomatic discord over historical grievances. Military normalization has already pro- vided the legal and military means to respond to perceived provocation or incursion by China in areas surrounding Japan; this includes the Senkakus, which are administered by Japan. Such policies have not discouraged China from voicing its declared rights to the territory or undertaking provocative military action in the region. Tit-for-tat exchanges have flared occasionally for the past thirty years (Griffith 2014). Both countries claim sovereignty over the islands (Pollack and Blasko 2014; Gupta 2014); the two countries have overlapping Air Defense Zones (ADZ) that include the islands (Manicom 2013; BBC 2013); and the presence of military vessels seem to increase from time to time (Gupta 2013). Nonetheless, neither country has let this flare into uncontrolled military conflict in the past. Additionally, both countries have refrained from deep sea drilling in the area, which could escalate tensions considerably. This makes the dispute a serious con- cern, but a dispute that is being managed. Military normalization has seemingly only heightened historical grievances with China.

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Japanese Cybersecurity

#### US and Japan alliance facilitates cooperation on cybersecurity

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Ian E. Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, February 9, 2016, “The US-Japan Alliance,” <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Japan has emphasized cooperation with the United States and taking a whole-of-government approach in its cybersecurity efforts. The Japanese Cabinet Secretariat in November 2014 established a Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters to take a central role in policy coordination and response to cybersecurity incidents. The United States and Japan inaugurated a bilateral cybersecurity dialogue in May 2013, led by the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the two sides can exchange information on cyber threats and align international cyber policies. The SDF created a Cyber Defense Group in March 2014 with a budget of roughly $140 million and 100 dedicated officers. Analysts have hailed the new group as an important first step, but inadequate to the scale and sophistication of modern cyber challenges.44 Constitutional and legal barriers prevent the SDF cyber personnel from protecting civilian infrastructure networks, engaging in counterattacks, and recruiting “white hat” hackers from outside the government.

### US-Japan Alliance Good – Asian Democracies

#### The US-Japan Alliance spreads democratic ideals, human rights and civil society around Asia

Michael R. Auslin, Resident Scholar and Director of Japan Studies/American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, March 2016, “An Evolving U.S.-Japan Alliance and Its Strategic Outlook,” <http://www.nids.go.jp/event/other/seminar/pdf/04.pdf> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

Similarly, the alliance should increasingly link together Asia’s democracies, sponsoring legislative, military, media, and student exchanges. It is also time to revisit the idea of a summit of democracies in Asia as a way to promote the strengthening of civil society, rule of law, human rights, equality, and NIDS International Security Seminar March 2016 7 education. As Asia’s most developed democracy, Japan can play a special role along with the United States in championing liberal values. While Japan’s historical experience is very different from most of the nations of Asia, its leadership in developing civil society and solidifying democracy at home can allow it uniquely to discuss its experiences, and to work with other nations that are exploring the path of liberalization. Not only the Japanese government can do this, but Japanese non-governmental organizations could work with American counterparts to develop grassroots ties across the region. Although not formally an alliance activity, support from both both Tokyo and Washington for such endeavors clearly would help to fulfill the goal of ‘mutual cooperation’ in the alliance. The time is ripe for the U.S.-Japan alliance to help create a new community of liberal nations in Asia and forge a cooperative security architecture. Based on shared democratic values, and working with a host of partners throughout the region (and even in Europe), the alliance has the potential to halt the continued deterioration of Asia’s security environment. While increasing joint activity in the South China Sea or in relation to North Korea may appear to raise risk in the short-term, only by changing today’s trends can the Asia-Pacific hope to remain peaceful in the coming decade.

# DA Russia DA

### Explanation

The basic argument is that China and Russian relations, especially in the economic arena, are increasing now for a variety of reasons (but all somehow getting back to a shared fear of US power). However, increased economic engagement between China and the US hurts Sino-Russian coop because it means China fears the US less, needs Russia less, and worries Russia that it will do something to hurt it because of increased US influence. That’s bad because sustained economic engagement between China and Russia is necessary to prevent Russian economic collapse – China is a key market because Western sanctions have cut off most European economic support. That causes Russian aggression because Putin will want to distract the public from his failings domestically – i.e. diversionary theory.

### 1NC

#### Increased US-Sino engagement kills Sino-Russian cooperation

Alexey Timofeychev, staffwriter for Russia Beyond the Times paper, June 17, 2015

“U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests – experts” <http://rbth.com/international/2015/06/17/us-china_military_treaty_may_threaten_russian_interests_experts_46989.html>, (accessed 5/9/16)

The Moscow-Washington-Beijing triangle

At the same time some experts believe that a full-fledged alliance between the U.S. and China is extremely unlikely. This, however, does not make Russia's current situation any better. Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, said that the Russia-U.S.-China triangle is experiencing difficult relations. In this configuration each of the three countries is playing on the contradictions between the other two and the forging of closer ties by any two countries goes against the interests of the third. Even though it is hard to imagine a real alliance between any two players, the tactical convergence between Washington and Beijing is leaving Moscow with less space for maneuver.

#### Chinese economic cooperation with Russia is key to avoid Russian economic collapse – sanctions are killing most other markets

Henry Meyer, Bloomberg Business, and [Evgenia Pismennaya](http://www.bloomberg.com/authors/ARLbNcI2css/evgenia-pismennaya), Bloomberg Business, October 17, 2014

“China Embraces a Russia Cut off From Western Capital” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-16/putin-turns-to-china-as-russias-economy-is-weakened-by-sanctions>, (accessed 5/9/16)

 Defying the U.S. and Europe is forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to aid his biggest rival to the east. To avert a recession, Russia is turning to China for investment, granting it once restricted access to raw materials and advanced weapons, say two people involved in planning Kremlin policy who asked not to be identified discussing internal matters. Russia’s growing dependence on China, with which it spent decades battling for control over global communism, may end up strengthening its neighbor’s position in the Pacific. With the ruble near a record low and foreign investment disappearing, luring Chinese cash also may deepen Russia’s reliance on natural resources and derail efforts to diversify the economy.

#### Russian economic collapse causes nationalism and aggression

Robert D. Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and contributing editor at The Atlantic and previously was chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor and a visiting professor at the United States Naval Academy and a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and a consultant to the US Army’s Special Forces Regiment and Air Force and the Marines and has received the Distinguished Alumni Award by the University of Connecticut and the Benjamin Franklin Public Service Award by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 15, 2016,

“Eurasia's Coming Anarchy” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-15/eurasias-coming-anarchy>, (accessed 5/12/16)

The world has seen the kind of anarchy that ethnic, political, and sectarian conflict can cause in small and medium-size states. But the prospect of quasi anarchy in two economically struggling giants is far more worrisome. As conditions worsen at home, China and Russia are likely to increasingly export their troubles in the hope that nationalism will distract their disgruntled citizens and mobilize their populations. This type of belligerence presents an especially difficult problem for Western countries. Whereas aggression driven by domestic strength often follows a methodical, well-developed strategy—one that can be interpreted by other states, which can then react appropriately—that fueled by domestic crisis can result in daring, reactive, and impulsive behavior, which is much harder to forecast and counter.

#### Russian aggression causes nuclear war

Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, February 20, 2015

<http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2> (accessed 5/12/16)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare.

## Uniqueness

### UQ: China-Russia Coop High – General

#### Coop increasing now – even if some of the deals won’t have an effect until long-term - Chinese investment, providing of tax havens, and increased trade all prove

Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg View columnist and was the founding editor of Russia's top business daily, Vedomosti, a joint project of Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal, and the first publisher of the Russian edition of Forbes and also founded the opinion website Slon.ru; ran the business book arm of Russia's biggest book publisher, Eksmo; and worked as managing director at KIT Finance investment bank and has an MBA from Insead in Fontainebleau, France, June 25, 2015

“Russia's Pivot to China Is Real” <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-25/russia-s-pivot-to-china-is-real>, (accessed 5/9/16)

The search for alternative investors and markets has been a political priority for President Vladimir Putin and his government since Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia last year. The resulting pivot to China may seem merely cosmetic, but it is happening.

[Vladimir Putin](http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/vladimir-putin-2)

Admittedly, most of the vague and extremely long-term mega-deals signed by the two countries' governments over the last year will have no immediate effect. Even so, China has become one of the two biggest sources of funding and investment for the Russian economy. The other is the money Russian businesses have stashed in tax havens and bring home as needed. The Chinese share of Russian trade is growing, too.

#### China-Russia cooperation has momentum now

Sputnik News, 5/24/16

“Development of Relations With China Russia’s Key Priority” <http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160524/1040136358/russia-china-lavrov-cooperation.html>, (accessed 5/24/16)

Development of the Russia-China relations is Moscow’s key foreign policy priority, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on Tuesday.

The two ministers met ahead of the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)](http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160521/1040014150/sco-accession-india-pakistan.html) Council of Foreign Ministers’ session, set to be held later in the day in Tashkent.

"We believe that the development of our cooperation with China is a key foreign policy priority for our country," Lavrov said.

According to Lavrov, Moscow and Beijing have a common understanding of the steps that need to be undertaken to further improve the quality of bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

"Our coordination in international affairs is an increasingly important factor in world politics," the Russian foreign minister said.

Wang, on his part, noted the importance of maintaining "high dynamics of contacts."

#### Energy coop proves China-Russian relations are on the upswing

Daniel Wiser, assistant editor of National Affairs. He graduated from UNC-Chapel Hill in May 2013, where he studied Journalism and Political Science and was the State & National Editor for The Daily Tar Heel, September 2, 2015

“Putin Touts ‘Peak’ for Russia-China Relations As Two Countries Develop Military, Economic Ties” <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/putin-touts-peak-for-russia-china-relations-as-two-countries-develop-military-economic-ties/> (accessed 5/29/16)

“I would not agree that the illegitimate restrictions imposed by certain Western countries against Russia have a negative impact on Russian-Chinese economic cooperation,” he said. “On the contrary, this encourages our domestic business to develop stable business ties with China.”

Russia and China are also forming a “strategic energy alliance” that “will play a significant role in international economic relations,” Putin said.

### UQ: China-Russia Coop High – Framing

#### Prefer our uniqueness evidence – 3 framing issues

#### A. Their authors misunderstand Russia’s goal – the pivot is about long-term benefits, so their short-term measures aren’t relevant

Ian Ivory, a partner at international law firm Berwin Leighton Paisner, January 27, 2016

“Why Russia’s pivot East is crucial for its own survival” <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/27/why-russias-pivot-east-is-crucial-for-its-own-survival.html>, (accessed 5/9/16)

It is important to remember that both China and Russia are playing a long game here. When looking in at Russia from the West, many regard the Russian attempts to pivot East as a failure, or disappointing at best.

Nonetheless, the longer-term trend supports Russia's pivot east and there are high-profile examples, such as the recent $15 billion fundraising by sanctioned Russian state oil giant Rosneft, purportedly from prepayments by China National Petroleum Corporation.

#### B. Their authors aren’t being realistic about how much time it takes to build sustainable shifts in economic ties. Prefer our evidence because it isn’t just a snapshot of the status quo but instead is predictive.

Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg View columnist and was the founding editor of Russia's top business daily, Vedomosti, a joint project of Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal, and the first publisher of the Russian edition of Forbes and also founded the opinion website Slon.ru; ran the business book arm of Russia's biggest book publisher, Eksmo; and worked as managing director at KIT Finance investment bank and has an MBA from Insead in Fontainebleau, France, June 25, 2015

“Russia's Pivot to China Is Real” <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-25/russia-s-pivot-to-china-is-real>, (accessed 5/9/16)

It would be wrong to discount Russia's swing toward China as just a PR campaign to convince Russians their country can do without the West. Russia is a big ship and turning it around is not a quick exercise, but the trend toward closer economic ties with China is real. In that respect, sanctions have done Russia a favor. They have forced the regime to accelerate much-needed market diversification and to pay more attention to the country's huge, underdeveloped eastern regions.

### UQ: Russia Arms Exports to China High

#### China gets most of its arms from Russia

Benjamin David Baker, an editorial assistant at The Diplomat and is currently serving as a reserve officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces and has previously worked and published at the International Law and Policy Institute and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and received his Master of Arts from the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he focused mainly on Chinese Foreign and Security Studies, November 10, 2015

“Russian Arms Sales in Asia May Be Poised for Trouble” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/russian-arms-sales-in-asia-may-be-poised-for-trouble/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

China’s history of importing Russian military equipment is not new. Since the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, China’s military hardware has basically consisted of either imported Soviet/Russian equipment or licensed-produced knockoffs. Although this was supplemented by hardware from other states–notably Israel–following Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, Russia is still China’s largest external provider of military equipment. ([As an example, Beijing is set to purchase Russia’s S-400 Triumf missile defense system](http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/sold-russian-s-400-missile-defense-systems-to-china/).)

## Links

### Ext: L – Generic

#### Shared interest in a common security threat from the US is key to Sino-Russian cooperation– the plan improves engagement with China, which means they see us as less of a threat than Russia now

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for Inational Studies, 2015

“WILL CHINA AND RUSSIA FORM AN¶ ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?” <https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report_07_the_new_geostrategic_game_web.pdf>, (accessed 5/29/16)

The nature of Chinese-Russian relations is not inevitably and naturally positive.

They will need to overcome huge differences in order to move to a military alliance,¶ including historical issues, ideology, identity, leadership in Central Asia, power¶ relations, military technology transfer, energy negotiations and economics and¶ future trade, etc.

■ The current close relationship between China and Russia is rooted in the common security threat from the United States in particular and the West in general.

Although China and Russia are strengthening their comprehensive strategic¶ partnership with gas and oil deals, arms transfer, military cooperation and mutual¶ international support, economic cooperation between the two countries will face¶ more challenges.

■ The future Chinese-Russian relations depend largely on what the United States¶ does. If the United States continuously pushes Russia through NATO and China¶ through its “rebalancing” in the Asia Pacific, it will certainly drive Russia and China¶ closer. The deepening economic and security cooperation between the two nations¶ will not only beef up their military capabilities, but will also create a military¶ platform for alliance formation.¶

### Ext: L – Generic

#### And, the US will use economic cooperation with China to create tensions with Russia

Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, and Ariel Cohen, PhD and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, September 2013

“How Washington Should Manage U.S.–Russia–China Relations” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/how-washington-should-manage-usrussiachina-relations>, (accessed 5/9/16)

However, while Chinese–Russian cooperation is continuing and even expanding, the two nations are linked more by shared aversions than by shared interests. While Moscow and Beijing agree on the need to counter American power and have complementary economies, they are also geopolitical competitors.

The U.S. should maintain an engaged American diplomatic, political, and economic presence in Asia and strong bilateral relations with Russia and China, using these to exploit their differences and ensure that they remain competitors. In particular, the U.S. should develop bilateral security cooperation programs with Central Asian countries aimed at strengthening the security environment after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 and preventing al-Qaeda and the Taliban from taking over Kabul and projecting power into Central Asia.

### Ext: L – Generic

#### Playing on the economic relations of the US and China hurts China’s relations with other authoritarian nations like Russia

Daniel Brumberg, Associate Professor, Department of Government, and Director, Democracy and Governance Studies, Georgetown University, and Steven Heydemann, Vice President, Applied Research on Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, January 29, 2013

“Global Authoritarians and the Arab Spring: New Challenges for U.S. Diplomacy” The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East: Issue 1, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/global_authoritarians_and%20_the_arab_spring_1.pdf> (accessed 5/29/16)

Third, because this global agenda is tied to their quest to enhance mechanisms of authoritarian control and contain Western influence, all three GA states have an interest in working together to build regional and international institutions that expand authoritarian influence. While their efforts are sometimes buttressed by formal agreements and treaties, the informal, tacit, or improvised nature of their collaboration that equips them to adapt flexibly to both exploit the opportunities and mitigate the constraints that come with political and social shifts on a regional and global plane. Fourth, the ad hoc nature of global authoritarian collaboration is provides a mechanism to mitigate competing or conflicting economic, political, and ideological interests among leading authoritarian powers. For example, economic interdependence between China and the West necessitates prudent, focused calculation among Chinese leaders concerning where and when confrontation versus cooperation with the West is warranted Thus, as we show below, the very conditions which necessitate flexibility also generate potential conflicts that could limit the capacity for collective action among global authoritarian regimes.

### Ext: L – Generic

#### Empirics prove better ties with the US hurt Sino-Russian relations

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for Inational Studies, 2015

“WILL CHINA AND RUSSIA FORM AN¶ ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?” <https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report_07_the_new_geostrategic_game_web.pdf>, (accessed 5/29/16)

The September 11 tragedy changed the world and also influenced Sino-Russian¶ relations in the early 2000s. Both Russia and China supported the US “War on¶ Terror” soon after the terrorist attacks. Both adjusted their threat perceptions¶ regarding the United States, which undermined the security bond in their bilateral¶ relations. While some tactical cooperation in international affairs continued, their attitude toward each other turned aloof and dropped to the level of “economic partnership” at best, with lethargic and unimpressive economic interaction.

### Ext: L – Generic

#### Closer Chinese-US ties dampens China-Russia relations – kills Russia’s trust

Michael Clarke, Associate Professor at the National Security College, ANU, and Anthony Ricketts, doctoral candidate at the National Security College, ANU, February 1, 2016

“Should America Fear the China-Russia Relationship?” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-fear-the-china-russia-relationship-15075> (accessed 5/29/16)

Such representations play into [broader notions of Western relations](http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/china-america-stay-focused-what-really-matters-13704). In this sense, Russia remains skeptical of China’s long game, and whether China legitimately views the West as an enemy—as supposedly Russia does—or a critical partner in their future success. Such an acquiescent Chinese view of the West would hamper China from becoming too close to Russia, as it would impede upon China’s capacity to be an “equal” global leader with America.

### Ext: L – Generic

#### Common security threats and shared economic interests are the two key factors for improved Sino-Russian relations – the plan kills one of them

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for Inational Studies, 2015

“WILL CHINA AND RUSSIA FORM AN¶ ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?” <https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report_07_the_new_geostrategic_game_web.pdf>, (accessed 5/29/16)

It is not the purpose of this report to evaluate which party should be blamed for the¶ strained relations between Russia and the United States as well as between the¶ United States and China. Instead, I demonstrate that Sino-Russian relations¶ developed dramatically when both perceived the United States as threatening. In¶ September 2010 Russia and China signed a joint statement to upgrade their¶ “strategic partnership” to “comprehensive strategic partnership” and Moscow¶ confirmed that its bilateral relation with China was one of the priorities in Russia’s¶ foreign policy. The addition of the adjective “comprehensive” indicated that the SinoRussian¶ partnership had moved to “full partnership” phase, in which they faced¶ common security threats and had shared economic interests.

### Ext: L – Generic

#### The plan hurts Russia’s ability to cooperate with China on important issues like the economy

Alexey Timofeychev, staffwriter for Russia Beyond the Times paper, June 17, 2015

“U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests – experts” <http://rbth.com/international/2015/06/17/us-china_military_treaty_may_threaten_russian_interests_experts_46989.html>, (accessed 5/9/16)

The U.S. and China have signed a collaboration agreement on military dialogue. According to the Chinese media, it is the first agreement of its kind in the last several years. While Russian experts believe that for now this is most likely a protocol of intentions, they also think that any rapprochement between China and the U.S. amid Moscow's confrontation with the West is against Russia's interests.

## Internal Links

### Ext – IL: China Key – Russia Econ – General

#### Sino-Russian econ cooperation is a priority now – sustaining it is key to preventing Russian economic collapse

NYT, May 19, 2014

“Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China” <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-pushing-putin-toward-china.html?_r=1>, (accessed 5/12/16)

While Mr. Putin has been casting an eye eastward [practically since he returned to the presidency](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/europe/at-asia-pacific-meeting-putin-focuses-on-the-far-east.html?version=meter+at+10&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId=&mediaId=&referrer=&priority=true&action=click&contentCollection=meter-links-click) in 2012, the crisis in relations with the West over Ukraine has made ties to Asia, and particularly relations with its economic engine, China, a key strategic priority. With Europe trying to wean itself off Russian gas, and the possibility of far more serious Western sanctions looming should the crisis deepen, Moscow needs an alternative.

#### Russia pivot to China is crucial – it’s a key partner in several crucial sectors

Sergei Strokan and Vladimir Mikheev, writers for Russia Beyond the Times News, December 24, 2015

“Russia streamlines its ‘pivot to Asia’”http://rbth.com/international/troika/2015/12/24/russia-streamlines-its-pivot-to-asia\_554497, (accessed 5/12/16)

 “China is becoming an indispensible partner for Russia in terms of obtaining sophisticated technologies. For instance, certain types of engines or semiconductors are banned for export to Russia, but they can be purchased in China. Chinese producers can be at least rated as ‘second best’ because they offer decent quality and reasonable price. For this reason China is much more important to Russia today than it was several years ago.”

### 2NC IL: China Key – Russia Econ – Arms Sales

#### Decreased Sino-Russo cooperation devastates Russian arms exports

[Andrey Gubin](http://russiancouncil.ru/en/author_profile/index.php?author_id_4=343), PhD in Political Science, Director of Scientific Programs of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies at Regional Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, Assistant Professor at the International Relations Department of Far Eastern Federal University, RIAC Expert, December 16, 2013

“Asia Arming Itself: Military and Technical Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region” <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2843#top-content>, (accessed 5/9/16)

According to the estimates of some experts, Russia will suffer negative consequences because of a significant reduction in military-technical cooperation with China if China achieves “self-sufficiency” in armaments planned for 2015-2020. A similar situation may develop with regards to India, which has started to pursue an active policy for developing its own defense industry (including through the help of foreign investment). Opportunities for Russian exports will be also affected by a sharp reduction in technological advances in its defense sector, observed after the end of the Cold War [[22]](http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2843#22) .

Another factor affecting the state of Russia's military security in the Asia-Pacific region is, in particular, the presence of states with a high level of defense spending, with numerous and well-equipped armed forces undergoing reform and modernization [[23]](http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2843#23).

In this regard, our country will not only have to find ways to increase supplies of military equipment to Asia-Pacific markets, but also to actively put into service the latest weapons designs so as not to become a "technological outsider" and a "second-rate power.” If the latter occurs, there may be significant negative effects for Russian foreign policy in the Pacific, since indeed this is not a quiet ocean.

#### That destroys Russia’s economy

Jayant Singh, Researcher, Institute of South Asian Studies, National Univ. of Singapore, June 6, 2015

“Russia and India: A 21st Century Decline” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/russia-and-india-a-21st-century-decline/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

This shift is significant, and is driven by what IDSA scholar, Jyotsna Bakshi, calls Moscow’s “compulsive” need to sell weapons. One of the most important issues following the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the distribution of its external state debt and assets among the fifteen successor states. Russia inherited a mammoth military-industrial complex (MIC) that comprised 1,600 defense enterprises staffing nearly two million people. Today, that number has grown to include between 2.5 and 3 million workers, representing 20 percent of all manufacturing jobs in Russia. However, Russia did not inherit an equally robust economy to support its expansive MIC. Average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the three years leading up to the break-up of the Soviet Union was 14.1 percent, compared with 3.8 percent for Russia between 1992 and 2013 was 3.8 percent. To make up for the deficit in military expenditure and maintain the economies of scale to sustain its resource hungry defense and R&D facilities Russia became increasingly reliant on military exports. As Bakshi [points out](http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-100.html), former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov once stated that arms exports were the “life buoy for our defense industries now that the defense budget is so small and military state orders are so few.” Thus, in addition to fostering strategic cooperation with other countries, the sale of Russian weapons to foreign nations is driven by the financial imperative of bankrolling its own domestic defense industries. In all likelihood, Russia’s decision to revive military exports to Pakistan and others is essentially motivated by the economic need to maintain a high level of military exports.

#### Specifically, China is a key arms export market for Russia – that’s the core of Russia’s economy

Benjamin David Baker, an editorial assistant at The Diplomat and is currently serving as a reserve officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces and has previously worked and published at the International Law and Policy Institute and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and received his Master of Arts from the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he focused mainly on Chinese Foreign and Security Studies, November 10, 2015

“Russian Arms Sales in Asia May Be Poised for Trouble” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/russian-arms-sales-in-asia-may-be-poised-for-trouble/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

To compensate for the loss of western export markets—not only for its weapons, but also for its crucial hydrocarbons and rare earths—Russia has attempted to strengthen its economic ties with Asian states, especially China. [One very obvious example of this is the massive oil and gas deal signed last year.](http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/china-and-russia-sign-massive-natural-gas-deal/)

Armaments are an important part of this relationship. Since the end of the Cold War, Asia has been Russia’s largest market for weapons’ exports; 60 percent of all Russian arms exports have gone to Asian states, with India and China in particular commanding a large percentage of these orders. [As a share of total Russian arms transfers from 2010 to 2014, India and China represented 39 and 11 percent, respectively](http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/weapons/2015/11/01/russia-seeks-energize-asian-presence/74861392/).

