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**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST AFFIRMATIVE**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

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# Topic Analysis

## Resolution

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

### Topic Overview

#### General

This year’s topic asks the Affirmative to propose and defend engagement with the People’s Republic of China. We’ll begin with an introduction to the basic architecture of the topic by discussing the meaning of specific terms in the resolution and their likely implications for the structure of debates on this topic.

#### Substantially

Per usual substantially is a weak modifier that offers modest help for establishing clear topic limits. Because substantially modifies the increase of “diplomatic or economic engagement”—terms that constitute a posture or strategy for interacting with China rather than a specific, material action—it will be challenging to persuasively argue what is sufficient to constitute a substantial increase.

Contextual evidence regarding past economic or diplomatic engagement efforts referred to as “substantial” may enable teams to draw lines-in-the-sand (albeit slightly arbitrary ones) to limit out small Affirmatives with some success. Nonetheless, requiring the Aff to be a substantial departure from the status quo may be an important limit (and as such receive sympathy from critics) to guarantee the Neg core arguments, because engagement and the potential issues over which the U.S. and China have relevant interests are nearly endless.

As always invoking discussion of argument interactions in the debate will assist in articulating adequate bright lines for what qualifies as “substantial action”, and therefore help ensure links to core topic disadvantages. For example, forcing Aff to prove itself topical via a substantial act of diplomatic engagement may enhance the credibility of your Politics DA link argument. As surely any act of diplomacy, to be substantial, would have to be sufficiently large enough to be perceived by legislators who oppose playing nice with China and support containment. Conversely, an action defined by its diplomatic nature that is insufficient in scale or seriousness to be contentious or get noticed makes a far more compelling case for a T violation.

#### Increase

Increase offers directionality to the topic and though rarely contested its importance for clarifying the ground available to both sides cannot be understated. The expansion (whether in new forms or a material increase) of economic or diplomatic engagement over the status quo provides the foundation for stable link ground to disadvantages such as tradeoffs, perception links, and many more essential negative arguments in the toolbox. It also provides competition to counterplan options that allow the negative to test whether more engagement is the answer: offsets (shifting current engagement), conditions, pressure/containment, and more discussed later. Two particular T debates are likely to occur involving this term during the year.

**Action v. Offers** – Engagement is a process and so the type of actions undergone within the umbrella of engagement may depend largely on China’s response. The Neg may wish to argue that to be topical affirmatives must guarantee an increase in engagement (whatever they define that to be), that is, that the plan must mandate U.S. action toward engagement (via removal of sanctions, foreign assistance, etc.) and that such topical action cannot be contingent on an outcome of the plan – e.g. it must not rely on a solvency argument that China responds favorably which only then allows the engagement to occur. In this world the neg is not guaranteed links to core position because the plans effect on material engagement is indeterminate. In these cases the Aff may choose to argue that the offer itself is engagement (likely diplomatic) and inclusion of such offers under the topic is beneficial.

**New forms of engagement v. expanding current engagement** – Due to the breadth of options available to the affirmative regarding types of engagement and an even wider array of options over what issues may be the subject of engagement, there exists a reasonable argument that Affs should be limited to historical or status quo channels of engagement. The Neg may argue that the expansion of existing diplomatic frameworks of engagement provides a reasonable number of options for solvency mechanisms to the Aff while offering a manageable research burden and eliminating new, unpredictable engagement strategies for which there is no literature base for defending. They may also argue that narrowing the solvency mechanisms of the Aff also functionally limits the issues over which can be discussed. The weaknesses of this argument include difficulty in objectively distinguishing what is new and not new engagement, as well as the potential educational value in discussion new things the U.S. hasn’t tried before that are timely, important topics.

#### Its

The term “its” in the topic implies ownership over the engagement belonging to the United States federal government – this situates the topic firmly within Sino-American interactions as Aff action is limited exclusively to China. This could mean that the Aff should be limited strictly to bilateral engagement, and that any engagement involving additional countries would need to be an effect of initial action between the United States and China. This may offer a compelling limit against the use of multilateral frameworks such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to economically engage China, or diplomatic institutions such as the United Nations (because the U.S. would engagement would extend beyond merely China in these cases), and preserve those multilateral options for the negative.

#### Engagement

Engagement is a term defined broadly and often with varying implications for debates. A robust literature base regarding the respective benefits and drawbacks to defining the term in particular ways exists, making T debates more interesting if you’re a fan, and still more common even if you’re not – learning about the terms is important in either case.

So, how do policymakers define economic engagement? Broadly, most sources support the idea that engagement requires interaction between two or more countries on an economic or diplomatic issue, in contrast to approaches where one country does something to a passive second country. Engagement also usually involves a goal, such as encouraging or discouraging some type of behavior in the target country. This strategy is often posited in contrast to policies of “containment” that aim to augment behavior of states by restricting access to trade via sanctions or other punitive measure that compel change.

Because the resolution qualifies the types of engagement—*economic* or *diplomatic*—teams may choose to define the terms separately or together as a specific term of art; in the first case, beginning with what engagement must mean and how economic or diplomatic further narrows the meaning of the topic, or in the second, pointing to a unique meaning to the phrases “economic engagement” or “diplomatic engagement.” As always, context of the definition (preferably from international relations literature and specific to China is even better) and intent to define will be important factors in assessing the definitional accuracy and desirability of that interpretation for the topic.

**Positive/Negative** or **carrots v. sticks** – There are interpretations that suggest that “engagement” must include positive rather than negative incentives. In other words, enticements are topical, but threatening punishments or punitive actions for failure to comply are not. Imposing sanctions, for instance, would thus not be topical. The removal of sanctions, foreign assistance, and other such economic or political incentives would be solvency mechanisms available to the affirmative. Again, though, this is always debatable.

**Conditional/Unconditional** – Another consideration is that, according to many interpretations, engagement requires a quid pro quo (“this for that;” placing conditions upon the interaction).

Affs could do this by conditioning some form of economic involvement upon behavioral changes dealing with other issues (such as human rights—e.g. “The USFG should offer the People Republic of China member in the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the condition that they [does whatever—maybe something like end persecution of Uighurs in Chinese provinces or reach a negotiated settlement with the Dalai Llama over Tibet.]”).

Evidence concluding that there are two types of engagement is widely available: those that are conditional and those that are not. Affs who do not want to include quid pro quos should make sure they have some of that evidence handy to respond to “T: engagement must be conditional.” Due to how robust this literature base, topicality arguments in both directions are included in this file and should help familiarize you with their respective merits.

#### Economic (Engagement)

As discussed previously, there is a case to be made defining economic separate to modify an interpretation of engagement or define them in conjunction as a specific term of art. Either option yields a similar limit for economic engagement, as there exists considerable overlap with general discussions of defining engagement and their economic application. Negs may argue that topical plans must provide tangible economic incentives that deepen economic relations and that dialogue over economic issues alone is not sufficient.

#### Diplomatic (Engagement)

Diplomatic can be defined down to a particular set of actions constituting diplomatic engagement, or as broadly as including dialogue between states. Versus “economic” - diplomatic is slightly more difficult to clearly establish as what actions constitute diplomatic engagement. Despite there being less evidence clearly demarcating what actions are/are not “diplomatic” the term is very significant in modifying engagement because it implies purpose to the engagement. Considerable evidence exists that argues that the purpose of diplomatic engagement uniquely is to seek adjustments in the behavior or ambitions of another state, requiring mutual concessions. In other words, what makes engagement “diplomatic” uniquely refers to the use to inducement tools for modifying behavior. Conversely, economic engagement can focus on long term strategic goals emerging from greater economic interconnectedness rather than being restricted to short term policy changes.

#### With

“With” the PRC may be argued to suggest that China has an active role to play in the process, rather than being a passive agent being acted upon. This interpretation supports most definitions of “engagement” discussed earlier that involves some form of reciprocation between states. This definition may also have implications for how we choose to define the PRC, as an involved process would require a decisionmaking body and therefore may suggest that engaging private industry is not part of the resolution. More broadly “with” can be defined simply as identifying where what actors or area may be the target of engagement.

#### People’s Republic of China

The PRC can be defined in many different ways that have significant implications for topic limits and the distributions of predictable ground available to the negative. How we choose to define the PRC is implicated by the definitions of other terms in the resolution as well. For example, is we choose to interpret “engagement” as a process occurring between state governments then it would make little sense to define the PRC as anything other than the government.

However, Aff teams may choose to interpret PRC more broadly by using one of the many different definitions of PRC as referring to a geographic territory, thereby including anything that falls within that. Economic engagement that targets specific industries within China, or diplomatic engagement with specific ethnic communities within China are both possible under such an interpretations and Aff plans may circumvent involvement with the Chinese government altogether. While these type of interpretation may facilitate discussion of a additional venues for interacting with China external government channels, it likely presents an unfair burden on the negative to prepare for all the possible Aff options.

# Topic Aff Strategies

Now that we’ve outlined the crucial issues of topicality, let’s move on to discussing some specific affirmative arguments that may populate the resolution. This is in no way intended to be a comprehensive guide; it is only a primer on a few core topic issues. You are strongly encouraged to do your own research, think for yourself, and consult caselists for more ideas.

#### Specific Plans & Solvency Mechanisms

The U.S. and China have a fascinating history of engagement. As two global powers, the number of shared and opposing interests, as well as the opportunities for alignment is simply staggering. Economic engagement has been a principle tool for fostering relations and augmenting Chinese policy and ambitions. Much of our contemporary economic relationship is still structured by the historic extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the PRC, which itself was a tool of engagement. Diplomatic channels between the states cover a diverse number of issues over which the U.S. and China have agreed, disagreed, and feuded over.

The world has radically changed since the Cold War era, the growing velocity and volume of international flows of capital, goods, information, and people has elevated the need for bilateral cooperation by creating a multitude of global problems that are impervious to resolution by single states, even the most powerful in the world. Many of today's foreign policy challenges--such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spread of deadly epidemics, the disruption of financial markets, and the loss of biodiversity--have transnational causes and carry consequences for human populations around the globe. It can be argued one vital channel of such cooperation will need to be between the U.S. and China the world’s largest two economic and military powers.

Aff teams have the option of numerous engagement tools over a multitude of issues. Many of these options can be enhanced through strategy pairing of engagement methods and demands for reform. Because these possible combinations are so diverse, reference to specific Aff plan suggestions and research ideas are presented in each subsection of the advantage areas.

#### Advantage Areas

Trade/Economy – At center of our relationship with the People’s Republic of China—and nearly every news headline—are a host of controversies over the terms of our economic exchanges with one another and the rest of the world. Product tariffs, industry sanctions, currency manipulation, trade agreements, intellectual property protections, natural resource development, and so on. Our expansive trade relationship offers the Affirmative a variety of effective solvency mechanisms in the form of positive incentives such as rescinding sanctions and removing protectionist barriers. In other words, the size of our economies and extent of our trade entail substantial leverage, that when augmented can offer compelling incentives for bringing about favorable change. Economic strength and interdependence not only constitute effective negotiating tools but also comprise substantial advantage ground. The future trajectory of U.S. and China trade has massive implications for global development and economic stability. The capacity to resolve protectionist disputes and foster growth in key industries provide convincing access to impacts such as global trade, economic growth/averting collapse, resource conflicts, and poverty. Specific plans may consider using engagement to welcome China into the Trans Pacific Partnership and claim to trade leadership and U.S./China relations as advantages, or relax crucial trade tariffs and claim to enhance WTO credibility and stabilize economic growth in both countries. Diplomatic or not, debates over engagement will likely (if not inexorably) become heavily entangled with economic matters.

Relations – The generally accepted positive nature of *diplomatic and economic engagement* as a foreign policy posture offers the Affirmative numerous avenues for expanding, repairing, or strengthening U.S.-Sino relations. Interstate relations are complex and will require Aff teams discuss nuances of U.S.-China political, economic, and cultural relationship. Most important the Aff will need to distinguish its engagement from all other interactions with China, thereby proving why the plan is key to access a credible relations advantage. The enhancement of U.S.-Sino relations allows the affirmative to access an expansive number of impacts both proximal to the issue concerning the plan and well beyond by winning “spillover” claims. If the plan uniquely reverses a trend toward positive relations and cooperation, then nearly any of their complementary interests are a possible impact.

Security Issues (general) – The Unites States and China have extensive shared security interests globally; many involve direct competition with one another while many more implicate the actions of allies and rival nations of both countries. Chinese cooperation would greatly benefit a number of U.S. security interests internationally, particularly in areas where China commands significant geopolitical influence. One such example is North Korea, deterring nuclear acquisition and development there will, according to many, necessitate the help of the Chinese government. Contested territories alone already involve considerable naval power projection in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands, which represent major tripwires and potential flashpoints for military conflict.

Weapons Nonproliferation – China commands an expansive sphere of influence in the Asian theater, which implicates numerous global security concerns and opportunities. In addition to North Korea, China’s military trajectory and posture will influence many countries’ decision of whether or not to strengthen their domestic security infrastructure including acquisition of nuclear arms in the case of several U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea. The credibility of U.S. security guarantees for allies is shaped not just by U.S. demonstration of its power and willingness to use it, but China’s relative display of power and adventurism. China’s cooperation on efforts such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and isolating regimes is absolutely essential to discouraging and limiting the spread of weapons globally. Finally, and perhaps most significantly the U.S. and China are in direct competition on a number of military fronts that present danger of future conflict: the weaponization of space, national missile defense, and nuclear competition.

Cyber Security – For teams that just didn’t get enough of this discussion last year, cybersecurity constitutes a large area over which the U.S. and China can cooperate for mutual gain. The issue of cybersecurity is seldom discussed without some reference to China for many good reasons: First, the sheer size of China’s economy and its rate of growth and modernization inexorably make it a key stakeholder and player in the future of data security. Second, China is a major contributor in the ongoing development of security technology and efforts to infiltrate security measures. Moreover, deployment of offensive cyber operations have largely included China and in many cases have been directed at the United States government and major industries. Most notably a high profile incident involved a successful hacking of the U.S. Pentagon building from China. An issue with profound implications for national and economic security, cooperation with China over cyber security is an excellent opportunity to align security interests, deter offensive operations, and improve shared security through information and technological exchange. Plans may offer join exercises to identify and correct vulnerability or offer a “no first use” pledge to absolve the adversarial dynamic of the status quo.

Counter-terrorism – The U.S. and China have many complimentary interests concerning domestic and international security that is threatened by terrorism globally. China’s continued ascension to economic and geopolitical power makes it increasingly involved in a myriad of domestic and international affairs that are threatened by terrorism. Whether it’s the threat terrorism against the Chinese homeland or the destabilization of regions crucial to their foreign investment, China has a large interest in improving global security through counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, both nations have an expansive network of counter-terrorism operations providing numerous opportunities for Intelligence sharing, joint diplomatic efforts, military exercises, opposing regimes that support terrorism, or eliminating organized crime networks that fund them. involved in a lot of different parts of the world

Taiwan – This merits its own section as Taiwan involves a wide array of geopolitical and economic factors discussed elsewhere – Taiwan has long been a defining pillar of Sino-U.S. politics. Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. has stated clear positions

and has changed or should change policy that has massive implications for U.S. interests in security and democracy. Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy have been challenged by the PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion starting in the 1990s. Though there exists a tenuous convergence around “peaceful development” of cross-strait ties, disagreements remain about the PRC’s goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan’s status, Taiwan’s self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan.

Human Rights – There exist a myriad of concerning humanitarian issues within China and in areas under Chinese control or influence. Criticizing China for its human rights record has long been a foreign policy tool of the United States. It has been argued that this behavior is often led by ulterior motives to earn credibility for another pursuit or undermine China in the hopes that it will resolve a dispute favorably. Others argue that such criticism is deeply hypocritical given the United States’ own problematic record of violating international norms regarding human rights. Whether benign or opportunistic, addressing human rights concerns is a pillar of U.S. policy with China and Affs have numerous options for meaningfully engaging China to alleviate or eliminate certain abuses. The widespread practice of organ harvesting, the oppression and discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities such as the suppression of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, or the occupation of Tibet and systematic elimination of their culture, endemic poverty and political suppression are but only a few such issues occurring in China that may be addressed. Furthermore areas under Chinese control or influence have also been rightly criticized for permitting the violation of rights—many oil operations controlled by Chinese investments throughout Africa, for example, exist in areas of conflict and ethnic strife and China has valued preservation of stability in ways that have been argued to be at time complicit and supportive of ethnic violence and political oppression.

Climate/Energy – Over the past several years, climate change has become a pillar of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Both countries have taken strong measures at home to build green, low-carbon and climate-resilient economies, helping galvanize global action to combat climate change and culminating in the Paris Agreement reached last December. However, much remains to be decided regarding the future of climate accords, energy diversification, and economic development between the two states. According to many experts, it is evident that any successful response to climate change will need to include China due to their sheer size by population and economic activity. China relies extensively on producing and burning coal currently. China also possesses critical resources for the development of certain alternative energy sources. A good working relationship with China over issues of climate and the environment more broadly will continue to be essential.

Now you should be ready to craft an excellent case and win some debates!

# Aff Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

This affirmative has the USFG join and make a financial contribution to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new Chinese-led international infrastructure development project that will be focused on developing economies in Asia—Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh are some of the early borrowers. The US originally questioned the bank and encouraged allies to stay away due to concerns about environmental, economic and human rights safeguards but failed to prevent the AIIB from picking up key members like India, the UK and Germany. The affirmative must portray Asian infrastructure development as an inevitable and US involvement as the only option to create a positive outcome. Advantage 1 argues that these development projects will have the potential to unleash massive environmental damage and carbon emissions, risking near term impacts for global warming. China has a bad record with green development projects but has proved amenable when the US seeks negotiate favorable climate policies. Advantage 2 argues that the bank’s importance to China as a tool for rebalancing its economy will not only make it a necessity to prevent the harms of Chinese decline but to encourage multilateralism on a host of pressing diplomatic and economic issues.

## 1AC

Plan—The United States federal government should make a substantial financial contribution to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and secure membership as a partner-nation.

## Advantage 1—Climate Change

#### International aid can’t meet Asia’s infrastructure demand without the AIIB

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

Currently, traditional financing mechanisms are unable to meet the need for spending in the developing world, particularly in the area of infrastructure. In Asia alone, despite having access to international capital markets, the overall need for national infrastructure investment is estimated to be about US$ 8.22 trillion for the period between 2010-2020. Total expenditures on infrastructure throughout Asia come from a number of actors in the sphere, mostly domestic development banks, private investment, and MDBs, and the ability to tally this total expenditure towards this US$ 8.22 trillion need over the next decade is quite difficult. However, based on trends of what large actors have contributed recently, meeting this large need is likely to be very difficult. For example, the current ADB and World Bank capital bases alone, two of the largest MDBs operating in Asia, are far from adequate in meeting this great need. For the 2014 fiscal year, the World Bank’s overall global spending on infrastructure was US$ 24.2 billion42 while the ADB’s total assistance spending across all sectors in 2013 was US$ 21 billion. 43

#### New infrastructure in developing economies will be responsible for a massive share of carbon emissions if projects aren’t green

Paolo Mauro. Writer at Caixin Online. November 27, 2015. To Curb Carbon Emissions, Focus on New Consumers on the Move. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://english.caixin.com/2015-11-27/100879206.html

Household surveys show the share of spending on transportation – an energy-intensive category – rises as incomes grow. This universal regularity holds across cultures – not unlike the well-known Engel curve, whereby the share of food in total consumption declines as individuals become more affluent. Put this result together with information on income distribution as well as consensus projections of economic growth and population for most countries in the world, and it becomes clear that hundreds of millions of people in emerging economies are on the cusp of being able to afford a car or to travel internationally for the first time. Tomas Hellebrandt and I project that spending on transportation in emerging Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa will treble or quadruple during the next two decades, well in excess of total consumption. Indeed, the combined dollar increase for both total consumption and transportation spending in emerging economies will be far larger than for rich countries. And for many emerging economies, the transportation sector will account for more than one-quarter of the increase in total consumption in the next 20 years – about the same as in advanced economies. This marks a change from the past. In several emerging economies, including China and India, the share of CO2 emissions attributable to transportation was one-tenth or less in 2012. Focusing on air travel, industry specialists consider that people start flying when their total consumption passes the threshold of US$ 20,000 per household. In our projections, the population above this threshold will rise from 2.5 billion in 2013 to 4.7 billion in 2035 globally, with 90 percent of the increase coming from the emerging economies, mostly in Asia.

#### China can’t be relied upon to make green investments without outside pressure

Simon Pollock. Writer at Climate Change News. April 15, 2016. Renminbi power: Will China’s wallet shape the planet? Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/04/15/chinese-investment-has-the-power-to-shape-the-planet/>

International power balancing aside, the bank’s emergence has been accompanied by widespread and, arguably, legitimate concerns over possible environmental implications – based on past Chinese investment practices. Environmental NGO Friends of the Earth found in a report published two years ago many Chinese banks investing internationally were not following appropriate environmental and social safeguards. More recently, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, another NGO, in calling on the AIIB to follow international standards cites its recording of hundreds of local protests about the operation of Chinese extractive firms from Myanmar to Zambia. Chinese banks have come under unfavourable scrutiny over key environmental concerns in developing countries, ranging from resource extraction to dam building. Chinese investment in African nations’ forest industries, for example, has been found in many cases to be contributing to deforestation and illegal logging. China’s overseas investment in Asia has also led to criticism resulting in a Chinese-funded dam being cancelled in Myanmar in 2011 and serious concerns over widespread flooding accompanying the construction of Jatigede Dam in Indonesia’s West Java in September last year.

#### Unchecked carbon emissions will trigger the impacts of climate change in the near future

Carana 4/16/14, ( Sam Carana is an environmental analyst whose expertise lies in environmental policy and sustainable energy. He also is a writer and policy developer. “Near-Term Human Extinction”,[ http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2014/04/near-term-human-extinction.html ] , //hss-RJ) Accessed April 24, 2016.

Is there a mechanism that could make humanity go extinct in the not-too-distant future, i.e. within a handful of decades? Most people will be aware that emissions due to human activity are causing global warming, as illustrated by the arrow marked 1 in the image on the left. Global warming can cause changes to the land, to vegetation and to the weather. This can result in wildfires that can in turn cause emissions, thus closing the loop and forming a self-reinforcing cycle that progressively makes things worse. Furthermore, less forests and soil carbon also constitute a decrease in carbon sinks, resulting in carbon that would otherwise have been absorbed by such sinks to instead remain in the atmosphere, thus causing more global warming, as illustrated by the additional downward arrow in the image on the right. In conclusion, there are a number of processes at work that can all reinforce the impact of global warming. Emissions can also contribute more directly to land degradation, to changes in vegetation and to more extreme weather, as indicated by the additional arrow pointing upward in the image on the right. Feedback loops are causing warming in the Arctic to accelerate. Warming in the Arctic is accelerating with the demise of the snow and ice cover in the Arctic, and this is only feedback #1 out out many feedbacks that are hitting the Arctic, as described in an earlier post. As the temperature difference between the equator and the Arctic decreases, the Jet Stream is changing, making it easier for cold air to move out of the Arctic and for warm air from lower latitudes to move in (feedback #10). Abrupt Climate Change leading to Extinction at Massive Scale The danger is that, as temperatures over the Arctic Ocean warm up further and as the Gulf Stream carries ever warmer water into the Arctic Ocean, large quantitities of methane will erupt abruptly from the seafloor of the Arctic Ocean, adding a third kind of warming, runaway warming resulting in abrupt climate change, and leading to mass death, destruction and extinction of species including humans.

#### US influence is key to pushing the AIIB toward green policies

Paolo Mauro. Writer at Project Syndicate. June 12, 2015. Why America Should Join the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06>

It is pointless to attempt to divine whether China’s effort to establish the AIIB reflects a desire to strengthen its global standing or is aimed only at advancing the country’s narrowly defined commercial interests. The most likely explanation is that both motives are at work. There can be no doubting, for example, that China has a keen interest in allocating its vast stockpile of savings to productive use on projects undertaken abroad. To be sure, Western China still needs to be urbanized and modernized, but that market may soon become too small, at least relative to Chinese companies’ formidable ability to deliver infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, as neighboring countries develop economically, new opportunities for regional trade will be created. Commercial ties may also help preserve political stability in the region, especially if the fruits of economic development are perceived by all to be shared in a reasonably fair manner. Decisions like the one the US is facing – whether or not to join the AIIB – should not be based on speculation about other countries’ motivations, but rather on an estimation of what can be accomplished by choosing one way or the other. By participating in the AIIB, advanced economies will be able to influence its operations, ensure that its processes are transparent, and put in place incentives for projects that preserve the world’s natural resources and control climate change. The US is well placed to play a constructive role in that endeavor.

#### Influencing the AIIB is a key opportunity for US international climate cooperation

Paolo Mauro. Writer at Project Syndicate. June 12, 2015. Why America Should Join the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-should-join-aiib-by-paolo-mauro-2015-06>

Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The US has an opportunity to influence the AIIB’s design without looking like it is reversing course. In exchange for participating in the institution, the Obama administration could and should insist that the AIIB focus on financing infrastructure projects that reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and meet the highest environmental standards. The need for infrastructure investment in Asia’s emerging economies is vast. Generally, as a country’s household income rises, the share of spending on food declines, while spending on transportation rises sharply. And most developing countries in Asia have reached an economic stage at which large segments of their populations will soon be able to afford cars and plane travel for the first time. According to research I conducted with my colleague, Tomas Hellebrandt, average household income in Asia’s emerging economies will double over the next two decades; in the meantime, spending on transportation will quadruple. The choices being made now regarding what kind of infrastructure to build – subway systems or roads; green energy or coal power – will have a major impact on the world’s ability to keep climate change in check.

#### Ensuring green infrastructure in the developing world is the best chance to curb carbon emissions—AIIB is key

Simon Pollock. Writer at Climate Change News. April 15, 2016. Renminbi power: Will China’s wallet shape the planet? Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/04/15/chinese-investment-has-the-power-to-shape-the-planet/>

Investment decisions made now in developing countries will lock in the type of infrastructure in buildings, transport and energy that sustain societies for many years to come. The burgeoning populations, and increasingly high-consuming middle class segments, of developing countries means the implications of these decisions, along with the associated emission of greenhouse gases, have implications for everybody. That is why the question of how China’s burgeoning investment across the developing world will be used is so important. The growing volume of overseas Chinese investment is clear. Between 2004 and 2013, China’s overseas investments increased 13.7 times, from $45 billion to $613 billion – with developing countries soaking up a considerable amount of this dramatic rise. Funding considerations being taken now by the new, Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) offers a timely juncture to consider how China’s growing international investment power will alter our planet. With initial capital of US$100 billion, the AIIB is nearly two-thirds the size of the decades-old Asian Development Bank, which is led by Japan. China is providing some 30% of the AIIB’s initial capital. While China displayed wily diplomatic skills in attracting an initial membership of 57 countries, the United States and Japan are notable in their absence.

## Advantage 2—Multilateralism

#### US influence is key to prevent China from using the AIIB to manipulate regional politics

Miles Kimball. Professor of Economics at University of Michigan. April 8, 2015. America Should Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment. Accessed April 24, 2016. Bankhttp://blog.supplysideliberal.com/post/115825750743/congyi-liu-america-should-join-the-asian

If America joins AIIB, they can bring many matured rules and regulations by their various former experiences from leading the World Bank and IMF. After all, global economic chaos will also present negative effects on America. As AIIB has such a magnificent scale, if this organization expose essential problems, it is hard to image America will not suffer any harm. Joining in AIIB also helps America lessen China’s dominant power. “Another pending issue is how to structure the board of directors at the new bank. In the World Bank and the IMF, countries are represented by resident directors who are actively involved in the institutions and vote on new projects, programs and policies. Those representatives act as a check on management. The U.S. has been pushing the Chinese to adopt the same structure, according to those involved in the discussions, but Beijing is resisting. Instead, it wants the bank’s management, which will likely mean Chinese officials, to have a more powerful position.” Without America’s joining, China will absolutely be the sole dominator of AIIB. Then, China will readily and legitimately introduce some foreign policies that benefit itself. That is definitely what America did not want to see. “Still, Mr. Jin, interim chief of the new bank, said over the weekend that more than 35 countries will join as the bank’s founding members by the end of this month. South Korea and Australia, key U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region, are also expected to come on board by then, according to Chinese officials involved in the effort.” Moreover, as some America’s allies joined AIIB for their own profits, America could draw them on the same side to against China and balance the authority in the AIIB.

#### China needs AIIB to avoid economic decline

Stewart Taggart. Writer at Eurasia Review. February 3, 2016. China’s Asian Infrastructure Bank Needs Borrowers, Badly – Analysis. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.eurasiareview.com/03022016-chinas-asian-infrastructure-bank-needs-borrowers-badly-analysis/

After years of exporting to the world, China’s now struggling to keep her economy moving amid a slowing global economy. The alternative could be political unrest among a populace choking on pollution that’s increasingly rendering hollow President Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream.’ Overseas infrastructure, therefore, represents a key pump-priming relief valve for the Chinese economy. Understanding China’s deep need for overseas infrastructure export projects t can significantly strengthen the negotiating power of AIIB borrowers. That’s because China needs employment-generating overseas outward investment as much as AIIB borrowers need infrastructure make overs. Faced with a slowing domestic economy already choking on wasteful infrastructure investment, China must ‘keep pedaling’ (ie to maintain momentum in its infrastructure industry) or fall off (suffer politically-destabilizing rising domestic unemployment in key infrastructure industries). China’s leaders know this. It’s economic orthodoxy at this point that China must reorient her economy away from excess investment increasing wasteful domestic infrastructure and toward domestic consumption. But that transition won’t happen overnight. Building overseas infrastructure buys time.

#### Chinese economic decline risks lash out and global wars drawing in the US

Gordon Chang. Researcher at Gatestone Institute. April 16, 2014. China on the Edge. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4269/china-on-the-edge

The country has entered an especially troubling phase, and we have to be concerned that Beijing—out of fundamental weakness and not out of strength—will lash out and shake the world.¶ So what happened in the past decade?¶ To understand China's new belligerent external policies, we need to look inside the country, and we might well start with the motor of its rise: its economy.¶ Everyone knows China's growth is slowing. Yet what is not obvious is that it is slowing so fast that the economy could fail.¶ The Chinese economy almost failed in June. And why are China's severe economic problems relevant to us? Because for more than three decades the Communist Party has primarily based its legitimacy on the continual delivery of prosperity. And without prosperity, the only remaining basis of legitimacy is nationalism.¶ The People's Liberation Army, which is configuring itself to fight the United States, is the embodiment of that nationalism.¶ China's militant nationalism is creating friction in an arc of nations from India in the south to South Korea in the north. Let us focus on the Philippines and Japan.¶ In any event, China's external policies are of deep concern. It is not just that Beijing is hostile; its foreign policy now makes little sense. In the past, Beijing threw tantrums and even started wars when it wanted to punish a neighbor. Chinese leaders were always smart enough to direct their anger at just one or two targets to make sure they got what they wanted. And many times they were successful.¶ Today, Beijing is taking on many others, all at the same time, especially countries to its south and its east and the United States. How many adversaries does a country need?¶ The Party is lashing out, and that is not a good sign. If nothing else, it betrays a lack of strategic thinking. It is not promoting worldwide revolution, as it did in the early years of the People's Republic, but it is trying to upend the existing international order, something that Mao also attempted. So we have to be prepared to face the fact that China is no longer a status quo power.¶ Let us all remember, World War II started not on the plains of Europe in 1939 but near Beijing two years before.¶ We live in an era defined by the absence of major war, but this peace may not last.

#### China’s economic need for AIIB means it will cave when members apply pressure

Stewart Taggart. Writer at Eurasia Review. February 3, 2016. China’s Asian Infrastructure Bank Needs Borrowers, Badly – Analysis. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.eurasiareview.com/03022016-chinas-asian-infrastructure-bank-needs-borrowers-badly-analysis/

Happily, legitimate worries about State Grid being used as a stalking horse for progressive political Chinese domination of the Philippines have proved unfounded. Two things show this. First, the Philippines has continued to be vocal in opposing Chinese encroachment in disputed areas the South China Sea. The Philippines is still pursuing a UN tribunal judgement over China’s Nine-Dotted Line — a decision which is expected in coming months. Separately, the Philippines last year sent home State Grid technicians and replaced them with Philippine workers. This after largely unsubstantiated concerns were aired of a security virus in the Philippine grid of unstated, but clearly inferential, origin. Instead of responding with strident, threatening language, State Grid quietly accepted the expulsions with little more than a call for ‘procedural fairness.’ This indicates that as State Grid and other Chinese infrastructure companies realize that as they expand internationally, they no longer occupy the home turf where capricious actions are the unchallengeable privilege of the home team. Therefore, the devil’s bargain for China of gaining a solution to its ‘bicycle problem’ of maintaining domestic employment through export infrastructure may be a realization in China that it must play by other countries’ rules as part of its ‘Going Out’ export strategy. Given this, AIIB borrowers may now enjoy being able to apply a few pages from China’s own successful playbook. These can include limiting Chinese companies like State Grid and CNOOC to minority stakes with majority owner domestic joint venture partners, requiring transfer of leading edge intellectual property and requiring local staffing. All of these are common features of Build-Operate-Transfer infrastructure projects, which already are staples of Chinese domestic projects that have involved foreign partners.

#### The AIIB’s success would push China toward soft power and away from economic and military aggression

Phillip Y. Lipscy. Writer at Foreign Affairs. May 7, 2015. Who's Afraid of the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib

The AIIB would give China somewhat greater material and ideological influence over multilateral development lending than it currently enjoys. Perhaps equally important, the AIIB can be interpreted as a marker of status and prestige. One could argue that a multilateral development bank is one of the bells and whistles that comes with contemporary great power status: the United States has the World Bank, Japan has the ADB, and the EU has the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. China will have the AIIB. The upshot is that the influence and prestige of contemporary international institutions give countries a new avenue through which to gently contest the contours of the world order. There is less of a need to resort to coercion or military conflict. The heart of the matter is this: Does the United States prefer a world in which China seeks to establish its influence and international prestige by building multilateral development banks or one in which it seeks to do so by building aircraft carriers? Pushing back against the former sends the troubling message that the United States is concerned about not just the means but the ends of China’s rise. The AIIB provides an opportunity to acknowledge and applaud China’s emergence as a builder of multilateral institutions and a contributor to global public goods. The institution may very well give China more influence over development in Asia, but it will be a more transparent and accountable way of exerting influence than through bilateral economic or military pressure.

#### Chinese soft power is key to avoid global conflicts

Zhang Weiwei. Professor at University of Shanghai. September 4, 2012. The Rise of China’s Political Softpower. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experiencewould indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser thanthat of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

#### The US can exert significant influence on the AIIB by joining

The Economist. March 22, 2015. Why America is wrong to obstruct China's new international bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/why-america-is-wrong-to-obstruct-chinas-asian-infrastructure-bank-2015-3

Second, the best way to deal with concerns about Chinese lending standards is to join the bank and improve it from inside, not to throw brickbats from outside. Chinese leaders know perfectly well that the new institution will come under a lot of scrutiny. They have an incentive to be open and transparent, at least at first. Having more nations outside its orbit on board should help keep things more honest. Third, although it might have been better to expand and reform existing institutions (the ADB, World Bank and so on), America itself has made that impossible. Even a modest proposal to increase the resources of the IMF (giving slightly more votes to China and other big emerging markets) has been stymied for years in Congress. America has frustrated efforts to boost China's clout in the World Bank. Nor is China included in its planned Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade deal. Rather than try to thwart the AIIB, America ought to embrace it. China should invite it to join, and America should accept. That would be the best way to accommodate Asia's massive infrastructure plans--to say nothing of a rising China.

## Extensions and Blocks

## AIIB can control carbon emissions

#### The AIIB is the key mechanism for ensuring climate cooperation and making a significant impact on emissions

Stewart Taggart. Founder at Grenatec. April 10, 2015. Can China’s Infrastructure Bank Fix Climate Change? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/can-chinas-infrastructure-bank-fix-climate-change/

Instead of viewing the AIIB as a symbol of looming Chinese economic hegemony, the AIIB should instead be viewed as a global climate change solution (starting in Asia) and major market opener with powerful, vastly distributed benefits. Seen this way, the AIIB benefits all. That’s particularly so if other members hold a veto over China. What’s needed now is an intellectual bridge to be made between the AIIB and the COP21 meetings in Paris later this year. At the COP21 meeting, countries must pledge future numerical carbon emissions reduction targets all will ignore. A far better plan would be to use global need for new and revamped energy infrastructure to remove impediments to better carbon-adjusted creation, valuation and delivery of energy. When this happens, markets – not politicians – can take the lead in reducing carbon emissions. The timing has never been better. For China the creation of the AIIB – or something like it – is now an economic necessity. China now desperately needs to recycle its growing and economically destabilizing multi-trillion dollar foreign reserve hoard. The hoard accumulated during China’s three-decade macroeconomic development policy centered on a weak currency. The result: China stayed employed while the West got cheap consumer products.

#### China has the experience necessary to lead green infrastructure projects

Michelle Chan. Writer at Dialogo Chino. December 1, 2015. Can China make the AIIB and BRICS the greenest banks in town? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://dialogochino.net/can-china-make-the-aiib-and-brics-the-greenest-banks-in-town/

NGOs hope that these new banks can help to advance sustainability and China has a surprisingly great deal of experience in this regard. China’s urgent environmental health crisis led to Chinese authorities harnessing the power of the financial sector to “put teeth” into domestic environmental protection efforts. Since at least 2007, regulators have instituted green credit policies which require banks to consider environmental impacts in their lending. For instance, an early set of policies required banks to curb lending to high energy intensive and highly polluting industries like steel and iron, coal, and others. Another example was the creation of a “credit blacklist”, in which companies with subpar environmental records were barred from receiving any bank loans. These kinds of policies led Chinese banks to start assessing and categorising their loan portfolio according to a project’s environmental impacts. Perhaps China’s most famous policy is the Green Credit Guidelines, which require banks to deny credit to clients with poor environmental and social performance, and suspend or terminate any credit funds if “major risks and hazards” are found in a project. The revised 2012 version of the policy even required Chinese banks to abide by international practices and norms when investing abroad, something which, in contrast, not even US and European governments require of their banks. The Green Credit Guidelines have since become a cornerstone of the Chinese banking sector, with the government developing legal instruments and regulatory support to establish a “green financial system”. Although promoting the full implementation and potential of relatively new policies like the Green Credit Guidelines remains a major challenge, the direction China has taken in tying credit to environmental performance is still undoubtedly positive.

#### The US can provide key influence to ensure the AIIB makes green investments

Stewart Taggart. Founder at Grenatec. April 10, 2015. Can China’s Infrastructure Bank Fix Climate Change? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/can-chinas-infrastructure-bank-fix-climate-change/

Can China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) fix climate change? Yes. Only if it funds infrastructure encouraging common standards, integrated markets and deeper energy network interconnection. China’s partners in the bank need to push this, hard. If they do, the benefits to both Asia and the world will be enormous. To date, AIIB analysis has focused upon shortsighted, geopolitical handicapping of the power balance between China and the United States. This misses the far larger story: the AIIB’s ability to alter 21st Century history through constructive, much-needed energy market reform. Asia now accounts for a large proportion of the world economy. Supplementing regional infrastructure investment with energy decarbonization will generate incalculable net present value.

## Infrastructure projects have a high carbon risk

#### Demand for infrastructure investment in the developing countries is inevitable

Paolo Mauro. Writer at Caixin Online. November 27, 2015. To Curb Carbon Emissions, Focus on New Consumers on the Move. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://english.caixin.com/2015-11-27/100879206.html

Notwithstanding this year's recession in Brazil and Russia and a possible slowdown in China's economy, emerging economies will be the main engines of global growth during the next 20 years. Beyond technological catch-up, expanding populations will foster rising spending power in India, parts of Southeast Asia, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, which will account for almost half of net global growth of the working-age population over that period. Despite the onset of population aging in China, household spending will expand further as growth shifts from exports, investment and industrial production to a model based on private consumption and the service sector. Thus far, both public discourse and policy measures have placed emphasis on production-related emissions. The image in the public's mind is that of a polluting coal plant in an emerging economy powering the production of manufactures destined for advanced economies. That image needs to be complemented by the prospect of growing numbers of emerging-market consumers driving a car or traveling internationally by air. This is a welcome and natural part of the development process, but its sheer scale will present policy challenges, not least with respect to climate change.

#### Infrastructure projects in the developing world will have a massive impact on the course of climate change and environmental degradation

Bill Laurance. Professor at James Cook University. April 8, 2016. New development banks propel environmental 'race to the bottom' Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.theecologist.org/blogs\_and\_comments/commentators/2987526/new\_development\_banks\_propel\_environmental\_race\_to\_the\_bottom.html

The next few decades are expected to see some 25 million km of new paved roads, thousands more hydroelectric dams, and hundreds of thousands of new mining, oil and gas projects. The environmental impacts of the modern infrastructure tsunami could easily dwarf climate change and many other human pressures, as thousands of projects penetrate into the world's last surviving wild areas. Roughly 90% of the new projects are in developing nations, often in the tropics or subtropics which harbour the planet's biologically richest and environmentally most critical ecosystems. In these contexts, new infrastructures such as roads can open a Pandora's box of environmental problems, by promoting widespread deforestation, habitat fragmentation, poaching, fires, illegal mining and land speculation.

## US influence key to multilateralism

#### The US must be involved in emerging banks like AIIB to steer them toward positive goals

Jon Kyl. US Senator (R-AZ). December 3, 2015. Why American leadership still matters. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.aei.org/publication/why-american-leadership-still-matters/>

Broad participation in and burden sharing in the upkeep of international economic institutions remains the most effective way to ensure the ongoing efficacy of the rules-based economic order. This has meant reforming the governance of international economic institutions to ensure that they better reflect the economic importance of large emerging economies, such as China. The failure of Congress to pass reforms for the governance of the World Bank was an important reason why China established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a development that could weaken the US-led international economic system. American leadership in the international financial system provides a practical example of how the United States has leveraged partnerships to tackle international economic challenges. Historically, the United States has worked with other members of the G7 (Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy), to address global economic issues and has also tended to coordinate with these countries closely in international economic organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. However, the emergence of major economic powers in the developing world, such as China, India, and South Africa, along with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, exposed the limits of the G7 in managing the global economy and the need for these other emerging countries to be involved.

#### Influence by the US and allies in the early years is key to shaping a positive AIIB

Jonathan Silin. Writer at Dartmouth Business Journal. June 22, 2015. American Belligerence and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://dartmouthbusinessjournal.com/2015/06/american-belligerence-and-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/

While it is naive to assume the AIIB will have a spotless pro-environment, corruption-free record, the fact that the bank is still in its inaugural stages means there is room to effectively work on stamping out these issues that would be more difficult in already established institutions. Indeed, at the bequest of some of its European founding members, the AIIB leadership has already begun drafting a series of environmental standards for its projects, including requiring Environmental Impact Assessment documents (EIA) and environmental management plans (EMP) in order to receive funding. The final and most pressing concern for the U.S. government is what it sees in China using the AIIB as both a hard and soft power tool, threating the historically U.S. controlled World Bank. Rather than fight a losing battle, the United States ought to join the AIIB. As an active member, the United States would be able to work with the other members, many of whom are allies, to shape the direction of the bank in a mutually beneficial manner.

#### Resisting the AIIB reinforces negative views of US intentions in China

Fred Bergsten. Writer at Financial Times. May 15, 2015. US should work with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://next.ft.com/content/4937bbde-c9a8-11e4-a2d9-00144feab7de>

The US has correctly urged China to exercise leadership consistent with its expanding power, and to provide more resources to support development and other global goals. When the Chinese move in those directions, as they are doing with the AIIB, it is short-sighted and hypocritical for the US to seek to block them. This is especially true when the Obama administration has not persuaded Congress in four years to adopt legislation to provide enhanced roles for China and other emerging economies in the International Monetary Fund, as agreed by all other countries; and has opposed increasing the capital of the Asian Development Bank. This US hostility reinforces the Chinese view that US strategy is to contain and suppress it; so increasing rather than decreasing the prospect of uncooperative Chinese behaviour. The UK and other US allies, by contrast, are wise to accept China’s invitation to join. The US should reverse course. It should join the bank and persuade Congress to provide the small amounts needed to fund a minority share. It should bless the desire of its friends in Asia and Europe to join, to help counter any untoward Chinese actions.

#### US influence in the AIIB can push China toward peacekeeping and humanitarian foreign policies

Bhaskar Chakravorti. Writer at Harvard Business Review. April 20, 2015. China’s New Development Bank Is a Wake-Up Call for Washington. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington>

The AIIB is just the latest signal that China is ready to collaborate with other world powers to address broad global issues. Beijing has started playing an active role in applying international treaties on issues such as arms and nuclear control – China is part of the international group negotiating with Iran – and climate change. China has also begun to modestly contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian campaigns. It has joined international anti-piracy naval patrols off the Horn of Africa and has even begun to offer the use of its naval vessels in rescue missions involving non-Chinese citizens. China is still far from participating in global issues in a manner proportionate to its economic heft. For example, in the recent campaign against Ebola in West Africa, China contributed a meager $120 million in aid and doctors, despite its outsize economic and business interests in Africa. In comparison, the U.S. spent more than $1 billion on Ebola. It is essential for the U.S. to find new ways to collaborate with China on multiple fronts and use its influence to encourage Beijing to become its partner in the face of global crises. The recent U.S.-China climate deal is a step in the right direction – but it’s not enough. Is it wise to pivot away from China? I would say an emphatic no. As Henry Kissinger warned, if a Cold War were to develop between the countries, it “would arrest progress for a generation on both sides of the Pacific.”

#### The US can influence the AIIB by joining

Véronique Salze-Lozac'h. Writer at Asia Foundation. July 22, 2015. To Be or Not To Be Part of AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2015/07/22/to-be-or-not-to-be-part-of-aiib/>

However, the question is not whether the AIIB will give a greater role to China in the region, but whether the best way to respond to this development is to join it or to stand apart. As mentioned before, signatory nations will have an opportunity to influence AIIB governance and operations. Nations deciding to stay out of the AIIB, like Japan and the U.S., will have no way to express their concerns or to influence the development of requirements, criteria, and rules of governance. By joining, Japan and the U.S. would also be able to push for good coordination with the other multilateral development organizations. Finally, on the inside, they would be in a better position to ensure that the AIIB brings truly effective benefits to regional development and regional trade, and to observe carefully how the AIIB affects the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its members’ economies.

#### Lack of western influence in AIIB creates polarization

Ian Talley. Writer at the Wall Street Journal. March 2, 2015. In Democrats’ Eyes, Republicans Are Helping Foster Chinese Power. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-seek-collaboration-with-china-led-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-1427057486?mod=e2tw

But without the standards that the World Bank and other U.S.-influenced lending facilities have developed over decades, China’s new bank risks fomenting distrust with the U.S. and creating a host of social and economic issues. It could also help subsidize Chinese corporate interests. Lack of transparency in the new bank’s governance could nurture suspicion, for instance, about whether Beijing would use its financing to develop deep-water ports in strategic harbors that could accommodate China’s growing navy. Lending to countries without consideration of whether governments can pay back the loans could sow the seeds for future financial crises. Investment in dams that required massive population relocation could, without adequate safeguards, fuel human-rights abuses. As China’s economy slows faster than expected, the country faces growing spare-production capacity. Infrastructure investment could help sop some of that excess capacity up, as well as offer higher returns on its trillion-dollar holdings of low-interest U.S. Treasurys. But while wary of China, Washington has at the same time been trying to pull the country into the global political and economic architecture based on the theory that Beijing’s participation cultivates greater responsibility. Co-financing could become a steppingstone for the U.S. to join in a few years. That’s why economists such as Fred Bergsten, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute and a former senior U.S. Treasury official, pushed for the U.S. to join the China-led bank. “If this does meet high standards, then that would be a good thing and we’d take a look at it,” the senior administration official said. “But we’re still a few steps away from that.”

## AIIB creates Asian multilateralism

#### The AIIB promotes trade as a model for Chinese leadership

Phillip Y. Lipscy. Writer at Foreign Affairs. May 7, 2015. Who's Afraid of the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib

Multilateralism will also make it more difficult for China to overtly manipulate projects funded by the AIIB. An important reason the United States established multilateral institutions after the end of World War II was to reassure its allies that their voices would be heard and that the United States would not seek unilateral domination. Multilateralism not only enhances but also constrains the ability of powerful states to get what they want. For all the shortcomings of U.S. foreign policymaking since the end of World War II, its emphasis on multilateralism has been a resounding success. Take trade. Before the 1930s, U.S. trade policy oscillated between openness and closure depending on which political party controlled Congress. The contemporary trade architecture, initially based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and more recently the World Trade Organization and a host of regional arrangements, prevents such dramatic swings. It also surely benefits U.S. economic interests by maintaining the free flow of international commerce. The same logic applies to the AIIB. The AIIB will likely give China some important advantages akin to what the United States and Japan enjoy, respectively, in the World Bank and ADB. However, China will also be constrained by other members of the institution. The structural advantages that China enjoys in the AIIB will be beneficial only insofar as other members take the institution seriously and provide funding, skilled staff, and coordination. If the institution is perceived as being unfair or nontransparent, it will become nothing more than a shell organization through which China disburses bilateral foreign aid.

#### The AIIB is key to China’s transition to soft power

Shi Zhiqin and Vasilis Trigkas. Research fellows at Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. June 16, 2015. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Win-Win for China-EU Relations. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/06/16/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-win-win-for-china-eu-relations/ialz

In the past several years, China has accumulated trillions of dollars in foreign currency reserves. The AIIB initiative and the One Belt, One Road (or New Silk Road) plan to promote connectivity and trade with neighboring countries are part of China’s response to the challenges stemming from its economic success. Each endeavor is inclusive, democratic, and nondiscriminatory. The AIIB and the One Belt, One Road initiative also will help improve the economic situation in China’s neighborhood. They exemplify the continuity of China’s diplomacy with nearby countries, which is characterized by the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. These initiatives now are seen as central to China’s foreign policy strategy. As the GDP levels of some of the poorest states in Asia increase due to infrastructure investments, higher income levels will prompt aggregate demand to also rise, creating a prosperous community of Asian nations and forging strong economic interdependence between China and its neighbors.

#### The AIIB will enhance multilateral cooperation in Asia

Véronique Salze-Lozac'h. Writer at Asia Foundation. July 22, 2015. To Be or Not To Be Part of AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2015/07/22/to-be-or-not-to-be-part-of-aiib/>

China will be the largest shareholder, with 26.06 percent of the votes, giving it an effective veto over major decisions, followed by India with 7.5 percent and Russia with 5.92 percent; however, it is expected that all founding members will have the right to create the governance and operational rules of the bank. This important prerogative is one argument advanced by founding members to justify their willingness to be part of this initiative from the beginning rather than to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The AIIB’s intention to support this much-needed infrastructure development is therefore welcomed both by governments and by businesses managing ever-expanding regional and global supply chains. The Asian-led AIIB also represents a new, distinctively Asian development tool, bringing regional know-how and expertise to the problem of matching the supply of infrastructure to specific regional needs. This newcomer development actor may also provide opportunities for collaboration with existing multilateral agencies. IMF chief Christine Lagarde, speaking at the opening of the China Development Forum in Beijing earlier this year, said that the IMF and the World Bank would be “delighted” to cooperate with the AIIB.

#### The AIIB is key for a stable, multilateral environment in Asia

Joseph Stiglitz. Writer at The Guardian. April 14, 2015. In defence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/14/in-defence-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>

There is a further major global advantage to a fund like the AIIB: right now, the world suffers from insufficient aggregate demand. Financial markets have proven unequal to the task of recycling savings from places where incomes exceed consumption to places where investment is needed. When he was chair of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke mistakenly described the problem as a “global saving glut.” But in a world with such huge infrastructure needs, the problem is not a surplus of savings or a deficiency of good investment opportunities. The problem is a financial system that has excelled at enabling market manipulation, speculation, and insider trading, but has failed at its core task: intermediating savings and investment on a global scale. That is why the AIIB could bring a small but badly needed boost to global aggregate demand. So we should welcome China’s initiative to multilateralise the flow of funds. Indeed, it replicates American policy in the period following the second world war, when the World Bank was founded to multilaterise development funds that were overwhelmingly coming from the US (a move that also helped to create a cadre of first-class international civil servants and development professionals).

## AIIB prevents SCS conflict

#### Infrastructure-focused multilateralism would defuse a South China Sea scenario

Stewart Taggart. Writer at Eurasia Review. February 3, 2016. China’s Asian Infrastructure Bank Needs Borrowers, Badly – Analysis. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.eurasiareview.com/03022016-chinas-asian-infrastructure-bank-needs-borrowers-badly-analysis/

In coming years, China can be a infrastructure engine for a greening global economy using capital China is now ideally-suited to provide through the AIIB. Done right, it can be a rising tide that lifts all ships. It can bind China into a positive web of mutually beneficial, trusting relationships. The place to start down this path would be through funding such Chinese ‘near abroad’ infrastructure projects such as the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) and Trans-ASEAN Electricity Grid (TAEG). Both of these fit well into China’s concepts of a One Belt, One Road concept linking China to the world. They also fit with other energy infastructure concepts for Asia such as the Japan’s Masayoshi Son’s proposed East Asian Super Grid connecting northeast Asia and southeast Asia and Grenatec’s Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure stretching from Australia to South Korea with gas pipelines, high voltage power lines and fiber optic cables. This in turn could reduce the risk of territorial war in the South China Sea through creating a deepening web of cooperative ventures focused on energy security. This in turn would be best served through creating Joint Development Areas in the South China Sea protected by multilateral patrols.

#### US involvement in the AIIB can backstop a South China Sea scenario

Bhaskar Chakravorti. Writer at Harvard Business Review. April 20, 2015. China’s New Development Bank Is a Wake-Up Call for Washington. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington>

Helping to build the region’s infrastructure is also a powerful way of building political capital. Six of the nine known nuclear powers are in Asia and two, Pakistan and North Korea, are highly unstable states. Further west, the stretch from South Asia to West Asia poses an ongoing security challenge for the U.S. and NATO forces. A potential diplomatic breakthrough with Iran could shift the geo-political and economic dynamics not only in West Asia, but across the Middle East as well. Key U.S. allies along the Pacific rim and in the Indian Ocean would like to see the U.S. play a stronger role in counter-balancing China’s growing maritime ambitions. The ability to help craft investments in ports and shipping along with a robust naval presence would have been important signals of commitment to such a counter-balancing role.

## Chinese economic decline causes war

#### Chinese economic collapse would be fast, chaotic and cause global wars

Dan Lewis. Research Director at Economic Research Council. April 19, 2007. The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.economicpolicycentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-nightmare-of-a-Chinese-economic-collapse.pdf

A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### Economic sluggishness increases the chance of armed conflict

Drago Berhholt and Paivi Lujala. Professors at Norwegian University of Science and Technology. January, 2012. Climate-related natural disasters, economic growth, and armed civil conflict. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/49/1/147.abstract

Research indicates that economic growth is related to the occurrence of armed conflict. If sudden changes in economic growth increase the risk of armed conflict and weather-related disasters cause negative growth shocks, a logical consequence would be that such disasters can cause armed conflict via their negative impact on growth. Several empirical studies document that slow economic growth and low income levels are important in predicting which countries will experience a conflict: armed civil conflict is more likely to occur in poor countries than in rich (see, among others, Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). This can be the result of frustration and grievances, ease of recruiting rebels when even modest compensations to the rebel and his/her family exceed their present income, and lack of military capabilities and state capacity to prevent and suppress armed conflicts.

#### Chinese economic decline provokes global war scenarios

Ted Galen Carpenter. Writer at National Interest. September 6, 2015. Could China’s Economic Troubles Spark a War? Accessed April 24, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2

It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war.

#### China is interconnected with the global economy – downturn collapses the world economy

Edward Friedman. Writer at the Diplomat. May, 2012. If China Sneezes… Accessed April 24, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/china-power/if-china-sneezes/#more-3556

Commodity exporters from Brazil to Sudan to Australia can seem on the verge of nervous breakdowns at hints that the Chinese economy will slow and its commodity imports will shrink. After all, no country adds more new wealth to the world each year than does China. If China’s property bubble were to burst and the Chinese economy crashed in a “hard landing,” even economies as strong as Germany’s would be impacted. That country’s exports to China last year were worth about $110 billion. When China sneezes, the world could really catch a cold.

## China war draws in the US

#### US-Sino war is not backstopped by economic relations or MAD

Christopher Layne. Professor at Bush School at Texas A&M University. April, 2015. Avoiding a Sino-American confrontation. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://bush.tamu.edu/faculty/clayne/AP%204%202015%20Layne.pdf>

First, without delving too deeply into the arcane details of nuclear weapons strategy, we know that, because of the “stability/instability paradox,” although nuclear armed states are deterred from using nuclear weapons against each other, they are not stopped from fighting a conventional war. This isn’t speculation: in the 1999 Kargil conflict, India and Pakistan — both armed with nuclear weapons — fought each other with conventional forces. Second, as for the notion that economic interdependence prevents war, that was exploded by the outbreak of World War I. In 1911 the British writer Norman Angell published a famous book, The Great Illusion, arguing that the tight economic interconnections between Europe’s great powers made war between, or among, them impossible.3 August 1914 proved otherwise. Third, it is delusional to think that a powerful China willingly will subordinate itself to the institutions, rules, and norms of the current world order — the Pax Americana, which the US established after 1945. While the Pax Americana has benefitted other states, it foremostly privileges American interests. As China attains co-equal great power status with the US, it inevitably will demand a reshaping of the international order that diminishes US influence. Indeed, with its new AIIB, and memberships in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, Beijing already is building a parallel institutional structure outside of the Pax Americana’s framework.

#### US-Sino war causes extinction

Lee J.Hunkovic. Professor at American Military University. January 2009. The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

#### Great power war with China is possible—interdependence doesn’t check

Christopher Layne. Professor at Bush School at Texas A&M University. April, 2015. Avoiding a Sino-American confrontation. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://bush.tamu.edu/faculty/clayne/AP%204%202015%20Layne.pdf>

The basic take-away from the arguments of American liberal IR theorists — whose views resonate among US policymakers — is that great power war is a thing of the past. This is an appealing — but false — notion. International politics has not changed fundamentally since the time of Thucydides, the Greek historian of the Peloponnesian Wars, and one of the most astute thinkers ever to write about international politics. Many in the American foreign policy establishment believed that the Cold War represented both the “end of history”, and the end of great power politics (or at least the end of great power politics practiced by any state other than the US). China’s astonishingly rapid great power rise means, however, that great power politics is back (not that it ever really went away). And it is back with a vengeance. There is a regular pattern to great power politics. Great powers compete — hard — for power, security, status, prestige, and influence. Newly emerging great powers want to move up the league table to the top of the great power premier league. If they succeed, they want to leverage their new found wealth and power to remake the existing international order into a new one that privileges their interests. They also want to become dominant — hegemonic — in their own region. Of course, China says its rise will be peaceful. If history is any guide, however, it will be anything but peaceful. When new great powers enter the international system, the result is geopolitical turbulence and war. We don’t have to look too far back in history to find supporting evidence. The near-simultaneous great power emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan during the last third of the 19th century was the direct cause of the 20th century’s two world wars.

#### The US would get drawn into a South China Seas conflict

Bo Zhiyue. Writer at the Diplomat. May 27, 2015. Could the South China Sea Cause a China-US Military Conflict. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-the-south-china-sea-cause-a-china-us-military-conflict/>

But it is in the interest of the United States to create some degree of tension over the South China Sea, mainly for three reasons. First, the success of President Barack Obama’s rebalancing strategy depends on the ability of the United States to keep the attention of its allies and other concerned parties on the issue of security — and away from purely economic and trade issues. Escalated tensions in the South China Sea help achieve that goal. Second, China’s appeal as an alternative world leader has drastically increased along with its megaprojects such as the “one belt, one road” strategy and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Drawing attention to China’s provocative moves in the South China Sea is an effective way of deflating that appeal. Third, for the United States, this is a cost-effective way to “engage” China. Sending a few warships and surveillance planes to the vicinity of China’s territories makes China nervous but does not cost much on the part of the United States. It is not in China’s interest to have military conflicts with the United States over the South China Sea. But China will feel pressured to respond to U.S. actions and the cycle of action-reaction may very well spiral out of control.

## Chinese Energy Security Add-on

#### The AIIB is key to Chinese energy security

Kyle Churchman. Research Fellow at National Bureau of Asian Research. December 22, 2015. China’s Vision for a New Asian Economic and Political Order. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=637

Large state-owned enterprises in the infrastructure, energy, and advanced manufacturing industries, which have suffered in recent years from a glut of domestic overinvestment and the slowdown in the Chinese economy, are being encouraged to “go out” and win contracts along the routes. Whether China might eventually push for a free trade zone that covers OBOR countries in response to the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement is an important question. Geostrategic motivations also drive the OBOR initiative, with the overarching one being the desire to circumvent U.S. encirclement in the Western Pacific. U.S. political and military influence in the regions west of China is considerably weaker than around China’s eastern rim, giving Beijing incentive to “go west” as Washington rebalances to the Asia-Pacific. The construction of new pipelines linking China with hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian states and the transport of Middle Eastern oil through Pakistan instead of the South China Sea will improve Chinese energy security. Currently, more than 70% of China’s oil imports from the Middle East and Africa pass through the Strait of Malacca—a chokepoint between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra that is vulnerable to a U.S. blockade. The AIIB seeks to address the Asia-Pacific’s enormous infrastructure needs, including financing of some OBOR-related projects. Thanks to pledges by key European countries to join the bank as well as China’s $29.78 billion contribution, the AIIB’s capitalization stood at $100 billion at the time of the June 2015 signing ceremony.

#### Chinese energy insecurity causes Sino-Indian war

Nicholas Clement. Writer at 2.6 Billion. May 25, 2012. China and India Vie for Energy Security. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-india-vie-for-energy-security-11177.html

Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages. Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the world’s GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. China’s thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine that “control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.” Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications.

#### Sino-Indian war causes extinction

Jeremy Kahn. Writer at Newsweek World. October 9, 2010. India’s China Obsession. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/indias-china-obsession-81179

The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

## US Economy Add-On

#### Failure to participate in the AIIB risks US economic competitiveness

Bhaskar Chakravorti. Writer at Harvard Business Review. April 20, 2015. China’s New Development Bank Is a Wake-Up Call for Washington. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington>

The AIIB is poised to have disproportionate access to fast growing investment and development funding opportunities in Asia. The opportunity costs of not participating could be quite high, with both economic and geopolitical dimensions. The evolution of Asian infrastructure will be a critical enabler of growth in the region. Taking part in strengthening the region’s fundamentals, like infrastructure, presents opportunities; this is, after all, widely considered to be the Asian century. Consider that three out of the four largest economies in the world in 2030 are expected to be in Asia; by 2050, half of the global GDP will come from Asia; three of the top six trading partners for the U.S. are in Asia and a fourth Asian country, India, has the potential to become the fastest-growing large emerging market in the world.

#### US banking leadership spills over to corruption, human rights and security issues

Jon Kyl. US Senator (R-AZ). December 3, 2015. Why American leadership still matters. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.aei.org/publication/why-american-leadership-still-matters/>

American Leadership in the International Economic Realm Supports Other Foreign Policy Goals. US capacity to exercise global economic leadership represents a powerful tool to achieve national security goals. The size of the US market and the importance of its banking and financial system allows it to, in many cases, impose effective trade and financial sanctions and to persuade other countries to take similar measures both through the UN Security Council and through bilateral and multilateral agreements to enhance global security. In addition, the US has effectively used its economic power to further the global adoption of and adherence to norms of behavior in areas such as democracy, human rights, and environmental protection. Important US laws with extraterritorial reach, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have also been instrumental in preventing corruption and protecting the rule of law globally.

#### US banking leadership backstops the international economy

Jon Kyl. US Senator (R-AZ). December 3, 2015. Why American leadership still matters. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.aei.org/publication/why-american-leadership-still-matters/>

International financial markets also benefit from American leadership. As the global financial crisis made clear, unevenness in regulatory measures, such as accounting, leverage standards, and supervision methodologies, within and across borders exacerbated the situation and delayed the recovery. The US has since moved more quickly than most other nations to address problems the crisis uncovered. For example, US bank regulators introduced “stress tests” for capital positions and encouraged large US banks to adopt global capital standards such as Basel III well ahead of the international schedule. Even in the wake the worst crisis to affect international financial markets in generations, American responses have set the standard for international recovery efforts and the stability of the global financial system.

## Rebuttal to Safeguards DA

#### The AIIB will use current safeguard norms as a baseline and improve them

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

The creation of the NDB and the AIIB could result in the harmonization of safeguard policies (Statement 8) Despite the potential benefits from these new banks harmonizing safeguard policies with those of the existing MDBs, many agreed that it is unrealistic to expect that these new banks will adopt existing safeguard policies in their entirety. Instead, many believe that, while the spirit of these safeguards will mostly remain intact, the individual policies may be adjusted or omitted entirely. Amongst those interviewed, it is generally expected that the new banks’ standards, while unique, will be largely compatible with existing MDB policies to facilitate co-financing. Additionally, utilizing tried and true policies will add to the new banks’ legitimacy and credibility, solidifying their capability to function in international capital markets. Interviewees from MDBs brought up the importance of leadership when discussing the harmonization of safeguard policies in the context of the addition of these new institutions. Citing the reports of Jin Liqun’s prospective role as head of the AIIB, MDB interviewees expressed faith and confidence in his ability to guide the AIIB toward a stringent safeguard regime. Given his time as Vice President of the ADB, Jin Liqun has ample experience and a strong track record with promoting strong safeguards, which MDB interviewees pointed to as proof that these new institutions are likely to adopt strong safeguard policies; further, policies that are likely to reflect those of existing MDBs.

#### The AIIB will not lower the quality of development aid

Phillip Y. Lipscy. Writer at Foreign Affairs. May 7, 2015. Who's Afraid of the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib

First, to remain relevant, aid organizations must be accountable to their stakeholders. If the AIIB is seen as being overly dominated by China, other members will turn their attention elsewhere, depriving the organization of resources, attention, and skilled staff. There is no plausible scenario under which the AIIB could supplant existing organizations such as the World Bank and ADB unless the organization suitably reflects the concerns and interests of the broader international community. Second, maintaining governance and accountability standards in development aid is already extremely difficult, particularly when dealing with relatively successful developing countries that can pick and choose from a wide range of multilateral, bilateral, and private financing sources. For this reason, the entry of the AIIB as an additional funding source in Asia is unlikely to make a significant difference in social and environmental standards. If China truly seeks to undercut the quality and conditions of existing aid agencies, it can already do so more expediently through bilateral aid and overseas activities of its state-owned enterprises.