### 2NC IL: China Key – Framing

#### Even if they win Russia isn’t dependent on China at this moment, prefer our evidence because it’s predictive and accounts for likely long-term events

Alexander Gabuev, visiting fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations and a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chair of the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program at Moscow Carnegie Center and prior to joining Carnegie in February 2015, Alexander was deputy editor-in-chief for the Russian Kommersant-Vlast weekly and has published extensively on Russia-China relations, and the interplay among big business and foreign policymaking in Russia’s and China’s domestic policy, February 2015

“A “SOFT ALLIANCE”? RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE UKRAINE CRISIS” <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf>, (accessed 5/9/16)

The developing relationship between China¶ and Russia could provide Putin with a way to¶ undermine the effect of sanctions and may also¶ help Beijing become even more assertive both¶ regionally and globally. In the long term, current¶ developments could make Russia even more¶ dependent on China. The EU has two options:¶ to work with the United States to increase the¶ pressure on Russia by sanctioning Chinese¶ companies that do business with sanctioned¶ Russian entities and individuals; or, alternatively,¶ to try to undermine the increasingly close¶ relationship between Moscow and Beijing by¶ encouraging other Asian countries such as Japan¶ and South Korea to co-operate with Russia in¶ order to decrease its dependence on China.¶

### 2NC IL: China Key – State Collapse

#### Chinese economic investment is crucial to preventing regime collapse

Alexander Gabuev, visiting fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations and a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chair of the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program at Moscow Carnegie Center and prior to joining Carnegie in February 2015, Alexander was deputy editor-in-chief for the Russian Kommersant-Vlast weekly and has published extensively on Russia-China relations, and the interplay among big business and foreign policymaking in Russia’s and China’s domestic policy, February 2015

“A “SOFT ALLIANCE”? RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE UKRAINE CRISIS” <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf>, (accessed 5/9/16)

As a result of the Ukraine crisis, the relationship between¶ Russia and China will become stronger and more¶ comprehensive. For Russia, China cannot fully replace the¶ West as a market and source of capital and technologies,¶ but cooperation can help to reduce the damage caused by¶ sanctions. Russia’s economy will be in a worse shape, but¶ China may provide it with the minimum level of wealth¶ needed for Putin’s regime to stay in place. For China,¶ meanwhile, the crisis provided a great opportunity for¶ Beijing to turn Russia into a junior partner in the relationship¶ and secure many of its strategic interests. A submissive¶ Russia will give China more resources to prepare itself for¶ the ultimate struggle for great-power status in Asia-Pacific.

## Impact – Russia Econ

### Ext: Econ Collapse => Aggression

#### Worsening Russian economic crisis causes aggression and regime instability

Chung, writer at AU News, 2014

The Cold War is back, and colder, December, [www.news.com.au/finance/economy/the-cold-war-is-back-and-colder/news-story/ac7ca11a978305cb4b13b4bb64902cd7](http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/the-cold-war-is-back-and-colder/news-story/ac7ca11a978305cb4b13b4bb64902cd7), (accessed 5/12/16)

If the instability continues, Moscow will pump more and more money into its military industrial complex — first, to shore up popular support by maintaining an artificially high level of employment through unproductive jobs; second, to prepare for further confrontation. “The military build-up benefits the Putin regime both politically and economically,” Dr Petrov said. “Already we have gone back to before where we were in 1991.”

It’s a feedback loop with potentially deadly implications: if the instability continues, Russia’s oil-rich regions may decide they’re better off going it alone. And as the domestic economic situation worsens, Russia may ratchet up external conflicts to distract attention.

#### Russian economic crisis escalates to global war – Russia has an incentive to be aggressive

Chung, writer at AU News, 2014

“The Cold War is back, and colder”, December, [www.news.com.au/finance/economy/the-cold-war-is-back-and-colder/news-story/ac7ca11a978305cb4b13b4bb64902cd7](http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/the-cold-war-is-back-and-colder/news-story/ac7ca11a978305cb4b13b4bb64902cd7), (accessed 5/12/16)

Dr Leonid Petrov, an expert in strategic intelligence and visiting fellow at the ANU School of Asia and the Pacific, has warned that the Russian economic crisis may quickly develop into a global strategic crisis on par with, or worse than, the Cold War.

“Russia needs to maintain the slow-motion crisis in Eastern Ukraine, first to deflect attention from domestic economic issues and second to support Putin’s approval rating,” he said. “But pretty soon people are going to start asking questions.”

### Ext: Aggression => Extinction

#### The impact is U.S.-Russian nuclear war

Ockham Research, November 18, 2008

“Economic Distress and Geopolitical Risks,” <http://seekingalpha.com/article/106562-economic-distress-and-geopolitical-risks> (accessed 5/12/16)

**Russia,** whose economy, stock markets and financial system have literally imploded over the past few months, **could become increasingly problematic if faced with a protracted economic downturn**. The increasingly authoritarian and aggressive Russian regime is already showing signs of anger projection. **Its** invasion of Georgia this summer and **increasing** willingness to confront the West reflect **a desire to stoke the pride and anger of its people against foreign powers—**particularly the United States. It is no accident that the Russians announced a willingness to deploy tactical missile systems to Kaliningrad the day after Barack Obama’s election in the U.S. This was a clear “shot across the bow” of the new administration and demonstrates Russian willingness to pursue a much more confrontational foreign policy going forward. Furthermore, the collapse in the price of oil augers poorly for Russia’s economy. The Russian budget reputedly needs oil at $70 per barrel or higher in order to be in balance. Russian foreign currency reserves, once huge, have been depleted massively over the past few months by ham-fisted attempts to arrest the slide in both markets and the financial system. Bristling with nuclear weapons and nursing an ego still badly bruised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of superpower status, an impoverished and unstable Russia would be a dangerous thing to behold.

#### Russian aggression causes nuclear war---it’s the only great-power war that’s likely because other relationships don’t involve ideological rivalry

Dr. Stephen Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009

“Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously,

The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171

### 2NC I: China Aggression

#### Weak Russian economic relations with China causes Chinese aggression

Richard Weitz, Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, January 5, 2016

“Putin’s Perennial Pivot Problem” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/putins-perennial-pivot-problem/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Russia’s lagging presence in Asian economic affairs is not necessarily beneficial to the region. A stronger Russia under a less confrontational leadership could help counter the potential negative repercussions of China’s rise, better rein in a problematic Pyongyang, and more effectively resist transnational threats in Eurasia. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that Russia will reverse this situation anytime soon.

#### Aggression causes US-China war

Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, June 9, 2014

“Asia's Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War”, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621?page=4>

Fifteen years ago, the only answers to “How would a war between the People’s Republic of China and the United States start?” involved disputes over Taiwan or North Korea. A Taiwanese declaration of independence, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or some similar triggering event would force the PRC and the US reluctantly into war. This has changed. The expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between China and the United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea scenario, but now also involve disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure.

#### US-China war will go nuclear and destroy the planet

Rory Medcalf, Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Professor and Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University, and Brendan Thomas-Noone, Research Associate in the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, Master of Science in Global Politics from the London School of Economics, Lowy Institute for International Policy, September 4, 2015

“NUCLEAR-ARMED SUBMARINES IN INDO-PACIFIC ASIA: STABILISER OR MENACE?”

The relatively underdeveloped state of Chinese SSBNs also poses a risk in the unlikely event of conventional conflict between China and the United States in the near future. Some aspects of both US and Chinese strategies for major conventional conflict might inadvertently raise the risks of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.

### 2NC I: NK Prolif

#### Weak Russian economic relations with China causes North Korean aggression

Richard Weitz, Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, January 5, 2016

“Putin’s Perennial Pivot Problem” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/putins-perennial-pivot-problem/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Russia’s lagging presence in Asian economic affairs is not necessarily beneficial to the region. A stronger Russia under a less confrontational leadership could help counter the potential negative repercussions of China’s rise, better rein in a problematic Pyongyang, and more effectively resist transnational threats in Eurasia. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that Russia will reverse this situation anytime soon.

#### Extinction

Peter Hayes, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Michael Hamel-Green, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development, Victoria University, 2010,

“The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia”, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267/article.html>

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.

At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a (~~holocaust~~) disaster of unprecedented proportions. \

### Ext: NK Prolif => Extinction

#### It escalates – triggers other prolif, targets important assets, and leads to economic crisis and food insecurity

Peter Hayes, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Michael Hamel-Green, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development, Victoria University, 2010,

“The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia”, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267/article.html>

These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

### 2NC I: State Collapse

#### Continued economic decline causes state collapse and nuclear war

Armin Rosen, writer at Business Insider, March 10, 2015

“Stratfor predicts loose nukes in Russia will be 'the greatest crisis of the next decade”, [www.businessinsider.com/russia-nukes-could-be-a-huge-crisis-2015-3](http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-nukes-could-be-a-huge-crisis-2015-3) (accessed 5/12/16)

The most alarming prediction in the Decade Forecast from private intelligence firm Strategic Forecasting, or Stratfor, involves a Russian collapse leading to a nuclear crisis. The firm believes the Russian Federation will not survive the decade in its present form, after a combination of international sanctions, plunging oil prices, and a suffering ruble trigger a political and social crisis. Russia will then devolve into an archipelago of often-impoverished and confrontational local governments under the Kremlin's very loose control.

"We expect Moscow's authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia" the report states, adding, "It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form."

 If that upheaval happened, it could lead to what Stratfor calls "the greatest crisis of the next decade": Moscow's loss of control over the world's biggest nuclear weapons stockpile.

### Ext: Econ Decline => State Collapse

#### Russia state collapse causes extinction – loose nukes and Central Asian war

Robert D. Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and contributing editor at The Atlantic and previously was chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor and a visiting professor at the United States Naval Academy and a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and a consultant to the US Army’s Special Forces Regiment and Air Force and the Marines and has received the Distinguished Alumni Award by the University of Connecticut and the Benjamin Franklin Public Service Award by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 15, 2016

“Eurasia's Coming Anarchy” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-15/eurasias-coming-anarchy>, (accessed 5/12/16)

Central control—who has it, who doesn’t—is the geopolitical issue of our time. Centralized authoritarian rule over large areas is inherently problematic, and all the more so in an era of intensified ethnic, religious, and individual consciousness, when electronic communications can incite identity-based grievances. No wonder the map of Eurasia is about to become more complex.

Policymakers in Washington had better start planning now for the potential chaos to come: a Kremlin coup, a partial breakup of Russia, an Islamic terrorist campaign in western China, factional fighting in Beijing, and political turbulence in Central Asia, although not probable, are all increasingly possible. Whatever form the coming turbulence takes, it seems certain the United States will be forced to grapple with new questions of one sort or another. Who will control Russia’s nuclear arsenal if the country’s leadership splinters? How can the United States stand up for human rights inside China while standing by as the regime puts down an internal rebellion?

#### Economic collapse causes state collapse and loose nukes

Sheldon Filger, Author for the Huffington Post, 2009

“Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356> (accessed 5/12/16)

Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world.

### I: State Collapse => Miscalc

#### Political instability causes a nuclear strike on the US

Peter Vincent, Former US Intelligence Operative, 1999

“War Scare: U.S.-Russia on the Nuclear Brink”

Russian internal troubles—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—could aggravate Russia’s fears of foreign aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction. While this may sound like a complicated and improbable chain of events, Russia’s story in the 1990s is one long series of domestic crises that have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls. The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway’s launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War. The Russian military’s continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s, combined with Russia’s deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the United States might find itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles. At least in nuclear confrontations of the 1950s–1970s—during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.

#### That causes extinction – huge nuclear arsenals

Nick Bostrom, the director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford and has a PhD from the London School of Economics and is also the director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at Oxford and co-founded the World Transhumanist Association and also the Insititute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies and is the 2009 recipient of the Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, 2002

Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that *might* have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century

### Ext: State Collapse => Miscalc

#### Even if decline itself doesn’t cause war, it makes accidental launch inevitable

Frank Von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Chairman of the research arm of the Federation of American Scientists, November 1, 1998

“De-alerting Nuclear Missiles,” <http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/von_hippelISODARCO.PDF> (accessed 5/12/16)

The danger of mistaken launch has been reduced by the relaxation of U.S.-Russian tensions following the end of the Cold War. Some expert analysts such as Bruce Blair feel, however, that it is also being significant increased by the current economic and political crisis in Russia. The Strategic Missile Forces have suffered in this crisis along with the rest of the country. On February 6, 1997 then Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned that

"Some components of our systems have already been made to operate for twice or three times their useful life. Today, no one can...guarantee the reliability of our control systems...If the shortage of funds persists, the system...could fall apart...Russia may soon approach a threshold beyond which its missiles and nuclear systems become uncontrollable."

### Ext: Miscalc => Extinction

#### Miscalculation causes extinction – quick targeting procedures

Morton Mintz, former chair of the Fund for Investigative Journalism and a former Washington Post reporter, February 26, 2001

“Two Minutes to Launch,” The American Prospect, online: http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=two\_minutes\_to\_launch (accessed 5/12/16)

Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the United States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages. Launch crews--on duty every second of every day--are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended--or accidental--enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us," explains Bruce Blair. "It would be, basically, a nuclear war by checklist, by rote."

## Answers to Answers

### A2: UQ OW L – Russia-China Coop Inevitable – Econ Concerns

#### Even for Russia, sanctions aren’t enough to force it to look to China – a fear on both sides of the US is the root of all of their cooperation – plan reverses this for China.

Alexander Gabuev, visiting fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations and a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chair of the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program at Moscow Carnegie Center and prior to joining Carnegie in February 2015, Alexander was deputy editor-in-chief for the Russian Kommersant-Vlast weekly and has published extensively on Russia-China relations, and the interplay among big business and foreign policymaking in Russia’s and China’s domestic policy, February 2015

“A “SOFT ALLIANCE”? RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE UKRAINE CRISIS” <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf>, (accessed 5/12/16)

While Russia’s pivot to China is focused on the economy and fuelled by the Kremlin’s desire to find alternative markets and sources of capital, politics is also important. Even before the Ukrainian crisis, Beijing and Moscow supported non-democratic regimes around the world, opposed the US presence in Central Asia, held joint military exercises, and tried to craft a joint strategy to counter the “colour revolutions”. The current situation will only reinforce this mood. Chinese officials see Russia as more accommodating to some of Beijing’s ideas about global and regional governance. “It is not only because the conflict in Ukraine drives our countries closer, but because the Kremlin became more anti-Western on an emotional level”, a Chinese expert with ties to Zhongnanhai says.

#### True UNLESS their views on the US changes – that’s the link

Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, and Ariel Cohen, PhD and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, September 2013

“How Washington Should Manage U.S.–Russia–China Relations” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/how-washington-should-manage-usrussiachina-relations>, (accessed 5/9/16)

However, for a renewed Sino–Russian split to develop, both states would need not only to be antagonized by the other, but also to view the other as more problematic than the United States. The two sides are not strategically allied, and their trade ties do not appear to be leading toward economic integration, but the two countries have sufficient links to avert open hostility toward one another.

### A2: Decreased China-Russia Coop = Good

#### Too many issues ensure China and Russia can never cooperate enough to threaten the US – there’s only a risk from too little cooperation.

Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, and Ariel Cohen, PhD and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, September 2013

“How Washington Should Manage U.S.–Russia–China Relations” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/how-washington-should-manage-usrussiachina-relations>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Recognize the limits of shared interests with both Russia and China as well as between them.Washington should not assume that these two states automatically agree with each other and should therefore seek to deal with them separately. Only in a handful of instances will all three share common interests, such as in limiting the depredations of seaborne pirates. Most of the time, it is essential to recognize that Russia and China are at best aligned, but not allied. Consequently, cooperation with either country should be on a case-by-case basis, recognizing the limits of their shared interests. In particular, there is little reason to believe that Russian and Chinese armed forces are engaging in joint military planning. Episodic high-profile joint exercises are not the same as the kind of joint planning that typifies U.S.–NATO, U.S.–Japan, or U.S.–ROK military cooperation—although the U.S. should keep an eye on their interactions in case such closeness eventually evolves.

### A2: India Solves Russia Exports

#### Concerns about excessive dependence on Russia is leading India to massively decrease its Russian exports now – won’t continue to be a reliable market.

Benjamin David Baker, an editorial assistant at The Diplomat and is currently serving as a reserve officer in the Norwegian Armed Forces and has previously worked and published at the International Law and Policy Institute and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and received his Master of Arts from the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he focused mainly on Chinese Foreign and Security Studies, November 10, 2015

“Russian Arms Sales in Asia May Be Poised for Trouble” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/russian-arms-sales-in-asia-may-be-poised-for-trouble/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

India is another large-scale customer of Russian kit. Delhi is the world’s third largest armaments importer, [with Russian equipment making up almost 75 percent of its total imports from 2004-2013](http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf). However, this may soon change. [Many Indian observers have raised concerns that the country](http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-diversifying-arms-purchases/) is too dependent on Moscow for its defense needs, and advocate for a diversification of its military imports. In this, India has an important advantage over China: Beijing is still subject to western sanctions on military hardware over the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. India does not face the same constraints. [In 2014, the U.S. actually supplanted Russia as Delhi’s number one armaments provider, with the total value of U.S. imports jumping from $200 million in 2009 to $2 billion in 2014](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/indias-rising-military-might-made-the-usa-11253).

#### Their uniqueness evidence doesn’t assume that current sales numbers are misleading because they rely on contracts already in place – our evidence is about the lack of future contracts being meaningful.

Jayant Singh, Researcher at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, June 6, 2015

“Russia and India: A 21st Century Decline” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/russia-and-india-a-21st-century-decline/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

At present, Russia’s defense industry is sustaining its considerable ties with India on the strength of the execution of contracts already in place. Barring the upcoming $11 billion contract for the [joint design and development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft](http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/whats-the-status-of-the-indian-russian-fifth-generation-fighter-jet/) (FGFA) program with Russia, there are no specific plans to purchase new Russian arms. And although Russia is taking part in various Indian military tenders currently open to foreign firms, it is not a clear frontrunner in any. The EADS Airbus A330 MRTT has emerged as the preferred vendor over Russia’s Ilyushin Il-78 to supply six aerial tankers for the Indian Air Force in a $1 billion contract; Russian platforms have also fared poorly in the rotary-wing aircraft category, where Boeing’s AH-64 Apache and the Chinook CH-47F won the Indian attack and heavy-lift helicopter tenders respectively. Thus, with the fulfillment of contracts signed in previous years, there is a considerable risk that Russia will lose its decades long stranglehold on the Indian arms industry.

### A2: Russia Econ Collapse Good – Imperialism

#### Russia could be imperialist even with a bad economy—it’s still far more powerful than its neighbors and there’s no impact

Mark Adomanis, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, April 21, 2010

“Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/

And **even if Russia’s economy doesn’t**, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, **rapidly recover** to pre-crisis levels, **the Kremlin will nonetheless be able to exert a great degree of influence in the “near abroad” because of the extreme fiscal/economic weaknesses of the rest of the CIS**. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that **many of the former-Soviet states are in truly dire economic straights and that they are *extremely* vulnerable to outside leverage, particularly from** a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as **Russia**.

One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that **in certain countries**, such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, **Russian influence is** and can continue to be modestly **progressive**. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like [Turkmenbashi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saparmurat_Niyazov). In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since **the US and Europe are up against some pretty darn catastrophic resource constraints, the odds that the West will be able to effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim.**

**Russia is and will continue to be a great power.** Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. **Whatever your reaction,** though, **get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics.**

#### Russia won’t be aggressive in a dangerous way

National Journal, October 20, 2007

“From Russia, With Bile,” http://thebereanoasis.yuku.com/topic/1210/From-Russia-With-Bile#.T-dQ7PVSQmw

"**Russian security policy is all about prestige and economic benefits**, and because the Russians see themselves as our equals in strategic nuclear forces they are focusing their modernization efforts there to try and maintain the prestige of that position," said Lowell Schwartz, an analyst with the Rand think tank who is working on a report on the Russian military. In terms of Russia **transforming conventional forces into a more modern and professional military,** Schwartz believes that **will remain a much lower priority**. "That corresponds with another interesting phenomenon, which is that **despite the provocative rhetoric, Putin is actually very cautious about using Russian military forces outside of Russian borders,**" he said. "**They understand that their conventional forces are inherently weak, and they've gotten smarter about using soft power such as oil resources to influence world events."**

# Kritik Orientalism Kritik

Orientalism is a theory developed during the late 1970’s by Edward Said that is said to explain Western (European and American) representations of, and relations with, the global East (including, the Middle East, Russia, and Asia). The theory is premised on the idea that the West perpetuates ideas about the East based on flawed understandings of other cultures; these ideas are said to influence policy decisions and Western knowledge production. The negative in this case argues that the affirmative maintains a culture of Orientalism in respect to the United States’ relationship with China and that that act leads to violence, colonialism, and domination. The alternative is to reject engagement with China and instead analyze the history and influence of Orientalism. The affirmative responses to the criticism include permutation and alternative solvency arguments questioning the viability of withdrawing from material politics and engagement, as well as various criticisms of Orientalism as a theory.

## 1NC

#### Orientalism must be the foundation of any call to action with the Orient—any other starting point is fundamentally flawed

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 1- 3

On a visit to Beirut during the terrible civil war of 1975-1976 a French journalist wrote regretfully of the gutted downtown area that “it had once seemed to belong to . . . the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval.”1 He was right about the place, of course, especially so far as a European was concerned. The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over. Perhaps it seemed irrelevant that Orientals themselves had something at stat in the process, that even in the time of Chateaubriand and Nerval Orientals had lived there, and that now it was they who were suffering; the main thing for the European visitor was a European representation of the Orient and its contemporary fate, both of which had a privileged communal significance for the journalist and his French readers. Americans will not feel quite the same about the Orient, which for them is much more likely to be associated very differently with the Far East (China and Japan, mainly). Unlike the Americans, the French and the British—less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians, and Swiss—have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling Orientalism, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience. The orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. In contrast, the American understanding of the Orient will seem considerably less dense, although our recent Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese adventures ought now to be creating a more sober, more realistic “Oriental” awareness. Moreover, the vastly expanded American political and economic role in the Near East (the Middle East) makes great claims on our understanding of that Orient. It will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation for Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed the label still serves in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism. Compared with Oriental studies or area studies, it is true that the term Orientalism is less preferred by specialists today, both because it is too vague and because it connotes the high-handed executive attitude of nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century European colonialism. Nevertheless books are written and congresses are held with “the Orient” as their main focus, with the Orientalist in his new or old guise as their main authority. The point is that even if it does not survive as it once did, Orientalism lives on academically through its doctrines and theses about the Orient and the Oriental. Related to this academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigrations, specializations, and transmissions are in part the subject of this study, is a more general meaning for Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident.” Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,”

destiny, and so on. This Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante, and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly construed a “field” as this. The interchange between the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplines—perhaps even regulated—traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore is always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity “the Orient” is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show that European culture gained its strength and identity by settling itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.

#### The affirmative’s theorization of China as an abstract player in a hypothetical game assumes a generic cross-cultural reading that allows us to mistake our knowledge of China as China as reality

Daniel Vukovich, Associate Professor at Hong Kong University here he teaches a variety of courses in postcolonial, literary, and cultural or inter-disciplinary studies, PhD in English at the University of Illinois (Urbana), 2010, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy,” Cultural Critique, No. 76 (Fall 2010), Pg. 158-159, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925349

Thus, despite the caveat that Sinography will proceed "without abandoning the question of reference altogether," it indeed abandons this, save for a few potshots at Maoist or "nationalist" intellectuals and the party-state ("the shadow of realpolitikal China") (Hayot, 182). (Such shots further indicate that the eschewal of reference allows Sinography and other poststructuralist "new" readings of China to conceal their essentially cold war political dimensions.) All forms of knowledge - of writing China - are generally equivalent, as they are all "graphesis" (Hayot, 185). Here, China ceases to exist outside of con- structions, dreams, or writings of "China." For a theoretical turn that aims to be more sophisticated than Saidian critique, we are left with a China - and Sino-West encounter - that is an abstract thought ex- periment. This is preordained in the original transformation of the topic of Western understandings of China into an act of generic cross- cultural reading. The problem arises in part with Hayot' s positioning of China as only a space in Eurasia with a "more or less continuous history of being conceived as a political identity"; from this standpoint, the study of representations of China can only be an exercise in "intel- lectual history and cross-cultural reading" in general (Hayot, ix, my emphasis). As is often the case with strict "social obstructionist" modes of criticism, the only reality is that of perception and form. My point here is not just that there is a difference between such construc- tions of reality and reality itself. That, as Roy Bhaskar reminds us, is the epistemic fallacy: mistaking our knowledge of reality for the "thing," reality, itself (111-12, 397). It is also that "Sinography" cannot help us discern what is being constructed. It cannot answer or even pose questions like, Why is one "graphing" of China more or less valuable than another? Why do Sinography other than to show that representations of China and Chineseness are "written"? There is here no dialectic, process, or relay between an actual event and our textualized knowledge of it.

#### Orientalism is a complex process by which the West comes to represent the Orient which removes any autonomy from non-Western entities, justifies their colonization and contributes to the maintenance of Western domination

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 111-144, September 2010, Pg. 119-120, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

The person who firmly established Foucault as a central figure in postcolonial theory and therefore set much of the tone of Foucault-reception afterward was of course Edward Said. The 1978 publication of Orientalism, often taken to be the text which “effectively founded postcolonial studies as an academic discipline,”24 explicitly references Foucault (along with Gramsci and Raymond Williams) as its main philosophical and methodological inspiration. The main theoretical move within Orientalism is Said’s proposal that colonialism and imperial governance of European powers and their allies over the remainder of the world has not only been a project of direct physical domination and control; rather, it has also involved a complex process of dominating the representation of non-Western peoples through the production of specific forms of knowledge about the non-West that have simultaneously served to (a) remove representational authority from non-Western peoples, (b) distort the images and forms of knowledge about them, (c) justify the ongoing physical-military colonization of their lands and resources, and, finally, (d) actually contribute to the production of a new object of study—in this specific case, the ‚Orient.‛ Using only the first three functions of colonial knowledge production Said’s analysis would not fit uncomfortably within the “critique of ideology.” It is, however, the last of these claims—the productive function of colonial discourse—that moves Said further away from Gramsci and Williams, for instance, and toward Foucault. It is also this final claim that troubles his account most persistently.

#### Orientalism naturalizes colonial violence through the repetition and belief in the norm that the Orient is of lesser value. The structure of US hegemony places it in a unique position in regards to the prevalence and potentiality of violence—the alternative is key

Kenichi Yamaguchi, completing his doctoral dissertation, on the “state of exception” in American-occupied Okinawan Islands in the Pacific, at the University of Saskatchewan, 2012, “Rationalization and concealment of violence in American responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a state of exception,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48:3, Pg. 246-247, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.678708

How, then, can there be such non-complicity among the American people, and the national discourse in general, that information leaks have indeed taken place? An understanding of this weakened domestic sovereignty in the state’s use of violence requires a careful consideration of the compact between disciplinary power and its rationalization through discourse. The intricacies of disciplinary power and its relationship to discourse have been the weakest links in Said’s application of Foucauldian discourse. If the colonial domination was exercised not only by physical power but also by means of a priori knowledge about the Orient, it is reasonable to assume that disciplinary power played an instrumental role in colonizing the native bodies by subjecting them to a strict code of discipline. Indeed, considering the massive impact of colonization, surprisingly few critiques among Europeans and the resisting voices from the colonized world took place during the colonial era itself.4 The reason for this situation, as in Said’s implication, is that the discourse of Orientalism – the conceded inferiority of the Oriental subjects themselves on account of their elite – was supported by both sides: Occident (by dominance) and Orient (by hegemony). In this context, colonial violence sustained its “legitimacy” as long as the rationality of colonialism was moralized, normalized and governmentalized. Jordanna Bailkin, for instance, analyzed how English violence on Indians in the Raj was legitimized by modifying the concept of murder and reforming the criminal code. Given the overwhelming, uncontested structural power of European colonies, it was then possible to maintain European hegemony over the “Orient” both materially and representationally in the most domineering fashion. This, however, is not the case with the new Orientalists of the postcolonial, post-9/11 era in which the reception and reapplication of Oriental ideologies cannot be forged by a totalizing domination of the sovereign power. As Harvey reminds us: what the critics [ … ] too often fail to acknowledge is that coercion and liquidation of the enemy is only a partial, and sometimes counterproductive, basis for US power. Consent and cooperation are just as important. If these could not be mobilized internationally and if leadership could not be exercised in such a way as to generate collective benefits, then the US would long ago have ceased to be hegemonic. The US must at least act in such a way as to make the claim that it is acting in the general interest plausible to others even when, as most people suspect, it is acting out of narrow self-interest. (39) In a similar vein, Callinicos argues that “US hegemony, when rationally exercised (as it was not under Bush II), serves the shared interests of the advanced capitalist states in a specific neoliberal globalization” (18). As US responses to the 9/11 attacks are not necessitated by the sort of rationality invoked by the colonial regimes of violence, its hegemonic power cannot reach the same heights of sovereignty that European colonialism once did. Although the US has been relatively successful in assuming leadership among western nations in the last half of the 20th century, both its modalities of power and the period of domination were not as long-standing and domineering as those of the old European colonial states. The 9/11 incident did not alter American political and military advantage relative to other imperial states in a considerable way. Though it did certainly enough to legitimize America’s pre-existing global dominance, it has led to an uneasy climate of fret and disorder within American policymaking. It is therefore possible, I contend, that a combination of strategic dominance and a decline of hegemonic power has become the lynchpin of new Orientalism’s wake.

#### Reject the affirmative—the only means by which orientalism will sustain itself is further projection of Western values. Only disengaging with China undermines this process.

Gordon White, was a political scientist who worked extensively on the political economy of East Asia with a particular focus on China and Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, and Roger Goodman, University Lecturer in the Social Anthropology of Japan and a Fellow of St Antony’s College, University of Oxford , 1998, “Welfare Orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare model,” in *The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the state*, ed. Roger Goodman, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon, Routledge: New York and London, pg. 7-8, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Huck\_Ju\_Kwon/publication/248653877\_The\_East\_Asian\_Welfare\_Model\_Welfare\_Orientalism\_and\_State/links/559de53708aeb45d1715dd07.pdf

This process was particularly pronounced and influential in Japan, which was the first non-Western nation to develop an unquestionably advanced form of capitalism. As the Japanese economy began to take off again in the early 1970s, there was a growth in what is generally known as the Nihonjinron literature2 – a genre of writing detailing the essential qualities of what it means to be Japanese – providing for many in Japan a cultural explanation of why Japan was doing so well. During this period there was a parallel re-evaluation of Western values and experience. As the economies of the West began indeed to go into decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of those same values – individualism, independence, rationality, universalism, logicality, insistence on rights, heterogeneity, equality and contractual relations – which had been seen as responsible for the great strength of the West began to be seen in East Asia as also responsible for its decline. Positive Occidentalism was being transformed into negative Occidentalism. As other economies in the region emulated Japanese economic success – first the ‘four tigers’, then China itself and the second tier of Southeast Asian NICs such as Malaysia and Indonesia – positive Orientalism and negative Occidentalism achieved much wider currency. Even Communist Party reformers in Beijing laid increasing claim to their ‘traditional’ heritage and emphasised their status as an East Asian rather than as a Communist nation; political leaders in Singapore and Malaysia articulated a notion of ‘Asian values’ which challenged the universalistic claims of Western civilisation. Positive Orientalism and negative Occidentalism of this type are two sides of the same coin and they both rest on assertions about cultural identity and the superiority/inferiority of different culturally defined entities. In his analysis of the post-Cold War world in terms of a ‘clash of civilisations’, Samuel Huntington (1997) has identified these trends in East Asia as part of a wider process of ‘indigenisation’, visible in much of the rest of Asia and the Middle East, and related to changing power realities on the world scene. In the East Asian case, the assertion of ‘Asian values’ and the like has reflected not only the growing economic strength of the region, but also the waning ability of Western powers to influence events there. In a manner redolent of Said, Huntington recognises the close link between negative Orientalist images and the spread of Western imperialism; in his words, ‘Culture follows power. If non-Western societies are once again to be shaped by western culture, it will happen only as a result of the expansion of western power’ (1997: 39). Correspondingly, the emphasis on the distinctiveness of East Asian culture has been interpreted as one aspect of the ‘counterhegemonic self-assertiveness 3 of a group of Third World societies which have broken the shackles of poverty and powerlessness, a kind of ‘emancipatory politics of culture that gives non-EuroAmerican cultures greater visibility and voice in a new world capitalist order that is culturally more fluid and complex than the more Eurocentric capitalism of the past’ (Greenhalgh 1994: 747).

## Link

### Contact Zone

#### The affirmative is nothing more than a contact zone for imperial encounters—they do not subvert power dynamics between the US and China they simply moderate and maintain US hegemony

Arif Dirlik, a US historian of Turkish origin who has published extensively on historiography and political ideology in modern China, as well as issues in modernity, globalization, and post-colonial criticism, professor at Duke University, 1996, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4, Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective (Dec., 1996), Pg. 112-113, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505446

Rather than view orientalism as an autochthonous product of a European modernity, therefore, it makes some sense to view it as a product of those "contact zones" in which Europeans encountered non-Europeans, where a Euro- pean modernity produced and was also challenged by alternative modernities as the Others in their turn entered the discourse on modernity. I borrow the term "contact zone" from Mary Louis Pratt, who has described it as "the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict."43 The contact zone is not merely a zone of domination, but also a zone of exchange, even if unequal exchange, which Pratt describes as "transcult- uration," whereby "subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture. While subjugated peoples cannot readily control what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to various extents what they absorb into their own, and what they use it for."44 We may note also that, in the contact zone, in the process of the very effort to communicate with the dominated, the dominant or the metropolitan culture goes through a language change, if to a lesser extent than the dominated. The idea (and the reality) of the contact zone enable an explanation of some of the contradictions in orientalism that I have described above. The contact zone is a zone of domination, because it does not abolish the structures of power of which it is an expression, and to which it serves as a zone of mediation. But the contact zone also implies a distance, a distance from the society of the Self, as well as of the Other. The orientalist, I suggested above, is "orientalized" himself or herself in the very process of entering the "orient" intellectually and sentimentally. It is the same with the "oriental," whose very contact with the orientalist culminates in a distancing from native society, where she or he be- comes an object of suspicion, and who in the long run is better able to communi- cate with the orientalist than with the society of the Self (remember the quotation from Jiang Tingfu above). In some ways, it is this distancing from the complexi- ties of everyday life in either society that facilitates the metonymic cultural representations that I have described above as a basic feature of orientalism - whether by the orientalist, or by the self-orientalizing "oriental." Is it very surprising that nationalism in China, which was as much a source of cultural reification as orientalism, was the production of intellectuals who were them- selves products of contact zones, be they Chinese in China, Chinese intellectuals studying abroad, or Chinese overseas?

### Culture

#### The Orient’s culture is merely a construct created by the Orientalist—appeals to Chinese culture only locks in domination

Neil Lazarus, postcolonial studies scholar, Professor of English at the University of Warwick, editor of The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies, 1993, “Disavowing Decolonization: Fanon, Nationalism, and the Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” Research in African Literatures, Vol. 24, No. 4, Special Issue in Memory of Josaphat Bekunuru Kubayanda (Winter, 1993), Pg. 75 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3820255

We come close, here, to sensing both why Fanon should refer to the culture of the colonized in the disparaging terms that so offend Miller, and what is at stake for him in doing so. Miller has it that Fanon holds African culture in contempt. The truth is quite different. For in a significant sense Fanon does not regard the culture of the colonized in Africa as "African culture" at all! On the contrary, the culture of the colonized is for him a starkly colonial projection, bespeaking a colonial logic that, from the standpoint of the colonized masses themselves, cannot be redeemed except through the destruction of colonialism itself: "The immobility to which the native is condemned can only be called in question if the native decides to put an end to the history of colonization-the history of pillage-and to bring into exis- tence the history of the nation-the history of decolonization" (51). Rather like Edward W. Said's concept of the "oriental" or Spivak's of the "sub- altern"-figures within colonial discourse that are imposed upon and, subsequently, taken up under duress and "lived" by, colonized populations-Fanon's concept of the "native" or the "Negro" is not to be thought of as merely descriptive of indepen- dently existing (African) subjects. This is a point absolutely insisted upon by Fanon: he notes time and again that the figure of the native is not autochthonous, but is rather a construct of colonialism-in fact, of the settler: "The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is right when he speaks of knowing 'them' very well. For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who per- petuates his existence" (36); and, elsewhere: The settler makes history; his life is an epoch, an Odyssey. He is the absolute beginning: "This land was created by us"; he is the unceasing cause: the country will go back to the middle ages." Over against him torpid creatures, wasted by fevers, obsessed by ancestral customs, form an almost inorganic background for the innovating dynamism of colonial mercantilism. (51) In addressing himself to "native" culture, therefore, Fanon is not addressing himself to "traditional" African culture. On the contrary, he is addressing himself to a cul- ture fabricated almost entirely by colonialism, a culture that positions the native as its degraded other: The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil. He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is the depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces. (41 )4

### Chinese Progress

#### The affirmative’s call to action based on furthering the development of China is Orientalism at its finest—comparing China’s lack of development to the US justifies domination

Arif Dirlik, a US historian of Turkish origin who has published extensively on historiography and political ideology in modern China, as well as issues in modernity, globalization, and post-colonial criticism, professor at Duke University, 1996, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4, Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective (Dec., 1996), Pg. 99-100, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505446

Said's argument in Orientalism may be open to criticism from a variety of perspectives, and it has received its share of criticism, especially from "oriental- ists." Whatever may be the merit or lack thereof of these criticisms, the central argument of the book is in my opinion indisputable: orientalism was an integral part (at once as constituent and product) of a Eurocentric conceptualization of the world that was fully articulated in the course of the nineteenth century, that placed Europe at the center and pinnacle of development, and ordered the globe spatially and temporally in accordance with the criteria of European development. Non-European societies were characterized in this reordering of the world not by what they had but by what they lacked - in other words, the lack of one or more of those characteristics that accounted for European development. Rather than provide contemporary alternatives to European de- velopment, they were perceived predominantly as located at some rung or other of the ladder of development that Europe already had left behind. They pro- vided Europeans with glimpses not of alternative presents, but of a past stage of European development, what has been described as "a theory of our contem- porary ancestors." 12 development of this new view of the world went hand in hand with the progress of European colonization and domination of the world.

### Economic Development

#### Striving for economic development of China without analyzing Orientalist knowledge production and intellectual labor dooms the affirmative and necessitates colonization of China

Daniel Vukovich, Associate Professor at Hong Kong University here he teaches a variety of courses in postcolonial, literary, and cultural or inter-disciplinary studies, PhD in English at the University of Illinois (Urbana), 2010, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy,” Cultural Critique, No. 76 (Fall 2010), Pg. 168, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925349

What I will now claim, then, is that as befits a global capitalism increasingly centered on and obsessed with the rising PRC, "China" or "the real China" represents a placeholder for a "new" abstract form of thought within intellectual labor and knowledge production.18 This is to say that the self-referential "China references" in the above "heterodox" texts are abstract in an economic, Sohn-Rethelian sense. They are non-empirical form-abstractions. They are real, orientalist ones that index not China, or even a considered "China," but the in- creasingly economistic nature of intellectual labor and the increasing presence of "China" within Western minds. In sum, then, I am point- ing to a homology between the abstract form of the China in theory, and the real, forceful abstraction at work in contemporary global cap- italism and intellectual labor. This economism of theory points to the expansion of capital within the realm of thought, and for which Sohn- Rethel's work knows a new lease on life. It is an encroachment with orientalist "Chinese characteristics." Unless the production of knowl- edge about China changes - including within the mainland, itself sub- ject to the same forces - the decolonization of China in theory will remain an unfinished project. Such a change will not proceed from further modernizing development and "quality management" within academe, nor from theoretical-critique-as-application.

#### Economic development of China is nothing more than an attempt at Westernizing the Orient while maintaining the distinction between the East and West and thus the perceived superiority of the West

Wang Ning, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University and Director of the Research Institute for Postmodern Studies, 1997, “Orientalism versus Occidentalism?,” New Literary History Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 1997, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/24344

We should first of all recognize that Said’s book has indeed opened up for scholars of comparative literature and cultural studies a new theoretic horizon, which enables us to explore a “marginalized” sphere which has long been neglected and even deliberately overlooked by mainstream Western academic circles. The Orient geographically exists separately from the Western world, but the “Orient” does not merely refer to a geographical location. It also has a very profound political and cultural connotation. This “Orient” has become the “other” of the West, from which perspective Western people reflect its world. Thus it is absolutely necessary for them to have such an “other.” Just as Said writes in his “Introduction,” “The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences. Now it was disappearing; in a sense it had happened, its time was over” (O 1). Said expresses here his somewhat implicit and ambivalent attitude: on the one hand, as an Oriental descendent, he has all the time been recollecting the once-powerful Orient in history, feeling sad about its disappearance; on the other hand, as a high-ranking scholar in the West, he cannot help feeling proud of himself, especially qualified to deal with the “Orient” as an “other” which is unfamiliar to mainstream Western scholarship but with which he has countless ties. Due to his dislike for Western imperialist hegemony, Said starts with his critique of the Western empires by pointing out the axiomatic historical fact of Western dominance over the Orient. “From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did” (O 4). Not only should the Eastern political system model itself on the American one, and its economy keep up with the Western developed countries, with the United States as their center, but Oriental culture should be reframed in Western discourse in order to become significant. In such Oriental countries as China, India, and Japan, to be modernized simply means to be Westernized. Especially in current China, to realize modernization in an all-around way is almost equal to being Westernized in an all-around way. Thousands of Oriental students have tried their best to obtain a degree in the department of Oriental languages and cultures in a Western university and then redoubled their efforts to get a green [End Page 59] card in the West. All this cannot but imply the natural superiority of the West to the East. In contrast, the Orient is nothing but an “other” far from the imperial center, which could be used to reflect on its culture only when the West has begun to be on the decline. If we refer to the unequal East-West cultural relations, I think Said is absolutely correct. In this respect, Said’s book is significant because it encourages mainstream Western scholarship to shift its attention to the Orient with a stress on the “anticolonialist” factor.

### Engagement

#### The affirmative may value China now but Orientalism necessitates the inevitable devaluation of the Orient

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 150

The main traits of this inequality are worth recapitulating briefly. I have already referred to Schlegel’s enthusiasm for India, and then his subsequent revulsion from it and of course from Islam. Many of the earliest Oriental amateurs began by welcoming the Orient as a salutary dérangement of their European habits of mind and spirit. The Orient was overvalued for its pantheism, its spirituality, its stability, its longevity, its primitivity, and so forth. Schelling, for example, saw in Oriental polytheism a preparation of the way for Judeo-Christian monotheism: Abraham was prefigured in Brahma. Yet almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a counterresponse: the Orient suddenly appeared lamentably under-humanized, antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth. A swing of the pendulum in one direction caused an equal and opposite swing back: the Orient was undervalued. Orientalism as a profession grew out of these opposites, of compensations and corrections based on inequality, ideas nourished by and nourishing similar ideas in the culture at large. Indeed the very project of restriction and restructuring associated with Orientalism can be traced directly to the inequality by which the Orient’s comparative poverty (or wealth) besought scholarly, scientific treatment of the kind to be found in disciplines like philology, biology, history, anthropology, philosophy, or economics.

#### The affirmative’s demand for [diplomatic/economic] engagement is strictly reactionary—China has been on the rise and in order to maintain Western superiority, the US must engage and be a part of the evolution

Daniel Vukovich, teaches postcolonial, literary, and theoretical studies at Hong Kong University, with an emphasis on the PRC and Sino-Western politics , 2012, “China as Humanist Exemplum,” Cultural Politics, 8(2), Duke University Press, Pg. 214, http://culturalpolitics.dukejournals.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/content/8/2/207.full.pdf

The demand for humanism today must be about something else. Not the rediscovery of an essential discourse in tune with human nature, or the foundation of individuals speaking Truth to Power, but a shift— the demand or resurgence—within our intellectual-political culture. To begin with, we need to deal with that nod toward Asia, that is, China. It has not escaped anyone’s attention in recent years that China is not only irresistibly rising (even within the recent financial tsunami) but in some sense has already arisen. One answer to the question of why China and humanism, then, has to do with this. The use of humanism to interpret or even change China (from the outside or inside) may be a response—something like a denial or displacement—to the difference and dissonance that this rise of China poses. In the face of a powerful, booming, multitudinous China, one filled with a variety of official and popular, sometimes strident nationalisms as well as a resilient party-state with strong legitimacy and a resistance to (Western) liberal political reform, a universalist humanism reasserts itself. Underneath that difference, particularity, and/or antagonism—especially in regard to the political system and its legitimacy despite being allegedly “despotic”—they must be the same as “us,” subjectively or existentially speaking.

### Historical Ignorance

#### Historicity necessitates a complex yet coherent unity—the affirmative acquires this unity by homogenizing the experience of the Orient and blocking epistemological critiques

Edward W. Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, author of Orientalism, 1985, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Cultural Critique, No. 1 (Autumn, 1985), Pg. 101-102, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354282

But along with the greater capacity for dealing with - in Ernst Bloch's phrase - the non-synchronous experiences of Europe's Other has gone a fairly uniform avoidance of the relationship between Euro- pean imperialism and these variously constituted, variously formed and articulated knowledges. What, in other words, has never taken place is an epistemological critique at the most fundamental level of the connection between the development of a historicism which has expanded and developed enough to include antithetical attitudes such as ideologies of Western imperialism and critiques of imperialism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the actual practise of imperialism by which the accumulation of territories and population, the control of economies, and the incorporation and homogenization of histories are maintained. If we keep this in mind we will remark, for example, that in the methodological assumptions and practise of world history - which is ideologically anti-imperialist - little or no attention is given to those cultural practises like Orientalism or ethnography af- filiated with imperialism, which in genealogical fact fathered world history itself; hence the emphasis in world history as a discipline has been on economic and political practises, defined by the processes of world historical writing, as in a sense separate and different from, as well as unaffected by, the knowledge of them which world history pro- duces. The curious result is that the theories of accumulation on a world scale, or the captialist world state, or lineages of absolutism depend (a) on the same displaced percipient and historicist observer who had been an Orientalist or colonial traveler three generations ago; (b) they depend also on a homogenizing and incorporating world historical scheme that assimilated non-synchronous developments, histories, cultures, and peoples to it; and (c) they block and keep down latent epistemological critiques of the institutional, cultural, and dis- ciplinary instruments linking the incorporative practise of world his- tory with partial knowledges like Orientalism, on the one hand, and with continued "Western" hegemony of the non-European, peripheral world, on the other.

#### The affirmative is founded on the idea that the Other can provide no useful theory of international relations because it is unable to transcend its particular experience

Siba N. Grovogui, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1998 “Rituals of Power: Theory, Languages, and Vernaculars of International Relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1998), Pg. 503 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644926

There is a degree of predictability to this apparent randomness of selection. International theorists, like most social theorists, have been inclined to view "Theory" as one of the only appropriate forms of social knowledge, as they have also considered their own form as an exclusively valid mode of signification. Accordingly, modern the- ory has excluded countless forms of knowledge from examination; it has also discounted unfamiliar or ideologically contemptible ana- lytical methods and related lines of inquiry or regimes of truth. Re- latedly, it has validated particular social realities, moral imaginaries, and relations at the expense of others. Naomi Schor, among others, has attributed the ideological assumptions underlying such exclu- sions to a discursive tradition, originating in the Enlightenment, that questions the ability of certain subjects - particularly the formerly colonized, women, and Western minorities - to "feel responsible for the universe."18 This means that they are unable to transcend their particular experiences in order to derive universalist conclusions from them.19 According to Neil Lazarus, the preceding suggestion has been made more strongly in regard to African anticolonialists. The latter's supposed disinterest in assuming "the burden of hu- manity" has been attributed to a lack of ability to theorize beyond their own particular circumstances.20 Alternatively, according to Partha Chatterjee, theorists have intimated that non-Western Others could not imagine any modern reality outside of the images of polity and political processes provided by the West.21 Hence, the propensity to view any pretension to universalism by the contemptible subjects as merely an essentialism or a particularism transmuted into tran- scendental narcissism.22

### Humanism

#### The affirmative’s engagement with China based on humanism is a way to regress to an antitheoretical time prior to anti-imperial theory

Daniel Vukovich, teaches postcolonial, literary, and theoretical studies at Hong Kong University, with an emphasis on the PRC and Sino-Western politics , 2012, “China as Humanist Exemplum,” Cultural Politics, 8(2), Duke University Press, Pg. 210-211, http://culturalpolitics.dukejournals.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/content/8/2/207.full.pdf

All of my opening examples above are each separate events with their own local contexts, constituencies, and purposes.1 My point is not to argue that they are identical: that would be the logic of humanism in the first place. At the same time, humanism’s denial of historical and contextual specificities should not preclude us from analyzing global, homologous phenomena. It is in this sense that these above examples index a renewed appeal of the concept or discursive “thing” called humanism—both in China (as the inclusion of the photographic/portraiture exhibit is meant to suggest) and in the West. More specifically, there is a demand to use China as the site or proof of the universal validity of humanism. That this can and does happen both in China and outside it does not mean that, say, Chinese Marxist or neo-Confucian humanism and the old-fashioned, literary humanism of middlebrow American intellectuals are the same. But it does mean—I will insist—that there is a global trend and incitement to discourse worth examining here, not least in terms of its politics. I will briefly examine recent, if faded, Chinese returns to humanism below. But my focus in this essay is much more on the Western or perhaps chiefly American context of this demand for humanism. I interrogate the deployment of humanism as a way of understanding modern China in general and the Mao era in particular. This development has to be situated within and in part explained by the long history and enduring phenomenon of orientalism, a thing that is still too much with us even if it has taken different, “sinological,” and Cold War–inflected characteristics since the time of Said’s classic work (see Vukovich 2012; Hevia 2003; Chan 2009).2 Put another way, this turn to humanism is a backlash or a return to an essentially antitheoretical and, more important, an anti- or depoliticizing mode of discourse and cultural politics. It is neither a discovery nor an innovation; it seeks to take us back to the good old days before theory on the one hand and before postcolonial, anti-imperialist, or other forms of radical critique on the other.

#### Diplomatic engagement with China on the basis of human rights is a ploy to attempt to establish the US as the moral victor thus perpetuating Orientalism

Gloria Davies, a literary scholar and historian of China who conducts research, supervises and teaches in several areas, 2010, “Affirming the Human in China,” boundary 2 37:1 (2010), Pg. 59, http://ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=48638014&site=ehost-live

Setting aside the accuracy or otherwise of such reports by either party, if nothing else, the fact that the governments of China and the United States feel compelled to conduct this mutual finger-pointing in the language of human rights speaks volumes for the authority that this language has come to command in our times. Indeed, it would seem, to borrow Michael Ignatieff’s phrase, to have become “the only universally available moral vernacular” in which all parties can at least superficially agree on and work toward at least some common principles and goals.2 But precisely because of its universal appeal and usage, the language of human rights is always at risk of dilution into the banal or even trite. Both the Chinese and U.S. reports exemplify how such language can be and routinely is used to produce a cycle of accusation and counteraccusation with no expected prospect of productive dialogue over the substance of the actual criticisms exchanged. These reports, of course, were designed not for the purpose of productive dialogue but rather to pursue the purely polemical goal of occupying the higher moral ground in a tit-for-tat annual round-robin of judging the “other” for their human rights transgressions.