#### The AIIB safeguards are the best balance between strict and lenient

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

Some borrowers and bank staff, however, view safeguard policies as stricter than necessary, potentially adding delays and costs to projects. Such proponents would prefer to weaken safeguard policies as a means to increase the ease of lending and decrease associated costs. Proponents of this approach tend to believe that the costs of compliance with safeguards outweigh the benefits gained from better environmental and social policies. According to a World Bank study from 2001, safeguard policies, of one kind or another, increase project preparation costs between $200 and $300 million annually.37 Further, a 2011 Independent Evaluation Group report found that social and environmental costs significantly outweigh the benefits of safeguard implementation when risks are underestimated or when communities are excluded from project benefits.38 Further, some policies may affect the tendency of bank staff to take on certain projects, which can be viewed as a limitation of strict safeguards, since they are substantially less likely to take on projects that have high probabilities of delays and difficulties in implementation.39 In fact, some claim that the presence of strict safeguard policies pushes borrowers away from MDBs, instead leaving would-be borrowers to proceed with little to no safeguards. As such, borrowers may often come to cause more environmental and social damage than they otherwise would with MDB collaboration, assuming modest safeguards. 40 As such, there is a delicate balance that new institutions interested in designing safeguard policies need take note of: weak safeguard policies threaten to leave environmental and social risks unchecked, yet corrective safeguard policies that become too strict may actually become self-defeating by making projects cost prohibitive and might push borrowers towards less stringent options. Similarly, countries that have the option to borrow from capital markets, rather than from MDBs, are choosing to do so more often, resulting in processes that have even less scrutiny than when sanctioned by MDBs, such as the World Bank or Asian Development Bank.

#### The AIIB won’t dilute safeguards

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

One popular concern, as expressed through media reports, is that the emergence of these banks could result in the dilution of the existing MDBs’ safeguard standards in a “race to the bottom.”56 CSO interviewees widely accepted this concern, whereas MDB interviewees vehemently disagreed with this perceived risk of a “race to bottom.” On this topic, MDB interviewees expressed a strong commitment to their existing safeguard policies, regardless of any potential changes to the competitive landscape of development finance. That is, regardless of the addition of these new institutions, MDB shareholders would be unwilling to allow the dilution of existing safeguard policies. Similarly, these new institutions would also be pressured by shareholders to meet international safeguard standards, making a “race to the bottom” unlikely. Further, in contrast to promoting a “race to the bottom,” the MDB interviewees felt that the new banks could bring with them beneficial competition among MDBs, which could result in greater innovation, more efficient practices, and knowledge spillovers.

#### Chinese lending practices are trending toward safeguard compliance

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

Although, despite these concerns and criticisms, a number of interviewees expressed faith in China’s domestic safeguard policies and a shifting trend of improvement for China. For example, MDB interviewees trumpeted the capabilities of Chinese capacity and a growing deference to international standards. This is particularly noteworthy in light of a spate of countries signing on as founding members of the AIIB, illustrating the growing support for and following of this Chinese-led institution. Similarly, Chinese CSO interviewees expressed the rapid development of Chinese CSOs over the past decade, which has given a greater voice to environmental and social concerns. This voice was mostly absent before and CSO interviewees highlighted this positive shift towards more interaction with an increasingly more open and approachable Chinese government. This increased influence of CSOs symbolizes China’s progress in regards to civil society engagement and sheds a positive light on how future interactions may develop with a more responsive government at the helm.

#### Diverse membership will ensure strong safeguards

Martin Edward. Professor at Seton Hall University. April 6, 2015. US should stop blocking China’s AIIB and join allies in new club. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://theconversation.com/us-should-stop-blocking-chinas-aiib-and-join-allies-in-new-club-39406

For the past year, the White House has raised concerns about how the new bank would operate, suggesting that the AIIB would have insufficient safeguards. The AIIB might undercut the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the argument goes, as countries might prefer the promise of cheap money from Beijing without the strings the other lenders attach. But questioning Chinese governance of the bank not only reminds our allies of our shortcomings in IMF reform, it also overlooks the surest route to reforming the AIIB. Cooperation is always more difficult in large groups with divergent preferences than smaller ones. The growing list of AIIB members (including South Korea, Norway and Denmark) means that the Chinese will have to accommodate those countries concerned about safeguards. Rather than push back on AIIB, the US should welcome the participation of many countries. It will fall to China to figure out how to reconcile this diverse membership. This will ensure that fighting climate change and improving environmental standards will not be sacrificed in favor of growth at any cost.

## Rebuttal to IMF/WB/etc. tradeoff DA

#### Development aid in Asia is already a competitive field

Phillip Y. Lipscy. Writer at Foreign Affairs. May 7, 2015. Who's Afraid of the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib

Development aid is a highly competitive and fragmented policy area. There are at least 28 multilateral international organizations that already specialize in international development akin to the AIIB. In addition, most major economies also engage in bilateral aid through their own aid agencies. These include 29 members of the Development Cooperation Directorate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and a host of developing countries, including China. To top it off, numerous private foundations and firms participate in development directly or indirectly. On a yearly basis, the ADB and Inter-American Development Bank each disburse the equivalent of about 40 percent of the World Bank’s disbursements. Yearly U.S. bilateral aid is typically on a par with World Bank disbursements. Aid organizations often work collaboratively, pooling expertise and resources to implement projects. However, competition is also an important feature of contemporary development aid. Donors have numerous channels through which they can give out aid; likewise, potential recipients can receive aid from a wide range of sources. This is particularly true for the rapidly developing countries of Asia, which the AIIB will target.

#### Competition is good—it makes development organizations more responsive

Phillip Y. Lipscy. Writer at Foreign Affairs. May 7, 2015. Who's Afraid of the AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib

The competition imposes accountability and places important limits on international aid organizations. A good example is the United Nations Development Program. The UNDP is considered one of the premier international development organizations. It was established in 1966 as a major agency of the United Nations, and it has near-universal membership. However, the agency was created with a decision-making structure that limits the influence of important donor states: following the broader UN principle that each member state should have equal representation, the organization follows a one-country-one-vote rule. Hence, the United States, one of the largest donors to the organization, has the same voting power as Nepal, a major aid recipient. This means that large donor states feel their interests are not sufficiently reflected in UNDP decision-making. As a consequence, they have effectively shifted their attention elsewhere, depriving the UNDP of resources and forcing the organization to pursue “noncore” arrangements over which it has limited control. The UNDP has faced a chronic shortage of funding: adjusted for inflation, core disbursements by the UNDP peaked in 1981 and have steadily declined to about half those levels.

#### The AIIB will complement other development efforts more than compete

Stephen Olson. Writer at The Diplomat. November 9, 2015. Time for the US to Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/time-for-the-us-to-join-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/>

The real debate about the AIIB revolves around the rather ill-defined question of whether the AIIB will be a “competitor” to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Of course, this is a somewhat loaded question depending on the precise definition of “competitor.” If making additional sources of funding available for infrastructure projects is viewed as “competing” with the World Bank or ADB, then, yes, clearly the AIIB is a competitor. But since the mission of the AIIB will overlap with the mission of these other institutions, the question arises as to why its efforts would not be seen as complimentary. And indeed, the Presidents of both the World Bank and the ADB have already signaled their desire to work cooperatively with the AIIB.

#### The AIIB is key to improving development strategies

Joseph Stiglitz. Writer at The Guardian. April 14, 2015. In defence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/14/in-defence-of-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank>

The World Bank’s assistance was sometimes overburdened by prevailing ideology; for example, the free-market Washington Consensus policies foisted on recipients actually led to deindustrialization and declining income in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, US assistance was, overall, far more effective than it would have been had it not been multilateralised. Had these resources been channeled through America’s own aid agency, policymaking would have been subject to the vagaries of development thinking (or the absence of reflection) from one administration to another. New attempts to multilateralise flows of assistance (including the Brics countries’ launch of the New Development Bank last July) are similarly likely to contribute significantly to global development. Some years ago, the Asian Development Bank defended the virtues of competitive pluralism. The AIIB offers a chance to test that idea in development finance itself. Perhaps America’s opposition to the AIIB is an example of an economic phenomenon that I have often observed: firms want greater competition everywhere except in their own industry. This position has already exacted a heavy price: had there been a more competitive marketplace of ideas, the flawed Washington Consensus might never have become a consensus at all.

#### There is room in the market for more international development projects

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

There was broad consensus throughout our interviews that there is enough room for new development banks. Most interviewees cited the large existing infrastructure investment gap globally, as previously mentioned in this report. The $800 billion annual infrastructure gap from 2010-2020, as assessed by the Asian Development Bank, was mentioned in most interviews to support this opinion. As such, most interviewees believed that there is plenty of space for new actors in this sphere. The NDB & the AIIB can be complementary to existing development finance institutions. (Statement 7) As many people note that there is space for these new institutions, the question remains how they will interact with existing institutions. Interviewees noted to a high degree the potential complementarity between existing MDBs and these new banks, indicating prospective co-financing opportunities. As many infrastructure projects are very expensive and can be risky, they can be difficult for any individual bank to finance. As such, there will be ample opportunity for co-financing between existing and new MDBs, highlighting potential complementarity in risk sharing and knowledge transfer.

#### New infrastructure projects are key to meeting demand

Alex Mourant et al. Research fellows at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. May 2015. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/SAIS-WRI-PracticumMay2015.pdf>

However, even with contributions from domestic development banks and private investment, covering the gap to meet the US$ 8.22 trillion need for infrastructure spending remains a large challenge. Private investment in infrastructure in the Asia Pacific region for 2013, for example, was just US$ 33 billion. This, even aggregated with global World Bank and ADB infrastructure spending, let alone regional spending, would still fall hundreds of billions of dollars short of the US$ 800 billion needed yearly in Asia.44 In fact, this financing challenge is compounded by the current, overall decline in private sector investment in infrastructure across the region, which dropped from US$ 58 billion in 2012 to US$ 36 billion in 2013. Such massive infrastructure investment needs far exceed that which is currently available, indicating that there is space for new financial institutions to have positive impacts. Illustrating willingness for collaboration, the World Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim, has welcomed the arrival of these new institutions, saying, “Globally, we need additional funding for critical infrastructure projects and so we welcome efforts that will lead to more long-term financing

#### AIIB will not diminish the role of the IMF

Mike Bastin. Writer at the Telegraph UK. July 26, 2015. With the AIIB, there is no pain for the West, only gain. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/business/11763107/aiib-investment-will-benefit-the-west.html>

The United States also claims the AIIB will diminish the role of the IMF. Once again, this argument flies directly in the face of the facts. First and foremost, the AIIB is about long-term development with persistent pumping of investment into the poorest Asian economies. The AIIB has been set up to support sustainable economic growth across the region, too, and is unlikely to focus investment on one country. Instead, critically important infrastructure projects across many of the poorest Asian nations will be established. The IMF, on the other hand, is there to support specific governments with short-term liquidity challenges. The IMF is also not far behind the World Bank with the volume of increasingly vociferous criticism. Witness the Greek debt crisis for a perfect example of the IMF’s failings. Clearly, the World Bank and the IMF need to be redesigned totally to meet the challenges facing today’s world economy.

#### The AIIB’s competition is key to determine best practices

Anton Malkin. Research Fellow at China Open Research Network. May 3, 2015. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Not Simply About Countering US Influence. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://corn.groups.politics.utoronto.ca/?p=496

In addition to tweaking global economic governance structures, the AIIB’s very specific focus on infrastructure investment promises to be a departure from the World Bank’s more comprehensive approach to development financing. The World Bank and the IMF have long been criticized for promoting the US-championed “Washington Consensus” model of development that became prominent in the 1980s, which stresses privatization, macroeconomic liberalization, labour market reform, and increasingly political reforms as well. China, by contrast, has favoured economic growth, prioritizing infrastructure development and slower, more experimental steps towards privatization and economic liberalization. This is in line with China’s broader foreign policy, which stresses respect for national sovereignty and political neutrality. Indeed, China’s hands-off approach has frequently been criticized for being too permissive of human rights abuses and for courting corrupt autocrats, especially in oil-producing countries. The AIIB’s insistence on infrastructure spending alone thus goes some way in addressing China’s criticism of what it considers to be the World Bank’s “mission creep,” which insists on specific political and economic reforms. Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng have even gone so far as to insist that “the AIIB’s operations will most likely resemble those of the World Bank in the 1960s, when engineers with hands-on development experience dominated the staff and could design lending conditions that worked for borrowers.”

## Rebuttal to AIIB hurts US economy/hegemony

#### The US doesn’t have an investment interest in the countries AIIB would target

Joshua Kurlantzick. Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations. January 15, 2016. Let China win. It’s good for America. Accessed April 24, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-win-its-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html>

What “strategic imbalance” would result if Washington’s influence in these parts of the region diminished? Countries like Cambodia and Burma are still largely irrelevant to U.S. investors and strategic interests. The United States began boosting ties with Burma five years ago, but American investors have sunk only $2 million in officially counted investment into the country since 2011, largely because the business climate there remains atrocious. In Cambodia, U.S. companies invested about $85 million in 2014, the last year for which figures are available. (By contrast, American executives sent $290 million to tiny Luxembourg in 2015, a nation whose population is 4 percent of Cambodia’s.) Its AIIB failure may have made the United States look weak and miserly, but its focus on competition in unimportant parts of Southeast Asia has real consequences. Washington needs Chinese help to halt Iran’s nuclear program, combat climate change and protect global cybersecurity. The White House can fairly complain about Xi’s repressive regime and his rapid military buildup, but needlessly alienating Beijing only makes the world’s most important bilateral relationship harder. China has responded harshly to U.S. attempts to mitigate its influence in its own neighborhood, repeatedly delivering veiled public warnings to Southeast Asian nations that side with Washington on major issues and offering massive assistance to countries like Cambodia for moving closer to China. Sparking confrontation over important issues such as the South China Sea is worth it, but raising disputes over places like Cambodia is not.

#### Joining the bank improves America’s international standing

Martin Edward. Professor at Seton Hall University. April 6, 2015. US should stop blocking China’s AIIB and join allies in new club. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://theconversation.com/us-should-stop-blocking-chinas-aiib-and-join-allies-in-new-club-39406

For years, Washington has sought to encourage China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the global economy. The AIIB demonstrates that China seeks to embrace this challenge, and the fact that it is doing so multilaterally rather than bilaterally should not be overlooked. The US has helped to support regional development banks in Africa and Europe, so a new one in Asia should not be the threat that it is made out to be. The need for infrastructure in emerging Asian economies is so acute that the two banks need not be in competition. Embracing AIIB will help keep US-Chinese relations moving forward by moving beyond the sharp rhetoric of recent weeks. It will also give us a means to smooth over relations with European allies. More importantly, joining the AIIB gives the US a seat at the table, and a way to work with allies to moderate Chinese behavior. What will make the difference in the long term in shaping US relationships with Asia is working with allies to address common challenges. Multilateral diplomacy is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself, and enmeshing China in a network of international organizations, regardless of who created them, provides the best route for deepening cooperation between the US and the People’s Republic of China.

#### US policy failure created the need for the bank—only joining maintains US influence in Asian economic development

Greg Moore. Professor at Zhejiang University. April 1, 2015. Isolation or Integration? Why America Should Join China's AIIB. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://russia-insider.com/en/no-escape-america-should-join-chinas-new-bank/5187>

Last, by joining the AIIB as a founding member, the United States could reserve the right to withdraw from membership in protest down the road if U.S. (and general Western) concerns are not adequately addressed. The United States would have greater leverage in this sense by being in the bank than by remaining outside it. American policy makers should have more confidence in their liberal policy proclivities than their current policy demonstrates. The rest of the world knows that global standards for such institutions are everyone’s “best practices” currently, and these standards reflect cherished liberal (and humanitarian) values. If China chooses to flout these values and practices, and instead chooses to use the AIIB for partisan political gain, it will be painfully obvious to everyone, and the other members would likely criticize Beijing for this. Given its level of interdependence with the rest of the world, China is highly accountable and vulnerable to international pressure if it misbehaves. Let us give China the benefit of the doubt for now, and let’s allow them the chance to prove they are responsible stakeholders (or not). As Daniel Drezner, Jack Lew himself and others have pointed out, the United States should have supported reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions earlier. If it had, perhaps there would have been no market for the AIIB, or at least less support for its establishment. As things currently stand, however, a continued U.S. policy of trying to isolate Beijing over the AIIB only serves to isolate Washington, and does less to address Washington’s legitimate concerns about the bank than becoming a member likely would.

#### The only outcome of the AIIB that benefits the US is if it succeeds

Kerry Brown. Writer at the Diplomat. June 1, 2015. The US should make sure China’s AIIB succeeds. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-should-make-sure-chinas-aiib-succeeds/

The first scenario is that the bank proves, quickly, to be a success. The naysayers who wondered about its ability to conform to high standards of governance and transparency will see an entity operating entirely in line with international norms, and fulfilling a hugely important function. In this scenario, the AIIB will be challenge one of the stronger arguments used by supporters of the “China threat” theory, particularly in the United States. It will give powerful evidence that China is a status quo power, that it is able to play the international game according to rules largely laid down by others, and that it can show real leadership and work with other countries. This would be a huge fillip to China’s soft power credentials and a problem to those who constantly accuse it of holding more nefarious motives. The second scenario is that the bank quickly shows it is unable to operate, and that it was far too ambitious and bold an idea for a latecomer to the finance sector like China to contemplate. The 56 other partners will show vocal antipathy and the whole project’s failure will fall like a gift to those who dislike China’s prominence and feel that it is existentially unable to operate according to global standards. The downside of this scenario however, even for the U.S. hardline opponents and skeptics, is that the major economy in the world’s most critical growth area, where there is a projected $8 trillion in infrastructure needs, is unable to optimally contribute where help is most needed. It would mean that China’s knowledge of developmental economics would not be translatable and easily usable outside its own country. This would be a depressing outcome, and in the long term, a bad one for the region and the world. The third scenario is simply that nothing happens. The AIIB becomes another sclerotic bureaucracy lined up with many others, mired in politics, stymied by internal divisions, and a monument to China’s love of soothing rhetoric over real action. Skeptics win in this scenario too, up to a point, but once more its long-term meaning is good for no one. Looking at these three broad scenarios, there’s one more conclusion to be drawn: the United States gets far more from being involved — and making sure the bank succeeds — then from staying outside. A successful AIIB with the U.S. eventually joining in means no more than a bit of hurt pride for Washington. But after enduring this, the United States can bask in reflected glory by being associated with a successful and much-needed project, which Washington can argue it made work. A failed bank, or an inactive, empty one, is not in the United States’ or anyone else’s long term interests.

## Rebuttal to Politics DA

#### Republicans will like the plan because they perceive it as Obama losing US primacy

Ian Talley. Writer at the Wall Street Journal. March 2, 2015. In Democrats’ Eyes, Republicans Are Helping Foster Chinese Power. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/27/in-democrats-eyes-republicans-are-helping-foster-chinese-power/>

Are Republicans aiding Chinese efforts to undercut America’s global economic sway? That’s the case some Democrats are making, complaining that GOP lawmakers are eroding U.S. soft-power overseas by refusing to back the key international institutions where the U.S. has long exercised intellectual, political and economic leverage. As Exhibit No. 1, they cite China’s ability to persuade Washington’s top trans-Atlantic allies to join its new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, despite U.S. pleas for them to snub Beijing’s offer. Behind that success, U.S. Treasury officials, senior Democratic lawmakers and a host of influential economists say, is a Republican refusal to ratify an overhaul of the International Monetary Fund’s governing structure, which would have given China a larger say in the institution. Critics say that has encouraged China to set up an institution that could compete with the U.S.-led World Bank and Washington-influenced Asian Development Bank. In 2010, the Obama administration agreed to an international deal that would give emerging market economies more power at the IMF in line with their expanding economic heft. The deal, orchestrated by the Obama administration and linked to a doubling of the fund’s core lending reserves, was in part an effort to ensure countries such as China, India and Brazil remain committed to the existing international financial architecture designed by the U.S. Republican lawmakers have rejected administration requests to ratify the five-year-old deal, questioning the fund’s lending programs, citing the failing Greek loan in particular, and the IMF’s need for more cash reserves.

#### Republicans want projects like AIIB that make Obama seem weak

Ian Talley. Writer at the Wall Street Journal. March 2, 2015. In Democrats’ Eyes, Republicans Are Helping Foster Chinese Power. Accessed April 24, 2016. <http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/27/in-democrats-eyes-republicans-are-helping-foster-chinese-power/>

Amid the impasse, Treasury officials have warned (see here and here) that disenfranchisement of China and other emerging-market nations at the IMF could accelerate a move to non-U.S.-led international financial institutions. “Our international credibility and influence are being threatened,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told lawmakers last week. In the last year alone, China has launched the Asian infrastructure bank and, along with other major emerging markets, started a $100 billion IMF-like emergency rescue facility and a $100 billion World Bank-like development bank. Some analysts say the IMF governance issue has also undermined U.S. influence within the Group of 20 largest economies, which acts as an executive board for the global economy. “The failure by Congress to ratify the IMF reforms is seen as a weakening of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism, spurring doubt about our leadership on global economic issues,” said Rep. Maxine Waters of California, the top Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee that has oversight of the IMF. “In response, a number of developing countries, led by China, have begun to act independently to challenge Western dominance in the world economy.”

## Rebuttal to Asian Development Bank CP

#### The ADB isn’t sufficiently growth driven

William Easterly. Research Fellow at Brookings Institute. October 2, 2007. Don't Bank on the Asian Development Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/10/02development-easterly

The inequality report is a good example of an iron law of aid: Aid agencies need bad news to justify their existence. Frantically trying to find some bad news in the greatest mass escape from poverty in world history, the quarter-century-old Asian boom, the ADB complains that economic growth worsens "absolute inequality." This is true, but meaningless. If I had a tenfold income increase and Bill Gates only a 10% raise, such economic growth would still worsen the "absolute" income gap between Mr. Gates and me because billionaire Gates's raise is larger in absolute size. But I think most of us would take this growth anyway. Even the ADB concedes the poor are growing richer with economic growth. But this obsession with inequality leads to bad policies, since the only way to avert rising absolute inequality is to stop growth. And anyway, if indeed that's the goal, we don't need the ADB to tell us how to accomplish it -- the Burmese junta has done an admirable job of avoiding growth, and the resulting "absolute inequality," without much advice from the ADB at all. Then there is Aid-for-Trade. The program is intended to give poor countries financial assistance to "prepare" themselves for trade. But there's evidence that aid inflows actually make exporting more rather than less difficult by fueling currency appreciation. And even setting aside this inconvenient fact, the ADB more generally seems to be rather at sea as to how aid would increase trade.

#### ADB is overburdened by bureaucratic thinking and hasn’t been effective

William Easterly. Research Fellow at Brookings Institute. October 2, 2007. Don't Bank on the Asian Development Bank. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/10/02development-easterly

All of which goes to show that the ADB's fundamental problem is that it needs advice from successful Asian countries more than they need advice from it. In the face of this, much of the ADB's framework contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, tinkering with the bank's management structure perhaps in the hope that some function will follow the form. The strategic framework suggests creating "prioritized sectors," distinguishing between "core operational areas" and "sectors from where ADB should plan to move out of operations." Unfortunately, the document fails to mention any sectors in the latter category, even while it has scads of ideas for new "operational areas." Indeed, the ADB is currently following and will surely continue to follow another iron law of aid: Not only do old aid agencies never die, neither does any single old department of an old aid agency. The ADB's focus has if anything gotten less "prioritized," not more, over the quarter century that Asia has been booming. The foreign aid part of ADB, for example, is currently operating in 14 different sectors, each of which averages about 7% of the budget. A summary measure of this kind of splitting up of the budget into many small pieces at the ADB shows it getting steadily worse over the past quarter century.

## Rebuttal to T—Cooperation

#### Economic cooperation includes entering into multilateral banks and investment groups

Daily Tape. September 21, 2011. Definition and forms of economic cooperation among nations. Accessed April 24, 2016. http://dailytape.com/2011/09/21/definition-and-forms-of-economic-cooperation-among-nations.html

Economic cooperation between countries is cooperation between countries in the economic field, bilateral, regional and international levels. Economic cooperation between countries covering several fields, such as exports and imports of goods (goods and services), lending and borrowing of capital and payments, and acceptance services. Based on the number of countries, economic cooperation can be divided into two, namely as follows. a. Bilateral cooperation is cooperation between the two countries. b. Multilateral cooperation, the cooperation between many countries or cooperation by a country with some other countries. Multilateral cooperation can be divided into two kinds: 1. Regional cooperation is a cooperation between several countries in one region. 2. International cooperation is cooperation between the countries in the world and not confined in one area. Forms of economic cooperation between countries covering the following areas. a. Interstate commerce. Form of interstate commerce includes the export and import goods. b. Implementation and acceptance of services or investments referred to exports and imports of services.

# Aff Military-to-Military Engagement

### 1AC

**Thesis:** This 1AC argues that the current strategy of “Engage & Hedge”, engaging to mitigate/manage conflicts and a robust military agenda in the region, undermines real diplomacy aimed at building a cooperative Sino-US future. The current policy risk miscalculation on multiple fronts. The plan reverses this strategy by increase military-to-military diplomatic engagement. This allows military forces to build a trusting relationship to sustain relations, control escalation and avoid wars via miscalculation. By default, the plan would reduce U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, which has independent impacts.

#### Observation One: The Status Quo

#### A. The U.S.-China relationship has a high degree of mistrust on both sides. U.S. engagement efforts are losing out to competitive views of relations

David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, June 12, 2015, “Sino-US relations: Divorce is not an option,” The Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/sino-us-relations-divorce-is-not-an-option, Accessed 4-23-2016

Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of the public in both countries view US-China ties as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the leading powers.

#### B. Current diplomatic engagement with China is tied to an “Engage and Hedge” strategy that increases tensions and nullifies genuine diplomacy

Sean P. Quirk, Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, November 9, 2015, “Reconciling China’s PLAN: Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-intervention-with-tactical-engagement/>, Accessed 4-11-2016

America’s interest in the Asia-Pacific region is foremost stability and peace, but U.S. policymakers and scholars increasingly state that such goals may be mutually exclusive in China’s near seas. Congressman J. Randy Forbes, R-Virginia, recently submitted a [bipartisan letter](http://forbes.house.gov/uploadedfiles/09.17.15_letter_to_obama_and_kerry.pdf) to the White House and Department of Defense urging the United States to reasonably and militarily challenge Chinese claims in the South China Sea, with the inherent risk of armed conflict. Meanwhile, leading academics such as Charles Glaser argue in favor of ceding geopolitical ground to China to preserve peace, even suggesting that the United States [end its special relationship with Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war) that has preserved Taiwan’s status quo for seven decades. Current U.S. China policy of sanguine diplomatic engagement combined with U.S. military capability hedging against Chinese defense posture, so called “[Engage and Hedge](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ccb40e8e-e8ba-11e2-aead-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3mzSDieaN),” is only increasing tensions between the United States and China. This strategy focuses on diplomatic engagement and high-level talks (see the presidents [Sunnylands summit](http://sunnylands.org/news/view/374) and [President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit](http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/obama-hosts-lavish-state-dinner-chinas-president-xi-jinping-n434126)), while hedging China’s growth with the [Asia-Pacific “rebalance” of U.S. military forces](http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/americas-military-first-asia-pivot/). Yet, the effect of Engage and Hedge is U.S. capitulation to China’s maritime expansion strategy; Washington downplays Beijing’s antagonism on the diplomatic stage. This ambivalence coincides with increasing numbers of military assets in the air and seas surrounding China that might be involved in a deadly accident.

### 1AC

#### C. This “Engage and Hedge” strategy is like treating cancer with aspirin and risks new world war

Graham Allison, the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, September 24, 2015, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/, Accessed 4-19-2016

At this point, the established script for discussion of policy challenges calls for a pivot to a new strategy (or at least slogan), with a short to-do list that promises peaceful and prosperous relations with China. Shoehorning this challenge into that template would demonstrate only one thing: a failure to understand the central point I’m trying to make. What strategists need most at the moment is not a new strategy, but a long pause for reflection. If the tectonic shift caused by China’s rise poses a challenge of genuinely Thucydidean proportions, declarations about “rebalancing,” or revitalizing “engage and hedge,” or presidential hopefuls’ calls for more “muscular” or “robust” variants of the same, amount to little more than aspirin treating cancer. Future historians will compare such assertions to the reveries of British, German, and Russian leaders as they sleepwalked into 1914.

#### PLAN: The United States federal government will reverse its “Engage and Hedge” strategy toward China in favor of substantially expanding military-to-military diplomatic engagement

#### Observation Two: Solvency

#### A. Reversing the “Edge and Hedge” strategy means utilizing diplomacy to call out Chinese aggression while using military diplomacy to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Sean P. Quirk, Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, November 9, 2015, “Reconciling China’s PLAN: Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-intervention-with-tactical-engagement/>, Accessed 4-11-2016

However, a strategy that reverses the domains of Engage and Hedge may foster both geopolitical stability and peace. The United States should invert Engage and Hedge by hedging in the diplomatic realm and bolstering engagement at a mil-to-mil level. Hedging against Chinese belligerence means aggressively denouncing China’s strategic moves through state-to-state diplomacy. Washington can simultaneously engage in tactical mil-to-mil exchanges that decrease tension between opposing ships and aircraft. This strategic diplomatic intervention with tactical military engagement is a two-pronged strategy to unequivocally denounce Beijing’s expansionist actions and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, while simultaneously stepping up mil-to-mil cooperation, particularly with the PLAN.

The first prong establishes geopolitical stability as Washington’s perennial strategic objective in East Asia and reveals Beijing’s efforts to disrupt that stability. The second prong at the tactical level allows for mil-to-mil interactions that will help prevent air and maritime incidents, which may cause needless injury and death. Strategic intervention with tactical engagement will not prevent armed conflict if one or both parties determine war to be the best mechanism for dispute resolution and escalation management, but will decrease the likelihood of animosity, misunderstanding, and unintentional death. The goal should be to normalize mil-to-mil exchanges such that they occur separately from the tumult of U.S.-China politics.

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#### B. All the cooperative tools are in place. Washington and Beijing have clear channels for greater military cooperation

Sputnik News, Staff Writer, September 25, 2015, “US, China Agree to Reduce 'Risk of Miscalculation' Between Armies,” <http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150925/1027549898/us-china-military-training.html>, Accessed 4-17-2016

Xi also noted he and Obama agreed that "terrorism was the common enemy of mankind" and consequently also agreed to "step up multilateral and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation." The commitment to expand military cooperation follows two Memoranda of Understanding on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) military deals that the United States and China signed in November 2014. As part of the CBMs, Washington and Beijing agreed to avoid military confrontation in Asia. The CBMs stipulate the two countries notify the one another of major military activities, policy and strategy development, and also outlines rules of engagement in air and maritime incidents.

#### C. The drive for international prestige and status means China is open to dialogue

Philip Stephens, Associated Editor, November 5, 2015, “China must learn how to be a great power,” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4effd3c6-82e9-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767.html#ixzz46HfJY3BY>, Accessed 4-14-2016
When a US warship steamed through the South China Sea the other day China protested and her neighbours applauded. Washington said it was upholding freedom of navigation in the face of Chinese land reclamation projects that are turning disputed rocks into artificial islands. Beijing warned against provocation from an outsider with no claims of its own in the region. The rest of us were reminded of the [dismal determinism](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2be10df4-7d78-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3qSOCPl9M) of Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian war. The demonstration of US [naval power](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f38298a4-7d3d-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3qSOCPl9M) — the ship sailed in waters deemed territorial by China — pointed up the multiple collisions of competing historical claims, geography and shifting power balances fuelling an East Asian arms race. Some say there are now as many submarines [prowling the waters](http://www.ft.com/indepth/asia-maritime-tensions) of the western Pacific as there once were in the north Atlantic. Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia also contest the “nine-dash line” that asserts Chinese suzerainty over the South China Sea. Tokyo and Beijing are locked in a separate dispute in the East China Sea. Just before the guided missile destroyer USS Lassen set its course, I joined the serried senior ranks of the People’s Liberation Army at China’s annual international security conference in Beijing. I have never seen so many starred epaulettes. The Xiangshan Forum, hosted by the Chinese Association for Military Science, is another sign of the changing times. Not so long ago the PLA was, in the minds of westerners, an ineffably secret, some would have said sinister, organisation. The Xiangshan meeting, a competitor of sorts to Singapore’s long-running Shangri La Dialogue, speaks to a military establishment that now wants to be heard on the international stage. China’s rise has come faster than its own leadership imagined, in part because of the immense damage inflicted on the west by the 2008 financial crash. Beijing now has to learn what it means to be a great power. This is not meant to sound patronising. Rather it is a description of reality. After two centuries, first as a victim of, and then largely a bystander at, global events, China has emerged in the space of a couple of decades as second only to the US.

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#### D. Our dual-track diplomacy ties confidence –building measures with military-to-military cooperation. This lets off steam and builds military trust to prevent miscalc

Sean P. Quirk, Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS, November 9, 2015, “Reconciling China’s PLAN: Strategic Intervention, Tactical Engagement,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/reconciling-chinas-plan-strategic-intervention-with-tactical-engagement/>, Accessed 4-11-2016

Diplomatically, Washington should hold a strategic intervention with Beijing to address China’s bad neighbor policy: The United States will never accept the Chinese strategy of rapidly expanding its maritime domain at the price of international law and the sovereignty of its neighbors. There are already several forums for U.S.-China strategic discussion, among them the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Strategic Security Dialogue, Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue, and the Assistant Secretary Sub-Dialogue. Conveying U.S. concerns and intentions in these bilateral strategic forums allow Beijing to save face on the international stage. However, past U.S. passivity has allowed the PRC to gain ground. The United States and China have developed joint [confidence building measures (CBMs),](http://amti.csis.org/us-china-cbms-stability-maritime-asia/) [military memoranda of understanding (MOUs),](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/mous-the-secret-sauce-avoiding-us-china-disaster-12154) and the [Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80532) Yet such progress coincides with significantly heightened tensions and a litany of Chinese actions that disrupt calm in neighboring seas. Indeed, legally non-binding CBMs, MOUs, and CUES can be counterproductive if they temporarily quell U.S. public opinion, thereby enabling China’s expansionist strategy to persist. If bilateral forums do not result in substantive, peaceful resolution, Washington should assertively employ multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) or United Nations to convey its strategic concerns. The goal of this strategic intervention would be to pressure Beijing to back down from its destabilizing belligerence in the East and South China Seas. As the Department of Defense reiterates in its recent [Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF), the United States “takes no position on competing sovereignty claims” in territorial disputes. Washington does not need to proclaim the legal validity of each state’s territorial claim, which would earn it more enemies than friends. The United States should, however, continue to demand that all claimants resolve disputes through peaceful arbitration, never with the use of force. Attempts to militarily alter established international boundaries in the East and South China Seas would be met with U.S. force, à la [USS Lassen’s patrol near Subi Reef](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/28/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKCN0SK2AC20151028). Washington should make clear that China would face international repercussions for further militarization of international waters, to include United Nations condemnation and possible sanctions. While engaging in strategic diplomacy, Washington should simultaneously pursue a campaign for U.S-China mil-to-mil exchange as a means to let off steam in the pressure cooker that is the South China Sea. U.S. forward-deployed forces – the tip of the spear – would need to work tactfully in meaningful naval exchanges with the PLAN to balance U.S. government officials that would confront Beijing’s actions in diplomatic forums. From the track-II U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue to the official DCT between both countries defense departments, increasing mil-to-mil exchange is a common refrain coming from bilateral dialogues and [military experts](http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/sailing-with-dragons-the-case-for-increased-cooperation-with-the-plan/). Both countries’ defense apparatuses should orchestrate a full range of meaningful exercises that show tangible cooperation between their militaries, ultimately cultivating “[military trust](http://english.cntv.cn/2015/09/25/VIDE1443112437412876.shtml).” These exercises could include joint training on maritime air encounters, counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR), emergency evacuations, and naval escort exercises, such as those that were [recently completed](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84858). In a multilateral capacity, the United States and China could go so far as to joint-host training events as an East Asian corollary to Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which the United States hosts in Hawaii every two years. Both militaries could invite their partners in the region, particularly members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to a large multilateral training environment that builds trust across several international fronts.

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#### Advantage One: Miscalculation

#### A. The status quo approach to miscalculation is a hedging strategy of threat management

Prashanth Parameswaran, Associate Editor at The Diplomat and a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, December 11, 2015, “Underestimating US in Asia a ‘Severe Miscalculation’: Senior Defense Official,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/underestimating-us-in-asia-a-severe-miscalculation-senior-defense-official/, Accessed 4-17-2016

Turning to China’s rise, Denmark acknowledged that there are areas where Chinese actions are clearly concerning – including in the air, cyber and maritime domains. In response, he said the United States would continue to pursue a strategy “from a position of strength” to get China to adhere to principles of the international order for the security and prosperity of all. “Our strategy acknowledges that there will be areas of competition and underscores that the United States will manage this competition with China from a position of strength, while seeking to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation,” he said.

#### B. China’s expansion makes miscalculation inevitable. Only military diplomatic engagement solves

Luis Martinez, Staff Writer, September 2, 2015, “Chinese Navy Ships off Alaska Coast Highlights Need To Avoid 'Miscalculations,' General Says,” ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/chinese-navy-ships-off-alaska-coast-highlights-avoid/story?id=33493194, Accessed 4-17-2016

With [China](http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/china.htm) sending five Navy ships into the Bering Sea north and west of Alaska for the first time ever, the nation’s top military officer says the move highlights the need for both the U.S. and China to work to avoid "miscalculations and interactions that could be unsafe at sea and in the air." In an exclusive interview with ABC News’ [Martha Raddatz](http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/reporters/martha-raddatz.htm), General [Martin Dempsey](http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/whitehouse/martin-dempsey.htm), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the vessels operating in international waters close to Alaska indicate to him that China is “developing capabilities to expand their reach” as they continue to pursue economic interests. Dempsey said that the more China asserts itself, “the more they are likely to interact with us and the more responsibility we both have to avoid miscalculation and interactions that could be unsafe at sea and in the air.” “It tells me we should be more engaged with them and it tells me that we have to help allow China to become peaceful and prosperous and rise economically without becoming threatening” to U.S. allies in the region, Dempsey said, also noting that the U.S. has five alliances in the Pacific region “and we intend to live up those alliances.”

#### C. A U.S-China war causes extinction—not because China is evil, but by miscalculation with territory disputes

Anatol Lieven, professor in the War Studies Department of King's College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington, June 12, 2012, “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html, Accessed 4-23-2016

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

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#### D. Only a balance in regional influence can prevent Sino-U.S. miscalculation

Philip Stephens, Associated Editor, November 5, 2015, “China must learn how to be a great power,” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4effd3c6-82e9-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767.html#ixzz46HfJY3BY>, Accessed 4-14-2016
Yet it is equally natural that Beijing’s ambitions jar with the US. America’s presence in East Asia has been the guarantor of regional peace. What is more, the US is an East Asian power by invitation. China’s neighbouring states have been asking for a bigger not a smaller US presence. Vietnam is cross because Washington will not sell it sufficiently sophisticated weaponry. Think about it. The big criticism from most regional powers of President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia is that it has been too timid. East Asia will not stay the same for the simple reason that China’s rise has remade the landscape. America cannot hold on to a primacy that has already been lost. But nor can China claim its own hegemony. A new order must accommodate both. Any effort from either side to prove otherwise would tell us only that, like Sparta and Athens, they are doomed to collide.

#### E. Miscalc is the only real scenario for war

Cheong Suk-Wai, Staff Writer, February 26, 2016, “War between China, US highly improbable: Bilahari Kausikan,” The Strait Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/war-between-china-us-highly-improbable-bilahari-kausikan, Accessed 4-23-2016

China's military build-up in the South China Sea continues to rile the United States, the world's current sole superpower, and its allies, but the friction between these two powers is sabre-rattling at most, said veteran Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan yesterday. War between the two "is highly improbable", he said in the second of five lectures as the Institute of Policy Studies' second S R Nathan fellow. If they did go to war, it would be by accident, not by design

#### F. U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific makes a catastrophic war with China inevitable. It relies on constructing China as a “threat” causing a devastating self-fulfilling prophecy

Jihyun Kim, an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, Summer 2015, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/> Summer\_2015/kim.pdf, Accessed 4-21-2016

China’s core interests and ambitions are likely to expand as the nation’s power expands. However, China’s intentions and willingness to aggressively use that power are not predetermined—nor are the exact contents of those intentions and willingness static. Rather, “the specific nature and content of its growing appetites,” along with the means through which they are fulfilled, will be greatly influenced by “the choices that other states take in regard to China” as well as the Chinese domestic audience, which is sensitive to any outside actions taken against the country. The Chinese elite cannot afford to take a conciliatory strategy of peaceful rise if doing so may appear too soft to protect China’s national interests and pride, especially when other states singled out China as a threat or an instigator of regional tensions. Nevertheless, the US priority in terms of keeping American preeminence and credibility as a regional security guarantor is likely to make the United States reluctant to give way to China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, which China considers its own traditional sphere of influence. That could heighten the potential clash between the two great powers, with the South China Sea disputes becoming a trigger. Joseph S. Nye asserts that “throughout history, whenever a rising power creates fear among its neighbors and other great powers, that fear becomes a cause of conflict,” with even small events triggering an unintended and catastrophic chain reaction. In other words, exaggerated and unmanaged fears could produce the so-called Thucydides trap, creating a devastating self-fulfilling prophecy.

## Inherency

### Inherency Extension

#### The current U.S. approach will maintain a Engage and Hedge strategy

[Bonnie S. Glaser](http://csis.org/expert/bonnie-s-glaser), Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, Project on Chinese Power at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Jake Douglas, Research Assistant in the Japan Chair at CSIS, July 7, 2015, “Another Sign that U.S.-China Relations are Souring,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/another-sign-us-china-relations-are-souring-13269, Accessed 4-18-2016

As calls to take a harder line against China grow louder in Washington, expect the rhetoric coming out of the Pentagon to steer clear of any “new model of military-to-military relations.” Instead, Secretary Carter will likely focus on promoting cooperation where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap, expanding mechanisms to avoid accidents and enable communication in a crisis, and pressuring China to change its behavior where its actions are judged to be destabilizing and contrary to international laws and norms.

#### The Defense Dept. is moving away from engagement to containment. This proves low mil-mil relations can drag down overall relations

Sean Lyngaas, Staff Writer, October 29, 2015, “Jaded U.S.-China Military Ties Fray in Wake of Recent Tensions,” The Washington Diplomat, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=12652:jaded-us-china-military-ties-fray-in-wake-of-recent-tensions&catid=1537&Itemid=428, Accessed 4-19-2016

Some officials across the Defense Department have grown wary of engagement with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to the official, who asked not to be named. “There are positions within all branches that are voicing significant concern over the Chinese activities and calling into question” the utility of engagement, he said. The bilateral military tension has not subsided despite increased engagement between the two militaries in recent years and, observers say, is gnawing away at any goodwill generated by that cooperation. A string of high-profile cyber-attacks against the U.S. government and American businesses that have been blamed on China has increased pressure on Washington to respond more decisively to Chinese cyber-hacking. Beijing’s territorial claims in the South and East China Seas have also ratcheted up tensions and threatened to spark clashes as the U.S. [contemplates](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-patrols-to-test-chinas-pledge-on-south-china-sea-islands-1444615926) stepping up naval patrols in response to China’s military buildup in the region. Beijing insists it has sovereignty over the disputed territory, while Washington counters that its military has the right to ensure unfettered navigation in international waters. The disagreement speaks to a larger rift in bilateral relations: Some in Beijing have taken exception to President Obama's so-called Asia Pivot to reassert America's presence in the Pacific, calling it a thinly veiled attempt to constrain Beijing's influence in its own backyard. The administration denies that the purpose of the realignment is to counteract Chinese hegemony, but it also says that Beijing needs to abide by international rules and assume responsibilities that are commensurate with its status as the world’s second-largest economy.

### Inherency Extension

#### Mistrust is deepening on both sides. The Pentagon is resisting reforms to mil-mil engagement

[Bonnie S. Glaser](http://csis.org/expert/bonnie-s-glaser), Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, Project on Chinese Power at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Jake Douglas, Research Assistant in the Japan Chair at CSIS, July 7, 2015, “Another Sign that U.S.-China Relations are Souring,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/another-sign-us-china-relations-are-souring-13269, Accessed 4-18-2016

The 7th Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) concluded last month. Once again, the work of hundreds of senior officials and dozens of agencies produced a mountain of literature. China watchers are still parsing the 127 outcomes of the Strategic Track, but one important change seems to have slipped through the cracks. Unlike last year,[the factsheet](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm) contains no reference to a “new model of U.S.-China military-to-military relations,” an offshoot of President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy concept, the “new type of great power relations (NTGPR).” In fact, a careful reading of recent Pentagon speeches and reports confirms this is no accidental omission. Despite some recent progress in areas of practical cooperation like the signing of an Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism Framework, Secretary Ashton Carter has systematically purged the term from the Defense Department’s engagement rhetoric. Exasperated with Beijing’s maritime assertiveness and cyber activities, views of China within the Pentagon—and Washington in general—are unmistakably hardening. Observers on both sides of the Pacific should take note of this latest sign of deepening strategic mistrust.

## Solvency Extension

### Solvency – A2: Too much mistrust

#### Widespread distrust is not an obstacle to engagement

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of Asian Research, September 22, 2015, “Enhancing U.S.-China Military-to-Military Exchanges,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=609, Accessed 4-20-2016

Additionally, the two militaries share high levels of mistrust. The history of military interactions is replete with negative examples. For China, these include the United States’ abrupt termination of cooperative defense programs in 1989 following violent protests and loss of life in Tiananmen Square; the inadvertent, but inexplicable, launch of air-ground missiles into the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999; the ongoing U.S. military presence in China’s exclusive economic zone; and the periodic announcement of new arms sales to Taiwan. All these incidents raised serious questions about American intent. For the United States, the mistrust has different origins. U.S. leadership helped create the peaceful environment in East Asia that has directly facilitated the postwar economic boom. Changes to the regional order suggest risk, both to U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific and to the broader regional order. Yet the level of mistrust is not ipso facto an inhibitor to greater cooperation; many senior leaders on both sides have argued that trust is not a precondition for cooperation but can be built over time.

#### The Xi-Obama meeting in April sent a clear signal that cooperation is the new norm, despite tension

Tao Wenzhao, Researcher for the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, April 12, 2016, “China-U.S. Summit Heralds Stable Relations,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-u-s-summit-heralds-stable-relations/, Accessed 4-23-2016

On 31 March, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama on the margins of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. The 90-minute meeting represented an important attempt to stabilize bilateral relations in the U.S. election year. For months, the relationship has been talked down – mainly because of perceived disputes over the South China Sea. The Xi-Obama meeting sent a clear message: The basic tone of China-US relations remains positive; the two sides have more shared interests than differences and more cooperation than competition.

### Solvency – China will cooperate

#### Despite disputes, The U.S. and China can still cooperate

Dingding Chen, an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, April 23, 2016, “Cooperation is the only way ahead for US-China relations,” China and the World Program, Princeton University, http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/cooperation-only-way-ahead-us-china-relations, Accessed 4-23-2016

Amid a flurry of pessimistic analyses and predictions about the future of U.S.-China relations, one prominent Chinese international relations scholar, Professor Niu Jun at Peking University, is calling for a new Chinese approach to the United States. Specifically, per Niu, on the whole China should maintain a cooperative relationship with the United States and this should be part of its national strategy — not a policy of convenience. Indeed, Niu’s new essay sheds some light on U.S.-China relations from a Chinese perspective. It is particularly timely given that both countries are increasingly suspicious of each other’s intentions in East Asia and beyond. The United States is suspicious of a rising China that tries to push U.S. influence out of Asia and, in the process, becomes a regional hegemon. China, on the other hand, suspects that the United States wants to block its rise for fear of losing its hegemonic status in world politics. Such a deep level of distrust was already evident as early as 2012, when China’s Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal in the United States co-wrote a [report on strategic distrust(link is external)](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30-us-china-lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf) between the two powers. Unfortunately, tensions between the two powers have only increased due to disputes in cybersecurity, the South China Sea issue, and trade competition. Niu, however, believes that the best term to characterize U.S.-China relations is “competitive interdependence,” meaning that the two countries are competing in Asia, but also are constrained by their economically interdependent relationship. Furthermore, he points out that the deterioration of U.S.-China relations in the last few years should not be blamed on the U.S. side alone, as some in China would suggest. Many favor a U.S. ‘conspiracy’ theory, but such a view is not only intellectually lazy, but also unsupported by empirical facts. The U.S. side certainly has its own share of the blame, but perhaps more important is what has changed within China.

### Solvency – China will cooperate

#### China has a history of supporting joint naval exercises

Shan Jie, Staff Writer, March 4, 2016, “China hopes US-led naval exercise will not harm the interests of ‘third parties’,” Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971844.shtml, Accessed 4-17-2016

China's foreign ministry said on Thursday that China hopes a joint naval exercise by the US, Japan and India in waters off the northern Philippines near the South China Sea will not harm the interests of "third parties." Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr, chief of the United States Pacific Command, said on Wednesday in a security conference in New Delhi that the naval exercise, Malabar, will be held in the northern Philippine Sea and that Japan will take part, Reuters reported on Thursday. "We hope that cooperation among relevant countries will contribute to regional peace, stability and security, and no harm shall be done to the interests of third parties," Hong Lei, a spokesman for China's [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](http://www.globaltimes.cn/db/government/1.shtml), told a daily news briefing on Thursday. Harris said the United States wished to expand the annual naval exercises it holds with India into a joint operation across the region, which could draw India directly into the row in the South China Sea, Reuters reported. "The intention of the exercise is to show all three nations' united support for the Philippines," Zha Xiaogang, a research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times. "The US aims to show its military presence through the exercises to further press China in the Asia-Pacific and to demonstrate that it does not acknowledge China's position on the South China Sea issue," Zha said.

### Solvency – A2: NDAA barriers

#### Intensifying military-to-military diplomatic exchanges will positively change perceptions on both sides. The NDAA is not a barrier

Kyle Churchman, Political and Security Affairs group at NBR, and Yao Yunzhu, currently a Senior Fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science and is Director of its Center on China-American Defense Relations, September 18, 2015, “Building a New Type of U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=607, Accessed 4-19-2016

Do you think intensifying U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges at the operational level, such as through joint military exercises and academic exchanges among midlevel officers, will have a positive long-term impact on attitudes within the PLA and the U.S. military toward the other side? Intensifying exchanges among officers at all levels and across the training, academic, educational, and even cultural fields will have a decidedly positive impact on their perceptions of each other in both the near and long terms. One example is the 2011 and 2012 joint performances by the PLA and U.S. Army bands that were received by audiences in both countries with great enthusiasm. Another example is the highly successful ongoing effort to locate the remains of U.S. military personnel who fought on Chinese soil during World War II. Yet the core of the military-to-military relationship should not involve people-to-people exchanges simply for their own sake; rather, soldiers, sailors, and airmen from both sides should work together in their fatigues to achieve a good and practical purpose. The chief obstacle to a truly substantive military-to-military relationship is the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) passed by the U.S. Congress in 1999. This law places restrictions on U.S. military exchanges with the PLA in twelve operational areas, and gives the U.S. secretary of defense wide latitude in determining what is permissible. The fundamental aim of the legislation is to ensure that no U.S. military exchanges with the PLA could in any way enhance China’s military capability. This makes a full and robust military-to-military relationship difficult. Moreover, the United States and several European Union countries since 1989 have imposed arms embargoes on China that have effectively eliminated military technology as an area of possible cooperation.

### Solvency – Military Diplomatic Engagement

#### Sino-U.S. military-to-military diplomatic exchanges are crucial to global security

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the Washington, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research and Jessica Drun, a Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2016, “Executive Summary,” U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57\_US-China\_April2016.pdf, Accessed 4-18-2016

This essay argues that there are indeed areas of convergence in the relationship, including having modest expectations and giving mutual assurances that neither side will arbitrarily cancel mil-mil activities or freeze out this dimension more generally. The sides also converge in assessing that, in an era in which China’s rise has achieved certain impressive effects, continued work—at the most senior policy levels all the way down to tactical military engagements—must be undertaken to better understand the dynamics of this evolving relationship in a new period. The two sides also agree that continuing effort must be made to find the optimal mix of mil-mil activities to better define the great-power relationship in the new era. This essay proposes options for developing decision-making processes that would help in this process. All in all, these areas of convergence present opportunities for strengthening the overall bilateral relationship. This essay also identifies areas of divergence, which are often sources of tension. Of note, the Chinese side highlights how the degree to which international media emphasize the metanarrative of tension between a rising and an established power serves to color all interactions. The facts, however, suggest that the two militaries are less constrained by this metanarrative, and several data points in the essay indicate that an adjustment is underway. For instance, U.S. PACOM commander Admiral Harry Harris and U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Scott Swift proceeded with their visits to China in November 2015, even after the USS Lassen conducted a freedom-of-navigation action in the South China Sea in late October. Their decision to execute preplanned activities reflects a level of maturity that might not have existed in previous years. Ultimately, however, this essay finds that the key to developing a more effective mil-mil relationship will be to move beyond the type of relationship defined by the satisfaction of each party with direct exchanges to a new paradigm in which Sino-U.S. mil-mil engagement makes real contributions to regional and global security. In many respects, such a development will help define how the two great powers interact in the mil-mil domain going forward.

#### Diplomatic engagement is the only recent the South China Seas haven’t erupted in war

Tao Wenzhao, Researcher for the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, April 12, 2016, “China-U.S. Summit Heralds Stable Relations,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-u-s-summit-heralds-stable-relations/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Admittedly, the South China Sea remains a significant area of dispute between the two countries. While China seeks to uphold its sovereignty and legitimate interests, the US is bent on making it a multilateral, international and even military issue. Consensus seems elusive. However, Xi and Obama agreed in Washington to manage their differences constructively. In all fairness, Washington is inserting itself in the issue not to precipitate war with Beijing, but to maintain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, demonstrate its presence in this strategically important region, counterbalance China and telegraph support for its allies and friends. While the differences are here to stay, it does not mean they cannot be managed — that is entirely possible thanks to the smooth channels of communication between the two sides and the recent bilateral agreement on mutual notification of major military actions and the rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. The bottom line is, nothing is going to stand in the way of the China-US relationship, which is headed firmly in the direction of no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

## Miscalculation Advantage Extension

### Miscalc Adv. – U.S.-China war impacts

#### A U.S.-China war has a high risk of escalation—goes nuclear

[Hugh White](http://www.straitstimes.com/authors/hugh-white), Professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, October 27, 2015, “The new nuclear war threat in US-China ties,” The Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-new-nuclear-war-threat-in-us-china-ties, Accessed 4-23-2016

Could a confrontation between America and China ever escalate into a nuclear war? At first glance, the idea seems absurd - surely no one has worried about that kind of thing since the Cold War ended 25 years ago? But as rising maritime tensions make conventional conflict between Asia-Pacific's two strongest states an increasingly credible possibility, it becomes more and more important that we understand just how bad such a conflict could become. Otherwise, we will not know how hard we should be working to avoid it. No one really knows the answer. In the 70 years since nuclear weapons were first and last used, the India-Pakistan war of 1999 is the only armed clash between nuclear-armed states. Of course, Cold War strategists spent decades studying how a conventional conflict might cross the nuclear threshold, but the conclusions they drew reflected the specific strategic, political and geographic conditions of the superpower confrontation of that time. Today, things are very different. What we think we know about how a nuclear war could have started between the United States and the Soviet Union on the central front in Europe in the 1960s might not tell us much about how one might start between America and China in the Western Pacific in 2016. Since the Cold War, it has been easy to assume that America's overwhelming preponderance of conventional military power means that nuclear weapons have lost their relevance. In its last major Nuclear Posture Review in 2010, Washington itself argued that America would rely less and less on nuclear weapons to deter or defeat potential adversaries as it became easier for it to prevail with high-tech non-nuclear forces. But that is not what's happened here in Asia. Over the past decade, America's traditional naval and air superiority in the Western Pacific has been steadily eroded by major enhancements in China's maritime capability - especially its capability to find and sink US aircraft carriers and attack US bases. As America's ability to score a swift and decisive victory over China with conventional forces alone dwindles, the probability grows that any conflict between them would escalate in time, space and intensity. And as that happens, the risk that it would cross the nuclear threshold rises too.

#### Lack of understanding means both sides underestimate each other and make false assumptions that cause escalation risking nuclear war

[Hugh White](http://www.straitstimes.com/authors/hugh-white), Professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, October 27, 2015, “The new nuclear war threat in US-China ties,” The Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-new-nuclear-war-threat-in-us-china-ties, Accessed 4-23-2016

The danger remains, however, that each side underestimates the other. That is one of the key differences between the escalating rivalry between the US and China in Asia today and the Cold War confrontation between America and the Soviets. In the Cold War, both sides fully understood the determination of the other. Each side knew that both of them would be willing to fight a nuclear war to deny any advantage to their rival. That made both sides very careful, and ultimately kept the peace between them. Today, there is a real risk that both sides assume the other would back down rather than fight a nuclear war. That makes both sides more willing to take risks that might lead to a confrontation, and increases the risks that a confrontation could escalate to a conflict, and that a conflict might cross the nuclear threshold. What's even more worrying is that no one is very clear where that nuclear threshold might lie. During the Cold War, it was usually very clear to both sides exactly what actions by either of them would trigger a nuclear exchange - especially in Europe where there was a clearly defined border between East and West. In Asia today, this is much less clear. Neither Washington nor Beijing really know where one another's red lines lie, and that makes it dangerously easy for miscalculations to occur, especially when they confront one another in a vast swathe of open ocean without clearly demarcated strategic boundaries.

### Miscalc Adv. - Plan solves

#### Only military diplomatic engagement can build cooperative trust to manage tensions and avoid miscalculation conflicts

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of Asian Research, September 22, 2015, “Enhancing U.S.-China Military-to-Military Exchanges,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=609, Accessed 4-20-2016

While the possibility of conflict between the two militaries is not high, the United States can ill afford to stumble into a new conflict, given simmering tensions elsewhere. To a much greater extent, it must employ the non-war uses of its military power. Military presence and diplomacy, as well as exercises with allies and partners, are traditional strengths of the U.S. armed forces, but the reduction of the full spectrum of options for U.S. leaders requires new approaches to achieve security objectives. Both building cooperation in areas of shared goals and agreeing on mechanisms to manage tension and crises are urgently needed to complement existing approaches to U.S.-China military relations.

#### Mil-mil diplomatic engagement should be expanded. Dialogue can reduce miscalc and strengthen long-term relations

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the Washington, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research and Jessica Drun, a Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, April 22, 2016, “What are mil-mil ties between the U.S. and China Good For?,” War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/what-are-mil-mil-ties-between-the-u-s-and-china-good-for/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Yet the mil-mil program between the United States and China could be further optimized in the near term through collaboration in areas of shared interests. This includes enhancing communication mechanisms to reduce miscalculations and assuage differences. For example, they could mutually determine the correct mix of mil-mil activities or clarify interests to the other party. Longer term, the development of a collaborative agenda could both increase security and strengthen the relationship in important ways. There seems to be scope — based off the success of extra-regional initiatives such as the Gulf of Aden exercises — for the United States and China to develop a framework of mil-mil engagement through activities that manage each other’s important constraints and deal with existing challenges.

### Miscalc Adv. - Hegemony / Primacy in Asia bad

#### Continued American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific guarantees a destabilizing arms race that drains our economy and collapses relations

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, April 20, 2015, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance->of-power, Accessed 4-21-2016

While continued American predominance cannot, at present, be justified on the basis of a Chinese drive for predominance, what of the widespread argument in U.S. policy circles that such predominance is necessary regardless of Chinese intentions, as the best possible means of ensuring regional (and global) order? While deeply rooted in both American exceptionalism and beliefs about the benefits of hegemonic power in the international order, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the Western Pacific constitutes the only basis for long-term stability and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific is a dangerous, increasingly obsolete concept, for several reasons. First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is required to ensure long-term regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. “freedom of action” and a clear “ability to prevail” militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to China’s mainland borders. The United States would never tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given China’s expanding interests and capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along Beijing’s maritime periphery will virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and economically draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work together to address a growing array of common global challenges.

#### Containment guarantees war. We should give up on primacy

John Glaser, International Security at George Mason University, December 28, 2015, “The Ugly Truth About Avoiding War With China,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ugly-truth-about-avoiding-war-china-14740, Accessed 4-19-2016

While ISIS is the threat that keeps Washington policymakers up at night, it’s the rise of China that has international relations theorists in a panic. Graham Allison[argues persuasively](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/) that China’s rise portends a classic Thucydides Trap. His research shows that in twelve of the last sixteen cases over the past five hundred years, when a rising power challenged an established one, the result was war. John Mearsheimer, somewhat more bluntly,[warns](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204) that “China cannot rise peacefully.” It’s an impending great power clash that makes the threat from ISIS look like child’s play. But China threatens the United States only insofar as America insists on being the dominant power in China’s backyard, a policy that actually contributes very little to U.S. security. If we abandon our strategy of primacy, the risk of a clash will shrink away. If we try to contain China’s rise, on the other hand, these predictions of doom may prove right. The current approach to China boils down to a kind of measured containment. It manifests in essentially in three ways: 1)[maintaining and strengthening](http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/) U.S. “treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand,” which “are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific”; 2)[increasing overall U.S. military presence](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf) in the region to develop “a geographically dispersed, politically sustainable force posture in the region”; and 3) further integrating U.S. economic engagement in the region in a way that[marginalizes, and in some cases excludes](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/why-tpp-is-high-risk-low-reward-117658), China. But containment is problematic: it carries the dubious presumption that China’s most likely reaction to U.S. expansion in the region is to become a docile power, eager to give up its regional ambitions. In reality, Washington’s determination to maintain dominance in East Asia is much more likely to generate an intense security dilemma.

### Miscalc Adv. - Hegemony / Primacy in Asia bad

#### Sustaining hegemony in China’s back yard guarantees domestic instability and regime collapse

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, April 20, 2015, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance->of-power, Accessed 4-21-2016

U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders.

China historically tolerated US presence but perceives the pivot to an offensive posture as containment. This destabilizes the balance of power
Brad Roberts, served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy from 2009 to 2013. From September 2013 to December 2014 he was a consulting professor at Stanford University and William Perry fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, March 9, 2015, “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia”,  <http://www.chairestrategique.fr/IMG/pdf/brad_roberts_-_extended_deterrence_and_strategic_stability_in_northeast_asia.pdf>, Accessed 4-24-2016

An additional factor in this strategic landscape is China’s shifting view of U.S. extended deterrence. Historically, China has been ambivalent about U.S. extended deterrence in Northeast Asia; but today, this ambivalence is giving way to clear opposition. Historically, China resisted a major U.S. military presence in East Asia but accepted it as useful for providing regional stability in a Cold War context and containing Japanese militarism. Today, China sees U.S. alliances as having an increasingly anti-China focus and accordingly it fears encirclement and containment by the United States alliance system. Chinese experts also argue that America’s strong commitment to its allies in Northeast Asia, especially with its promised “rebalance” of military forces into the region over the next five years, has emboldened U.S. allies to challenge China’s interests in dangerous and destabilizing ways.

### Miscalc Adv. - Hegemony / Primacy in Asia bad (Relations Internal)

#### Trying to sustain or bolster U.S. predominance in the Asia-Pacific tanks relations. We headed on a zero-sum path now

[Michael Swaine](http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=119), Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, April 20, 2015, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance->of-power, Accessed 4-21-2016

The limits on U.S. maritime predominance do not mean that China will eventually grow into the position of Asia’s next military hegemon, however. The above-mentioned Carnegie reports also concluded that American military power in Asia will remain very strong under all but the most unlikely, worst-case scenarios involving a U.S. withdrawal from the region. While China’s regional military capabilities will continue to grow significantly in key areas such as submarines and surface warships, ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive aircraft, air defense, and joint warfare, they will not provide an unambiguous level of superiority over U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, and certainly not in any other region. Therefore, any eventual Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would almost inevitably fail, and not only because of U.S. capabilities and resolve, but also because such an effort would drive regional states much closer to the United States. The result would be either a cold or a hot war in Asia, with intensifying polarization, arms races, and an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts. The Chinese leaders understand this and hence might only seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting opportunistically and in a more limited manner) if American words and actions were to convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek were to require it. Such a belief could emerge if Washington insists on maintaining its own historical level of military superiority in Asia by attempting to neutralize entirely Chinese military capabilities right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace or to develop a force capable of blockading China from a distance. Variants of operational concepts currently under consideration in U.S. policy circles, such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control (the former designed to defeat Beijing through preemptive, precision strikes deep into Chinese territory, and the latter to throttle China via a blockade along the first island chain bordering the eastern and southern Chinese mainland), contain such features. Indeed, any effort to sustain U.S. predominance in the face of a growing relative decline in U.S. capabilities alongside steady increases in Chinese power and influence will almost certainly intensify the U.S.-China security competition, deepen tensions between the two powers, and greatly unsettle U.S. allies and friends. Fortunately, this zero-sum dynamic has yet to emerge, but growing suspicions and beliefs in both capitals—founded on the above clashing assumptions held by each side regarding the necessary conditions for long-term order and prosperity in Asia—are certainly moving events in this direction.

## Maritime Security Advantage

### Maritime Security Advantage

#### A. Current South China Seas instability proves coercive military diplomacy risks war

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, November 4, 2015, “Washington Needlessly Escalates South China Sea Crisis,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/washington-needlessly-escalates-south-china-sea-crisis/, Accessed 4-21-2016

Beijing’s suspicions about U.S. motives in the South China Sea are already at a high level. The Lassen incident and the planned additional naval patrols are certain to intensify those suspicions. The South China Sea dispute has now emerged as the most prominent issue that could irrevocably damage relations between the United States and China. Naval patrols brazenly challenging China’s position regarding the man-made islands are unnecessarily provocative. Washington needs to take a step back before it ignites a major crisis.

#### B. The risks of military confrontation in the S. China Seas are real. Inevitable friction means we must expand engagement. The alternative is war

David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, June 12, 2015, “Sino-US relations: Divorce is not an option,” The Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/sino-us-relations-divorce-is-not-an-option, Accessed 4-23-2016

Even the current situation in the South China Sea has real potential to hemorrhage, as China is not going to stop its island- building activities and hence will not meet American demands that it do so. Or if China, having fortified the islands, proclaims an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. What is Washington to do then? The potential for military confrontation is not insignificant. So, looking to the future, the key responsibility for both countries is to learn how to manage competition, keep it from edging towards the conflictual end of the spectrum, while trying to expand the zone of practical cooperation. Neither country has any playbook to guide such a relationship. Henry Kissinger envisions what he calls "co-evolution" between the two powers, but even he concludes that this will require "wisdom and patience". But it is not at all clear to me that the respective political cultures and existing political systems, national identities, social values and world views will afford such a strategic grand bargain today. Thus, these two great nations are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist - yet they must. However fraught, this is a marriage in which divorce is not an option. Divorce means war.