### Modernity

#### Striving for modernization has led to self-orientalism in China

Grace Yan, doctoral student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Carla Almeida Santos, Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009, “’CHINA, FOREVER’: Tourism Discourse and Self-Orientalism,” Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carla\_Santos12/publication/222509059\_China\_forever\_tourism\_discourse\_and\_self-Orientalism/links/0912f50cba5dae7ed4000000.pdf Pg. 298-299

Another approach considers self-Orientalism a profound consequence of the Orient’s striving for modernity. In particular, China’s fervent pursuit of modernity has been the most defining feature of its modern history (Duara 1995). To fully interpret the intertwined relationship between modernity and postcolonialism, it is necessary to trace back the philosophical underpinnings of colonialism—the Western Enlightenment ideology and social Darwinism. Accordingly, history develops along a linear scale where Western nations acquire an advanced ‘‘mature individuality’’ (Hegel 1956:91), while the rest of the world are positioned on lower scales—China, for instance, is a ‘‘mindless unhistorical history’’ (140), and Africa is the ‘‘innocent land of childhood’’ (140). Thus, modernity is interpreted as the unique quality and possession of Western civilization, leaving the Orient to develop along this scale (Shih 2001). Implicit in such ideological positioning is the assumption of inferiority of non-Western civilizations; incapable of producing alternative versions of modernity. Such ideological positioning has been internalized by the Orient, and manifested by the reliance on stereotypical material symbols of modernity that were initially invented and endorsed by the West. Those representations, as they speak of desires and yearnings of seeking equality with the West, posit reflexively at its own cultural premise, hence invoking self-Orientalism. Moreover, because the interpretation and representation of global culture is firmly entrenched in an overarching framework of EuroAmerican conceptions of the world (Shome and Hedge 2002), Orientalism is useful in creating a unique and different identity for the once colonized (Zhang 2006). That is, to counter a homogeneous modernity discourse, recollecting and, in some cases, reinventing traditions to recreate an ancient, historical, and unchanging identity has become a strategy for the Orient. Consequently, self-Orientalism is invoked and manipulated to create a sense of difference in postcolonial power dynamics: an ideological maneuvering. Constructing an East-West binary, Asia acquires a visible position in a predominantly invisible modern world (Chatterjee 1993; Zhang 2006).

### Queer Theory

#### The Orient has historically been characterized as Queer and thus has been a focal point in attempts to ontologically capture and describe the Other

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 102-104

With disenchantment and a generalized—not to say schizophrenic—view of the Orient, there is usually another peculiarity. Because it is made into a general object, the whole Orient can be made to serve as an illustration of a particular form of eccentricity. Although the individual Oriental cannot shake or disturb the general categories that make sense of his oddness, his oddness can nevertheless be enjoyed for its own sake. Here, for example, is Flaubert describing the spectacle of the Orient: To amuse the crowd, Mohammed Ali’s jester took a woman in a Cairo bazaar one day, set her on the counter of a shop, and coupled with her publicly while the shopkeeper calmly smoked his pipe. On the road from Cairo to Shubra some time ago a young fellow had himself publicly buggered by a large monkey—as in the story above, to create a good opinion of himself and make people laugh. A marabout died a while ago—an idiot—who had long passed as a saint marked by God; all the Moslem women came to see him and masturbated him—in the end he died of exhaustion—from morning to night it was a perpetual jacking-off. . . . Quid dicis of the following fact: some time ago a santon (ascetic priest) used to walk through the streets of Cairo completely naked except for a cap on his head and another on his prick. To piss he would doff the prick-cap, and sterile women who wanted children would run up, put themselves under the parabola of his urine and rub themselves with it.98 Flaubert frankly acknowledges that this is grotesquerie of a special kind. “All the old comic business”—by which Flaubert meant the well-known conventions of “the cudgeled slave . . . the coarse trafficker in women . . . the thieving merchant”—acquire a new, “fresh . . . genuine and charming” meaning in the Orient. This meaning cannot be reproduced; it can only be enjoyed on the spot and “brought back” very approximately. The Orient is watched, since its almost (but never quite) offensive behavior issues out of a reservoir of infinite peculiarity; the European, whose sensibility tours the Orient, is a watcher, never involved, always detached, always ready for new examples of what the Description de l’Égypte called “bizarre jouissance.” The Orient becomes a living tableau of queerness. And this tableau quite logically becomes a special topic for texts. Thus the circle is completed; from being exposed as what texts do not prepare one for, the Orient can return as something one writes about in a disciplined way. Its foreignness can be translated, its meanings decoded, its hostility tamed; yet the generality assigned to the Orient, the disenchantment that one feels after encountering it, the unresolved eccentricity it displays, all are redistributed in what is said or written about it. Islam, for example, was typically Oriental for Orientalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Carl Becker argued that although “Islam” (note the vast generality) inherited the Hellenic tradition, it could neither grasp nor employ the Greek, humanist tradition; moreover, to understand Islam one needed above all else to see it, not as an “original” religion, but as a sort of failed Oriental attempt to employ Greek philosophy without the creative inspiration that we find in Renaissance Europe.99 For Louis Massignon, perhaps the most renowned and influential or modern French Orientalists, Islam was renowned and influential of modern French Orientalists, Islam was a systematic rejection of the Christian incarnation, and its greatest hero was not Mohammed or Averroës but al-Hallaj, a Muslim saint who was crucified by the orthodox Muslims for having dared to personalize Islam.100 What Becker and Massignon explicitly left out of their studies was the eccentricity of the Orient, which they backhandedly acknowledged by trying so hard to regularize it in Western terms. Mohammed was thrown out, but al-Hallaj was made prominent because he took himself to be a Christ-figure.

### Postmodernism

#### Western postmodern thinkers theorize about China using only Western understandings of the PRC—this obscures the lived reality in the country and creates problematic solutions

Daniel Vukovich, Associate Professor at Hong Kong University here he teaches a variety of courses in postcolonial, literary, and cultural or inter-disciplinary studies, PhD in English at the University of Illinois (Urbana), 2010, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy,” Cultural Critique, No. 76 (Fall 2010), Pg. 156-157, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925349

The simpler, "vulgar" question of reading bears scrutiny. What is striking in the positions adopted by heterodox thinkers is that even in the sphere of left cultural theory, many of our theorists content them- selves with received notions about China taken largely from the West- ern media. Ironically, we need not be limited to such knowledge due to Chinese state censorship, for there is now a significant body of work that offers alternative, complex knowledge of the PRC. There is no evidence at all, in fact, that radical theory has read or digested the views of their counterparts in China or abroad, whose own hetero- doxy would throw new light on the problem of an imputed totalitar- ianism and the "known" realities of the PRC. Wang Zheng, for instance, has argued that the quasi-feminist, Maoist discourse of gender neutral- ity - promulgated by the state - enabled young women to self-identify as "revolutionary youth" and "communist successors," to grow up free from patriarchal kinship obligations, and to be largely unaware of being "women" (see esp. Wang Zheng, 51-52). Han and Gao (1999) offer us rich studies of the remarkable increases in rural welfare, edu- cation, health care, and political participation during the Cultural Rev- olution, as well as incisive critiques of elite histories of post-1949 China within and outside the mainland. These are complemented by Wang Hui's (116-37) theoretical arguments against the Eurocentrism of the antistate, beyond-the-nation position of Western theory and for more, not less state intervention into the free market.

### Privileging Western Scholarship

#### Privileging Western modes of knowledge production assumes that the West’s language of politics is the only relevant mode, undermining any alternative and furthering stereotypes of inferiority

Siba N. Grovogui, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1998 “Rituals of Power: Theory, Languages, and Vernaculars of International Relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1998), Pg. 500-501 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644926

In a telling lapse, the Daedalus discussions omitted from consid- eration a multitude of alternative views of the moral order, interests, desires, and will, as well as related assumptions or inquiries by indi- viduals, groups, and associations that hold fundamentally distinct conclusions and recommendations of global reform. This omission is consistent with modern Western discursive traditions that mistakenly link the existence of the moral imaginary with political theory and its practice, or theorizing.7 Taking theory as the only legitimate form of social knowledge and the modern Western language of politics as its ultimate expression, these traditions intimate that the historic Western political imaginary and its related theories offer the stric- tures of all valid discourses of international relations. The political imaginary encompasses distinct structures of subjectivity or identity and historically formed objects of social relations. For its part, theory formalizes public language in the form of symbolic representations of interests and morality within the social order. The consequence of the formalization of a particular moral imaginary by theory is not simply that in its universal instantiation the latter amalgamates a multitude of distinct social orders that may be compatible or not. Rather, Western theoretical traditions have produced their own his- tories and conceptual economies based upon the presumption of the inexorable progression of an omniscient regenerative Western civi- lization that they contrast with stereotypes of fixed cultures else- where, presumed to be beset by privation and moral degeneration. As illustrated by the contributions to "The Quest," the vast majority of contemporary international theorists have subscribed to the logic of the above traditions and, consequently, failed to recognize t;he va- lidity of non-Western languages of politics and their intended moral orders as legitimate contexts for imagining the alternatives to the present moral order.8

### Protest/Social Movement

#### Theorists calling for uprise and revolution consistently characterize China as incapable of communicating with global protest networks and study only Tiananmen Square—this focus allows for descriptive and normative claims to be made from an Orientalist lens without an actual analysis of protest groups in China

Daniel Vukovich, Associate Professor at Hong Kong University here he teaches a variety of courses in postcolonial, literary, and cultural or inter-disciplinary studies, PhD in English at the University of Illinois (Urbana), 2010, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy,” Cultural Critique, No. 76 (Fall 2010), Pg. 152-153, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925349

Hardt and Negri's Empire is a similar text in both its Zeitgeist- style and its case for nothing less than a new communist manifesto for the global communities or "multitudes." Hardt and Negri revise the metaphysically anthropological mode of Agamben's The Coming Community by emphasizing "immaterial labor" and post-Fordism and declaring that the new global community has already arrived. But they share with Agamben a highly challenged use of China. Here, too, Tiananmen presents itself in unexpected places, again turning on what the movement lacked. This struggle, like the Palestinian Intifada of 1989 and the Zapatista uprising to which it is equated, is characterized above all by its "incommunicability," its "failure" to communicate at both a "local level" and to other, global struggles (Hardt and Negri, 54). Hardt and Negri do not see this as a problem as much as a sign of the times: that in the age of empire, what such struggles lack in communicability and duration, they make up for in "intensity" and point to a new or future type of communication based "not on resem- blances but . . . differences": "a communication of singularities" (57). And yet, the question of who is communicating what to whom goes begging. This is also assuming, as one must with Agamben, that a crypto-sublime singularity can be communicated at all. But despite its alleged ephemerality and inability to "communicate" locally or globally, Tiananmen nonetheless leaps "vertically," "touches" "the global level," and "attacks . . . Empire" (55, 57). It is very odd to hear that a mass movement that spread across several provinces and rapidly mobilized much of Beijing's population, not least through big-character posters, handbills, and pirate broadcasts, was not communicating any- thing - even to the Chinese (see, e.g., Unger). I would submit that, just as the Mao period is made equivalent to Soviet Russia, the Tiananmen reference is simply a convenient vehicle - a crucial "proof" and exem- plum - to show the truth of "empire." Precisely because the text seeks to convince us that the new empire, its multitudes, and their common resistances do actually exist and form a whole, it is crucial to ask what such struggles as Tiananmen, the Intifada, and so on have in common. But Tiananmen, invoked in Deleuzian language, is something that we are just supposed to know. "China" is ready-made to fit the theory in a seamless way.

## Impact

### Colonization

#### Orientalism is the attempt by the orientalist to conquer and exert power over the Orient via consumption and cancelation of the people, their culture and their history

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 87

Yet the military failure of Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt did not also destroy the fertility of its over-all projection for Egypt or the rest of the Orient. Quite literally, the occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted form within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt, whose agencies of domination and dissemination included the Institut and the Description. The idea, as it has been characterized by Charles-Roux, was that Egypt “restored to prosperity, regenerated by wise and enlightened administration . . . would shed its civilizing rays upon all its Oriental neighbors.”80 True, the other European powers would seek to compete in this mission, none more than England. But what would happen as a continuing legacy of the common Occidental mission to the Orient—despite inter-European squabbling, indecent competition, or outright war—would be the creation of new projects, new visions, new enterprises combining additional parts of the old Orient with the conquering European spirit. After Napoleon, then, the very language of Orientalism changed radically. Its descriptive realism was upgraded and became not merely a style of representation but a language, indeed a means of creation. Along with the langues mères, as those forgotten dormant sources for the modern European demotics were entitled by Antoine Fabre d’Olivet, the Orient was reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, born out of the Orientalists’ efforts. The Description became the master type of all further efforts to bring the Orient closer to Europe, thereafter to absorb it entirely and—centrally important—to cancel, or at least subdue and reduce, its strangeness and, in the case of Islam, its hostility. For the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists’ power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as history.

#### Orientalism justifies unending Western exploitation and colonization of the East

Grace Yan, doctoral student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Carla Almeida Santos, Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009, “’CHINA, FOREVER’: Tourism Discourse and Self-Orientalism,” Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carla\_Santos12/publication/222509059\_China\_forever\_tourism\_discourse\_and\_self-Orientalism/links/0912f50cba5dae7ed4000000.pdf Pg. 296-297

Postcolonial is ‘‘...not the end of colonization. It is after a certain kind of colonialism, after a certain moment of high imperialism and colonial occupation—in the wake of it, in the shadow of it, inflected by it—it is what it is because something else has happened before, but it is also something new’’ (Drew 1999:230). Within postcolonialism, Said’s (1978) seminal work Orientalism is considered the primary catalyst for the development of postcolonial theory. Orientalism is ‘‘the ideological suppositions, images and fantasies about a currently important and politically urgent region of the world called the ‘Orient’’’ (Said 1978). Orientalism, therefore, is an imperialist epistemology which assumes that the differences between Western and Eastern civilizations are ontological (Said 1978). It proposes that the West carries moral, intellectual and cultural superiority over non-Western civilizations (Hung 2003). This essentialist boundary is based upon hierarchical binary oppositions separating the Orient and Occident; the result of human fabrication rather than nature (Dirlik 1996). In postcolonial times, the power that the West exercises on the Orient is no longer strictly military-based–with exception of neocolonial relations in post-Cold War era. This, nevertheless, does not suggest the receding of Western power; instead, in postcolonial times the act of power takes the form of representation—the power of ‘‘textual attitude’’ (Costa 1997; Said 1978). Indeed, Said articulates Orientalism by focusing on the textuality and the body of writing and representing; shifting previous postcolonialism scholars’ critique of the colonial system to a critique of colonial discourse (Hassen 2002). In doing so, Said suggests that to represent the Orient is to construct or invent it, and thus to eventually exercise power over it. Specifically, in Western discourse, the East is constructed as an Other in opposition to the West; if the West is culturally, politically and economically speaking at the center of the world, the East is undeniably positioned at the periphery (Chang and Holt 1991; Wang 1997). Symbolically, the West is civilized, masculine, advanced, normative, and rational while the East is cruel, sly, backward, mysterious, exotic, and irrational (Echtner and Prasad 2003; Said 1978); implying that the Orient’s socio-cultural realities are truly different from the West (Said 1994). Thus, by defining the Orient, Orientalism functions as discursive practices of domination used to ‘‘justify the exploration, exploitation, colonization, and ‘civilization’ of the East’’ (Echtner and Prasad 2003:667). Such binary oppositions of Occidental/Oriental are mutually defining and reflexive; the process of identity formation of the Orient is to maintain the Western imagination of itself and thus, ironically, Orientalism has become the ‘‘life force of Western self-identification’’ (Sardar 1999:13). Therefore, the emergence and practice of Orientalism has, in fact, substantially illuminated Western self-subjectivities and self-positionings in the world order.

#### Orientalism creates and perpetuates static, racist caricatures of the Orient in an effort to maintain Western domination—these stereotypes are used as justifications for interventionist policies

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 108-109

Thus as revolutionary turmoil grips the Islamic Orient, sociologists remind us that Arabs are addicted to “oral functions,”106 while economists—recycled Orientalists—observe that for modern Islam neither capitalism nor socialism is an adequate rubric.107 As anticolonialism sweeps and indeed unifies the entire Oriental world, the Orientalist damns the whole business not only as a nuisance but as an insult to the Western democracies. As momentous, generally important issues face the world—issues involving nuclear destruction, catastrophically scarce resources, unprecedented human demands for equality, justice, and economic parity—popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist. The legendary Arabists in the State Department warn of Arab plans to take over the world. The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for “our” largesse and are damned when “we lose them” to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts: the difference is scarcely significant. These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, vernal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls “the hegemonism of possessing minorities” and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition “it” is not quite as human as “we” are. There is no purer example that this of dehumanized thought. In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient’s cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent The new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow-citizens.108 Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient’s misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, The Cambridge Hisotry of islam, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social-science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident.

### Self-fulfilling prophecy

#### The West projects its conceptualization of the Orient onto China, creating the China it imagines foreclosing the possibility of any self-determination and justifying exploitation

Eric Hayot, professor in the department of Comparative Literature at Penn State, 1999, “Orientalism, Modernism, and the Meaning of Pound's China,” Twentieth Century Literature, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter, 1999), Pg. 515, http://www.jstor.org/stable/441950

A half-century after Eliot called Pound "the inventor of Chinese poetry," Edward Said declared on the first page of Orientalism that "The Orient was almost a European invention." Like Eliot, Said is discussing the powerful reality effect of Western representations of the East. In some way, Said names the process Eliot had identified in 1928: the tendency for the West to believe that its literature and art accurately represented the Orient an sich. Unlike Eliot, however, Said sees this process as moral and historical, declaring that orientalism allowed the West to justify its imperialist exploitation of a good chunk of the world from the Enlightenment through the Second World War. For Said, orientalism means "the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage-and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, and imaginatively" (3). Unlike Eliot, for whom the reality effect of Pound's translations worked primarily as a thought-problem or an exercise in ontology, Said's concern with the West's Orient ultimately returns to the real Orient. The West's Orient develops its "reality and presence" (5) by virtue of the changes it effects on the minds of Westerners who then behave a certain way in the real Orient, dealing its effects on the people and governments that live there. The myth of orientalism thus returns to its source and becomes real, in the form of some extravagant self-fulfilling prophecy.

### Domination

#### Domination inevitable when the affirmative’s scholarship is based entirely on orientalism

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 45-46

In Cromer’s own case as an imperial administrator the “proper study is also man,” he says. When Pope proclaimed the proper study of mankind to be man, he meant all men, including “the poor Indian”; whereas Cromer’s “also” reminds us that certain men, such as Orientals, can be singled out as the subject for proper study. The proper study—in this sense—of Orientals is Orientalism, properly separate from other forms of knowledge, but finally useful (because finite) for the material and social reality enclosing all knowledge at any time, supporting knowledge, providing it with uses. An order of sovereignty is set up from East to West, a mock chain of being whose clearest form was given once by Kipling: Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier his general, who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.15 As deeply forged as is this monstrous chain of command, as strongly managed as is Cromer’s “harmonious working,” Orientalism can also express the strength of the West and the Orient’s weakness—as seen by the West. Such strength and such weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into large general divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference. For that is the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism. Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into “us” (Westerners) and “they” (Orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy (as the categories were used by Balfour and Cromer) the result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. In short, from its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as “East” and “West”: to channel thought into a West or an East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice, and values found in the West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having the status of scientific truth.

### State of Exception

#### Orientalism requires the Orient be subjected to an unending state of exception which justifies policing and war

Kenichi Yamaguchi, completing his doctoral dissertation, on the “state of exception” in American-occupied Okinawan Islands in the Pacific, at the University of Saskatchewan, 2012, “Rationalization and concealment of violence in American responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a state of exception,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48:3, Pg. 242, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.678708

Notwithstanding Said’s own sustained interest, many scholars have claimed a latent resurgence of Orientalism(s) in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In his pioneering study Military Orientalism, Patrick Porter observes the emergence of post-9/11 military ideologies based on the (old) Orientalist epistemic rift between the so-called creative/productive westerners and predatory/destructive Orientalists who cannot fight (75). With war as its pretext, western nations and their allies have resorted to an ever more violent Orientalist ideology wherein the “besieged cartographies” of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine (Gregory 111–44) are subjected to a permanent state of exception and emergency in the name of global democracy and world civilization. It is only reasonable to suggest that policing and military enforcements at the Guantanamo Bay Camp have become the domestic examples of such “besieged cartographies” within which the demonized Muslim subjects can be contained and cured. Yet the concept and critique of new Orientalism has emerged in such an anti-Orientalist climate that its theoretical perimeters remain as vague as the contexts and ideologies it seeks to challenge.

## Alternative

### Reject

#### Contemplating Orientalism is key to understanding the otherization of minority/oppressed populations

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 96-97

The point I am trying to make here is that the transition from a merely textual apprehension, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the putting of all this into practice in the Orient did take place, and that Orientalism had much to do with that—if I may use the word in a literal sense—preposterous transition. So far as its strictly scholarly work was concerned (and I find the idea of strictly scholarly work as disinterested and abstract hard to understand: still, we can allow it intellectually), Orientalism did a great many things. During its great age in the nineteenth century it produced scholars; it increased the number of languages taught in the West and the quantity of manuscripts edited, translated, and commented on; in many cases, it provided the Orient with sympathetic European students, genuinely interested in such matters as Sanskrit grammar, Phoenician numismatics, and Arabic poetry. Yet—and here we must be very clear—Orientalism overrode the Orient. As a system of thought about the Orient, it always rose from the specifically human detail to the general transhuman one; an observation about a tenth-century Arab poet multiplied itself into a policy towards (and about) the Oriental mentality in Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia. Similarly a verse from the Koran would be considered the best evidence of an ineradicable Muslim sensuality. Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient, absolutely different (the reasons change from epoch to epoch) from the West. And Orientalism, in its post-eighteenth-century form, could never revise itself. All this makes Cromer and Balfour, as observers and administrators of the Orient, inevitable. The closeness between politics and Orientalism, or to put it more circumspectly, the great likelihood that ideas about the Orient drawn from Orientalism can be put to political use, is an important yet extremely sensitive truth. It raises questions about the predisposition towards innocence or guilt, scholarly disinterest or pressure-group complicity, in such fields as black or women’s studies. It necessarily provokes unrest in one’s conscience about cultural, racial, or historical generalizations, their uses, value, degree of objectivity, and fundamental intent. More than anything else, the political and cultural circumstances in which Western Orientalism has flourished draw attention to the debased position of the Orient or Oriental as an object of study. Can any other than a political master-slave relation produce the Orientalized Orient perfectly characterized by Anwar Abdel Malek? a) On the level of the position of the problem, and the problematic . . . the Orient and Orientals [are considered by Orientalism] as an “object” of study, stamped with an otherness—as all that is different, whether it be “subject” or “object”—but of a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist character. . . . This “object” of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a “historical” subjectivity, above all, non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself: the only Orient or Oriental or “subject” which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed understood, defined—and acted—by others. b) On the level of the thematic, [the Orientalists] adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology . . . and will soon proceed with it towards racism. According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist—sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms—which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both “historical,” since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, “the object” of study, within its inalienable and non-evolutive specificity,

instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples, and cultures—as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution. Thus one ends with a typology—based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential—which makes of the studied “object” another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man—the “normal man,” is understood—being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples.88

### Solvency

#### Understanding is impossible without interrogating the role Orientalism plays in Western conceptualizations of China and how those representations mediate international relationships and knowledge

Daniel Vukovich, Associate Professor at Hong Kong University here he teaches a variety of courses in postcolonial, literary, and cultural or inter-disciplinary studies, PhD in English at the University of Illinois (Urbana), 2010, “China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy,” Cultural Critique, No. 76 (Fall 2010), Pg. 159-160, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40925349

In the end we are presented with a closed system of discourse that like orientalism itself is only self-referential: "Whatever distinc- tion exists between the West and 'China' . . . nonetheless reveals itself ... to be caught up in the ephemerality of self-recognition" (Hayot, 188). This echoes Saussy's claim against critique and for theory as self-referential therapy: "Have we been missing something all these centuries, so that we take a work of critique to be the archetypal pro- ject of logical construction? Or is the difference (between philosophy as foundation and philosophy as therapy) merely illusory?" (189-90). There is indeed a long view of History here, resulting in a condition that can no longer say what China or "China" refer to, beyond a cer- tain set of signifiers that refer back only to the text in question. This is indeed a postmodernism - a triumphalistic textuality reminiscent of the Modern Language Association of the late 1980s - writ large. The positional superiority of the Sinographer is as strong here as in Agam- ben and the rest. It is assumed that this "graphing" framework fits China seamlessly, and virtually all writings of China at any point in time. Thus, Saussy can reach back to Mateo Ricci, the sixteenth- century Italian missionary, as easily as to journalist Edgar Snow (1905- 72), alleged Chinese nationalists, or Derrida, because he is unimpeded by contextualization. Note that this type of analysis departs from Said's own sweeping history. Orientalism mapped changes within a discur- sive structure and rooted these within a larger history of contact and colonialism. The postmodern template of Sinography is also notable for its non-engagement with the large body of literature from China on postmodernism (as theory and as epoch) and its relationship to the mainland, a subject of intense debate since the late 1980s (for an overview, see Dirlik and Zhang, and Liu and Tang).11 We can thus say of these texts directed against postcolonialism and for misrepresenta- tion what Brennan has said of Rey Chow's deconstruction of the "myth of origins" and "Chineseness": that they do not deconstruct reference so much as "efface" it; and having done this, "there is no outer tribu- nal to compare China against the West's 'translation' of it" (Brennan, 54). This is not to appeal to an unmediated reality but to a mediated one, to the context and constitutive outside of interpretation and cul- tural translation. In the case of China this must be informed by the antagonisms and epistemological challenges - such as orientalism - that have subtended the China-West relationship for, say, a good three hundred years. Without such ground not just critique but understand- ing is impossible. This tribunal will inevitably have to substantially address and not dismiss the complex matters of misrepresentation and judgment.

#### The alternative is necessary to any productive political engagement—we must actively engage in the way we produce knowledge about the Orient in order to change the oppressive dynamic that operates in the status quo

Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor of Indian History and Culture, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, and David Washbrook, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, 1992 “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), Pg. 155-156, http://www.jstor.org/stable/178988

Said's continuing commitment at other levels both to conventional human- ist techniques of representation and to an implicitly universalist discourse of freedom is often less well appreciated. Despite his criticism of Orientalism as a style of representation, he makes it clear that his concern is not to reject the possibility of any kind of objective representation. Knowledge for Said clear- ly is not just the endlessly self-referential product of all-pervasive power relations. On the contrary, his interest lies in developing forms of representa- tion and knowledge which are emancipatory in their effects and which can serve as a basis for active political commitment and intervention. As he says, unless intellectuals are interested in changing political relations, in disman- tling systems of domination as well as defining them, the critique of Orien- talism is merely "an ephemeral pastime."4' He sees any worthwhile cultural criticism as "constitutionally opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are non-coercive knowledge produced in the in- terests of human freedom."42 This pursuit of criticism's active emancipatory potential is "a fundamental human and intellectual obligation."43 He differs sharply here from Derrida and Foucault, whom he sees as having abandoned the critic's proper task of an engagement which is ultimately political in its nature with the dominant structures of contemporary culture. Derrida elected to illustrate what is undecidable within texts, rather than to investigate their worldly power; and Foucault forgot that ultimately "the fascinated description of exercised power is never a substitute for trying to change power relations within society."44

#### The discourse of the alternative solves—ourselves are shaped by the things we learn in debates and discussions like this which allows us to adopt and apply the criticisms of Orientalism the alternative requires

Andrea Lobb, Gender, Sexuality and Diversity Studies College of Arts, Social Sciences and Commerce La Trobe University, 2015, “Technologies of the Other: Renewing ‘empathy’ between Foucault and psychoanalysis,” Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 218-235, December 2015, Pg. 220, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/4938/5364

In preparation for clarifying what this distinct category of techné might entail, let us firstly recall, by way of potential contrast, how Foucault defines his own vital addition: Technologies of the self permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.5 There is no doubt that Foucault allows for the contribution of the ‘help of others’ to the successful production of the sort of subject who can practice self-care. In his last lectures in January and February of 1982 (in front of the sea of tape recorders and overflowing audience at the Collège de France) he sketches out key instances of the instructive-mentoring relationships that he finds in the texts of Ancient Greece. These illustrate how the transformation of an inadequate, unfocused, ‘unsteady’ form of subjectivity (what the Greeks called the stultus, or the person trapped in a state of stultitia) to the desirable state of the sapient (one who has achieved the state of sapientia and can therefore care for the self in appropriate ways) was mediated and overseen by the (philosophical) performances of authoritative guidance and other-care.6

### Decentralized Consciousness

#### The alternative is to develop a decentralized consciousness—this is an investment in intersectionality, one that rejects universal, central, sovereign knowledge production and instead embraces contingencies and differences in experiences to create a more holistic understanding

Edward W. Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, author of Orientalism, 1985, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Cultural Critique, No. 1 (Autumn, 1985), Pg. 105-106, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354282

One could go on mentioning many more, but I certainly do not wish to suggest that by excluding particular examples I have thought them less eminent or less worth attention. What I want to do in conclusion is to try to draw them together into a common endeavor which, it has seemed to me, can inform the larger enterprise of which the critique of Orientalism is a part. First, we note a plurality of audiences and con- stituencies; none of the works and workers I have cited claims to be working on behalf of One audience which is the only one that counts, or for one supervening, overcoming Truth, a truth allied to Western (or for that matter Eastern) reason, objectivity, science. On the contrary, we note here a plurality of terrains, multiple experiences, and different constituencies, each with its admitted (as opposed to denied) interest, political desiderata, disciplinary goals. All these efforts work out of what might be called a decentered consciousness, not less reflective and critical for being decentered, for the most part non- and in some cases anti-totalizing and anti-systematic. The result is that instead of seeking common unity by appeals to a center of sovereign authority, methodological consistency, canonicity, and science, they offer the possibility of common grounds of assembly between them. They are therefore planes of activity and praxis, rather than one topography commanded by a geographical and historical vision locatable in a known center of metropolitan power. Second, these activities and praxes are consciously secular, marginal, and oppositional with reference to the mainstream, generally authoritarian systems from which they emanate, and against which they now agitate. Thirdly, they are political and practical in as much as they intend - without necessarily succeed- ing in implementing - the end of dominating, coercive systems of knowledge. I do not think it too much to say that the political meaning of analysis, as carried out in all these fields, is uniformly and program- matically libertarian by virtue of the fact that, unlike Orientalism, it is not based on the finality and closure of antiquarian or curatorial knowledge, but on investigative open models of analysis, even though it might seem that analyses of this sort - frequently difficult and abstruse - are in the final count paradoxically quietistic. I think we must remember the lesson provided by Adorno's negative dialectics, and regard analysis as in the fullest sense being against the grain, deconstructive, utopian.

## Block Answers

### AT: Permutation

#### The permutation doesn’t offer a real change from status quo international relations—it refashions the current language of the political into a seemingly new theory while never changing substance

Siba N. Grovogui, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1998 “Rituals of Power: Theory, Languages, and Vernaculars of International Relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1998), Pg. 507-508 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644926

International theories constitute vehicular languages in that they seek to impose their own generalization and codifications as univer- sal standards, or vehicles, for would-be adherents. Indeed, although international theories offer conflicting representations of politics, their essential generalizations and extrapolations may be unified to reflect historical traditions or particularities of the European imagi- nary that were long encrypted by post-Enlightenment rationalism, romanticism, and other modern intellectual movements. Like the movements and traditions that inspired them, the theoretical canons of international relations - the vehicular languages - seek to estab- lish corresponding social orders that may be imitated across a multi- tude of areas beyond their regions of origin.35 Historically, the in- herent ambiguities of the meanings embedded in these vehicular languages, like the inconsistencies in the ethos of their generative movements, have compelled subsequent speakers and adherents to derive from them new but related symbols and significations. These transformations or linguistic derivations constitute vernaculars. Whereas a new language is necessarily founded upon a new imagi- nary, a vernacular is a derivation that takes place through symbolic displacements within the framework of the original language. The vernacular does not break away from the general structure of the imaginary of the originating language. Nor does the former abandon the logics and intents of the latter.

#### The language of Orientalism necessitates a particular perception of the Orient which forecloses the possibility of a permutation that resolves the alternative

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 70-72

And so, indeed, is the Orientalist attitude in general. It shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter. The European encounter with the Orient, and specifically with Islam, strengthened this system of representing the Orient, and specifically with Islam, strengthened this system of representing the Orient and, as has been suggested by Henri Pirenne, turned Islam into the very epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilization from the Middle Ages on was founded. The decline of the Roman Empire as a result of the barbarian invasions had the paradoxical effect of incorporating barbarian ways into Roman and Mediterranean culture, Romania; whereas, Pirenne argues, the consequence of the Islamic invasions beginning in the seventh century was to move the center of European culture away from the Mediterranean, which was then an Arab province, and towards the North. “Germanism began to play its part in history. Hitherto the Roman tradition had been uninterrupted. Now an original Romano-Germanic civilization was about to develop.” Europe was shut in on itself: the Orient, when it was not merely a place in which one traded, was culturally, intellectually, spiritually outside Europe and European civilization, which, in Pirenne’s words, became “one great Christian community, coterminous with the ecclesia. . . . The Occident was now living its own life.”52 In Dante’s poem in the work of Peter the Venerable and other Cluniac Orientalists, in the writings of the Christian polemicists against Islam from Guibert of Nogent and Bede to Roger Bacon, William of Tripoli, Burchard of Mount Syon, and Luther, in the Poema del Cid, in the Chanson de Roland, and in Shakespeare’s Othello (that “abuser of the world”), the Orient and Islam are always represented as outsiders having a special role to play inside Europe. Imaginative geography, from the vivid portraits to be found in the Inferno to the prosaic niches of d’Herbelot’s Bibliotheque orientale, legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and of the Orient. What this discourse considers to be a fact—that Mohammed is an imposter, for example—is a component of the discourse, a statement the discourse compels one to make whenever the name Mohammed occurs. Underlying all the different units of Orientalist discourse—by which I mean simply the vocabulary employed whenever the Orient is spoken or written about—is a set of representative figures, or tropes. These figures are to the actual Orient—or Islam, which is my main concern here—as stylized costumes are to characters in a play; they are like, for example, the cross that Everyman will carry, or the particolored costume worn by Harlequin in a commedia dell’arte play. In other words, we need not look for correspondence between the language used to depict the Orient and the Orient itself, not so much because the language is inaccurate but because it is not even trying to be accurate. What it is trying to do, as Dante tried to do in the Inferno, is at one and the same time to characterize the Orient as alien and to incorporate it schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are for Europe, and only for Europe. Hence the vacillation between the familiar and the alien; Mohammed is always the imposter (familiar, because he pretends to be like the Jesus we know) and always the Oriental (alien, because although he is in some ways “like” Jesus, he is after all not like him).

### Flawed Theory

#### Even if the original text has some problems, the theory of Orientalism presented by Said has triggered critical scholarship on the nature of Western imperialism and coloniality

John Whalen-Bridge, Dept of English Language and Literature Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences National University of Singapore, 2001, “Orientalism, Politics, and Literature,” Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2001), Pg. 195-196, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23653932

Before we move on to Said's impact in the social sciences, we might ask how his critical review of the discourse of Orientalism has been received within American literary studies, from whence it issued. One consequence of Said's Orientalism has been to facilitate connections between American multiculturalism and the international discourse of postcolonialism, and in the work of critics such as David Leiwei Li and Elaine Kim we see the emergence of a kind of intra-American "subaltern" study of American writing in which writers of the Asian diaspora come to terms with the hegemonic structures of mainstream American culture. For Kim and Li, as for Spivak and Bhabha, Said's work has been absolutely foundational. Said's linking of cultural activity and a larger imperial context has also been of seminal significance to Robert Kern, who argues in Orientalism, Modernism, and the American Poem (1996) that we must understand how Orientalist mechanisms have allowed European and American writers to project onto the Orient self-concepts and desires that are already implicit in the traditions of European and American writing.

### Framework

#### Analyzing orientalism in our discourse about and representations of China is critical—without such a discussion, Orientalism continues unabated and is able to adapt to modern politics

Kenichi Yamaguchi, completing his doctoral dissertation, on the “state of exception” in American-occupied Okinawan Islands in the Pacific, at the University of Saskatchewan, 2012, “Rationalization and concealment of violence in American responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a state of exception,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48:3, Pg. 249-250, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.678708

The exercise of power takes many discursive forms; the re-presentation of the Other may be a fundamental tactic of Orientalism. However, just like all other forms of domination, one cannot ignore flexible characteristics of discursive power. For a theoretical consideration of new Orientalism, overemphasis of representational aspects may impede one’s understanding of its further mutative qualities. Nevertheless, it is important to concede that what has allowed old Orientalism’s influence to survive and mutate is not the consistent and stable exercise of power, but its flexibility, both temporally and spatially, in diverse discursive forms and contexts. The post-9/11 US governance alludes to a combination of different tactics. The tactics of normalization by discipline and by military conquest have been relatively successful. However, the second and third – controlling the “exterior Other” and homo sacer – have posed a great difficulty in sustaining the “legitimacy” of “democratic” governance. Taken together, the climate in current global politics is characteristically different from the colonial one in which biopower was a key instrument of control to Orientalism. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the significant contributions made by Said, despite his methodological shortcomings, and the alleged misapplication of Foucault’s discourse. This, however, does not mean that Foucault’s discourse is inapplicable or inadequate to understand Orientalism in a post-9/11 context. As I have tried to demonstrate, normalizing modes of institutional disciplines and the rationalization of violence are still relevant to an understanding of both “commensurable” and “exterior Othering”. In addition to that, Agamben’s renewed approach to Foucault provides a more nuanced understanding of the concealment of violence which is instrumental to an understanding of Orientalism through “bare life” and the usurpation of the “incommensurable enemy”.

#### The affirmative’s call for political engagement and attempt for knowledge purposefully ignores and obscures our role in domination of the Orient—the only ethical engagement is to be radically open and mindful of the role we have played in the domination of the Other

Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti, PhD., Associate Professor; Canada Research Chair in Race, Inequalities and Global Change at the University of British Columbia, 2014, “Conflicting Epistemic Demands in Poststructuralist and Postcolonial Engagements With Questions of Complicity in Systemic Harm,” Educational Studies, 50:4, 28 July 2014, Pg. 381-382, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131946.2014.924940

The strand connected with poststructuralism, drawing also from Derrida, Spivak, Bhabha, and (further on) psychoanalysis, complexifies the relationship between colonizers and colonized by focusing on the problems and aporias of veridiction and governmentality (knowledge/power/representation and claims of truth) at work in any discourse, including hegemonic and counterhegemonic, others and one’s own instances. As emancipation, agency and essentialism are problematized and an uncontaminated resistance becomes impossible (see Figure 2), the imagined way forward is the opening of new possibilities as “an uncoercive relationship towards the Other of Western humanism” (Gandhi 1998, 39) that requires an ethical stance of (not) knowing for an ethical imperative toward the Other to emerge before will (Spivak 2004). In other words, Spivak is interested in an ethical imperative that precedes cognition and does not depend on rational choice. This implies a different (non-Cartesian) relationship between being and thinking and a decentering of reasoning and agency, which results in a hyper-self-reflexive deconstructive stance of learning to learn/work without guarantees (Spivak 2004). This strand prioritizes answerability as responsibility toward not for the Other, based on a recognition of the injustice committed to the Other, over the preoccupation about the aesthetics of self. In this sense, practices of self are driven by a different form of answerability toward the Other, which is grounded on systemic complicity/self-implication in harm, not on projective empathy (Taylor 2011). Projective empathy is the form of care prevalent in liberal humanist approaches where the subject dissociates herself from the mechanisms that produce the inequality and exclusion of the Other.

#### The affirmative has an incorrect understanding of what constitutes political knowledge. Civil society views knowledge on a spectrum of political importance—awareness of Orientalism will implicate our participation in politics

Edward Said, was a Palestinian literary theoretician, professor of English, history and comparative literature at Columbia University, and a public intellectual who was a founder of post-colonial studies, 1979, “Orientalism,” Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, Pg. 9-11

1. The distinction between pure and political knowledge. It is very easy to argue that knowledge about Shakespeare or Wordswroth is not political whereas knowledge about contemporary China or the Soviet Union is. My own formal and professional designation is that of “humanist,” a title which indicates the humanities as my field and therefore the unlikely eventuality that there might be anything political about what I do in that field. Of course, all these labels and terms are quite unnuanced as I use them here, but the general truth of what I am pointing to is, I think, widely held. One reason for saying that a humanist who writes about Wordsworth, or any editor whose specialty is Keats, is not involved in anything political is that what he does seems to have no direct political effect upon reality in the everyday sense. A scholar whose field is Soviet economics works in a highly charged area where there is much government interest, and what he might produce in the way of studies or proposals will be taken up by policymakers, government officials, institutional economists, intelligence experts. The distinction between “humanists” and persons whose work has policy implications, or political significance, can be broadened further by saying that the former’s ideological color is a matter of incidental importance to politics (although possibly of great moment to his colleagues in the field, who may object to his Stalinism or fascism or too easy liberalism), whereas the ideology of the latter is woven directly into his material—indeed, economics, politics, and sociology in the modern academy are ideological science—and therefore taken for granted as being “political.” Nevertheless the determining impingement on most knowledge produced in the contemporary West (and here I speak mainly about the United States) is that it be nonpolitical, that is, scholarly, academic, impartial, above partisan or small-minded doctrinal belief. One can have no quarrel with such an ambition in theory, perhaps, but in practice the reality is much more problematic. No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear on what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research an its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality. For there is such a thing as knowledge that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with his entangling and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not therefore automatically nonpolitical. Whether discussions of literature or of classical philology are fraught with—or have unmediated—political significance is a very large question that I have tried to treat in some detail elsewhere.5 What I am interested in doing now is suggesting how the general liberal consensus that “true” knowledge is fundamentally nonpolitical (and conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not “true” knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. No one is helped in understanding this today when the adjective “political” is used as a label to discredit any work for daring to violate the protocol of pretended suprapolitical objectivity. We may say, first, that civil society recognizes a gradation of political importance in the various fields of knowledge. To some extent the political importance given a field comes from the possibility of its direct translation into economic terms; but to a greater extent political importance comes from the closeness of a field to ascertainable sources of power in political society. Thus an economic study of long-term Soviet energy potential and its effect on military capability is likely to be commissioned by the Defense Department, and thereafter to acquire a kind of political status impossible for a study of Tolstoi’s early fiction financed in part by a foundation. Yet both works belong in what civil society acknowledges to be a similar field, Russian studies, even though one work may be done by a very conservative

**EVIDENCE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE**

economist, the other by a radical literary historian. My point here is that “Russia” as a general subject matter has political priority over nicer distinctions such as “economics” and “literary history,” because political society in Gramsci’s sense reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy and saturates them with significance of direct concern to it. I do not want to press all this any further on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of my case can be demonstrated by being much more specific, in the way, for example, Noam Chomsky has studied the instrumental connection between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship as it was applied to cover state-sponsored military research.6 Now because Britain, France, and recently the United States are imperial powers, their political societies impart to their civil societies a sense of urgency, a direct political infusion as it were, where and whenever matters pertaining to their imperial interests abroad are concerned. I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India or Egypt in the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, the gross political fact—and yet that is what I am saying in this study of Orientalism. For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can never ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.

### No orientalism

#### Orientalism has only adapted to changing history, it has not disappeared

Arif Dirlik, a US historian of Turkish origin who has published extensively on historiography and political ideology in modern China, as well as issues in modernity, globalization, and post-colonial criticism, professor at Duke University, 1996, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4, Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective (Dec., 1996), Pg. 108, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505446

The above is from the introduction to Jiang Tingfu's Outline of Modern Chinese History. Jiang Tingfu had received his Ph.D. in diplomatic history from Columbia University, before he went back to China to establish the field of modern Chinese diplomatic history in Qinghua University. It was there that in the 1930s John King Fairbank as a graduate student worked with Jiang Tingfu. In pointing to the strong parallels between Fairbank's and Jiang's views of modern China I do not wish to imply that Fairbank's views were shaped by Jiang's; if anything unites their views, it is a common origin in liberal interpreta- tions of Chinese history. But the parallels do suggest the confounding of the origins in Europe or China of such views. By the twentieth century in particular, orientalist conceptions had no distinct geographical origin.34 This circulation of ideas is more than ever the condition of our understanding of China, which has led some to the conclusion that orientalism is no longer a problem. What I would like to propose instead is that what has changed is the power relationship between China and Euro-America, rather than the abolition of orientalism. On the contrary, the very transformation of power may have culminated in the reification of orientalism at the level of a global ideology. Orientalism, which earlier articulated a distancing of Asian societies from the Euro-American, now appears in the articulation of differences within a global modernity as Asian societies emerge as dynamic participants in a global capitalism.35 In this contemporary guise, orientalism provides the site for con- tention between the conflicting ideological loyalties of an elite that is no longer easily identifiable as Eastern or Western, Chinese or non-Chinese.

#### Orientalism still exists in post-colonialism, it has just shifted its epistemological practices and ideas and altered its mechanisms to the policy realm

Kenichi Yamaguchi, completing his doctoral dissertation, on the “state of exception” in American-occupied Okinawan Islands in the Pacific, at the University of Saskatchewan, 2012, “Rationalization and concealment of violence in American responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a state of exception,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48:3, Pg. 247, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.678708

Why does the west now need help to deal with the uppity natives? It may simply be the case that the disciplinary power of contemporary imperialism is met with forms of resistance from which colonial dominance was spared. US dominance in particular, despite its weakened state of disciplinary tactics of power, continues to stay afloat by means of concealed violence and other prevailing remnants of disciplinary power. Articulated in this manner, US post-9/11 governance not only showcases how hegemony can be maintained even in a weakened state, but it further divulges the multifaceted modalities of Othering (and Orientalizing) necessary for its functioning. This view enables a contextualization of new modes of Othering and Orientalizing through the two frameworks I have outlined above: rationalization and concealment of violence in the works of Foucault and Agamben. In Orientalism, Said takes the “disciplinary” tactics and rationalization of violence in pressing Orientalism into militant action as something complete and uncontestable. I do not raise an issue with Said’s approach at large, as it is entirely possible that colonial domination allowed such totalizing hegemony by suppressing dissent and destabilization, but such an approach cannot explain the survival of Orientalism “after” the formal end of colonialism. In Porter’s view, the emergence of “military Orientalism” in the postcolonial context must be understood as a plural and shifting set of epistemological ideas, attitudes and practices [ … ]. It is reflected in abstract thought as well as policy, from intelligence analysis to the hiring of indigenous forces, from proposals for Western military reform to coercive diplomacy. (14) Complementing Porter’s non-totalizing, multilayered approach, I propose four distinct, yet interrelated, categories of Othering within the new Orientalist project: (1) commensurable Other; (2) exterior Other; (3) bare life; and (4) incommensurable enemy

#### The problem is not that China is not actually dissimilar, it is that Orientalism defines the Orient based on Western perceptions of China

Wang Ning, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University and Director of the Research Institute for Postmodern Studies, 1997, “Orientalism versus Occidentalism?,” New Literary History Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 1997, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/24344

Said here clearly illustrates that the logical theorizing perspective from which to construct Orientalism is not that of the “Orient” but that of its opposite side—the “Occident.” That is, the “Orient” is merely what exists in the eyes of certain Western people. It is constructed as an “other” opposed to the Occident. If the Occident is both geographically and culturally speaking at the very center of the world, the Orient is undoubtedly at its periphery, subject to the power of this center. According to Said, Orientalism contains at least the following connotations: First, it refers to a mode of thinking based on the difference in ontology and epistemology between the Orient and the Occident. The Orient and Occident are in separate hemispheres on earth, opposing each other in many respects due to their striking differences, politically, economically, and even linguistically. Second, it refers to a way of dominance of the powerful West over the weak East and its oppression of the latter. On the basis of such an unequal relationship, “Orientalism” has become a kind of “Oriental myth” invented and appreciated by Westerners who have little actual knowledge of the Orient and the Third World, but have some prejudice against and curiosity about the latter. As far as the connotation of Orientalism is concerned, Said further points out that it overlaps three fields: the history of cultural relations between the East and the West which has lasted for over four thousand years; a discipline in which one generation after another of scholars dealing with Oriental languages and cultures are trained; and an image of the “other” created by generations of Westerners about the Orient. For a long period of time, the Oriental in the eyes of Westerners has been both “stupid” and “lazy” on the one hand, but on the other hand, the Orient itself is certainly somewhat “mysterious” and attractive for its being far from the imperial center and the metropolitan countries (see O 1–28). Since the Occident is already the “other” to the Oriental, the “Orient” in the eyes of Westerners is just an “other” of this “other.” In this way, Said argues, Orientalism, among its other connotations, is a deep-rooted episteme of Westerners about the Orient that has always [End Page 58] functioned as part and parcel of Euro-American colonialist ideology. 4 Since the concept of Orientalism is created by Westerners as a “myth” or a false image, it is problematic and illusive. What then is Said’s own attitude? This is the starting point for the present essay that attempts to question his “Orientalism.” It is a question that I, as a scholar from the Orient, find provocative.

### Not Monolithic

#### Orientalism functions because of the intersections of oppressions—it is positioned in a way that allows it to adapt to change while still determining power relations

Arif Dirlik, a US historian of Turkish origin who has published extensively on historiography and political ideology in modern China, as well as issues in modernity, globalization, and post-colonial criticism, professor at Duke University, 1996, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, Vol. 35, No. 4, Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective (Dec., 1996), Pg. 116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505446

Aijaz Ahmad in a recent study has criticized Said for ignoring class relations in the emergence of orientalism.49 Orientalism is not just a matter of continents or nations representing one another; it also entails class (or, for that matter, gender and ethnic) representations, not only in terms of who is engaged in representation, but how a society is represented. It was the upper-class, upper- caste Brahmins who provided British orientalists with the texts of Hinduism, as well as their assumptions about Hindu spirituality. Jesuits in China, who were initially drawn to Buddhism as a means of entry into China, decided that Confucianism served better than Buddhism in the representation of China because their friends in officialdom pointed them toward the lifestyles of the elite. In our day, Confucianism may be subjected to different evaluations, which also suggest different relations of power within Chinese societies, and between Chinese societies and the outside world. Recent experience also indicates that it is insufficient to conceive of orientalism simply in terms of Eurocentrism or nationalism. It is position in the capitalist structuring of the world that ulti- mately accounts for the changing relationships between orientalist discourse (Eurocentric or self-orientalizing) and power. Just as it was once the apparent Chinese inability to make the transition to capitalism that condemned Confu- cianism to a defunct past, it is currently Chinese success in the world of capi- talism that now enables its admission to the center of a global modernity as an alternative to Euro-American capitalism -acknowledged as such even by the ideologues of the latter. Intellectuals who themselves have become part of a global elite (not to speak of the managers of capital) play a crucial part in the transformation.