### Maritime Security Advantage

#### C. The 2015 FONOP in the south China Seas proves CBMs and diplomatic engagement through military-to-military exercises can resolve maritime conflicts

Prashanth Parameswaran, Associate Editor at The Diplomat and a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, December 11, 2015, “Underestimating US in Asia a ‘Severe Miscalculation’: Senior Defense Official,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/underestimating-us-in-asia-a-severe-miscalculation-senior-defense-official/, Accessed 4-17-2016

The recent U.S freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the South China Sea, Denmark said, was a good example of how U.S. resolve could be used to ensure China’s adherence to international law. Despite criticism about the FONOP’s mixed signals, Denmark said it successfully demonstrated that there was “one global standard” for freedom of navigation, even on China’s periphery. It also proved the “real world application” of recent confidence-building measures between the two militaries, since the PLA Navy had utilized a defense telephone link to the U.S. chief of naval operations following the FONOP. “China is more likely to play a constructive role regionally and globally when the United States, our allies and partners demonstrate our resolve to uphold the principled international order. The operation conducted by the USS Lassen in the South China Sea last month should be viewed through this lens,” he said.

#### D. War in the S. China Seas would close the Straits of Malacca, collapsing the economies and food supplies of China and regional actors, escalating to the full region

Frank G. Rando, serves as the U.S. Correspondent and a frequent contributing author for the Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Warfare Journal and the Non-Conventional Threat Newsletter, DHS Certified Weapons of Mass Destruction/CBRNE Instructor, Weapons of Mass Destruction Hazardous Materials Specialist, Radiological-Nuclear HAZMAT Technician, NFPA Certified HAZMAT Defensive Operations and HAZMAT Technician, September 29, 2015, “Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, CBRNe Portal, http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/, Accessed 4-23-2016

A scenario of regional and maritime domination and control could lead to the partial or total exclusion of adjacent nation-states to access any food or natural resources derived from a sea ruled with an iron hand; leading to a massive complex humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions from malnutrition and starvation, limitations in energy production, and economic collapse. These factors make the South China Sea a national security priority for nations in the region, including one of the world’s superpowers, China. The dependence of China and other regional nations surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one -third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere. Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war, and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster.

#### E. We should not consider examples of China’s rise, like tensions in the S. China Seas, as a security threat. The assumption of aggression creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, but it’s not too late! Building strategic trust can foster cooperation and pragmatism

Jihyun Kim, an assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, Summer 2015, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/> Summer\_2015/kim.pdf, Accessed 4-21-2016

Faced with the risk of conflict and the task of reducing the geopolitical tensions, scholars and global leaders alike have called for building strategic trust, based upon a new type of major power relationship between Beijing and Washington. Henry Kissinger, for example, asserts that “the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China” should not be considered “in itself to be an American strategic defeat” given the non-zero-sum nature of their bilateral ties in the twenty-first century. Perhaps then, the real danger is to treat a rising China as detrimental to regional peace while seeing growing tensions in the South China Sea simply as a reflection of Beijing’s expansionist ambitions or concluding that Sino-US relations will follow the vicious cycle of the rise and fall of the great powers. To fall prey to such thinking will enhance an arms race and worsen the security dilemma. Thus, there is no better time than now to heed Joseph Nye’s counsel that “the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one,” leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the future of China’s rise is open-ended, which is not necessarily bad. Rather, it means it is still possible to shape the future to become more peacefully and mutually-enhancing. Such a promise can bring out pragmatic realism in China, which strives to emerge not as a threat but a powerful, yet respected and proud, member of the regional and international communities. The specific issue of South China Sea disputes, though deemed as a major geopolitical flashpoint, can still be turned into an opportunity for creating a better future. Especially if China wants to be recognized not merely as a rising power but also as a valued leader in Asia and beyond, that nation must not miss this chance to mitigate the ongoing tensions by assuaging its neighbors’ concerns about its aggressive expansionism and by promoting inclusive region-wide commercial benefits and strategic partnerships.

### Maritime Security Adv. – Solvency (relations)

#### Maritime interactions are a cornerstone of relations. Improving military-to-military engagement significantly improves the broader relationship

Mark Redden, retired Navy Captain and a Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Strategic Research, and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, both part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 2015, “Chapter 10: The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic, Catalyst for Cooperation or Confrontation?,” Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operations, pp. 96-97.

Operational air and maritime interactions between U.S. and Chinese military forces may appear to be a relatively minor issue, but the ambiguous blend of cooperation and competition in the United States —China relationship gives them disproportionate weight in shaping the course of future relations. Similar interactions between American and Soviet forces during the Cold War occurred in the context of a global political and military confrontation, a circumstance very different from today’s more positive United States—China relationship. In that earlier, adversarial context, both the United States and the Soviet Union endured the loss of aircraft and more than a hundred airmen, in addition to damage to ships, as an inevitable part of the Cold War military competition. Even so, the risks of incidents escalating into a broader conflict and a desire to reduce the operational risks of air and maritime interactions eventually led both sides to seek agreement on rules and norms for managing dangerous interactions. The result was the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), which provided tactical procedures and an arbitration mechanism that proved invaluable in reducing the number and severity of confrontations between U.S. and Soviet forces. The United States and China enjoy a much more positive relationship, one that includes substantial areas of economic, political, and security cooperation. The two countries are not global rivals or antagonists. Both sides have strong incentives to seek a positive future, and senior political leaders in both countries have articulated the importance of cooperative bilateral relations. If the U.S. and Chinese militaries can substantially improve operational cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, this would have a significant positive impact on the broader relationship. Conversely, if competition and rivalry at the operational level intensify, the repercussions could have a negative impact that goes well beyond military-to-military relations. In that context, a collision or incident that resulted in significant loss of life could be amplified to have a much larger negative impact on the broader relationship.

### Maritime Security Adv. – Solvency (China will cooperate)

#### There are multiple areas ripe for U.S.-Chinese maritime cooperation

Christopher D. Yung, the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University, September 18, 2015, “Assessing the Sino-U.S. Strategic Interaction in the Maritime Security Domain,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=606>, Accessed 4-20-2016

Despite the presence of these maritime challenges to the U.S.-China relationship, the two countries can find areas for further cooperation. One option is to strengthen existing programs; for example, the U.S. and Chinese coast guards already collaborate on a range of missions to enforce maritime law that could be expanded and deepened. Second, Chinese and U.S. ships participated in the RIMPAC, or the Rim of the Pacific, exercise in summer 2014. This cooperation could be expanded to include enhanced cooperative programs such as table top noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) planning exercises and subsequently joint NEO and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief exercises with the two navies. At present, the two navies do not engage in staff talks as the U.S. Navy does with Japan and South Korea. Although China is not an ally of the United States, the two navies could still engage in formal staff discussions to develop habits of cooperation and coordination. A good argument can also be made that regular navy-to-navy staff talks could help prevent miscommunication and avert the buildup of unintended tension. Finally, the two navies could cooperate to protect SLOCs in the Indian Ocean or provide antipiracy protection to ships operating near the Gulf of Aden.

#### The U.S. and China are in full agreement about the need to maintain stability of the sea lanes

Christopher Yung, the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University and Wang Dong, an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University, April 2016, “Executive Summary,” U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57, <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/> SR57\_US-China\_April2016.pdf, Accessed 4-18-2016

The United States and China enjoy a significant convergence of interests in the maritime domain. Both countries value free and open trade and view security of the domain as important to this goal. As a consequence, they view secure sea lanes as absolutely necessary for national security. Both countries believe in safety and order at sea and act to enforce rules set down by interested countries to maintain that safety and order. Both countries believe that military forces can be used and force structure can be developed to protect a nation’s maritime security, even though the two countries differ on how military force should be used and how transparent the militaries should be to assure one another. On the issue of how militaries can be used in the maritime domain, both countries have an existing or growing network of interests abroad and believe that overseas interests need to be protected and that therefore the use of force to protect overseas interests is valid. Additionally, both countries believe that military forces can be used to help nations that have experienced natural and man-made disasters. Finally, both countries have extensive economic interests in the maritime domain and have a substantial interest in policies designed to protect those economic interests. Some of those policies have been discussed above—for example, in the case of Chinese counterpiracy task forces. However, the protection of economic interests also extends to common policies against driftnet fishing, ocean pollution, and terrorist threats to major ports, as well as providing an effective search and rescue process to aid in shipping and aviation commerce.

### Maritime Security Adv. – General impact

#### U.S. maritime security is the cornerstone of national security. It’s essential to deterring and defeating new threats

Christopher Yung, the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University and Wang Dong, an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University, April 2016, “Executive Summary,” U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57, <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/> SR57\_US-China\_April2016.pdf, Accessed 4-18-2016

The maritime domain is therefore a vital element of U.S. national security strategy. First, this space serves as an initial barrier to threats to the homeland. Second, it is seen as a highway for the United States to strategically respond to crises and threats abroad. Finally, because the United States sees the prevention of hegemonic powers dominating their respective continents or regions as vital to its own national security interests, the maritime domain has been seen as one in which the United States is able to take action to balance that emerging threat or, if necessary, defeat it. Thus, the United States uses the domain to project power abroad to affect the balance of power in important regions and, when necessary, to fight in world wars or regional conflicts. Secure access to sea lanes is especially important because the United States sees the deterrence of emerging threats as an important component of its national security strategy—and deterring threats in part depends on the ability of the United States to be seen as rapidly capable of deploying forces anywhere in the world.

### Maritime Security Adv. – SCS war impacts

#### A war between the U.S. and China over the S. China Seas would go nuclear

Frank G. Rando, serves as the U.S. Correspondent and a frequent contributing author for the Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Warfare Journal and the Non-Conventional Threat Newsletter, DHS Certified Weapons of Mass Destruction/CBRNE Instructor, Weapons of Mass Destruction Hazardous Materials Specialist, Radiological-Nuclear HAZMAT Technician, NFPA Certified HAZMAT Defensive Operations and HAZMAT Technician, September 29, 2015, “Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, CBRNe Portal, http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/, Accessed 4-23-2016

China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived “ownership” of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the “Chinese Dream”. The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived “right” to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the “submarine factor”, it is evident that China’s submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India’s nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China’s submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances, such as the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters claimed by both countries in the region and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets. A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. China’s Global Times published an unprecedented report that revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S. with JL-2 missiles could generate up to 12 million American fatalities. The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to China’s claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat, which included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation. The possibilities of China’s anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including conventional and, potentially, nuclear scenarios.

## Relations Advantage

### Relations Advantage

#### A. Relations are degrading now. The reliance on hard power drives a wedge in diplomacy and denies cooperation

Ryan Pickrell, MA in IR, PhD Candidate at Central China University, October 26, 2015, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168, Accessed 4-23-2016

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain unwilling to make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.

#### B. They will claim a bunch of alternate causes, but relations have to be pragmatic. Perfect harmony is not possible

David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, June 12, 2015, “Sino-US relations: Divorce is not an option,” The Straits Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/sino-us-relations-divorce-is-not-an-option, Accessed 4-23-2016

But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft non-governmental organisation and national security laws), human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction. This is the "new normal" and both sides had better get used to it rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable.

#### C. Current U.S.-China military engagement is hampered by misconceptions and animosity is increasing. We must actively work to change perceptions on both sides

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of Asian Research, September 22, 2015, “Enhancing U.S.-China Military-to-Military Exchanges,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=609, Accessed 4-20-2016

A second challenge is that the two militaries have conflicting core national security interests. For China, U.S. naval and air activity off the Chinese littoral—even when conducted in international airspace and waters—puts at risk Chinese national security. China remains a strategically defensive-oriented armed force; its doctrine, disposition, and development reflect a national security strategy intended to defend the Chinese mainland. For Washington, new Chinese weapons systems, intensified claims to disputed territories in the East and South China Seas, and new activities (even when conducted by others first, such as land reclamation) give the strong impression that China seeks to displace the United States from normal operating areas in the Western Pacific and somehow inhibit freedom of navigation. Consequently, the United States must hedge against this undesirable development because it will not accept a reduction in its hard-won freedom of maneuver. Moreover, U.S. allies and security partners increasingly feel under pressure from China and seek stronger U.S. commitments in response. Neither military fully accepts the other’s assurances about benign intent, which negatively colors all engagements. Indeed, each military increasingly regards the other as an adversary.

### Relations Advantage

#### D. Increasing bi-lateral military-to-military diplomatic engagement can make relations more resilient and constructive, which is crucial to international security

Tiffany Ma, Director of Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2016, “Conclusion,” U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57\_US-China\_April2016.pdf, Accessed 4-18-2016

Various forms of bilateral engagement on strategic domains could play a role in managing risk and building cooperation. The special studies in this report highlight the potential for exchanges at the people-to-people and military-to-military levels to push forward bilateral discussions. Beyond establishing good habits of engagement, these two modes of exchange can cut across issues in all the strategic domains and tap into the broader policy communities on both sides. More importantly, the outcomes of these discussions can add content and substance to the relationship, setting it on a more durable and constructive course. In this sense, official and nonofficial discussions complement each other in addressing critical issues in the strategic domains. While challenges in the strategic domains will remain salient in the U.S.-China relationship, the authors identify areas of convergence for fostering cooperation and recommend steps that policymakers can take to manage tensions in areas of divergence. As is evident in this report, the key is not to disregard the areas of disagreement—or let them diminish the possibilities for cooperation—but rather to foster an understanding of each side’s approach in order to talk about these issues more constructively. The future course of the U.S.-China relationship has ramifications both for regional security, even in contingencies not directly involving the two countries, and for the international system as China carves out its global role. Looking ahead, the methodology employed in this report might be useful for understanding areas of convergence and divergence on other substantive issues, including views of global governance, the broader functions of the international system, and the importance of innovation to economic development.

### Relations Adv. – Status Quo fails

#### Current U.S.-China military engagement is hampered by misconceptions and animosity is increasing. We must actively work to change perceptions on both sides

Roy D. Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of Asian Research, September 22, 2015, “Enhancing U.S.-China Military-to-Military Exchanges,” http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=609, Accessed 4-20-2016

A second challenge is that the two militaries have conflicting core national security interests. For China, U.S. naval and air activity off the Chinese littoral—even when conducted in international airspace and waters—puts at risk Chinese national security. China remains a strategically defensive-oriented armed force; its doctrine, disposition, and development reflect a national security strategy intended to defend the Chinese mainland. For Washington, new Chinese weapons systems, intensified claims to disputed territories in the East and South China Seas, and new activities (even when conducted by others first, such as land reclamation) give the strong impression that China seeks to displace the United States from normal operating areas in the Western Pacific and somehow inhibit freedom of navigation. Consequently, the United States must hedge against this undesirable development because it will not accept a reduction in its hard-won freedom of maneuver. Moreover, U.S. allies and security partners increasingly feel under pressure from China and seek stronger U.S. commitments in response. Neither military fully accepts the other’s assurances about benign intent, which negatively colors all engagements. Indeed, each military increasingly regards the other as an adversary.

### Relations Adv. – Plan Solves

#### Despite challenges, overlapping interests means now is a good time to expand military-to-military engagement programs to reduce fractures in relations

Christopher Yung, the Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University and Wang Dong, an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University, April 2016, “Executive Summary,” U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57, <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/> SR57\_US-China\_April2016.pdf, Accessed 4-18-2016

Complicating this divergence of interests and perspectives is the complex reality involved when a hegemon or superpower is confronted by a rising challenger—the so-called Thucydides trap—and the security dilemmas that emerge from this trap. An additional complication is the vexing fact that all the present hot spots or potential conflict scenarios between the two countries reside in the maritime domain. Consequently, both countries are in the delicate position of being able to frustrate the other’s political objectives through actions of their own or through the development of specific military capabilities and weapon systems designed to counter the capabilities of the other. Finally, the complication that some of China’s rival claimants to maritime territorial disputes also happen to be allies or evolving partners of the United States—the so-called third-party factor—is a significant challenge to the prospects for improved maritime security cooperation between China and the United States. Despite these challenges and complications, there are enough overlapping interests in the maritime domain to warrant serious thought about deepening and strengthening cooperative programs between agencies and military services already in existence. Furthermore, the convergence of interests is substantial enough that new programs that can foster habits of cooperation and reduce tensions and automatic suspicions deserve consideration.

#### Despite mistrust and rocky history, U.S.-China mil-mil engagement can help moderate tensions

Minxin Pei, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 11, 2015, “U.S.-China Military Exchange Can Help Moderate Rivalry,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/u-s-china-military-exchange-can-help-moderate-rivalry/, Accessed 4-19-2016

The tortuous history of U.S.-China mil-to-mil exchanges shows why such programs are vital safety valves in moderating tensions between the U.S. and China. When carried out professionally and constructively, they allow senior military officers on both sides to have opportunities to engage each other in substantive and even contentious discussions about their missions, strategies, and threat assessment. To be sure, such exchanges will be limited by their lack of trust and by the political restrictions imposed on them. Yet, these activities can occasionally bear fruit and help moderate tensions. For instance, the timing of Gen. Fan’s visit coincides with the heated controversy over China’s island-building project in the contested waters in the South China Sea. And we can expect this issue to take up much of the discussion between Gen. Fan and his American counterparts.

### Relations Adv. – Impact Extension

#### Strong U.S.-China relations are crucial to managing climate change and the global economy

Timothy Garton Ash, Staff Writer, October 15, 2015, “If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america, Accessed 4-23-2016

What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the [United States](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news)? How to deal with [China](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china). The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of [Islamic State](http://www.theguardian.com/world/isis) are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.

#### Stronger military relations with China develops strategic trust

Stratfor.com, Staff Writer, December 4, 2015, “A New High for U.S.-China Military Ties,” https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/new-high-us-china-military-ties, Accessed 4-23-2016

After reaching their apex in the final decade of the Cold War, military-to-military ties between China and the United States entered a two-decade tailspin. In the interlude, China emerged as a [major power in the Pacific Rim](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/forecasting-japan-china-rises). Now, with Beijing's regional heft at an all-time high, regional military tensions are elevated, especially in the [disputed waters of the South China Sea](https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/great-power-politics-south-china-sea). In this volatile environment, the United States and China are now looking to military relations as a tool for developing strategic trust, making accidents less likely and helping to manage them when they inevitably occur.

#### A strong Sino-U.S. relationship allows them to mitigate disagreements from escalating

Kevin Rudd, Former Australian Prime Minitser and President of the Asia Society Policy Institute, April 2015, “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose,”

http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21\_English\_1509.pdf, Accessed 4-23-2016

Securing a stable, effective global order for the future, and avoiding “global chaos under heaven” of the type offered by the proliferation of non-state actors such as ISIS, may well constitute the beginnings of a common strategic purpose for China and the United States for the future. This may be able, over time, to transcend the considerable ideational divide that at present separates them on the question of precisely what sort of order that should be. Furthermore, if the preservation and evolution of a functioning order could become an animating vision for the future of U.S.-China relations, not only could it provide a global dividend to the rest of the international community, it could also provide an even deeper momentum for managing the more basic tasks confronting the bilateral relationship: i.e. avoiding conflict; managing ideational differences on democracy, human rights and the rule of law; as well as the range of bilateral, regional and global problem-solving referred to above. This question on future Chinese and American collaboration in defending and enhancing the global order is discussed further in the conclusion of this summary report.

### Relations Adv. – Impact Extension

#### Now is a key time for relations. It’s the biggest challenge of our time

Kevin Rudd, Former Australian Prime Minitser and President of the Asia Society Policy Institute, April 2015, “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose,”

http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21\_English\_1509.pdf, Accessed 4-23-2016

The future relationship between China and the United States represents one of the great mega-changes and mega-challenges of our age. Unlike other such changes, the consequences of China’s rise are unfolding gradually, sometimes purposefully, but most of the time imperceptibly while the world’s attention is drawn to more dramatic events elsewhere. With the rise of China, we are observing the geopolitical equivalent of the melting of the polar ice caps. Slowly the ice thins, cracks appear and one day a large sheet of ice spectac­ularly peels away. If captured on camera, the world momentarily sits up and pays attention before CNN returns our gaze to the drama of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s most recent atrocity.

#### U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address climate change

Tao Wenzhao, Researcher for the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, April 12, 2016, “China-U.S. Summit Heralds Stable Relations,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-u-s-summit-heralds-stable-relations/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Addressing climate change has been another highlight of China-US relations in recent years. After the meeting, the two sides issued another joint statement on the subject. The two leaders pledged that China and the US will jointly sign the Paris Agreement on 22 April (Earth Day) and committed to “take their respective domestic steps in order to join the [Paris] Agreement as early as possible this year”. The three joint statements issued so far point to the continuing expansion of China-US collaboration against climate change. It is a stellar example of the two countries’ shared contribution toward global governance and a key safeguard of the smooth operation of the new international regime launched in Paris. Despite the February ruling by the US Supreme Court to block the executive order from the Obama Administration that sought to curb greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, the latest China-US statement is particularly reassuring for other parties and a rallying call for the early signing of the Paris Agreement. Separately, the China-US summit also issued a joint statement on nuclear security, which is another positive area of bilateral cooperation.

## Japanese Nationalism Advantage

### Japanese Nationalism Advantage

#### A. Reversing “Engage and Hedge” reassures regional allies. The status quo encourages robust Japanese nationalism, risks miscalculation and a new world war

Philip Stephens, Associated Editor, July 11, 2013, “The perilous imperative that keeps the US in Asia,” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccb40e8e-e8ba-11e2-aead-00144feabdc0.html#axzz45T8NFFxG>, Accessed 4-14-2016

US policy towards China is to engage and hedge: to engage with Beijing to prevent inescapable competition falling into confrontation; and to hedge against Chinese assertiveness by sustaining its own forces and strengthening US alliances. Most of China's neighbours have taken something of the same approach. They combine economic integration with China with political, and in some cases military, ties with the US - and, in Vietnam's case, with submarines from Russia. There is a catch-22 here. The balancing strategy can work only if China's neighbours remain convinced that the US is there for the long haul; and yet the more persuasive Washington is about its intent, the more likely allies such as Japan will be to assume they have a blank cheque to confront Beijing. The US has become distinctly edgy about Mr Abe's muscular nationalism. China's behaviour towards Japan is in turn calculated to test American as much as Japanese resolve. The result is a precarious balance, vulnerable to miscalculation. The US has the economic and military strength to remain a resident power for decades yet. It has too much at stake in terms of strategic interests to contemplate stepping back. Yet China is building military forces that will allow it to set the terms for its own region. Mr Xi has gone so far as to suggest that the two powers carve up the Pacific between them. There is no magic way to manage this. By leaving, the US would invite chaos and worse; by staying it provokes deep Chinese resentment. The American presence has thus become a dangerous imperative: a vital source of stability but also, quite possibly, of confrontation. Europeans know well where this can lead. Britain once played the role of offshore balancing power against a rising [Germany](http://go.galegroup.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sort=DA-SORT&docType=Article&tabID=T004&prodId=AONE&searchId=R2&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchType=BasicSearchForm&contentSegment=&currentPosition=2&searchResultsType=SingleTab&inPS=true&userGroupName=ksu&docId=GALE%7CA336531646&contentSet=GALE%7CA336531646). Next year marks the centenary of the collapse of the consequent stand-off into the carnage of the 1914-18 war. It is a decidedly uncomfortable precedent.

#### B. Japan could full rearm and nuclearized within 3 years

Brian Cloughley, Staff Writer, October 23, 2015, “[The Rise of Japanese Militarism](http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/23/the-rise-of-japanese-militarism/),” CounterPunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/23/the-rise-of-japanese-militarism/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Some commentators on the size and capabilities of Japan’s military forces point out that power projection is not practicable, given that there are no aircraft carriers, long-range bombers or missiles, and no nuclear weapons.  This is true; but it is also true that these offensive capabilities, including nuclear weapons, could be produced in quantity by Japan within at most three years of a decision being made to do so.  Production of nuclear bombs and warheads would take a year at the outside.  Concurrent development of delivery systems would be speedy.  As the BBC pointed out on  October 15, “the JSDF at least have the potential to become a formidable fighting force.  For one thing, the Japanese culture with its traditional emphasis on group cohesion, careful planning, and attention to detail —  particularly important in today’s hi-tech military environment — is an ideal for modern soldiering.” The worry for Asia is that a militarily resurgent Japan might have a government that is prepared to exert military pressure outside its borders.

#### C. Militarization provokes a major war with China

Brian Cloughley, Staff Writer, October 23, 2015, “[The Rise of Japanese Militarism](http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/23/the-rise-of-japanese-militarism/),” CounterPunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/10/23/the-rise-of-japanese-militarism/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Asia is rightly wary of a militaristic Japanese government, and China’s apprehension that Japan intends to “deviate from the path of peaceful development” is understandable.  Given Washington’s approval and abundant support of Japanese actions thus far, it is likely that Japan will accelerate its military expansion.  Mr Abe’s October 19 speech on the Japanese navy destroyer Kurama referred to Japan’s policy as being “proactive pacifism” but there’s no comfort in that cloudy phrase. He wants Japan to develop power-projection, which is the road to military confrontation. Let’s hope the Japanese people see his ambitions as dangerous.

### Japanese Nationalism Adv. – Internal Links

#### Lack of diplomatic assertiveness over the South China Seas is pushing Japan to take an independent regional security role

The American Interest, Staff Writer, April 5, 2016, “U.S. and Asian Powers Step Up Joint Activity on South China Sea,” http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/05/u-s-and-asian-powers-step-up-joint-activity-on-south-china-sea/, Accessed 4-17-2016

Although the United States seems more assertive these days, the White House has [wavered](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/12/15/u-s-sends-mixed-signals-on-south-china-sea/) for a year on confronting Beijing more directly in the South China Sea. In the meantime, Japan and other regional powers have stepped up their own military and naval power projection—forming alliances with each other in which the United States played no formal role. One of those collaborations was on display Sunday, when a Japanese submarine [docked](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/03/national/msdf-submarine-escort-ships-arrive-philippines-port-call-training/#.VwPT_MeAyHo) in the Philippines this week, and it brought two Japanese destroyers along—an unusual event. The three Japanese ships are expected to make a similar “goodwill” visit to Vietnam later this month. The U.S. remains a critical part of the web of alliances and relationships seeking to put pressure on Beijing, but joint exercises and occasional freedom of navigation exercises clearly aren’t instilling total confidence in Asian powers worried about an assertive China. It’s difficult not to suspect that rising military spending and activity on the part of formerly quiescent powers like Japan are a vote of [no confidence](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/05/the-global-vote-of-no-confidence-in-pax-americana/) in American leadership. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is [pushing](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/05/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-aims-include-south-china-sea-north-korea-issues-g-7-statement/#.VwPUCceAyHo) for a joint G-7 statement on the South China Sea, according to reports in the Japan Times. If Washington supports his effort to make a forceful declaration, it could signal that the era of American dithering in the South China Sea has come to a welcome end.

### Japanese Nationalism Adv. – Impacts

#### Moves to militarize increase the risks of war

Jean-Pierre Lehmann, emeritus professor of international political economy at IMD in Lausanne, Switzerland, is a Contributing Editor at The Globalist, July 22, 2015, “The Resurgence of Japanese Nationalism,” The Globalist, http://www.theglobalist.com/japan-shinzo-abe-nationalism-germany/, Accessed 4-23-2016

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s choice to beef up Japan’s military role, supposedly made to fulfill a commitment to his American ally, is emphatically the wrong choice: It enhances the chances of war. To see why, let us recall the historical context: Japan was [engaged in constant military expeditions](http://www.theglobalist.com/japan-the-worlds-really-lucky-country/) and wars against its Asian neighbors from the mid-1870s until 1945. Only seven decades after embarking on that aggressive path was it finally defeated by China and the United States. To its credit, since 1945 Japan has not been engaged in military conflict with its neighbors or with anyone else. In article nine of the country’s 1947 Constitution, Japan renounces the sovereign right to war and, to that end, undertakes not to maintain land, sea or air forces. In reality, that latter part of article 9 has been violated since the outbreak of the Cold and Korean wars. For appearance’s sake, however, the troops were referred to as “self-defense” forces. Japan was also protected through the military alliance signed with the United States in 1952.

#### Japanese militarization risks igniting a regional arms race

Cesar Chelala, Staff Writer, August 15, 2015, “Abe is wrong to rush toward militarization,” Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/15/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-wrong-rush-toward-militarization/#.Vx1c5\_krKR0, Accessed 4-23-2016

It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. In 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and this year hosted a trade show on military defense systems. Not everybody agrees with Abe’s push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from the Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe that the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something that absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan also carries the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences. Given the volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9.

### Japanese Nationalism Adv. – A2: Article 9 prevents

#### New changes to Article 9 mean Japan can send military forces overseas to support allies

Kohei Joshi, Staff Writer, November 17, 2015, “Japan Sees Rise In Nationalism, And Possibly Militarism,” The Odyssey Online, http://theodysseyonline.com/vassar/rise-nationalism-potential-remilitirization-worlds-third-largest-economy/222203, Accessed 4-23-2016

The recent reinterpretation of the notorious article 9 of the constitution, imposed upon Japan by the US after World War II, is perhaps the most controversial and significant change to have occurred in Japan in the last decade. For those who don’t know, the article 9 expresses the following; "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of [belligerency](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/belligerency) of the state will not be recognized." Basically, what this means is that Japan cannot hold a standing military (currently, it has a self-defense force), and cannot project any military force whatsoever unless in self-defense and attacked upon first by another force—until now. With Mr. Abe’s successful re-interpretation of article 9, the meaning of “self-defense” has expanded to include not just the state of Japan, but also our allies including the US. Japan can now send forces to support our allies if and when our allies are attacked by another force. The term often used for this kind of self-defense is called “collective self-defense”.

## A2: Topicality

### A2: “Diplomatic Engagement”

#### Their Topicality violation assumes diplomacy as distinction from military force. No link. The plan is diplomatic engagement between militaries to build trust and avoid war via miscalculation. Here’s contextual evidence to prove our point.

[Ray Takeyh](http://www.cfr.org/experts/bahrain-nonstate-actors-and-nongovernmental-organizations-democratization/ray-takeyh/b9599), Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, October 7, 2009, “The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement,” The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362>, Accessed 4-19-16

The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

#### Only the Affirmative has contextual evidence on military-to-military diplomatic engagement

Hormazd Sethna, a desk officer for countries in the [US Pacific Command](http://www.pacom.mil/) region, including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, US Navy, 2010, “Military Networking Key to Eliminating HIV/AIDS,” http://science.dodlive.mil/2010/04/17/military-networking-key-to-eliminating-hivaids-hormazd-sethna/, Accessed 4-20-2016

I joined the [Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program](http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/dhapp/Pages/default.aspx) (DHAPP) in February 2009 as a desk officer for countries in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) region. I came to DHAPP with a background in medical anthropology and public health, and some experience working on HIV/AIDS projects, both in the U.S., as well as my native India. My first reaction to seeing the job posting for DHAPP was, “What does the U.S. Department of Defense have to do with HIV prevention?”, followed quickly by, “Why would they want to hire a civilian like me, whose military experience extends only as far as being a fan of the television show ‘MASH’?” As I learned, HIV/AIDS poses a threat to militaries as much as, if not more so, than the civilian population. This, in turn, poses a threat to national security. DHAPP plays a leadership role in working with the militaries of over eighty countries across the globe to eliminate this threat by developing and strengthening sustainable programs in prevention, care, and treatment. These programs form the cornerstone of military-to-military diplomatic engagement between the U.S. and the militaries of the host countries. Militaries also often serve as a change agent for the broader society, so it stands to reason that they are actively involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

### A2: “Diplomatic Engagement”

#### We meet. Plan is military diplomatic engagement

FAOA, Staff Writer, 2015, “FAOA Reading Room,” Foreign Area Officer Association, <http://www.faoa.org/FAO-Content>, Accessed 4-20-16

What is the DoD's role in foreign policy and diplomacy? While the State Department is the lead foreign policy organization within the US government, the DoD plays an increasingly important role in diplomacy largely through its long tradition of international engagement through shaping the security environment. In this paper, Dr Derek Reveron, from the US Naval War College, examines military diplomatic engagement activities as a part of US grand strategy and explores the legal and policy implications of an increasingly militarized foreign policy.

#### We meet. The military engages in diplomacy

Derek S. Reveron, U.S. Naval War College, 2007, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 2, 2007, [http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07\_proceeding\_ 210193.pdf](http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07_proceeding_%20210193.pdf), Accessed 4-19-16

In spite of the size disparity between State and Defense, the two organizations are for the most part mutually supporting. U.S. ambassadors are the President’s representatives to a particular country and U.S. military commanders often assist in formulating and implementing the President’s foreign policy. Both departments advance and defend national interests, and outside of Washington, officers from both departments recognize the importance of cooperation. Yet, the Defense Department’s size gives it an advantage during the interagency process. For example, when President Bush announced that the United States would become more strategically engaged in Africa, it was through the creation of a new military command—U.S. Africa Command, and not simply upgrading USAID or the State Department’s Africa Bureau. Yet, the military command will have a decidedly interagency focus as the President’s vision suggests. The focus of the new command will be on shaping “to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.” Through shaping, military forces engage in diplomacy, strategic communication, and security cooperation.

#### We meet. The plan is military diplomatic engagement. This proves there is no ground loss

Derek S. Reveron, U.S. Naval War College, 2007, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 2, 2007, [http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07\_proceeding\_ 210193.pdf](http://www.faoa.org/resources/documents/apsa07_proceeding_%20210193.pdf), Accessed 4-19-16

Writing soon after the Berlin Wall fell, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye commented that, “Although the United States still has leverage over particular countries, it has far less leverage over the system as a whole.” Nye observed that not only was the international system changing from bipolar to unipolar, but power itself was changing. Nye predicted that non-lethal military power would not be enough to affect outcomes. While the title superpower is bestowed upon the United States for its military prowess, military force is increasingly less relevant to address transnational threats that require international cooperation. Instead, outcomes were more likely to be affected through noncoercive measures or soft power, which Nye defines as "the ability to get what we want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." This prediction bore itself out in the late 1990s when coercive diplomacy did not produce the desired effects and the early 2000s in reaction to a post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, the U.S. government has placed extraordinary emphasis on generating soft power to serve as a reservoir from which to draw non-lethal solutions to U.S. foreign policy problems. The Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, testified to this point. “I believe there is no more important challenge for our future than the urgent need to foster greater understanding, more respect and a sense of common interests and common ideals among Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world.” One way to do this is through global military engagement, which can build trust among societies. The United States attempts through formal engagement to make it the partner of choice. As Robert Art notes, “short of waging war or playing chicken in a crisis, then, military power shapes outcomes more by its peacetime presence than by its forceful use.”

## A2: Disadvantages

### A2: Disadvantages – Non-Unique

#### Recent diplomatic engagement made progress, but we still have a long way to go

Shen Dingli, professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University. He is also the founder and director of China’s first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan University, April 15, 2016, “Stabilizing Relations Through High-Level Exchanges,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/positive-approaches-to-the-development-of-china-u-s-relations/, Accessed 4-23-2016

The most recent summit in DC once again served to stabilize China-US relations in multiple areas. On non-traditional security issues, Beijing and Washington showcased their partnership on nuclear security as well as climate change. On maritime issues the leaders decided to collaborate again on the US-led biannual Ring Pacific naval drill. However, it looks that the two sides were not able to make big headway to narrow their difference on South China Sea and the US THAAD deployment in Republic of Korea. Despite this, they shall have refined their common stance on responding to the nuclear and missile development of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

#### Non-Unique. Military diplomatic engagement now

Alex Timofeychev, Staff Writer, June 17, 2015, “U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests – experts,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, http://rbth.com/international/2015/06/17/us-china\_military\_treaty\_may\_threaten\_russian\_interests\_experts\_46989.html, Accessed 4-19-2016

A new deal on military cooperation signed by Washington and Beijing threatens to undermine Russia’s efforts to forge closer ties with China, say Russian experts. Representatives of the U.S. and Chinese defense ministries [signed](http://www.voanews.com/content/united-states-china-sign-deal-on-military-dialogue/2820468.html) the agreement on the mechanism of interactivity of troops when coordinating humanitarian efforts and reactions to emergency situations (), on June 12. The sides are expected to sign a security agreement by the end of September that will help reduce the likelihood of incidents occurring between the two countries’ armed forces in the air and at sea. The American military says that these agreements will create a better mutual understanding and lower the risk of any accidental confrontations. Meanwhile, China is [calling](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-06/15/content_21001723.htm) the agreement a big step forward in Sino-American relations. As a result, there have already been announcements about possible American-Chinese military drills in 2016.

### A2: Civil-Military Relations DA

#### Civil-Military relations are low now, especially with respect to China

Joan Johnson-Freese, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, April 15, 2016, “When is a Gag Order Not a Gag Order?,” China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/when-is-a-gag-order-not-a-gag-order/, Accessed 4-21-2016

The Navy Times reported on April 8, 2016 that Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander, Admiral Harry Harris, wanted to take a more confrontational, muscular approach with China in the South China Sea but was being prevented from doing so by the White House. Further, the article stated that National Security Advisor Susan Rice has imposed a “gag order” on military leadership on the subject. National Security Adviser Susan Rice imposed a gag order on military leaders over the disputed South China Sea in the weeks running up to the last week’s high-level nuclear summit, according to two defense officials who asked for anonymity to discuss policy deliberations. China’s president, Xi Jinping, attended the summit held in Washington, and met privately with President Obama. The order was part of the notes from a March 18 National Security Council meeting and included a request from Rice to avoid public comments on China’s recent actions in the South China Sea, said a defense official familiar with the meeting readout. Both the White House and senior military leaders, including Admiral Harris and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General William Dunford, later denied that there was any gag order. The characterization of what was very likely a caution to the military by National Security Advisor Susan Rice not to make potentially inflammatory statements or statements that could be interpreted as contrary to White House policy regarding China just prior to a meeting between President Obama and Chinese leadership as a gag order was unfortunate. It was a caution well within her rights and responsibility. Admiral Harris seemed to see it that way as well. Harris issued a statement saying that he was confident the President considers his counsel on East Asian matters. However, he declined to discuss what policy recommendations he had offered, saying his private counsel to the President during classified briefings “wouldn’t be worth much if it weren’t private.” The relationship as described by Harris is the basis for civil-military relations in the United States. Some military leaders before him have not understood it as well. The military and their civilian masters often disagree. Ultimately, however, civilians get to make policy, ideally after having privately received candid and comprehensive input and advice from the military. The military’s job then becomes to execute the policy. Understanding those job descriptions and keeping disagreements private are key components of civil-military relations. General MacArthur Douglas failed to hide his disagreement – contempt – for Truman administration policies in Korea. He went so far as to send a letter expressing that disagreement to Congress. Truman fired him, with the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### A2: Russia DA

#### Sino-U.S. military engagement wouldn’t affect Russian security for years

Alex Timofeychev, Staff Writer, June 17, 2015, “U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests – experts,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, http://rbth.com/international/2015/06/17/us-china\_military\_treaty\_may\_threaten\_russian\_interests\_experts\_46989.html, Accessed 4-19-2016

At the same time some experts believe that a full-fledged alliance between the U.S. and China is extremely unlikely. This, however, does not make Russia's current situation any better. Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, said that the Russia-U.S.-China triangle is experiencing difficult relations. In this configuration each of the three countries is playing on the contradictions between the other two and the forging of closer ties by any two countries goes against the interests of the third. Even though it is hard to imagine a real alliance between any two players, the tactical convergence between Washington and Beijing is leaving Moscow with less space for maneuver. Andrei Frolov, editor-in-chief of Export Vooruzheny magazine, also believes that the Chinese-American agreement, which he calls a memorandum of understanding, is a sign of a certain rapprochement between the U.S. and China. However, he underlines that in the next couple of years this should not have any practical consequences for Russia.

## A2: BIT CP

### A2: BIT CP – Links to politics

#### The CP links to politics and tanks the TPP

David Dayden, Staff Writer, March 18, 2016, “The Job-Killing Trade Deal You’ve Never Heard Of: The China Bilateral Investment Treaty,” The American Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/job-killing-trade-deal-you%E2%80%99ve-never-heard-china-bilateral-investment-treaty, Accessed 4-23-2016

Wrapping up the BIT negotiations, however, would trigger a political explosion. Given that the leading Republican candidate assails trade deals with China in every public address, tossing another U.S./China treaty into the mix would fan an already volatile political fire. Like other treaties, the BIT would require a two-thirds vote for Senate ratification. That would be a difficult lift in a year with a [record Chinese trade deficit](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3476644/U-S-trade-deficit-widens-exports-hit-5-1-2-year-low.html) and high anxiety over the downsides of globalization. The BIT’s presence also undermines the geopolitical case for TPP, since one of the main arguments for that treaty is that it’s needed to “contain” China. “If you’re saying TPP is for strategic reasons and doing this at the same time and not telling us anything about it, what are we to expect?” asks Lynn of New America. “We have to assume it’s a giveaway, and we have to assume your claims about TPP are bogus.”

#### China ignores its WTO obligations and will do the same with the BIT. This hollows out our industrial base and causes an election year political explosion

David Dayden, Staff Writer, March 18, 2016, “The Job-Killing Trade Deal You’ve Never Heard Of: The China Bilateral Investment Treaty,” The American Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/job-killing-trade-deal-you%E2%80%99ve-never-heard-china-bilateral-investment-treaty, Accessed 4-23-2016

China has ignored many of the commitments imposed on it following its entry into the World Trade Organization, and critics fear the Chinese would not live up to their obligations on the BIT either. And even amid the secrecy surrounding the deal, many question the value of letting China invest more in the United States, or letting U.S. corporations escape domestic laws and regulations, effectively turning capitalism into a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose game. Investment rules acceptable to corporate executives aren’t necessarily good for workers. And pushing another deal that accelerates the hollowing out of the nation’s industrial base, in an election year, borders on political insanity.

# Aff Service Liberalization

### Introduction

There are three types of economic interactions between nations: trade in goods, trade in services, and financial investments. This affirmative liberalizes trade in services between the United States and China. Service liberalization means reductions in discrimination against foreign suppliers of service-oriented jobs like transportation, telecommunication, insurance coverage, financial services, management, consultation—the things *humans* do to help businesses function. Services can also mean actual workers in the service industry, such as entertainment, lodging, and food services, although those are typically not what is discussed when nations negotiate service liberalization—they typically mean higher-skilled, tech-oriented services.

In the status quo, regulatory barriers prevent many services from being offered by the U.S. to China, and China arguably needs that technical expertise to better solidify its exports of goods and make its economy work better. The plan (which may be re-written if teams find different solvency evidence) uses the Bilateral Investment Treaty, which the U.S. and China are currently negotiating, to include liberalization on trade in services. The advantages are economic growth and U.S. economic competitiveness.

There are many negative arguments in this section, including answers to the advantages, a counterplan allowing limited investment, and regionalism arguments. Typically, these negative arguments say that liberalization moves too quickly and allows too much U.S. influence, while in the status quo, China is forging regional partnerships that are better for the world, and is slowly reforming its economic sector, which is better for China.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 1/6

#### Observation One: Inherency:

#### China has a high level of restrictions on service trade—much higher than global average, because of restrictions on foreign entry, lack of transparency, trade barriers

Sheng Bin, Professor, Institute of International Economics, Nankai University Center for Northeast Asian Integration Studies, April 2015

"China's Trade Development Strategy and Trade Policy Reforms: Overview and Prospect," International Institute for Sustainable Development, http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload\_files/Report\_3\_54\_Chinarsquos\_2973653904.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

We evaluate the degree of China’s service liberalization by Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) developed by OECD29. The STRI indices take the value from 0 to 1, where 0 is completely open and 1 is completely closed. They are calculated on the basis of information in the STRI database which reports regulation currently in force. China’s score on the STRI index in the 18 sectors is shown in the Chart 1, along with the average and the lowest score among the 40 countries included in the STRI database for each sector. Apparently, China’s service trade restrictiveness is higher than global average in all sectors. The least restricted sectors covered by the STRI in China are architecture, engineering and computer services. However, these sectors still score above average. Courier, broadcasting, air transport, telecom and legal service are most protected. In terms of restrictive measures, restriction on foreign entry (FDI) is the most widely-used barriers in service sectors, followed by barriers to competition and regulatory transparency.

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by incorporating into the Bilateral Investment Treaty an offer to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade in services.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 2/6

#### Observation Two: Solvency:

#### A. U.S. and China can utilize negotiations in Bilateral Investment Treaty to increase service trade: Foreign direct investment and GATS provisions facilitate cross-border service sales and consultations

J. Bradford Jensen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor of economics at Georgetown University, 2015

"Role of a Bilateral Investment Treaty in Increasing Trade in Services Between China and the United States," Towards a U.S.-China Investment Treaty, Peterson Institute for International Economics, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

The two countries can address some of these impediments in their negotiation for a US-China BIT. Foreign direct investment (FDI) can spur Chinese imports of services. To understand how a BIT can facilitate Chinese service imports, consider the four modes of trade in services, as defined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Obviously, consumption abroad—for example, when a vacationer travels to a resort in another country and purchases hotel accommodations, meals, and other services there—would be a mode of service “export” unaffected by a BIT. But three other types of trade in services would be affected. For example, cross-border sales of services—i.e., when software is produced in one country and shipped via the internet to another—can be facilitated by a foreign-owned firm in China. In addition, expanded FDI can permit investors to open a branch of a chain of restaurants or retail outlets outside its home country. Reducing curbs on FDI can also expand the temporary movement of natural persons across borders, for example, when a business consultant travels to visit a foreign client.

#### B. U.S. action is key because U.S. tariffs are leading hindrance of trade

Bryan Riley, Senior Policy Analyst in Trade Policy at the Center for Trade and Economics, April 29, 2013

"Tariff Reform Needed to Boost the U.S. Economy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2792 on Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/tariff-reform-needed-to-boost-the-us-economy (accessed 5/29/2016)

One way the United States can reverse its decline in economic freedom is by eliminating its own tariffs. Eliminating tariffs would add 3.6 points to the U.S. trade freedom score in the Index of Economic Freedom. The United States would jump from 38th place to first place in the trade freedom rankings, and almost certainly move up from its current 10th place in the overall rankings.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 3/6

#### Advantage One: Growth

#### Service liberalization lowers prices, improves competition, increases productivity, improves risk-sharing, savings and investments, helps poor farmers, spreads information, increases market efficiency, and facilitates human development

Sallie James, trade policy analyst at Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, February 4, 2009

"A Service to the Economy: Removing Barriers to 'Invisible Trade,'" Center for Trade Policy Studies Analysis No. 38, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/service-economy-removing-barriers-invisible-trade (accessed 5/27/2016)

As with lowering barriers to trade in goods, liberalizing services trade is likely to lead to lower prices, improved competition and choice for consumers, and improved productivity. Because many services are an input to the production of other services and goods, the indirect effects can be especially pervasive. For example, efficient financial services and insurance markets lead to better risk sharing in the economy and direct savings and investments to their best use and economical open transport system enables goods and people to flow more easily and contributes to lower prices and increased trade. Effective storage and distribution systems help poor farmers get their perishable goods to market. Telecommunications are vital to the spread of information and entertainment and are an especially important factor in efficient markets. Education and health services are crucial to human development.

#### B. Economic growth saves the planet: Acceleration of growth is the only way to solve eco-disasters

Leigh Phillips, author of Austerity Ecology & the Collapse-porn Addicts, November 4, 2015

"Why Eco-Austerity Won't Save Us from Climate Change," The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change (accessed 5/29/2016)

The patchwork of hair-shirted, back-to-the-land, anti-industrial and degrowth prescriptions common on the green left should really be described as “eco-austerity”. Green anti-modernism is a cuckoo’s egg in the nest of the left. The truth is that we can stop climate change and deliver expanding wealth for all. The end is not nigh and we do not need to rein in industrial society. If anything, we must accelerate our modernity.

#### Chinese economic growth key to environmental sustainability

Margot Song, Founding Partner, eJnnn Phecda Partners, March 23, 2016

"China’s Dual Economic and Environmental Crises Present an Opportunity for Green Growth," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margot-song/china-economic-environmental-growth\_b\_9519308.html (accessed 5/28/2016)

Public and private initiatives in the field of environmental services may therefore contribute to solving China’s two “crises”: the environmental one, by encouraging a smart management of the country’s resources; and the economic one, by fostering innovation, technological advances and job creation. In this context, China’s modern history could very well be that of an environmental revolution.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 4/6

#### D. Chinese environmental recovery is key to its survival

Minxin Pei, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, January 28, 2013

"China's Environment: An Economic Death Sentence," Fortune, http://fortune.com/2013/01/28/chinas-environment-an-economic-death-sentence/ (accessed 5/29/2016)

To be sure, adopting environmental measures may be politically difficult, especially for a new leadership that is confronting challenges on all fronts. But the alternative would be too calamitous to contemplate. Horrendous humanitarian and economic consequences aside, business as usual on the environment could even spell the end of the Communist Party’s rule. The Chinese middle-class, which is particularly conscious of quality-of-life issues, could very well become a powerful source of opposition to the party if it concludes that the one-party state is responsible for their daily miseries: poisonous air, toxic water, and unsafe food. The case for decisive and quick action is compelling. The question is whether China’s ruling party will actually act, both for the long-term survival of the country and itself.

#### Mutual growth and trade between U.S. and China is key to prevent conflicts that could escalate into nuclear confrontation

Ali Wyne, contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the Project for the Study of the 21st Century, June 3, 2015

"The Strategic Importance of U.S.-China Trade Ties," Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics\_online/0106 (accessed 5/29/2016)

Given these developments, it is natural to fear that a miscalculation at sea could spiral into an armed confrontation between the United States and China; some observers, such as the University of Pennsylvania's Avery Goldstein, have even ventured that such a clash could involve nuclear weapons. To their credit, the two countries are taking steps to preempt destabilizing contingencies. In November 2014, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense signed a memorandum of understanding on "rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters" and another on "notification of major military activities." While the escalatory potential of China's maritime disputes is foremost on many observers' minds, the greatest long-term threat to U.S.-China relations may be something far less vivid: the gradual weakening of economic, and especially trade, interdependence between the two countries. Aside from the sobering historical record—conflicts between leading powers and rising ones have often culminated in disaster—that interdependence has arguably done more than any other phenomenon to furnish a rationale for sustained cooperation between the United States and China, whose relationship lacks the sorts of organic factors that dissuade many other pairs of countries from contemplating conflict: shared values, comparable systems of governance, and compatible understandings of history, to name a few.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 5/6

#### Advantage Two: Competitiveness

#### U.S. is uniquely suited to service trade; plan is huge win for the U.S.

J. Bradford Jensen, professor of business at Georgetown University and Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2014

"Expanding Service Exports Background," Markle Economic Future Initiative, http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/Expanding%20Service%20Exports%20Background\_0.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

As I have documented previously (see Jensen 2011), trade in business services offers a significant, but unexploited opportunity for U.S. growth. The business service sector is large – employing about 25 percent of the labor force (more than twice the size of the manufacturing sector) – and most of the employment in business services is in tradable activities. Because business services are skill-intensive and the U.S. is still relatively skill-abundant, the U.S. has comparative advantage in tradable business services. The U.S. has globally competitive service firms and runs a persistent trade surplus in services. Yet, service firm participation in exporting significantly lags behind participation in the manufacturing sector (where the U.S. does not have comparative advantage broadly), irrespective of whether the metric is the share of export sales or the share of producers that are exporters. Hufbauer, Jensen, and Stephenson (2013) report that about 20 percent of manufacturing output is exported, but less than 5 percent of tradable business service industries output is exported. Roughly a quarter of manufacturing plants export, while less than 5 percent of service establishments in business services export. (Jensen 2011). In contrast to the large, sophisticated business service sector in the U.S., most emerging markets have relatively small business service sectors. Jensen (2013) document the relatively small and unproductive business service sectors in a range of emerging markets and argue that – because the fast growing needs for talent in the countries are currently outstripping the ability to produce educated workers – these countries would benefit significantly from allowing greater service imports from the developed world, including the U.S.

#### Increased services competiveness causes massive increase in employment and salaries for U.S. workers

Harold Godsoe, attorney and Foreign Legal Specialist for the Public International Law and Policy Group, 2014

"The Depth of the Trade Services Agreement," Brigham Young University International Law and Management Review, Vol. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol10/iss1/2 (accessed 5/25/2016)

Speaking to the lack of liberalization of services, J. Bradford Jensen, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economic, calculates that tradable business services are five times less likely to be exported than manufactured products. He argues that if the exports-to-sales ratio in tradable business services were increased to the same level as manufacturing, there would be a 40% increase in total U.S. exports. As Jensen modestly assures, “[e]ven if those aren’t the right numbers, the right numbers are big.” Additionally, more service exports mean more jobs. USTR estimates that every $1 billion in U.S. services exports supports an estimated four thousand U.S. jobs, equating to about three million additional jobs. Workers in tradable services earn about 20% more than workers in similar industries, even accounting for their higher education, and service jobs are qualitatively better Although these estimates ought to be considered on a country-by-country basis, the basic assumptions about the impact resulting from growth in services exports will often be the same for other developed countries.

### Service Liberalization 1AC 6/6

#### Loss of manufacturing and service competitiveness decreases investment, and increases unemployment, spurring extremist political candidates

Lynn Parramore, Senior Research Analyst, Institute for New Economic Thinking, May 17, 2016

"Neither Clinton nor Trump is engaging with the causes of America’s economic woes," Institute for New Economic Thinking, https://ineteconomics.org/ideas-papers/blog/neither-clinton-nor-trump-is-engaging-with-the-causes-of-americas-economic-woes (accessed 5/28/2016)

Adam Smith-style market capitalism, says Foroohar, was supposed to funnel our savings into productive investments in new businesses, which would in turn create new jobs and growth in a virtuous cycle. But today, “only about 15 percent of money coming out of the financial institutions makes its way into business investment.” That, she says, is a broken system. The rest of the money is going into a “closed loop of finance… buying and selling existing assets like stocks, bonds, houses instead of going into new business investment.” Because this process tends to bid up existing assets, it results in bubbles and reinforces inequality, while underlying growth is degraded. “If we wonder why we have a 2 percent economy eight years and $4 trillion worth of monetary stimulus on, we should look at the fact that the capital markets are simply not doing what they were set up to do,” she says. Foroohar sees the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders as pointing to “the sense that people of all political stripes have lost faith in the establishment answers and establishment candidates.”

#### D. This results in endless wars and ecological disasters

Joe Romm, Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, May 30, 2016

"Memorial Day: Trump’s War On Climate Action Would Ensure A World Of Wars," ThinkProgress.org, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/05/30/3782673/memorial-day-trump-climate/ (accessed 5/31/2016)

If President Trump does what he says he will, then America and the world will be doomed to decades, or more likely, centuries, of strife and conflict from catastrophic climate change from the synergistic effect of soaring temperatures, Dust-Bowlification, extreme weather, sea level rise and super-charged storm surges. These climate impacts will create the kind of food insecurity that drives war, conflict, and the competition for arable and habitable land.

### Inherency Extensions

#### Trade and service relations flat now—engagement now will cause investment flows

Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 24, 2015

"China, U.S. are looking past each other on trade and investment," Caixin Online, http://english.caixin.com/2015-07-24/100832787.html (accessed 5/27/2016)

U.S. exports of goods and services to China have been practically flat since the first quarter of 2014, while Chinese exports to the United States have expanded only modestly. This is not an inspiring record. Meanwhile, two-way stocks of direct investment remain well below potential – about US$ 60 billion from the United States to China and around US$ 50 billion going the other direction. This stands in contrast with a potential of at least US$ 100 billion in each direction. More troubling than lackluster figures is another fact: in recent months the two giants have made little progress liberalizing their trade and investment barriers. Policy achievements today would spur trade and investment flows in a few years. But the pace of bilateral policy achievements is tepid. Instead the two governments are preoccupied with initiatives elsewhere.

#### Barriers to service trade include domestic regulations, quotas, procurement policies

J. Bradford Jensen, professor of business at Georgetown University and Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2014

"Expanding Service Exports Background," Markle Economic Future Initiative, http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/Expanding%20Service%20Exports%20Background\_0.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

While research by the World Bank suggests that the U.S. is already relatively open to trade in services, a number of large and fast-growing countries, notably China, India, Indonesia, and Russia, have relatively high barriers to trade in services. Other increasingly important economies, notably Brazil and Korea, maintain lower but still substantial barriers to service trade. These impediments are not in the form of tariffs. Instead, a thicket of domestic regulations, policies, and industrial practices abroad make it difficult to provide business services in these countries. Some countries place requirements for and restrictions on “commercial presence.” That is, if you’re an architect who wants to work abroad, you need to establish an office; however, you can’t establish an office until you demonstrate that a need exists for your service. This type of Catch-22 – along with economic needs tests, quotas, requirements for local joint ventures, licensing accreditation, differential tax treatments, and government procurement practices – can make it difficult, if not impossible, to export U.S. services.

### Solvency Extensions

#### Solving market entry requirements and regulatory consistency is critical to increased service trade

Sallie James, trade policy analyst at Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, February 4, 2009

"A Service to the Economy: Removing Barriers to 'Invisible Trade,'" Center for Trade Policy Studies Analysis No. 38, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/service-economy-removing-barriers-invisible-trade (accessed 5/27/2016)

To the extent that trade negotiators are able to encourage reform abroad, the Coalition of Services Industries, a U.S.-based trade group, identifies five main impediments where the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should focus its efforts: •foreign equity restrictions that limit the investment opportunities for foreign firms and the inflow of foreign capital so helpful to the growth of domestic firms (e.g., the 26 percent cap on foreign ownership of insurance firms in India);• market entry requirements such as high capital requirements that impose a heavy burden for would-be services exporters (e.g., those stipulated for telecommunications firms in China);• exacting requirements on the form that investments should take when establishing a business, which limit a firm’s flexibility and business development (e.g., the economic needs test in Malaysia that allows the government to reject applications, such as those for additional bank branches if the market is deemed to be “saturated”);• regulations that are not “national treatment” compliant, and instead discriminate against foreign firms; and• unpredictable and unclear implementation of regulations and licensing approval processes that generate a lack of commercial certainty.

#### Increased service trade solves U.S. trade deficit with China

J. Bradford Jensen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor of economics at Georgetown University, 2015

"Role of a Bilateral Investment Treaty in Increasing Trade in Services Between China and the United States," Towards a U.S.-China Investment Treaty, Peterson Institute for International Economica, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Completion of a US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) offers an important opportunity for the United States and China to increase their trade in business services. The United States needs to export more to overcome its persistent, large trade deficit with China. China is handicapped by its small, inefficient business service sector and would benefit by importing efficient, leading-edge services in engineering, design, development, testing, marketing, advertising, logistics, and distribution to upgrade the sophistication of its manufactured goods. Both countries would gain from increased trade in business services.

### Solvency: Plan Benefits China & China Will Comply

#### Increased service trade helps Chinese telecom, distribution, marketing and finance and allows Chinese businesses to move up the value chain in manufacturing

J. Bradford Jensen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor of economics at Georgetown University, 2015

"Role of a Bilateral Investment Treaty in Increasing Trade in Services Between China and the United States," Towards a U.S.-China Investment Treaty, Peterson Institute for International Economics, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Increased trade would improve the level of service in telecommunications, finance, and other business services in China for both businesses and consumers. To move up the value chain in manufactured goods, China will need access to efficient, leading-edge services in engineering, design, development, testing, marketing, advertising, logistics, and distribution. Given the current relatively small size of the business service sector, it seems unlikely that China can be self-sufficient in these activities in the near term. Importing these services is an obvious way to provide them.

#### Empirically China will comply with agreements to open up trade barriers

Office of the State Council of People's Republic of China, 2011

"China's Foreign Trade," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/bps/t943740.htm (accessed 5/27/2016)

China has earnestly fulfilled its commitments upon entry into the WTO by offering market access to international service providers in a wide range of fields, including finance, telecommunications, construction, distribution, logistics, tourism and education. China has opened up 100 of the WTO's 160 sub-sectors of services trade, approaching the average level of developed countries. In 2010 a total of 13,905 foreign-invested enterprises in the services sector had been set up in China, with 48.7 billion U.S. dollars of foreign investment actually used, accounting for 50.7 percent of the total number of newly founded foreign-invested enterprises in China's non-financial sectors and 46.1 percent of the total amount of foreign investment actually utilized that year, respectively.

### Competitiveness Extensions: Plan Increases Competitiveness

#### U.S. has advantage but needs to increase service exports to match its goods exports

J. Bradford Jensen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor of economics at Georgetown University, 2015

Contrary to popular perception, business services are tradable and the United States has a comparative advantage in them (Jensen 2011). Yet, in spite of its large and globally competitive business service sector, the United States exports less of its business service output than it exports of its manufacturing output. China, for its part, needs to import more services to make its economy more driven by domestic consumer spending rather than exports. But China has relatively high barriers to service trade.

#### Unprecedented expansion in U.S. competitiveness exists now

J. Bradford Jensen, professor of business at Georgetown University and Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2014

"Expanding Service Exports Background," Markle Economic Future Initiative, http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/Expanding%20Service%20Exports%20Background\_0.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

The world, led by a number of fast-growing developing countries, is undertaking a building and construction boom of historic proportions. It is estimated that over the next 25 years, as much as $40 trillion will be spent on infrastructure of all types worldwide, more than 80 percent of which will take place outside of the United States. In addition, because of urbanization and middle class growth in population-dense countries like China, Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa there is an increased demand for new and better services, including health care, transportation, and entertainment. These trends in global development represent a potential surge in demand for business services, ranging from architecture, engineering and planning, to health care, logistics, finance and insurance. American companies, with their strong global reputation for expertise and high concentration of skilled workers, are competitive when it comes to delivering these services. As a result, there is a large - and largely underexloited - opportunity to expand the exporting activities of American service firms.

### Competitiveness Extensions: Plan Increases Competitiveness

#### Increase in service trade is huge push for U.S. on architecture, financing, engineering, water treatment, and management services

Harold Godsoe, attorney and Foreign Legal Specialist for the Public International Law and Policy Group, 2014

"The Depth of the Trade Services Agreement," Brigham Young University International Law and Management Review, Vol. 1, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol10/iss1/2 (accessed 5/25/2016)

Developed countries have the most to gain from liberalization of trade in services. Comparative advantage is the traditional way to think about the opportunities in trade—a country has trading advantage where its factors of production are abundant. For services, the most salient factor is skill/education and, in general, the United States and other developed countries have a great comparative advantage in the amount and quality of highly skilled, or highly educated, service providers. The United States is also currently the world’s largest services trader. Additionally, Jensen speculates that there are obvious future opportunities for developed countries to reap dividends from a coming forty trillion dollar global infrastructure boom, mostly in the emerging economies, involving architecture, financing, engineering, water treatment, and project management services.

#### Unilateral U.S. action while pressing for agreements still benefits U.S. competitiveness

 Sallie James, trade policy analyst at Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, February 4, 2009

"A Service to the Economy: Removing Barriers to 'Invisible Trade,'" Center for Trade Policy Studies Analysis No. 38, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/service-economy-removing-barriers-invisible-trade (accessed 5/27/2016)

Fortunately, the United States does not have to wait for a negotiated trade agreement to benefit from a more open trade in services. The United States should continue to press other nations, including developing countries, to open their markets to American service providers, while removing unwieldy restrictions at home. By autonomously reducing the remaining barriers on maritime services, rail and air transportation services, distribution services, and restrictions on the temporary entry of workers from abroad, many of the benefits to American consumers and industry will be realized regardless of what other nations choose to do.

### Competitiveness Impact Extensions: Trade Wars and Real Wars

#### Trump election causes global trade war

PRI, September 7, 2015

"'If he did 1/10th of what he’s planning, he would trigger a global trade war' - The Economist," Pubic Radio International, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-07/if-he-were-president-donald-trump-says-world-would-respect-america-and-fear-it (accessed 5/30/2016)

The editors at The Economist looked at the overall implications of Trump’s policy ideas and were less than impressed. "Americans are waking up to the possibility that a man whose hobby is naming things after himself might — conceivably — be the nominee of the party of Lincoln and Reagan. It is worth spelling out why that would be a terrible thing," they write in the latest issue of the magazine. “From an economics point-of-view, we think that if he did one-tenth of what he’s planning, he would trigger a global trade war, which would cause a kind of global recession and cost lots of jobs,” Rennie says.

#### Trade wars lead to real wars

Cris Sheridan, Senior Editor at Financial Sense, October 6, 2011

"Trade Wars Always Lead to Real War," Financial Sense, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/cris-sheridan/2011/10/06/jim-rogers-trade-war-second-great-depression (accessed 5/29/2016)

Successful investor and author, Jim Rogers, warns that a trade war could lead to a repeat of the Great Depression along with a war between the U.S. and China. He's also bullish on the US dollar. “This could be terribly, terribly dangerous if we turn into a trade war. We had a trade war in the 1930s, it led to the Great Depression. We already have small signs of trade wars breaking out: Brazil, France, other places, now America. This could be very dangerous in the end.” “If it turns into a trade war it is the most momentous thing of 2011. Trade wars always lead to wars.”

### Competitiveness Impact Extensions: Unemployment and Inequality Cause Instability

#### Labor oversupply causes intense political instability

Kirk Galster, CEO at Wasta Global Partners, July 1, 2015

"Poverty and Conflict: Can Economic Development Prevent Conflict?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, Vol. 1 No. 1, http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jics (accessed 5/29/2016)

The final theory assessed is the structural demographic theory. It postulates that labor oversupply leads to falling living standards and elite overproduction. Those, in turn, cause a wave of prolonged and intense sociopolitical instability.

#### Inequality causes political instability

Phys.org, November 30, 2015

"What is left of our democratic ambitions?" Phys.org, http://phys.org/news/2015-11-left-democratic-ambitions.html (accessed 5/29/2016)

Michael J. Sandel also observes "the population's deep frustration with politics, parties, and politicians, due to a void in public discourse," combined with the prominent place that money and free-market ideology hold in society." "These two trends are now embedded in every sphere of daily life," said Sandel. Our societies have become businesses. Everything is now for sale or monetized. And, according to him, the situation is worrisome for two reasons. First, it creates deep inequalities. "I am not talking about inequalities that prevent some people from buying a luxury vacation or having a BMW: we cannot be all equal in society," he said. "I am talking about inequalities that prevent people from having access to the minimum, such as adequate health care, quality education, and living in a safe neighbourhood. Without such access, inequality brings about changes that can become fertile ground for extremist thought."

#### Low income creates conflict-prone societies

Kirk Galster, CEO at Wasta Global Partners, July 1, 2015

"Poverty and Conflict: Can Economic Development Prevent Conflict?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, Vol. 1 No. 1, http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jics (accessed 5/29/2016)

Paul Collier’s research of civil wars in the world that broke out from the period of 1965- 99 indicated factors that statistically make a country prone to conflict are low income, rate of growth, and economic structure. A civil war is classified as an internal conflict with at least one thousand battle-related deaths. During this period, there were 73 civil wars globally, and in principle, Collier analyzed the pattern to determine why these wars occurred (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006).

### Growth Advantage Extensions: Plan Increases Growth

#### Trade in services is win-win, sparking huge growth for both the U.S. and China

J. Bradford Jensen, professor of business at Georgetown University and Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2014

"Expanding Service Exports Background," Markle Economic Future Initiative, http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/Expanding%20Service%20Exports%20Background\_0.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

The McKinsey Global Institute reports that China’s urban population will grow by 350 million people by 2025. This is likely to require an additional 5 million buildings, of which 50,000 could be skyscrapers - the equivalent of constructing New York City ten times over! But in China, as in many other emerging market economies, potential growth is tempered by a need for more skilled labor. According to the McKinsey study: “As costs go up, it will be important to create higher-value jobs necessary for top-line growth.….The shortage of skilled labor and talent will pose a serious threat to China’s aspiration to move quickly towards higher value-added economic activity.” The rising demand for affordable talent presents a significant opportunity for U.S. firms to export their services and thereby facilitate emerging market growth. Trade in services presents an enormous “win-win” opportunity: continued growth in emerging markets calls for skills, talent and professional services; while in the U.S., scaling service exports presents a significant opportunity for economic growth, job creation and enhanced global engagement.

#### Plan increases growth in both U.S. and China

J. Bradford Jensen, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor of economics at Georgetown University, 2015

"Role of a Bilateral Investment Treaty in Increasing Trade in Services Between China and the United States," Towards a U.S.-China Investment Treaty, Peterson Institute for International Economics, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/us-china-bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/toward-a-us-china-investment-treaty.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

The United States and China have a significant opportunity to foster growth through increased trade in business services. Many of these activities can be provided at a distance. Sizable gains to trade appear to be available to the United States and China in this area due to differences in current factor endowments. Existing barriers to service trade in China are significant. For example, C. Fred Bergsten, Gary Hufbauer, and Sean Miner (2014) report that a China-US trade and investment agreement (and the accompanying reduction of trade barriers in China) could generate $218 billion in additional US service exports to China by 2025. These additional exports would help foster growth in the United States and would constitute lower-cost intermediate inputs to China’s manufacturing and service industries, enabling faster growth in China too.

#### The essential nature of services makes its growth potential much higher than other trade

Sallie James, trade policy analyst at Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, February 4, 2009

"A Service to the Economy: Removing Barriers to 'Invisible Trade,'" Center for Trade Policy Studies Analysis No. 38, http://www.cato.org/publications/trade-policy-analysis/service-economy-removing-barriers-invisible-trade (accessed 5/27/2016)

Because services are an input to most other sectors of the economy, the benefits from open and competitive markets are pervasive. Indeed, the gains from lowering remaining trade barriers in services would eclipse the gains from trade liberalization in agriculture and manufacturing.

### Growth Advantage Extensions: Plan Increases Growth

#### Trade service liberalization critical for manufacturing growth

Yan Zhang, Professor at University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, et al, April 20, 2010

"Productivity Eﬀects of Services Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firm-level Data," Research Center for International Economics, http://www.rcie-cn.org/conferences/2010/papers/zhang-tang.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

The emerging literature on the relationship between service trade liberalization and manufacturing productivity mainly focuses on the eﬀect of FDI in services on productivity. Fernandes (2007) estimates positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of liberalization of ﬁnance and infrastructure on labor productivity of downstream manufacturing industries in Eastern European countries. Arnold et al. (2007a)[7] use the presence of foreign service providers, privatization and the level of competition to proxy for service trade liberalization and ﬁnd foreign entry into services industry is the key channel through which service liberalization contributes to improvement of ﬁrm-level manufacturing TFP. Arnold et al. (2007b) ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive productivity eﬀects of banking, telecommunications, and transport reforms on manufacturing ﬁrms in India. All these studies capture the dependence of manufacturing on services using industry level data from input-output table.

#### Multiple studies show huge manufacturing productivity gains because of service liberalization

Yan Zhang, Professor at University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, et al, April 20, 2010

"Productivity Eﬀects of Services Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firm-level Data," Research Center for International Economics, http://www.rcie-cn.org/conferences/2010/papers/zhang-tang.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Fernandes and Paunov (2008) use ﬁrm-speciﬁc time varying measures of the intensity of service usage and ﬁnd forward linkage from FDI in services accounts for almost 5% of the manufacturing productivity growth in Chile from year 1992 to 2004. Javorcik and Li (2008) estimate a positive eﬀect of FDI in Romanian retail sector on the TFP of manufacturing suppliers (food industry) to that sector. Arnolda, Mattoob and Narcisoc (2008) show a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between ﬁrm productivity and service performance in communications, electricity and ﬁnancial sectors by using its variation at the sub-national regional level of Sub-Saharan Africa.

#### Foreign imports of service massively increase domestic productivity

Yan Zhang, Professor at University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, et al, April 20, 2010

"Productivity Eﬀects of Services Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Chinese Firm-level Data," Research Center for International Economics, http://www.rcie-cn.org/conferences/2010/papers/zhang-tang.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

When material outsourcing (imported inputs) and input tariﬀs are considered, more literature contributes. Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile (1992)[16] estimate at the industry level, TFP is positively related with the introduction of new inputs in Korea. Yasar and Morrison (2007)ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁrm productivity and ﬁrm-level imports of materials in a production function framework using data for Turkey. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) ﬁnd that foreign inputs increase plant productivity in Chile by 2.3 percent, and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2005) show that imports contributed 30 percent to growth in aggregate TFP in Hungary during the 1990s. Amiti and Konings (2007) relate manufacturing productivity to trade liberalization, and show that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariﬀs leads to a productivity gain of 12 percent for ﬁrms that import their inputs in Indonesia from year 1991 to 2001.

### Growth Impact Extensions: Saves Environment

#### Transition to clean energy requires growth and lowering of trade barriers

Christian Turner, British High Commissioner, October 14, 2015

"Remarks by British High Commissioner Dr. Christian Turner, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/launch-of-safaricoms-fourth-sustainability-report-fy-20142015 (accessed 5/29/2016)

Why can we not demand a similar revolution in access to clean energy over the next ten years? This will require Governments, investors and aid agencies to tear down regulatory barriers, and attract new finance.

#### Growth surges are leading the way on renewable energy

R. Randolph Richardson, President of the Grace Richardson Fund, May 12, 2016

"After Earth Day: Capitalist Ideas Save the Planet," American Spectator, http://spectator.org/all-the-bad-people-in-one-party/ (accessed 5/28/2016)

Fortunately, clean capitalists lead the way. Crushing costs, big wind and solar just beat gas or coal on unsubsidized price alone, with lowest levelized costs for best executed and sited plants in 2015. The strong forecast-beating trend is clear: surging growth, profitability and competitiveness are here now, at the leading edge, with more on the way.

#### Improving economy is the only option to fight climate change impacts

R. Randolph Richardson, President of the Grace Richardson Fund, May 12, 2016

"After Earth Day: Capitalist Ideas Save the Planet," American Spectator, http://spectator.org/all-the-bad-people-in-one-party/ (accessed 5/28/2016)

If you are a conservative, you don’t even need to care about climate change to see a couple of dozen benefits to this strategy. But of course, these days, even Charles Koch says CO2 linked climate change is real. So if climate change is an actual risk, all the more reason to take some action that will not harm the economy, but will only help.

### Growth Impact Extensions: Saves Environment

#### Global prosperity key to climate

R. Randolph Richardson, President of the Grace Richardson Fund, May 12, 2016

"After Earth Day: Capitalist Ideas Save the Planet," American Spectator, http://spectator.org/all-the-bad-people-in-one-party/ (accessed 5/28/2016)

In fact, fear of climate disaster is God’s gift to conservatives, a golden opportunity to spark a new world-wide recognition of the power of clean capitalism — of low capital tax rates and positive side free market deregulation — to promote growth and prosperity around the world, without bad side effects, and for a profit. If we stay on the positive side, capitalism can and will save the planet.

#### Humans exceed limits sustainably through growth; anti-growth arguments assume we’re like other species

Leigh Phillips, author of Austerity Ecology & the Collapse-porn Addicts, November 4, 2015

"Why Eco-Austerity Won't Save Us from Climate Change," The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change (accessed 5/29/2016)

Unlike any other species, our per capita rate of material and energy throughput alters as a result of changes in technology and our political economy. Through technological advance, we can use less of something to produce the same amount, or replace one raw material with another. We didn’t “run out” of whale blubber. We replaced it with kerosene.

### Growth Impact Extensions: Stops Conflict

#### Economic growth encourages trade instead of war

Eduardo Porter, New York Times Economic Scene Reporter, December 1, 2015

"Imagining a World without Growth," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/business/economy/imagining-a-world-without-growth.html?\_r=0 (accessed 5/29/2016)

Zero growth gave us Genghis Khan and the Middle Ages, conquest and subjugation. It fostered an order in which the only mechanism to get ahead was to plunder one's neighbor. Economic growth opened up a much better alternative: trade.

#### Low growth causes tyranny and conflict

E. Wayne Nafziger, Professor of Economics at Kansas State University, and Raimo Väyrynen, Professor of Government and International Studies at University of Notre Dame, 2002

"How Do We Prevent War and State Murder?" United Nations University UNU-Wider, https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/how-do-we-prevent-war-and-state-murder (accessed 5/29/2016)

Slow or negative growth puts ruling coalitions on the horns of a dilemma. Political elites can expand rent seeking, but that contributes to further stagnation, threatening political legitimacy and stability. Or they can reduce the allies they support, risking opposition by those losing benefits. Either strategy, amid economic crises, exacerbates the potential for repression, insurgency, and ultimately humanitarian emergencies.

### Growth Impact Extensions: Stops Conflict

#### Poverty and low-income cause civil conflicts

Kirk Galster, CEO at Wasta Global Partners, July 1, 2015

"Poverty and Conflict: Can Economic Development Prevent Conflict?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, Vol. 1 No. 1, http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jics (accessed 5/29/2016)

Low-income countries face a 14% risk of civil war, but doubling the income of a country will halve the risk of conflict. One percentage point of growth rate reduces the risk by around a percentage point, and reducing dependence upon natural resource exports powerfully reduces the risk of conflict (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004). Causes that lead to increased risk of conflict and poor economic conditions are many. One such factor is poverty making it difficult for governments to gain popular allegiance. Rebellion becomes an attractive option with the prospect of the parties involved gaining power, weapons, and drugs (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004). Generally, half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapse and results in common underlying characteristics such as low income, natural resource dependence, and the legacy of the conflict itself (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004)

#### Low GDP and high resource-dependence causes wars

Kirk Galster, CEO at Wasta Global Partners, July 1, 2015

"Poverty and Conflict: Can Economic Development Prevent Conflict?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, Vol. 1 No. 1, http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jics (accessed 5/29/2016)

Collier’s analysis indicated that a major component of risk was whether or not the country had a substantial share of its income in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) generated from primary commodities. Dependence of 26% of GDP or more indicated serious danger of conflict. The risk in Collier’s sample was 23%, whereas countries with no primary commodity in exports, but were otherwise the same, would have a risk of half of a percentage point (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006). This, as well as economic opportunity, provide major implications for conflict. Conflict was found to be concentrated in countries with low education (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006). On average, young males in secondary education in the sample consisted of 45%. Any country that had 55% of its youth in an education system would cut its risk from the 14% risk of civil war to 10%. Again, conflict was more likely in countries with rapid population growth. Each percentage point of growth raises the risk of conflict by around 2.5 points. Therefore, the most significant predictors of civil war were dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006)

### Answers to Conditioning and Shunning Arguments

#### Hardline approach hurts U.S. interests

Craig VanGrasstek, Executive Director of the Program on Trade and Negotiations in the John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University), July 2006

"The Benefits of U.S.-China Trade in Services," United States Council Foundation Occasional Paper #1, http://www.uscib.org/docs/china\_services\_study.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Demands for a “get-tough” approach with China often lead to proposals that trade sanctions be threatened or imposed as a means of pursuing U.S. interests in non-trade issues. While trade sanctions might be targeted at China, they are just as likely to damage U.S. economic interests. The services sector is the leading edge of the economy, accounting for large and growing shares of jobs and exports.

#### U.S. should deal with trade disputes in WTO and other differences of opinion in other forums but should not walk away from trade

Craig VanGrasstek, Executive Director of the Program on Trade and Negotiations in the John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University), July 2006

"The Benefits of U.S.-China Trade in Services," United States Council Foundation Occasional Paper #1, http://www.uscib.org/docs/china\_services\_study.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

The opening of the Chinese economy has brought great benefits not only to export-oriented service industries such as express delivery, information technology, and banking, but also to U.S. exporters of goods. It would be self-defeating for the United States to take precipitous, unilateral action that jeopardizes this relationship at the very time that it is coming to economic fruition. The World Trade Organization offers a forum in which to deal with access to the Chinese market, both through the negotiation of commitments and the adjudication of any disputes that may arise over market access; disputes outside of the trade arena can and should be handled elsewhere.

### Plan Solves Adverse Trade Effects of Trans-Pacific Partnership

#### Plan overcomes trade inequalities brought about by TPP—nonmembers benefit from increases in trade in services

Peter A. Petri, Professor of International Finance at the Brandeis International Business School, and Michael G. Plummer, Professor of International Economics at Johns Hopkins University, January 2016

"The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 16-2, https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-2.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

Economies that lose from the TPP (on the right-hand side of the chart) do so mainly because of goods provisions, and those that benefit (on the left-hand side of the chart) do so because of service and FDI provisions. Nonmembers that compete in the goods sectors face a tough challenge, because many TPP members are also competitive in the goods sector. There is less international competition within the TPP in services (the United States is the only dominant exporter), and the nonpreferential portion of service liberalization by the United States thus favors external service exporters such as the European Union.

#### Service liberalization increases trade with nonmember countries

Peter A. Petri, Professor of International Finance at the Brandeis International Business School, and Michael G. Plummer, Professor of International Economics at Johns Hopkins University, January 2016

"The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 16-2, https://piie.com/publications/wp/wp16-2.pdf (accessed 5/25/2016)

Twenty percent of NTBs are assumed to be reduced on a nonpreferential basis increasing estimated gains for TPP members and especially nonmembers. Table B.1 (in appendix B) shows that, without this component, estimated gains from the TPP would be 30 percent lower for the United States and 21 percent lower for all TPP members. For the United States, service liberalization is important in this context, because it stimulates additional trade with the European Union. Evidence from past studies and conversations with business experts, academics and negotiators suggest that nonpreferential liberalization is an unavoidable and useful byproduct of next-generation trade agreements, although more research is needed to improve the measurement of its scope and the assessment of its impacts.

### Answers to Pakistan Argument: Economic Growth in Pakistan Increases Terrorism

#### Because of income distribution, any small increase in growth in Pakistan causes a larger spike in terror

Muhammad Shahbaz, Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan, 2013

"Linkages between inflation, economic growth and terrorism in Pakistan," Economic Modeling, vol. 32, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999313000643 (accessed 5/27/2016)

Surprisingly, the impact of economic growth on terrorism is positive, keeping other things constant and statistically significant at 1% level of significance. These findings are contradictory with Nasir et al. (2011) while consistent with Caruso and Schneider (2011). Further, results show that a 1% increase in economic growth will raise terrorist attacks by 4.112%. This indicates that distribution of income in Pakistan is deteriorating day-by-day and increasing income inequality.

#### Growth in Pakistan increases the rich-poor gap, which increases terrorism

Muhammad Shahbaz, Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan, 2013

"Linkages between inflation, economic growth and terrorism in Pakistan," Economic Modeling, vol. 32, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999313000643 (accessed 5/27/2016)

This gap between “haves and haves not” in the country is linked with rise in poverty and hence terrorism. This finding is contradictory with Nasir et al. (2011) who reported that an increase in income per capita is linked with decline in terrorism in South Asian countries while Muller and Seligson (1987) argued that economic growth increases terrorism when economic growth does not benefit poor segments of population following trickle-down effect. Finally, both linear and non-linear terms of real GDP provide evidence in supporting inverted-U relationship between economic growth and terrorism. The result indicates that a 1% rise in real GDP will raise terrorism by 5.70% while negative sign of squared term seems to corroborate the delinking of terrorism and real GDP at the higher level of income.

### U.S. Action Key

#### Eliminating tariffs in pending trade agreements is key to their success

Bryan Riley, Senior Policy Analyst in Trade Policy at the Center for Trade and Economics, April 29, 2013

"Tariff Reform Needed to Boost the U.S. Economy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2792 on Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/tariff-reform-needed-to-boost-the-us-economy (accessed 5/29/2016)

One of the best ways in which the U.S. promotes trade and economic prosperity is through free trade agreements. Congress should direct the U.S. Trade Representative to adopt Australia’s policy for negotiations including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the International Services Agreement, and other trade agreements: “Pro-competitive economic reform should be pursued in its own right; it should not be conditional upon other countries reforming their economies.”

#### The U.S. combines safety and environmental restrictions on trade, hampering agreements

European Commission, July 2009

"United States Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008," European Commission Directorate General for Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc\_144160.pdf (accessed 5/29/2016)

In the U.S., products are increasingly being required to conform to multiple technical regulations regarding consumer protection (including health and safety) and environmental protection. Although, in general, not de jure discriminatory, the complexity of U.S. regulatory systems can represent an important structural impediment to market access.

### Answers to “Trade Agreements Unpopular” Politics, Elections Etc.

#### Focus on service trade renews public support for free trade agreements

Geza Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, 1986

"Trade in Professional Services: An Overview," University of Chicago Legal Forum, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Documents/Debate%20Research/Trade%20in%20Professional%20Services-%20An%20Overview.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Finally, political considerations have also contributed to the increased focus on service trade. Because in the U.S. free trade has become associated with job losses in manufacturing, support for further liberalization of trade in goods has eroded. Those seeking to regain support for the benefits of unrestrained trade in the U.S. can emphasize the job gains associated with service trade.

#### Plan spurs higher standards for trade agreements on environment, workers’ rights etc.

Kurt Tong, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State, June 1, 2015

"The Strategic Implications of Trade Promotion and Capacity-Building in the Asia-Pacific Region," Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/061615\_Tong\_Testimony.pdf (accessed 5/29/2016)

If we do not take the lead, we risk ceding leadership to other countries that do not share our interests and our values, and are pushing their own regional initiatives with weaker standards. Presently, China and others are negotiating a number of agreements. These agreements do not protect workers’ rights or environmental interests. They do not adequately protect intellectual property rights or help maintain a free and open internet. And they do not address unfair competition from state-owned enterprises. If these agreements were to become the model for the fastest growing region of the world, it would not only put our workers and firms at a significant disadvantage, it would also result in Asian markets being carved up, removing us from supply chains, decreasing our linkages to important allies, and seeing our overall influence diminished.

### Answers to "Trade Causes Deregulation/Bad Social Effects" Arguments

#### Trade doesn’t strip domestic regulations

Geza Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, 1986

"Trade in Professional Services: An Overview," University of Chicago Legal Forum, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Documents/Debate%20Research/Trade%20in%20Professional%20Services-%20An%20Overview.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Moreover, governments have regulatory means for assuring that broader social objectives are achieved. The argument for free service trade is not an argument for the non-observance of local regulations designed to protect the public against abuses by either local or foreign service providers.

#### Domestic laws protect

Geza Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, 1986

"Trade in Professional Services: An Overview," University of Chicago Legal Forum, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Documents/Debate%20Research/Trade%20in%20Professional%20Services-%20An%20Overview.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Just as an auto sold in a foreign market must meet that country's safety or environmental regulations, so must an insurance policy sold in a foreign market meet domestic regulations designed to protect the interests of policy holders.

### Answers to "Multilateral Agreements Better" Arguments

#### Non-Unique: China won’t enter regional trade agreements because it’s slow on service FTAs and subordinates service to goods

Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in Politics at University of Bath, September 2-4 2013

"EU, USA and China: Balancing through Free Trade Agreements?" UACES 43rd Annual Conference, http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/garcia.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Unlike the more comprehensive FTA approach of the EU and US, China has preferred to negotiate FTAs on trade in goods first, and services and investment later, as it did with ASEAN and Chile. It has only included services and investment in its agreements with New Zealand, Singapore, Peru and Pakistan, but these are very limited (Jiang 2010, 244). China’s pragmatic approach to FTAs means these vary in form and scope, and are relatively narrow, with no clear dispute settlement mechanisms and log lists of excluded items (Zeng 2010; Antkiewicz & Whalley 2004; Hufbauer & Wong 2005) making the eventual emergence of an Asian trading bloc around these agreements problematic (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2004) and weakening some of the strategic objectives pursued through FTAs such as legal competition and using FTAs to increase legal influence in the shaping of international rules at the WTO by having exported legal preferences to others via FTAs previously (Yang 2008).

#### Turn: Bilateral agreements pave the way for multilateral agreements

Geza Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, 1986

"Trade in Professional Services: An Overview," University of Chicago Legal Forum, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Documents/Debate%20Research/Trade%20in%20Professional%20Services-%20An%20Overview.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

In all bilateral trade negotiations on services, but particularly in the negotiations with Israel and the preliminary discussions with Canada, U.S. trade negotiators have pursued dual objectives: solving concrete problems faced by U.S. service industries and establishing useful precedents for the future. Bilateral negotiations have thus been treated as stepping stones to future, multilateral agreements.

#### Turn: Bilateral agreements are testing laboratories for multilateral agreements, increasing cooperation

Geza Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, 1986

"Trade in Professional Services: An Overview," University of Chicago Legal Forum, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Documents/Debate%20Research/Trade%20in%20Professional%20Services-%20An%20Overview.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

While some concern has been expressed that such bilateral agreements might prejudice future multilateral ones, their positive contributions as testing laboratories for concepts and procedures that might be incorporated in future multilateral agreements far outweigh those concerns.

### Answers to “China Unilaterally Lower Barriers” Counterplans

#### U.S. barriers prevent financial services liberalization

Ying Shi and Yanjuan Chen, professors at the School of International Business, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, July 2009

"The Comparison of Opening up in Banking Industry between U.S. and China," International Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 4 no. 7, http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/viewFile/3082/2851 (accessed 5/25/2016)

From the figures above, we can see that limitations in US are fewer from the appearance, but more in fact. There are few federal limitations, and US give foreign banks almost fully national treatment. However, there are many intangible trade barriers. First, the limitations on market access are different among states, so does the national treatment, which can be the huge barriers for foreign banks that plan to strength their power in terms of size and capital. Second, the financial regulation system in US is very complicated, foreign banks have to deal with multiple regulations, and accept harsh openness control and business control if they want to broad their business. In addition, United Stated has published action in 1997 to regulate foreign banks before signing Financial Service Agreement.

#### Department of Defense can hinder service trade

European Commission, July 2009

"United States Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008," European Commission Directorate General for Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc\_144160.pdf (accessed 5/29/2016)

The Department of Defense (DoD) also has significant procurement expenditures that exclude foreign suppliers of goods or services. The DoD is the largest public procurement agency within the U.S. government, spending billions of dollars annually on supplies and other requirements. Many procurements fall under “national security” exceptions to open procurement obligations.

#### U.S. Patriot Act provisions restrict trade in services

European Commission, July 2009

"United States Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008," European Commission Directorate General for Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc\_144160.pdf (accessed 5/29/2016)

Section 319 of the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" Act, known as the Patriot Act, signed in 2001, deals with allegations of money laundering and the forfeiture of funds in U.S. inter-bank accounts. Some European banks have alleged that it applies extraterritorial provisions to financial services. The European Commission has been concerned about the lack of legal certainty and the potential impact on the ability of European banks to conduct business in the U.S. as a result of this legislation, but concrete problems have not been brought to our attention over the last two years.

### EU Tradeoff Answers

#### EU-Korea agreements show low welfare outcomes and regulatory barriers

Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in Politics at University of Bath, September 2-4 2013

"EU, USA and China: Balancing through Free Trade Agreements?" UACES 43rd Annual Conference, http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/garcia.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

GCE models predicted a rise in Korean exports to the EU of 34 percent and of 82 percent for EU exports (Decreux et al. 2010: 6). Despite this, given the openness of both economies and the asymmetrical effects of FTAs across sectors, the estimated welfare effects on GDP of this agreement are 0.08 percent for the EU and between 0.4 and 2% for South Korea, as a result of potential higher FDI (IBM, 2008: 13). The main aim of the FTA was to ease the problems EU companies encountered accessing and operating in the South Korean market due to stringent standards and testing requirements for products and services often creating barriers to trade, despite being the largest investor in Korea since 1962.

#### Empirically EU trade negotiations alienate ASEAN members because of expanded demands and attaching political requirements to trade agreements

Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in Politics at University of Bath, September 2-4 2013

"EU, USA and China: Balancing through Free Trade Agreements?" UACES 43rd Annual Conference, http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/garcia.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

In 2003 ASEAN asked the EU to consider an FTA, but the EU was reluctant as Lamy preferred the WTO and the unsuccessful negotiations with MERCOSUR made it sceptical (Robles, 2008: 337). In 2005 Commissioner Mandelson asked a Vision Group to study upgrading EU-ASEAN relations and in the 2006 Global Europe Strategy an FTA with ASEAN was prioritised. Negotiations began in May 2007 and progressed slowly, due to the differences amongst ASEAN members and the EU’s requirements that its FTAs encompass more than trade, but also investment, procurement, intellectual property rights, and a host of political clauses. This complicates FTA negotiations, and marks a sharp contrast with the Chinese approach. The Philippines, for example, signaled from the start that the political cooperation agreement would be problematic as it requires signatories to become members of the International Criminal Court (bilaterals.org).

### Free Trade Generally Good

#### Free trade spurs peace, cures for diseases, improves the environment and creates high-paying jobs

Ana I. Eiras, Senior Policy Analyst on International Economics, Center for Trade and Economics, May 24, 2004

"Why America Needs to Support Free Trade," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder on Trade and Economic Freedom No. 1761, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/05/why-america-needs-to-support-free-trade (accessed 5/29/2016)

Specialization and free trade allow the U.S. to become more competitive and innovative. Innovation constantly provides new technologies that allow Americans to produce more, cure more diseases, pollute less, improve education, and choose from a greater range of investment opportunities. The resulting economic growth generates better-paying jobs, higher standards of living, and a greater appreciation of the benefits of living in a peaceful society.

#### Free trade doesn't cause unemployment

Donald J. Boudreaux, senior fellow with the F.A. Hayek Program at George Mason University, April 20, 2015

"The Benefits of Free Trade: Addressing Key Myths," Mercatus Center, http://mercatus.org/publication/benefits-free-trade-addressing-key-myths (accessed 5/29/2016)

Much of the change in the labor force is not the result of free trade but of innovation. New technology, such as apps on mobile devices, has displaced a staggering variety of products, including radios, cameras, alarm clocks, calculators, compact discs, DVDs, carpenters’ levels, tape-measures, tape recorders, blood-pressure monitors, cardiographs, flashlights, and file cabinets. Using protectionist policies to “save” a job comes at enormous cost, as opportunities shrink and input costs swell for industries downstream.

#### Free trade increases rule of law

Ana I. Eiras, Senior Policy Analyst on International Economics, Center for Trade and Economics, May 24, 2004

"Why America Needs to Support Free Trade," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder on Trade and Economic Freedom No. 1761, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/05/why-america-needs-to-support-free-trade (accessed 5/29/2016)

The rule of law is the first and most important institution fostered by free trade. In order to enforce contracts, prevent merchandise robbery and damage, and protect ships and their crews, trading countries need to establish a framework of objective rules under which free trade will be conducted. At the same time, those countries need to have a law enforcement mechanism to apply those rules, such as a police force and an independent judicial system. The proper functioning of these two institutions encourages individuals to initiate businesses and to sell, buy, and seize to the maximum extent the economic opportunities of free trade.

### Free Trade Generally Good

#### Free trade improves the standard of living for everyone

Ana I. Eiras, Senior Policy Analyst on International Economics, Center for Trade and Economics, May 24, 2004

"Why America Needs to Support Free Trade," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder on Trade and Economic Freedom No. 1761, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/05/why-america-needs-to-support-free-trade (accessed 5/29/2016)

The most compelling reason to support free trade is that society as a whole benefits from it. Free trade improves people's living standards because it allows them to consume higher quality goods at less expensive prices. In the 19th century, British economist David Ricardo showed that any nation that focuses on producing goods in which it has a comparative advantage will be able to get cheaper and better goods from other countries in return. As a result of the exchange, both trading parties gain from producing more efficiently and consuming higher quality goods and services at lower prices.

#### Protectionism increases poverty

Donald J. Boudreaux, senior fellow with the F.A. Hayek Program at George Mason University, April 20, 2015

"The Benefits of Free Trade: Addressing Key Myths," Mercatus Center, http://mercatus.org/publication/benefits-free-trade-addressing-key-myths (accessed 5/29/2016)

However well intended, restrictions on foreign trade harm the very people they aim to protect: American consumers and producers. Trade restrictions limit the choices of what Americans can buy; they also drive up the prices of everything from clothing and groceries to the materials manufacturers use to make everyday products. Moreover, it is lower-income Americans who generally bear a disproportionate share of these costs.

### Topicality: Trade negotiations are economic engagement

#### Correcting trade imbalances is economic engagement

Matthew P. Goodman, chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 18, 2013

"U.S. Economic Engagement in East Asia and the Pacific," Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Goodman\_Testimony.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Our economic engagement with Asia also poses challenges. We have large and persistent trade imbalances with a number of major Asian countries, including a $315 billion deficit with China in 2012. Americans companies face an array of barriers both at and behind the border in these countries, and unfair trade practices in the region burden both our businesses and workers. In addition, macroeconomic imbalances – including an excess of savings in many Asian economies – produce large financial flows from Asia to the United States that bring near-term benefits but may pose longer-term risks to the U.S. economy. These challenges require active U.S. policy engagement in the region.

#### Bilateral trade negotiations are especially economic engagement

Matthew P. Goodman, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 18, 2013

"U.S. Economic Engagement in East Asia and the Pacific," Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Goodman\_Testimony.pdf (accessed 5/28/2016)

Economic engagement is critical to the overall rebalancing strategy. In addition to its intrinsic value, it helps balance the military and diplomatic elements and thus bolster the strategy’s credibility both in the region and at home. While most of the focus has been on TPP, the Obama Administration has in fact pursued a multi-pronged economic policy in the region, covering three levels of interaction. Bilaterally, the Administration has engaged with most of the major economic powers of the region, in a variety of formats. With China, it reconfigured a high-level forum created by the Bush Administration and established the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Along the S&ED’s economic track, the Administration has sought to encourage more balanced growth in China, to promote financial liberalization and movement to a more flexible currency system, and to advance a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).

# Aff TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership

Trans-Pacific Partnership Affirmative Explanation:

In October, President Obama reached an agreement with 12 Pacific-Rim countries known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is a trade deal that controls 40% of the world economy. Currently, China is not included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This aff has two advantages. The first advantage is a trade advantage with a trade wars scenario and China economy scenario. The thesis is that leaving China out of the deal creates trade diversion away from China that incites a trade war between them and the U.S. and also destroys their economy because of how much money they will lose from being left out. The second advantage is a U.S.-China relations advantage that says that excluding China from the deal makes them perceive us as containing them, which stifle cooperation on a range of issues and kills our relationship. The thesis of the plan is that the United States invites China to join the TPP. This affirmative constitutes economic engagement for topicality purposes.

The negative:

Although there are plausible links for any generic West Coast disadvantages, the core disadvantage against this aff is China containment good. The thesis of this is that when China is excluded from the TPP, it allows us to contain China economically and prevent it from overtaking U.S. hegemony. For the relations advantage, the best strategy is that there is sufficient cooperation between the U.S. and China on other issues (such as climate change). There is an advantage counterplan included that essentially has China pursue other trade agreements that are not the TPP in order to resolve the trade advantage scenarios.

## 1AC – TPP

### TPP Advantage 1: Trade

#### Scenario 1: Trade War

#### China trade strong now- strongest data in months and improving China’s economy

Laura He, covers markets and business in Hong Kong and China for the Post. Previously, she worked as Asia financial correspondent for MarketWatch, The Wall Street Journal Digital Network, she served as an editor for Xinhua News Agency in Beijing, and later became an anchor and chief financial correspondent for Xinhua in Hong Kong. She has a Master’s in journalism from Stanford University, April, 2016, “China, Hong Kong stocks surge as turnover spikes on strong trade data,” South China Morning Post, <http://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/1935627/china-hong-kong-stocks-surge-turnover-spikes-strong-trade-data> (accessed 5/11/16)

Chinese stocks closed on Wednesday at their highest level in over three months, with a spike in trading volumes, as the surprisingly strong trade data for March reflected improving economic conditions in China. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng also recorded its biggest one-day rally in two months, extending its bull run to a sixth session. The Shanghai Composite Index advanced 1.4 per cent, or 42.99 points, to 3,066.64. The CSI300 rose 1.3 per cent, or 42.93 points, to 3,261.38. The Shenzhen Composite Index finished up 1.4 per cent, or 26.83 points, at 1,962.43. Start-up index ChiNext ended 1.3 per cent, or 30 points, higher at 2,294.01. Turnover for Shanghai and Shenzhen spiked 41 per cent to 824 billion yuan from Tuesday’s 582 billion yuan. A-shares also attracted massive fund inflows from overseas. The northbound quota for the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheme, which reflects foreigners’ investment in Shanghai stock market, saw inflows of 3.6 billion yuan, the highest since the end of January. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index rose for a sixth straight session, up 3.2 per cent, or 654.27 points, to close at 21,158.71, its highest since early January. The Hang Seng China Enterprises index surged 4 per cent, or 349.63 points, to 9,191.49. Turnover in Hong Kong soared 80 per cent to HK$94 billion from HK$52 billion on Tuesday. The Chinese customs authorities reported on Wednesday that the nation’s exports in US dollar terms rose 11.5 per cent in March from the same period a year earlier, the first increase in nine months, reversing a 25.4 per cent contraction in February. The figure beat analysts’ expectations in a Reuters poll, which had forecast a 2.5 per cent increase. Imports continued to fall but at a slower pace, down 7.6 per cent year on year, compared with a decline of 13.8 per cent in February. This number also exceeded market estimates of a 10.2 per cent fall. “China’s trade data for March point to healthy growth in import volumes and add to growing evidence that the extreme gloom of a few weeks ago about the state of the domestic economy was misplaced,” said Marcel Thieliant and Mark Williams, economists from London-based Capital Economics, in a note. They are “further signs that conditions are improving” in the Chinese economy, they added.

#### Leaving China out of the TPP causes trade diversion away from China

Peter Cai, China Editor at Business Spectator, Research Fellow at Lowy Institute for International Policy, Education: University of Oxford, University of Adelaide, Gymnasium Martkbreit, Bavaria, Germanym October, 2015, “Why China should join the TPP,” Business Spectator, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/why-china-should-join-the-tpp/news-story/de2167f7f4348caceae05d5e4b173293> (accessed 4/26/16)

However, a better option is for China to join the TPP and fast. This will not be an easy option for Chinese policymakers. If Australians are concerned about some of the TPP provisions such as intellectual protection and investor-state dispute resolutions, one can only start to imagine the reservations in Beijing. If China does not join the pact it will become marginalised in the new preferential trade area. Companies, including Chinese ones, will adjust their supply chains to take advantage of preferential access to TPP markets and especially the all-important US. It will accelerate the migration of low-cost manufacturing from China to new TPP signatories such as Vietnam.

#### Trade diversion incites a U.S. – China trade war

Dr Arvind Subramanian and Dennis Weatherstone, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International, Economics and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development, April, 2014, “‘Trade and Flag: The Changing Balance of Power in the Multilateral Trading System’ ,” IISS Geo-Economics and Strategy Programme (accessed 5/8/16)

The third alternative is to impose costs on China indirectly: not by raising American barriers but by discriminatorily lowering barriers in American, Asian and European markets to the disadvantage of Chinese firms. This is what TPP and TTIP will achieve. They will indirectly 22 inflict costs on China by worsening its competitive position in international markets. Now, China can respond in a number of ways. It can offset its own disadvantage relative to American competition in Asia-Pacific markets by negotiating free trade agreements of its own with these countries. Indeed, that is what it is doing. China has negotiated agreements with four countries already and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN and six other countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea, India and China) is aimed at widening this circle of free trade agreements to parry similar American efforts. But such agreements negotiated by China also impose a cost on American and European firms because in Chinese markets they are now disadvantaged relative to Asian firms. De facto, TPP and TTIP combined with Chinese responses to them amount really to an elaborate trade war by proxy.

#### A US-China trade war escalates to conflict

Clif Droke, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report, 2010, “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29, <http://www.greenfaucet.com/technical-analysis/america-and-the-next-major-war/79314> (accessed 5/8/16)

It seems China is flexing its economic and political muscle against the West in a show of bravado. Yet one can't help thinking that this is exactly the sort of arrogance that typically precedes a major downfall. As the Bible states, "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall." In his book, "Jubilee on Wall Street," author David Knox Barker devotes a chapter to how trade wars tend to be common occurrences in the long wave economic cycle of developed nations. Barker explains his belief that the industrial nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China will play a major role in pulling the world of the long wave deflationary decline as their domestic economies begin to develop and grow. "They are and will demand more foreign goods produced in the United States and other markets," he writes. Barker believes this will help the U.S. rebalance from an over weighted consumption-oriented economy to a high-end producer economy. Barker adds a caveat, however: if protectionist policies are allowed to gain force in Washington, trade wars will almost certainly erupt and. If this happens, says Barker, "all bets are off." He adds, "The impact on global trade of increased protectionism and trade wars would be catastrophic, and what could prove to be a mild long wave [economic] winter season this time around could plunge into a global depression." Barker also observes that the storm clouds of trade wars are already forming on the horizon as we have moved further into the long wave economic "winter season." Writes Barker, "If trade wars are allowed to get under way in these final years of a long wave winter, this decline will be far deeper and darker than necessary, just as the Great Depression was far deeper and lengthier than it should have been, due to growing international trade isolationism. He further cautions that protectionism in Washington will certainly bring retaliation from the nations that bear the brunt of punitive U.S. trade policies. He observes that the reaction from one nation against the protectionist policies of another is typically far worse than the original action. He cites as an example the restriction by the U.S. of $55 million worth of cotton blouses from China in the 1980s. China retaliated by cancelling $500 million worth of orders for American rain. "As one nation blocks trade, the nation that is hurt will surely retaliate and the entire world will suffer," writes Barker.

#### Trade wars cause extinction

Anatol Lieven, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), June, 2012, “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

#### Scenario 2: China’s Economy

#### China’s economy has slowed but is still strong- it’s strength is because of services

Arthur R. Kroeber Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings-Tsinghua Center, February, 2016, “Should we worry about China’s economy?,” Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/02/09-worry-about-chinese-economy-kroeber> (accessed 5/8/16)

In one sense, markets overreacted. China’s economy grew by 6.9 percent in 2015; financial media headlines bewailed this as “the lowest growth rate in a quarter century,” but neglected to mention that this is still by a good margin the fastest growth of any major economy except for India. Even at its new, slower pace, China continues to grow more than twice as fast as developed economies. Some doubt the reliability of China’s economic statistics, of course, but most credible alternative estimates (based on hard-to-fake indicators of physical output) still suggest that China is growing at around 6 percent, and that if anything there was a slight pickup in activity in late 2015. It’s true that construction and heavy industry, which drove China’s growth from 2000 to 2013, are now nearing recession levels. But services—which now account for over half of China’s economy—and consumer spending remain strong, underpinned by solid employment and wage gains. The latest Nielsen survey of consumer confidence ranked China eighth of 61 countries in consumer optimism, and confidence actually increased in the last quarter of 2015. All in all, another year of 6 percent-plus growth should be achievable in 2016.

#### Leaving China out of TPP causes billions in losses via trade and services

Gordon G. Chang, October, 2015, “TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-control-pacific-trade-14021> (accessed 5/3/16)

Liberalization would be good for China: a bonanza awaits Beijing should it decide to make the reforms necessary for TPP inclusion. In a 2014 study, Peter Petri of Brandeis University, Michael Plummer of John Hopkins and Fan Zhai of China Investment Corp. estimate China, if it were to join TPP, could reap income gains of $809 billion by 2025. If it fails to do so, however, it might lose over $46 billion by that year. This should not be a mystery to Chinese leaders. Their country reaped large gains after it joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, due mostly to the reforms required by its accession agreement. The big story is that today, despite the obvious benefits of being a signatory to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, there is no longer a consensus in Beijing to accept liberalizing change.

#### Chinese economic downturn causes World War III

TomPlate**,** professor of Policy and Communication Studies at UCLA where he founded the Asia Pacific Media Network, June 30, 2003 “WHY NOT INVADE CHINA? With allies like the neo-cons, Bush scarcely needs enemies”, , <http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm> (accessed 5/8/16)

But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don’t’ want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style. That’s why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

#### And, getting China in the deal is key to economically stabilizing China AND alternate trade deals fail

Bloomberg, October, 2015, “China Belongs in the TPP,” BloombergView, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-08/china-belongs-in-the-tpp> (accessed 4/26/16)

While the exact numbers can be debated, a careful study has estimated that widening the TPP from 12 to 17 countries -- adding China, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand -- would triple the deal's global benefits. Bringing in China, the world's biggest trading nation, would further strengthen the TPP's promise as the template for an even wider global agreement. For all the focus on trade in manufacturing, the biggest potential for gains may lie in services. China's services sector is one of the world's most restricted, and a lowering of those barriers would benefit U.S. suppliers handsomely. (According to one estimate, they'd gain another $218 billion by 2025.) China would get better access to the U.S. market in return. More important, though, liberalizing China's trade in services would hasten the reform of its domestic services providers, dominated today by inefficient state-owned companies jealous of their privileges. That's exactly why many Chinese reformers want their country to join the TPP. Efforts at reform have lost momentum lately, with good progress seen in less than a quarter of the 113 areas designated by Beijing. Ring-fenced experiments such as the Shanghai free-trade zone haven't delivered as hoped. The TPP's requirements would encourage the government to pick up the pace. The result would be a more productive and stable Chinese economy -- good for everyone. Beijing is discovering the limits of going its own way. Its efforts to set up a regional free-trade agreement without the U.S. are looking less promising. Its new infrastructure bank won't do much to promote reform at home. Its "one belt, one road" scheme to build infrastructure linking China to the Middle East and Europe offers less potential than greater access to U.S. and Japanese markets.

### TPP Advantage 2: U.S. – China Relations

#### Relations between China and the U.S. are fragile now and cooperation is failing

Wu Jianmin Former President of China Foreign Affairs University, March, 2016, “Here’s What’s on the Table for the China-U.S. Relationship This Year,” The World Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-relationship-2016_b_9568060.html> (accessed 5/12/16)

Undoubtedly, we’re seeing more and more friction between China and the U.S. on a range of issues, such as the South China Sea, cybersecurity, trade disputes, human rights and intellectual property rights. China and the U.S. have different histories, cultures and political systems and are at different stages of development. Naturally, they may have differences. In 2010, Chinese GDP overtook that of Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world. This fact added a new dimension to the China-U.S. relationship: rivalry between an established power and a rising power. The year 2016 is a very sensitive year for the China-U.S. relationship, because this is the election year in the U.S.. The presidential candidates may have a big mouth and say whatever they deem helpful to their campaign. Other sensitive issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the Democratic Progressive Party’s victory in the election in Taiwan. How to best manage the China-U.S. relationship is a major challenge to both China and the U.S.. There are two competing agendas in the relationship: cooperation and friction. If the cooperation agenda fails to move forward, the friction agenda may take over. That would be a very bad scenario. Given the importance of China-U.S. relations to world peace and development, this scenario would be bad not only for our two countries, but also for the whole world. Therefore, to advance the cooperation agenda is the best way to manage the China-U.S. relationship. To advance the cooperation agenda, we have first to identify the convergent interests between China and the U.S.. In 2016, what is the most important convergent interest between the two countries? Economy. If you read Premier Li Keqiang’s government work report and watch the U.S. economic performance in the 4th quarter of 2015, you can see that economic growth tops the agenda of both the Chinese and American governments.

#### TPP key to US China relations – other areas of cooperation insufficient

Steven Zhou, journalist based in Toronto, November, 2015, Aljazeera, “The TPP risks making US-China relations worse,” <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/the-tpp-risks-making-us-china-relations-worse.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

Much discussion regarding the TPP has focused on the absence from the pact of China, the largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region. President Barack Obama has portrayed the exclusion as an attempt by the U.S. and its allies to “write the rules” in the region before China does. But this kind of antagonism does nothing to push U.S.-China relations — perhaps the most important bilateral relationship in the world — toward anything productive. The increasing anti-China rhetoric that has accompanied the Obama administration’s Asian pivot will result in fewer opportunities to partner on major global initiatives and hurt both nations economically. While the U.S. and China have cooperated on a number of important issues, including a notable recent agreement on climate change, geopolitical tensions persist. President Xi Jinping, who has led China since 2012, has pushed for a new brand of nationalism that emphasizes the projection of Chinese power in Asia. This has gotten China into territorial disputes with its neighbors, which in turn have looked to the U.S. for help. China’s periodic alignment with Syria, Iran and Russia has set it at odds with the Obama administration’s strategy in the Middle East. Finally, Washington has serious concerns about Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses. Given all this, China’s ruling Communist Party has been very nervous about the TPP from the beginning. The Obama administration is selling the TPP to Congress and to the United States’ international partners as an opportunity to get a jump on China in writing global trade rules. The TPP includes China’s neighbors and major trading partners such as Japan and Australia, and the Chinese leadership is worried about losing regional influence. On the other hand, moderate voices in China such as Long Yongtu, who negotiated China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, have viewed the TPP as a possible way to encourage the Chinese leadership to carry out systemic reforms. For instance, the TPP contains clauses regarding the environment that could influence Chinese policies in a progressive manner. He even argued in 2014 that the TPP would have to include China “sooner or later.” But the Obama administration’s domestic considerations have eclipsed this possibility, as it uses China as a foil to persuade Democrats and Republicans to accept the accord.

#### Relations collapse goes nuclear

Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, Spring, 2013, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Muse (accessed 5/8/16)

Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post-Cold War era. The first is the potentially deadly mix of nuclear proliferation, rogue states, and international terrorists, a worry that became dominant after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.1 The second concern, one whose prominence has waxed and waned since the mid-1990s, is the potentially disruptive impact that China will have if it emerges as a peer competitor of the United States, challenging an international order established during the era of U.S. preponderance.2 Reflecting this second concern, some analysts have expressed reservations about the dominant post-September 11 security agenda, arguing that China could challenge U.S. global interests in ways that terrorists and rogue states cannot. In this article, I raise a more pressing issue, one to which not enough attention has been paid. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak, the gravest danger in Sino-American relations is the possibility the two countries will find themselves in a crisis that could escalate to open military conflict**.** In contrast to the long-term prospect of a new great power rivalry between the United States and China, which ultimately rests on debatable claims about the intentions of the two countries and uncertain forecasts about big shifts in their national capabilities, the danger of instability in a crisis involving these two nuclear-armed states is a tangible, near-term concern.3 Even if the probability of such a war-threatening crisis and its escalation to the use of significant military force is low, the **potentially catastrophic** consequences of this scenario provide good reason for analysts to better understand its dynamics and for policymakers to fully consider its implications. Moreover, events since 2010—especially those relevant to disputes in the East and South China Seas—suggest that thedanger of a military confrontation in the Western Pacific that could lead to a U.S.-China standoff may be on the rise**.** In what follows, I identify not just pressures to use force preemptively that pose the most serious risk should a Sino-American confrontation unfold, but also related, if slightly less dramatic, incentives to initiate the limited use of force to gain bargaining leverage—a second trigger for potentially devastating instability during a crisis.4 My discussion proceeds in three sections. The first section explains why, during the next decade or two, a serious U.S.-China crisis may be more likely than is currently recognized. The second section examines the features of plausible Sino-American crises that may make them so dangerous. The third section considers general features of crisis stability in asymmetric dyads such as the one in which a U.S. superpower would confront an increasingly capable but still thoroughly overmatched China—the asymmetry that will prevail for at least the next decade. This more stylized discussion clarifies the inadequacy of focusing one-sidedly on conventional forces, as has much of the current commentary about the modernization of China's military and the implications this has for potential conflicts with the United States in the Western Pacific,5 or of focusing one-sidedly on China's nuclear forces, as a smaller slice of the commentary has.6 An assessment considering the interaction of conventional and nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility.

#### China joining TPP key to US-China relations and economic interdependence

Joshua Meltzer, senior fellow in Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, September, 2015, “Why China should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/21-us-china-economic-integration-tpp-meltzer> (accessed 4/26/16)

Conversely, China’s absence from the TPP would not be cost-free. According to economic modelling by Petri and Plummer, income losses to China from the TPP will be over $46 billion by 2025. However, should China join the TPP (along with South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand), income gains for China could be over $800 billion by 2025, and the gains for the United States would increase five-fold to nearly $330 billion. Such economics creates a solid basis for the United States and China to find ways to further integrate their economies.

### Plan

#### Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its economic engagement with the People’s Republic of China by inviting the People’s Republic of China to become a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

### TPP Solvency

#### China will be in the TPP inevitably- joining sooner is better for trade relations

China Daily, November, 2015, “China should participate in TPP negotiations, say executives,” <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/03/content_22357485.htm> (accessed 4/27/16)

China should actively involve itself in discussions for joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), said business executives at a forum in Beijing on Friday. "China will join the TPP in the end," said Eddie Chen Yonglan, managing director and regional head of leading French investment company Eurazeo, adding that it's a pity that China lost the chance of forming rules as a founding member. The TPP framework takes cooperation beyond trade level, by involving areas such as government procurement, labor issue and intellectual property, said Chen. "Investment rules are becoming equally important as those in trade." To shift toward an innovative economy, China has to promote intellectual property protection, said Bill Huang Xiaoqing, founder and CEO of cloud computing service provider CloudMinds Inc, at the forum. "The TPP shouldn't been seen as containment to the country," said Huang, "China should actively involve itself in the negotiation."

#### Plan key to success of the deal and global economy AND the administration is open to it

Jeffrey Lee, Staff Writer, November, 2014, “Obama Administration Signals Green Light for China to Join TPP Discussions,” Asia Cargo News, <http://www.asiacargonews.com/en/news/detail?id=42> (accessed 4/27/16)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, a new trade agreement under negotiation between the United States and 11 other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, has been on the table for years, but nine of these countries have still not been able to sign and implement a finalized version of the agreement. Chinese vice-minister of finance Zhu Guangyao recently said at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington that China should join agreements like the TPP, in line with closer integration with the global trade system. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has previously expressed interest in the partnership, saying that China may join “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” The Obama administration has also said that the US is open to letting China join the negotiation talks. Michael DeGolyer, a government and international studies professor at Hong Kong Baptist University, thinks the US doesn’t really have a choice in the matter. “If [the US wasn’t open to China joining the negotiations], the TPP would be perceived as ‘anti-China’ in its orientation, and other members might be less willing to join if China began to denounce the TPP and its members as trying to damage or exclude China,” he says. “It would make little sense to call it the TPP if it excluded the largest Pacific economy.” As the world’s second-largest economy – soon to be the largest – China views Japan, the third-largest, as a major rival. Some may be led to believe that Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiation talks in the latter half of 2013 was a contributing factor to China’s interest, but Mo Pak Hung, an assistant economics professor at Hong Kong Baptist University, says that is not necessarily the case. “Increasing trade with any country will raise the Chinese economic influence, and that will transform to political influence over time,” he says. “That will also bring benefits to the global economy.”

#### US should invite China- they have the incentive to say yes and it reinstores credibility to the deal

David Pilling, October, 2015, “The ‘anyone but China’ club needs a gatecrasher,” FT, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/62613e6a-6b5a-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html#axzz47zs7gGOB> (accessed 5/7/16)

Now that the TPP framework has been agreed, if not yet ratified, member states should make good on their word that their club is not barred to Chinese entry. They should invite Beijing to join. China should go one better still. It should call everyone’s bluff by starting negotiations to do just that. The idea is not as outlandish as it sounds. From Beijing’s perspective, there are good reasons to be inside the TPP tent. True, the TPP — less of a trade pact and more of a behind-the-borders exercise in protecting investments and standardising regulations — has faults aplenty. It goes too far in strengthening corporate clout by allowing companies to sue sovereign powers accused of eroding their profits. True, too, the TPP contains provisions against state exercise of economic power that seem almost designed with China in mind. Even so, the aims of the TPP and those of China’s hoped-for economic transformation are roughly aligned. In the late 1990s, Zhu Rongji, then premier, led China’s last great economic overhaul by using its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organisation to push domestic change. Today the TPP could play a similar role. Take the TPP’s prohibition of preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises. China falls short of that standard, supplying its behemoth SOEs with everything from cheap credit to cheap electricity. Yet Beijing has explicitly said it wants to stop such practices by forcing its mostly inefficient SOEs to operate on a more commercial basis. Similarly, the TPP has strict provisions on intellectual property covering trademarks, copyrights and patents, all areas flouted by Chinese companies. Yet China’s leaders know this has to change too. As their own companies, some of them heavy spenders on research and development, move up the value chain, Beijing will want to protect their innovations rather than encourage a promiscuous attitude towards intellectual property. The TPP has environmental provisions to prevent countries from attracting investments through trashing their own ecosystem. Again, China is moving gingerly in this direction as it seeks to clean up the environmental wreckage its early-stage industrialisation has caused. On labour issues too, China’s domestic reform agenda and TPP provisions are in sync. China wants to see a higher proportion of output in the pockets of its workers, who would then have more money to spend. Certainly, Beijing would be wary of unleashing genuinely independent trade unions. But it may at least be able to pay lip service to the idea of collective bargaining in the country’s own economic interests. The TPP might be good for China, then, by kick-starting its stalled economic transformation from state-led manufacturing to private-led services. But could it possibly be allowed to join? The hurdles may not be as high as they seem. Other countries, such as Vietnam, are TPP members. Vietnam is a one-party state with coddled SOEs and an attitude towards intellectual property every bit as cavalier as China’s. If Hanoi can join, surely Beijing can make the grade as well. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, has been one of the most explicit in envisioning the TPP as a geopolitical organisation. Yet this week he appeared to open the door to Chinese membership, saying the TPP would have more “significant strategic meaning if China joined”. Mr Abe is right. Without China, the TPP looks like a containment strategy in disguise. With China on board, it could help ease Beijing into a post-WTO world. The TPP might then begin to resemble the forward-looking trade pact its advocates pretend it always was.

## Advantage – Trade

## Uniqueness

### 2AC – China Trade Strong Now

#### China trade strong now, but could falter

Ese Erheriene, Reporter for the Wall Street Journal, April 2016, “Strong China Trade Data Pushes Copper Prices Higher,” The Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/strong-china-trade-data-pushes-copper-prices-higher-1460546522> (accessed 5/8/16)

China’s General Administration of Customs said exports expanded in March for the first time in nine months, up 11.5% year-over-year in March versus a 25.4% drop in February. The country’s imports fell less than economists expected over the same period, declining 7.6% compared with February’s fall of 13.8%. Imports of copper into China reached their highest level ever in March, according to Commerzbank, up 40% at 570,000 tons year-over-year. China is the world’s biggest consumer of copper, accounting for roughly 45% of global demand for the metal. As a result, metal prices tend to follow the country’s economic fortunes closely. Additionally, copper found support in oil prices, which have strengthened in recent days on the back of market expectations of a potential deal to freeze production between major producers at a meeting in Doha, Qatar, this weekend. The two commodities are often bought together as part of a basket of commodities in a fund, so large upswings in the oil price tend to positively spill over into copper. Shares in Asia also rose, with Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index gaining 3.2% and the Shanghai Composite Index up 1.4%. This indicated greater investor risk appetite, which tends to benefit so-called risk assets like base metals to the detriment of safe-havens like gold. Going forward, future Chinese imports could slow and that could hurt copper prices. “[China’s] import levels could ease lower in coming months if an improvement in fundamentals doesn’t follow through,” said ANZ Research.

#### China trade strong now- recent data

Allan von Mehren, Chief Analyst, January, 2016, “Flash Comment China – strong trade data should ease fears of a hard Landing,” Danske Bank, <http://www.danskebank.com/en-uk/ci/Products-Services/Markets/Research/Documents/FlashComment_China_130116.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

 Export and import data show encouraging signs of a moderate recovery in China and not a downturn as markets have been fearing and pricing in. As China has been one of the major concerns since the start of the year, this should help ease fears of a hard landing in China and support global risk sentiment. It will also help China stop the capital outflows and halt the depreciation of the CNY in the short term.  On exports, the market focuses on the y/y rate, which rose from -6.8% to -1.4% versus expectations of -8.0%. To evaluate the current development, it is better to look at the development in the level adjusted for seasonal fluctuations. It shows that exports are on a rising trend and have been so since the autumn of 2015. It underpins our expectations that the Chinese economy is in a phase of stabilisation and gradual albeit a moderate recovery.  As interesting and positive is that Chinese imports are picking up strongly. It supports inventory depletion having been a strong driving force behind the slowdown. Imports also follow exports closely as China is a hub for assembling and thus the import contents in exports is very high. Imports fell strongly in early 2014 but are in recovery mode. This is positive for the rest of the world not least other emerging markets with high exposure to China such as Brazil.  To sum up, the trade data today supports a picture of a gradual recovery in China as inventory depletion runs its' course, housing construction picks up during the year and moderate fiscal and monetary stimulus underpin public investment.

### 2AC – China Economy Strong Now

#### China economy slowing but strong

Liu Xiaoming, Chinese ambassador to the UK, February, 2016, “The Chinese economy is still full of power,” The Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12175115/The-Chinese-economy-is-still-full-of-power.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

In fact, the recent moderation in China’s growth is the anticipated result of reform measures and regulation. This is therefore the “new normal”: we are seeing slower yet better quality growth helped along by proactive and deeper reforms. Of course, China’s growth rate could easily have exceeded 7 per cent if the energy- and- pollution-intensive industries had been given free rein, or if massive stimulus measures had been applied. China, however, chose not to opt for this kind of unsustainable growth – because it would come with a huge cost and would sacrifice the long-term development of China and the world. Instead, China has chosen to focus on the following five key areas: addressing excess capacity, downsizing property inventories, expanding effective supply, helping enterprises reduce cost and guarding against financial risks. This approach, like losing weight, won’t be without its discomforts or pain. But just as perseverance will see one through a diet – to less fat, stronger muscles and a healthier body – so it is with the Chinese economy. Despite the moderation in growth, the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain strong. While the stock and foreign exchange markets have their own patterns, the key is to look at the bigger picture. It is true that the 6.9 per cent growth in 2015 was the lowest for China in 25 years. But this was achieved by an economy that is 10 trillion dollars in size. The actual increment is equivalent to the yearly GDP of a medium-sized country and it is larger than the amount generated by double-digit growth years ago.

### 2AC – AT: China Econ Resilience Overwhelms L

#### China’s economy is at an inflection point- now is key for a new economic growth engine

Jess McHugh, reports on Europe for the breaking news team. A Yale alum, she has previously worked for CNN, McSweeney's, and The Missing Slate and reported from France, Senegal, San Francisco, and DC., March, 2016, “China Economy News 2016: Exports Slump Amid Weak Demand,” International Business Times, <http://www.ibtimes.com/china-economy-news-2016-exports-slump-amid-weak-demand-2365956> (accessed 5/12/16)

First-quarter GDP growth hovered at 6.7 percent, compared with 15.4 percent in 2008 in the runup to the Beijing Olympics. Authorities in both the public and private sector have borrowed trillions of dollars in an attempt to stimulate the economy and to pay off past investments, and debt as a percentage of GDP reached 237 percent earlier this year. The nation of some nearly 1.4 billion people has struggled to shift from a manufacturing or industrial economy to a consumer-based one, and its future will depend on its ability to successfully make that transition, experts said. Where jobs in factories making everything from steel to sneakers once dominated the Chinese economy, the model has begun to shift to one of consumption in the past several years. "China hasn't found a new economic growth engine," one local told National Public Radio last week, adding, "If I had to use a word to describe the current state, it would be 'confusion.' We don't know where the country is headed."

### 2AC – AT: TPP Doesn’t Get Ratified

#### Passes in the US

South China Morning Post, February, 2016, “40 per cent of world’s economy signs up to TPP trade pact that Obama says ‘allows US, not China to write the rules of the road’,” <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1909671/40-cent-worlds-economy-signs-tpp-trade-pact-obama-says> (accessed 5/7/16)

But many analysts believe the pact will go through, and have urged China to seek TPP membership as early as possible. “The US trade rules always become global rules eventually. Better to join it earlier than later,” said Lu Zhengwei, chief economist of Industrial Bank. He said some terms in Sino-US trade talks were already similar to those of the TPP. However, Wei pointed out that China had never been invited to TPP talks. The TPP’s high standards for labour rights protection and provisions against state-owned enterprises would be two major hurdles for China, said Chu Yin, a researcher at the Centre for China and Globalisation.

## Impact

### 2AC – Add-On – Democracy

#### Including China in the TPP key to solve trade, democracy, and solve global cooperation

Hiroki Takeuchi Southern Methodist University, April, 2015, “From the World Trade Organization to the Trans-Pacific Partnership: China’s Rise, Globalization, and American Domestic Politics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Takeuchi%20-%20From%20WTO%20to%20TPP%20150403.pdf> (accessed 5/6/16)

How should the United States accommodate China’s interests and fears by advancing the TPP and by including China in the TPP in the future? How would China have an incentive to be an internationally responsible stakeholder and to play active roles to lead free trade in the AsiaPacific and eventually in the world? The multilateral approach through an international institution like the TPP might superficially restrain the U.S. leadership in negotiations on various issues of international political economy; however, it would eventually make it easier for the U.S. to achieve a more peaceful world environment, trade, and democracy, because the U.S. would find it easier to acquire valuable international support, which would give the U.S. legitimacy and burden-sharing (Ikenberry 2003, 2011). Moreover, economic interdependence would create a demand for a more liberal regime in the Chinese domestic sphere, which would provide credible limits on the state’s power over individual citizens (Doyle 1986; Schumpeter [1919] 1955). Theoretically, under a liberal regime, citizens are equal before the law and possess fundamental rights as individuals (e.g., freedom of speech, religion, association, and press) and there is minimal state intrusion in the economic sphere (e.g., protections for private property) (Doyle 1986; Kant [1795] 1983, 111–8). In sum, China’s rise and further involvement in the global market might create the following virtuous cycle: economic interdependence would give China a stake in being a member of the international institutions that govern international trade and build a prosperous middle class that might promote democratization; international institutions would facilitate cooperation and further interdependence; and following the rules and norms through the membership of international institutions might give China an incentive to advance rule of law in the domestic sphere. Thus, this theoretical perspective implies that the United States should advance the negotiations for the TPP and whether the U.S. should include China in the TPP negotiations in the near future.

#### Effective democracy promotion is key to solve global conflict

Mark Lagon, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, <http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090> (accessed 5/8/16)

Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.

### 2AC – Add-On – Asian War

#### China joining solves Asian war

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

If China joins the TPP, it will have to be committed to the economic reforms that the reformist internationalists want to advance. The negotiated issues of the TPP include not only the SOE reform, which will directly undermine the vested interests that the conservative hardliners desperately want to protect, but intellectual property rights and labor conditions, which will also undermine the vested interests because the state capitalists tend to lack innovation and have to rely on copied products or low-wage labor. Thus, the early conclusion of the TPP will empower the reformist internationalists against the conservative hardliners in the power struggle of Chinese elite politics. The TPP will impose on China the “gaiatsu” (literally “foreign pressure”), which was frequently used during U.S.-Japan trade negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s. 33 This gaiatsu will promote market reform, which will shift the Chinese economy away from state capitalism; then, the empowered reformist internationalists will make China’s foreign policy more cooperative. Therefore, the TPP will strengthen the regional security of the Asia-Pacific region by turning China’s behavior toward international cooperation. By contrast, the failure of the TPP will empower the conservative hardliners vis-à-vis the reformist internationalists in Chinese domestic politics, make China’s behavior more aggressive in international relations, and make it more difficult for the United States and its allies to manage China’s rise and the regional security of the Asia-Pacific.

#### Asian war leads to massive nuclear war

Walter Mead, November, 2010 senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Obama in Asia”, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia> (accessed 4/25/16)

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation. East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here. American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival.¶ The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia. The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas.¶ Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns. That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

### 2AC – Trade Controls All Impacts

#### Trade is a controlling impact---economic partnerships solve every conflict because it reduces need for military conquest---global hotspots now, only trade-based alliances solve.

Loren Mooney 14, citing Matthew O. Jackson, William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford, and PhD in economics from Stanford Graduate School of Business, May 28 2014, “Matthew O. Jackson: Can Trade Prevent War?” <http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/matthew-o-jackson-can-trade-prevent-war> (accessed 5/8/16)

How can humans stop war? Obviously there's no simple answer, but a new network model analysis of international alliances suggests that trade may be at least part of the answer. The model, developed by Stanford economist Matthew O. Jackson and economics Ph.D. candidate Stephen Nei, suggests that military alliances alone aren't enough to stop nations from attacking one other, and also that the addition of multilateral economic trade creates a more stable, peaceful world.¶ While there is considerable existing research on the effects of trade and war, much of it has looked at bilateral relationships. This model focuses on multilateral interactions and considers various incentives for countries to attack, form alliances with, and trade with one another. In an attempt to understand what's necessary to achieve a stable network with no incentive for war, Jackson and Nei first explored an alliance scenario based solely on military defense considerations, excluding trade. "The fundamental difficulty we find is that alliances are costly to maintain if there's no economic incentive," says Jackson. So networks remain relatively sparse, a condition in which even a few shifting allegiances leaves some countries vulnerable to attack. "Stability is not just a little bit elusive; it's very elusive."¶ Economic trade, however, makes a significant difference. "Once you bring in trade, you see network structures densify," he says. Nations form a web of trading alliances, which creates financial incentive not only to keep peace with trading partners, but also to protect them from being attacked so as not to disrupt trade. "In the context of the alliances we have analyzed, trade motives are essential to avoiding wars and sustaining stable networks," the authors wrote in their paper, Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.¶ Their findings coincide with two major global trends since World War II: From 1950 to 2000, the incidence of interstate war has decreased nearly tenfold compared with the period from 1850 to 1949. At the same time, since 1950 international trade networks have increased nearly fourfold, becoming significantly more dense. "In the period before World War II, it was hard to find a stable set of alliances," says Jackson. The probability of a lasting alliance was about 60%. "You have almost a coin-flip chance that the alliance won't still be there in five years," he says. In Europe in the 1870s, for example, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought peace with "balance of power" diplomacy, which crumbled leading up to World War I. "Then in the past 50 years or so, there's been a surprising global stability." The impact of economic interdependence is especially apparent in Europe, Jackson says, where the Eurozone has promoted not only peace and increased trade among nations, but also labor mobility.¶ Very costly wars still occur, of course, but Jackson notes that the most war-torn places in recent history have tended to be those with fewer global trade alliances. For example, the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003 and beyond, which killed more than four million people and is the deadliest war since World War II, involved eight African nations with relatively few trade ties. "Then look at the Kuwait situation," says Jackson, referring to U.S. intervention in the first Gulf War to protect oil supplies. "Economic interest drives a lot of what goes on in terms of where nations are willing to exercise military strength."