### Identifying Orient Bad

#### Delineating between the Orient and Orientalist or identifying the subaltern is not altogether bad—to assume such would throw out almost every critical race scholar’s work

Neil Lazarus, postcolonial studies scholar, Professor of English at the University of Warwick, editor of The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies, 1993, “Disavowing Decolonization: Fanon, Nationalism, and the Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” Research in African Literatures, Vol. 24, No. 4, Special Issue in Memory of Josaphat Bekunuru Kubayanda (Winter, 1993), Pg. 83 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3820255

One does not want to deny, of course, that self-proclaimedly radical intellec- tualism is often an exercise in bad faith, and that expressions of solidarity with "the masses" should therefore always be scrutinized carefully. But in Trinh's formulation, the baby of representation is thrown out with the bathwater of ideological appropri- ation or "subalternization." The proposition that intellectuals cannot talk about "the masses" without guiltily romanticizing and/or implicitly disparaging them strikes me as being empirically indefensible. I cannot accept that such contempo- rary writers as Njabulo Ndebele, Naguib Mahfouz, Ninotchka Rosca, Ngugi wa Thi- ong'o, Yashar Kemal, Micere Mugo, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Michelle Cliff, Salman Rushdie, Ousmane Sembene, and Mahasweta Devi (and one could name literally hundreds more) insist on the distinction between the masses and the elite in their work only to sanctify their own positions, or to assuage guilt. Nor can I accept that in the writing of such influential contemporary cultural critics, histori- ans, and political theorists as, say, Aijaz Ahmad, Benedict Anderson, Belinda Boz- zoli, Hazel Carby, Edward Said, E. San Juan, Jr., Margaret Randall, Jean Franco, Ranaj it Guha, Terence Ranger, and James Scott-all of whom, again, regard the dis- tinction between elite and subaltern populations as indispensable-there is at work an implication that "the masses" are herd-like, doltish, or anonymous.

### Root Cause—Sexual Difference

#### Critiques of Said’s Orientalism based on sexual difference are too universal in their theory—they obfuscate the rereading and revising Said conducts of his own writing and exaggerate the relationships at play

Graham Huggan, Chair of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Literatures in the School of English at the University of Leeds, where he also directs the cross-disciplinary Institute for Colonial and Postcolonial Studies, 2005, “(Not) Reading ‘Orientalism’,” Research in African Literatures, Vol. 36, No. 3, Edward Said, Africa, and Cultural Criticism (Autumn, 2005), Pg. 132-133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3821368

This tendency to "out-Orientalize" Orientalism is also apparent in feminist cri- tiques of Said's study, at least some of which reinforce the type of binary thinking they hastily accuse Said of practicing, but which they see their work (looking right past the considerable deconstructive activity in Said's own text) as seeking to dismantle and disrupt. The example I have picked out here is the Turkish sociologist Meyda Yegeno- glu's book-length study Colonial Fantasies (1998), which advertises itself in its subtitle as working "toward a feminist reading of Orientalism" (the method, though, as as is soon made clear, this method is closely tied in with the workings of Said's eponymous text). Colonial Fantasies, it has to be said, is a good step forward from several earlier feminist approaches to Orientalism that either falsely assumed the gender-blindness of Said's methods or prematurely judged him to have joined the massed ranks of the Orientalists, thus reinforcing the male gender specificity of Orientalism and giving the impression that all Orientalists, to paraphrase Wordsworth, are men speaking to other men (see, for example, Emberley and Lewis). Like most of these earlier critics, Yegenoglu believes that there is a connection between the production of cultural and gender differences in Orientalism, and that representations of the Oriental Other require an understanding of the unconscious nature of Western male fantasies and desires. The Orient, she suggests, is "a fantasy based upon sexual difference" (11): a difference, however, that has frequently been unaccounted for or strategically effaced. She falls short, however, of accusing Said himself of conspiring in this effacement; after all, he readily acknowledges in Orientalism that "Orientalism [has often been] an exclusively male province; like so many professional guilds during the modern period, it [has] viewed itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders" (Orientalism 207). What she objects to is Said's suggestion that the Orient as sexualized site is not "the province of [his own] analysis" (Orientalism 188); as if what he calls, after Freud, the "latent" (sexual) and "manifest" (cultural) constructions of the Oriental Other could somehow be separated out (Orientalism 206). This is a reasonable objection; for as Yegenoglu convincingly argues, sexual fantasy and the production of sexual dif- ference are constitutive of Orientalism, as is the link between (imagined) knowledge of the Orient and (unconscious) sexual desire. Less convincing is her insistence that "the Western subject's desire for its Oriental other is always mediated by a desire to have access to the space of its women, to the body of its women and to the truth of its women" (Yegenoglu 62-73). While she is surely right that "[t]he process of Oriental- ization ofthe Orient is one that intermingles with its feminization" (73), her insistence that the Orient is always mediated through the feminine clearly overstates the issue while recoding the process of "Orientalization" in what appear to be exclusively het- erosexual terms. Equally questionable is her assertion of the dualistic nature of Said's approach to Orientalism: "latent' versus "manifest" Orientalisms; "synchronic" versus "diachronic" Orientalisms; "scholarly" versus "sensual" Orientalisms; and so on. These are binary categories Said admittedly deploys, but also repeatedly interrogates and challenges in Orientalism; like several other poststructurally oriented analyses of Orientalism, Yegenoglu's seems reluctant to acknowledge the deconstructive activity already at work within the text. Yegenoglu's book certainly reveals her, in the main, to be a careful reader and reviser of Orientalism, but at the risk of withholding a similar status to Said himself as a reader and reviser of his own text.

# Kritik Securitization Kritik

### 1NC

**Thesis:** “Security” or “Threat Construction” kritiks are a common occurrence in contemporary debates involving foreign policies. This version presents security and threat construction arguments more in the context of China and the idea of Security Cosmopolitanism. Several arguments are embedded within the 1NC. It includes the classic security representations & “no value to life” arguments, a methodology argument against empiricism and positivist IR scholarship, homogenization of identity, realism bad, etc. Burke argues that we need a universal set of ethics that can transform international governance. Here’s the double-edged sword: You get to link out of/link turn their “state good” offense but you must win that the alternative transforms those actors. Another strategy here is to just win the best threat construction link and read the Liu ‘5 racism evidence. Even if you lose the alternative, voting for Aff. representations is still racist.

#### A. Describing China as a threat is not a neutral construction, but a contingent representation of (in)security. This subjectivity of American identity in peril means policymakers interpret everything China does as a threat

Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, October 2013, “Threatening China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity,” Review of International Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, p. 923

The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature. The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’— whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of Beijing's intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded.

### 1NC

#### B. Engagement policies are just more of the same threat construction of China

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2012, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, Western Representations of China’s Rise, p. 86

The previous chapter examined how the knowledge of the China threat is linked to power. But its implications in power relations are not conﬁned to the domestic sphere; they permeate also through the realms of international relations and foreign policy. In fact, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is instrumental to the making of the ‘containment’ policy towards China. Here, I use ‘containment’ as shorthand for a range of US policy measures directed at China in military, economic, political and moral realms. Their common aim is, with various degrees of pressure and coercion, to deter or ‘dissuade’ China from expanding its power beyond certain limits. Of course, this China containment strategy cannot be likened to the American Cold War containment policy towards the Soviet Union; much has changed between then and now. Indeed, given its obvious Cold War connotation, ‘containment’ has lost its potency as a policy label among scholars or policy-makers alike; instead, people prefer to call American China policy ‘hedging’, ‘principled engagement’, 'engagement’, ‘balancing’, ‘management’ or ‘deterrence’. Whether or not ‘containment’ is the right word should not detain us hem. The point is that so long as it is more or less the same ‘threat’ perception and institutions that continue to be behind the making of US China policy, it would be erroneous to believe that US policy has made a clear break with the past.

#### C. Representations are inherently linked to both ontology and epistemology in mediating human relationships. The Affirmative’s positivist IR scholarship eschews the role of representations and values in shaping US-China policies. Our criticism is not a retreat from policy but one of real engagement with the discursive structures that underlie justifications for the 1AC

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2012, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, Western Representations of China’s Rise, pp. vii-viii

Though it may appear that way in the eyes of some, going along this path is not a cunning attempt of finding a literary niche in an increasingly crowded field to score some cheap points all the while dodging the heavy lifting of tackling complex ‘real-world’ issues surrounding China. Nor is it to deliberately court controversy or strike an affected pose of malaise about an otherwise vibrant field of study. To me, this book is a necessary move justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, the book rejects the prevalent assumption about the dichotomy between reality and representation. Contra positivism, we cannot bypass thoughts and representations to come into direct contact with China as it is. What we see as ‘China’ cannot be detached from various discourses and representations of it. Works that purport to study China’s rise, as if it were a transparent and empirically observable phenomenon out there, are always already inextricably enmeshed in representations. In all likelihood, those works will then become themselves part of such representations, through which still later studies will gaze at ‘China’. In this sense, my focus on representation is less an expedient choice than ontological and epistemological necessity. On practical grounds, given the inescapable immanence of representation and discourse in the social realm, a proper study of discursive representation is not a retreat from the real world but a genuine engagement with it in the full sense of the words. Perhaps with the exception of sleepwalking or unconscious twitching, no human action (let alone social action) can do without thought and representation. Constructivists are right in saying that words have consequences. But we may add that all social domains and human relationships are mediated through and constituted by thought and representation. China’s relationship with the West is certainly no exception. With regional stability, prosperity and even world peace at stake, there is now an urgent, practical need to understand how the various strains of representation and discourse pervade and condition this critical and complex relationship.

### 1NC

#### D. Security politics works as a technology of power that shapes subjectivity through State-based discursive deployments via things like engagement and diplomacy. Instead, we should refuse security politics to affirm agency as decision-makers. This opens up new avenues for ethical policy analysis to disrupt and rewrite the politics of security bent on domination and violence

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2007, Beyond Security: Ethics and Violence War Against the Other, pp. 52

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many of the tools are already available – and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important step for dissent, critique and refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault’s challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegal, but not to discover who what are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels we too can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socio-economic implications. Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels: that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and which in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society and international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship, which thinks difference not on the basis of the Same, but on the basis of a dialogue with the Other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for what Gatens calls a ‘debate and engagement with the other’s law and the other’s ethics’ – an encounter which involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (The potential and limits of these models of ethics are explored in Chapter 3, where I critically analyse the political possibilities offered by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.) In short, while the sweep and the power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on ‘ourselves’ – a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an Other that never returns to the Same. It is to imagine a world in which alternative possibilities of society, justice and existence are free to develop, independent of sovereign ontologies and their animating forms of geopolitical control, desire and violence. It is to ask if there can be a world or a security after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

#### The alternative is to vote Negative to refuse the security politics of the 1AC in favor of security cosmopolitanism

### 1NC

#### E. Cosmopolitanism is mutually exclusive with the Affirmative because it necessitates an ontological shift, which means any permutation is severance or intrinsic. The dominant narrative of security tied to the nation-state operates as an anthropocentric death drive on a planetary scale

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2013, “Security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, [Volume 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1), [Issue 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), pp. 13-28

The ontology underpinning security cosmopolitanism necessitates a profound transformation of the national security ontology that precedes and frustrates it. While acknowledging the significance of states – as core actors and potential means of security, as structures of democratic governance, and as (one) of the legal foundations of international order and law – such an ontology understands human existence as irreversibly global in nature. When multiple and often anonymous human actions collectively produce such profound changes to the biosphere and climate that many now term ours a new geological era – the ‘Anthropocene’ – national borders lose their claim to define and enclose human existence, and humanity must be thought in non-anthropocentric terms. Through interlocking historical, social, and systemic processes – imperialism, world war, decolonization, capitalism, cold war, globalization, migration, terrorism, nuclear strategy, intervention, and environmental degradation – human beings have effectively unified their life and death process on a planetary scale and extended it to other species and life forms. This event needs to be reflected in a transformation of the historically dominant ontological narrative of insecurity – the narrative of its origins, sources, nature, and necessity. In the traditional (and still dominant) narrative, security emerges from insecurity through the creation of a distinctive political form and subjectivity – that of the nationstate and its corporeal manifestation, sovereignty, the ‘body-politic’. As argued by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the origins of national security lie in a temporal narrative that traces the emergence of the sovereign state (the ‘Commonwealth’) from an originary ‘state of nature’: a realm of perpetual insecurity and conflict in which a natural equality ‘and Right of every man to everything’ remains governed by no rule or jurisdiction that could stabilize or order it; it resembles then a ‘time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man’ and there ‘can be no security to any man of living out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live’. As Roberto Esposito explains, an ‘immunitary mechanism begins to operate’ in this narrative, because ‘if life is abandoned to its internal powers, [and] its natural dynamics, human life is destined to self-destruct’. An all-powerful sovereign – the paradoxical embodiment and governor of the body-politic – then functions to ‘immunize’ the body-politic against the potential of its own disorder and preserve the life that threatens it. This biopolitical life is not the degraded ‘bare life’ of Giorgio Agamben’s theory – which certainly remains an ever-present possibility for the subjects and objects of sovereign power – but a rich vision of life that Hobbes describes in De Cive as ‘happiness’ and in Leviathan as all ‘the benefit and good’ of ‘lawful industry’ and knowledge; a life, in short, enabled, protected, and transformed by modernity.

## Links

### China – Engagement / Cooperation

#### Engagement policies that seek to bring China into harmony with international norms are false promises based on managing China as an “opportunity”

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2012, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, Western Representations of China’s Rise, p. 109

All these sanguine views seem to reﬂect a belief in the self-fulﬁlling effect of the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm. Some engagement advocates believe that states, through their socialisation in international institutions and interactions with other international actors, can learn new norms and rules, and in doing so, redeﬁne their interests or even take on new identities. Others make a similar point by drawing on regime theory, the English School and path-dependency theory.’ In short, the consensus is that through engagement, China can be shaped, socialised, or even converted. There is no doubt that China’s recent transformation would not be possible without its engagement with the outside world in general and the West in particular. As I have noted elsewhere, various transnational actors, including the US, have played a key role in some profound changes in Beijing’s understanding of both its legitimacy base and responsibility, changes that are manifested in its ‘Peaceful Rise’ strategy.“ Yet, despite its apparently positive effect on China, the ‘China opportunity’ theory as practice is not going to be a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. If anything, as this chapter will argue, it is essentially a false promise.

### China – Positivist IR scholaship

#### Policy toward China based on traditional IR theory guarantees error replication

Joshua Eisenman, Staff Writer, January 21, 2016, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756>, Accessed 4-17-2016

To improve U.S. policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict requires going beyond simplistic applications of international relations theory. It means opening the 'black box' of China's policymaking process to understand why it makes the decisions it does and how this process has and is changing. Unfortunately, barriers continue to prevent the U.S. from better understanding and responding to China. Most importantly, Friedberg identified a "yawning ideological chasm" that inhibits the success of U.S.' engagement, arguing that: "The very different domestic political regimes of the two pacific powers" make the liberalization of the Chinese political system essential for "a true trans-Pacific entente." CPC repression inhibits change in China and presents "a significant additional impetus to rivalry.

#### The 1AC constructs “China” as a knowable object whereby empirical data can be gathered without critical reflection. There is no fixed “China” identity for objective study, which is intrinsically shaped by representations

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2012, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, Western Representations of China’s Rise, p. 4-5

Critical epistemological reflection on the field of China’s international relations is anything but trivial. At one level, some measure of self-reflectivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself. All forms of knowledge contain within themselves some conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect, autobiographical accounts of the knowing/writing self at either individual or certain collective levels. As evidenced in the self-image of positivist knowledge in general, the very absence of critical self-reflection in China watching already denotes a particular way of speaking about itself, namely, as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China. The problem is that this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If Pierre Macherey is right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say, then this curious silence and unconscious ness in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a process which Jürgen Habermas calls reflection. Besides, it seems impossible for China watching to watch only China. Aihwa Ong notes that ‘When a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’. We may add that it is also self-delusional. China as an object of study does not simply exist in an objectivist or empiricist fashion, like a free-floating, self-contained entity waiting to be directly contacted, observed and analysed. This is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion constructed entirely out of literary representation. Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than one billion people living there are all too real. And yet, to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent and fixed meaning for all to see. None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let alone offer an unadulterated, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s term, as a type of ‘being-in-the-world’. The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of China’s being, which always needs to be understood in conjunction with its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound discourse and representation.

### China – Knowable Object

#### Even if the 1AC does not treat China as a threat, the plan is based on a self/Other dichotomy based on China as a knowable object of homogeneity

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2012, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, Western Representations of China’s Rise, pp. 109-110

Underpinning the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm are several assumptions about the relationship between the West and China. These assumptions, I will argue, are nothing less than false premises. One key false premise is the assumed self/Other dichotomy between the West/US and China, which are seen as two separate, more or less homogeneous entities. Just as the ‘China threat’ discourse reduces China to a threat, the ‘China opportunity’ literature reiﬁes it as an opportunity. Whether that opportunity means markets, a place ripe for democracy, or a maturing global actor, all these imageries convey a sense of homogeneity. While China’s internal differences are not ignored, they are often seen as insigniﬁcant. Even as analysts write about the schism between the Communist regime and the Chinese people, they often quickly describe the regime as fragile, illegitimate, or almost non-Chinese. ln effect, China is again reduced to a homogeneous entity deﬁned as a people longing for freedom and democracy, just like ‘people anywhere else in the world’. Alongside the assumption of a monolithic China are some equally monolithic terms such as ‘the West’, ‘the international community’, or simply ‘we’ (‘us’). For reasons of analytical convenience or stylistic neatness, we certainly cannot avoid such misleadingly singular terms as ‘the West’, ‘the United States’, and ‘China’ altogether. But very often we are led to believe in the naturalness of the terms we have invented. ‘The West’ is precisely such a turn in the ‘China opportunity’ discourse. Thomas Paine once said that ‘We have it in our power to begin the world all over again’. More recently, the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso declared that ‘we [the European Union] are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative power in the world’. These examples testify to an enduring belief that the US and indeed the West are one, making up a unitary Western self, a transatlantic community, a civilisation, an alliance, an Enlightenment project, or a ‘zone of democratic peace’. Certainly, some analysts will admit that tactically the West is not one. Robert Kagan famously wrote that ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’."‘ To Kagan, however, this rill is a lamentable anomaly in an otherwise unitary liberal democratic world which has lately come under a common threat.

### China – “Security interests”

#### Even defining “security” interests can create a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting in U.S.-China conflicts

Caleb Pomeroy, University of Oxford, June 6, 2015, “[Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & U.S. Security](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/),” E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/, Accessed 5-1-2016

There are few instances in history where an emerging power did not enter conflict with an existing power. As China reemerges as an international power, it is natural to question whether or not the U.S. and China will engage in conflict. However, asking if China’s reemergence is a threat to U.S. security interests may not be the best way to approach this issue. In fact, even defining U.S. security interests could cause an inherent threat to those supposed interests. This essay will argue that defining U.S. security interests can threaten the U.S., and this question’s discursive construction increases the risk of a U.S.-China conflict. A wide range of case studies could be used to illustrate these arguments to approach the question of U.S.-China conflict; this essay will look at the contemporary issue of space security as it is currently receiving historically high levels of attention in Beijing and Washington.

### China - Threat Construction

#### China threat policy discourse constructs a self-reinforcing us vs. them ideological dichotomy, where unipolarity pushes China to the periphery

Caleb Pomeroy, University of Oxford, June 6, 2015, “[Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & U.S. Security](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/),” E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/, Accessed 5-1-2016

This question’s discursive construction forces the use of the terms “U.S.” and “China,” creating a “Self” and “Other” paradigm which places the two states in opposition; the debate over whether or not China is a threat to U.S. security interests is often expressed in the U.S. by using the language of America as “us” and China as “them.” Jisheng Sun (2014) argues that previously, when China was considered an ideological partner, such as under the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. policymakers used the term “we” to describe the two states. When referring to China’s rise today, China is often referred to as the “Other,” in comparison to the “Self” of the U.S. The “Other” portrays the “U.S.-imposed ideological dichotomy between itself and China, identifying the latter as different and even contradictory to the U.S.” The policy discourse of the “Self” and “Other” simplifies and polarizes and can increase the speed and intensity of security dilemma dynamics between the U.S. and China. This language creates American unipolarity where China’s threat reputation leads to out-group status, which in turn fuels perceptions of China as threatening. Intensifying threat perception increases a possible security dilemma, and security-conscious Chinese political elites are acutely aware of the security costs of dangerous foreign attributions to China’s character. The “Self” versus “Other” paradigm distances Washington from Beijing and discursively places the two states in opposition.

#### Every aspect of U.S. China policy is shaped by representations of China as a threat. This guarantees error replication

Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, October 2013, “Threatening China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity,” Review of International Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, p. 924

Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future. In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes.

### China - Threat Construction

#### The 'China threat' is a master narrative of policymakers that is wildly inaccurate and excludes alternative perspectives. Our criticism disrupts this dangerous narrative

Wu Chengqiu, PhD in Planning, Governance and Globalization at VA Tech and Professor of International Politics at Fudan University, 2007, “Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development," Barking Up the Wrong Tree? The Master Narrative of "China Threat Theory" Examined, pp. 135-136

This chapter understands “China threat theory” as a master narrative that claims that China’s rise will lead to military and economic threats to its neighbors and the United States. Particularly, the essential argument of “China threat theory” is that a rising China will challenge the United States, regionally or globally. Reviewing the U.S. debates on the strategic implications of China’s rise and the Chinese responses to these debates, this chapter shows that “China threat theory” exists in the U.S. intellectual discourse as one of the positions rather than the only U.S. position or a systematic project with a hidden agent. In fact, many American scholars disagree with the “China threat theory,” and there are diverse understandings of what a possible China threat will be among proponents of the “China threat theory. This chapter also finds that while focusing on a few articles in the popular press and on certain events, the Chinese criticisms have largely ignored many other major works in the U.S. debates on China. Therefore, while the Chinese critics have not been barking up the wrong tree, they have failed to see other trees in the woods. Yet, does “China threat theory” deserve the criticisms that it has received? This chapter examines the master narrative of “China threat theory” - that China’s economic growth will lead to an economic threat as well as power growth that will lead to a military threat to East Asian countries and the United States - and outlines the theoretical and empirical challenges that the master narrative faces. China has not been an economic threat to the United States, and its power growth will not make China a threat to the United States and its East Asian neighbors. The “China threat theory” exists in people’s minds as a master narrative, which is similar to an “ideal type.” While it faces many challenges theoretically and empirically, it can exert its dominance over scholars, pundits, and policymakers by excluding other interpretations of China’s economic and social changes. Therefore, it should be critiqued so that its dominance can be disrupted. In fact, by proposing such concepts as “peaceful rise,” “peaceful development” (heping fazhan), and “harmonious world” (hexie shijie), the Chinese government has been groping for ways to disrupt the dominance of the master narrative of “China threat theory.”

### China - U.S. Relations

#### U.S.-China relations are fundamentally constituted by our representations of China as a knowable object. The alternative is to not accept the 1AC as unproblematic

Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, October 2013, “Threatening China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity,” Review of International Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, p. 924

In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’. The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

### China - Space

#### Even the very word “threat” in the context of Chinese space policy activates the security dilemma and guarantees space weaponization

Caleb Pomeroy, University of Oxford, June 6, 2015, “[Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & U.S. Security](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/),” E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/, Accessed 5-1-2016

This question’s use of the word “threat” can increase U.S. perceptions of a Chinese threat. Threatening versus nonthreatening language forces one to view space actions through a threatening versus nonthreatening lens. For example, an emerging amount of literature focuses on the “China threat theory.” Yong Deng (2006) argues that the “China threat theory” is foreign attributions to China as being harmful and destabilizing in international relations. Some analysts argue the theory helps defense industry insiders keep power and prestige gained during the Cold War by creating an existential threat supposedly facing the U.S. Though Beijing has disregarded this as Cold War-style power politics while reassuring the international community of its peaceful intentions, the risk still exists that the U.S. may genuinely feel threatened by China’s actions. However, one reason may be the use of threat language and the subsequent understanding of actions as threatening or nonthreatening. This is problematic, because it risks creating a discursively constructed security dilemma that increases the likelihood of space weaponization. While space weapons are only in their infancy in terms of development and deployment, the “space policy discourse of several states is already predicated, to a greater or lesser extent, on the general probability of space weaponization, and this in turn risks premature preclusion of alternative outcomes”. The existence of U.S. perceptions of a China threat that arises from its use of threatening versus nonthreatening terminology leads the U.S. to perceive China’s increasing space power as threatening, even if it is not China’s intention. Therefore, this question’s use of threat terminology can increase the likelihood that the U.S. will perceive a threat.