#### Loss of effective trade flips their DA

Michael J. Panzer, Faculty Member specializing in Equities, Trading, Global Capital Markets and Technical Analysis at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and J.P. Morgan Chase, 2007 “Geopolitics,” *Financial Armageddon: Protecting Your Future from Four Impending Catastrophes*, Published by Kaplan Publishing, ISBN 141959608X, p. 137-138 (accessed 5/8/16)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious [end page 137] differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Trade solves prolif, relations, econ, environment, HR, demo, terrorism, disease

David Dreier, Rep. Chairman of the House Rules Committee, 1/5/11, Politico, “Bipartisanship can revive economy,” <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47044.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

There are no higher priorities for our country right now than job creation and economic growth. As the new Congress begins, every decision we make must be tied directly to those goals. If we are going to get our economy back on track, we need to take several key steps. These include making the current tax rates permanent, repealing the job-killing health care law and dramatically reducing federal spending. Some of these efforts will divide Congress politically. But they are all a part of what House Republicans pledged we would do — and of what the American people expect us to do. At the same time, there are areas in which both parties can work together. **A strong trade agenda presents a unique opportunity to promote economic growth, global partnerships and bipartisan cooperation.** Unfortunately, the **trade agenda has been allowed to languish** for the past four years and, in some cases, has been thwarted. **In the meantime, our economy and our global prestige have suffered. There’s never been a more important time to re-engage on trade.** Trade is often blamed for every manner of society’s ills. **Globally connected commerce has been accused of having a hand in everything from terrorism to pandemics.** In December, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez blamed it for the tragic mudslides that claimed dozens of lives in his nation and in Colombia. Setting aside the disservice that such a claim does for addressing the true root causes of the great challenges we face, **the reality of the role of trade is precisely the opposite of what this viewpoint presents. International trade plays an important part in improving a nation’s circumstances** — far beyond the immediate scope of exports and imports. **Given the current climate, the direct economic impact is the most urgent. Opening up new markets for U.S. producers, farmers, service providers and investors is essential for spurring growth and creating new job opportunities for both union and nonunion workers here at home.** The three markets with which we have pending free-trade agreements — Colombia, Panama and South Korea — represent 96 million consumers and $1.8 trillion in economic activity. **The opportunity for U.S. job creators is enormous**, so the delay in the agreements’ consideration is unjustifiable. The benefits of trade, however, extend considerably beyond job creation and economic growth. **Economic engagement across borders builds the strong global partnerships that are necessary to address the challenges of the 21st century. Whether the issue is tariffs or nuclear proliferation, the trust and spirit of collaboration forged through economic ties help the** United States **advance its interests and spread its values around the globe. Enhancing prosperity through international trade also creates the resources necessary for essential efforts like improving environmental quality, protecting human rights and building democratic institutions.** **Raising living standards, in fact, helps alleviate many of society’s ills, including terrorism, pandemics** and, yes, even the ability to respond to natural disasters in South America.

### 2AC – Trade Solves Disease

#### Trade increases standard of living- prevents disease spread

Miriam Sapiro, visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2014 Mirian, “Why trade matters” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why%20trade%20matters/trade%20global%20views\_final.pdf

We should not take these spillover effects for granted, or overlook the powerful role that trade can play in promoting growth, raising living standards in some of the poorest countries, and reducing poverty, especially given that global trade remains below its normal rate of expansion. Jeffrey Sachs and others have written extensively about the importance of trade liberalization to overall economic reform efforts and economic growth. ''While there has been debate about the extent to which trade openness can help alleviate poverty, recent studies show that trade does tend to reduce poverty when there are complementary reforms also under way. These enabling factors include a growing financial sector, improving education and better governance. This conclusion reinforces earlier research finding that trade generally is a "strongly positive contributor to poverty alleviation"" notwithstanding some shifts and temporary dislocations in the job market. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has drawn similar conclusions, stating in a report on "Trade, Growth and Jobs" that: "Openness has historically gone hand in hand with better economic performance, in both developed and developing economies, creating new opportunities for workers, consumers and firms around the globe and helping to lift millions out of poverty. Raising barriers to trade, on the other hand, is not only a costly and an ineffective policy option, but it can also be anti-poor, penalizing most those it aims to protect.""

### 2AC – Trade Solves Heg

**Trade key to hegemony-** Signals our interest in maintaining power

Robert, **Zoellick,** served as president of the World Bank Group, U.S. trade representative and deputy secretary of state, January, **14** “Leading From the Front on Free Trade,” The Wall Street Journal, Factiva, (accessed 5/8/16)

The U.S. is also combining geoeconomics with geopolitics by negotiating a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union. Together, TPP and TTIP could forge modern trade and investment rules with major economies of western and eastern Eurasia. To offer opportunities for global trade liberalization, the U.S. is also negotiating in the World Trade Organization freer trade for services businesses and a Digital Economy compact that would update the successful Information Technology Agreement of the 1990s. These openings would be especially valuable for middle-income economies that want to boost productivity and reach high incomes through more competitive service and information industries.¶ The economic record of America's free-trade agreements argues for expansion. America's free-trade partners account for about 45% of all U.S. exports, even though their economies amount to only 10% of global GDP. On average, in the first five years of a new free-trade agreement, U.S. exports grew three to four times as rapidly as U.S. exports to others. The U.S. has a trade surplus with its 20 free-trade partners -- in manufacturing, agriculture, and services -- instead of the large deficit it runs with the world.¶ These trade agreements serve principally to bring down the barriers of other countries, because U.S. restrictions are already relatively low. U.S. free-trade agreements are also comprehensive -- covering not only manufacturing and almost all agriculture, but also services, government procurement and transparency, investment and intellectual property, as well as dispute resolution. These trade agreements encourage others to move toward greater compatibility with the U.S. economy and legal framework**.**¶ Republicans have provided most of the votes in Congress for free-trade accords in the past. Here is why: The deals cut taxes on trade. They expand individual freedom, consumer choice and opportunities for innovation. They reduce governmental barriers. They boost the private sector. They enhance the rule of law and foster civil society.¶ An active trade agenda alsosignals America's interest in the rest of the world at a time others are worried about U.S. withdrawal. Free trade boosts development and economic reformers around the world, while supporting U.S. growth. For much of the world,America's commitment to stability seems more credible if built upon an economic foundation. Economic diplomacy can be the basis for hard, soft and smart power.

### 2AC – Trade K2 Human Rights

#### TPP key to keep human rights abuses in check-

Colleen Nelson and William Mauldin, October, 2015, The Wall Street Journal, “White House Compares Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Tariff Cuts to Tax Breaks,” <http://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-compares-trans-pacific-partnerships-tariff-cuts-to-tax-breaks-1444258931>) (accessed 10/21/15)

While the agreement has come under fire from environmental and labor rights groups, a senior White House official said environmental protections turned out better than many of those groups had expected and the provisions covering the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism make it clear that signatory governments can regulate for health and safety. “Labor standards are enforceable and more comprehensive and will require Malaysia to deal with human trafficking, Brunei with minimum wage, Vietnam with labor unions rights,” the official said. “All three of them are going to have to change laws to comply with this. It’s a leveling up of the playing field.”

## Solvency

### 2AC – I/L: Trade Diversion

#### Yes – exclusion from TPP results in trade diversion

Ni Yueju, Reporter for China Daily Europe, December, 2015, “China needs strategy to deal with TPP,” China Daily Europe, <http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-12/04/content_22625314.htm> (accessed 5/12/16)

So how does the TPP affect China? Economically, there would be some trade diversion effect on China. The TPP specifies that the member states shall eliminate, within the prescribed time frame, tariffs on more than 18,000 goods, including automobiles, machinery tools, information products, consumer products, chemicals and agricultural products such as avocados, wheat, pork and beef. Exports of some of China's labor-intensive products, such as clothing, shoes and hats, would be diverted to Vietnam. The export of some mechanical and electrical products might be shifted to Singapore and Malaysia. Also, foreign investment would be diverted specifically to Southeast Asian countries at a faster speed, thus reducing foreign direct investment in China. The reason is that, under the rules, the country of origin can benefit from tax cuts only when over 60 percent of the intermediate goods used to make an export product come from the member country.

### 2AC – AT: =/= Solve Trade War

#### Inviting China solves trade war

Li Shengjiao is a researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has served as China's deputy consul-general in Toronto, March, 2015, “China-U.S. Trade Engagement in Asia Could Be Win-Win,” Caixin Online, <http://english.caixin.com/2015-03-27/100795499.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

Hyping China's trade dominance in Asia is merely a political gimmick to win domestic support for the TPP. The FTAAP is a joint effort by APEC economies, and have the potential to incorporate the TPP and other existing free trade arrangements, not necessarily conflicting with the TPP. While the TPP is not attractive to several APEC economies because of its U.S. dominance, the proposed FTAAP is meant to be an all-inclusive, all-win trade initiative that "represents the largest single liberalization in history," as Bergsten himself put it. The United States should walk the talk and work with China to take a leadership role to truly facilitate global economic integration instead of waging a trade war with China and only trying to have a narrow interest that barely a certain number of countries could benefit. As long as the two parties seek collaboration over conflict, there is reason to believe that the China-U.S. trade engagement in the Asia-Pacific could be a win-win game.

### 2AC – AT: TPP Not Key to China’s Economy

#### China should join- TCI’s show huge economic gains

Bala Ramasamy, Professor of Economics, China Europe International Business School, April, 2016, “Why China could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Conversation, <http://theconversation.com/why-china-could-never-sign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361> (accessed 4/29/16)

In 2013, the 12 countries participating in the TPP accounted for about a third of China’s trade in merchandise goods. However the US stands out as it makes up about half of the TPP in terms of exports, and about a quarter when it comes to imports. This would imply that exclusion from the TPP is essentially a lost opportunity for any country trying to secure a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Meanwhile, a look at the Trade Complementary Index (TCI) – an indicator of how well the structures of a country’s imports and exports match – shows how much could be gained by both the US and China if the latter were included in the TPP.

#### TPP key to China exports

Wen Jin Yuan is a researcher with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she specializes in China’s economic and financial issues as well as economic integration in East Asia, June 2012, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and China’s Corresponding Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Despite the currently sluggish climate, some Chinese scholars still actively argue that if the TPP is successfully negotiated and implemented in the future, it will have a strong negative economic impact on China. Song Guoyou notes that the TPP will result in “trade diversion”, namely, the effect in which trade is diverted from a more efficient exporter towards a less efficient one by the formation of a free trade agreement. Song argues that since some of the TPP member countries are developing countries, the quality of their export products is highly similar to that of China’s. This similarity will in turn trigger export competition between China and these developing countries. Under these circumstances, the TPP will pose a severe threat to China’s exports to the US. 19 Meanwhile, Chinese scholars in general, opine that compared to the TPP’s impact on the Chinese economy, China’s geopolitical status will face an even greater threat in the long term. Shen Minghui, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), notes that the implementation of the TPP would attract ASEAN countries and other U.S. allies in East Asia to adopt a policy leaning towards the US and support its return to East Asia, which would in turn estrange China from those countries. This will present a huge threat to China’s strategic maneuver and its status in the East Asian region. Therefore, Shen argues that China should pay attention to the TPP’s tentative geopolitical implications and respond to them strategically.20

#### Excluding China kills their manufacturing base

The Korea Herald, December, 2015, “'TPP will spur erosion of China’s manufacturing edge’,” <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20151224001190> (accessed 4/30/16)

It may take time for the TPP to be ratified (by each member of the pact). Personally, I am not optimistic about the domestic ratification process. But if it is ratified, chances are high that the structure of the global manufacturing base, which has hitherto been led by China, will change. In the past when China pursued growth based on exports, it purchased raw materials or components from countries in East Asia and used its cheap labor to produce finished products. China then sold them to advanced nations. But its per capita income has risen to $8,000. Particularly, the income in China’s eastern coastal regions -- its manufacturing hub -- is much higher than the average as the regions have become more affluent than their counterparts. Thus, China’s advantage in the labor-intensive industries has been weakening. This trend is in sync with the TPP. Countries like Malaysia and Vietnam that joined the TPP could emerge as the center of manufacturing. Within the TPP framework, there are manufacturing hubs like these countries, and there are also countries like Japan that can invest in these hubs and provide components. Also in the TPP, there is a huge U.S. market. This said, the TPP platform offers good conditions for countries like Malaysia to emerge as a new manufacturing center. To sum up, the TPP would accelerate the movement of the manufacturing center from China to other countries, and it would encourage the growth of Southeast Asian nations.

### 2AC – AT: Trade =/= Solve War

#### Solves trade disputes and creates protective mechanisms against trade asymmetries

[David Autor](http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor), leading labor economist and associate head of the economics department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, [David Dorn](http://www.ddorn.net/), professor of international trade and labor markets at the University of Zurich, and [Gordon H. Hanson](http://irps.ucsd.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/gordon-hanson.htm), director of the Center on Emerging and Pacific Economies at the University of California, San Diego, March, 2015, “Why Obama’s key trade deal with Asia would actually be good for American workers,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/03/12/why-obamas-key-trade-deal-with-asia-would-actually-be-good-for-american-workers/> (accessed 4/30/16)

If passed, the TPP also would create a powerful template for future trade deals, including with China, which would move the U.S. closer to resolving conflicts the WTO has been unable to handle. Consider, for example, the case of Qualcomm, a highly successful San Diego-based maker of chipsets for wireless communications that [earns half of its global revenues in China](http://investor.qualcomm.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1234452-14-320&CIK=804328). The company’s substantial share of the Chinese chip market attracted the attention of the Chinese government, which proceeded to extract [$1 billion in fines](http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-settles-china-probe-1423518143) for alleged anti-competitive practices. In the U.S., where Qualcomm also sells its chipsets, the company has faced no such anti-trust penalties. Under current trade law, Qualcomm has little recourse to appeal its treatment by the Chinese government. Under a trade agreement with China like the TPP, however, Qualcomm and other U.S. companies would have access to an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Contrary to [criticism from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.)](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html), this mechanism would protect U.S. firms against predatory regulatory interventions by member governments. Anti-competitive asymmetries in the world trade system disproportionately harm U.S. firms at present. Enactment of the TPP would establish protections against these asymmetries for U.S. companies.

#### Even if it doesn’t solve all war, it acts as a conflict dampener – studies prove

Adam S. Posen (PIIE) Op-ed in Caixin Online, June, 2014, “A Win-Win-Win Solution for the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/win-win-win-solution-trans-pacific-partnership> (accessed 5/7/16)

Therefore, a practical step would be for the United States to explicitly and publicly invite China to join the TPP talks at the upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As a preparation for that participation, China and the United States should agree on the proposal for an official observer status for Chinese trade negotiators in the current negotiations. There will of course be fears on both sides (but particularly in the United States) that such an observer from China would take confidential negotiating positions and possibly use them to interfere with the progress of TPP or pursue side bargains. I believe that by giving China an explicit and open observer status in TPP, the Chinese government would find it in its own self-interest to play fairly and respectfully with all the negotiating partners. The underlying suspicions and actual disputes between China and the United States will not be solved by trade alone, let alone a future-oriented trade agreement. There is no automatic link between expanding trade relations and good relations and broader relations overall—if there was, the trillions of dollars of Chinese goods purchased by the United States over the last three decades would have assured mutual bliss. In the absence of outright conflict, however, deeper economic integration can act as a counterweight to escalating overreaction to and spillover of what should be manageable tensions. More importantly, an economically reformed and open China serves both Chinese reform and American interests. Let us move this forward.

### 2AC – AT: No Reforms

#### TPP good- key to domestic reforms in China

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

What are the TPP’s implications beyond economic benefits? This essay discusses three aspects of the TPP: economy, strategy, and security. From the economic perspective, the TPP will promote international trade in the Asia-Pacific region, enhance each nation’s economy, increase employment, and especially benefit consumers and exporting industries in each nation. From the strategic perspective, the TPP will establish the rules of international economy in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthen the “rule-based U.S.-led international order,” and make it easier to manage China, a country which challenges the U.S.-led international order. From the security perspective, the TPP will give China—when China is interested in joining the TPP in the future—an incentive to be committed to economic reforms, empower reformists in Chinese domestic politics, and motivate its leaders to make cooperative foreign policy.

### 2AC – AT: TPP Not Credible

#### China must join- key to TPP credibility

Global Times, October 2015, “Successful global trade agreements require China's participation,” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/945689.shtml> (accessed 4/29/16)

The question is to what extent these TPP partners can achieve their goal. It is generally believed that a free trade agreement can bring extra trade volume to partner countries while adversely affecting non-partner countries. The TPP is likely to have an impact on China in a short term, but its importance may be overblown. The TPP is only a regional agreement. Each of the 12 countries has a different development level. Although the US said the pact will have new members, the TPP will have limited vitality without the participation of the world's second largest economy. The world economy has been deeply interdependent. China is the largest trading partner for many nations involved in the TPP, including Japan, Singapore and Australia. China is also second largest trading partner of the US. Beijing has signed FTAs with Seoul and Canberra. Unilateral containment of China, a difficult task, will also backfire. Mutual benefit and win-win cooperation has been increasingly regarded as a realistic consensus, a path that the TPP will very likely choose in the future. China hasn't ruled out the possibility of joining the TPP either. It will be not easy for the TPP to be accepted as a global trade standard. In areas such as agriculture, intellectual property and medical patents, Washington stresses its own interests. A responsible superpower should lead by example and advocate fairness. Concealing selfishness with so-called loftier goals is self-deception. The TPP will not dictate global trade rules, judging by the agreement. It can at most boost Washington's influence in trade. Washington has repeatedly said it cannot let China write the rules. But it is clear what the rules will be under its dominance. The decline of US global leadership is partly caused by its way of setting rules. The TPP is not an opportunity China cannot miss. Any global trade framework will not be perfect without China's participation. We have nothing to be insecure about.

### 2AC – AT: Inviting China Hurts Economy

#### No- inviting China to join TPP good for global economy

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

The second scenario is that China will become a negotiating member when the TPP increases its membership in the near future. The TPP is based on the goal of advancing economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific. The reality is that the United States and the 11 other negotiating nations all more or less share common economic interests with China, and would benefit from China’s participation in any international economic institution. This scenario is supported by the following liberal theory argued by Robert O. Keohane and others: international institutions might mitigate the effects of anarchy by promoting economic interdependence and trust, which could decrease conflict among states and hence weaken the role of military power and the insecurity it breeds.26 From this viewpoint, given the reality that China’s rise increases common interests between China and the United States (and its allies), the United States should include China in the U.S.-led global market system and in U.S.-led international economic institutions such as the TPP. However, it is unrealistic for China to participate in the ongoing negotiation, and hence, China will start negotiations for joining the TPP after the TPP is concluded.

### AT: Status Quo China FTAs Solve

#### Squo FTAs fail- don’t improving neighboring environment, military might or economy

Wen Jin Yuan is a researcher with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she specializes in China’s economic and financial issues as well as economic integration in East Asia, June 2012, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and China’s Corresponding Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Though the Beijing leadership is actively pursuing its own FTA agenda as a strategy to counter-balance the TPP agenda, it is highly unlikely that China will fulfill its goal of improving its neighboring environment through the aforementioned strategy. According to Joseph S. Nye, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, China’s growing economic and military might has frightened its neighbors into looking for allies to balance China’s increase in hard power.33 Although the Chinese government is trying to “bribe” its Asian neighbors with economic benefits, China’s amiable stance has constantly been undercut by its unwillingness to solve territorial disputes in a multilateral setting as well as its simultaneous threat to browbeat its neighbors. For instance, in 2010, China’s rapidly increasing military budget and naval modernization aroused fears among its ASEAN neighbors -- especially in view of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel islands. Concern about China’s military ambitions led neighboring ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam, to try to “internationalize” the dispute. Comments by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010, indicating that “the United States would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the issue,” elicited a furious response from Beijing, charging that the United States was interfering in the issue. 34 Most recently, tensions have been rising again between China and the Philippines over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea, and Chinese state media warned the Philippines that military conflict is possible over a stand-off at a disputed reef, the Scarborough Shoal, off the Philippine coast.35 Against this backdrop, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for China’s FTA strategy to reach its political aim.

## Advantage – U.S.-China Relations

## Uniqueness

### 2AC – AT: Relations High

#### Relations tenuous now- Obama’s strategies have been ineffective at fostering true cooperation

Brian Hopkins, Reporter, April 2016, “The future of U.S.-China relations,” The Duke Chronicle, <http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016/04/the-future-of-u-s-china-relations> (accessed 5/12/16)

The relationship between the United States and China has always been tenuous at best. Like members of a class project group forced to interact with one another against their will, China and the United States find themselves forced to cooperate. Since his inauguration in 2009, President Obama has attempted to develop a new strategic outlook toward the emerging superpower—one that engages them and incorporates them into the international system through the US strategic lens. To date, his strategy has been marginally effective and offers his successor a solid foundation off of which they will (hopefully) build a new and effective strategic partnership.

#### Now is key- inflection point for their relations

Travis Tanner is Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the 100,000 Strong Foundation. Zhao Minghao is a Member of the Academic Committee and a Research Fellow at the Pangoal Institution, May, 2016, “Investment in U.S.-China Relations Starts with People - See more at: <http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/investment-in-u-s-china-relations-starts-with-people/#sthash.MXgoqMuB.dpuf>,” China Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/investment-in-u-s-china-relations-starts-with-people/> (accessed 5/12/16)

The U.S.-China relationship faces a critical juncture. Today the relationship is marked by progress in certain areas but continued stalemate and simmering tensions in others. The stakes are high given the global implications of the two nations’ interactions with each other across a wide range of issues. One important mechanism to facilitate positive engagement and collaboration, as well as successfully manage tension and areas of disagreement, is people-to-people (P2P) exchange. The U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly over the past three decades and continues to evolve. As ties between the two countries appear to be entering a new and important phase—marked by high international stakes, increased tensions over strategic and economic issues, and a growing number of overlapping interests—the senior leaders in both nations must counter the buildup of strategic mistrust and rivalry. From a national security perspective, people-to-people activities have traditionally been considered a less important issue and viewed more as a tool of cultural and public diplomacy, useful only for achieving “soft” diplomatic objectives. Altering this view and utilizing P2P as a way to tackle strategic issues could help reduce tensions over cybersecurity, activities in outer space, nuclear weapons, maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, and other sensitive security-related topics, as well as address the general trust deficit in the bilateral relationship.

## Impact

### 2AC – Add/On – China-EU Relations (Bad)

#### Leaving China out of the deal causes spike in China-EU relations

Timothy Guzman, independent researcher and writer with a focus on political, economic, media and historical spheres. He has been published in Global Research, The Progressive Mind, European Union Examiner, News Beacon Ireland, WhatReallyHappened.com, EIN News and a number of other alternative news sites. He is a graduate of Hunter College in New York City, October, 2015, “The Secretive Trans-Pacific Partnership: Washington’s Strategy to Isolate China,” Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-secretive-trans-pacific-partnership-washingtons-strategy-to-isolate-china/5482252> (accessed 4/26/16)

RT news reported that China can unite to counter the TPP with Europe which accounts for “€1 billion in trade daily, while bilateral trade in goods reached €428.1 billion in 2013.” According to the RT news report: This raises questions, whether China and other countries are ready to unite to counter-balance the Pacific Rim pact. “China and Europe may finally look at each other and find some commonalities that they were unaware of before,” said Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia-Pacific economist at Natixis, in a report quoted by CNBC. “China expressed interest to the EU commencing negotiations on a bilateral FTA [free trade agreement] when President Xi Jinping visited the EU in March 2014. At the time, the EU recognized this to be a desirable long-term objective rather than something that would be negotiated in the near future,” CNBC quotes Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist at HIS as saying RT news also reported that “another way for China to oppose TPP is boosting its BRICS participation. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa comprise about 30 percent of world’s GDP at the moment in PPP terms and are projected to increase to as much as 45 percent by 2030.” Which rightly so, allows China to bypass the TPP trade zone.

#### Strong China-EU relations causes shift to multipolarity

Bates Gill and Melissa Murphy, May, 2008, “China-Europe Relations Implications and Policy Responses for the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080507-gill-chinaeuroperelations-web.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Today, as China’s influence in the world grows and as the European Union moves to strengthen its position as a more cohesive and effective voice in international affairs, it is all the more critical for U.S. policy leaders to take careful stock of China-Europe relations and their implications for U.S. interests. Europe-China relations have become increasingly regularized, institutionalized, and mutually beneficial, encompassing a broadening range of political, economic, military, scientific, technological, educational, and cultural ties. The China question has arisen as an area of potential transatlantic disagreement, especially over the arm embargo issue, but also on broader concerns of global order, multipolarity, balancing U.S. power, and economic competition. Given the political, economic and security-related importance of China and Europe to the United States, and their steadily improving relationship, these developments pose important challenges and opportunities for U.S. interests. These developments may not only challenge the U.S. position vis-à-vis China and Europe; they also could contribute to an increasingly competitive, confrontational, and ultimately detrimental deterioration in traditionally strong transatlantic relations, while also further exacerbating persistent mistrust in U.S.-China ties. Were U.S.-EuropeChina relations to deteriorate, Washington could lose out on the enormous strategic opportunities that would encourage positive political, economic, and security-related outcomes in China, which favor U.S., European, and Chinese interests over the longer term.

#### Even with territorial security, multipolarity results in war because of status competition

William C Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth, World Politics, 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” pg. 56 (accessed 5/10/16)

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict.

### 2AC – Relations Control Every Impact

#### Maintaining strong U.S.-China relations solves every existential risk and resolves [the DA impact]

Yang Jiechi, June 23, 2015, Chinese State Councilor For Foreign Policy, "China-US Cooperation Benefits the Two Countries and the World", 6-23-2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\_eng/zxxx\_662805/t1275022.shtml

The seventh round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) will be held in Washington D.C. between 22 and 24 of June. The mechanism of the S&ED was first established in 2009. Over the last six years, especially since 2013 when President Xi Jinping and President Obama reached agreement on China and the United States working together to build a new model of major-country relationship, this mechanism has kept growing in depth and covered more and more areas in bilateral relations. With over 700 deliverables achieved so far, this mechanism is playing an increasingly positive role in bringing about closer exchanges and cooperation between China and the United States. Today, China and the United States maintain close communication and cooperation in a wide range of areas concerning peace and development of humanity. The two countries have increasingly close and effective cooperation in combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, seeking solutions to regional hotspot issues, fighting transnational crimes and containing the outbreak of epidemics. Last year, two-way trade and investment stock registered record figures, driving employment and economic growth in both countries. The two economies, contributing 27.8% and 15.3% respectively to the global economy, have become two main engines propelling global economic growth. The two countries have worked with other parties at the G20 and APEC to promote better global economic governance and launched the process of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The two countries have maintained close communication and coordination over such issues as the Iranian nuclear issue, the Korean nuclear issue and South Sudan and worked tirelessly for their resolution. Together, our two countries have trained diplomats for Afghanistan, helped Timor-Leste with agricultural development, and explored tripartite cooperation in Africa and other regions, thus contributing to stability and development of the countries and regions concerned. Together, the two countries have shown to the world the resolve to do more on cutting emissions, setting an example for other countries to jointly confront climate change and create a green world. When the Ebola epidemic raged in West African countries, our two countries worked closely with each other to provide financial and material assistance to the countries affected, helped with the training of local medical workers, and set up treatment centers in the affected areas. After 36 years of diplomatic engagement, China and the United States now share more and more converging interests. Our bilateral ties are assuming greater strategic significance as well as global influence. Under the new circumstances, the number of areas where our two countries should and could work together has dramatically increased, not decreased. China stands ready to work with the United States to follow up on the agreement reached between the two Presidents by keeping to the right direction of building a new model of major-country relationship. The two countries need to work together to deepen strategic communication, enhance strategic mutual trust, avoid strategic miscalculation, properly manage differences and sensitive issues, and expand exchanges and results-oriented cooperation across the board. Within the S&ED framework, this round of strategic dialogue will focus on the upcoming important agenda for bilateral ties. This includes such major topics as reinforcing extensive cooperation in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, military-to-military ties, law enforcement, climate change, energy and the environment, and science and technology. It also includes dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue, the Korean nuclear issue and other regional hotspot issues, and exploring the way we conduct exchanges and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. I look forward to working with Secretary Kerry to make this dialogue as productive as it could be in order to prepare for President Xi's state visit to the United States in September and inject more positive energy to the growth of China-US relations.

#### Keeping China out of the deal hurts its growth and regional influence

Peter Yu, professor of law and co-director of the Center for Law and Intellectual Property at Texas A&M University October, 2015, “How China's exclusion from the TPP could hurt its economic growth,” Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2015/10/19/china-exclusion-tpp-economic-growth/> (accessed 4/26/16)

The disappointment is understandable. China is now the world’s second largest or largest economy – depending on whom you ask. Although President Barack Obama rightly notes that the global economy is too important for China to write its rules, the exclusion of this important market will certainly make the regional pact less attractive. One question that has not been explored much within the U.S. is whether China actually cares about its being excluded from the TPP. It is also worth asking what followup actions China will take in response to the adoption of this regional pact. Why China might care about being left out of TPP From its inception, the TPP has been considered by many as a strategic instrument to isolate or contain China. Given the country’s ambitions, its leaders are understandably concerned about the concerted effort by the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific countries to curtail its economic growth and geopolitical influence. China’s outsider status could also be seen as an indictment of its inadequacies, such as limited intellectual property protection and a lack of government procurement standards. The exclusion of China not only has caused the country to lose face, but has also provided a painful reminder of its continued struggle to gain an equal status in the international community. Finally, the lack of TPP membership will prevent China from enjoying new tariff reduction and preferential market access. If this regional pact is to operate according to design, it will divert trade and manufacturing from China to TPP members.

### 2AC – Relations Solve Cyber-Security

#### Strong U.S.-China relations are key to cybersecurity and preventing organized crime networks from using cyberspace to initiate conflict

Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. From 2009 to 2012, Lieberthal served as the director of the John L. Thornton China Center. Lieberthal was a professor at the University of Michigan from 1983 to 2009) and Peter W. Singer, was director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, February, 2012, “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations” 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/23-cybersecurity-china-us-singer-lieberthal/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_english.pdf> (accessed 4/14/16)

And yet, concerns over this domain have rapidly moved to the forefront of U.S.-China relations. While both senior policymakers and general publics are struggling to understand the cyber realm’s basic dynamics and implications, the issue of cybersecurity is looming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides.2 Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (such as trade, human rights, cross-Strait relations, and regional territorial disputes). The underlying concern is driven by the fact that the malevolent side of cyberspace has increased hand in hand with the growing scale and use of the benevolent side. There are an estimated 55,000 new pieces of malware found each day and another 200,000 computers worldwide turned into “zombies” (compromised computers under the control of an actor other than the owner) each day. These computers are often bundled together into “botnets,” chains of thousands and in some cases even millions of computers externally controlled and often used for nefarious activities.3 But even more important than the growing numbers behind the malicious use of the Internet may be the evolution of the cyber threat landscape from one dominated by individual hackers, often motivated by a search for attention, to one driven by complex, organized groups, which range from international criminal networks to state-related espionage and military efforts. The result is that just as the positive side of the cyber domain is rippling out into the physical domain with rapid and often unexpected consequences, so too is the negative side. Establishing greater mutual understanding and trust will be a difficult process. It will require consistent efforts over time, common approaches to structuring the discussion, and selection of topics that hold the most promise for permitting increasing understanding of perceptions, goals, and mutually acceptable approaches and methods. The path will be a challenging one for both U.S. and Chinese experts and officials, but important things cannot be accomplished without a dedicated effort. And, it is an effort that must begin soon. In Chinese there is a proverb, “Ice does not freeze three inches thick from one day’s cold.” This adage is akin to the proverb in English that “ancient Rome was not built in a day.” These old sayings still hold true, even more so in the fast-moving world of cybersecurity. The U.S. and China relationship is critical both to the Internet and its billions of users, as well as to overall global order beyond the world of cyberspace. If these two nations are to set both realms towards a more positive future, then facing the challenges of cybersecurity is an imperative today.

### 2AC – Relations Solve Disease

#### Strong U.S. – China relations are key to prevent global pandemics

May Zhou, May, 2015, "US, China leaders confront epidemic threat", No Publication, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-05/13/content\_20703783.htm (accessed 5/8/16)

How can China and the US work together to develop a global strategy that deploys tangible new actions -such as technology and educational programs - to avert human suffering and economic and social disruption that could result from bioterrorist threats or epidemics involving Ebola, influenza and other diseases? These are the questions being addressed by the 6th George H.W. Bush China-US Relations Conference yesterday in Houston. A panel of experts led by Andrew Natsios, director of the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and executive professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, discussed the current problems and proposed some ideas on how to solve them. Natsios pointed out that the world, including the US, is not yet prepared to respond to a pandemic like the 1918 influenza outbreak that killed 3-to-5 percent of the total population of the world. The recent outbreak of Ebola, even though under control now, proved that our current system would fail. Nils Daulaire, senior visiting scholar on Global Health Security at the Norwegian Institute of Public Health and former US Assistant Secretary of Health for Global Affairs, said that the international response to such events needs changes in three areas that US and China certainly can work together on: develop new technologies and vaccines to prevent infectious disease; prevent and respond to the spread of growing resistance to antibiotics; and set up an international operations center coordinating rapid deployment and action. Liu Qian, vice-minister of the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China, discussed China's current infectious disease response system developed from experience dealing with SARS in 2003. He said that China now has a vast monitoring and reporting network to evaluate risk, identify sources of infection and take quick action for diagnosis, treatment and quarantine. Other panel sessions discussed national strategy and the role of corporate programs in dealing with infectious disease on a global level. Other experts shared insights gained from dealing with the recent Ebola outbreak. The conference also includedfour closed-door symposia to explore forging deeper collaboration on: how to work together for clean air, safe food and water; how to commercialize biotechnology; how to improve chronic health conditions; and how to combat tuberculosis with new techniques developed in both countries. "Microbes respect no national boundaries, political affiliations or ethnicities," said Brett Giroir, CEO of the Texas A&M Health Science Center and the conference program chair. "Given today's global connectivity, an epidemic anywhere will rapidly become a threat everywhere. We hope the conference leads to tangible new actions that will substantially improve health and biosecurity around the world." For a lot a people, the conference was testament to the fact that US-China relations have developed from bilateral to global. "China has now emerged as a global economy,"said Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. "Its remarkable economic development gives it global influence. Now the US and China, instead of being two parties on opposite sides, have come together to work on issues that have a global impact. This conference should be viewed in the light of that."

### 2AC – Relations Solve North Korea

#### Strong U.S.-China relations key to successful denuclearization and stability of North Korea

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder,  President of the Korea Economic Institute (KEI)  & former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution; Tilelli = degree in economics from Widener University; Snyder = Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html?breadcrumb=/region/478/northeast\_asi (accessed 4/23/16)

In its report, U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, the Task Force emphasizes that "despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization." The United States cannot risk "the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, terrorist groups or others--especially in the Middle East." The Task Force says that the United States also must provide leadership with its regional partners to "coordinate actions designed to contain the spillover effects of possible North Korean instability while insisting that North Korea give up its destabilizing course of action." It recommends that contingency planning be prioritized: "Given the uncertainties and associated risks related to North Korea's future, it is necessary and sensible for its neighbors to consider the possibility of volatility in North Korea and plan for its possible effects." The bipartisan Task Force, chaired by former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard and former commander of UN Command/U.S. Forces Korea John H. Tilelli Jr., and directed by CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Scott A. Snyder, is comprised of roughly two dozen distinguished experts representing a wide variety of backgrounds. The report commends the U.S.-South Korean partnership and applauds the close alliance coordination following the ship incident. The Task Force urges the passage of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which it says is good for America and would send a strong message of support for South Korea. While each member of the Six Party talks--China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States--has its own concerns, "any hope of resolving the North Korean standoff will depend on all parties cooperating with one another and being firm with North Korea." The report emphasizes that "Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability." The report makes several specific recommendations, including calling for the establishment of a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula, bilateral talks with North Korea regarding missile development, and close consultations with allies South Korea and Japan. The report recommends that the Obama administration prioritize its approach to North Korea in the following order. Prevent horizontal proliferation: "The United States and its allies should heighten vigilance against the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons technologies or fissile material from North Korea and strengthen the capacity to carry out effective counterproliferation measures." Stop vertical proliferation: "North Korea's unconstrained efforts to develop a missile delivery capability for its nuclear arsenal would dramatically expand its ability to threaten its neighbors and further complicate prospects for reversing its nuclear program." Denuclearize: "The debate over nonproliferation versus denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization."

## Solvency

### 2AC – Solvency – U.S. – China Cooperation k2 Global Economy

#### Stable U.S.-China relationship ensures growth of the global economy

Daniel R. Russel Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC, June, 2014, U.S. Department of State, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations", http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm (accessed 5/8/16)

Economic issues play a central role in the U.S.-China relationship. China’s economic success has added to our growth and increased the purchasing power of consumers in the United States. Our two-way trade has almost quadrupled since China joined the WTO in late 2001. While the long-standing imbalance in that trade remains troubling, China is now one of the fastest growing U.S. export markets. In fact, U.S. exports to China grew by more than 90 percent between 2007 and 2013. In our bilateral engagements, we are encouraging economic reforms within China to ensure not only that its economic behavior is sustainable on its own terms, but that it contributes to strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the global economy. This includes re-orienting its economy away from a development model reliant on exports and credit-fueled investment in real estate and infrastructure to one that increases consumer spending and contributes to global demand. Central to this goal has been urging China to move toward a market-determined exchange rate. We are also addressing sources of friction in our bilateral relationship by pressing China to change a range of discriminatory policies and practices that harm U.S. companies and workers and that undermine incentives to innovate. These include subsidies that tilt the competitive playing field in favor of Chinese national champions, policies that pressure companies to hand over intellectual property as a condition for access to the Chinese market, and export credits that unfairly advantage Chinese companies in third markets. U.S. businesses have investments totaling over $50 billion. And from 2012 to 2013, Chinese direct investment flows into the United States more than doubled, according to private sector figures, and now contribute to thousands of jobs here. Our ongoing bilateral investment treaty negotiations hold the potential for even more mutually beneficial economic ties.

### 2AC – AT: TPP Not K2 U.S.-China Relations

#### TPP key to US China relations

Steven Zhou is a journalist based in Toronto. He is a regular contributor to The American Conservative, Muftah and Ricochet media, among other outlets. He is also a columnist and an associate editor at The Islamic Monthly, November, 2015, Aljazeera, “The TPP risks making US-China relations worse,” <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/the-tpp-risks-making-us-china-relations-worse.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

The saddest aspect of the widening U.S.-China gap is that the TPP’s specific clauses aren’t necessarily aimed at antagonizing or containing China. The country remains one of America’s biggest trading partners and is the biggest trading partner of Vietnam, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, all signatories of the TPP. It would have benefited the U.S. and China if the two countries could have come together to write the international rules on trade. That ship has likely sailed, unless China’s recent economic struggles can direct its leadership to join the TPP or at least form a strategic partnership with the bloc. Each participating country has to ratify the TPP agreement, and the accord faces serious opposition in the U.S. from both Democrats and Republicans, for different reasons. Some Democrats have questioned whether the deal is good for U.S. labor, while senior Republicans have voiced their disagreement over rules affecting the pharmaceutical industry. The U.S. debate takes place against the backdrop of a presidential campaign, and Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has begun to change her tune on the TPP in a bid for the support of organized labor, despite advocating for it as Obama’s secretary of state. It has likely become too late to change China’s fundamental orientation in the region. Beijing is now trying to push through its own multilateral trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This proposal is widely seen as China’s version of the TPP and involves 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Like the TPP, it will affect about 40 percent of the global economy. If the U.S. and China continue to use trade as a weapon against each other’s influence, both countries will suffer, along with the rest of Asia – and the world.

#### Plan key to US-China relations- combats perception of containment, boosts the global economy, and generates credibility for all other trade agreements

Li Kun, October, 2015, “U.S. should invite China to join TPP, CCTV, <http://english.cntv.cn/2015/10/10/ARTI1444466006678681.shtml> (accessed 4/27/16)

The TPP seems to be a Cold War-style geopolitical stratagem. In order to inject a positive impetus to bilateral relations, the US should compromise on TPP. According to the “Entering only with Invitation” principle, Beijing can only participate in TPP negotiations if invited. Therefore an invitation from the US can refute a perspective that the TPP is curbing China's rise. China's entrance would ensure that TPP becomes more inclusive. Let’s not forget that one of the most important achievements during Chinese President Xi Jinping's first state visit to the US on Sept.22-25 had been to convince Washington on the significance of building a new type of major country relationship. Xi invited the US to take part in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and pledged to cooperate with the US on issues of common concern, dispelling Washington’s fears that Beijing is squeezing the US out of the Asia Pacific sphere of influence. It's time for Washington to take positive action on TPP. Excluding China from international or regional trade arrangements is unrealistic. Although China has come to grips with a currency and stock market correction, the short term fluctuations won't change its status as one of the largest trading and economic powers for the many years ahead. Currently, China is the world's second-largest economy and the largest exporter. China should be included in the TPP, it would make a combined GDP stand at more than 50 per cent of global GDP. Furthermore, China has signed numerous free trade agreements with other countries, including TPP member states. China and US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations are accelerating as well.

#### TPP key to US China relations – other areas of cooperation insufficient

Steven Zhou is a journalist based in Toronto. He is a regular contributor to The American Conservative, Muftah and Ricochet media, among other outlets. He is also a columnist and an associate editor at The Islamic Monthly, November, 2015, Aljazeera, “The TPP risks making US-China relations worse,” <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/the-tpp-risks-making-us-china-relations-worse.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

Much discussion regarding the TPP has focused on the absence from the pact of China, the largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region. President Barack Obama has portrayed the exclusion as an attempt by the U.S. and its allies to “write the rules” in the region before China does. But this kind of antagonism does nothing to push U.S.-China relations — perhaps the most important bilateral relationship in the world — toward anything productive. The increasing anti-China rhetoric that has accompanied the Obama administration’s Asian pivot will result in fewer opportunities to partner on major global initiatives and hurt both nations economically. While the U.S. and China have cooperated on a number of important issues, including a notable recent agreement on climate change, geopolitical tensions persist. President Xi Jinping, who has led China since 2012, has pushed for a new brand of nationalism that emphasizes the projection of Chinese power in Asia. This has gotten China into territorial disputes with its neighbors, which in turn have looked to the U.S. for help. China’s periodic alignment with Syria, Iran and Russia has set it at odds with the Obama administration’s strategy in the Middle East. Finally, Washington has serious concerns about Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses. Given all this, China’s ruling Communist Party has been very nervous about the TPP from the beginning. The Obama administration is selling the TPP to Congress and to the United States’ international partners as an opportunity to get a jump on China in writing global trade rules. The TPP includes China’s neighbors and major trading partners such as Japan and Australia, and the Chinese leadership is worried about losing regional influence. On the other hand, moderate voices in China such as Long Yongtu, who negotiated China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, have viewed the TPP as a possible way to encourage the Chinese leadership to carry out systemic reforms. For instance, the TPP contains clauses regarding the environment that could influence Chinese policies in a progressive manner. He even argued in 2014 that the TPP would have to include China “sooner or later.” But the Obama administration’s domestic considerations have eclipsed this possibility, as it uses China as a foil to persuade Democrats and Republicans to accept the accord.

### 2AC – AT: Climate Coop Solve

#### Climate cooperation fails – history proves

Thomas Hale, PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a Visiting Fellow at LSE Global Governance, London School of Economics, 2011 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 34:1 pp. 89-101, “A Climate Coalition of the Willing,” <http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Hale.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Intergovernmental efforts to limit the gases that cause climate change have all but failed. After the unsuccessful 2010 Copenhagen summit, and with little progress at the 2010 Cancun meeting, it is hard to see how major emitters will agree any time soon on mutual emissions reductions that are sufficiently ambitious to prevent a substantial (greater than two degree Celsius) increase in average global temperatures.¶ It is not hard to see why. No deal excluding the United States and China, which together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases (GHGs), is worth the paper it is written on. But domestic politics in both countries effectively block ‘‘G-2’’ leadership on climate. In the United States, the Obama administration has basically given up on national cap-and-trade legislation. Even the relatively modest Kerry-Lieberman-Graham energy bill remains dead in the Senate. The Chinese government, in turn, faces an even harsher constraint. Although the nation has adopted important energy efficiency goals, the Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy and political survival on raising the living standard of average Chinese. Accepting international commitments that stand even a small chance of reducing the country’s GDP growth rate below a crucial threshold poses an unacceptable risk to the stability of the regime. Although the G-2 present the largest and most obvious barrier to a global treaty, they also provide a convenient excuse for other governments to avoid aggressive action. Therefore, the international community should not expect to negotiate a worthwhile successor to the Kyoto Protocol, at least not in the near future.

## Answers to Answers

### 2AC – AT: China Says No

#### China says yes- reforms are inevitable so they wouldn’t have incentive to reject

East Asia Forum, February, 2016, “Does the TPP Need China, and Vice Versa?,” Economy Watch, <http://www.economywatch.com/features/Does-the-TPP-Need-China-and-Vice-Versa0217.html> (accessed 5/3/16)

There are many reasons for China not to join: China is unlikely to accept the TPP’s labour and environmental standards, its higher intellectual property standards or the entailed reforms of its state-owned enterprises. These objections all have weight, but perhaps not as much as might be first thought. China is no longer the lowest-cost location for labour and so comparatively modest provisions on labour standards are less of a problem for China. In addition, with water and air pollution posing major health concerns, tackling environmental problems has become a high priority. What’s more, tilting the metaphorical ‘balance’ in intellectual property protection even further in favour of owners is no longer a major concern for China. China’s warm embrace of intellectual property systems continues to be revealed by the cold statistics: its patent office is the largest in the world in terms of applications and since 2010, it has accounted for more than half the annual increases in trademark filing activity worldwide. China will also have to reform its state-owned enterprises even if it does not join the TPP. Such reforms are part of creating a dynamic internal market that will continue to attract investors despite fluctuations and crises in global growth. Obviously, China would have to negotiate with the United States to join the TPP. This would likely be a long and difficult process. However, China has already been through a WTO accession. It knows what to expect. There is perhaps one more reason for China to think about the TPP. The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007 committed China to the concept of an ‘ecological civilization’. China will need to acquire much greater regulatory capacity if it is to implement the goals implicit in this idea. Scandals linked to poor regulation — such as the contamination of milk powder by the toxic compound melamine, which affected an estimated 300,000 infants — have drastically reduced consumer confidence.

#### China joins- they’re interested

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

Although China is not a member of the current TPP negotiation, whether China should be included is a question discussed frequently. One official of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) said: “China is actually very interested in joining the TPP. Thus, while in the short term we will focus on concluding a comprehensive bilateral investment treaty with China, as well as the TPP with the 11 other currently negotiating countries, we should keep the possibility for China to join the TPP membership.” 24 This essay argues that whether and how China will join the TPP has important implications on the security of the Asia-Pacific region, taking into consideration Chinese domestic politics. What is China’s intention on the TPP? What strategy would China take? Is China a threat? To answer these questions, one should take China as a “plural form.” There is no aggregate actor called China as a “singular form.” Chinese foreign policy is greatly influenced by domestic politics, and China’s role in international relations depends on how the Chinese leadership manages domestic politics. The Chinese leadership is divided over domestic policy issues, and hence one should take into consideration this division when examining the implications of whether China joins the TPP.

#### They say yes- undertaking TPP reforms now proves incentive

Everett Rosenfeld , March, 2015, “Major Asia-Pacific trade pact enters final stages,” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/20/tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-trade-pact-in-final-stages-china-set-to-join-later.html> (accessed 5/7/16)

The U.S. and other partners have publicly stated that they remain open to that possibility. "We're certainly not doing this as an anti-Chinese thing," Craft said. "We can foresee them joining it." In fact, high-level Chinese delegations regularly ask for updates on the talks and have inquired about what would be necessary to get into the trade pact, according to one administration official. "They seem to be trying to ready themselves to undertake at least some of the reforms that would be required before they could credibly say they wanted to join in the second or third tranche of the TPP," the official said. Experts told CNBC that reduced tariffs and higher quality standards among TPP states are likely to result in many Asian nations preferring to import from fellow signatories, rather than from China. "I think no matter if [China is] joining or not, I say the post-TPP era will be totally different than it is now," Cheng said. "China has no choice—they have to join it."

#### China has incentive to join- US and Japan two largest trading blocs

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Sun & Star Program on Japan and East Asia in the Tower Center at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

Consisting of 20 issue areas with 29 draft chapters, the TPP is considered to be the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA). Because of its comprehensiveness, the conclusion of the TPP is expected to bring catalytic effects to the expansion of free trade under larger FTA frameworks, such as the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which would include all 21 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as its participants. The 12 participants in the current TPP negotiation are a subset of the APEC members. Thus, the ultimate goal to promote prosperity based on free trade in the Asia-Pacific region is to conclude the FTAAP. However, the FTAAP is too big to establish rules through negotiations. Therefore, it is better to establish rules as the TPP first and then expand those rules to the APEC members to eventually make the FTAAP. Hence, the TPP is an important step to further promote free trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Even though neither China nor South Korea is currently participating in the TPP negotiation, given that the United States and Japan are two of the biggest trading partners for both, they will have a strong incentive to join the TPP once it is concluded.

## AT: Topicality Violations

### 2AC – AT: Not Economic Engagement

#### Counter-interpretation: Economic engagement includes economic interdependence strategies

Colin Dueck, assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, Spring, 2006, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States,” Orbis Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241 (accessed 5/8/16)

Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside continued rivalry or competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the second is a condition rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured by détente; and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy,” “negotiating,” or “bargaining” when they have served very well up to now.11

#### We meet- TPP controls 40% of world’s economy

Bloomberg View, October, 2015, West Hawaii, “How Obama can sell the Pacific trade deal to Congress,” [http://www.westhawaiitoday.com/opinion/editorial/how-obama-can-sell-pacific-trade-deal-congress](http://www.westhawaiitoday.com/opinion/editorial/how-obama-can-sell-pacific-trade-deal-congress%29) (accessed 5/8/16)

In weighing the pact, lawmakers ought to recognize that all such deals involve compromise, and look at the big picture. The TPP will spur growth across roughly 40 percent of the world economy. If the U.S. and its 11 partners are looking for a way to counter the growing pessimism about the world’s economic prospects, they can start by putting TPP into effect as soon as possible.

## AT: China Containment Disadvantage

### 2AC – Containment Bad

#### Leading from behind better- DA stifles U.S.-China economic relations

Rebecca Liao is a corporate attorney, writer and China analyst based in Silicon Valley, June, 2015, “Sorry, Obama: America Can't Contain China,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-obama-america-cant-contain-china-13097> (accessed 5/8/16)

The instinct to contain a fast-growing rival for global influence drove U.S. action in each of these cases. This strategy is a remnant of Cold-War thinking, in which relations between major world powers were neatly reduced to a zero-sum game between good and evil. A stable balance of power in that context entailed snatching up patron countries looking for a superpower’s aid and protection. China is perhaps the greatest beneficiary of this game. In “the world today,” however, balance of power entails something much more nuanced. China and the United States are too economically dependent on one another, and have too many common security interests, to resort to pure competition. Both recognize this to a certain extent: Admiral Sun Jianguo mirrored Secretary Carter’s tone in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. China had not been expecting such a strong response from the United States on its South China Sea expansion in the weeks prior, and it also moved to signal good intentions. By spearheading new military deals with China’s neighbors straight after, the United States has negated any progress made. Given China’s rise and our relationship with them, the United States cannot be effective in the Asia-Pacific by leading from the front. We cannot approach the region as the indispensable nation. China is extremely sensitive to any indications that America is gathering a team of allies in Asia, believing that we are doing so at their expense. The PRC also views U.S. attempts to intervene in regional disputes as arrogant interference. That is not to say that America should exit from that region. It should, for example, continue to insist upon freedom of navigation in international waters, as they are defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It should continue to push for stronger economic ties with Southeast Asia.

#### China containment results in security-dilemma between US and China- increases possibility of war

Peter Navarro, professor at the University of California-Irvine, March, 2016, “Crouching Tiger: Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

My argument, in a nutshell, is that if China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much the way it has over the past 30 years, that it will translate that wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this makes good strategic sense for China. Of course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can. And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing coalition in Asia, which will include most of China’s neighbors and the United States. And they will work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense security competition between the United States and China’s neighbors on one hand, and China on the other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of war.

### 2AC – AT Link: Contains China

#### TPP doesn’t contain China

Felipe Caro is an associate professor of decisions, operations and technology management at the UCLA Anderson School of Management and Christopher Tang is a distinguished professor and the Edward W. Carter chair in business administration at UCLA Anderson, September, 2015, “UCLA faculty voice: China isn’t afraid of the new Pacific trade deal,” UCLA Newsroom, <http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-faculty-voice-china-isnt-afraid-of-the-new-pacific-trade-deal> (accessed 4/30/16)

These are some of the controversies swirling around the trade deal, which Congress has authorized the president to present for an up-or-down vote once negotiations with the 11 other countries are concluded. Meanwhile, there’s a core assumption underlying the argument in favor of the TPP in this country that isn’t being contested, but deserves a second look: Supporters hold up the ambitious Pacific trade deal that excludes China as a way to contain and counter China’s dominant influence. This is a flawed assumption that is leading the U.S. and its partners into a strategic blunder, needlessly complicating Pacific trading patterns and exacerbating tensions with Beijing. Asserting that the TPP can be a counterweight to China might sound good on Capitol Hill and in other policy forums, but it’s not an assertion that survives an encounter with economic realities, the pattern of cross-border investments in Asia, and the existing web of trade agreements already in place. Just follow the supply chains out there, our form of connecting dots as researchers, and you will see. The dozen nations negotiating the TPP are the United States, Japan, Australia, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Canada, Mexico, and Brunei Darussalam, which account for 40 percent of global trade. The U.S. already has free trade agreements with some of these countries (for example, Canada, Chile, Mexico), and many believe that establishing new free trade relationships with Japan and Vietnam under the TPP framework will thwart China’s ability to dominate industries such as automobiles, telecom equipment, and clothing manufacturing. It’s naive to believe that China can be locked out of a preferential trading network. Despite its present currency and stock market corrections (all part of the transition to a “normal” market-based economy), China recently overtook the U.S. as the world’s leading trading nation and it is determined to become the world’s largest economy this decade.

### 2AC – Other FTAs Trigger the L

#### China already resolving relations between it and its neighbors with FTAs

Wen Jin Yuan is a researcher with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she specializes in China’s economic and financial issues as well as economic integration in East Asia, June 2012, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and China’s Corresponding Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Jianmin Jin, a Senior Fellow at the Fujitsu Research Institute, a think tank in Japan, groups China’s current and potential FTA partners into four different categories: 1) greater China economic region (four cross-strait regions: mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau); 2) surrounding regions (ASEAN, Pakistan); 3) resource-rich regions (GCC, Australia); and 4) developed countries (Switzerland, etc.).25 Keeping this in mind, it is obvious that the Chinese government is not driven primarily by economic concerns when pushing its FTA agenda. Instead, political factors play an important role in framing China’s FTA strategy. According to Song Guoyou, apart from an economic rationale to secure China’s future supplies of much-needed natural resources, improving its international environment, especially the surrounding environment, is one of the most important reasons that China pushes its FTA agenda.26 Though the Chinese Government has persistently portrayed itself as “rising peacefully”, not all of its neighbors have been charmed. Beijing’s rise as a regional and global power has aroused both economic and strategic fears to varying degrees among its ASEAN neighbors. 27 Beneath the surface lies a deep-rooted strategic mistrust between China and its neighbors left over from history. 28 Therefore, the Chinese government has long been trying to diminish the strategic mistrust and build close ties with its neighbors politically by offering them economic benefits through FTAs. For instance, China’s FTA with Taiwan (the Economic Cooperation and Framework Agreement) serves as an effective tool to enhance the formation of a “one China” political identity and suppress separate independence movements like “Taiwan Independence”.29 Similarly, the incentive for China to sign FTAs with ASEAN nations and Pakistan is mainly to reduce the strategic mistrust between China and its neighbors. With the Beijing leadership viewing the TPP agenda as a U.S. encroachment into China’s backyard, the Chinese government has decided to increase its pace on pushing its own FTA agenda to demonstrate to its neighboring countries that it will continue to be their reliable bilateral economic partner.

## AT: Disad Links

### AT: Heg links

#### Plan doesn’t do anything to shift US influence in the region

Joseph E. Stiglitz is Senior Fellow and Chief Economist at the Roosevelt Institute and a professor at Columbia University. A recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2001) and the John Bates Clark Medal (1979), he is a former senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank and a former member and chairman of the (US president’s) Council of Economic Advisers, March, 2016, “Will TPP Help to Curb China’s Rise?,” Roosevelt Institute, <http://rooseveltinstitute.org/will-tpp-help-curb-chinas-rise/> (accessed 5/3/16)

With few people buying the argument that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping trade and investment agreement between the United States and 11 Pacific Rim countries, will bring more jobs and higher wages, proponents of TPP now argue that it is a critical front in the geopolitical conflict between the United States and China. President Obama made this case in his State of the Union address: “With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do.” Such rhetoric, reminiscent of Cold War containment strategies, is not constructive for the world’s most important bilateral relationship. The truth is that this strategic rationale for TPP makes little sense. With China now the world’s largest economy in terms of output (measured in purchasing power parity), trade, and source of foreign direct investment, the ship has sailed on containing China’s influence. This should have been obvious from last year’s failed attempt by U.S. policymakers to block the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, created under China’s leadership. If trade deals were all that mattered for securing influence, the United States could at best hope for a stalemate with China, which already has agreements with more than half of TPP partners, among other nations. What matters for influence is not just signing agreements but the depth and nature of relationships. Given the hundreds of billions of dollars China has committed to finance infrastructure development across the region and the magnitude of China’s trade and investment integration with the world, there is little reason to think that implementation of TPP would tip the balance of economic power in the U.S.’s favor.

### AT: Japan Relations Link

#### Japan wants China in the TPP- Abe believes it makes the deal credible

Linda Sieg and Kaoei Kaneko, October, 2015, “Japan's Abe says TPP would have strategic significance if China joined,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-abe-idUSKCN0S004920151006> (accessed 5/12/16)

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe welcomed the pan-Pacific agreement struck in the United States on Monday, which would liberalize trade in 40 percent of the world economy, though he said bringing China into the deal in future would increase its strategic significance. "The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) establishes in the Asia-Pacific a free, fair and open international economic system with countries that share the basic values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law," Abe told a nationally televised news conference. "It would contribute largely to our nation's security and Asia-Pacific regional stability, and it would have significant strategic meaning if China joined the system in the future."

#### Japan wants China to join- thinks it benefits them economically

World Politics Review, April, 2016, “After Securing Exceptions, Japan Hopes to Benefit From TPP,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/18570/after-securing-exceptions-japan-hopes-to-benefit-from-tpp> (accessed 5/12/16)

WPR: What impact will the TPP have on Japan’s regional trade relations, notably with China and South Korea? Watanabe: Japan expects that progress on the TPP will accelerate negotiations for both the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia and the Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral free trade agreement. Since China is a key production network and value-chain partner, Japan will encourage China to join the TPP and will help with Beijing’s accession process, as it did when China joined the World Trade Organization.

### 2AC – AT: Appeasement Link

#### Plan isn’t appeasement- forces China to follow specific domestic reforms to get in the deal

Peter Cai, China Editor at Business Spectator, Research Fellow at Lowy Institute for International Policy, Education: University of Oxford, University of Adelaide, Gymnasium Martkbreit, Bavaria, Germanym October, 2015, “Why China should join the TPP,” Business Spectator, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/why-china-should-join-the-tpp/news-story/de2167f7f4348caceae05d5e4b173293> (accessed 4/26/16)

However, the biggest reason for China to sign up to the TPP is not about becoming a part of preferential trade club but to give a shot in arm to the country’s slowing reform program. The overall goal of the TPP is to break new ground and establish the rules for trade in the new century. The deal will includes provisions such as enforceable labour standards, environmental protections and curbing the competitive advantages enjoyed by state-owned enterprises. There is actually a great deal of overlap between the goals of the TPP and China’s own ambitious reform agenda unveiled two years ago. According to a comprehensive analysis by Caixin, a respected Chinese business publication, only 23 out of 113 reform areas are really making any progress and the rest are either stuck in the slow lane or not moving forward at all (China’s reform program moves into the slow lane, September 2). What China needs now is to fast track its reform agenda. Judging by its progress so far, it is not moving fast enough, in fact, far from it. Some of the country’s most senior policymakers, such as the central bank governor and the finance minister, have warned about the dire consequences of not pushing ahead with reform (China's central bank governor beats the drum on reform, October 5) and (How China can avoid the middle income trap, May 5). It is clear that the domestic impetus is not enough. What China needs is strong external pressure to break down the reform impasse and there is no better instrument for doing this than the TPP. Beijing was bold enough to sign up to the World Trade Organisation back in 2000 against significant domestic opposition and many of the doomsday predictions didn’t become true. China’s bet paid off handsomely and it is now the world’s largest trading nation. In a powerful editorial penned by reformer Hu Shuli, the editor in chief of Caixin, she argued four years ago about the need for China to sign on to the TPP. “If China wants to ride the next wave of globalisation, it must break out of its reform fatigue and free itself from shackles of special interest groups. It should achieve TPP standards as soon as possible and proactively open itself more to the outside world.”

### 2AC – AT: Russia Link

#### No link- Russia doesn’t care about the TPP because they know their exports are safe

Vladimir Salamatov, November, 2015, “Why the TPP is not a threat to Russia,” <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/why-tpp-not-threat-russia> (accessed 5/12/16)

At first glance, the trade preferences within the TPP seem to threaten many important goods that Russia exports. However, an analysis of tariff protection in member countries and/or import duties shows that most Russian exports are safe. In the near future, 12 Pacific Rim countries will ratify an agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This partnership will be one of the world’s largest economic integration projects, bringing together about 25 percent of the world’s exports, 30 percent of the world’s GDP and more than 800 million consumers. The basis of the agreement is providing a wide range of preferences for mutual trade in goods and services. This includes the field of investments, capital flows, as well as other aspects of economic cooperation, beyond just the classical framework of the WTO. Here two legitimate questions arise: How will the creation of the TPP affect Russia’s trade with the countries of this new partnership? Won’t Russian competitors “shove aside” Russian exports, after they receive preferential treatment in these markets? Analysis shows, however, there are very few vulnerable positions among important Russian exports, including non-commodity exports.

## AT: CPs

### 2AC – AT: Trade Advantage CPs

#### TPP key- other trade agreements are insufficient, only plan creates trade balances for China

Nikhil Sonnad and Josh Horwitz, October, 2015, “What China will have to do to join the Trans-Pacific trade club,” Quartz, <http://qz.com/517905/what-china-will-have-to-do-to-join-the-trans-pacific-trade-club/> (accessed 4/27/16)

The TPP also aims to open up services and investment between member nations. This means removing preferential treatment and protection for local service providers, tech firms, financial institutions, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This in fact points in the very direction that China is already moving. Many of its recent bilateral free-trade agreements include provisions on services and investment liberalization. China last month laid out a plan to “improve the competence of SOEs and turn them into fully independent market entities.” It will even allow foreign investors to play a role in SOE reform. Similar promises have been made for financial reforms. At a meeting with American and Chinese business leaders, president Xi Jinping said that his country aims to further remove barriers to foreign investment. But moving in the right direction is not the same as reaching the destination. China may want to make SOEs more market-driven, but it will not scrap preferential treatment of them any time soon. And while fewer domestic sectors remain off-limits to foreign investment, the list is still very long. For China to join the trade agreement, it will take a sustained effort to level the playing field for TPP members operating in the country.

#### Political tensions are too strong for China FTAs to overwhelm

Wen Jin Yuan is a researcher with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she specializes in China’s economic and financial issues as well as economic integration in East Asia, June 2012, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and China’s Corresponding Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

Though the Beijing leadership is actively pursuing its own FTA agenda as a strategy to counter-balance the TPP agenda, it is highly unlikely that China will fulfill its goal of improving its neighboring environment through the aforementioned strategy. According to Joseph S. Nye, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, China’s growing economic and military might has frightened its neighbors into looking for allies to balance China’s increase in hard power.33 Although the Chinese government is trying to “bribe” its Asian neighbors with economic benefits, China’s amiable stance has constantly been undercut by its unwillingness to solve territorial disputes in a multilateral setting as well as its simultaneous threat to browbeat its neighbors. For instance, in 2010, China’s rapidly increasing military budget and naval modernization aroused fears among its ASEAN neighbors -- especially in view of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel islands. Concern about China’s military ambitions led neighboring ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam, to try to “internationalize” the dispute. Comments by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010, indicating that “the United States would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the issue,” elicited a furious response from Beijing, charging that the United States was interfering in the issue. 34 Most recently, tensions have been rising again between China and the Philippines over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea, and Chinese state media warned the Philippines that military conflict is possible over a stand-off at a disputed reef, the Scarborough Shoal, off the Philippine coast.35 Against this backdrop, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for China’s FTA strategy to reach its political aim.

# Aff U.S. China Counterterrorism Coop

Although the United States and China have had limited cooperation on counterterrorist operations since 2001, both countries want more from the other. China’s growth as a world power makes it more concerned than before about incurring terrorist backlash to its activities, and terrorism is increasing in Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East and North Africa. The plan utilizes the framework laid out in the 1972 Shanghai Communique respecting each other's sovereignty, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, respecting China's freedom to trade, as gateways into a strategic dialogue, including military-to-military relations, for Sino-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation. The advantages are terrorism and relations, with science and technology cooperation as the specific relations scenario. The affirmative file also includes an add-on advantage of Southeast Asian terrorism, with a Chinese economy impact.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 1/7

#### Observation One: Inherency

#### Bilateral counterterrorism ties between the U.S. and China are weak

Dan Steinbock, Research Director of International Business at India China and America Institute, May 14, 2014

"Destabilizing Terror and U.S.-Chinese Counterterrorism," China U.S. Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/destabilizing-terror-and-us-chinese-counterterrorism/ (accessed 4/24/2016)

US officials see the bilateral ties between the two militaries as too weak, in the light of the US pivot to Asia since 2011, territorial disputes in East and South China Seas, China’s military modernization, and China’s concerns over US military expansion in the region and the scope of the US National Security Agency’s (NSA) activities. Despite rising threats, counterterrorism has not played a central role in recent efforts to re-ignite US-Chinese cooperation.

#### Therefore, we present the following plan: The United States should engage the People's Republic of China through the Shanghai Communique and Gulf Cooperation Council frameworks, including conducting strategic dialogues, confidence-building measures, and working groups on military-to-military cooperation for anti-terror operations.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 2/7

#### Observation Two: Solvency

#### The United States should engage China on anti-terrorism cooperation by invoking the Shanghai Communique and Gulf Cooperation Council frameworks to build commitment to military-to-military cooperation regarding anti-terror operations

Wang Lian, Professor of International Politics, School of International Studies, Peking University, September 20, 2011

The Rise of Political Islamism and the Anti-terrorism Cooperation of China and the U.S.," China U.S. Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/the-rise-of-political-islamism-and-the-anti-terrorism-cooperation-of-china-and-the-u-s/ (accessed 4/24/2016)

The rise of the Islamic extremism is a general trend, which makes China-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation necessary. China has long been the victim of religious extremism, ethnic separatists and international terrorism in its northwest border and in MECA. China has essential interest in the anti-terrorism agenda in MECA, which make it necessary for China to cooperate effectively and actively with the U.S. in this area. As the biggest developing country and the biggest developed country, China and the U.S. will become the main countries the new regimes hope to get along with. This will provide the foundation of China-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in MECA.

(i) To discuss the possibility of U.S. –China anti-terrorism cooperation within the existing bilateral and multi-lateral frame, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, and Gulf Cooperation Council

(ii) To deepen the interaction between the militaries of the two countries, to further sum up the experience of the joint anti-piracy practice of the two countries in the Gulf of Aden, to safeguard the navigation safety in the area

(iii) To discuss the possibility of anti-terrorism cooperation among China, the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan

(iv) To strike all kinds of terrorism, avoiding double standards.

#### The plan is successful diplomatic engagement: integrates China into mutually beneficial pursuits, uses U.S. power to enhance diplomacy, participates in regional relations, engages multilateralism

Bob Waltemeyer, Colonel in U.S. Army, and Jiyul Kim, Colonel and Project Advisor in U.S. Army, March 15, 2006

"Comprehensive Engagement with China," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA448717 (accessed 4/24/2016)

Improving U.S. diplomatic engagement with China will require the type of bold “transformational diplomacy” Secretary of State Rice defined in January 2006 as the means to integrate states that are competing in mutually beneficial democratic and economic pursuits. America’s diplomatic relations with China would be most effective if conducted in a spirit of partnership with China, not in paternalism, and this relationship could be further enhanced by leveraging the collective effect of all the elements of U.S. national power.This diplomatic posture would affirm U.S. proactive participation in regional relations. Given China’s growing importance, and the interconnected nature of our respective national concerns, “it would serve the interests of the United States and China to rethink their relationship in terms as broad and bold as the 1972 understanding that then President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger worked out with China’s leader at the time, Mao Zedong and its premier, Zhou Enlai.” The newly created Senior Dialogue Initiative between Assistant Secretary of State Zoellick and his Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo could serve as a model for a larger forum that includes other members of the U.S administration and their Chinese counterparts. The U.S. should participate in, and integrate China into as many multilateral arrangements as possible.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 3/7

#### U.S.-China cooperation is key to prevent the re-emergence of global terror organizations and build international consensus, and will succeed even if the two countries have disagreements about Chinese crackdowns

Fu Xiaoqiang, research fellow and director of the Institute of Security and Arms Control, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, September 25, 2014

"Seeking Common Ground for Anti-Terror Cooperation," China U.S. Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/seeking-common-ground-for-anti-terror-cooperation/ (accessed 4/24/2016)

It is believed that future anti-terror cooperation between China and the U.S. can be reached in the following four areas. First, they need to reach strategic consensus on preventing the reoccurrence of global terror organizations. The rise of terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS pose an enormous risk to countries like the United States, European nations, China and Russia. In the face of a new round of global terror threats, no country could be a safe haven or is able to stay away from the threats. China and the United States can play a leading role among the big-power countries in reaching such consensus. During this process, if regional terror groups with close ties to al-Qaeda and ISIS are not targeted, the global efforts to rein in the occurrence and growth of terror organizations can hardly achieve the desired results. Therefore, China and the United States could carry out pragmatic cooperation in the fight against the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” forces, at least on some fronts, even if the United States cannot agree completely with China’s crackdown on such forces.

#### Advantage One: Terrorism

#### Sino-U.S. bilateral information sharing solves causes and effects of terrorism

Rudy deLeon, Senior Fellow with the National Security and International Policy team at American Progress, and Yang Jiemian, President Emeritus of Shanghai Institute of International Studies, July 2015

"Exploring Avenues for China-U.S. Cooperation on the Middle East," Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ChinaMiddleEast\_web-FINAL2.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

The United States and China should work toward an analytical consensus regarding the root causes of, as well as the threats posed by, extremism in the Middle East. At the moment, the United States and China may have different views on both the nature of the problem and the challenges it poses. A shared assessment would be the first step in building the foundation for deeper bilateral cooperation. To achieve this, the United States and China should explore the use of high-level mechanisms such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. As part of this effort, the United States and China should also discuss ways to further share information and analysis through law enforcement and security institutions regarding the threats posed by transnational terrorist groups.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 4/7

#### Nuclear terrorism kills hundreds of thousands instantly, risks millions more lives, and destroys the global economy

Kenneth C. Brill, former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A., and Kenneth N. Luongo, president of Partnership for Global Security, March 15, 2012

"Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?\_r=0 (accessed 4/24/2016)

At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material. A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.”

#### Biological terrorism could kill tens of millions instantly

CNN, December 2, 2008

"Biological terror attack likely by 2013, panel says," Cable News Network, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/02/terror.report/ (accessed 4/24/2016)

"The consequences of a biological attack are almost beyond comprehension. It would be 9/11 times 10 or a hundred in terms of the number of people who would be killed," former Sen. Bob Graham said. He cited the flu virus that killed millions of people in 1918 as an example. "Today it is still in the laboratory, but if it should get out and into the hands of scientists who knew how to use it for a violent purpose, we could have multiple times the 40 million people who were killed 100 years ago," he said.

#### Anti-terror cooperation protects critical infrastructure, builds peace, rule of law, solves economic rivalries, secures energy cooperation, and spreads to other areas of geopolitical differences

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

There are many reasons for US and Chinese cooperation in counterterrorism. Cooperation is critical to the protection of their populations and critical infrastructure. It is also a natural obligation to their friends and allies, humanitarian obligations, their search for peace, and their need to support the international rule of law. It is an important way to develop cooperation in areas where they do not compete, and to build mutual trust. The need for cooperation is also shaped by the common, critical strategic interests of both countries. While the US and China may be economic competitors, they are synergistic competitors that are mutually dependent on the secure flow of trade, the health of the global economy, and the secure flow of energy exports at market prices to each other and to other trading partners throughout the world.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 5/7

#### Advantage Two: Relations

#### Perception of U.S. security cooperation key to relations

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

In each of China's four security rings, the United States is omnipresent. It is the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, the formal or informal military ally of many of China's neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing international legal regimes. This omnipresence means that China's understanding of American motives determines how the Chinese deal with most of their security issues.

#### Pro-relations gestures are empirically successful for the U.S.—engaging China now will increase relations

Melanie Hart, Director of China Policy at Center for American Progress, September 29, 2015

"Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China," Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China Relations, AmericanProgress.org, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China’s most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party’s right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China’s capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 6/7

#### Sino-U.S. relations are key to all other international relations and conflict is inevitable in the status quo

Hung Ming-Te, doctoral candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics (GIOIP), National Chung Hsing University, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu, doctoral student at GIOIP, 2011

"Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since 9/11," Political Perspectives volume 5 (3), http://china.praguesummerschools.org/files/china/2china2012.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

In other words, Sino-US relations are perhaps the most important set of relations in the near future and nearly all other sets of state relations can be considered under the Sino-US framework. Southeast Asia is the first testing ground of Sino-US relations in the new century as the impact of China’s rise is most profoundly demonstrated in the region. Coupled with ASEAN’s great power balancing strategy, competition between Beijing and Washington is likely to be unavoidable.

#### Relations are key to collaboration on technology

Richard P. Suttmeier, professor of political science at the University of Oregon, September 11, 2014

"Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First Century?" U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

Both China and the United States exhibit these tensions between “science and technology nationalism” and “science and technology globalism”; the relationship between the two countries is an especially rich case study in how these tensions are managed. The recognition by both sides that national research and innovation capabilities are critical assets in facing new security and economic challenges sometimes makes the identification of mutually beneficial, positive-sum programs of cooperation more difficult—though certainly not impossible, as a number of new programs of cooperation illustrate.

### U.S. China Counterterrorism Cooperation 1AC 7/7

#### Tech cooperation yields billions in economic growth

Edward W. Lempinen, staffwriter for Salon.com, April 24, 2009

"U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation at 30: Looking Forward," American Association for the Advancement of Science, http://www.aaas.org/news/us-china-science-and-technology-cooperation-30-looking-forward (accessed 4/25/2016)

Thirty years ago, as U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping moved to normalize relations by signing a bi-lateral science and technology agreement, few could have foreseen the impact: S&T cooperation has become a pillar in a complex and important relationship, yielding a range of research advances and helping to drive billions of dollars in economic growth.

#### Economic growth is necessary to save the planet, the environment, and human quality of life

Oliver Hartwich, Executive Director, The New Zealand Initiative, 2015

"Forward," The Case for Economic Growth, http://nzinitiative.org.nz/site/nzinitiative/files/Economic%20Growth%20Web.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

To such crude and usually fact-free statements, Eric Crampton and Jenesa Jeram provide a potent antidote in this paper. They take the most common objections typically levelled against economic growth and assess them for their empirical validity. In doing so, they come to the conclusion that typically economic growth achieves the very opposite of what its critics believe it does: Instead of ruining the environment, economic growth helps us to manage and preserve it. Instead of making us unhappy, economic growth enables us to lead longer, healthier and more fulfilled lives. Instead of depleting our resources, economic growth is helping us find alternative ways of satisfying our needs.

### Inherency Extensions

#### U.S. has pulled back from anti-terrorism focus and is engaging Southeast Asian nations to hedge against China

Hung Ming-Te, doctoral candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics (GIOIP), National Chung Hsing University, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu, doctoral student at GIOIP, 2011

"Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since 9/11," Political Perspectives volume 5 (3), http://china.praguesummerschools.org/files/china/2china2012.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

The US return to Asia under the Obama administration re-engages the lone superpower with the region and Southeast Asia is an important testing ground of US cordiality towards Asia. Current US foreign policy has departed from the Bush administration’s emphasis on anti-terrorism and seeks engagement with Southeast Asia towards the goal of balancing China’s rise.

####  U.S. feels China isn’t doing enough on terrorism

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010

"U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," CRS Report RL33001, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China’s extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that “China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism” after “a good start,” in his policy speech that called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers.

### Inherency Extensions

#### China has not assisted the U.S. militarily in the war on terror

Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for Congressional Research Service, July 25, 2013

"U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress," Congression Research Service h Service 7-5700, file:///C:/Users/Matt/Downloads/ADA585310.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

The PRC’s cooperation in counterterrorism after the attacks on September 11, 2001, has not included military cooperation with the U.S. military. The U.S. Commanders of the Central and Pacific Commands, General Tommy Franks and Admiral Dennis Blair, separately confirmed in April 2002 that China did not provide military cooperation (nor was it requested) in Operation Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (e.g., basing, staging, or overflight) and that China’s shared intelligence was not specific enough. Also, the Pentagon issued a report in June 2002 on the international coalition fighting terrorism and did not include China among the countries providing military contributions.

#### China and U.S. lack terrorism cooperation due to perceptions of Chinese opacity

Jeffrey Payne, Manager of Academic Affairs at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, July 23, 2014

"Can the US and China Cooperate on Counterterrorism?" The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/can-the-us-and-china-cooperate-on-counterterrorism/ (accessed 4/23/2016)

Both the U.S. and China view combatting terror as an essential duty. Thus, should not the 21st century’s two dominant powers use this shared interest as a platform for cooperation when possible? Quite simply, they should – but quite honestly, they won’t. For starters, the People’s Republic is not transparent when it comes to law enforcement or military affairs and there is a fear within the U.S. that counterterrorism efforts with China would put American security personnel in a scenario where they help to target dissidents, not terrorists. China can object to this characterization, but this is a real fear among American security professionals, and not without cause given both China’s record on political dissent and a general unwillingness to share specific information on terrorism.

### Solvency Extensions

#### China and the U.S. share mutual security goals

Michael Clarke, Associate Professor at the National Security College, ANU, October 12, 2015

"Afghanistan: An Opportunity for U.S.–China Cooperation?" The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/afghanistan-opportunity-us%E2%80%93china-cooperation-14052 (accessed 4/23/2016)

The problem in the current climate of Sino–U.S. relations, however, is to identify areas in which those interests overlap to “mutual benefit” more than they diverge. China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) strategy is an area that holds potential. According to John Hudson, where U.S. officials see China’s resurgence and ambition in the Asia–Pacific as the core driver of regional insecurity, in Eurasia they see a “surprising convergence of U.S. and Chinese interests” that “boils down to one mutual goal: security.” From this perspective, Beijing shares Washington’s desires to see a stable and secure Afghanistan and Pakistan due primarily to Beijing’s own concerns with Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang.

#### Empirically China supports U.S. counterterrorism

Huiyun Feng, Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015

"Will China and Russia Form an Alliance Against the United States," Defense and Security Studies Series, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120393/1/828390282.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

Soon after the September 11 attacks, China voiced its support for US fight against terrorists. China voted for the anti-terrorism resolutions in the UN Security Council, which granted the US a mandate to conduct military action in Afghanistan. China helped the United States freeze financial transactions of terrorist suspects in Chinese banks. At the 2001 APEC summit China supported the US request to include the anti-terrorist cause in the joint statement. Moreover, China permitted the US to open its first FBI office in Beijing, in order to facilitate “cooperation and coordination of US efforts on counter-terrorism, trans-national crime, and drug trafficking” (US Department of State, 2004).

#### Differences don’t undermine engagement based on mutual interests

Melanie Hart, Director of China Policy at Center for American Progress, September 29, 2015

"Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China," Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China Relations, AmericanProgress.org, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Engagement need not be predicated on the assumption that China will not seek to undermine U.S. interests in some areas. The United States can work constructively with China while accepting that we have different principles, that we are not perfectly aligned. We can work along multiple tracks at the same time: expanding cooperation in one area while confronting differences and exchanging threats in another. That dynamic was on display through the most recent U.S.-China presidential summit, which aimed to achieve three distinct goals.

### Solvency Extensions: Cooperation Key to International Alliance

#### Sino-U.S. cooperation is key to international anti-terror alliances

Dan Steinbock, Research Director of International Business at India China and America Institute, April 25, 2013

"Toward Multipolar Counterterrorism," China U.S. Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/toward-multipolar-counter-terrorism/ (accessed 4/24/2016)

Neither Washington, with all of its military muscle and more than 40 percent of annual military expenditures worldwide, nor China, with its rising economic clout and military modernization, can contain globalized terrorism. But together, the two countries could rally the international community into effective counter-terrorism.

#### Dialogue will improve counterterrorism efforts—there’s no need to reach exact agreement on definitions of terrorism

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

Over the past ten years, China and the US have engaged in limited sharing of intelligence on counterterrorism. It is not possible to determine the level of such cooperation, but it seems clear that better dialogue on both sides could expand the scope of such exchanges on both a bilateral level and in various international forums and UN bodies. This does not require that China and the US agree on who is a terrorist or share deeply sensitive data, but it does require clear guidance from both governments to their respective intelligence and security communities.

### Solvency: China Wants the Plan

#### China is asking for increased antiterrorism cooperation with the U.S.

Reuters, March 16, 2016

"China calls for FBI cooperation in internet security, counter-terrorism," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-security-idUSKCN0WH0AT (accessed 4/23/2016)

China wants to have deeper internet security, anti-terrorism and corruption cooperation with the United States, Chinese security officials told the visiting director of the FBI, state news agency Xinhua said. Meeting in Beijing, Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun, told James B. Comey that China was willing to enhance strategic mutual trust and the respect of each others core interests, Xinhua said late on Monday. The two countries should "deepen law enforcement and security cooperation in the fields of internet security and counter-terrorism", the report paraphrased Guo as saying.

#### China is concerned with counter-terrorism as part of its Middle East wishlist

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

China has signalled its gradual recognition of these new realities with the publication in January 2016 of an Arab Policy Paper, the country’s first articulation of a policy towards the Middle East and North Africa. But, rather than spelling out specific policies, the paper reiterated the generalities of China’s core focus in its relations with the Arab world: economics, energy, counter-terrorism, security, technical cooperation and its One Belt, One Road initiative.

### Solvency: Incentives Exist to Cooperate

#### Many areas of common ground

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

All of this suggests that China and the U.S. could, for example, find common ground on the principle of adherence to international legality, a principle Obama emphasised when he was first elected and whose interpretation is driven as much by power politics and interests as it is by ideology. Moreover, international relations scholar Jian Junbo suggested that if China can cooperate with the United States and other Western countries in countering terrorism, “they should also be able to help each other to protect their interests overseas.”

#### China and the West face similar threats from terrorism

Moritz Rudolf, Research Associate at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Berlin, et al, June 3, 2015

"China's Counterterrorism Campaign Goes Global," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/chinas-counterterrorism-campaign-goes-global/ (accessed 4/23/2016)

As China and the West face a similar threat from trans-regional Islamist terrorist networks, areas of cooperation should be identified and actively pursued. Apart from exchanges of information on terrorist groups, many European countries also have their own experiences to share with regard to fighting terrorism, emphasizing milder forms of policing and surveillance as well as cultural and educational methods of prevention.

#### Even superficial Sino-U.S. gestures facilitate global stability

Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, January 2013

"Strategic Cooperation without Mutual Trust: A Path Forward for China and the United States," Asia Policy, Number 15, http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7236/20120308004022054904369/2013-1-no.15.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

In comparison with U.S. policy toward China during the first term of the Clinton administration, the current U.S. rebalancing strategy is much softer and clearly illustrates the superficial friendship between China and the United States. This state of superficial friendship drives rivalry between the two countries, but the strategy of superficial friendship facilitates cooperation between them. China and the United States have been able to maintain this superficial friendship since the late 1990s, even in the absence of mutual trust, mainly because they share objective strategic interests, such as nuclear nonproliferation, peace in the Asia-Pacific, counterterrorism in Central Asia, and trade and investment. In the late 1990s, for example, China and the United States agreed to no longer target nuclear weapons at each other, which helped stabilize bilateral relations.

### Terrorism Solvency Extensions

#### Sino-U.S. cooperation overcomes ideological barriers and facilitates regional de-radicalization

Rudy deLeon, Senior Fellow with the National Security and International Policy team at American Progress, and Yang Jiemian, President Emeritus of Shanghai Institute of International Studies, July 2015

"Exploring Avenues for China-U.S. Cooperation on the Middle East," Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ChinaMiddleEast\_web-FINAL2.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

The United States and China have a variety of hard-power tools at their disposal to counter the threat posed by extremism and terrorism. However, the challenge posed is fundamentally ideological in nature. The United States and China should explore avenues of mutual cooperation to advance anti-extremist discourse and exchange lessons and experiences in creating an atmosphere that is conducive to deradicalization. As part of this effort, special attention should be paid to initiatives advanced by regional stakeholders in the Middle East who are best placed to understand the nature of the ideological challenge in an Islamic context.

#### Increased cooperation enhances already existing efforts to halt terrorist financing

Rudy deLeon, Senior Fellow with the National Security and International Policy team at American Progress, and Yang Jiemian, President Emeritus of Shanghai Institute of International Studies, July 2015

"Exploring Avenues for China-U.S. Cooperation on the Middle East," Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ChinaMiddleEast\_web-FINAL2.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

The United States and China already cooperate to combat illegal financial flows. But the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, and other transnational extremist organizations underscore the need for the United States and China to redouble shared efforts in order to identify and disrupt these flows. Both countries could establish working groups to examine discreet aspects of the problem and propose issue-specific recommendations on how best to deepen both countries’ cooperation.

### Terrorism Impact Extensions

#### Current safeguards insufficient to prevent nuclear terrorism

Kenneth C. Brill, former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A., and Kenneth N. Luongo, president of Partnership for Global Security, March 15, 2012

"Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?\_r=0 (accessed 4/24/2016)

This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices.

#### Biological weapons are easy to make

Jack Spencer, Vice President, the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, and Michael Scardaville, Policy Analyst, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, October 11, 2001

"Understanding the Bioterrorist Threat: Facts and Figures," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1488 on Department of Homeland Security

Biological weapons can be produced from widely available pathogens that are manufactured for legitimate biomedical research or obtained from soil or infected animals and humans. (See Table 1.) In fact, many of the infectious diseases that are associated with biological warfare are endemic to the same countries that are most often suspected of trying to develop biological weapons. And because biological agents may be cheap and easy to obtain, any nation with a basic industry or facility such as a brewery has a de facto capability to produce biological weapons.

### Southeast Asian Terrorism Scenario

#### Southeast Asia will be new frontline in war on terror

Asia Times, January 22, 2016

"Jakarta terror attacks: Will parts of Southeast Asia become ISIS’ satellite cities?" Asia Times, http://atimes.com/2016/01/jakarta-terror-attacks-will-parts-of-southeast-asia-become-isis-satellite-cities/ (accessed 4/25/2016)

It now seems that the world’s two main terror groups — ISIS and al-Qaeda — have come to the same conclusion that Southeast Asia is a key strategic region, and this region could well become the next front line in the fight against global terror.

#### Multiple terror events increasing across the region

Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi, Researcher at the Near Eastern Department. University of California, Berkeley, March 10, 2016

"Terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Role of Ideology," Huffpost Politics, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/khairuldeen-al-makhzoomi/terrorism-in-southeast-as\_b\_9396942.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

Southeast Asia has faced multiple terrorist attacks in the recent past, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, has called Southeast Asia a “key recruitment area for ISIS,” and during the opening of the ASEAN summit in November, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, said that the attacks were propelled by ISIS’ religious ideology. The increasing number of both terror threats in Malaysia and successful attacks in Indonesia could imply that ISIS has reinvigorated its terror networks as part of its plan for the region.

#### Southeast Asian terrorism threatens Chinese economy

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor at East-West Center, March 2006

"Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, http://apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

The potential danger Southeast Asia-based terrorist groups pose to Chinese interests is not trivial. With its voracious appetite for energy and other supplies and the huge profits it gains from its exports, China’s reliance on shipping that passes through Southeast Asian waters is growing. Linkage with terrorist groups could worsen the piracy that already plagues these waters. As China grows wealthier, Chinese investment in Southeast Asian countries is increasing. PRC nationals frequently do business with ethnic Chinese in the sub-region. Given the resentment aroused by these overseas Chinese among other local ethnic communities, it is not difficult to imagine that terrorist attacks might target enterprises in which Chinese citizens have investments.

### Chinese Economy Impacts

#### Chinese economic downturn spills over globally

Chris Giles, London Correspondent for Financial Times, January 7, 2016

"World economy feels the impact when China takes a knock," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/30441208-b548-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html#axzz46tVjOUA8 (accessed 4/25/2016)

The spillover effects, however, are much broader than this direct calculation of China’s importance. Maury Obstfeld, the IMF chief economist, says he is most worried about these knock-on effects in 2016. “The global spillovers from China’s reduced rate of growth . . . have been much larger than we would have anticipated,” he said this week.

#### China's importation and exportation means that tics in its economy spill over to the rest of the world

Andrew Walker, BBC World Service economics correspondent, January 7, 2016

"China Share Turmoil," British Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34040679 (accessed 4/25/2016)

China is now such a big force in the global economy that it would inevitably affect the rest of the world. It is the second largest economy and the second largest importer of both goods and commercial services.

#### Downturn spills over to Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand

DW.com, January 12, 2016

"The winners and losers of China's downturn," DW.com, http://www.dw.com/en/the-winners-and-losers-of-chinas-downturn/a-18973627 (accessed 4/25/2016)

Particularly hard hit are commodities exporters such as Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. As China strives to rebalance its economy towards domestic consumption, the demand for raw materials supplied by these countries - such as iron ore, copper and coal - has plummeted, thus contributing to the global slump in commodities prices.

### Chinese Economy Impacts

#### Chinese economic crisis risks militarism and war

Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, September 6, 2015

"Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?" The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784 (accessed 4/25/2016)

The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.”

#### Economic downturn causes poverty, collapse of social programs, and wars

Michel Chossudovsky, professor of economics at the University of Ottawa, June 10, 2014

In all major regions of the world, the economic recession is deep-seated, resulting in mass unemployment, the collapse of state social programs and the impoverishment of millions of people. The economic crisis is accompanied by a worldwide process of militarization, a “war without borders” led by the United States of America and its NATO allies. The conduct of the Pentagon’s “long war” is intimately related to the restructuring of the global economy.

### Relations Advantage Extensions

#### Cooperation possible even if there are competing interests—shared security concerns are key

Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, January 2013

"Strategic Cooperation without Mutual Trust: A Path Forward for China and the United States," Asia Policy, Number 15, http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7236/20120308004022054904369/2013-1-no.15.pdf

China and the United States should thus expend more effort on developing preventive cooperation than on trying to improve mutual trust. Cooperation can be based on conflicting as well as shared interests. Although in the coming years China and the United States should be psychologically prepared to witness conflicting interests increase faster than common interests, Beijing and Washington can skillfully manage competition by focusing on developing preventive cooperation based on these conflicting interests. China and the United States can develop such cooperation not only in the military sphere but also in addressing nontraditional security threats, such as those posed by energy, finance, and climate change.

#### Stable Sino-U.S. relations are key to Asian stability

Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981, January/February 2012

"Balancing the East, Upgrading the West," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/2011-12-13/balancing-east-upgrading-west (accessed 4/22/2016)

The US' central challenge over the next several decades is to revitalize itself, while promoting a larger West and buttressing a complex balance in the East that can accommodate China's rising global status. A successful US effort to enlarge the West, making it the world's most stable and democratic zone, would seek to combine power with principle. A cooperative larger West-extending from North America and Europe through Eurasia (by eventually embracing Russia and Turkey), all the way to Japan and South Korea-would enhance the appeal of the West's core principles for other cultures, thus encouraging the gradual emergence of a universal democratic political culture. At the same time, the US should continue to engage cooperatively in the economically dynamic but also potentially conflicted East. If the US and China can accommodate each other on a broad range of issues, the prospects for stability in Asia will be greatly increased.

#### U.S. allowing greater role for China will improve relations

Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, September/October 2012

"How China Sees America," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2012-08-16/how-china-sees-america (accessed 4/22/2016)

In the long run, however, the better alternative for both China and the West is to create a new equilibrium of power that maintains the current world system, but with a larger role for China. China has good reasons to seek that outcome. Even after it becomes the world's largest economy, its prosperity will remain dependent on the prosperity of its global rivals (and vice versa), including the United States and Japan. The richer China becomes, the greater will be its stake in the security of sea-lanes, the stability of the world trade and financial regimes, nonproliferation, the control of global climate change, and cooperation on public health. China will not get ahead if its rivals do not also prosper. And Chinese strategists must come to understand that core U.S. interests-in the rule of law, regional stability, and open economic competition-do not threaten China's security.

### Relations Advantage Extensions

#### Compromise on counterterrorism solves paralysis and public moralizing

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

It is far too easy to take strong, national, public positions with rhetoric to match. The end result is almost always confrontation and near paralysis instead of progress. Public exchanges in which China and the US do nothing but angrily lecture each other in a ―dialogue of the deaf‖ is as purposeless as it is boring. As is the case with most issues in US and Chinese relations, the question in each case is not who is right or wrong. It is what level of quiet compromise will produce the best results for both sides.

#### Empirically cooperation on counterterrorism drastically improves Sino-U.S. relations

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

While the US and China often disagree over the details of given diplomatic issues, this is an area where more dialogue and flexibility on both sides could improve cooperation. For example, China has provided tacit support for the WOT and American efforts by softening its criticism of US allies, particularly Japan‘s military participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shirley Kan of the US Congressional Research Service notes, ―Tokyo‘s dispatch of naval vessels to the Indian Ocean to support US forces fighting in Afghanistan was a precedent-setting event, as was sending Japanese soldiers to Iraq during the post-Saddam insurgency. In both cases, China tempered its diplomatic language in order to avoid being perceived as obstructionist. There will inevitably be areas where the US can show similar flexibility, and both sides again need to strengthen the kind of quiet dialogue that can eliminate the risk that such efforts might become the subject of public political controversy.

#### Sino-U.S. relations key to post-Cold War stability

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

“U.S.-China relations will certainly be a, if not the, central pillar of any new post-Cold War international order,” noted Bilahari Kausikan, a prominent Singaporean diplomat and intellectual. The immediate problem, Kausikan argued, was that “U.S.-China relations are infused with deep strategic distrust” that underlies their current “groping towards a new modus vivendi with each other.”

### Science and Tech Cooperation Extensions

#### Sino-U.S. relations on tech and science cooperation are uncertain now

Richard P. Suttmeier, professor of political science at the University of Oregon, September 11, 2014

"Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First Century?" U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Report, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20US-China%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf (accessed 4/23/2016)

There have been many successful and mutually beneficial cooperative activities under the Agreement over the years, and the S&T relationship has been a positive influence on U.S.-China relations in general. At the same time, as the two sides face new geopolitical uncertainties and forms of commercial competition, the context for S&T cooperation has been changing. The manifest asymmetry in capabilities—which characterized the relationship in 1979—has been reduced as a result of the remarkable development of S&T in China, made possible by its own domestic policy initiatives and its strategic exploitation of international cooperative opportunities, especially those offered by relations with the United States. Meanwhile, demographic changes, educational failures, and U.S. budget politics have introduced uncertainties into the future of the U.S. research enterprise, the quality of which has served as a major “soft power” resource in U.S. engagement with China.

#### Level of science and technology cooperation increases or decreases according to fluctuations in relations

Lan Xue, Professor and Dean of School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, and Denis Simon, Vice Provost, International Strategic Initiatives and Foundation Professor of Contemporary Chinese Affairs at Arizona State University, 2013

"U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation," ChinaUSFocus.com, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part-02-Chapter-122.pdf

The tangible and growing levels of economic and technological interdependence between the world’s two largest economies is undeniable; they both have shared in the benefits derived from their high level of integration in terms of commercial affairs, academic and S&T exchanges, etc. A souring of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship from a political perspective, would almost certainly transform their engagement from the current, largely win-win orientation to more of a zero-sum game – leaving both countries with many lost opportunities, especially in terms of their ability to work together to address many of the world’s pressing problems.

### Science and Tech Cooperation Extensions

#### Cooperation key to domestic and global economic growth

United States Department of Treasury, June 25, 2015

"2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet – Economic Track," United States Department of Treasury Press Center, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0092.aspx (accessed 4/25/2016)

The United States and China underscored the importance of fostering an open, transparent, and non-discriminatory environment for trade and investment, recognizing that doing so is critical to economic growth and job creation in both countries and in the global economy.

#### Growth saves the environment

Owen Paterson, Former British Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, September 20, 2015

"Owen Paterson: Economic growth is the key to saving the planet," The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/climatechange/11877170/Owen-Paterson-Economic-growth-is-the-key-to-saving-the-planet.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

The rich parts of the world, like Europe and North America, are now teeming with far richer wildlife populations than for many centuries, to the point where it is becoming a problem in cities – foxes in London, turkeys in Boston, bears in Philadelphia. Outside the developing world, forests are increasing in extent and diversity all the time. Britain now has more woodland than in the days of Chaucer; I set a target to reach the levels of the Domesday Book by 2060. Whales, penguins and seals have boomed back from near extinction in the polar regions to relative abundance.

### Answers to “China-Russia Relations” Arguments

#### Relations are not a zero-sum game. China, the U.S., and Russia can all cooperative together

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Brandon Fite, researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2011

"U.S. and Chinese Cooperation in Counterterrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia: Finding Ways to Move Forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/110829\_US\_China\_Coop.pdf (accessed 4/24/2016)

Russia could be another critical partner in this struggle. The US, China, and Russia all have unique intelligence assets to bring to a partnership in fighting terrorism in given countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. They cannot freely share sensitive data, or cooperate in every area. They do, however, have a common definition of terrorist in many areas, and they have a common interest in preventing any form of terrorism that involves weapons of mass destruction or a threat to critical facilities and infrastructure.

#### Russia-China relationship is tenuous, good relations not likely to last

William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at RAND Corporation, and David Sedney, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, May 13, 2015

"How durable is the China-Russia ‘friendship?’" Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/12/how-durable-are-china-russia-relations/ (accessed 4/25/2016)

Though they share key economic interests and oppose what they claim to be a U.S.-dominated world order, the two nations’ relationship over time promises to be uneven and tense. One crucial source of discord is that China is a rising power and Russia is not. Moscow may not be willing to accept a junior partnership with China, nor is China likely to treat Russia with the respect Moscow would assume as its right.

### Uniqueness Takeouts

#### U.S. and China have issued a joint commitment to cooperate on preventing nuclear terrorism

The White House, March 31, 2016

"U.S.-China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation," Whitehouse.gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-statement-nuclear-security-cooperation (accessed 4/23/2016)

Today in Washington, D.C., on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), we, the United States and China, declare our commitment to working together to foster a peaceful and stable international environment by reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and striving for a more inclusive, coordinated, sustainable and robust global nuclear security architecture for the common benefit and security of all.

#### High-level anti-terrorism meetings occurring between U.S. and China

Zhang Yunbi, staffwriter, August 5, 2015

"China and U.S. Discuss Ways to Fight Terror," China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-08/05/content\_21502662.htm (accessed 4/23/2016)

On April 9, State Councilor and Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun and visiting US Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson co-chaired the first ministerial meeting between the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the US Homeland Security Department in Beijing. They agreed to fortify cooperation in "anti-terrorism information exchanges involving foreign terrorists, border controls, anti-terrorism financing, cyberspace anti-terrorism and the fight against violent extremism".

### Answers to “Chinese Empowerment Bad”Disadvantages

#### Non-Unique: China helping on anti-piracy and security now

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

Chinese warships have participated since 2009 in the international anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, and have paid fleets visits to the Mediterranean. China claimed in August 2014 that its naval vessels had escorted some 5,670 ships in the region and come to the aid of 60 others. China used that deployment, according to Sun Degang, as a platform for military diplomacy. It has since held joint anti-piracy and counter-terrorism exercises; paid naval visits to neighbouring countries and regions, made interim technical service stops in Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan for ship fuel and material resupply; and agreed on short-term arrangements for reconnaissance aircraft. China reportedly has also deployed troops to Kashmir to protect construction projects.

#### Turn: Chinese power projection leads to cooperation with U.S. and Europe

Dr. James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 18, 2016

"China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom," RSIS Working Paper No. 296, http://fankultur-institut.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296-China-and-the-Middle-East\_Venturing-into-the-Maelstrom.pdf (accessed 4/22/2016)

The Chinese approach to the Mediterranean is informed by Sun Degang’s argument that China’s initial military approach was designed to balance its security interests with its reliance on the U.S. by adopting a soft military policy. It also stroked with the notion put forward by Niu Xinchun, director of the Middle East Program at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, that the creation of Chinese naval footholds in the Middle East would foster military cooperation with Europe, the United States, and the other regional actors on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief.

### Sino-U.S. Tensions High Now

#### Hacking dispute puts tensions high now

Reuters, July 10, 2014

"Chinese hackers pursue key data on US workers," Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/article/usa-cybersecurity-china-idINKBN0FF09Y20140710 (accessed 4/22/2016)

Tensions are high between China and the United States. The United States recently charged five Chinese military officers, accusing them of hacking into American companies to steal trade secrets. China showed its anger over the allegations by shutting down a bilateral working group on cyber security.

#### South China Sea dispute raising tensions

Reuters, April 21, 2016

"U.S. says China's intentions in South China Sea raise tension and questions," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-usa-idUSKCN0XI19I (accessed 4/25/2016)

A top U.S. official on Thursday said China's land reclamation and militarization in the disputed South China Sea was raising tensions and serious questions about its intention. On a visit to Vietnam, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington would continue to play a constructive role in supporting its regional allies but was not looking to set up bases for its troops.

### Topicality: Plan is Diplomatic Engagement

#### Diplomacy for the purpose of counterterrorism is diplomatic engagement

The National, October 8, 2015

"Ambassador for Counterterrorism Announced," National.org.nz, https://www.national.org.nz/news/news/media-releases/detail/2015/10/08/Ambassador-for-Counter-Terrorism-Announced (accessed 4/23/2016)

“Appointing a specialist Ambassador will enable New Zealand to contribute further to international and regional efforts to counter terrorism and allow us to expand our diplomatic engagement with important international counter terrorism forums, including the Anti-ISIL Coalition, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, and the United Nations.

#### Diplomatic engagement is a subset of counterterrorism

Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013

"President Obama's Speech at National Defense University: The Future of our Fight against Terrorism," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/president-obamas-speech-national-defense-university-future-our-fight-against-terrorism-may-2013/p30771 (accessed 4/23/2016)

President Barack Obama outlined on May 23, 2013, at the National Defense University, his administration's counterterrorism strategy, which include three areas: "targeted action against terrorists; effective partnerships; and diplomatic engagement and assistance."

#### Counterterrorism is a subject of diplomatic engagement

Yang Jiechi, Chinese State Councilor for Foreign Policy, June 23, 2015

"China-US Cooperation Benefits the Two Countries and the World," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\_eng/wjdt\_665385/zyjh\_665391/t1275022.shtml (accessed 4/23/2016)

After 36 years of diplomatic engagement, China and the United States now share more and more converging interests. Our bilateral ties are assuming greater strategic significance as well as global influence. Under the new circumstances, the number of areas where our two countries should and could work together has dramatically increased, not decreased. China stands ready to work with the United States to follow up on the agreement reached between the two Presidents by keeping to the right direction of building a new model of major-country relationship. The two countries need to work together to deepen strategic communication, enhance strategic mutual trust, avoid strategic miscalculation, properly manage differences and sensitive issues, and expand exchanges and results-oriented cooperation across the board. Within the S&ED framework, this round of strategic dialogue will focus on the upcoming important agenda for bilateral ties. This includes such major topics as reinforcing extensive cooperation in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, military-to-military ties, law enforcement, climate change, energy and the environment, and science and technology. It also includes dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue, the Korean nuclear issue and other regional hotspot issues, and exploring the way we conduct exchanges and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

### Answers to Terror Talk Arguments

#### Description of terror threat is not marginalizing--it stems from real instances of economic oppression and alienation

Atul Singh, CEO and editor-in-chief of Fair Observer, April 5, 2016

"Yes, nuclear terrorism is a real threat the world over," The News Minute, http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/yes-nuclear-terrorism-real-threat-world-over-41204 (accessed 4/25/2016)

Attacks are taking place with disturbing regularity in different parts of the world. It is unlikely that IS operates a global command and control center coordinating attacks. What is definitely true is that many young Muslim men are inspired by this fanatical organization and are emulating its methods. Disaffected young men who feel marginalized can often be harmless. However, once they feel extreme injustice and are exposed to toxic ideology, they can be deadly dangerous. Once these young men have a belief to live for and die for, they have few limits.

#### Terrorism is a result of real global and socioeconomic contexts

Atul Singh, CEO and editor-in-chief of Fair Observer, April 5, 2016

"Yes, nuclear terrorism is a real threat the world over," The News Minute, http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/yes-nuclear-terrorism-real-threat-world-over-41204 (accessed 4/25/2016)

Terrorism increased in the 19th century because of severe political, social and economic strain. It is the same today. A scandal that has been breaking out at the time of writing this demonstrates how the rich and powerful use tax havens to launder money and evade tax. The global economic model is flailing if not failing. A debt crisis and a chronic lack of jobs are hobbling the economy. Inequality is increasing and social contracts are fraying.

### Answers to Terror Talk Arguments

#### Turn--censoring the ability to call an act terrorist increases the danger of domestic attacks

Brian C. Joondeph, medical doctor, December 8, 2015

"Political Correctness More Deadly Than ISIS," American Thinker, http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/12/political\_correctness\_more\_deadly\_than\_isis.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

If citizens are vigilant, many terror plots will be noticed and disrupted. But residents must feel free to speak up, even if their suspicions turn out to be wrong. Even if they are wrong more than right, lives will be saved and we will have a chance at stopping San Bernardino-like plots. But if citizens are afraid to speak up due to political correctness, we all lose as law enforcement can’t do it alone.

#### Obsession with language squashes debate and increases the danger of risks

Katie Pavlich, news editor at Townhall.com, September 23, 2014

"Shed political correctness in combatting ISIS," http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/218571-katie-pavlich-shed-political-correctness-in-combatting-isis (accessed 4/25/2016)

Islamic radicalization and domestic terror are real and imminent threats. Addressing terror through politically correct lenses will only get more people killed. It’s time to seriously revisit this issue without false, baseless accusations and squashing of debate.

### Answers to Politics/Elections Disadvantages

#### Non-unique and no link: Obama is engaging now on South China Sea and has strong domestic support for it

Agence France-Presse, February 17, 2016

"Obama calls for ‘tangible steps’ to ease South China Sea tensions," Inquirer.net, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/765504/obama-calls-for-tangible-steps-to-ease-south-china-sea-tensions-2 (accessed 4/25/2016)

But the White House hoped to send a message to the region that Washington will remain engaged. “I’m confident that whoever the next president may be will build on the foundation that we’ve laid, because there’s strong, sustained bipartisan support for American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region,” Obama said.

#### Engagement with China always has bipartisan support

David Nakamura, staff reporter for Stars and Stripes, September 23, 2015

"Anti-China rhetoric in presidential campaign suggests change under new president," Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/news/anti-china-rhetoric-in-presidential-campaign-suggests-change-under-new-president-1.369829 (accessed 4/25/2016)

White House deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes chalked up much of the criticism from GOP candidates to hyperbole that overstates "the degree of Chinese responsibility for certain things." He emphasized the "bipartisan support" over previous Democratic and Republican administration for a policy of engagement with China since the opening of relations more than four decades ago.

### Answers to Politics/Elections Disadvantages

#### China issues won't influence election--empirically denied, and nobody is seriously engaging it

Colin Moreshead, Tokyo-based East Asian correspondent, November 3, 2015

"Will China-Bashing Subside in 2016?," China U.S. Focus, http://m.chinausfocus.com/article/4047.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

Three years ago, then-Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney made waves when he vowed to label China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. The circumstances of the 2012 presidential contest were undoubtedly different than those of the current race; Romney was the challenger to a sitting president, and by extension a challenger to the U.S. foreign policy status quo. He was criticized by The New York Times on the left and by the Wall Street Journal on the right, both framing his position as hollow posturing. Xinhua took umbrage in a September, 2012 op-ed, calling China bashing like Romney’s “a cancer in U.S. electoral politics, seriously plaguing the relations between the two countries.” Candidates for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination haven’t strayed too far from the Romney position, but their statements lack conviction. They have delivered, in the place of Romney’s brazen policy prescriptions, a series of tangential claims that eschew outright condemnation.

#### Tough talk doesn't reflect policy reality, doesn't influence elections, and candidates pull back

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, October 16, 2015

'Be Tough, Not Stupid, in Dealing with China," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/be-tough-not-stupid-deali\_b\_8316678.html (accessed 4/25/2016)

But much is at stake in maintaining a civil if not overly warm relationship. Even Donald Trump admitted that he has sold real estate to Chinese buyers: “Am I supposed to dislike them,” he asked? Hopefully any threats and insults will be forgotten by the winning candidate, like both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, who chose to build cooperative relationships despite their campaign attacks.

# CP Answers Pressure CPs

### 2AC Perm Do Both – General

#### Combining engagement with pressure-based balancing strategies solves best

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

What this leaves, then, is a strategy that combines continued attempts at engagement with expanded and intensified balancing. Unlike containment, which would likely be both extremely costly and highly controversial, such an approach has the very important virtue of being feasible in light of current political and economic constraints. Unlike offshore balancing, it would not rest on unrealistic and potentially dangerous assumptions about the behaviour of third parties. And, in contrast to enhanced engagement, reassurance or a notional grand bargain, it is rooted in a realistic appreciation of the likely extent of China’s ambitions, given its recent achievements and current momentum. Better balancing is not a perfect strategy, and arguing about how it should be adjusted at the margins is not as stimulating as debating the merits of bold new alternatives. But in the real world of practical policymaking, it remains the best available alternative.

### 2AC Pressure Fails/Bad – General

#### CP fails, emboldens Chinese aggression, and Chinese economic retaliation harms the US economy

Leland R. Miller, Chief Executive Officer of China Beige Book International, a data analytics and investment advisory firm focused on the Chinese economy, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-26-2015, “Rethinking U.S. Economic Policy Toward China,” in Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World, http://www.choosingtolead.net/rethinking-us-economic-policy-toward-china

To confront these challenges the U.S. government needs a revamped approach to U.S.-China policy, but not one that stresses greater reliance on economic and trade policy as a means of retribution. This idea, which has been making the rounds in Congress and elsewhere, implies that such a tactic constitutes either a less costly or more effective way to address China’s aggressive behavior. Both are deeply flawed assumptions, however, and to the extent they remain unchallenged, a new Administration may mistakenly believe it wise to forgo conventional military deterrence and instead rely primarily on its economic toolbox for solutions. This notion, therefore, merits a more detailed critique. Acts of economic warfare—be they raising tariffs on Chinese goods, threatening to fling “currency manipulation” labels about, or barring China’s inclusion in global trade pacts—typically represent ineffective and counterproductive U.S. policy responses. This is so for two key reasons. First, they will boomerang in such a way as to harm American interests as much as or more than those of China—which is certain to escalate and in any case can better mitigate short-term damage to its state-controlled economy than we can to our less centralized one. Second, they will not disincentivize aggressive Chinese behavior but will almost certainly have the opposite effect. In today’s world China holds a comparatively stronger hand in economic matters than it does in the security realm; by relying on economic tools to guide outcomes, Washington would effectively be ceding leverage to Beijing over how these disagreements are settled.

### 2AC Export Controls CP – Domestic Tradeoff DA

#### CP backfires and doesn’t solve – China can just produce arms domestically – international restrictions prevent oversight of production and makes China balancing more likely

Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 4-18-2012, “EU Should Keep China Arms Embargo,” http://www.hudson.org/research/8880-eu-should-keep-china-arms-embargo

Also, opponents of the arms embargo also believe it encourages China to develop its own domestic military research, development, and production capabilities, thus reducing the strategic advantage of Western countries in these sectors and making it harder for Western analysts to follow developments regarding Chinese weapons capabilities. Conversely, expanding the EU’s defense sales to China could make the Chinese government more reluctant to pursue policies Western governments oppose for fear of the EU retaliating by curtailing these sales.

### 1AR Export Controls CP – Domestic Tradeoff DA

#### Restrictions on Chinese arms imports empirically cause a shift to domestic development – that’s more dangerous because we can’t oversee production

Jiri Suchanek, analyst at the Center for Security Analyses and Prevention, no date (was published after 2012, based on references in the article), “EU Arms Embargo on China: A Frozen Opportunity?” http://www.cbap.cz/archiv/1356?lang=en

To answer the first question, the European arms embargo is, in the first place, a symbol and sign for China. The more than 20-year-old sanction is no longer an adequate measure for today´s Chinese reality. In one of his statements, Wen Jiabao even said that China would not buy European arms if the embargo was lifted. Of course, China would especially welcome European advanced arms technologies, but Beijing has proven that Europe and the United States (which has also imposed an arms embargo on China) can´t stop Chinese armament and the technology boom. In this point of view, it is important to say that an arms embargo imposed by the most technologically advanced actors – the USA and the EU – can have, and in the case of China actually has, paradoxically counterproductive effects. The Chinese arms industry has been forced into massive investments in research and development and can now produce modern weapons without foreign assistance. Even more dangerous, in the future newly developed Chinese weapons may be as effective as their Western counterparts, but unknown in the United States and Europe.

### 2AC Export Controls CP – Econ DA

#### Export controls hurt American competitiveness – kills jobs in critical defense and tech sectors like aerospace

Donald Manzullo, former US Representative from Illinois and Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business, JD From Marquette University, March 2006, “China’s Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.16-17.06HearingT.pdf

We should never forget that export controls cost about $10 to $20 billion in lost exports per year as well as roughly 200,000 jobs, according to studies performed by the Institute for International Economics. Most other nations do not have even the limitations we have now on our exports. So having HR 3100 add yet another burden on our overall ability to export and to be competitive struck me as a vain effort to make us "feel good" that we doing something against the Chinese. The potential damage to U.S. industry, especially the defense and technology sectors, from such a broad approach to export controls is significant. In the aerospace sector alone, total U.S. aerospace sales to the European Union exceeded $23 billion last year, accounting for 40 percent of U.S. aerospace exports and supporting more than 600,000 American aerospace jobs.

### 2AC Export Controls CP – No Solvency – Allies Say No

#### Allies say no to the CP – guts solvency

Dean Cheng, Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, 12-13-2010, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china#\_ftn44

Regrettably, the current U.S. export control regime is out of date and out of step with technological realities. Few U.S. allies are likely to join a strict regime aimed at denying China all access to advanced technology. This is crucial because many European and Asian states now have technological capabilities comparable to the U.S. in important fields. Without broad agreement on an export control regime, unilateral American efforts will affect only American exports, without actually curtailing Chinese access to many forms of high technology.

### 1AR Export Controls CP – No Solvency – Asian Allies Say No

#### Asian allies say no – takes out CP solvency

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

Elsewhere in the world, although concern over China is growing, there is no appetite for a full-blown rivalry. Aside from bigger defence budgets and less trade and investment, a shift toward containment would provoke fears of war. All parties would suffer in such a conflict, but China’s Asian neighbours have reason to fear that they would suffer more than most. Even if American strategists concluded that it was necessary, the democratic countries that are its principal strategic partners in Asia are simply not ready to abandon engagement and sign on to a policy of containment.

### 2AC Export Controls CP – No Solvency – Opacity

#### The CP fails – China can circumvent prohibitions on direct purchases – too opaque for regulations to solve

Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing\_without\_containment.pdf

Today, such capabilities do not reside solely in the United States—they can be found in many nations, especially America’s European and Asian allies. It is past time that these countries developed a coordinated approach to constrict China’s access to all technologies that can inflict “high leverage strategic harm,” which a 1990 U.S. Department of Defense policy persuasively argued should be the benchmark for deciding whether a particular military technology should be considered destabilizing.120 This issue, however, does not simply implicate the direct sales of advanced weaponry. The purchase of these end-items is relatively easy to monitor and control. But China’s increasingly significant outward foreign direct investment, when combined with the new realities of “hyperglobalization”—where trade in goods is not only increasingly organized within global value chains but is also dramatically supplemented by trade in disembodied services—implies that Beijing will be able to more easily access advanced technologies at varying stages of development through different means beyond direct purchases. These include mergers and acquisitions, greenfield investments abroad, joint ventures with distressed foreign firms, and licensing agreements. These forms of access are harder to control (or sometimes even to detect, given the high degree of opacity about the linkages between many Chinese firms and the Chinese state).

### 2AC Export Control CP – Links to Politics

#### Businesses backlash to tighter export controls – massive political opposition to the CP

Larry M. Wortzel, Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and Carolyn Bartholomew, Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2006, “China’s Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/3.16-17.06HearingT.pdf

This was the case as of 2002 -- and there seems to have been little improvement in the situation since then. No doubt the Commerce Department which houses the Bureau of Industry and Security is under tremendous pressure from U.S. exporters for relaxed enforcement. Here, I think we can see the major disconnect in America's export control ethos.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – Perm Do Both + No CP Solvency

#### Combining sanctions with other diplomatic strategies solves best – CP won’t solve by itself

Peter D. Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, and Eric B. Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 6-15-2015, “The Sanctions Myth,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sanctions-myth-13110?page=show

Third, and most importantly, policy makers should not rely on these tools in place of a strategy, but rather should incorporate them into a broader strategy for safeguarding U.S. interests. In the case of Russia, for example, the Obama administration has seemingly relied on sanctions to impose economic pain on the country in the hopes of convincing it to pull out of Crimea and to cease its support of rebels in eastern Ukraine. But sanctions—even sophisticated ones—are rarely effective alone, and must be used in conjunction with other tools of diplomacy to have much chance of success. Rather than imposing sanctions on target countries and rogue actors and hoping that they can cause enough pain, policy makers should carefully consider how to use sanctions, threats of force, negotiations and other forms of diplomacy in a coordinated way to achieve U.S. objectives.

### 1AR Sanctions CP – Perm Do Both

#### Only the perm solves – need to combine sanctions with diplomacy to be effective – Iran talks prove

Zachary Goldman, Executive Director of the Center on Law and Security at the NYU School of Law, 4-10-2015, “Iran and Three Questions on the Effectiveness of Sanctions,” https://www.justsecurity.org/21898/efficacy-financial-sanctions-case-iran-larger-questions/

Sanctions cannot unilaterally solve foreign policy problems; they must be integrated with other tools of national power into a holistic strategic approach to threat management. The Iran nuclear negotiations are perhaps the best example of how this can be done — the sanctions programs were tied tightly to the concept or conduct of a diplomatic process and focused on generating leverage that would be deployed in those negotiations. But this should be true across sanctions programs, from those levied against Russia in response to its aggression in Ukraine, to those contemplated in the cybersecurity context.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – Laundry List Impact Turn

#### Sanctions cause retaliation – China collapses global financial markets, increases military aggression, and ends cooperation on climate change and Iran

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 2-23-2016, “The Right Way to Sanction China,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

U.S. sanctions would also risk retaliation through horizontal escalation in other domains. China might adopt measures to undermine U.S. centrality in the global economic system, such as efforts to undermine confidence in the U.S. financial system or to more rapidly shift away from dollar-based trade and investment. Alternatively, China could increase the pace of land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea or more frequently confront U.S. ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace. China could also become less cooperative on a host of other issues that are important to U.S. interests, from climate change to the nuclear deal with Iran.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – Econ DA

#### Chinese economic retaliation tanks the US economy

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 3-13-2016, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

Fourth, China would bite back, and the economic consequences would be damaging. Unlike Russia or Iran, China could severely harm U.S. economic interests and those of U.S. allies and partners, both in the region and around the world. Beijing could impose sanctions on U.S. companies or make it significantly more difficult for certain U.S. companies to do business in China. Numerous U.S. businesses have already encountered political challenges to operating in China, which have caused some, like Google, to withdraw from mainland China despite its huge market. Similarly, in recent months, China has threatened to impose so-called secondary sanctions on U.S. defense manufacturers that provide arms to Taiwan as part of a newly announced U.S. package, cutting these companies off from Chinese markets.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – No Solvency – General

#### Targeted sanctions don’t lead to concessions – even proponents agree

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, February 2011, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/News%20Images/Drezner\_Sanctions.pdf

Smart sanctions are less promising in coercing the target government into making concessions. After reviewing the United Nations sanctions during the 1990s, Cortright and Lopez (2002a,b:8) note that ‘‘the obvious conclusion is that comprehensive sanctions are more effective than targeted or selective measures. Where economic and social impact have been greatest, political effects have also been most significant.’’ Elliott (2002:171) arrived at a similar conclusion: ‘‘with the exception of Libya, the results of UN targeted sanctions have been disappointing.’’ In their review essay, Tostenson and Bull (2002:402) concluded: ‘‘the optimism expressed in some academic circles and among decision makers at national and international levels appears largely unjustified.’’ At a 2010 International Studies Association panel on the topic, many of the scholarly architects of the smart sanctions approach agreed that, compared to comprehensive sanctions, the policy results had been mixed at best.

### 1AR Sanctions CP – No Solvency – China

#### China is resilient – sanctions fail

David Gompert, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, and Distinguished Visiting Professor for National Security Studies at the United States Naval Academy, and Hans Binnendijk, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Adjunct Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, 3-22-2016, “Time for Washington to Amp Up the Power to Coerce,” http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/time-for-washington-to-amp-up-the-power-to-coerce/

The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China — the state that also poses the strongest challenge to the U.S. military options. China seems at present to be politically resilient, plays a critical role in world trade and finance and has its own coercive options — with its cyber capabilities and holdings of U.S. debt. Russia, Iran and other states less robust than China are more efficacious targets for coercive power. At the other extreme, as the case of North Korea suggests, coercion may not be effective against regimes that are isolated and indifferent to the hardships of their populations.

### 1AR Sanctions CP – No Solvency – General

#### Be skeptical of CP solvency – impossible to predict the effect of sanctions

Peter D. Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, and Eric B. Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 6-15-2015, “The Sanctions Myth,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-sanctions-myth-13110?page=show

The developing narrative that increasingly sophisticated sanctions provide policy makers with a silver bullet for addressing intractable national-security issues is wrong. These new sanctions can be powerful, but they often cannot be calibrated to the extent policy makers desire—or to the extent necessary to deliver strategic objectives. Indeed, in many ways their greatest asset is also their most significant liability; because they primarily utilize international financial markets (which is how they are able to create so much leverage), their reach and effects can often be very difficult to predict.

### 1AR Sanctions CP – No Solvency – General – Empirics

#### Targeted sanctions fail – Russia proves

The Economist, 9-6-2014, “Too Smart By Half?” http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21615603-effective-sanctions-have-always-been-hard-craft-too-smart-half

When Russia annexed Crimea in March, Western leaders hoped that carefully crafted “smart” financial sanctions, directed at Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, plus some old-fashioned embargoes, for instance of high-tech equipment, might persuade him not to invade eastern Ukraine. Or at least, given that they had no stomach for stronger options, they said that was their hope. Either way, the response has so far been in vain. Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy, but they have had no discernible effect on Mr Putin’s military strategy. Instead, Russia has imposed counter-sanctions of its own, halting food imports and closing local branches of McDonald’s, ostensibly on public-health grounds.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – No Solvency – Cyber

#### Sanctions fail – no deterrent effect – specifically true for cyberattacks

Eric B. Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, and Jacquelyn Schneider, PhD Candidate-in-Residence at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, 4-14-2015, “Sanctioning to Deter: Implications for Cyberspace, Russia, and Beyond,” http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/sanctioning-to-deter-implications-for-cyberspace-russia-and-beyond/

Still, policymakers should be cautious in relying on sanctions to deter countries from engaging in cyber-attacks or, for that matter, annexing territory. First, and most notably, the record on effectively using sanctions to deter aggressive actions is unclear at best. For example, the United States first imposed sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea, and administration officials specifically noted that those sanctions were to be “very clear deterrents for actions that may be contemplated.” Despite employing these tools, those sanctions — and the threat of future sanctions — did not deter Russia from subsequently supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine with both arms and direct military action. And while the threat of further punishment may have deterred Russia from engaging in further destabilizing action, it is difficult to draw such a conclusion at this point. Second, while these new, sophisticated sanctions often cause medium- and long-term damage to a country’s economy, the prospect of such damage may not deter aggressive actors from taking immediate actions contrary to U.S. interests. For example, in the case of Russia, while the sanctions have certainly taken a toll, the Russian economy, when supported by capital reserves, is sufficiently resilient to put off the worst impacts of the sanctions for a few years. In the short-term, however, Russia has been able to annex Crimea and exercise significant influence in rebel-controlled areas deep in Eastern Ukraine. Thus, while the prospect of economic damage may loom down the road, this risk may be insufficient to deter an aggressive actor from pursuing short-term benefits. This may be especially true in cyberspace, where malicious actors have a low barrier for entry, may not have long-term aspirations, or, as in the case of Anonymous, no particular pressure points which sanctions could effectively target.

### 2AC Sanctions CP – No Solvency – Territory

#### CP fails – China would just offset economic losses

Zack Cooper, Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctoral candidate at Princeton University, and a member of the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance board of advisors, and Eric Lorber, Senior Associate at the Financial Integrity Network, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 3-13-2016, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-right-way-sanction-china-15285?page=show

Even if U.S. targeted sanctions were effective in pressuring specific firms to change their behavior in the South China Sea, some major obstacles would remain. Chinese leaders could offset private losses incurred by these sanctions and China could escalate in other domains, such as rare earth exports, in which Beijing has leverage.

### 2AC Tariffs CP – Laundry List Impact Turn

#### Across-the-board tariffs cause Chinese escalation – starts a trade war and decks the US economy – also links to politics

Leland R. Miller, Chief Executive Officer of China Beige Book International, a data analytics and investment advisory firm focused on the Chinese economy, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 10-26-2015, “Rethinking U.S. Economic Policy Toward China,” in Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World, http://www.choosingtolead.net/rethinking-us-economic-policy-toward-china

In 2013, the Blair-Huntsman Commission proposed responding to Chinese cyber intrusions with an “across the board tariff on Chinese goods,” an idea that was surprisingly seconded by a recent Council on Foreign Relations task force charged with re-assessing U.S. policy toward China. While these groups should be lauded for articulating an actual program of deterrence, raising tariffs on Chinese goods—or even threatening to do so—happens to be a spectacularly poor idea, for three major reasons. First, the obvious: China will inevitably respond to the raising of U.S. tariffs with exclusionary efforts of its own, harming U.S. interests and threatening escalation to a broader trade war. Second, the proposal betrays a flawed understanding of trade economics, under which imports are viewed merely as gifts bequeathed to foreign countries for good behavior rather than critical inputs to a well-functioning American economy. Imports such as steel, auto parts, and textiles—among many other key inputs—allow U.S. firms to produce more competitively priced end products, while cheaper consumer goods improve the quality of life for American families. Far from helping the average American, tariffs serve as a regressive tax on consumers that ends up hurting the poor the most. Third, and often overlooked, this approach may actually create a Chinese incentive for escalation. Compared to the U.S. political system, where any tariff-raising would certainly be subject to a fierce congressional tug of war, Chinese leaders can opt to raise tariffs or bail out injured parties with the mere stroke of a pen. This incongruity is not lost on Beijing, meaning the chances of miscalculation will increase if Beijing’s game theorists believe that a U.S. Administration cannot make good on its threats—or match any ensuing escalation. (After the recent debacle over TPA passage, could anyone possibly blame them?)

### 2AC – AT: Heg NB – Aff Solves + CP Links

#### Engagement solves the net benefit and pressure doesn’t – aff doesn’t trade off with maintaining US leadership in Asia

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

The prescriptions that follow from this analysis are straightforward and reassuring. Basically, Washington needs to stay the course, demonstrating renewed faith in the resilience and attractive power of the system it built after the Second World War. The United States must invest in bolstering the existing order, reinforcing the rules and institutions that comprise it, and avoiding actions that might undermine them in pursuit of short-term advantage. Properly managed, the current system can continue to function, and to serve America’s interests, even as its power declines relative to China’s. In short, ‘the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle … The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States.’7

### 2AC – AT: Heg NB – No Impact

#### No impact to heg decline

Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, former Professor of History at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, 8-3-2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.

### 2AC – Yes Solvency + AT: Heg NB – General

#### The aff solves – China doesn’t reject positive engagement and won’t challenge US leadership

Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2015, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis\_Blackwill.pdf

So long as the United States does not alter the intense “global codependency” that currently defines U.S.-China economic relations, China is content to maintain the current arrangement.32 China still seeks to cooperate with the United States whenever possible, but only when such collaboration is not unduly burdensome in the face of common interests, does not undercut its geopolitical ambitions to undermine U.S. primacy, and does not foreclose future options that might one day prove advantageous to China. Because China recognizes that its quest for comprehensive national power is still incomplete, it seeks to avoid any confrontation with the United States or the international system in the near term. Rather, Beijing aims to deepen ties with all its global partners—and especially with Washington—in the hope that its accelerated rise and centrality to international trade and politics will compel others to become increasingly deferential to China’s preferences. Should such obeisance not emerge once China has successfully risen, Beijing would then be properly equipped to protect its equities by force and at a lower cost than it could today, given that it is still relatively weak and remains reliant on the benefits of trade and global interdependence.

### 2AC – Yes Solvency – Specific Issues Key

#### Plan solves – older initiatives failed because they were too broad – engagement can succeed on specific issues and overcomes Chinese distrust

Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015, “Summary Report: U.S.-China 21 – The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping: Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25237/summary\_report.html

I argue that the only real prospect of altering the present reality in a substantive and durable way lies not in discovering some magical declaratory statement. Instead, the U.S. and China should set out an explicit, agreed road map of cooperative strategic projects (bilateral, regional and global) to build mutual trust and reduce deeply rooted strategic perceptions, inch by inch, year after year. The gains from such an approach will be slow and grueling, the reversals numerous. But it is the only way to arrest the political and policy dynamics that flow from China’s conclusion that the U.S. will do whatever it takes to retain its status as the pre-eminent power.

### 2AC – Yes Solvency – AT: Empirics

#### Current engagement has failed because it’s too unfocused – plan reorients US attention towards the US-China relationship

Harry Harding, University Professor at the University of Virginia and Visiting Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Fall 2015, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Fall2015\_Harding.pdf

This is, however, a minority U.S. view. Most participants in the current debate hold that U.S. strategy toward China policy has made a difference, but share no consensus as to how. The more positive assessments believe that U.S. policy toward China has been well conceived but poorly implemented. In this interpretation, both the George W. Bush and early Obama administrations were distracted by problems in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Ukraine, and elsewhere—and by the Obama administration’s ambitious socioeconomic objectives at home—and therefore paid insufficient attention to China or the Asia– Pacific region as a whole. When it did pay attention to China, its policy was poorly coordinated. Moreover, the United States showed weakness and indecisiveness in its policy toward various hotspots, including Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, thus encouraging Chinese assertiveness. Not only that, though it responded to the global financial crisis with a large and relatively successful stimulus package, it has not devoted energy to a more fundamental restructuring and long-term revitalization of the U.S. economy. Because of this poor prioritization of U.S. interests, in this view, U.S. soft power, economic power, and military power have all eroded, and U.S. policy toward China has not been backed up by sufficient resources to be effective.

### 2AC Pressure – Links to Elections/Politics – General

#### No political support for pressure strategies – the public and lawmakers will backlash to perceived economic costs

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, 10-26-2015, “A New China Strategy,” in Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World, http://www.choosingtolead.net/a-new-china-strategy

As with appeasement, although for different reasons, trying to shift to a strategy of outright containment at this point would be premature and self-defeating. Critics warn that an unremitting hardline approach risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, pushing Beijing to adopt a more openly hostile and aggressive posture more quickly than might otherwise have been the case. Even if worsening relations and intensified competition are inevitable, many U.S. friends and allies (and significant portions of the American public and the nation’s elites) are not yet convinced of it. For this reason, and because of the vast economic interests at stake, political support for containment is presently lacking, both at home and abroad.