### China – Powershift Narrative

#### The powershift narrative of a rising China constructs a spatial mindset that merely recycles old school realism. This mistakenly ties power to the states, which guarantees error replication and a self-fulfilling prophecy

Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia, 2014, “Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the “Power Shift” Narrative,” Asian Perspective 38 (2014), pp. 404-406

China may be the most complex and “paradoxical” rising power in modern international history, as reflected in various paradigms and lenses employed to try to make sense of it. The powershift narrative is one such lens; it provides a seemingly convincing identity statement about a China that, while still lacking in superpower status, no longer quite fits into the category of developing countries. This narrative also allows us to reduce the many complex transnational issues and challenges that do not have a single national origin to the familiar problems associated with international power transition. Overall it reflects a particular spatial mindset and geopolitical imagination that keeps recycling the age-old metanarrative of a realist world where power struggle is a constant reality and where the rise and fall of great powers not only unsettles the balance of power but more often than not results in “the tragedy of great power politics”. In doing so, the power-shift narrative betrays the lack of serious reconceptualization of power. Given the inherently social and relational nature of power itself as well as the changing global political, economic, and normative structures, we must understand the alleged power shift from the United States to China through a more complex and nuanced perspective of power. By assuming that power continues to be attached to the state as measurable capabilities, and that today’s power shift necessarily resembles shifts of the past, we risk employing old tools to tackle new problems. Here it is appropriate to invoke Chinese history and recent US foreign policy to illustrate how a failure to reconceptualize power can lead to grave strategic calamities. For more than a millennium, Chinese rulers closely watched their interior continental frontiers for signs of a challenge to their power. The fact that such a challenge could come from a new direction (the coast) and in a different form (naval power) never occurred to them. Yet when that new form of power arrived on its shores, the Qing dynasty found itself vastly ill-equipped to cope with it. The rest is history. The recent example is the false “unipolar moment” assessment of US power and its attendant neoconservative policy during the George W. Bush period. If the neoconservative faith in the unipolar moment of US power is misguided, the US decline and power-shift discourses may be equally mistaken. Yet, to the extent that power is socially constructed, the powerful conventional discourse of a classic power transition from the United States to China could have profound practical implications for this important relationship. As Breslin notes, “A key source of Chinese power is the assumption by others that it either has it . . . or, maybe more correctly, that it will have this power and influence some time soon.” Whether this discursively constructed Chinese power matches reality is beside the point, for China and other powers both may act on the basis of such a projected power shift. In China, it might well play into popular nationalism or encourage arrogance and assertiveness in its foreign policy, or both. In the West, it would justify a policy of hedging against an ostensibly rising Chinese power, a policy that in turn could harden China’s resolve to further amass power. In this sense, the conventional construction of Chinese power could well create a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

### Maritime Security

#### Maritime threat construction is the discursive manifestation of security politics that shape policy responses toward extreme measures

Christian Bueger, Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, 2015, “What is maritime security?,” Marine Policy, v53, p. 162

Securitization suggests that threats are constructed by (a series) of claims that draw on a certain generic grammar. In this grammar an issue, such as piracy, is presented to be an existential threat to a certain referent object, for instance the nation state or international trade. Such claims are only successful if they are presented by actors that have the authority to speak about security and if a relevant target audience accepts such threats. Threat construction usually comes along with a proposal for measures that should be taken to protect the reference object from the threat. For Buzan and Waever it is a specific characteristic of security, that counter-measures are extraordinary and often extreme. They might involve military instruments up to the scale of military conflict or a significant cutback of civil liberties. Drawing on the securitization framework to understand maritime security leads to two potential tracks of investigation. First, the question can be addressed by which securitization claims ‘the maritime’ has become an issue that is securitized. This implies to ask how the contemporary understanding of the oceans and the sea as a space of insecurity and threats has come about and how it has changed over time. Writing a genealogy will be the likely outcome considering that the discourse of the oceans as a zone of danger and uncertainty can be traced at least back to the Antique. Such an analysis provides a grand picture of how and why ‘the maritime’ is a source of insecurity or a reference object that requires to be protected.

#### Maritime “threats”, even if real, are addressed under the security paradigm undergirded by shifting modes of sovereignty

Ren´ee de Nevers, associate professor and vice chair of the Department of Public Administration and International Affairs in Syracuse University’s Maxwell School, 2015, “Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain,” Security Studies, 24, p.

Maritime environments facilitate both legal and illicit exchanges of goods. This presents states, especially great powers, with the dilemma of how to protect their territory from potential threats being transported on foreign flagged ships during peacetime. Dominant states like the United States worry about a range of potential threats that could originate from maritime sources. For example, the United States is the largest market for illegal drugs, and Washington also worries about both terrorist use of WMD and rogue state acquisition of WMD technology. Drugs do, and WMD might, enter the United States by sea. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers seek to revise understandings of sovereignty to further their security goals. This has involved conscious action to relax the protections associated with the sovereignty norm to ensure the powerful state’s capacity for self-protection. These are, in essence, workarounds to enable access in spite of sovereignty. This is evident in the U.S. response to the drug trade and the potential proliferation of WMD technology.

### Maritime Security

####  “Maritime security” is a subjective concept defined in policy by conflicting narratives of threats and opportunities. They all rely on greater calls for regulation and surveillance

Christian Bueger, Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, 2015, “What is maritime security?,” Marine Policy, v53, pp. 159-160.

Maritime Security, like other international buzzwords, is a term that draws attention to new challenges and rallies support for tackling these. Discussions of maritime security frequently do so by pointing to ‘threats’ that prevail in the maritime domain. They refer to threats such as maritime inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents and disasters. The argument is then that maritime security should be defined as the absence of these threats. This ‘laundry list’ approach to defining maritime security has rightfully been criticized as insufficient since it does neither prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are interlinked, nor outlines of how these threats can be addressed. It moreover creates enduring puzzles over which threats should be included. Are climate change and disasters at sea maritime security issues? Should inter-state disputes be treated in terms of national security rather than maritime security? Others advocate for an understanding of maritime security as “good” or “stable order at sea”. In contrast to the ‘negative’ definition of maritime security as absence of a range of threats, this understanding provides a ‘positive’ conceptualization that projects a certain ideal-typical end state that has to be reached. In this approach there is however hardly any discussion of what “good” or “stable” order is supposed to mean, or whose order it is intended to be. Instead the discussion turns immediately to questions of how law enforcement at sea can be improved. A related discussion aims at defining maritime security in positive terms by linking it to ‘economic’ or ‘blue growth’. In this economic attempt to define maritime security, similar questions arise: whose economy is it concerned about, and who will be the primary beneficiaries of such growth? Discussions of responses to maritime security outline a rather broad and incongruent mix of diverse policy proposals which tend to include calls for more coordination, information sharing, regulation, law enforcement and capacity building. Again it remains open what and who should be coordinated or regulated and who should build what kind of capacity. In short, and as several observers have alluded to: no international consensus over the definition of maritime security has emerged.

### U.S. Hegemony (General)

#### American hegemony suffers from a “security psychosis”. Seeing threats everywhere warps the views of policymakers

Stephen Kinzer, a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, April 12, 2015, “The world of threats to the US is an illusion,” Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/04/11/have-seen-enemies-and-they-weak/Cho9J5Bf9jxIkHKIZvnVTJ/story.html?p1=Article\_Recommended\_ArticleText, Accessed 5-1-2016

Promoting the image of a world full of enemies creates a “security psychosis” that misshapes our view of the world. It tempts us to interpret defensive steps taken by other countries as threatening. In extreme cases, it pushes us into wars aimed at preempting threats that do not actually exist. Arms manufacturers profit from the security psychosis even more directly than militarists. Americans take our staggeringly large defense budget almost for granted, and lament continuously that other countries do not build as many exotic weapons systems as we do. Finding new threats is always good business for someone.

### U.S. hegemony (China threat)

#### U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is premised on constructing China as a “threat” produces a devastating self-fulfilling prophecy

Jihyun Kim, an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, Summer 2015, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/> Summer\_2015/kim.pdf, Accessed 4-21-2016

China’s core interests and ambitions are likely to expand as the nation’s power expands. However, China’s intentions and willingness to aggressively use that power are not predetermined—nor are the exact contents of those intentions and willingness static. Rather, “the specific nature and content of its growing appetites,” along with the means through which they are fulfilled, will be greatly influenced by “the choices that other states take in regard to China” as well as the Chinese domestic audience, which is sensitive to any outside actions taken against the country. The Chinese elite cannot afford to take a conciliatory strategy of peaceful rise if doing so may appear too soft to protect China’s national interests and pride, especially when other states singled out China as a threat or an instigator of regional tensions. Nevertheless, the US priority in terms of keeping American preeminence and credibility as a regional security guarantor is likely to make the United States reluctant to give way to China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, which China considers its own traditional sphere of influence. That could heighten the potential clash between the two great powers, with the South China Sea disputes becoming a trigger. Joseph S. Nye asserts that “throughout history, whenever a rising power creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of conflict,” with even small events triggering an unintended and catastrophic chain reaction. In other words, exaggerated and unmanaged fears could produce the so-called Thucydides trap, creating a devastating self-fulfilling prophecy.

### Nuclear war escalation scenarios

#### Nuclear domino theory is securitized alarmism. There is no evidence of a nuclear chain reaction

Nicholas L. Miller, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program, 2014, “Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?,” Security Studies, 23:1, pp. 37-38

This theory of nuclear dominoes has remained a core motivation for US nonproliferation policy ever since—rather than dying with the Cold War, belief in the theory persisted and perhaps became even stronger. Today, scholars, pundits, and policymakers worry that an Iranian nuclear bomb could lead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey to pursue nuclear weapons. As Nicholas Kristof wrote in 2004, “If Iran develops nukes, jittery Saudi Arabia will seek to follow, and then Egypt, which prides itself as the leader of the Arab world. Likewise, anxiety about North Korea is already starting to topple one domino—Japan is moving in the direction of a nuclear capability.” A belief in the nuclear domino theory also underlies the security-centered approach that traditionally dominated the scholarly study of nuclear proliferation. According to the security model, states without the shelter of a nuclear umbrella seek to build nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security from a nuclear rival, although an overwhelming conventional threat may also suffice. As William Potter nicely sums it up, “It is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to find one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and tipping points.” Despite this traditional consensus, however, in recent years many scholars have attacked the validity of the nuclear domino theory. For example, in a recent Brookings Institution study on the history of proliferation forecasting, Moeed Yusuf finds “consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation.. .. [T]he pace of proliferation has been consistently slower than has been anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain from weapons development.” In a recent book, John Mueller goes even further, claiming “forecasts about horizontal proliferation have shown a want of prescience that approaches the monumental—even the pathological . . . even the supposedly optimistic forecasts about nuclear dispersion have proven to be too pessimistic.” Similarly, Gavin argues that the belief in nuclear dominoes is an example of “nuclear alarmism”—not only has it been invalidated by the relatively slow spread of nuclear weapons historically, but there is no “compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur.”

### Middle East Security

#### Their appeal to security politics in the “Middle East” is based on an illusion that ignores the mutual interplay between space and politics. Our criticism provides a new framework for understanding “regional security” by addressing those (in)securities

Pinar Bilgin, currently a guest professor at the Center of Contemporary Middle East Studies at the University of Southern Denmark and visiting researcher at CRIC, University of Copenhagen and an Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, September 2015, “Regional security in the Middle East—what is that we seek?,” Debate Analysis, Center for Mellemoststudier, Syddansk Universitet,

<http://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/centre/c_mellemoest/videncenter/artikler/2015/september/150901__bilgin.pdf>, Accessed 5-10-2016 \*Ellipses in original

The ‘Middle East’ is defined in multiple ways. The classic text quoted by almost every one writing on the subject is an article by the historian Roderic Davison (1960) entitled ‘Where is the Middle East?’ The political scientist Nikki Keddie (1973) asked an even more controversial question: ‘Is there a Middle East?’ There has been, in other words, some controversy regarding the definition of the ‘Middle East’ as a region and/or its delineation. Is Iran included? How about Turkey? Is not MENA a better designation?... There is no room for Middle East exceptionalism in this regard. Many regions have multiple definitions. Critical Geopolitics, a subfield of Political Geography, addresses these questions about the relationship between politics and space. What is important for the students of regional security in the Middle East is that for a long time the relationship between space and politics was not considered by students of regional security.

On ‘Europe’, for instance, there are two critical works by Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler (1992), and by Ole Wæver (1987). Both studies looked at contending definitions of 'Europe' that shaped different actors' approaches to security in Europe. At the time these studies came out, the Cold War structures were unraveling. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had spoken about a Common European home. NATO's future and US commitment to security in Europe was uncertain. Clashes between different definitions of Europe and different approaches to European security was a topic for everyday discussion—though not always ex-pressed in conceptual terms as in Booth & Wheeler and Wæver. These two studies, offered from within a critical security studies framework, pointed to a different way of studying regional security. In my previous work, I drew upon these two studies to build a critical security frame-work for studying regional security, i.e. by opening up both ‘region’ and ‘security’ to inquire into the mutually constitutive relationship between the two. When applied to the Middle East, a critical security studies approach to regional security points to the relationship between politics and space in a way that went unexplored for a long time. Such a framework allows inquiring into different insecurities and referents as prioritized by different perspectives on regional security.

#### U.S. policy approaches to the “Middle East” are driven by security politics that foreclose alternatives in favor of military action

Pinar Bilgin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, 2005, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, pp. 2-3

The Cold War approach to regional security in the Middle East was top-down because threats to security were deﬁned largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, communist inﬁltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threats to security in the Middle East during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the1978–79 revolution), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ. Traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’. During the 1990s, in following a policy of dual containment US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient to US interests. In the aftermath of the events of September 11 US policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in the Middle East and elsewhere. Yet, US policy so far has been one of ‘confronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ as it has focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect of the socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war on Iraq) in addressing these threats. This is not to underestimate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regional security. Rather, the point is that these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity at the same time hinder others. For example, societal and environmental problems caused by resource scarcity do not only threaten the security of individual human beings but also exacerbate existing conﬂicts (as with the struggle over water resources in Israel/Palestine; see Sosland 2002). Besides, the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were made insecure not only by the threat caused by Iraq’s military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women’s rights under the cloak of religious tradition. For, it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health. What is more, the measures that are adopted to meet such military threats sometimes constitute threats to the security of individuals and social groups. The sanctions regime adopted to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction has caused a problem of food insecurity for Iraqi people during the 1990s. In the aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq, Iraqi people are still far from meeting their daily needs. Indeed, it is estimated that if it  were not for the monthly basket distributed as part of the United Nations ’‘Oil for Food’ programme, ‘approximately 80 percent of the Iraqi population would become vulnerable to food insecurity’. Such concerns rarely make it into analyses on regional security in the Middle East.

### Climate Change

#### Securitizing climate change leads to failed short-term policies driven by economic imperatives

Jarrod Hayes, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and Janelle Knox-Hayes, PhD, associate professor in the school of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology,  2014, “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy,” http://spp.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/paper-for-twitter/Hayes%26Knox-Hayes\_Security%20in%20Climate%20Discourse,%20GEP%20(2014).pdf, Accessed 5-3-2016

Securitization theory also highlights structural problems, in that securitization may enable action on environmental problems without producing beneficial outcomes. Securitization of development policy has decreased aid to Africa, and securitization of HIV/AIDS has increased the authority of traditional security actors vis-à-vis civil society. In the US, there are indications that a similar empowerment of the military has taken place. The US military has also been an important securitizing and responding actor to climate change. Given the pervasiveness of the economic activities that generate climate change, the traditional beneficiaries of securitization may be least capable of dealing with the issue. Relying on securitization, with its logic of imminent threat and immediate response, to generate action may result in short-term policies that lack long-term public support. Because of the power centralizing and debate marginalizing characteristics of security, securitization has the potential to disempower skeptics as well as many members of Congress to speak on climate change.

#### Climate change securitization shapes public perceptions and can’t be supported by science

Mike S. Schäfer, Dept. for Communication Science and Media Research (IPMZ), University of Zürich, et al, 2016, with Jürgen Scheffran and Logan Penniket of the University of Hamburg, Germany, “Securitization of media reporting on climate change? A cross-national analysis in nine countries,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 47(1), p. 90

However, this securitization of mass media coverage of climate change differs considerably in trend, extent and focus between the analysed countries. Whereas concerns about security implications trended upwards in Western countries and also in Singapore and Thailand, they shrank in India and appear to trend downwards in South Africa. And while Western countries focus most strongly on energy security in the context of climate change, India, South Africa and Thailand refer more often to food and water security. These results have implications for securitization scholars. They show that even though security risks associated with climate change have not yet been fully established scientifically and are often difficult to attribute to climate change, concern about the potential security implications of climate change is quite visible in the mass media. The securitization of climate change coverage exists, grows in many countries, and may shape public perceptions and concern about climate change’s security implications. At the same time, it is still a relatively under-researched phenomenon, with most securitization studies focusing on political institutions instead of media coverage, and therefore a phenomenon that should be scrutinized analytically more thoroughly in the future. Our study is merely a first foray into this field, highlighting its relevance, demonstrating the suitability of this analytical angle, outlining some general patterns but leaving many questions unanswered. Further studies should go beyond our analysis by describing media representations of the security implications of climate change in more detail – including elaborate linguistic and semantic characteristics such as the use of metaphors of threats, or visualizations that may induce security concerns, by broadening the country sample as well as that of the media, and by connecting the findings more thoroughly with insights into the socio-political situation of the selected countries.

### Climate Change

#### The alternative is essential to understanding the role security politics plays in shaping climate change policy

Jarrod Hayes, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and Janelle Knox-Hayes, PhD, associate professor in the school of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology,  2014, “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy,” http://spp.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/paper-for-twitter/Hayes%26Knox-Hayes\_Security%20in%20Climate%20Discourse,%20GEP%20(2014).pdf, Accessed 5-3-2016

Examining climate change through the lens of security highlights important issues. First, climate change presents existential threats to individuals and collectives. Second, the diffused and collective nature of the phenomenon makes the “power centralizing” aspects of security attractive. Third, security discourses powerfully affect the relationship between state and society. If discourses create and construct the social world, understanding the role of security discourses in the debate over climate change has important ramifications for understanding climate change policy. With respect to climate change, political leaders can ignore it, tackle it through normal political processes, or address it as a security threat requiring extraordinary measures. Insights from the Copenhagen School of security studies sheds light on the significance of security in environmental discourses, as well as the limits of security and normal politics in addressing globalized environmental issues.

#### The DOD is fully engrained in viewing climate change through a security lens

Wilson VornDick, a Commander in the U.S. Navy at the Pentagon, August 25, 2015, “Climate Change and U.S. Military Strategy,” Real Clear Defense, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/25/climate_change_and_us_military_strategy_108406.html>, Accessed 5-1-2016

The Department of Defense (DoD)  proposed its first climate change strategy, the [Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap](http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint_wForeword_c.pdf), last year that described climate change as a “threat multiplier” and a “global problem” that not only threatens the U.S. military but the globe. Simultaneously, they asserted that climate change presents an opportunity to share tools for assessing and managing climate change impacts, while helping build other nation’s capacity to respond. While U.S. is beginning to securitize, or weave climate change into our nation’s broader national security framework, Chinese authorities have not.

### “9/11”

#### Their appeal to “9/11” is a problematic starting point that de-historicizes colonialism. We should call into question these temporal narratives of security

Columba Peoples, Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, UK and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Reader in International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK., 2015, Critical Security Studies An introduction, 2nd edition, p. 8

The tendency to take 9/11 as an unproblematised starting point in a seemingly continuous sequence of events in the ‘war on terror’, now known as simply ‘11/3’, ‘Bali’, ‘Istanbul’, ‘7/7’, ‘Mumbai’, has also been criticised. As well as ignoring the specificities of each of these tragedies, such a narrative implies that global history somehow begins with 9/11. In turn, as emphasised by those working in the postcolonial tradition, this de-historicises the various colonial legacies, Western foreign policies and global inequalities that are part of the broader context in which 9/11 and other terroristic events can be emplaced (for more see Chapter 4). Similarly, scholars associated with poststructuralism and international political sociology (IPS) approaches have sought to critically interrogate discourses of exceptionalism used by Western governments to justify the use of ‘exceptional’ illiberal practices in supposedly liberal democratic regimes (for more see Chapters 5 and 9). What is common to these critical commentaries, therefore, is an insistence on the importance of paying close attention to the way in which the discourse of a pre/post-9/11 world works politically in order to justify particular policies and interests. Despite the prevalence of temporal narratives in the study of security there are good reasons to exercise caution when relying on these various historical mappings. The evolution of security studies, and critical strands within it, has not been as linear as this method of framing the field implies. The association between the end of the cold war and the rise of critical security studies obscures critically oriented work that pre-dates 1989. Richard Falk’s (1975) contributions to the World Order Models Project in the 1970s and Richard K. Ashley’s (1984) poststructural critiques of neo-realism in the early 1980s were, for instance, arguably seminal in the formation of critical approaches to security. Also, many aspects of critical theorising, such as the contributions of feminist and gender approaches, transcend the arbitrary divisions of pre/post-cold war and 9/11. Another key problem with the un-reflexive usage of temporal narratives is that this type of map can overlook areas of continuity between different periods said to be distinct. Thus, for example, discussions of ‘homeland security’ and the need for a coordinated approach to counterterrorism in the US actually pre-date 9/11 (see Chapter 9).

### Fear Appeals Bad

#### Fear-based representations of China are rooted in racist politics that should be rejected on face. War becomes the only option to suppress insecurity

Henry C K Liu, chair of a New York-based private investment group Henry C.K., Pres. Investment Group, Asia Times, August 20, 2005, “Trade wars can lead to shooting wars,” Asia Times, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GH20Dj01.html>, Accessed 5-12-2016

The prospect that China can be a major economic power is feeding widespread paranoia in the United States. The fear is that developing nations, led by China and India, may out-compete the advanced nations for high-tech jobs while keeping the low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing jobs they already own. China already is the world's biggest producer and exporter of consumer electronics and it is a matter of time before it becomes a major player in auto exports. Shipbuilding is now dominated by China and aircraft manufacturing will follow. The US Navy is now dependent on Asia, and eventually China, to build its new ships, and eventually the economics of trade will force the US Air Force to procure planes made in Asia and assembled in China.
The fear of China by the US dates back to almost two centuries of racial prejudice**,** ever since Western imperialism invaded Asia beginning in the early 19th century. Notwithstanding that it is natural, *ceteris paribus,* that the country with the world's largest population, an ancient culture and long history would again be a big player in the world economy as it modernizes**,** the fear that China might soon gain advantages of labor, capital and even technology that would allow it to dominate the world economy and gain the strategic advantages that go along with such domination is enough to push the world's only superpower openly to contemplate preemptive strikes against it. Furthermore, Chinese culture commands close affinity with the peoples of Asia, the main concentration of the world's population and a revived focal point of global geopolitics. Suddenly, socio-economic Darwinism of survival of the fittest, celebrated in the UnitedStatessince its founding, is no longer welcome by US policymakers when the US is no longer the fittest and the survival of US hegemony is at stake. To many in the US, particularly the militant neo-conservatives, international trends of socio-economic Darwinism now need to be stopped by war.

#### Fear appeals create self-fulfilling prophecies

Stephen Kinzer, a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, December 23, 2015, “The United States of Fear and Panic,” Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/12/23/the-united-states-fear-and-panic/o3DvdxI1nUw45Z2Lza9aLM/story.html?p1=Article\_Related\_Box\_Article\_More, Accessed 5-1-2016

Fear has a corrosive and lamentable effect on our society, especially on our children. It also poses another danger. Unjustified panic can lead not only to crackdowns on freedom at home but also self-destructive foreign wars. If we persuade ourselves that our country is threatened by terrorists in the Middle East, we may be tempted to attack “at the source.” This could turn the threat we now imagine into something real.

## Alternatives

### Security Cosmopolitanism - Solvency

#### Threat construction and statist security politics inherently create (in)securities. The alternative resolves this three ways: Reformation of security policies from motive to norms, redefine their ontological foundations and infuse ethics. This challenges the ontological foundations of security politics. A cosmopolitan security alternative would generate debates about language and ontology toward an ethic of responsibility

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, June 17, 2013, “Security Cosmopolitanism,”

<https://worldthoughtworldpolitics.wordpress.com/2013/06/17/security-cosmopolitanism/>, Global Theory, Accessed 5-10-2016

Cosmopolitanism in international affairs is a body of thinking and practice committed to building a more just and sustainable international order, but it has never been systematically applied to the question or practice of security. This article argues that both a range of transnational (event-based and systemic) insecurities, and state abuses of security discourse to compromise rights and cause insecurity, create a compelling normative and empirical case for a new security paradigm: security cosmopolitanism. It would aim to critique and reform both national and collective security policies and processes: to put better norms and ends to them, redefine their ontological foundations, and generate guiding ethical principles. It does so in the service of a distinctive understanding of global security as a universal good: one in which the security of all states and all human beings is of equal weight, in which causal chains and processes spread widely across space and through time, and in which security actors bear a responsibility to consider the global impact of their choices.

This article lays out the key ontological and ethical frameworks for security cosmopolitanism. These challenge the dominant ontological foundations of national security (and international society) anchored in the social contract between citizen and state. Security cosmopolitanism argues that states cannot contain and immunize the national social body from external threats; rather, insecurity arises in a borderless way from the very histories, choices, powers, and systems of modernity. This generates both a new analytical model for global security and a different – relational, networked, and future-oriented – ethic of responsibility. The article seems firmly in the journal’s spirit of ‘challeng[ing] ourselves as critical security scholars and to open and explore new avenues’ – it draws strongly on insights from critical security studies, but is just as strongly oriented to concerns in the traditional security agenda; it draws on both (Frankfurt school) critical theory and post-structuralist approaches, while refusing to sit comfortably with either and thus challenging them both; and it ultimately rejects meta-theory as a primary terrain of debate, stating that urgent real-world problems of climate change, systemic poverty, nuclear weapons, and conflict prevention deserve our sustained research and attention. If two of the commentaries on it (by [Laura Sjoberg](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2013.801132#.Ub8G2RZ7lS8), and [Mandy Turner and Neil Cooper](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2013.801134#.Ub8G8RZ7lS8)) are a guide, my refusal to accept the ideological and intellectual rules of (what some interpret) to be critical security studies is profoundly unsettling – indeed, an occasion to hit back with such force as to place unbearable pressure on the protocols of academic civility – protocols that I take to involve criticism and debate that is anchored in a fair and careful reading of what one actually writes and says, rather than a mischievous and distorted version of it. If their interventions are typical (and I suspect they are not) I fear that critical security studies is reaching the kind of worrying turning point projected by Ken Booth in his fine introduction to Laura Shepherd’s new volume, Critical Approaches to Security, wherein we turn our backs on real-world insecurities in favour of ever more obscure and inwards methodological and meta-theoretical debates. Readers with an interest in such intellectual debates should read my article and these commentaries carefully, and make up their own minds as to the merits and problems of our various cases. Ultimately I agree with Booth: we need to be looking outwards to the world and trying to shape its structures of power and possibility – with the inevitable risks that involves – in ways that are informed by philosophically rich (and yes, contested) debates about our underlying languages and concepts.

### Security Cosmopolitanism – Solvency / Governments

#### The 1AC treats the symptoms but not causes. (In)security of national governments distorts political ontologies that guarantee error replication for policies like engagement. Only the alternative reconceptualizes security in pluralistic terms to avoid the 1AC case harms

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2013, “Security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, [Volume 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1), [Issue 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), pp. 13-28

While security cosmopolitanism does not deny that there are event-based sites and sources of insecurity, it argues that they can neither be fully understood nor ameliorated in their irruptive, symptomatic forms. Event-based threats – the insecurities of the moment – are epiphenomena of larger scale structures and systems. Insecurities arise as events out of multidimensional, interdependent, and often anonymous processes; out of complex articulations of agency, determination, and accident stretching far into a multilayered past and a future with multiple potentials. Against such a background, national governments can potentially be a valuable means of security, but will not be able to contain their communities within a prophylactic cocoon of safety in an insecure world; to secure nations, states must ensure that the world is secured. In sum, the potential for insecurity is immanent to political power, social organization, and cultural, industrial, and military activity under the conditions of modernity on this earth, not external to them. Security cosmopolitanism then becomes a project of reducing such insecurity for all human beings through a threefold series of transformations: of the identity-forms and policies of states; of the structures, norms, commitments, and operations of global governance; and of the actions of corporations and other non-state actors that have an impact on the security of people and ecosystems. My account here has some affinities to Ulrich Beck’s assertion, in his Cosmopolitan Vision, of an ‘interdependency crisis’: a ‘world risk society’ that arises out of ‘culturally manufactured actions, effects and insecurities’. However, I do not share his confidence that what results is a form of ‘risk-cosmopolitanism’ that ‘generates an unavoidable pressure to co-operate’ and a ‘global public awareness of the ongoing process of risk-cosmopolitanization’ with an ‘enlightening function’. Whereas he put the thesis that in ‘world risk society…the causes and agents of global threats spark new political conflicts, which in turn promote an institutional cosmopolitanism’, I would argue that we cannot assume that such conflicts will have an ‘enlightening function’, or that cosmopolitan outcomes will be historically determined by such a ‘risk awareness’. While the awareness of global risk is a powerful argument for cosmopolitanism**,** it is possible for transnational threats and risks to be conceptualized and addressed in strongly nationalist and self-regarding terms, for efforts at cooperation to be distorted by statist ontologies and Realpolitik, for the securitization of such risks to go haywire (for severe costs to be created by a refusal to accept any risk or, alternatively, for the management of risk to become an apologia for unacceptable levels of danger), and for transnational security institutions to produce damaging and dysfunctional outcomes that are far from cosmopolitan. In short, we cannot place our trust in such a cosmopolitan dialectic of history. Security cosmopolitanism is not going to arrive; it must be imagined and created with a combination of creativity, agency, and moral and strategic caution.

**EVIDENCE CONTINUED ON THENEXT PAGE**

 We could thus turn Beck’s schema on its head: rather than risk-awareness ineluctably creating cosmopolitanism, security cosmopolitanism is in fact needed to regulate the conceptualization and securitization of global risks to ensure that they are addressed in ways that promote, rather than undermine, enduring security for all human beings. Of significant concern here is that practices of collective security, intervention, and humanitarianism can inappropriately securitize and respond to transnational risks in ways that worsen them and silence the voices of affected communities. This has led a number of writers to view any practice of human security, or any pairing of security and cosmopolitanism, with intense skepticism. In a powerful recent article Vivienne Jabri argues – in effect – that joining cosmopolitanism with security is normatively dangerous and politically disabling for the populations of conflict-ridden states subject to intervention. She characterizes contemporary multinational interventions (state-building, liberal governance, humanitarian, and counter-terrorist) as cosmopolitanism as a practice of government through security’ – one that seeks to ‘reshape, or render ‘secure’, dangerous others’ within a more ambitious project to realize a ‘global liberal order’. She contrasts such an approach with a cosmopolitanism of ‘solidarity’ that empowers communities and recognizes their agency to participate in their own politicization: ‘a form of cosmopolitan politics that, rather than seeing distant populations as depoliticized targets of management, expresses a politics of solidarity the extension of which is…the recognition of the political agency of the other’. If Jabri’s construction of these categories is accepted, the creation of a security cosmopolitanism as I intend it would be impossible; irredeemably contradictory and aporetic. However, rather than continue to identify security exclusively with coercion, governmentality and violence (practices with which it has certainly been associated), security cosmopolitanism aims to drive the ethos of human solidarity, dignity, and agency that she promotes back into the practice and conceptualization of security at all levels, especially the transnational. Questions of solidarity are also of concern to Mark Duffield, who argues in his Development, Security and Unending War that human security is a colonizing ‘biopolitical category’ that is tainted by its close association with the western interventionist state (2007, 112). While this claim may be debatable, there does appear to be a cosmopolitan dimension in Duffield’s unarguable critique of post-9/11 interventions that have ‘moved the security of homeland population, livelihood systems and infrastructures to the fore’ and ‘privileged the role of effective states in deciding the security needs of others’ – as if to argue that the security of others should have priority, affected communities should be empowered to create their own security, and that our joint (and different) security needs should be addressed together. One can also sense a kind of radical ‘cosmopolitanism from below’ in his concluding argument for a global ‘solidarity of the governed’: an ‘international citizenship [of] new encounters, mutual recognition, reciprocity and hope’ that, in Thomas Oleson’s words, mobilizes an ‘extensive global consciousness that reconstructs the grievances of physically, socially and culturally distant people as deeply intertwined’. Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts – because all forms of governance, especially the global, involve the abstraction of human realities and needs into policy knowledge and law, and because all forms of governance raise dilemmas of information, abuse of power, and accountability. When dealing with climate, nuclear weapons, complex forms of conflict, and international law, among others, technical expertise will be at a premium, but global governance simultaneously needs forms of scrutiny and ethics that will more effectively connect it to the communities it is meant to serve. This is why security cosmopolitanism will need to theorize and defend norms for the responsible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance on the basis that if all our security is intertwined, none can be privileged. Security cosmopolitanism would add to a ‘solidarity of the governed’ a solidarity of the governing with the governed that ought to shape governance by elites: an ethic of responsibility of the governing not merely to those they govern but to all those whom they affect and should be accountable, especially the marginalized and vulnerable.

### Security Cosmopolitanism – Ontology /War

#### The ontology of security structures nation-state politics around the immunization against threats. This devolves into autoimmunization that generates massive human suffering and structural violence and makes war inevitable. Our alternative calls for a fundamental shift away from the ontology of the 1AC

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2013, “Security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, [Volume 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1), [Issue 1](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), pp. 13-28

Furthermore, as international relations grow in complexity and danger, and an international law based on the sovereign equality of peoples organized into states becomes normatively dominant with the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of the post-World War II national security state, the Hobbesian imaginary mutates: the nation-state comes to be thought of as a contained and vital body that must be immunized, or secured, against threats that come from without as well from within. This national body has integrity, sovereignty, borders – and international society, as Hedley Bull explained, comprises such ontologically separate body-politics linked together by a spiderweb of international law, strategic balances, and mutual interests. There is no common humanity, merely an anarchical society of states regulated by a minimal set of agreed rules. National enclosure becomes paired with anarchic balancing, strategic cooperation, and Realpolitik: this is the ontology that structures and animates dominant state approaches to both national and collective security, across the entirety of the security agenda. In security cosmopolitanism, there can be no successful immunization of the national body against insecurities that come from outside. Such immunization failure can be understood in two ways. First, the very constitution of the state and the national body can be a source of threat – to ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities, dissidents, indigenous peoples, the poor, and women – who become targets of exclusion, marginalization, discipline, violence, and repression. Masculinist and totalizing metaphors of state and community as body then mobilize their own violence, seeking to homogenize and exclude those designated as the other – the virus or cancer – of the state. Such policies generate both severe human insecurity and transnational insecurities in the form of refugees, the transmission of conflict, or the internationalization of struggle – the Palestinians being a powerful case in point. Second, dominant patterns of insecurity and threat – whether one thinks in terms of their causes, scope, or effects – develop within and across borders in ways that render containment models of national security inadequate, and are in fact exacerbated by the perseverance of such models. The atmosphere has no borders, and climate change – which will have dramatic effects on human security from environmental disruptions, degradation, disease vectors, climate-affected conflict, and ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and storm surges – arises as a totality out of millions of often anonymous daily actions in industry, agriculture, government, and individual life. While action at the state and government level is obviously crucial, attempts to partition legal responsibility along national lines have done little more than create paralyzing international disputes and no agreement on a global treaty framework to reduce emissions and arrest climate change. The antagonistic structure and ontology of international society here presents a profound obstacle to cosmopolitan ends: the result is what writers such as Esposito and Jacques Derrida have called ‘autoimmunization’, an immune response that threatens to destroy the social body rather than protect it. Nuclear weapons present a similar dilemma dating to the beginning of the post-war national security state: national efforts to seek security through nuclear threats soon became a threat to humanity as such, creating a global community of fate through escalating insecurity dynamics that could never be tamed or stabilized. In this way the nuclear balance of terror becomes the ultimate autoimmunization, as deterrence is forced by time compression and uncertainty to exist at the edge of pre-emption and thus of irreversible disaster, threatening to eliminate those it aims to defend. Similarly transnational Islamist terrorism operates, propagandizes, and recruits across borders, and violent and exceptionalist responses produce new autoimmunization processes that undermine multiculturalism and the democratic rule of law and drive new forms of radicalization and terror. Hence in security cosmopolitanism the founding narrative of security changes: insecurity does not arise before or external to a state that (in the classical narrative) acts as a double guarantee of both security and modernity, but arises out of that very modernity as a function of its histories, choices, powers, relations, and systems. It is not the enemy in possession of nuclear or conventional weapons that is the fundamental source of insecurity, but the weapons system itself; not the forced migrant or the massive storm creating insecurity for the nation-state, but the human interaction with the climate system; not the terrorist en route to an attack, but an historical system of injustice, geopolitics, and ideology around violence that enables terrorism as a normative choice and a social phenomenon. Similar arguments can be made about hunger and food insecurity, global health inequality, asylum seekers, transnational crime, weapons proliferation, and more. As Simon Dalby writes of climate change, its ‘irony’ is that ‘the threat is self-imposed; we are the makers of our own misfortunes’. This generates profound responsibilities toward peoples most vulnerable to climate disruptions and undermines ‘distinctions between nature and culture, human and environment’ such that ‘the global scale we now live in’ must be conceptualized as a ‘social nature’.

## Mechanics

### Social Constructions

#### Security politics are socially constructed

K.M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, 2007, Critical Approaches to International Relations, p. 101

Conventional approaches to security start with an objective threat, external to the agents of security. They assume that threats exist inde­pendent of the routines, procedures, discourses and knowledge brought to bear by security agencies. The central policy question raised by these approaches is either one of misperception or of which threats are to have policy priority. More critical approaches emphasize that threats are a product of a politics of repre­sentation. Far from being a purely external phenomenon, to which security agencies merely react, a potential threat is transformed into a security question through the active intervention of security agencies. Measurements of the scope and seriousness of threats are shaped by social, cultural and political processes that produce some phenomena as 'security' threats while largely ignoring others. In the process of reification, a human-made object or situation comes to be understood as a factual given that exists externally and independently of the agen­cies that produced it.

#### Securitization is an extension of political agency within social spaces to socially construct power-centralization

Jarrod Hayes, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and Janelle Knox-Hayes, PhD, associate professor in the school of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology,  2014, “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy,” http://spp.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/paper-for-twitter/Hayes%26Knox-Hayes\_Security%20in%20Climate%20Discourse,%20GEP%20(2014).pdf, Accessed 5-3-2016

Securitization involves the manifestation of both agency and structure. Political agents use security to achieve political objectives, for example, to delegitimize opposition or to access the power-centralizing aspect of securitization. Weber and Stern point to the importance of framing in climate change policies. However, securitization takes place within a social space that gives it power. For example, the EU is not constituted as an actor that can “speak” security. Conversely, the US president is an actor clearly constituted to speak security, and “very important” issues are discursively constructed as security, making the issues worthy of concentrated political attention. Differences in discourse are a product of how Americans assign meaning to important issues as compared to Europeans. Neither agency nor structure alone explains the emergence of security discourses. Instead they interact to create both the space in which security exists and how security is used. Here, we emphasize the agential aspects of securitization as a means of exposing the structural factors that shape policy

### A2: “Threats are Real”

#### Even if “threats” are real, their security representations allow the state to decide those exceptions that justify the worse forms of violence

Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology & Director of the Centre for Criminology at Oxford, and Neil Walker, Professor of Law at the European University Institute (EUI), 2007, Civilizing Security, p. 111

Secondly, by invoking 'security' as its foundational purpose and the policing of general order as the basic measure of that purpose, the state gives most tangible form to what in Schmittian terms (1922/1985: 5) may be viewed as its sovereign right to 'decide on the exception'. At best, then, security operates as primus inter pares in its claims on public policy as against other potential goods. At worst, security threatens to operate as an anti-political political practice wherein state actors declare the problem at hand (be it terrorism, or drugs, or migration, or...) to demand imperatives rather than involve trade-offs and polit­ical choices, to call for decisive decision instead of democratic deliber­ation**,** and to warrant the restriction of basic liberties as the price to be paid for the maintenance of public security. Whichever is the case, what is crucial to underline is that what may be claimed to justify exceptional treatment under the banner of security need not be the threat to any identifiable special interest or specific strain of order itself of 'exceptional' importance, but rather the threat to the 'normal' standard of general order, however defined. And along­side and underpinning the privileging of security discourse there is a privileging of the key 'securitizing' actors who partici­pate in that discourse and in its relevant politics of definition**.** As iconic figures in the production of national security, the police, despite their lack of democratic credentials, often acquire 'the right of legitimate pronouncement' – the reputational standing necessary to identify problems and deviations from the 'normal' standard of general order and make reckonable claims to their diagnosis and solution.

#### China is not a “threat” even in their terms. They are engaging in broad diplomatic efforts toward peace and stability to advance trade. They want U.S. cooperation

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, March 10, 2016, “China’s South Asia Strategy,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-south-asia-strategy>, Accessed 5-14-2016

China’s major interests in South Asia include promoting stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to curb the influence of Islamist extremists, and to facilitate trade and energy corridors throughout the region that China can access. China also is focused on enhancing its influence with other South Asian states, including Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, to further help it secure energy and trade flows from the Middle East and Europe, and as part of a global effort to extend its diplomatic and economic influence. Furthermore, China seeks to contain Indian power by building close ties with Pakistan and bolstering Islamabad’s strategic and military strength. China likely assesses that, by tilting toward Pakistan, it can keep India tied down in South Asia and divert its military force and strategic capabilities away from China. China has recently demonstrated willingness to play a more active economic and diplomatic role in efforts aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan. Washington welcomes Beijing’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and views efforts such as the establishment of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (made up of U.S., Afghan, Chinese, and Pakistani officials) as a rare opportunity for Washington and Beijing to work together toward a common security goal.

### A2: Permutations – Alt. is a Pre-requisite

#### The alternative is a pre-requisite the Aff. The only permutation is “do the alternative, then the plan” which severs the immediacy of the plan and skews Negative ground. Institutional change can only come after we adopt a cosmopolitan ethic because it shapes why we do what we do

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2015, “Security cosmopolitanism: the next phase,” Critical Studies on Security, [3](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1):[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), p. 208

It is my view that a cosmopolitan project should, in large part, be about such a politics: it should aim to create spaces of dissensus for the articulation and amelioration of silenced and hidden wrongs and harms and should work to eliminate egregious differends suffered by Indigenous peoples struggling against miners and developers, by child labourers, and by the victims of rape in war, of poverty and ecological devastation, or the ‘collateral damage’ permitted under International Humanitarian Law. There are already many examples of such opening and creativity in international law, such as Raphael Lemkin’s conceptualisation of the crime of genocide and his long campaign to have a convention adopted, or the incorporation of the ‘refugee’ as a juridical rights category. However, the limitations of that law highlight a second imperative: that the potential for new divisions of the sensible to simultaneously institutionalise exclusions must be critiqued, and in turn trigger new claims. For example, the genocide convention excludes political killing and requires proof of intent, while the definition of a refugee has been so grievously narrowed that it excludes millions of displaced persons who fear for their lives. There is certainly a need to institutionalise and address wrongs – that is, to create systems of security and governance – but global governance must always be a dynamic exchange between police and politics, consensus and dissensus. By emphasising a common system of ends – the need to preserve a just and sustainable structure of coexistence between humans, societies and ecologies – a posthuman cosmopolitanism provides an important way of determining what wrongs and claims to admit into a global structure of phrases and action. It sets out the purposes for which our agonistic politics must aim. Mary Kaldor’s powerful concluding note of belief in the potential for change, in what Kant called a duty to ‘to attempt the impractical’, is what we must seize on now (2013, 44). The crisis we face, which links a complex system of grave harms, inequalities and wrongs into a pattern that threatens the future of life on Earth, is too urgent to indulge either a totalising denunciation of global governance or the paralysing pessimism with which Oliver Richmond frames his response. He may believe that ‘asking security praxis to reform itself is like asking the King to behead himself’, but we must force it to do so. An (admirable) politics of peace – an idea embedded in the founding purposes and principles of the United Nations – is no less subject to ambiguity, failure, and agonism than security and requires an equally profound transformation of global institutions. We may look on our history of disaster and frustration and conclude that another world is impossible or we may conclude the very opposite: that another world must be made possible. By (almost) ending slavery, colonialism, and apartheid, inventing and creating human rights, removing murderous authoritarian regimes, ending conflicts, and putting the needs of animals and ecosystems into our politics, humanity has shown that it can successfully struggle for change based on principles, sympathies, and common ends that express something universal. This cosmopolitan project is complex, antagonistic, unfinished, and unfinishable, but always worth imagining. It is time we reshaped global order in its terms.

### A2: Permutations – Mutually Exclusive

#### The alternative rejects the security politics of the Affirmative. Students should activate agency to break down traditional modes of security politics. This is mutually exclusive with the Affirmative

Pinar Bilgin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, 2005, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, pp. 205-206

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is conceptualised as constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more 'realistic' picture of the future becomes 'real' through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a 'desired' future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a 'reality' through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a 'desired' future empowers people(s) in the present.

Presenting pictures of what a 'desired' future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as 'threats to the future' to use Beck's terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an 'optimistic', but a more 'realistic' picture of the future. Considering how the 'realism' of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world 'out there', but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more 'realistic' approaches to regional security in theory and practice.

#### The Affirmative is no different than militaristic and state-centric driven traditional modes of security politics by a theoretical orientation of illusory objectivity. Our criticism disrupts the dominant security narrative of threats to open up new approaches to policy. This is mutually exclusive with the Affirmative

Pinar Bilgin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, 2005, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, pp. 206-207

The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the 'realistic' picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the 'Middle East' by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that 'theories do not leave the world untouched'. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the 'politics behind the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that 'everything is socially constructed' or that 'all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them' is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a 'reality' in line with the tenets of 'realist' Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the 'reality' 'out there', foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call 'reality'. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world**.** After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in securityin the Middle Eastto decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a 'threat to the future', or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic' vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a 'desired' future but is also cognisant of 'threats to the future'.

### A2: State Good

#### Cooper, Turner & Sjoberg’s criticism is overly dismissive of discursive interventions, which is ethically irresponsible. Far from dismissing the State, the alternative calls for a new conception of the State under a cosmopolitan ethic. It is a fundamental reorientation of statist ontology. Absent the alternative, criticism is meaningless

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2015, “Security cosmopolitanism: the next phase,” Critical Studies on Security, [3](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1):[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), p. 196

Cooper and Turner’s analysis – which rightly highlights the agonistic and contestatory politics surrounding all normative claims – is nonetheless overly dismissive of the positive political role that well-framed ethical and normative discourse can and must play. Nor do they respect its rigours and demand for consistency. The notion that there is a ‘realpolitik security cosmopolitanism’ is morally absurd, because it fails to be cosmopolitan – to enact the ground principle of equality and create security universally. In contrast, liberal internationalism quite self-consciously allows states to resort to Realpolitik. They also accuse me, incorrectly, of thinking that ‘politics is ethics and not an arena of contestation’, without considering that without clear normative and ethical horizons contestation risks becoming meaningless pugilism, an endless Hobbesian chase of power after power. Certainly those making normative prescriptions must accept criticism and scrutiny, which is why their (and Sjoberg’s) concern that my text somehow privileges the state is worth airing. However, while I consider states as potential cosmopolitan agents, this would require a remarkable transformation of the way that too many (neoliberal) states frame their foreign policy as a channel of military and corporate (rather than genuinely public and global) interests. The article insists that states represent the interests not merely of their own communities, but of humanity and the global ecology. Far from being privileged, the state has neither ontological nor ethical priority. However, we are stuck with it, and in the hands of good people it can often do rather a lot of good. Sjoberg’s accusation that my ethic of solidarity of the governing with the governed ‘seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them’ only makes sense if the value of ethical and normative prescription is devalued and (the both damaging and potentially positive role of) states is ignored entirely. Rather than speaking truth to power, it is as if we should not speak to power at all. Such a position is both ethically and politically irresponsible.

## Impacts

### Impact Extension – Policymaking / Error Replication

#### Viewing policy through the lens of security falsely assumes the world is objective. But securitization allows policymakers to make snap decisions based on epistemology and ontology

Thierry Balzacq, The Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM), Paris and Stefano Guzzini, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen and Professor of Government at Uppsala University, Sweden, March 2015, Introduction: ‘What kind of theory – if any – is securitization?’,” International Relations, vol. 29 no. 1, pp. 98-99

Let us backtrack a little. Securitization is rooted in the basic idea that the existence and management of certain issues as security problems does not necessarily depend upon objective, or purely material conditions. Another way to cash in on the same formula is to say that something acquires a security status as a result of an intersubjective process involving a securitizing actor and an audience. In this sense, ‘security has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does something – securitize – rather than an objective (or subjective) condition’. One of the central implications of this idea is that once established, securitization enables policy makers to immediately adopt whatever means they deem appropriate to curb the threat. This is a fairly standard account, but it is amenable to various understandings, many of which draw on different intellectual traditions, and some of which conduct securitization in different epistemological and ontological terrains. For instance, some critics have observed that the commitment of securitization to the intersubjective nature of security problems is not always consistent. This problem has to do, to a great extent, with the precise status of audience in securitization theory.

#### Securitization leads to extreme policy responses that fail and risk military force

Christian Bueger, Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, 2015, “What is maritime security?,” Marine Policy, v53, p. 162

The securitization framework moreover points us to an important dynamic: As the literature has shown, securitization implies that issues are treated as urgent and top-priority matters and that usually more resources are devoted to them. The securitization of maritime problems is then on the one side a welcome development since it raises the profile of maritime issues and increases the resources available to address these. Securitization, on the other side, has a distinct logic which usually entails that extreme measures are taken and short term reactions are preferred. Phrased otherwise securitization does not necessary lead to optimal and sustainable solutions. Hence, the outcome might be wrong investments or to give preference to hugely expensive short term solutions (such as employing military forces). This dynamic has been for instance shown for the case of migration. Understanding migration as threat has undermined economic or humanitarian understandings, led to often extreme measures of border control and silenced the humanitarian tragedies that cases of illegal migration might imply.

#### Security politics guarantees extinction

Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, 1996, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, pp. 14-15

What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter. A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.

#### There is no value to life in their security framework

Michael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at Lancaster University, April 1999, “Another Justice,” Political Theory, Vol. 27 No. 2, p. 165

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logi­cally, can extend to the point of counting as nothing**.** Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust**.** How­ever liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the neces­sity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.