### 1AR Pressure – Links to Elections/Politics

#### Powerful political groups lobby against the CP – causes fights

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Do-Director of the Woodrow Wilson School’s Center for International Security Studies, non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, June-July 2015, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US\_China\_Strat.pdf

Even if they wanted to shift towards a policy of pure containment, barring some major discontinuity, American leaders would find it extremely difficult to do so. Current budgetary constraints are neither permanent nor insurmountable; the United States can certainly afford to fund a far more vigorous military competition with China than the one it is conducting today. Without an obvious breakdown in relations, however, forging a political consensus to support the required increase in expenditures would likely prove impossible. The fact that powerful and influential groups and individuals in American society remain deeply committed to preserving the best possible relations with China and opposed to any measures that, in their view, might damage them, will make the task of mobilising support even more difficult.

# DA Answers China Appeasement DA

### Non Unique—Cooperation Now—Nuclear

#### US/China nuclear cooperation high now, spills over to other issues

Xinhua, China Daily is a Chinese news organization, March 27, 2016, “US-China cooperation on nuclear energy helps build trust in relations: expert,” China Daily, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-03/27/content_24120820.htm> (accessed April 24, 2016)

Nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and China has yielded tremendous benefits for both countries and can contribute to trust in the larger bilateral relationship, a US nuclear energy expert told Xinhua. The United States and China could further enhance cooperation on nuclear energy as there are vast commercial opportunities for both countries and the world, Daniel Lipman, vice president of Washington-based Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), said in an interview ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Washington from March 31 to April 1. Bilateral nuclear energy cooperation "requires a strong foundation of mutual respect and trust that shared technologies will be used only for peaceful purposes," Lipman said, adding that it is "not something the United States enters into lightly." Through extensive person-to-person and institutional contacts, commercial nuclear trade can also share best practices on nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation, the expert said. In 2015, a new agreement formalizing civil nuclear cooperation between China and the United States entered into force. The US nuclear energy industry, led by the NEI, played an instrumental role in securing congressional approval for the new deal. The agreement is "critical for American nuclear suppliers and US foreign policy priorities," said an NEI report before the pact was approved. "Nuclear cooperation with China advances economic interests, safety culture and climate goals." Besides nuclear energy cooperation, China and the United States also share an interest in nuclear non-proliferation.

### Non Unique—Cooperation Now—General

#### US/ China cooperation high now across the board

Charles E. Morrison, President, East-West Center for research and analysis, January 3, 2016, “2015: A Year of China-US Competition and Cooperation,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eastwest-center/2015-a-year-of-china-us-c_b_8914260.html> (accessed April 24, 2016)

China’s artificial island-building program in the South China Sea alarmed neighbors and compelled the U.S. to conduct a freedom of navigation operation to show that such structures are not acceptable as a basis for territorial claims. Yet despite this and some exaggerated rhetoric, Chinese and American military-to-military engagement continues to expand. In fact, overall it was a successful - almost dramatic - year in China-U.S. cooperation. The annual China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in June and President Xi’s September state visit resulted in dozens of new agreements and initiatives. Visas have been liberalized and student and business interaction is growing remarkably. Chinese investment is pouring into U.S. localities. The Paris climate change conference outcome was enabled by commitments China and the U.S. made to each other beginning in late 2014. The two countries chaired an Afghanistan aid conference at the UN, and even such thorny issues as cybersecurity are being discussed. Despite many differences in areas such as human rights and freedom of expression, the two countries have many motivations for cooperating, especially on global issues.

### Non Unique—Cooperation Now

#### China and the US cooperate now—larger cooperation should push military posturing to the back burner

[Yin Chengde](http://www.chinausfocus.com/author/yin-chengde/), Research Fellow, China Foundation for Int'l Studies, March 7, 2016, “China-U.S. Relations: Cooperation or Confrontation?” China US Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-relations-cooperation-or-confrontation/> (accessed April 24, 2016)

China has not and will not challenge the U.S. position, and has never acted to deny U.S. interests. Washington knows this very well. All the pretexts it has fabricated to consolidate its containment of China are groundless. It is finding faults with China mainly because it can’t tolerate China’s rise. In its eyes, a strong China is in itself a threat to the U.S.; only through preventing China from becoming strong can the U.S. maintain its position as the global “number one.” Such gangster logic will never work. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, claimed the other day he wanted China to suffer unaffordable loss, so that it can no longer defy other countries’ sovereignty. This shows the U.S. will continue confusing right and wrong, and won’t stop creating trouble in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese sovereignty. China-U.S. gaming in the South China Sea will be a long-term phenomenon. China doesn’t provoke, but is never afraid of provocation. If the U.S. continues its actions, China should escalate its protestations and expose U.S. violations to win international sympathy and support; in the mean time, it should adopt a principle of proactive defense, taking advantage of its naval forces to make provocateurs pay a necessary price. No country should be allowed to make trouble on our own doorstep. It is a pathetic mistake for the U.S. to return to the gunboat policy of the past in the 21st century. China and the U.S., as the largest economies and countries with the strongest comprehensive national strength of the present-day world, have developed a very deep interdependence, and formed an inseparable community of shared interests, on both bilateral and global levels; cooperation benefits both, confrontation hurts both. Hopefully the U.S. will keep any eye on the big picture of cooperative bilateral ties and avoid going too far in the South China Sea and coming into confrontation with China. This will only create endless trouble.

### Non Unique—U.S. Looks Weak Now

#### China isn’t afraid of the US military now—plan won’t change that

[Tom Phillips](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/tomphillips), Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, October 28, 2015, “South China Sea: Beijing 'not frightened to fight a war' after US move,” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/28/china-not-frightened-fight-war-south-china-sea-uss-lassen> (accessed April 22, 2016)

China is not afraid of fighting a war against the United States in the [South China Sea](http://www.theguardian.com/world/south-china-sea), a state-run newspaper with links to the Communist party has claimed. Twenty-four hours after Washington challenged Beijing’s territorial claims in the region by [deploying a warship to waters around the disputed Spratly archipelago](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/us-warship-lassen-defies-beijing-sail-disputed-south-china-sea-islands), the notoriously nationalistic Global Times accused the Pentagon of provoking China. “In [the] face of the US harassment, Beijing should deal with Washington tactfully and prepare for the worst,” the newspaper argued [in an editorial](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/949261.shtml) on Wednesday. “This can convince the White House that [China](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china), despite its unwillingness, is not frightened to fight a war with the US in the region, and is determined to safeguard its national interests and dignity.” The [People’s Liberation Army Daily](http://english.chinamil.com.cn/), China’s leading military newspaper, used a front-page editorial to accuse the US of sowing chaos in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. “Cast-iron facts show that time and again the United States recklessly uses force and starts wars, stirring things up where once there was stability, causing the bitterest of harm to those countries directly involved,” the newspaper said, according to Reuters.

#### Chinese military officials confirm they don’t fear the US

[Josh Rogin](http://www.bloombergview.com/contributors/ASD1cRZwK6c/josh-rogin), Bloomberg View columnist who writes about national security and foreign affairs. He has previously worked for the Daily Beast, Newsweek, Foreign Policy magazine, the Washington Post, Congressional Quarterly and Asahi Shimbun, June 1, 2015, “China's Military Isn't Worried About Obama,” Bloomberg View, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-01/china-s-military-isn-t-worried-about-obama> (accessed April 21, 2016)

Chinese military officials attending a major security conference in Singapore over the weekend made clear that they have no intention of halting their aggressive activities in the South China Sea, and they are confident that U.S. President Barack Obama is not going to be able to stop them. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, several senior officials from the People’s Liberation Army made a rare appearance to mingle with leaders of Asian and Western governments, think tanks and corporations. It was a rare chance to hear what Chinese military leaders really think, through both public and private interactions. The main takeaway for many of us Westerners present was that People's Liberation Army is feeling confident, and it has little respect for an Obama administration [that talks big](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-30/ash-carter-talks-tough-on-china-but-it-s-just-talk) about confronting China but has yet to lay out a clear strategy for doing so. “A member of the PLA asked me whether, in 18 months if Hillary Clinton is elected president, will she be much tougher on China than the current administration,” said Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “I said, ‘The premise of your question is that in the next 18 months you have enough running room to do whatever you want.’ He just laughed.”

### Non Unique—U.S. Looks Weak Now

#### US refusal to sanction China for cyber-attacks already makes us look weak to China

Sandy Fitzgerald, Staff writer for NewsMax, September 19, 2015, “GOP: Obama Decision to Table China Sanctions a Sign of Weakness,” News Max, <http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/gop-obama-china-sanction/2015/09/19/id/692379/> (accessed April 20, 2016)

The White House's decision to table penalties for Chinese cyber attacks on businesses and government agencies until after President Xi Jinping makes his official state visit makes the Obama administration look weak, Republican critics are saying. "We have to do something," House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, R-Texas, told [The Hill](http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/254259-frustration-grows-with-obama-over-china-hacks). "We can’t have no response. And this administration has absolutely failed to put any sort of consequence on their actions." For several weeks, the White House had been discussing penalties to freeze Chinese companies' and individuals' assets and ban their dealings in the United States unless action was taken. However, a White House official told [The Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-us-will-not-impose-sanctions-on-chinese-companies-before-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping/2015/09/14/98a447e6-5b25-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html) this week that after four days of secret cybersecurity discussions between Chinese and American officials, the White House opted to delay sanctions before Xi's state visit occurs next week. Ending weeks of speculation, a senior White House official told The Washington Post that the U.S. will not impose economic sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals before President Xi Jinping's state visit next week. "I understand about quiet diplomacy, but this has been going on for far too long and I think the Chinese government has been far too complicit in this," Senate Homeland Security Committee Chairman Ron Johnson, R-Wis., complained to reporters.

### No Link—No Appeasement

#### No appeasement—the thesis of the disad is wrong

[Zack Beauchamp](http://www.vox.com/authors/zack-beauchamp), Political commentator and former editor for Think Progress, January 13, 2016, “The real lesson of Iran detaining those US sailors,” Vox, <http://www.vox.com/2016/1/13/10761906/iran-detain-weakness> (accessed April 22, 2016)

ZB: So if the idea that US "weakness" caused yesterday's situation doesn't really fit the facts, where does the idea come from? RF: Most recently, from opponents of the US-Iran nuclear deal. But the idea that weakness begets aggression has a pretty long heritage, back to the [1938] Munich Conference — which is of course this huge analogy that we use for every damn thing in American politics. But it also has some scholarly lineage, through Thomas Schelling and some other people — this idea that if you send signals of weakness to a potential aggressor, that aggressor will pick up on the weakness and then become more aggressive in small or large ways. The folks who are tweeting all about this are quite clear that they think the nuclear deal demonstrates weakness. So by demonstrating weakness, we then enable Iranian aggression — we suggest to them that we're pushovers, and that their actions will not be met by firm resolution. And so everything that happens after the deal with Iran becomes the fruits of appeasement, including an incident like this. ZB: I get that this makes a certain kind of sense, in theory, but is it actually true? Does signaling "weakness" through diplomatic overture actually embolden Iran — or China and Russia, for that matter? RF: It makes a certain amount of sense — as long as you don't look at most of the evidence. If Iran had not, in fact, seized sailors in 2007, and we didn't have clear evidence that Iran had done this kind of thing before, then maybe it would kind of make a little bit of face sense. "Oh, look, they took our sailors, and they took them right before the State of the Union, so that must be an indication of weakness." If we apply this to Russia as well — and the same crew [of pundits and politicians] does — we somehow demonstrated weakness and thus invited a Russian invasion of Ukraine [in 2014]. But again, this only makes sense if you don't remember that Russia invaded Georgia in 2008.

### No Link—Appeasement Exaggerated

#### Not all negotiations are appeasement—the disad’s claims are overblown

Daniel Larison, Senior editor at The American Conservative, October 14, 2013, “Kirk’s Tired and Dangerous Warning About Appeasement,” The American Conservative, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/kirks-tired-and-dangerous-warning-about-appeasement/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Sen. Mark Kirk [makes](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10376354/Appeasement-wont-reduce-the-peril-of-a-nuclear-Iran.html) a completely original and unprecedented argument against diplomacy with Iran: So when negotiations with Iran begin tomorrow, it is no exaggeration to say that David Cameron must choose between two Conservative legacies – that of Winston Churchill, or that of Neville Chamberlain. Sen. Kirk is writing for the Telegraph, so perhaps he thought that a British audience would be more interested in reading tendentious claims about diplomacy and appeasement. If so, he is likely to be disappointed. All that the constant references to Chamberlain and Munich achieve is to remind everyone how stale and outdated Iran hawks’ arguments are. Negotiations with Iran will not result in ceding Iran new territory or compromising the independence of another country. Properly speaking, it is not Iran that is being appeased. It is the one seeking to appease the states that are inflicting harm on it and threatening it with illegal attack.

### Turn—Removing Naval Presence Good

#### US naval buildup in Asia risks escalation and war with China

[Michael Auslin](http://www.thecommentator.com/author/michael_auslin/569), Resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at the [American Enterprise Institute (AEI)](http://www.aei.org/), where he specializes in Asian regional security and political issues. Before joining AEI, Auslin was an associate professor of history at Yale University, June 7, 2015, “Obama weakness may result in US-China confrontation,” The Commentator, <http://www.thecommentator.com/article/5905/obama_weakness_may_result_in_us_china_confrontation> (accessed April 22, 2016)

After years of ignoring China’s growing assertiveness in Asia, the Obama administration has been taken unaware by a major land and power grab by Beijing. Over the past several years, China has steadily expanded its territorial ambitions, including a claim that the entire South China Sea is under its dominion. The sea is one of the world’s most strategic bodies of water. It contains crucial sea lanes, such as the Malacca Strait, through which nearly 70,000 ships transit each year. In the middle of the South China Sea is a loose chain of islets, shoals and reefs called the Spratly Islands. They are claimed by almost every nation in the region, including Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and, of course, China. The rich fishing waters surrounding the Spratlys have been in contention for decades. The Philippines often have complained to the US -- in vain -- that powerful Chinese maritime patrol vessels have chased away their boats. Nor is this the only area in which China has thrown around its weight, having challenged Japanese control over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Now the situation has escalated. China has engaged in a massive reclamation project, dredging up sand and creating islands on shallow reefs. The US government estimates that up to 2,000 acres of new land has been built. On these “fantasy” islands, China is building airstrips and ports, erecting barracks and establishing radar systems. Guns and fighter jets are next. Beijing is militarizing its new land and then claiming it as sovereign territory, demanding that other countries stay out of what was once international waters. For years, Washington ignored treaty allies like the Philippines, which called it “a creeping invasion.” Instead, the Obama administration, like others before it, has bent over backward to try and improve relations with China, even inviting it to our biggest naval exercises. Much like the supposed Russian “reset,” that goodwill has been spurned. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter last week publicly rebuked Beijing, demanding that it stop its reclamation activities and warning China that it is isolating itself in the eyes of the world community. More concretely, Carter and other officials have stated that the US will ignore China’s claims and will fly military planes over the islands’ airspace, and will sail within the 12-mile limit claimed by China. Though no US ships have yet ventured inside that ring, the line has been drawn. For its part, Beijing is not backing down. Indeed, not only have Chinese officials criticized Washington’s response, a state run newspaper, The Global Times, warned that a “US-China war is inevitable,” if Washington tries to force China to halt its activities. Official Chinese military doctrine is also ominously changing to reflect the new reality, stating that Beijing’s forces will no longer focus solely on territorial defense, but will project power far beyond its borders. All it would take is one hotheaded action by a Chinese fighter pilot to ignite an armed confrontation between the two sides. Unlike during the Cold War days, when Moscow and Washington established important crisis-management mechanisms, there are almost no working relations of trust between China and the United States. It is not assured that an accident or encounter could be prevented from spiraling out of control. Yet neither side seems willing to back down. The US is being challenged again as a paper tiger, and if it fails to follow through on its promise to sail through the Spratlys, its Asian allies will wonder how strong America’s security commitments really are. For Beijing, the stakes are just as high. Failing to assert its control over the waters it now claims will expose it as a geopolitical fraud. This will embolden other nations to similarly challenge China’s claims, and ironically possibly increase the likelihood of some type of military clash in Asia. East Asia now stands close to a precipice. China figures the US is too distracted or uninterested to care about its expansion. They may be right.

### Turn—Removing Naval Presence Good

#### The US should remove its military presence in the Asia Pacific—it makes miscalculated war with China likely

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, June 19, 2015, “Is the South China Sea Worth the Risk of War?”, China Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/is-the-south-china-sea-worth-the-risk-of-war-for-anyone/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Since then both nations have become even more concerned over credibility and reputation, which means neither will readily back down when challenged. Beijing does not want to yield to seeming efforts at containment. The U.S. worries about being viewed as a paper tiger around the globe. The result: a real danger of an escalating military confrontation. Rather than working to prevent such an eventuality, however, a number of officials, pundits, and analysts appear to view it as almost inevitable. I recently attended a gathering, which included retired military, former government officials, current policy analysts and journalists, NGO staffers, and non-political professionals. Much of the discussion concerned the challenge posed by the PRC and recent events in the South China Sea. Without a neoconservative at the table there was broad agreement that Beijing had tossed down the gauntlet, so to speak, and had to be confronted. Most sobering was the acknowledgement that an aggressive reaction could trigger a Chinese response in kind and a confrontation such as a ship collision or plane shoot-down. The consensus was that Washington would have to act immediately and firmly by, for instance, sinking a vessel or destroying a runway. The unspoken presumption was that the confrontation would end there, with Beijing duly chastened. But the obvious question is what if the Chinese made a similar calculation and escalated in turn? Some “damn fool thing” in the Asia-Pacific just might trigger war between the two nations. Washington enjoys military superiority but must disperse its forces around the globe. More important, the PRC views its interests in nearby waters as important if not vital. In contrast, American domination everywhere, against everyone, is not necessary for America’s defense. Beijing knows that and will risk much more than the U.S. in handling nearby territorial issues. No amount of scare mongering is likely to change this calculation. If you were to ask Americans to risk a lot to preserve Japan’s independence, they might rise to the challenge. Ask them to war against a rising nuclear power to ensure that the Philippines controls Scarborough Reef, and they are likely to view their leaders as dangerous fools. The possibility of miscalculation and misjudgment makes it even more important that all participants step back from confrontation. China cares deeply about sovereignty; Beijing’s adversaries believe the U.S. has their back; Washington would not tolerate an attack on its forces. No one wants to look weak. The fuse to war may be long, but no one should risk lighting it. All parties should look for creative solutions to the plethora of territorial disputes. Countries could set aside deciding on sovereignty while jointly developing resources. Neighbors could share sovereignty and resources. Beijing could pledge to maintain navigational freedoms irrespective of the islands’ ultimate disposition. Sovereignty over territory in the western Pacific is important, but not worth war. Yet a dangerous dynamic appears to have taken hold. The PRC believes the islands are Beijing’s by right and can be acquired by assertion. The U.S. believes that the territories will end up China’s by conquest unless Washington actively blocks Beijing’s claims. Instead of sleepwalking into a shooting war while assuming the other party will bend, both America and China should renew their determination to defuse territorial controversies peacefully.

### Turn—Removing Naval Presence Good

#### US grand strategy trying to contain China with military presence fails and makes miscalculation likely.

Robert Newson, Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer who recently led strategy and concept development for the Naval Special Warfare Command, and Lauren Dickey, research associate for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2015, “Military Force Alone Can’t Deter China’s Expansionism,” Defense One, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/06/military-force-alone-cant-deter-chinas-expansionism/114475/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

China’s recent release of a has rightly captured the attention of many in Washington. Now, more than ever before, the Chinese military has made clear its intentions to develop maritime capabilities that will enable Beijing to assert claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and project military reach far beyond their immediate periphery. In the South China Sea, over the last two years alone, Chinese efforts have expanded the islands around Firey Cross Reef and Mischief Reef by 2,000 acres – equivalent to nearly 1,500 football fields—and counting. This massive “territory” building and the significant Chinese military build-up coupled with the release of strategic guidelines for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has sent clear signals to the Pentagon and U.S. allies in the region. China is a global competitor aggressively pursuing their aims and threatening to upend regional stability. Given news of Vietnam’s own land reclamation projects in the region, officials in Beijing have no doubt realized that they have some catching up to do. The latest Chinese military strategy will give further weight to their claims, revealing a willingness to use newly developed maritime capabilities as a means for asserting territorial sovereignty both in the South China Sea and well beyond. Each step in the Chinese establishment of greater territorial sovereignty has been individually too small to provoke a strong U.S. or regional military response. This gradualist strategy is asymmetric from the perspective of value placed on the outcome. China cares immensely both about the specific objective of building islands perceived to be Chinese territory and the tangible goal of establishing sovereignty within the nine-dash line. Onlookers in Washington seem to care less about each individual minor link in the chain of manufactured territories and more about the broad strategic implications of Chinese military outposts in the South China Sea. Aside from the longer-term challenges posed for regional stability and U.S. alliances across Asia, policymakers and onlookers are also concerned by the implications island reclamation has for the principle of freedom of the seas and skies. Presumably because of this asymmetry of interests, the United States has done very little to date, beyond surveillance efforts, in response to PLA-led island reclamation. As China continues to create a buffer zone along its periphery, the latest developments in island reclamation demand a close examination by policymakers—and a carefully crafted response from the Obama administration. Aside from the increased presence and focus upon the region that comes with the rebalance to Asia, the United States lacks an operable strategy in response to the goals of China’s incremental but relentless territorial grabs. Washington has become all too preoccupied with a military response, often overlooking the necessity of folding other policy responses into the toolkit of the U.S. regional strategy. A heavy military response could lead to miscalculation and conflict, endangering the stability vital to U.S. interests and those of our allies that we seek to preserve. And while maintaining a strong forward based presence to prevent and deter conflict remains central to any strategy, other elements of a hybrid approach should be considered.

### Turn—Strong China Better

#### A weak China is more dangerous than a strong and stable China—also leaves option for cooperation on key issues on the table

China Daily, Chinese news outlet, March 18, 2016, “More to fear from a weak China than one that is strong,” China Daily, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-03/18/content_23931544.htm> (accessed April 21, 2016)

As to what country Obama considers the greatest challenge to the US in the coming decades, Obama said "in terms of traditional great-state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States and China is going to be the most critical". He said that one possibility is a China that is on a peaceful rise, which will share with the US the burden and responsibility of maintaining the international order, while the flip side is "not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are going to come". Obama believes "we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful rising China". That is largely consistent with Obama's public statements, although US actions haven't always matched his words. Obama expressed that climate change worries him profoundly. Clearly he sees the achievements made on that front as among his most important legacies, those include the bilateral agreements between China and the US, and the Paris climate deal in which the US and China played key roles. All these show how important it is for the two nations to expand cooperation to tackle the common challenges facing the world. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said at the National People's Congress news conference on Wednesday that the two countries have far more common interests than difference, a fact that many seem to overlook. To tap the potential of their relationship, Obama should take the lead in his remaining 10 months in office and refrain from naming China as "threat" or "adversary" or "potential enemy", terms increasingly used by US officials, pundits and the news media when talking about China. While false and nasty rhetoric is common in US politics, positive tones are critical in leading the public to have a better perception of the relationship between China and the US.

### Turn—Foregoing Competition Best

#### We should pick our battles more wisely, let China “win” in areas that don’t matter to larger US foreign policy

[Joshua Kurlantzick](http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-southeast-asia-democracy-human-rights/joshua-kurlantzick/b15522), Senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 15, 2016, “Let China win. It’s good for America,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-win-its-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html> (accessed April 22, 2016)

Still, Obama administration officials see a battle for supremacy. As Clinton [told](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/02/AR2011030202888.html) the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011: “Let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in, and let’s just talk straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China” in the Pacific islands. So the White House has [increased](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/02/25/containing-china-the-united-states-in-the-south-pacific-since-2011/) U.S. diplomatic representation in the region, boosted aid dramatically and rhetorically pointed to a competition between Beijing and Washington. It has done so even though most Pacific nations are tiny economies and the U.S. Navy retains a massive [advantage](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html) over China’s in speed, technology and basing throughout the Pacific. The White House strategy inevitably diverts scarce U.S. diplomatic resources from other parts of the globe while leaving island nations feeling compelled to choose between closer ties with China or with the United States. The result might embarrass Washington: Many of these nations might prefer China for its lavish aid and possible investment. Despite China’s growing global influence, its image in many regions, including in Asia, is still weak. In the past decade, its relations with many of its neighbors have [soured](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-injured), largely because of its aggressive claims in disputed coastal waters. The same Pew surveys that found favorable views of China in Africa also showed that negative opinions were much higher in Asian nations such as India, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam, where [74 percent](http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/) of people had an unfavorable view of China. In Europe, Australia and parts of Latin America, initial excitement in the 2000s about the impact of new Chinese investment and aid has given way to decidedly mixed views among citizens and governments about Beijing, including fears that China will not play by trade rules, will steal technology and will make investments that offer little benefit to local economies. U.S. popularity, by contrast, has recovered from the lows of the Bush administration, particularly across the Pacific. A 2014 poll of people in 11 Asia-Pacific countries, conducted for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, found that nearly [80 percent](http://csis.org/files/publication/140605_Green_PowerandOrder_WEB.pdf) of respondents, including those in many countries that viewed China unfavorably in the Pew study, supported a more robust U.S. economic and security presence in Asia — a percentage that would have surely been lower during the 2000s. But the exercise of soft power rests on lasting positive perceptions, and it does not help for Washington to cultivate strongmen such as Malaysia’s Najib or Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev while promoting democracy elsewhere. It leads people in these countries to see little difference between U.S. and Chinese foreign policy. The real challenges posed by China require all of America’s focus at a time when the United States is shrinking its Army and is no longer the only global economic superpower. Those challenges include China’s [claims](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/5-things-didnt-know-south-china-sea-conflict/) in the South China Sea, through which half the world’s trade passes, and its [exertions](http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-tests-japans-resolve-over-east-china-sea/) in the East China Sea, which would give Beijing the right to block Japanese boats and fighter planes from the region around northeast Asia. And China is racing to [modernize](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35207369) its navy to help support these power grabs. These are the developments worth fighting. The right strategy requires a nuanced understanding of where the United States should pick its stands against a rising China and where it is necessary to concede some power. In Southeast Asia, for instance, that means helping the countries most likely to have to defend themselves in the South China Sea (including Vietnam and the Philippines) while worrying less about mainland states (such as Burma). Nuance also demands a political environment in which leaders can talk about ceding some international influence to China. This will not be easy: Any pol who plays down American global dominance can become a target for opponents. But it shouldn’t be politically toxic to admit that China is becoming more powerful and that a more reasoned U.S. foreign policy would be one that wields U.S. resources judiciously. We should marshal our capital for the challenges that are truly challenging.

### China Won’t Invade Taiwan

#### China won’t invade Taiwan—the US is a deterrent and they aren’t sure they can win

[Zachary Keck](http://thediplomat.com/authors/zachary-keck/), Formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored [The Pacific Realist](http://thediplomat.com/category/zachary-keck/) blog, December 24, 2013, “Why China Won't Attack Taiwan,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Although the trend lines are undoubtedly working in China’s favor, it is ultimately extremely unlikely that China will try to seize Taiwan by force. Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed. Even assuming China’s military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China’s invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China’s neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power. But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success. To be sure, China’s military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan’s military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nation’s armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is in this latter aim that China’s strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion.

### China Won’t Invade Taiwan

#### China wouldn’t invade Taiwan, they know invasion wouldn’t accomplish successful reunification

Rowan Allport, Senior Fellow at the Human Security Centre, July 29th, 2015, “The Taiwan Problem,” Human Security Centre, <http://www.hscentre.org/security-and-defence/taiwan-problem/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Nevertheless, the immediate threat to Taiwan should not be overstated. China is unlikely to commit itself to military action against Taiwan proper unless it were confident that it could force a successful outcome to such a conflict. Ultimately, this could only be guaranteed if Beijing could identify a viable path to deposing the Taipei government, and this would realistically entail having to invade and occupy the country. A resort to measures short of this – a blockade, an air and missile strike campaign, or even a grab for one or more of the outlying Taiwanese islands – would almost certainly fail to accomplish China’s political aims, whilst still inviting the same type of international condemnation, isolation and intervention as an all-out war of conquest.

### China Can’t Invade Taiwan

#### China lacks the physical infrastructure to invade Taiwan, they wouldn’t risk it

[John Grady](https://news.usni.org/author/jgrady), A former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army, February 10, 2016, “Atlantic Council Panel: China Likely Doesn’t Have the Ability to Invade Taiwan, Yet,” United States Naval Institute, <https://news.usni.org/2016/02/10/atlantic-council-panel-china-likely-doesnt-have-the-ability-to-invade-taiwan-yet> (accessed April 23, 2016)

Speaking Tuesday at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Thomas L. McNaugher, a professor at Georgetown University, said, an amphibious assault would be “an extremely dicey operation” for a military still dominated by its army and having no recent experience in that kind of warfare. “Right now, they’re capable of moving about two divisions at a time” over water, he said in answer to a question. “But they’re working on” overcoming those shortfalls. Roger Cliff, a fellow of the council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, said despite China’s 600 percent increase in real-term defense spending over the past 20 years “important weaknesses remain” in technology, logistics, training and organization. An example he used was maintaining equipment in the field. It “has to be sent back to the factory for maintenance and repair,” making sustained operations difficult. Cliff also cited shortfalls in underway replenishment and aerial refueling. While China has changed its military doctrine from “positional warfare” since 1995—when it launched missiles to intimidate Taiwan—to one based on surprise, deception and indirection used by the United States in Desert Storm, it still retains a centralized structure that does not “encourage risk-taking or creativity,” but “loyalty and obedience.”

### China Can’t Invade Taiwan

#### China won’t invade Taiwan—too risky

Global Security, Leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security, November 24, 2014, “China's Options in the Taiwan Confrontation,” Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm> (accessed April 23, 2016)

A main force attack to "Liberate Taiwan" would be an extremely high risk undertaking with uncertain prospects for success. Invasion is unlikely, since the PLA cannot yet transport a credible invasion force to Taiwan. Amphibious forces are capable of transporting no more than a single division [15,000 troops], and military air transports could add possibly an additional divisions worth of troops. Taipei would have significant warning time if Beijing were to prepare for an invasion, and could mobilize significant reserves that would outnumber the invading force by a wide margin. Taiwan retains significant qualitative advantages against the numerically superior PLA in fighter aircraft, surface warships, air defenses, and many ground force capabilities.

### China Rise Won’t Cause War

#### Even if China exercises regional hegemony, they will be cautious and not wars will start

Sorpong Peou, Chair of the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University in Canada, January 10, 2014, “Why China's Rise May Not Cause Major Power-Transition War: A Review Essay,” Asian Politics &Policy, [Volume 6, Issue 1,](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/doi/10.1111/aspp.2014.6.issue-1/issuetoc) pages 121–131 (Accessed April 23, 2016)

Chinese leaders are no doubt well aware of how states in the region will respond if it chooses to pursue hegemonic-power status aggressively. They made no substantial politico-strategic gains by supporting communist insurgencies that threatened the security of political regimes in Asia during the Cold War, nor will its current threatening behavior advance its future geostrategic interests. The fact that states in the region have adopted multiple strategies to manage the rise of China as evident in the two publications under review shows how China has been kept in check. We are thus likely to see a rising China that wants to throw its weight around from time to time because of its need to prove to the world that it is a power to be reckoned with. In the end, Beijing is most likely to take careful steps toward preventing backlashes that undermine its interests and great-power status. If war breaks out in the region, it will not be one between the United States and China, even if the former wants to wage a preventive war against the latter. A series of proxy wars is more likely, as happened during the Cold War.[2](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/doi/10.1111/aspp.12080/full#aspp12080-note-0003) But states in Asia seem to have grown more self-confident and more secure because of their economic development and growing military strength. They are likely to maintain a multipronged strategy toward China and the United States by engaging them on the economic and institutional fronts, but getting the United States to help keep China at bay militarily. Future stability in the Asia-Pacific will be based on neither a Sino-centric world order nor American hegemony.[3](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.utdallas.edu/doi/10.1111/aspp.12080/full#aspp12080-note-0004) In short, the rise of China is likely to remain a great source of controversy and debate in the years and decades to come. Still, evidence shows that the giant Asian state is likely to pursue its interests driven by certain hegemonic ambitions as its material power grows and as it becomes more status-conscious. However, its rise has been, and will be, limited by various constraints, one of which is a pattern of prudent responses from other states in the Asia-Pacific. The region is thus bound to remain stable, China rising but without enjoying the luxury of providing leadership for peaceful regional community building, at least not until it becomes a liberal democracy.

### China Not a Threat

#### China not a military threat—they only seek respect and fair treatment

Rob Green, Staff writer for World Beyond War non-profit anti-war movement organization, Accessed April 23, 2016, “[Myth: China Is a Military Threat](http://worldbeyondwar.org/myth-china-military-threat/),” World Beyond War, <http://worldbeyondwar.org/myth-china-military-threat/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

China Has Learned Not to Wage War. China is one of the world’s oldest civilisations. In a huge, influential country ruled by warlords and threatened by external enemies, the Chinese often pioneered new military technology (inventing gunpowder in the 9th century). Modern Chinese strategists know their history; they still follow the teachings of Sun Tzu, a General who wrote The Art of War around 500BC. Two of Sun’s maxims were: \* Choose a strategy which focuses on an enemy’s weaknesses \* Preferably do not wage war at all. For example, the largest copper mine in Afghanistan is being quietly run by the Chinese, who are building a railway from it into China; no military personnel are involved. The Greatest US Weakness is the Pentagon’s Power The Chinese correctly see that the greatest US weakness is the Pentagon’s stranglehold on US foreign and domestic policy. With military industry interests in every political constituency, over-powerful lobbyists rebuff any major Pentagon budget cuts. This is slowly but surely bringing the US economy to its knees, and destroying the morale and health, let alone lives, of young Americans. China is Fooling the Pentagon Sun Tzu taught China not to confront the US militarily. Instead, China’s strategy is to fool the Pentagon with glimpses of new weapons systems, but without any intention of matching the US capability. Two examples: \* China’s J-20 stealth fighter. In January 2011, despite China’s notorious secrecy, a prototype was photographed for the first time as the US Defense Secretary visited Beijing. The Pentagon used this to justify no cuts to the US F-35 stealth fighter programme. US stealth aircraft technology is some 20 years ahead of China’s. The F-35 programme is the most costly in military aviation history, yet still has unresolved problems. \* China’s first aircraft-carrier. China has one small, ex-Soviet aircraft-carrier, with no strike or fighter aircraft to operate from it. Instead, China has revealed a new anti-ship ballistic missile system which, with its increasingly capable submarine force, would have little difficulty in taking out US carriers if they threaten China. Meanwhile, it released a video of a design for a Chinese supercarrier, since [found](http://www.truthorfiction.com/rumors/c/China-New-Aircraft-Carrier.htm#.UvVUdhz8tfw) to be a hoax. This strategy is also weakening the economies of Japan and South Korea. China Wants Equal Treatment As a leading economic power, China is slowly modernising its relatively weak military forces, primarily for prestige reasons. It feels entitled to defend its interests in its own backyard, especially when history is on its side regarding the disputed islands in the East and South China Seas. Its recently established Air Defence Identification Zone was a long-delayed response, under severe provocation from the US and Japan, to the Japanese ADIZ. The US, Russia, UK and France have had their own unilaterally declared zones for years. China has begun restoring a “level playing field” in its sphere of influence. However, this entails a growing risk of confrontation, because of the belligerent responses of the US and its local allies.

### China Not Aggressive

#### China isn’t the problem, it’s US policy. Conflicts between US and China are caused by US expansionism

[John Glaser](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/john-glaser), Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, May 28, 2015, “The US and China can avoid a collision course – if the US gives up its empire,” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire> (accessed April 23, 2016)

To avoid a violent militaristic clash with [China](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china), or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire. Americans fear that China’s rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor Graham Allison [has found](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/allison_04-14-15): “in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war.” Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer [has bluntly argued](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__nationalinterest.org_commentary_can-2Dchina-2Drise-2Dpeacefully-2D10204&d=BQMFAg&c=RAhzPLrCAq19eJdrcQiUVEwFYoMRqGDAXQ_puw5tYjg&r=ci9dNSBHCsj_tBZnUFxUpnvmECiSBFNm6IYUdkMIY7I&m=QYWLOFwqlEkp7jGRIXcq05wpIEj2j-Jc2_xgVdHRMWw&s=ZfufAS-BqM9eI4lNP1QiaaUFD_-x3IV395YS7HvHr2g&e=): “China cannot rise peacefully.” But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China’s rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China’s neighbors. Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that’s inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn’t see it that way. According to political scientists [Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.foreignaffairs.com_articles_china_2012-2D08-2D16_how-2Dchina-2Dsees-2Damerica-3Fpage-3Dshow&d=BQMFAg&c=RAhzPLrCAq19eJdrcQiUVEwFYoMRqGDAXQ_puw5tYjg&r=ci9dNSBHCsj_tBZnUFxUpnvmECiSBFNm6IYUdkMIY7I&m=QYWLOFwqlEkp7jGRIXcq05wpIEj2j-Jc2_xgVdHRMWw&s=bfZrJ_kA5awxkLhSBJnX_RW5vhfZkXH12GvVvn21Nz8&e=), Beijing sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” (All of which is true.) They think that the US “seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harm China’s interests” with a “militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish” foreign policy.

### China Rise Good—More Peaceful

#### China’s rise is stabilizing and peaceful for the international order—they’re a better and less violent broker than the US

Murtaza Hussain, Toronto-based writer and analyst focused on issues related to Middle Eastern politics, June 25, 2013, “Why China might be a better superpower,” Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201362584334716870.html> (accessed April 23, 2016)

While the US seems committed to exert [imperial hegemony](http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/ancient-history-us-conduct-middle-east-world-war-ii-folly-intervention) over the Middle East using brute military force and punitive [economic blockades](http://www.ciartest.diplomacist.org/?p=2214) against civilians, China has publically committed to a policy of "peacefully rising" and has built mutually beneficial and respectful relationships throughout the region. While Chinese polices are no less self-interested, the country's forthright pragmatism is a refreshing alternative to the blatantly cynical and manipulative moralising rhetoric of Western powers. Shallow accusations of Chinese colonialism in Africa (based on Chinese commercial investments in the region) appear borne more of Western fears of Chinese power than of legitimate concerns about African self-determination. Evidence suggests that China's influence in Africa has been built on the basis of [mutual economic interest](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a10a9422-9619-11e2-b8dd-00144feabdc0.html) and its investments have coincided with historically unprecedented [economic growth](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/06/africa-is-rising-inside-the-continent-s-great-economic-leap.html) among the people of the continent. The contrast with the unrelentingly murderous and rapacious history of actual [Western colonialism in Africa](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/british-empire-crimes-ignore-atrocities) could not be starker. China today is a burgeoning player in global affairs, making forays into the [Israel/Palestine conflict](http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Seeking%2Blarger%2Brole%2Bregion%2Bimportance%2Beconomy%2BChina%2Bhosts/8539211/story.html), taking material steps to [confront environmental issues](http://shanghaiist.com/2013/06/17/china_to_cut_emissions_30_percent_by_2017.php) and pushing its ["soft-power" approach](http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/04/soft-power-china-has-plenty/) to international relations to new lengths. In the face of its rising stature many pundits and political figures have attempted to harp upon the inevitable growing pains of any rising power and cite this as evidence of its immaturity. While China is by no measure perfect, for years the country and its people have been unjustly demonised by those whose own hands are caked in the blood of untold number of innocents. Allegations of purported Chinese malevolence should be viewed for what they most often are - the [hysterical propaganda](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2013/04/15/obamas-china-syndrome/) of those who are fearful and insecure about competition for their own privileged position. The US however should not fear the rising tide of Chinese influence. Rather, it should warmly welcome it. In a unipolar world, the US government was free to act out its most self-destructive tendencies and was devoid of any pressure to reform in order to compete with a major adversary. Indeed, the US achieved [its most admirable feats](http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-06/40-years-later-ten-things-you-didnt-know-about-apollo-ii-moon-landing) when it was facing serious competition from Soviet Russia. While China is not yet a large enough player to individually balance the US on most major issues, its status is rising. When working within the emerging "[BRICS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS)" bloc of countries, it is capable of constraining unilateral US actions. This is good for both the American and Chinese people, as the existence of a multipolar world will mean that neither government will be able to delve into unchecked excess and military adventurism. However, as China's relationship with the US and other major powers develops, there is no doubt that the country has finally come to equal terms with its former oppressors. China's ascendance signifies the fruition of Tagore's prophecy and the long victory of the Chinese people over Western imperialism. If China continues its remarkably successful policy of "[peacefully rising](http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Bijian_-_China_s_Peaceful_Rise_-_Foreign_Affairs.pdf)" while pursuing continued self-improvement and reform, it will remain both a welcome player in global affairs and a responsible model for other aspiring world powers.

### Fear of China is Racist

#### US depictions of China as a military threat are unfounded and racist

Andre Vltchek, Novelist, filmmaker and investigative journalist. He covered wars and conflicts in dozens of countries, January 4, 2013, “[The Irrational, Racist Fear of China](http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/01/04/the-irrational-racist-fear-of-china/),” Counter Punch, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/01/04/the-irrational-racist-fear-of-china/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

To claim that there is no racism in the way China is perceived would be ludicrous. I have friends, otherwise sensible and progressive men and women, who, when China is mentioned, close their ears and begin to scream: “No, I never want to go there. It is terrible!” Communist, socialist, or capitalist, the success of Asian nations is never taken lightly in the West. Who can ever forget the sarcasm and ‘mistrust’ directed towards Japan when it bypassed, economically and socially, most of the European nations. And until now, when someone mentions that Singapore has many social indicators that are better than those in Australia, he or she is immediately countered by derogatory outbursts, directed at the tropical city state. Both Singapore and Japan are staunch Western allies and highly-developed market economies integrated in the global capitalist system. China is different. It is developing its own model; it is clearing and creating its own path through unknown territory. It is unwilling to follow orders from others. It is too big, its culture too old. In the past, like Japan, China was closed, living in its own realm, never externally aggressive, with no expansionist ambitions. Westerners arrived and forced it to open. What followed were bloodbaths and deceits, confusion and a long period of national humiliation and stagnation. Then came the struggle for independence, and revolution. Not easy, not smooth, but China once again grew, began rising to its feet, educating its people, housing and healing the poor. It went its own way; a complex way of balancing between its own culture and global conditions, between socialism and the capitalist reality that is dominating the world. It experienced some setbacks but many more accomplishments. And it did not really ‘rise’; it just began regaining its rightful place in the world, the place that was denied to it for so long, after years of plunder and debilitating invasions. It is generally a benign nation inhabited by kind hearted people. Almost all those that know China, agree on that. But it is also an extremely determined and proud nation. It is wise, and in search of harmony, always willing to compromise. To try to corner it, to provoke it, to attack it, would be insane, and almost suicidal. This time China will not yield, not when essential issue are involved. There is still the fresh memory there, of what happened when it did. The West, blinded by the fear that it could lose the privileges of the dictator, is doing the unthinkable: sticking an iron rod into the dragon’s mouth. Here in Asia, dragons are respected and loved – mythical creatures of great wisdom and power. But dragons can also be fierce when good-will is broken, and invaders are threatening to ravage the nation. \*\*\* China is growing and trying to understand the world, to interact with it. Its people are enthusiastic about what they see; they want to make friends. The West is acting in the most antagonistic way: once again triggering an arms race, spreading the most vitriolic propaganda, corrupting entire nations in Asia and Oceania into adopting an anti-Chinese stand. Understandably, the West did not sacrifice all those millions of people, all around the world, just to abandon its dictatorial and exclusive grip on power. It did not destroy dozens of freedom-seeking countries; it did not bomb tens of millions to oblivion, just to back up now. In the future, confrontation cannot be excluded, and it is clear who will be at fault. China will not abandon its course. There will be no Chinese Yeltsin. By standing firm, China is showing an example to the world. As these words are being written, Latin America is resisting and winning. Russia is resisting while searching for its own direction. And others may join. Africa is dreaming about resisting, but still does not dare; still too damaged. Arab countries dare, but have yet to decide in which direction to place their dreams. But discontent with the boots crashing freedom is growing. And China is not the one who is wearing them. The irrationality and racism of the West may backfire.

### Fear of China Inaccurate

#### The disad is based on an irrational fear of China—their scholarship is corrupt and inaccurate

[Dr Chengxin Pan](http://www.deakin.edu.au/arts-ed/shss/staff-directory2.php?username=chengxip), Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, December 12, 2012, “China Watching and Contemporary Geopolitics of Fear and Fantasy – by Chengxin Pan,” Elgar Blog, https://elgarblog.com/2012/12/12/china-watching-and-contemporary-geopolitics-of-fear-and-fantasy-by-chengxin-pan/

To many Western observers, this fear, based on objective knowledge of China’s rise, is warranted. As an authoritarian state with the world’s fastest growing economy and one of the largest military forces, China seems to be nothing but a frightening giant on the horizon. Clearly, one cannot deny China’s vast size, enormous economic power and military potential. [But the fact that the almost equally impressive rise of India has not attracted the same level of anxiety is revealing](http://business.time.com/2011/06/07/why-do-we-fear-a-rising-china/). If anything, India has been embraced with much enthusiasm and affection of late. In this sense, ‘objective’ knowledge, empirically grounded though it may seem, is nevertheless inseparable from emotion and desire. One might even say that what we know is often what we want to know. Thus, a significant portion of Western knowledge on China, gained apparently through the respected intellectual activity of China watching, has less to do with China and more with Western desire (a subject which has thus far attracted little attention). The familiar ‘China threat’ argument, for instance, is not so much an objectively verified fact as it is a fear-inspired speculation disguised as ‘knowledge’. To substitute for the lack of positive certainty about China’s trajectory, this knowledge is produced through fear, which helps provide a negative form of certainty, namely, threat. During the Cold War, an Australian China observer commented that ‘What we do not know we fear’. That habit did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Today, the [Australian government vows to boost its China literacy in the Asian Century](http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/white-paper), but all the while it is acutely wary of China’s intention and military might, citing the usual reason that China is not yet transparent. Sharing this China anxiety with US policy-makers, Canberra has recently beefed up its military ties with Washington, as exemplified by allowing 2 500 US marines to train in Darwin and passing the US-Australian Defence Trade Treaty. There is nothing wrong with feeling anxious about China. After all, the Chinese themselves may have been caught by surprise by the speed of their country’s ascendancy on the world stage, and many are grappling with the meanings and implications of China’s new global role. Meanwhile, aware of unease felt by neighbouring countries, the Chinese leadership has tried to reassure the rest of the world that China’s rise will be peaceful. Yet, this ‘reassurance’ policy has done little to ease that fear, for the latter has become interwoven with the expert knowledge of the ‘China threat’ offered by some quarters of the China watching community. This fear-induced China knowledge, now compounded by the widespread anxiety about impending US/Western decline, has in part given impetus to the Obama administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ to Asia. Although the US constantly denies that this strategic move aims at containing China, its unease with Beijing’s perceived growing clout has been at least one of its main driving forces. Interestingly but not surprisingly, despite their belonging to the opposite sides of the American partisan politics, [Secretary of State Hillary Clinton](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century) and [former Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney](http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/07/news/la-pn-mitt-romney-foreign-policy-20111007) both share this latent fear about America’s future as well as China’s ambition. Neither wants to see the widely anticipated Asian (Pacific) Century become a Chinese, rather than American, century.

### China War Defense—No Shooting War

#### No war between the US and China—they’ll continue to cooperate on some issues and have friction on others

Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus professor, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra, May 13, 2013, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/

Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin. Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines. But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in [South China Sea territorial disputes](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/14/china-s-non-confrontational-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea/), and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely. Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific Command, [recently stated](http://www.pacom.mil/media/news/2013/02/08-adm-locklear-us-indonesia-society-resilience-asia-pacific-rebalance.shtml), ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case … it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’. However, a review of past US–China military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing stronger. As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, both countries work separately to secure their interests through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest. The Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks.

### China War Defense—No Shooting War

#### Geographic constraints and nuclear deterrence prevent US China War even if economic interdependence fails

[Zachary Keck](http://thediplomat.com/authors/zachary-keck/), Formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored [The Pacific Realist](http://thediplomat.com/category/zachary-keck/) blog, July 12, 2013, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/> (accessed April 23, 2016)

But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. [As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly](http://www.amazon.com/Arms-Influence-Thomas-C-Schelling/dp/0837189802), nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, [there is evidence to suggest that wars](http://www.amazon.com/Guns-Germs-Steel-Fates-Societies/dp/0393061310/ref%3Dsr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1373621847&sr=1-1&keywords=jared+diamond+guns+germs+and+steel) between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures. Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways.

### China War Defense—No Cold War

#### No risk of Cold War between US and China--

[Michael Crowley](http://www.usnews.com/topics/author/michael_crowley), Writer for the Foreign Policy Association. He has previously worked at the Center for Strategic International Studies, Akin Gump and The Pew Charitable Trusts, June 20, 2014, “Why China Isn't the Next Soviet Union,” US News, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/20/a-uschina-cold-war-wont-happen> (accessed April 23, 2016)

What that more robust foreign policy means for Asia and the U.S. is the key question. Some in the U.S. advocate preparing for a great power showdown along the lines of the Cold War. There are, however, more differences than similarities between the current state of Sino-U.S. relations and the Cold War model. First, relations between the two countries are not built on struggles for territory stemming from a prior conflict, as the U.S. and Soviet Union struggled over post-World War II Europe. Where China is catching up with the U.S. and no longer keen to “accede to U.S. hyper power” (in the words of [t]he report’s authors), the U.S. and Soviet Union were strategic rivals and peers from the latter days of World War II. Second, while China is fast developing conventional military capabilities of a great power – for example, a blue water navy – there is no razor’s-edge “arms race” or mutually-assured destruction dynamic comparable to U.S.-Soviet competition over nuclear missile capability. Instead, China is looking, over time, to marginalize U.S. influence in Asia.

### Hegemony Defense—Collapse Inevitable

#### US hegemony is declining now—multiple challengers and too much intervention

[Jack A. Smith](http://www.globalresearch.ca/author/jack-a-smith), Staff writer and researcher at Global Research news and political outlet, May 31, 2015, ““The Hegemony Games”: the United States of America (USA) vs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC),” Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/tthe-hegemony-games-the-united-states-of-america-usa-vs-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc/5452656> (accessed April 24, 2016)

The days of American hegemony over the nations of the world are numbered. This is perhaps the main and certainly the most dangerous contradiction deriving from America’s determination to lead the world as carried forward by President Obama and undoubtedly to be continued by the next and the next administrations. There are many secondary contradictions strewn throughout the world, but almost all are related to first. The U.S. government is recklessly flailing its arms and interfering in all the global regions to impose its will in order to indefinitely continue enjoying unilateral domination and the sensation of luxuriating in the extraordinary advantages derived from being the world’s top cop, top judge, only jury, mass jailer and executioner extraordinaire. If you doubt it, just look about at the human, structural and environmental anguish created in the last 15 years by the action or inaction of Bush-Obama world leadership. Think about the trillions of U.S. dollars for destruction and death, and the paucity of expenditures for construction and life. A better world can only emerge from a better and more people-friendly political and economic global order. Obama’s policy of enhanced American “leadership” has created havoc these last six years as a result of the collusion between the Democratic White House and the Republican Congress — partners in the projection of American armed power around the world. The main target — despite all the elbowing and ranting about Russia, Putin, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, Yemen, Islamic State, ad infinitum — is and will remain China. The U.S. does not want a war with China, though one is certainly possible in time. It would prefer warm, friendly and mutually beneficial relations, under one condition: The U.S. is boss, and leads, while China — rich and powerful if it wishes — is subordinate, and follows, even in its own natural sphere of influence. Beijing does not seek hegemony, but it will not kowtow to the United States.

### Hegemony Defense—Collapse Inevitable

#### US hegemony is declining now—overstretch, economic troubles, and challengers prevent effective hegemony

[Finian Cunningham](http://sputniknews.com/authors/finian_cunningham/), Holds a Master’s degree and is a journalist writing for Sputnik News, April 22, 2016, “Broke and Paranoid...How the US Risks Nuclear War,” Sputnik News, <http://sputniknews.com/columnists/20160422/1038434280/us-russia-china-geopolitics.html> (accessed April 24, 2016)

Many observers fear that not only are we seeing a new Cold War, but that we are also in the throes a new global arms race. This stems from the United States being both wildly over-stretched militarily and wildly irrational. In short: broke and paranoid. Twenty-five years after the official end of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, political and military leaders in Washington continue to portray Russia and China as “existential threats”. This level of threat-designation is not reciprocated by Moscow or Beijing. While the Russian and Chinese leadership are no doubt wary about maverick American power, still there is nowhere a comparable rhetorical riposte of aggression. Even though it could be reasonably argued for, given the routine, shrill claims made by Washington against Russia and China. This is the first point. Washington’s assessment of security risks in the world is so far off reality. It is often prejudiced, subjective, heavily propagandized, and inaccurate. Take the recent close encounter in the Baltic between the USS Donald Cook guided-missile destroyer and Russian fighter jets. The incident was some 70 nautical miles off Russia’s territory, yet US officials decried it as “evidence of Russian aggression”. The same illogical inversion of reality is asserted against China which is routinely accused of impinging on territories in the South China Sea – by American forces patrolling thousands of miles from their home bases. At least in the heyday of the old Cold War, US planners had a semblance of ideological basis for their hostility towards Moscow and Beijing. Anti-Communism may have been overblown, but that perceived threat had an ideological premise invoking the need for military power. Today, what is the basis for American hostility towards Russia or China? There is negligible justification for American belligerence other than specious claims about Russian and Chinese aggression. The reality is that the aggression is one-sided American conduct. Arguably, it is about trying to preserve US hegemony and maintaining a unipolar world of American dominance in the face of an emerging multipolar world. A world in which a resurgent Russia and China are deemed to be “threats” – not in terms of being actual existential enemies, but simply because they are legitimate rival powers. The trouble with monopoly power is that any diminution is seen by those who wield such dominance as an unacceptable threat. But, unlike the former Cold War, America’s new Cold War against Russia and China is untenable, with no objective security rationale. It is simply on the basis of a paranoid projection of threat owing to an abnormal need to preserve an unsustainable hegemony of declining US capitalism.

### Hegemony Defense—Not Effective/ Collapse Inevitable

#### The idea that hegemony can be maintained indefinitely is flawed—hegemony can’t be effectively exercised

Christopher Preble, The president of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in History from Temple University, March 23, 2015, “Our Unrealistic Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/our-unrealistic-foreign-policy/> (accessed April 24, 2016)

Echoing those sentiments a few years later, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan characterized the proper U.S. role in the world as “[benevolent global hegemony](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52239/william-kristol-and-robert-kagan/toward-a-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy).” “The aspiration to benevolent hegemony,” they conceded in their famous Foreign Affairs essay from 1996, “might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect. But a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain.” Kristol and Kagan claimed, “Most of the world’s major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America’s benevolent hegemony to the alternatives.” Indeed, they continued, “The principal concern of America’s allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw.” That latter point has never been tested: U.S. troops have remained in Europe and Asia, and the U.S. military presence expanded in other regions. But whether it is good for others doesn’t necessarily make it good for us. For the most part, American taxpayers, and especially American troops, have borne the burdens of “benevolent hegemony,” while U.S. allies have been content to focus their attention on domestic spending, while their underfunded defenses languish. Modern-day advocates of our current foreign policy opt for a less grandiose name – “[deep engagement](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward?page=show)” – but the substance is the same as that advocated by Kristol and Kagan from nearly two decades ago. And the fact that U.S. foreign policy encourages other countries to neglect their defenses continues to be its key selling point. “By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations,” Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth explain, “Washington dampens competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities.” According to this view, the fact that U.S. allies have chosen not to invest in their own defenses is the clearest sign that the strategy is working as intended. “Since 1991,” Brooks and his co-authors enthuse, U.S. allies “have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows.” Curb Your Enthusiasm Because U.S. security guarantees to wealthy allies have caused them to under-provide for their own defense, they also have less capacity to deal with common security challenges, from ethnic violence in the Balkans in the late 1990s to combatting terrorism and piracy in the Middle East, South Asia, or the Horn or Africa today. But that isn’t the main flaw underlying U.S. foreign policy today. Cheerleaders for benevolent hegemony contend that Americans are inclined to carry these burdens indefinitely, a function of American exceptionalism combined with a pervasive culture of weakness among our allies. “The American people can be summoned to meet the challenges of global leadership,” Kristol and Kagan concluded in 1996, “if statesmen make the case loudly, cogently, and persistently.” American “statesmen” have typically opted for a different approach. They tend to sell U.S. foreign policy through misdirection and subterfuge to the extent that they ever talk about it at all. Astute observers of U.S. foreign policy understand why elites have neglected to make the case loudly, cogently, or persistently; the American people haven’t bought into this ambitious global mission, and they are unlikely to ever do so. Nor is it clear that other countries welcome U.S. leadership as much as the advocates of global hegemony contend. The key problem with “benevolent hegemony,” Francis Fukuyama explained in his book, [America at the Crossroads](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0300122535/ref%3Das_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0300122535&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwaronthec-20&linkId=2PD44YHPR4OSCGXO), is that it “rests on a belief in American exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find not credible.” He continued, “The idea that the United States behaves disinterestedly on the world stage is not widely believed because it is for the most part not true and, indeed, could not be true if American leaders fulfill their responsibilities to the American people.” Even strong advocates of global hegemony concede that it might not be realistic to expect Americans to bear the burdens of global governance indefinitely. For Americans, Michael Mandelbaum grudgingly admitted in his book, [The Case for Goliath](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1586484583/ref%3Das_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1586484583&linkCode=as2&tag=httpwaronthec-20&linkId=CVAR56MJO5ZLYZUC), our own “nation’s interests have priority.” This “does not bespeak unusual financial stinginess or moral callousness: Americans approach the world much as other people do….For the American public, foreign policy, like charity, begins at home.” For that reason, above all others, Mandelbaum predicted, “the American role in the world may depend in part on Americans not scrutinizing it too closely.”

### Hegemony Bad—Terrorism

#### US hegemony fuels global terrorism—we’re making more terrorists through our actions

Chandra Muzaffar, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), November 16, 2015, “Tragedy in Paris. Terrorism and the Politics of Hegemony,” Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/tragedy-in-paris-terrorism-and-the-politics-of-hegemony/5489418> (accessed April 24, 2016)

It is obvious that there is a set of complex factors ranging from the religious to the geopolitical that is responsible for the opposition to Bashar, a significant part of which is related to the politics of hegemony. It is not just in relation to terrorism in Syria that the politics of hegemony is critical. If we examined the three real reasons behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 which sired the current pattern of terrorism in WANA they are all connected to hegemony — the US desire to control Iraqi oil; Iraq’s strategic location in WANA; and Israel’s desire to eliminate an Arab leader who was not only passionately committed to the Palestinian cause but also uncompromisingly opposed to Israeli hegemony. Indeed, hegemony is at the root of the chaotic mess that prevails in yet another Arab country today. It was because of the West’s quest for control over Libyan oil and to thwart Muamar Gaddafi’s plan for economic self-reliance and political integration for Africa that NATO chose to liquidate him in 2011. His liquidation has opened the way to intense competition for power among contending terrorist groups. If we go back in history it was the contest for hegemony between the US and the demised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) over Afghanistan in the nineteen eighties that gave birth to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Even if we took another in-depth look at the Paris carnage it is undeniable that France has become a target of the IS because of its military interventions in a number of states from Syria, Iraq and Libya in WANA to Chad, Mali and Ivory Coast. It appears that France wants to play a more dominant role in both West Asia and Africa in pursuit of its own hegemonic agenda. This has earned it the ire of a lot of Muslims and Africans. This is why it will not be possible to eliminate terrorism unless there is a concerted attempt to overcome hegemony at the global level. Citizens within the hegemonic centres of power in particular will have to stand up and demand that their governments cease overt and covert military operations in other countries. Government leaders should know that they cannot denounce terrorism at the rhetorical level and yet hobnob with terrorist organizations in terms of realpolitik. They should be persuaded through the democratic process to abandon their hegemonic agendas forever. Respecting the independence and sovereignty of other nations and peoples should be a principle that is put into practice rather than preached from a rostrum. This does not mean that if global hegemony ends, terrorism will disappear altogether. There are many other causes of terrorism which will have to be combatted with resolute vigour. Nonetheless, a global movement against global hegemony with the focus upon terrorism is the need of the hour.

### Hegemony Bad—Creates Enemies

#### US hegemony creates enemies through aggressive intervention and domination

[Michael Payne](http://www.nationofchange.org/2015/author/michael-payne/), Journalist, blogger, and political activist writing for Nation of Change, June 14, 2015, “U.S. Global Hegemony Knows No Bounds,” Nation of Change, <http://www.nationofchange.org/2015/06/14/u-s-global-hegemony-knows-no-bounds/> (accessed April 24, 2016)

Not long ago Saddam Hussein of Iraq got in the way and look what happened to him. Then Muammar Gaddafi of Libya refused to play ball and he bit the dust. Now it seems like the next target is President Assad of Syria who stands in the way of the future plans of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Could Putin be the next one in line to have to go? Well, the probability of that happening is somewhere near zero to none. Yemen has become a prime target for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia who are trying to subdue this nation and its people. Apparently Mr. Obama’s drone attacks haven’t done the job intended. In this same vein, Somalia and Pakistan cannot escape the drones that hover in the skies above them and then rain down their deadly missiles. As the U.S. military colossus looks over the world and the next areas to control, it appears that Russia and China have now become prime targets for this hegemony. Talk about “biting off more than you can chew” or “opening a door which you won’t be able to close.” Trying to intimidate the Russian Bear or the Chinese Dragon should be the very last thing that you should contemplate doing for there is no way that these two large and powerful countries are ever going to allow that to happen. What kind of intimidation is this? Well, Mr. Obama, though he was strongly warned by Putin to stop interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine and allow that nation and Russia to resolve their differences on their own terms, is apparently not going to heed that advice. He has stated that he and his European allies are considering even greater economic sanctions against Russia if it does accede to their demands. And they may not be saying it but you can bet that they are keeping military intervention “on the table.” However, to think that Putin would buckle under is simply delusional thinking. Secondly, the U.S. government and this president have made it clear that they are going to proceed with their Asian Pivot which is designed to intimidate China by moving a large portion of the U.S. troops from the Middle East into the Asian Pacific region, aka, China’s backyard. It’s all part of the plan by which a massive new U.S. presence in this region of the world will serve to try to impede China’s extremely ambitious economic endeavors. Again, to think that China will allow itself to be pinned into a corner in its primary region of influence is yet more than delusional thinking. What’s with this government of ours? There seemingly is no end to this hegemony on steroids. This is a government that failed to learn valuable lessons from its military debacles in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan and it keeps making the same mistakes over and over again. Isn’t experience supposed to make you smarter? The big question is: what will this government do next? It’s already established a huge presence in many parts of Africa. So far it apparently is not interfering in the internal affairs of the countries of Latin America as was the case in decades past. It would like to find some way to establish control over Venezuela, a country that has somehow managed to escape it, largely due to the efforts of its now deceased President Hugo Chavez, who had been at the top of this government’s enemy list for years. Suppose a nationwide poll were taken posing this question to the American people: If you were given the opportunity would you vote to end this U.S. agenda of hegemony, scale back the number of military bases around the world, and still have a powerful military to protect America; yes or no? I think they would jump at the chance and at least 2/3 or more would vote yes. Unfortunately, that’s never likely to happen in this country, and if such a poll were taken, the U.S. government would completely ignore the wishes of the people whose views it considers to be completely irrelevant. How much longer can this hegemonic agenda continue to be sustained; at some time in the not too distant future will it collapse upon itself? Well, as this government tries to control more and more of the world, as it keeps creating a plethora of new enemies, and if our European allies and others opt out of the current alliance, that possibility will come ever closer to becoming a reality.

# DA Answers US India Relations DA

### 2AC – Frontline

#### U.S.-India relations are low now- economic ties have faltered

Sadanand Dhume, May, 2016, “U.S.-India relations: Balancing progress and managing expectations,” American Enterprise Institute, <https://www.aei.org/publication/u-s-india-relations-balancing-progress-and-managing-expectations/> (accessed 5/27/16)

Economic relations have deepened too, albeit from a modest base. Between 2002 and 2015, bilateral trade in goods and services quintupled from $21 billion to $107 billion. Since 2004, U.S. FDI stock in India has more than tripled from $8 billion to $28 billion. According to the Confederation of Indian Industry, 100 Indian companies have invested $15 billion in 35 U.S. states, creating 91,000 jobs. Indian students add $3.6 billion to the U.S. economy each year. At the same time, the three-million-strong Indian-American population continues to act as a bridge between the two countries. Nonetheless, neither country should take this continued progress for granted. For one, recent gains notwithstanding, trade ties remain far below potential. With an annual output of $2.1 trillion, India is the seventh largest economy in the world. In purchasing power parity terms it is even larger—a $8 trillion economy, or the world’s third largest. Yet, in 2015, with trade in goods of $66.7 billion, India was only the U.S.’s tenth largest trading partner in goods, ranked below smaller economies such as Taiwan and South Korea. Without a deeper trade relationship, and an India more deeply integrated into the global economy, the relationship risks remaining unsustainably lopsided toward shared geopolitical and security concerns.

#### No link- relations aren’t zero-sum and economic tie overwhelm India’s strategic interests against China

Jacques deLisle is director of the Asia Program at FPRI and professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania, January, 2011, “The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China’s Challenging Relations with Great Powers in Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-and-chinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/> (accessed 5/24/16)

But the most decisive disanalogies between U.S.-China-India relations today and the Cold War strategic triangle stem from the positive and dense ties between the U.S. and China and between China and India that had no parallel in the thin and hostile relations between the U.S. and the USSR and between China and the Soviet Union. During an era of high international economic interdependence, U.S.-PRC trade and investment relations are among the very largest globally-with China ranking as the U.S.’s second largest, and the U.S. ranking as China’s largest, trading partner in goods, and the U.S. being among China’s top sources of foreign investment and China among the U.S.’s largest creditors. China-India economic connections have been developing rapidly from low baselines, with trade having grown from less than $2 billion at the beginning of the decade to over $60 billion now and with China having become India’s biggest trading partner. Their expansion and deepening was a focus of Wen’s visit, including announcements of a goal of $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2015 (a figure consistent with recent trends), $16 billion in business deals, and plans to expand Chinese investment and economic activity in India, particularly in the fast-growing area of infrastructure construction. Such patterns contrast sharply with the low and often near-zero levels of economic engagement between the U.S. and USSR and between the USSR and the PRC during an earlier era. Although they also spawn conflicts, the large and growing economic linkages between the U.S. and China and between India and China have created national interests and powerful domestic political constituencies that favor good relations and weigh against strongly adversarial stances toward China in Washington and New Delhi. Such economic considerations are likely all the more central at this moment, when India has an economist prime minister and the U.S. has a president whose political fortunes hinge on improvement in a recently dismal national economy.

#### And, no risk of nuclear terrorism, too many obstacles

John J. Mearsheimer, January 2014, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show (accessed 5/28/16)

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

## A/T Uniqueness

### US-India Relations Low – Pakistan

#### Tension over US and Pakistan relationship is harming US-India relations

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, April 29, 2016, “Persistent Suitor: Washington Wants India as an Ally to Contain China,” <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/persistent-suitor-washington-wants-india-as-an-ally-to-contain-china/> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

The agreement that came from Carter’s visit would do nothing to reassure the Chinese. Carter and his Indian counterpart, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, pledged to increase bilateral logistical cooperation in the military arena, especially maritime cooperation. Although that agreement is still a considerable distance away from constituting a full-fledged military alliance between the two nations, it continues a trend that has developed over the past decade. And mutual concerns about China’s ambitions appear to be the principal driving force in the bilateral relationship. But there is likely to be a limit to Delhi’s receptivity to Washington’s courtship. Despite its own concerns about Beijing’s ambitions, India is wary about succumbing to an excessively close U.S. embrace. Delhi has much to lose and little to gain by becoming a cat’s paw ally of the United States against China. That is especially true if Washington is not willing to sever its close ties with India’s arch-enemy, Pakistan. Yet as long as U.S. leaders insist on waging a “war on terror” with a major Central Asia/South Asia component, centered in Afghanistan, they will not cut Washington’s supposed Pakistani ally loose. And as long as that is the case, Indian leaders and the Indian public will view professions of U.S. concern about their country’s vital interests with justifiable skepticism.

#### US is maneuvering Pakistan to instigate conflict

PTI, Times of India, March 1, 2016, “Amid Tension with US over South China Sea, a Warning for India from China,” <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Amid-tension-with-US-over-South-China-Sea-a-warning-for-India-from-China/articleshow/51209442.cms> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, where several other Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei have overlapping claims. Today's article also accused the US of attempting to drive a wedge between India and Pakistan. "Wary of India's rise, US is attempting to instigate conflicts between New Delhi and Islamabad by approving the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. New Delhi is wise to say no to Washington. "The White House is just manoeuvring India for its own interests, and will not stop supporting Pakistan as a repay to India. The US administration is following a 'divide and rule' policy," it said. From US perspective, China, Russia and India are all threatening its status as a superpower. The US does not want to see a stronger India, it said." In fact, the likelihood for India to station its naval forces in the South China Sea remains quite low. Yet, it may strengthen its military presence in the Indian Ocean. For instance, there is Indian Navy's ambitious Project Seabird, which pursues the construction of facilities to berth the nation's aircraft carriers," the article said.

### US-India Relations Low – Suspicion

#### India has a deep rooted suspicion of the US – unreliable patron

Jaideep Prabhu, Author/Writer at Firstpost, December 21, 2015, “Growing India-US Relations: New Delhi’s Defence Doctrine Must Match its Muscular Foreign Policy,” <http://www.firstpost.com/world/growing-india-us-relations-new-delhis-defence-doctrine-must-match-its-muscular-foreign-policy-2553514.html> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

India's equivocal response to the Pentagon's protocols does have a legitimate basis — a deep-rooted suspicion of the United States. For earlier generations, this was ideological: India eschewed the free market, embraced state socialism, and was in closer orbit to the Soviet Union diplomatically and militarily than it was to the West. For the younger generation, mistrust of Washington stems from what appears from Delhi as unwavering support of a hostile neighbour, Pakistan. Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, Foggy Bottom sees Islamabad as a close non-Nato ally and supplies it with advanced military equipment that includes nuclear-capable F-16 fighter jets. The United States has also earned a reputation as an unreliable patron, ironically from both India and Pakistan. Foggy Bottom cut off arms supplies in 1965 as well as in 1971 when war broke out between India and Pakistan; in 1974 and in 1998, after India's nuclear tests, it became the subject of US sanctions. Delhi worries that if it relies too much on an American defence framework, it might find its options in a conflict circumscribed by US interests and worldview. More recently, Washington's ridiculous good Taliban/bad Taliban routine got no chuckles in Delhi.

### US-India Relations Low – Trade Dispute

#### Tensions rising between the US and India over trade dispute

Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, ‎Correspondent at Thomson Reuters, and Rajesh Kumar Singh, ‎Correspondent at Thomson Reuters, March 4, 2016, “India Files Trade Complaint Against US Over Temporary Work Visas,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-united-states-visa-idUSKCN0W6165> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

Trade tensions between India and the United States intensified on Friday as New Delhi filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization over steep fee increases for U.S. non-immigrant temporary work visas. The WTO said in a statement that India has disputed the doubling of the fees for H-1B and L-1 work visas and limits on their numbers. The visas are typically used by thousands of Indian nationals hired by information technology services firms operating in the United States. The complaint comes just days after the United States won a WTO ruling in favor of its challenge to India's domestic content rules for its solar power subsidy program after months of negotiations failed to produce a settlement. In its filing, India said the new U.S. visa measures seemed inconsistent with the WTO commitments the United States had made, because the moves treat Indian IT workers in the United States less favorably than their American counterparts.

### India-China Relations Low – South China Sea

#### South China Sea tensions causing India to feel encircled by China now

Sumit Kumar, ICSSR Doctoral Fellow at UGC Centre for Southern Asia Studies, April 4, 2016, “Tensions in South China Sea and What it Means for India,” <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/india-china-relations-south-china-sea-barack-obama-narendra-modi-shinzo-abe/story/1/9880.html> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

At the same time, Washington is also seeking help from Asian military powers like Japan and India in maintaining peace and security in the South China Sea. Certainly, the recent unrest in the South China Sea has not gone unnoticed in India for various reasons. First, as about 50 per cent of Indian trade transits through the South China Sea, it is very important for India to ensure that there is an absolute freedom of navigation. Secondly, while India's relations with ASEAN have improved significantly since 1990s, it has assumed added significance under the Modi government's "Act East" policy in view of the fact that India views ASEAN countries, some of them are engrailed in the South China dispute, as playing a crucial role in India's economic development. Thirdly, India has become one of the few external forces which have been involved in oil and gas exploration in the region. Indian companies have invested in oil and gas, steel, spices, pharmaceuticals, edible oil, steel furniture and other sectors. Thus, New Delhi wishes to see prevalence of peace and security in this region so that it can meet its energy needs with South China Sea oil and gas considerably. Fourthly, India, in the past, chose to remain inactive on the South China issue. However, China's aggressive posturing against the activities of the Indian state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) in the South China Sea, calling theses activities illegal has forced New Delhi to rethink its stand on this issue. Also, as China is trying to encircle India by deepening its foothold in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean, the unrest in the South China Sea has provided India an opportunity to enlarge its presence in this region as well. It is in light of these above-mentioned factors that in the ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in Phnom Penh in 2012, India emphasised its strong support for freedom of navigation and access to resources such as fisheries and gas in accordance with principles of international law. India's 2015 Maritime Security Strategy document has also declared the South China Sea as a "secondary zone of interest" for the Indian Navy.

### India-China Relations Low – Pakistan

#### China is bolstering relations with Pakistan harming India-Sino relations

PTI, The Economic Times, March 15, 2016, “China, Pakistan Ties Driven by Rivalry with India: US Experts,” <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-pakistan-ties-driven-by-rivalry-with-india-us-experts/articleshow/51402338.cms?prtpage=1> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan is primarily driven by their rivalry with India, eminent US experts have said, with one of them expressing concern over Sino-India border tensions. "China's close ties with Pakistan also raise tension in the subcontinent. The China-Pakistan relationship has always been strategic in nature driven by their mutual rivalry with India," Katherine C Tobin, commissioner of the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, said during a hearing on China in South Asia. "I think the US has taken a very hands-off approach, but there may be some room for contingency planning back here in the US if the Sino-India border disputes were to ratchet up," Curtis said. "And certainly we have seen on two occasions in the last two years or three years rather, once in the spring of 2013, once in the fall of 2014, that tensions ratcheted up in terms of unusual troop movements by the Chinese pla forces in the Ladakh region," she said. "So, it's certainly something that I think we need to pay attention to. I'm not saying the US needs to get involved per se, but we should at least have an idea of how the US might react if the tensions were to escalate quickly along the border," Curtis said. China, she argued, seeks to build strategic and military ties with Pakistan in order to contain Indian power and to prevent India from extending its influence outward and essentially prevent it from focusing its attention and military resources towards China.

### India-China Relations Low – Border Disputes

#### India and China have long-standing tension over border

Kumaran Ira, WSW Contributor and Staff Writer, May 7, 2016, “US Official Stokes Border Tension Between India and China in the Himalayas,” <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/07/inch-m07.html> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

Hall’s comments were a calculated attempt to stoke the border dispute between India and China and were made just days after India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval had visited Beijing for talks on resolving the border issue. In 1962 India and China fought a month-long war over their disputed Himalayan border that claimed over 4,000 casualties. The war erupted following a series of violent border incidents in the aftermath of the 1959 CIA-backed Tibetan uprising against the Chinese regime. Following the uprising’s defeat, India had granted asylum to the Tibetan Buddhist leader, the Dalai Lama, and to this day, the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile is in Dharamsala in northwestern India. India and China share a long border that passes through several disputed regions, including much of Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. The latter is located between the Chinese autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, and is claimed by India as part of the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir. During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Chinese forces overran Arunachal Pradesh, only later to pull back, and expanded their control over Aksai Chin. Hall’s comments amounted to pouring fuel on the fire of the Sino-Indian border conflict. They make clear that as part of its “pivot to Asia,” which is aimed at isolating and preparing for war with China, Washington is willing to back Indian territorial claims that are viewed by Beijing as threats to China’s territorial integrity. Hall’s remarks come as India, aligning increasingly with the US strategic offensive against China, seeks to leverage its relationship with Washington to attain the status of a global power. India is rapidly expanding its military and demanding that the states of South Asia recognize it as the regional hegemon. The US is pushing for India to become a frontline state in its “pivot” against China. In April it got New Delhi’s agreement “in principle” to a bilateral Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) which will give the US military access to Indian military bases for resupply, repair and rest. China strongly objected to Hall’s comments. On Wednesday, Beijing said that any “irresponsible” third party intervention in the Sino-Indian border dispute would “complicate” the issue.

### India-China Relations Low – Isolation Now

#### India and China relations strained – US effort to isolate increasing

PTV, Press TV- International Relations News, May 21, 2016, “US Trying to Isolate India from China and Russia: Analyst” <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/05/21/466756/US-BRICS-China-Russia-India-relations> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

The United States seeks to isolate India from Russia and China by seeking a NATO-like partnership status with it, says a political commentator. US lawmakers have reportedly been pushing for a partnership status for India similar to that of America’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indian papers reported on Friday that US lawmakers’ recent approval of a defense bill will put the country at par with NATO allies. This would mean that Washington could in future treat New Delhi as a closer partner and might sell it more defense equipment and technology. American author and radio host, Stephen Lendman, however, believes that “this is the idea behind America’s scheme to get all the major countries isolated from Russia and China to make them more vulnerable, to make it easier to attack them politically, economically.” In a phone interview with Press TV, Lendman said China and Russia - the two countries that share similar positions on a raft of international issues - are “last frontier for America and “they represent a major threat to America’s desire for global hegemony.” “America is targeting the BRICS countries, Brazil, India, China, and Russia South Africa… Now America is eyeing India. India is a major country, just the way Brazil is. America has gotten Brazil isolated from China and Russia, now it wants to get India isolated from the two,” he noted.

### India-China Relations Low – Regional Power Grab

#### India is becoming a global challenger- economic tension with China limits cooperation

Joseph S. Nye, Former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, August 11, 2015, “What’s the Future of US-India Relations?” <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/whats-the-future-of-us-india-relations/> (Accessed 5/26/2016)

India is unlikely to develop the power to become a global challenger to the US in the first half of this century. Indeed, even in terms of soft power, a recent study by the Portland Consultancy in London placed India outside the top 30 countries. China ranked 30th, and the US came in third, behind the United Kingdom and Germany. Nonetheless, India has considerable assets that already affect the balance of power in Asia. While India and China signed agreements in 1993 and 1996 that promised a peaceful settlement of the border dispute that led them to war in l962, the issue has heated up again, following Chinese actions in recent years. India and China are fellow members of the BRICS (along with Brazil, Russia, and South Africa). But cooperation within that caucus is limited. While Indian officials are often discreet in public about relations with China, and wisely want bilateral trade and investment to grow, their security concerns remain acute. As part of the group of Asian countries that will tend to balance China, India has already begun to strengthen its diplomatic relations with Japan. It would be a mistake to cast the prospects for an improved US-India relationship solely in terms of China’s rising power. Indian economic success is an American interest on its own. So is the open approach taken by India and Brazil on issues such as governance of the Internet, at a time when Russia and China are seeking more authoritarian control. No one should expect an Indian-American alliance any time soon, given historical Indian public opinion. But one can predict a relationship in the coming years that will be both sui generis and stronger.

### No UQ—Relations Limited

#### US/India relations are limited now—multiple structural issues

Kanwal Sibal, Joined the Indian Foreign Service serving as the Foreign Secretary of India. Dr. Sibal served as Ambassador of India to Egypt, France, and Turkey, February 9, 2016, “What do Expect from US-India Relations in 2016,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-to-expect-from-us-india-relations-in-2016/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

U.S.-China tensions are growing, and, India too has longstanding disputes with China. The [2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region) specifically addresses maritime territorial disputes involving China and, among other things, affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and freedom of the air throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. U.S. trade and financial relations with China are vast; India too seeks stable and economically productive ties with China. India has the difficult task ahead of managing the China threat by both engaging closely with the United States and reaching out to China. At the same time, the credibility of the [U.S. rebalance to Asia and the Pacific](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific) is yet to be tested. As part of closer India-U.S. understandings on the Indo-Pacific region, India and the United States have decided to include Japan in the bilateral India-U.S. Malabar naval exercises. The trilateral India-U.S.-Japan political dialogue has also been raised from the official to Ministerial level. However, India’s problems with China are principally related to ongoing border disputes arising from a boundary disagreement and Beijing’s deepening relationship with Islamabad. In both cases, India cannot count on the United State to take a position supportive of India. This points to the limits of the strategic partnership, as such a partnership falls short of supporting India’s territorial sovereignty.

### 2AC – Non-UQ

#### Relations low now- U.S. F-16 sales to Pakistan

Ajai Shukla, February, 2016, “F-16 to Pakistan a 'down' in US-India relations: Parrikar,” Business Standard, <http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/f-16-to-pakistan-a-down-in-us-india-relations-parrikar-116022000055_1.html> (accessed 5/29/16)

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has joined the chorus of protest at Washington's announcement that it will sell Pakistan eight F-16 fighters for $699 million, in the fighter's most potent configuration called Block 50/52. On Thursday, speaking to interviewer Karan Thapar on India Today TV, Parrikar termed the sale a "down" in the US-India relationship, stating: "I'm quite hurt by that and we have expressed our feelings very clearly to America." This came a day after Phil Shaw, the India head of Lockheed Martin, the company that builds the F-16, offered at the Singapore Air Show to "build the F-16 aircraft in India and to move our production line from the US to India with an Indian partner to help with the 'Make in India' process." Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources say the US proposal to establish an F-16 production line in India has been dead for some time now. The Pakistan sale only hammers a final nail into that proposal's coffin.

#### India-US Military relations low- defense ties fragmented

Harsh V. Pant, Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., and Yogesh Joshi, doctoral candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, January, 2015, "Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the US Pivot." Asia Policy 19.1 89-114. https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asia\_policy/v019/19.pant.pdf (accessed 5/27/16)

This stagnation in the defense relationship is also visible in the tentative participation of the Indian Navy in the U.S. pivot. While joint exercises with the U.S. Navy continue apace, no qualitative change has accompanied the tenor of Indo-U.S. naval exercises. Whereas the 2012 Malabar series of exercises saw the participation of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines from the U.S. side, the 2013 exercise was initially postponed and was a low-key affair when finally held. Private conversations with Indian naval officials suggest there was foot-dragging from the Indian government on the scope of these exercises.39 India’s constabulary role in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific has also witnessed no major growth. The Indian Navy has gone on record stating its unwillingness to operate beyond the Strait of Malacca.40 Given the vastness of the Indo-Pacific waters and the economic sequestration reducing the efficiency and operability of U.S. defense forces, participation from the Indian Navy would help the pivot substantially.41 New Delhi, however, has remained reluctant. A.K. Antony, India’s defense minister from 2006 until May 2014, was particularly cagey about the growing Indo-U.S. defense relationship. Under Antony, the Ministry of Defence was instrumental in scuttling Indo-U.S. defense diplomacy even when Washington was keen to resolve outstanding issues.42 New Delhi remained resistant to upgrading the bilateral defense dialogue to a “2+2” mechanism (defense ministers plus foreign ministers) along the lines of the U.S.-Japan strategic dialogue. In June 2012, the Pentagon delegated responsibility for boosting defense ties and trade to then deputy secretary of defense Ashton Carter. However, the Ministry of Defence refused to appoint a senior-level bureaucrat to engage with Carter. In April of the same year, it also refused to engage with the U.S. assistant secretary of state for political affairs, Andrew Shapiro, in reviving the “pol-mil dialogue,” even though the dialogue had an overtly military component. Antony even refused to meet Admiral Sam Locklear, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, during his visit to New Delhi in June 2013.43 Locklear’s request for meeting the service chiefs was turned down by the Ministry of Defence on reasons of protocol. Antony also exhibited little interest in explaining the ministry’s view on Indian strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Not only did it remain underrepresented at the annual Shangri-La dialogues under his stewardship, he also skipped an all-important ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Brunei in 2013. Antony’s left-of-center ideological leanings ensured that India failed to develop a robust defense partnership with the United States over the last decade.44

#### U.S-India relations low- America perceived as cozying up to Pakistan

Daily News and Analysis, April, 2016, “India and US—Partners, Not Allies,” <http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/editorial-dnaedit-partners-not-allies-2201897> (accessed 5/29/16)

There are two inhibiting factors for a full-fledged India-US military alliance. First, is the Pakistan factor. The Americans have made it clear through their actions that they value Islamabad as a military ally. It was against communism in an earlier era. It is now against global jihad. American experts and politicians are only too well aware of the fact that Islamabad has been an unreliable partner in the war against Islamic terrorism. But Pakistan’s geo-strategic position makes it necessary for the Americans to keep the military partnership with Islamabad going. India’s pro-US experts have been hoping for quite sometime now that the Americans will choose India over Pakistan in the new Asian security architecture. But the Americans remain steadfast in their conviction that Pakistan is much too important to be left in the lurch.

### 2AC – U/Q Overwhelms the L

#### Relations between U.S. and India so strong that the plan doesn’t affect their multitude of security ties

Ashok Sharma, Research Fellow, International Relations and Business Development, Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne, June, 2015, “What’s behind the new US-India Defense Pact?,” The Conversation, <http://theconversation.com/whats-behind-the-new-us-india-defense-pact-42944> (accessed 5/29/16)

The bonhomie between the US and India continues. On June 3, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter signed a strategically significant Ten Year Defense Framework Agreement with his Indian counterpart, Manohar Parrikar, in New Delhi. This defense cooperation forms a vital component of a US-India strategic partnership that is only deepening. From prickly to partnership The US-India relationship has evolved –- from a wary association during the Cold War period to a strategic partnership. There are shared security interests, mainly the concerns about Chinese military ascendancy and the post-9/11 Islamic terrorism security threat. And there is growing business and professional collaboration. The increasingly influential Indian American lobby and India’s economic liberalization have both led to increased interaction between the two countries.

## A/T Link

### No Link/ No UQ

#### US/China relations are not zero sum with India—India/ China relations are increasing now despite territorial disputes

Tridivesh Maini, Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. and a Senior Research Associate with the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, March 13, 2016, “What the US Gets Wrong About India's Relationship With China,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indias-relationship-with-china/> (accessed May 26, 2016)

I found that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts are out of sync with the changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First, a focus on hard security issues and territorial disputes detracts from serious analysis of the India-China economic relationship and progress in other areas. While there are certainly major divergences in the strategic sphere apart from territorial disputes between the two countries, the strongest stress on the relationship does relate to [China’s inroads into South Asia](http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/india-and-china-slug-it-out-in-south-asia/). [Many](http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13272-india-and-the-cpec-project-to-oppose-or-not-to-oppose?.html) [strategic analysts](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/string-of-pearls-india-and-the-geopolitics-of-chinese-foreign-policy/) in India believe that China has designs of encircling India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this point. India’s increasing role in Southeast Asia, specifically in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship. One clear instance of this is the decision of Vietnam to award exploration projects to India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company in the South China Sea, an action which China has [raised objections](http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/beijing-tells-india-to-lay-off-south-china-sea-defends-pok-corridor/story-CgnrytWSYfXU2n6AhoatmI.html) to time and again. In May 2015, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman categorically [stated](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/No-oil-hunt-in-South-China-Sea-without-nod-Beijing-to-Delhi/articleshow/47486463.cms) that “Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first from China.” Meanwhile, New Delhi and Washington have found common ground on both strategic and economic issues. However, this does not necessitate a skeptical view of the New Delhi-Beijing relationship’s potential. Beijing and Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still share a robust economic relationship. Neither India nor the United States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely [stated](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-idUSTRE6BE1BM20101215) that the world is big enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emphasized that [India and China will need](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-closer-to-asian-century-of-prosperity/article7909630.ece) to work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the need for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of [China’s One Belt, One Road project](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-india-fasttrack-bcim-economic-corridor-project/article7355496.ece). A number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over China’s investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both countries by [increasing](http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/chinese-airlines-expand-india-flights-115102600829_1.html) the number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement between New Delhi and Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the [period April 2015-January 2016](http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-china-trade-deficit-at-44-7-bn-in-apr-jan-116030200437_1.html), India’s trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with India’s exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26 billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in India are increasing. India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing; interactions between the two countries’ states and provinces are also increasing. India is seeking [to reach out to Chinese provinces](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/india-taps-chinese-provinces-for-bolstering-foreign-investment/article6603196.ece) with whom it did not have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese provinces enriches and supports high-level diplomatic ties. Already, a number of [Indian chief ministers have visited China](http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/postpoll-china-looking-at-business-as-usual/article5877770.ece). During Modi’s visit last year to China, an annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, [the Indian prime minister made a significant point:](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modis-china-visit-discusses-border-issues/article7211179.ece) A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. Liberalizing visa regimes will also help strengthen people-to-people contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is [evident](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/965535.shtml) in the increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas, which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015.

### No Link

#### India doesn’t want too close of relations with the US—they value their relations with China

Matthew Southerland, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs, Iacob Koch-Weser Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade, and Angela Zhang, Research Intern, Security and Foreign Affairs, December 22, 2014,“China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite Growing Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China-India%20Relations--Tensions%20Persist%20Despite%20Growing%20Cooperation_12%2022%202014.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2016)

Despite the potential for enhanced military and security activities, India likely will continue to balance its desire to partner with the United States with its longstanding goal of “strategic autonomy” and its concern that closer U.S.-India ties could antagonize China and upset India-China relations.113 Furthermore, concerns about the United States’ reliability and memories of U.S. sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in the late 1990s hamper Indian officials’ trust in the United States. Some Indian officials are also concerned a stronger U.S.-India security relationship would be unequal, with India playing the role of a junior partner. 114 India’s growing perception of China as a threat is driving New Delhi to strengthen military ties with some U.S. allies and associates in the Asia Pacific region, \* including Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. India also may be motivated to develop closer security relations with other countries in the region to hedge against a potential decline in U.S. military and economic influence and to avoid being overly dependent on Washington for its regional security needs.

### No Link

#### India doesn’t base its actions on US/China relations

John Ryan, Intern with the Political and Security Affairs group at NBR, [John M. Shalikashvili, Chair in National Security Studies advances the study of national security issues and U.S. interests in Asia,](http://www.nbr.org/research/group.aspx?id=82a0c888-515e-43dc-9bcb-7ef41e8e9043) [and Kenneth B., Anne H.H. Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies studies the affairs of the region,](http://www.nbr.org/research/group.aspx?id=fea49944-0fd2-4d0c-86d0-2bc059ac5a4d) June 26, 2015, “China and Indo-U.S. Relations: An Emerging Triangle?,” National Bureau of Asian Research, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=582> (accessed May 26, 2016)

India pulled out of a 2013 trilateral naval exercise with the United States and Japan, reportedly due to concerns about the Chinese reaction. The Indian Ministry of Defence was similarly resistant to participating in the 2014 RIMPAC until China’s participation was confirmed. After President Obama’s recent visit, a Chinese editorial said that under Western influence, “India is sliding...into a zero-sum game.” How has China reacted to increased Indo-U.S. cooperation? India will obviously follow its own interests. The narrative that India would not attend RIMPAC because China was not coming, or that India was sensitive to Chinese concerns, is not true. The reason India was not going to attend was that Red Flag, the big air force exercise to which India had committed, was postponed a year by the United States for budgetary reasons. India was then committed to participate in two massive exercises—RIMPAC and Red Flag—in the same budgetary year without adequate fiscal provision. India eventually lowered its level of participation in Red Flag and maintained participation in RIMPAC, but the media read all kinds of things into this—for example, that India only joined RIMPAC after China decided to join. In regard to the Chinese media, there is the same mirror imaging in the Indian media about Chinese behavior in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Arunachal Pradesh. States do not function on the basis of media reports, and one is better served examining Indian actions, such as the fact that India engages in more exercises with the United States than with the rest of the world combined. Public commentary in India or China does not drive government and armed forces decisions. Indian policymakers do not base decisions regarding Indian engagement with the United States on relations with China—only on calculations of Indian national interest.

### No Link—Indian Opposition

#### There’s internal pushback in India to closer ties with the US

Ajai Shukla, Staff writer for the Business Standard, July 24, 2013, “Biden visit reveals potential and pitfalls of US-India ties,” Business Standard, <http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/biden-visit-reveals-potential-and-pitfalls-of-us-india-ties-113072300895_1.html> (accessed May 27, 2016)

A key part of that encouragement is the Defence Technology Initiative (DTI), co-chaired by US Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, and India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. The DTI is intended to smoothen the flow of US defence technology to India. But Washington has been discouraged by New Delhi’s apparent disinterest, which Indian officials say stems from Defence Minister A K Antony’s ideological and political resistance to deeper ties with the US. Last year, Carter had formally offered Menon the opportunity for Indian defence companies to join hands with US partners in five “co-production projects”, in which US companies would provide the technology and guidance for building five separate weapons in India. These include the Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk naval multi-role helicopter; the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile (less the seeker); the BAE Systems Mark 45 127 mm naval gun; and two other projects. The US had offered that the weaponry built in India would be supplied across the globe. In the year since Carter made the offer, New Delhi has not responded. Neither US Secretary of State John Kerry, who visited New Delhi last month, nor Biden during this visit, have managed to obtain a response. Indian defence ministry (MoD) officials suspect the US offer is motivated by the desire to capture the Indian market for these weapons systems, by getting in through the back door.

### No Link—US/ China Relations

#### India wants the US to have close ties with China so that the US can moderate Chinese behavior. India also wants closer ties with China

[Tanvi Madan](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/madant), Fellow in the [Project on International Order and Strategy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/international-order-strategy) in the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy) program at the Brookings Institution, and director of [The India Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/india), October 2013, “India’s Relations with China: The Good, the Bad and the (Potentially) Ugly,” The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/10/08-india-china-relations-madan> (accessed May 28, 2016)

Another key aspect of India’s approach has been the pursuit of closer relations with the United States. Of course, these ties with the United States are not solely driven by China. India indeed has no desire to make a choice between its relations with China and the United States. However, the United States plays a useful role as an offshore balancer. Furthermore, Indian policymakers believe that a strong U.S.-India relationship gives them leverage with China and sends a signal to that country. Some also note that China takes India more seriously because the United States does. India, however, still has doubts about U.S. reliability as a potential partner, especially given the level of Sino-U.S. engagement, and prefers to maintain a diversified portfolio of partnerships. So, where do India’s relations with China go from here? In the near term, during the Prime Minister’s visit, the two sides [might](http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/beijing-visit-pm-manmohan-singh-india-china-border-defence-cooperation-agreement/1/313420.html) sign a border defense cooperation agreement. The accord would essentially be a way to manage rather than resolve the boundary question, which the Indian foreign secretary has [noted](http://www.indianexpress.com/news/at-media-forum-meet-india-china-agree-to-widen-ties/1170109/) continues to be “a particularly difficult issue.” The trans-border rivers question is also likely to be discussed. In addition, given the two countries’ priorities, bilateral and global economic and financial issues will be high on the agenda. Potentially, there also might be agreements that could facilitate greater people-to-people ties, including a cultural and visa pacts. Regionally, developments vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the Middle East that concern both governments are likely to be discussed. Finally, on the multilateral front, trade and climate change issues might be on the agenda, given upcoming international summits in those two areas.

### Link Turn—US/ China Relations

#### Trilateral US/India/China relations are reinforcing—the plan would cause India to pursue better relations with China and the US

[Lisa Curtis](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/c/lisa-curtis), Focuses on U.S. national security interests and regional geopolitics as senior research fellow on South Asia in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, April 11, 2007, “The Triangular Dynamic in Asia: The U.S., India, and China,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-triangular-dynamic-in-asia-the-us-india-and-china> (accessed May 28, 2016)

Each of the three bilateral relationships (U.S.-India, India-China, and China-U.S.) is mutually reinforcing in that an expansion or improvement in one relationship will likely lead the third country to pursue better relations with the other two. We have already seen this with regard to the impact of improved U.S.-India relations on China's calculations vis-à-visits ties with India. Beijing was caught off guard by the Bush Administration's July 2005 announcement that it would extend civil nuclear cooperation to India and viewed the new U.S. policy as aimed at checking Chinese power in the region. It now seems to believe, however, that its best defense against any possible U.S. attempt to use New Delhi to contain it is through its own pursuit of better relations with India. For its part, India has long valued its strategic autonomy in international affairs and chafes at any assertion that it would play such a role at the behest of the U.S.

### A/T “India Helps US Contain China”

#### India won’t help the US contain China—they’d have to be willing to back us in a war; but they aren’t

Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, March 13, 2015, “Would India go to war with China to help America?,” The Interpreter, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Would-India-go-to-war-with-China-to-help-America.aspx> (accessed May 28, 2016)

In his [latest contribution to our debate](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx), Shashank Joshi raised some excellent points against my sceptical view of the emerging India-US strategic partnership. But I'm still unpersuaded. To explain why, it helps to step back and clarify the question we are debating here. It is not whether strategic relations between Delhi and Washington have grown closer in recent years, because clearly they have. It is what these closer relations mean for the geo-political contest between America and China. India's position is clearly important to this contest. Many Americans, and many of America's friends in Asia, have long believed that India's growing wealth and power will be vital in helping America counterbalance China's growing strategic weight, and resist China's challenge to US regional leadership. Indeed, the belief many people have that India will play this role is central to their confidence that America can and will preserve the status quo against China's challenge. It is therefore important to decide whether the progress we have seen in US-India relations justifies that confidence. I have argued that in a geopolitical contest of the kind we see unfolding between America and China today, India's relations with America will only make a difference to the extent that India is seen to be willing to support America in a US-China conflict. That is because who wins the contest between the American and Chinese visions of Asia's future order ultimately depends on which is seen to be more willing to fight for their vision. Each power wants the other to believe that it will go to war to impose its vision, and hopes that, if all else fails, this will persuade the other to back off.

### 2AC – No link

#### No link- India doesn’t perceive relations as zero sum and has no incentive to abandon the U.S

Subrata Kumar Mitra, Director and Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and Rahul Mukherji, Associate Professor in the South Asian Studies Programme at the NUS and Honorary Senior Fellow at ISAS, December, 2015, “Partnership without Alliance? The Contained Volatility of Indo-US Relations, and a Prognosis,” Institute of South Asian Studies, <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/ISAS%20Working%20Paper%20No.%20217%20-%20Partnership%20without%20Alliance.%20The%20Contained%20Volatility%20of%20%20Indo-US%20Relations.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

It is impossible to conclude a discussion on the nature of India-US relations without reflecting on China. We have noted that India and the US will continue to work closely on maritime security in the India Ocean and perhaps in the South China Sea as well. And, the US, India and Japan are working within a trilateral cooperative framework.28 While this is a cause for concern in China, China respects India because of its capacity to entice the US into a deep cooperative frame. Deep cooperation between India and the US drives Sino-Indian relations as well. China’s commercial engagement with India compares favourably with the United States’ engagement with India; and, its engagement with the US is far deeper than that with India. The positive sum in Indo-US and Sino-US relations should mitigate the chances of driving any one of these countries to an insecure corner in a world of security alliances that often drive trade preferences.

### 2AC – No Link/AT: China Key Factor in Relations

#### No link- India wants cooperation and doesn’t want to be perceived as containing China by freezing them out of relations

Rupakjyoti Borah, currently a research fellow with the Tokyo-based Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, April, 2016, “What of India and China relations?,” Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/india-china-relations-160427112839371.html> (accessed 5/29/16)

On the positive side, India has been cooperating with China in many areas. It was one of the first countries to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Besides, India and China are part of the BRICS, along with Brazil, Russia and South Africa. They have also teamed up at global forums on climate change to resist demands from developed nations to agree to binding emission cuts. China and India, however, fear that agreeing to binding emission cuts would force them to jettison their ambitious growth targets. It is also clear that New Delhi is loath to take on Beijing directly. This is seen in the recent case of India cancelling the visa issued earlier to a Uighur activist, Dolkun Isa, the Executive Committee Chairman of the World Uyghur Congress to attend a conference in India.

#### Increased engagement with China means there’s no incentive for Chinese containment- disproves the link

Mohammad Samir Hussain, 2012, “Research Associate at Yashwantrao Chavan National Center of International Security and Defence Analysis (YC-NISDA) University of Pune, Maharashtra,” Journal of Political Studies, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/India-US%20relations-winter2012.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

This section would like to highlight what the American officials had to say vis- à-vis containment of China. Many American officials are not in favor of containing China, instead they have suggested for more engagement with China, given the role that China would play in the twenty-first century. Also the international community demanded close cooperation between U.S. and China rather than confrontationist relations for the betterment of international peace and security. U.S. would need China’s help in meeting the twenty-first century challenges. As Mr. William Overholt had commented that, “these two great civilizations must now engage each other-for better or for worse-to a degree that has never before occurred’, since ‘much of the future of humanity will hinge on whether both sides can approach this engagements with appropriate gravity and earnest efforts to understand one another’s real motives’ Former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Mr. William Perry had concisely summed up China’s growing presence as one where ‘China is fast becoming the world’s largest economic power and that combined with its UN permanent five states, its political clout, its nuclear weapons and a modernizing military, make China a player with which the U.S. must work together’. This is followed by the statement of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of defence, Mr. Nye’s who had argued for ‘deep engagement’ with China where ‘it is wrong to portray China as an enemy. Nor is there reason to believe that China must be an enemy in the future….enmity would become self-fulfilling prophecy’. This view was again supported by Chief, Secretary of Defence Mr. William Perry when he said that containment was the wrong option, alienating China and damaging America’s own security interests. Instead, the U.S. should engage China, not contain it…..we believe that engagement is the best strategy to ensure that as China increases its power, it does so as a responsible member of the international community’.

### 2AC – Link Turn

\*Do **NOT** read if also reading the impact turn strategy\*

(Insert Uniqueness)

#### Strengthening ties with China avoids a clash of interests and deepens U.S.-India relations

Bruce Jones, Acting Vice President & Director, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 2013, “Non-Aligned, or Natural Allies?: Modi and the Challenge of Great Power Relations,” Brookings India, <http://www.brookings.in/in-focus/non-aligned-or-natural-allies-modi-and-the-challenge-of-great-power-relations/> (accessed 5/29/16)

Modi clearly sees that the India-China relationship is not likely to move off its long-established pattern of what former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon calls “duality” — deepening economic cooperation not necessarily leading to lessening strategic tension. So while closer ties with the United States might irritate China, it would not change the fundamentals and might bring benefits in the wider Asian balance. What’s more, Modi has been able to deepen the relationship with Washington without sundering India’s long-standing ties with Moscow. So far so good. There’s nothing officially contradictory about having a “natural alliance” with Washington and maintaining a ‘non-aligned’ stance more generally with the full suite of major powers; natural allies are not treaty allies. As long as great power relations remain moderately stable, India won’t be squeezed between these two views. But what will happen if wider relationships deteriorate—as they seem set to do. What happens if U.S.-China tensions over maritime boundaries and naval tactics escalate? India is far from neutral on the issues over which China and America will tangle. What happens if Russia and the United States/Europe escalate tensions on Russia’s western border? India doesn’t have to get drawn into that set of issues operationally, but Washington can at times be pretty intolerant of its friends remaining neutral when core issues are at stake. And what will Washington do if its ‘natural ally’ comes under greater pressure, for example along the India-China border? Will Washington actually prioritize the impact on India over its Afghanistan and Pakistan policy? For now, there’s no tension for India between great power speed-dating and a deeper relationship with the United States. But as events unfold, the tensions are sure to grow. And if the United States wants the India relationship to deepen, it’s going to have to be prepared to make some hard choices.

### 2AC – Alt Causes

#### Alt causes thump the link- arms sales, economic ties, Northeast Asian relations

Stephen Biegun, 2010, ““U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue” The Opportunities and Risks of Met and Unmet Expectations in U.SS.-India Defense Cooperation,” Aspen Strategy Group, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/ASG_Biegun_Opportunities_Risks.pdf> (accessed 5/26/16)

As was the case over the past fifteen years, the U.S.-Indian defense relationship will see an occasional bump along the way. Despite reassurances from the U.S. government and defense companies, the Indian government remains suspicious as to the willingness of the United States to permit unimpeded access to arms sales. The U.S. government, and specifically the U.S. Congress, 3 has placed restrictions on arms sales on numerous occasions to express U.S. opposition to, and influence, policy decisions by other countries. Many in the Indian defense establishment worry that, once they are on the hook, the United States will gain increased leverage over India's national security decisions. With the rapidly approaching Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to be held in the Spring of 2010, the Executive and Congressional Branches in the U.S. have signaled a push to ratify the languishing Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In order to come into force, and in order to be meaningful, many consider India's membership in the NPT and the CTBT as nonnegotiable. To state the obvious, India is likely to have zero interest in a permanent, zero yield nuclear test ban. Hence, some calls in the U.S. Congress can be expected for the use of diplomatic, defense and nuclear cooperation-related leverage to influence the Indian government's position on the Treaty. Both the United States and India see Afghanistan as a major defense concern, with obvious connections to the instability in neighboring Pakistan. In order to defeat the Afghan insurgency and bring stability to the sub-continent, there is and will remain a temptation by some in the United States to seek a lasting regional solution that involves discussion of all outstanding regional disputes—a non-starter in New Delhi. As for U.S.-Indian defense cooperation in the broader continent of Asia, efforts to shape India's defense orientation toward the established U.S. allies in the region—South Korea, Japan, and Australia—could quickly push India well past its historic comfort zone of non-alignment and neutrality. Likewise, both India and the three U.S.-allies in Asia are likely to place a higher emphasis on developing their own economic, diplomatic and defense relationships with China rather than with each other. And, to the extent that any of the aforementioned perceive that they are being molded into a regional counterweight to hedge against China, some U.S. policy makers are likely to see their aims frustrated. Finally, U.S.-Indian defense cooperation will likely be tested by the level of defense cooperation by the two nations with third parties such as Pakistan, Iran, Russia and others. As the U.S.-Indian relationship deepens, both sides will likely seek a greater insight and a greater say in the considerations that guide these decisions—considerations that could quite possibly expose the fact that, despite the deepening cooperation, the two nations' interests also diverge in significant ways.

#### Alt causes to relationship decline- climate change, trade, IP

Asit Ranjan Mishra, March, 2016, “Are India-US trade relations again on a downward spiral?,” Live Mint, <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/lHJutBYfHRDYce6okY10YL/Are-IndiaUS-trade-relations-again-on-a-downward-spiral.html> (accessed 5/29/16)

New Delhi: US President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi will meet on Thursday on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. They will for sure exchange pleasantries and even the latter’s trademark bear hug but there is no doubt that the two nations are now increasingly engaged in what even government officials in New Delhi have started to acknowledge is a “trade war”. It does not mean the two sides have become adversaries as both India and the US consider each other strategic partners. But the two countries have bitterly fought over bilateral and multilateral foras on issues of trade, climate change and intellectual property rights during the tenure of the previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Things had gone so bad that in April 2014, outgoing US ambassador to India Nancy Powell in one of her last speeches urged both sides to convene a “Track 1.5 event” in the first 100 days of the new Indian government’s inauguration to resolve contentious bilateral issues and help realise the full potential of their trading relationship. In a “track 1.5 event”, both official and non-official players work on resolving conflicts.

## A/T Impact

### Impact Inevitable—China/ Indian Conflict

#### India/China conflict inevitable because China’s global rise—no impact UQ

Shivshankar Menon, Distinguished fellow in the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) program at Brookings. Menon served as national security advisor to the Indian Prime Minister and foreign secretary. He currently serves as chairman of the advisory board of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi, March 4, 2016, “What China’s rise means for India,” The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/04-india-china-relations-menon>, (accessed May 26, 2016)

Absent drastic modifications in Chinese or U.S. behavior—which I consider unlikely—the rise of China promises an extended period of political and security instability in Asia and the Pacific. There will be no quick recovery for the world economy, and security competition between the United States and China will remain the principal contradiction, as Mao would have said. The assertive China that we have seen since 2008 is here to stay for the foreseeable future. Security dilemmas between China and Japan; China and India; China and Vietnam; and others will intensify. In other words, the environment in which India pursues its interests will get more complex. And the very complexity of the situation in the Asia-Pacific gives India a choice of partners and collaborators to work with in the pursuit of its interests. An assertive China is unlikely to seek an early settlement of the ongoing border dispute with India. Fifty years of stability on the border suggests that give and take on the status quo is most logical. But China’s other interests—its relationship with Pakistan, suspicions about Tibet, and desire to maintain levers in the relationship with India—suggest that a border settlement is not a Chinese priority at present. (Nor, for that matter, does it seem to be a priority of the present government in New Delhi.) China’s other priorities—religious extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang, overland access to the Indian Ocean, keeping India in check, a window on Western arms technology, the Chinese commitment and presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—have made Pakistan even more crucial to China’s purposes. Pakistan’s game is to suck India into confrontation, thus establishing Pakistan’s utility to those who feel the need to balance India’s rise (including China, the United States, and others). Today, Russia sells arms to Pakistan, the United States supplies arms and discusses Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and Afghanistan’s future with it, and China has committed $46 billion to an economic corridor and Gwadar in Pakistan. Each of these represents an increased commitment to Pakistan which is an order of magnitude bigger than ever before. India asks the West to refrain from supporting Pakistan, but countries will act according to their own interests. So long as Pakistani terrorism is not a threat to them, they will not expend blood or treasure eliminating Pakistan origin terrorism for India. China, meanwhile, remains dependent on the Indian Ocean and has suspicions about India-U.S. defense cooperation and strategic coordination. Taken together, all these factors make it likely that China will keep the border issue alive as a lever in its relationship with India. Nevertheless, the overall salience of the border in the relationship has diminished considerably, now that the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and subsequent confidence-building measures have stabilized the status quo.

### No Impact—Empirically Denied

#### Empirically denied—US/India relations have been trashed before with no impact

Seema Sirohi, Columnist and foreign policy writer, January 3, 2014, “Indo-US relations: A big chill descends,” Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/indo-us-relations-big-chill-descends-2014135227564694.html> (accessed May 27, 2016)

The Barack Obama administration seems to be losing the plot on India. Otherwise why would it burn [India-US relations](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/rocks-india-us-relations-2013121861945137419.html) over a nanny’s wages? But that in a nutshell is the current state of play. It threatens to destroy years of hard work behind this important relationship, one that was meant to reconfigure the geopolitics of Asia. The unexpected and entirely avoidable crisis was triggered by the humiliating [treatment of an Indian diplomat](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/india-us-row-escalates-over-diplomat-arrest-2013121764919464935.html) at the hands of the US law enforcement officers. It provoked massive outrage in New Delhi but Washington doesn’t understand why. The American surprise and bafflement at the extent of the Indian anger shows a curious lack of political insight. It also shows a failure to understand the basic governing principles of good relations. The public arrest and [strip-search of Devyani Khobragade](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/12/india-us-row-what-happened-when-2013122053428986490.html), India’s deputy consul general in New York, on December 12 last year has the Indian establishment fuming. And for good reason. A diplomat embodies the sovereignty of a country and must be treated with dignity. More so because the US diplomats in India and other countries enjoy benefits far in excess of what they grant in return. But their complete disregard for diplomatic conventions, norms and courtesies in Khobragade’s case has put a knife through bilateral relations. They have ensured that 2014 will be spent mostly fixing what should never have been broken.

### No Impact—US/Indian Relations Resilient

#### Indian/US relations are resilient—too much mutual shared interest

Arun K. Singh, Indian diplomat and current Indian Ambassador to the United States, March 26, 2016, “Ambassador Arun K Singh's Address at 20th Wharton India Economic Forum on "Evolving India-U.S. Relations" on March 26, 2016,” Indian Embassy, <https://www.indianembassy.org/press_detail.php?nid=2352> (accessed May 26, 2016)

A few years ago, President Obama characterized the India-U.S. relationship as a 'defining partnership of the 21st Century'. Prime Minister Modi has termed our partnership as a 'natural alliance'. Our strategic convergence and the global importance of this convergence are captured in our diplomatic moniker: a Global Strategic Partnership. Our partnership did not always appear so destined. Indeed, just three decades ago, such an alignment of interests between the two countries – located in two entirely different parts of the world, with little commercial or cultural interaction and divided by the politics of the Cold War --- was simply unthinkable. This makes the transformation of the India-U.S. relations in the last three decades so fascinating. Relations between nations obviously evolve on the basis of common characteristics, common values and common interests. I would, therefore, identify first those fundamental attributes between our nations that have made it worthy of mutual investment. Then, I will trace the trajectory of the effort over several decades to underline the importance of nurturing this continuously and with sensitivity. Finally, I will recount to you a few products of this partnership to show the promises it holds for the future of the world, and not only for our two countries. India and the U.S. are often referred to as the world's largest and oldest democracies respectively. What further distinguishes our two democracies is our unique position as multi-cultural and pluralistic societies. U.S. has been described as a melting pot of diverse races and ethnicities. India in its thousands of years of civilization has thrived by fully embracing diversity.

### No Impact—US/Indian Relations Resilient

#### Indian/US relations have become resilient—years of diplomatic work

M.K. Narayanan, Former National Security Adviser and former Governor of West Bengal, April 16, 2016, “All about the Obama Doctrine,” The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indias-foreign-policy-all-about-the-obama-doctrine/article8480472.ece> (accessed May 27, 2016)

The first decade and a half of the 21st century has witnessed a fundamental change in [India-U.S. relations](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/indous-relations-high-priority-regardless-of-poll-results-envoy/article8142107.ece) unparalleled in the history of the two democracies. President Bill Clinton demonstrated a tilt towards India during his second term, and subsequently the George Bush presidency brought about a transformational shift in the relationship. Relations have been on an upswing ever since, with the Obama presidency proceeding on the same course. Discerning observers nevertheless see subtle differences in the approach of the Bush and Obama presidencies. Both Presidents have been warm towards India and appreciative of India’s democratic credentials. President Bush, early in his second term, dispelled any notions that the decision to reach out to India had a hidden subtext, viz. strengthening India to function as a counterweight to China. President Barack Obama has been more circumspect, as his world view includes a more accommodative attitude towards China. The difference, according to strategic analysts, lies in their approach. Mr. Bush acted more on the basis of his instincts — an outstanding example being the manner in which he went out of his way to ensure the successful conclusion of the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal without seeking any quid pro quo. Analysts argue that Mr. Obama is more a practitioner of realpolitik and tends to see most issues through this prism.

### No Impact—US/Indian Relations Resilient

#### US/ India relations are resilient because there are fundamental points of mutual interest and strategic cooperation

Ashley J. Tellis, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, February 17, 2014, “India-U.S. Relations: ‘The Rupture is Certainly Real and Quite Tragic’,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/17/india-u.s.-relations-rupture-is-certainly-real-and-quite-tragic> (accessed May 28, 2016)

How deep is the U.S.-India rupture? Can it be healed in the near term? The rupture is certainly real and quite tragic. Unlike problems arising from policy differences, which can be negotiated and resolved somewhat dispassionately, the Khobragade affair has left bruised personal feelings on both sides. We often assume that diplomats are moved solely by concerns about the national interest. But, in truth, how they are treated makes a difference to the enthusiasm they muster in carrying out their duties. Both sides are obviously trying to put the incident behind them, but it will take time. And the repair is not helped by the fact that both countries are terribly inward looking at this point in time. Have you ever seen such a major diplomatic spat? Lest we forget, there was a very difficult moment in the bilateral partnership after India's 1998 nuclear tests. The U.S. then had imposed sanctions on India and the mood was dominated by great acrimony, at the highest levels in Washington, towards New Delhi's actions. The big difference between the 1998 crisis and the present dispute is that the former was provoked entirely by policy differences. In contrast, the latter implicates diplomatic niceties, the intersection of privileges and immunities with U.S. domestic law, and so on. What troubled me most was the fact that this crisis became more intense than was justified by the nature of the dispute. There were obviously failures of process on both sides leading up to the point of Dr. Khobragade's arrest -- a point that seems to be forgotten in India, where the hostile commentary seems to treat this matter as simply a product of U.S. maliciousness. But the intensity of the Indian bureaucratic grievances and the manner in which the younger cohort in the Indian Foreign Service were able to drive New Delhi's policy response to this problem -- as if India's national interest did not matter -- was simply startling to me and, if you permit me to say it, rather dangerous. Never before have I seen a diplomatic crisis in U.S.-Indian relations, or for that matter a crisis involving India and any other country, driven by bureaucratic trade unionism, where the political leadership was simply missing in action. Can the U.S.-India strategic partnership ever go back to the way things were? I believe there will be a slow return to equilibrium, because the fundamental imperatives that drove the transformation of the bilateral relationship have not changed.

### No Impact—US/ India Relations Not Effective

#### The effect of US/ India relations are limited by structural barriers—lack of economic reform and political differences over major issues

[Lisa Curtis](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/c/lisa-curtis), Focuses on U.S. national security interests and regional geopolitics as senior research fellow on South Asia in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, August 20, 2012, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.–India Relationship,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/going-the-extra-mile-for-a-strategic-us-india-relationship> (accessed May 28, 2016)

While the U.S. and India have developed multifaceted ties over the last decade, the overall relationship has recently been challenged: India bought advanced fighter jets from France, not from the U.S.; the Indian parliament virtually shut out U.S. companies from India’s civil nuclear industry; the Singh government delayed economic reforms that would give foreign companies greater access to the Indian market; and many Indians remain suspicious of the Obama Administration’s plans for the Asia–Pacific. Nevertheless, the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China, and India’s and America’s shared democratic values, will drive the two countries to increase cooperation. India and the U.S. should accept that the partnership will not always meet their expectations, and must demonstrate a willingness to collaborate on issues of core importance to the other. Several differences between the U.S. and India have arisen over the past two years. While none of the issues on its own would be a major cause of concern, when taken together, the irritants have cast doubt on India’s value as a strategic partner for the U.S. The most recent source of tension in the relationship has been India’s reluctance to impose oil sanctions against Iran. Washington was also disappointed by India’s decision last year to buy French (rather than American) aircraft to fill an $11 billion order for advanced fighters, as well as by the Indian parliament’s passage of legislation in August 2010 that virtually shuts U.S. companies out of India’s civil nuclear industry. The Singh government’s unwillingness to implement needed economic reforms has also led to disappointment among potential U.S. investors and undermined prospects for India’s future economic growth. The government’s quick reneging on the opening of the multi-brand retail sector and its efforts to retroactively tax telecommunications giant Vodafone billions of dollars for its entry into the Indian market in 2007 are the latest indications that India’s foreign investment climate is becoming increasingly inhospitable. Despite the steady upswing in ties between the two nations over the past decade, it is not surprising that they eventually hit some roadblocks, given the concerns of domestic constituencies in each country. Still, the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China, the two countries’ shared democratic values, and their mutual need to confront terrorism in South Asia should encourage them to redouble efforts to increase cooperation.

### No Impact—US/ India Relations Limited

#### The benefits of US/ India relations are exaggerated—the relationship is limited

[Sunjoy Joshi](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/nonstaff/j/sunjoy-joshi) et al., [C. Raja Mohan](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/nonstaff/m/c-raja-mohan), [Vikram Sood](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/nonstaff/s/vikram-sood), Staff writers for the Heritage Foundation, [Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D.](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/nonstaff/r/rajeswari-pillai-rajagopalan), [James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/c/james-carafano) and Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, [Walter Lohman](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/l/walter-lohman), Director, Asian Studies Center Asian Studies Center, [Lisa Curtis](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/c/lisa-curtis), Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center, and [Derek Scissors, Ph.D.](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/s/derek-scissors) and Senior Research Fellow Asian Studies Center, April 26, 2013, “Beyond the Plateau in U.S. – India Relations,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations> (accessed May 28, 2016)

Finally, there has undoubtedly been some exaggeration of the possibilities in the bilateral relationship. In both of these large democracies, making the case for a fundamental change in the structure and direction of bilateral relations in the face of considerable skepticism arguably raised expectations that could not be met. Realists on both sides, however, know that India was never going to be an Australia or Japan to the United States. Instead of an approximation of a traditional alliance relationship founded on presumed common geostrategy, New Delhi and Washington should focus on pragmatic cooperation on the basis of the intersection of their narrower respective interests.

### No Impact—US/ India Relations Limited

#### Structural differences in opinion on key issues will keep the US/ India relationship limited

Sourabh Gupta, Senior research associate at Samuels International Associates Inc, July 30, 2011, “The Limits to US-India Defence Ties,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/the-limits-to-us-india-defence-ties/> (accessed March 28, 2016)

Much has been written over the past decade about the promise of a transformed US-India strategic relationship, both globally and in Asia. From safeguarding the global commons and promoting the spread of democratic values, to preventing the domination of Asia by a single power, this partnership of ‘natural’ allies has been deemed indispensable for stability and prosperity in the 21st century. There has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been much less written about the limits to such cooperation. Yet with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton having [passed through New Delhi last week](http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/07/22/clintons-southern-india-sojourn/) following the second round of the annual [US-India Strategic Dialogue](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168736.htm)—one of only a half-dozen such dialogues that the United States has—these limits appear to be kicking in, and forcefully. In late April, despite personal lobbying by US President Barack Obama, New Delhi [eliminated](http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/06/15/indias-fighter-fetish/) the top two US contenders from its shortlist of suppliers for the India Air Force’s fourth generation of advanced combat aircraft. With New Delhi’s preliminary design contract for co-development of a fifth-generation fighter [recently signed](http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article967916.ece) with Moscow, the window for US-India collaboration here appears to have closed. In the same month, New Delhi also signalled its disinclination to upgrade the strategic dialogue to a joint 2+2 (foreign + defence ministers) format, as the United States has with Tokyo, in turn leading to postponement of the Strategic Dialogue. Attempts in May to revive the issue were met with firm objections, leaving the format stillborn. Near-term disappointments aside, though, it’s the underlying differences in New Delhi’s strategic goals that have been the key obstacle to deepening the US-India defence relationship.

### No Impact—US/ India Relations Limited

#### US/ India cooperation will inevitably plateau, the disad exaggerates the value of relations

[Premvir Das](http://www.business-standard.com/author/search/keyword/premvir-das), Former Director General, Defence Planning Staff at Business Standard, February 6, 2016, “Premvir Das: Military cooperation with the US has its limits,” Business Standard, <http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/military-cooperation-with-the-us-has-its-limits-116020601230_1.html> (accessed may 28, 2016)

There has been much talk in recent years of the flourishing [defence cooperation](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Defence+Cooperation) between India and the USA and future possibilities. Examples of the undoubtedly professional Malabar series of exercises at sea, as also of similar interfaces among the two armies and air forces, are quoted in support of the growing engagement, as well as the purchase of military hardware from [American companies](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=American+Companies) now crossing $9 billion. That this has come about through a larger strategic congruence between the two countries is also a given. Add to this the increasingly close interaction in exchange of intelligence relating to terrorism, which is not unrelated to security, and the picture gets bigger. Two visits of the American president to New Delhi in as many years and his bilateral exchanges with our own prime minister in Washington add to this synergy. Positive interactions at Track II levels have further facilitated this process, and the sky would appear to be the limit. Wisdom, however, lies in recognising the ground realities. Only two decades ago, our military interface with the [US](http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Us) was in the pits, literally. Even after the tensions of the Cold War began to recede and India started to see the world and its interests in it through a different prism, suspicions on both sides remained high. In 1995, the two countries signed what was termed a Minute on Defence Cooperation. Then came India's nuclear tests in 1998 and things went back to zero as the US imposed stiff sanctions on this country. From then until now, steady progress has been made in the relationship and defence has been an important driver. Acquisition of sophisticated aircraft for the navy and the air force that provide strategic reach has led the purchase segment even as exercises at sea have given a visible public face to the military engagement. However, the two, while advantageous to both sides in different ways, must, sooner or later, plateau and that may well be happening even now for reasons that are not difficult to understand.

### US/India Relations Bad—Can’t Be Trusted

#### At best, US/India relations are limited, at worst, India will side with China against the US

Crispin Rovere, Member of the ACT ALP International Affairs Policy Committee. Formerly he was a PhD candidate at the ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) and previously worked in Secretariat of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and published on nuclear policy, March 16, 2015, “India is no ally of the US,” The Interpreter, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/16/India-is-no-ally-of-the-US.aspx> (accessed May 27, 2016)

In the continuing debate between [Hugh White](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/13/Would-India-go-to-war-with-China-to-help-America.aspx) and [Shaskank Joshi](http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx?COLLCC=3024890782&) regarding US-India strategic cooperation, I would associate myself closely with the views of White and what he sees as the eventual limits of the relationship. But I would take it one step further. In the long-term, an anti-US coalition consisting of China, Russia and India cannot be discounted. India presently fears China's growing power. Accordingly, India hedges by deepening relations with the US and status quo middle powers such as Australia. However, India does not perceive itself as a status quo power, but as an emerging great power. As India's confidence grows it will be acting in its own interests, not those of the collective West. Of course there are clear areas of strategic tension in the bilateral China-India relationship. These include unresolved border disputes, China's patronage of Pakistan and China's growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region. But these issues are being managed between the parties and may well be resolved, probably in that order, over the next 10 to 20 years. It is very hard to see a similar outcome between China and the US. Last September, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi said they would '[seek an early settlement to the boundary question](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-19/news/54109084_1_boundary-issue-boundary-question-border-areas),' with both countries subsequently appointing new envoys to help manage the dispute. [Despite a recent setback](http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-fumes-over-modi-s-arunachal-visit-summons-indian-envoy/article1-1319335.aspx), negotiations [continue](http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/border-dispute-with-india-contained-says-china-likens-negotiations-to-climbing-a-mountain-744996), and there is no reason to believe they will not ultimately succeed. After all, China has settled its land border with 12 of the 14 countries on its periphery, sitting in stark contrast with increasing Chinese maritime assertiveness in the East and South China seas. As for Pakistan, India's view of China's patronage is complicated. India holds grievances over such issues as [China's support](http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/) for Pakistan's nuclear program, yet it is dangerous for India if Pakistan feels overly threatened. Making Pakistan feel secure is extremely challenging, especially as India's power grows. Thus a transparent Chinese role in Pakistani affairs is in India's long-term interest – transparency that will depend highly on India improving bilateral relations with China. Finally, China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean is another major concern for India; an expansion due mainly to China's dependency on energy imports from the Middle East. The long-term trajectory of this issue depends on a combination of China reducing its reliance on sea-borne oil imports, and on the improving strength and assertiveness of India. As China has no maritime claims in the Indian Ocean, maritime tension will likely be a consequence of fissures in the broader relationship, not a cause. As for India and the US, I find it astonishing that after more than 50 years of being repeatedly burned, some Americans still have not learned their lesson (though many have), and continue insisting that China and India are 'natural competitors'. This is false. China and India are historical competitors, but such competition is not necessarily 'natural' and certainly nothing like the strategic competition that exists between China and the US. After all, any Chinese expansion in the Western Pacific will be at America's expense. It is hard to argue that India's expansion into the Indian Ocean is being actively resisted by China. India is not a pro-Western democratic bulwark, and never will be.

### US-India Relations Bad – NPT

#### US-India partnership damages the NPT- double standards

Subrata Ghoshroy, research affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program, February 16, 2016, “Taking Stock: The US-India Nuclear Deal 10 Years Later,” <http://thebulletin.org/taking-stock-us-india-nuclear-deal-10-years-later9165> (Accessed 5/28/2016)

First, the US-India partnership has done serious damage to the NPT, perpetuating double standards in regard to nuclear power and further weakening the possibility of universalizing the treaty. With India now an accepted member of the nuclear club, there is no chance of India giving up its weapons—and so it will not be able to join the NPT with its existing formulation. The same goes for Pakistan. It has indeed lobbied for a similar deal and recent press reports indicated that the United States offered perhaps a lighter version of the India deal to Pakistan. Israel has also indirectly hinted at dropping its so-called “nuclear ambiguity” and entering into a similar arrangement. There is little or no chance for a favorable response from the United States on this issue, given that the NPT member countries have demanded that the United States not block a serious discussion on a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East that would include Israel and Iran. But the Pakistan nuclear situation remains unsettled, and a challenge to the nonproliferation regime. During a White House meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the fall of 2015, President Obama reportedly turned down Sharif’s request for the same deal as India. Instead, the United States apparently offered to ease the Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on Pakistan by giving it a waiver, so that Pakistan could import nuclear technology and perhaps reactors for its desperate power sector. In the meantime, Pakistan is reportedly building up its nuclear arsenal, including smaller tactical weapons that can be used in the battlefield. Yet, just focusing on Pakistan’s non-proliferation past is short-sighted for US-Pakistan relations and also for peace in South Asia.

### US/ India Relations Bad—False Ally

#### US/ India relations create the false perception that India would aid the US in a war against China

[Hugh White](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/hugh-white), Professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, March 13, 2015, “Sorry, America: India Won't Go to War with China,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sorry-america-india-wont-go-war-china-12415> (accessed May 28, 2016)

As I read him, Shashank makes two key points about this question. One is that, while India might not be willing to send combat forces to fight alongside America's in a coalition against China, it would provide other, non-combat support such as basing and refuelling facilities. That sounds like what the diplomats call “all support short of actual help.” It would do very little either practically or symbolically to bolster America's position against China, and certainly much less than American boosters of the relationship expect. His second key point is that perhaps India would be willing to provide America with more substantial support if it saw really fundamental issues of regional order at stake in a U.S.-China conflict. He cites the example of the wide support given to America in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by countries who saw basic questions of international order being tested there. I agree with Shashank that very important issues for India would be at stake in a U.S.-China clash. But deciding to support America against China would be much harder than joining the coalition against Iraq. In every way China is both a much more valuable partner and a much more dangerous adversary. The key question for India, and for America's other friends in Asia, is what would have to be at stake for them to make that decision? So it boils down to this: would India go to war with China to help America preserve the current order based on U.S. primacy? If the answer is no, then I don't think the new warmth between America and India matters much to the future of Asia, and America's position in Asia is rather weaker than most people assume.

### US/ India Relations Bad—Policy Conflicts

#### US/ India relations cause conflicts over Afghanistan policy and US power projection in Asia

David J. Karl, President of the Asia Strategy Initiative, a political and economic consultancy. He was project director of the Task Force on Enhancing India-U.S. Cooperation in the Global Innovation Economy, sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry and the Pacific Council on International Policy, February 09, 2012, “U.S.-India Ties: Pivot Problems,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/u-s-india-ties-pivot-problems/> (accessed May 28, 2016)

Washington and New Delhi hold regular consultations on East Asia policy, and a [trilateral U.S.-India-Japan security dialogue](http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/12/01/avoiding-u-s-india-drift/) was launched recently. A revival of quadrilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia that briefly flowered in 2006-07 also appears likely. The expansion of Chinese power and aspiration will undoubtedly push New Delhi to align closer with the United States, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many Americans would like. Pushing in the other direction is the adverse effect on Indian security concerns caused by U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan. Key differences are bound to emerge between the United States and India regarding the political endgame. Looking to the exits, Washington won’t be overly concerned with the exact details of the makeup of Afghanistan or the viability of the government in Kabul. New Delhi, which has invested heavily in Hamid Karzai’s government, will be all too focused on how the strategic terrain is shifting to its detriment. India has strong security interests in ensuring that any government in Kabul can be a bulwark against Pakistan, as well as a gateway to trade and energy links in Central Asia. Both goals would be undermined if Islamabad achieved a central role in shaping a political settlement or if a Taliban-influenced regime were to come to power. One wonders how committed Washington will be to the current regime’s survival or the protection of Indian equities in an accommodation with the Taliban. This is all the more so as U.S. staying power is visibly waning. The security situation is likely to deteriorate as the military withdrawals that Obama announced last summer take hold and as remaining U.S. forces shift from direct combat operations to a back-stop role. A newly-minted National Intelligence Estimate reportedly is filled with pessimism about Afghanistan’s prospects. [Obama has promised to help Afghanistan](http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-22/politics/obama.afghanistan.transcript_1_al-qaeda-network-bin-afghanistan/3?_s=PM:POLITICS) “move from an economy shaped by war to one that can sustain a lasting peace.” Yet reports by the World Bank and the IMF underscore how formidable a challenge that will be. A recent report by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers concluded that U.S. nation-building efforts have largely failed, and warned that with Afghanistan so reliant upon foreign military and development spending it could slide into an economic depression as this funding decreases. Meanwhile, [the transformation of U.S.-Pakistan relations](http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/27/the-endless-pakistan-tragedy/), from the past decade’s broad if dysfunctional security partnership to a more circumscribed, largely transactional arrangement will accelerate U.S. disengagement. Islamabad will be even more stinting in deploying its influence with the Taliban and other militant groups to benefit U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, while the higher transit fees likely to be charged on U.S. military supplies moving through Pakistan will further dampen the Obama administration’s fortitude in Afghanistan. As the U.S. winds down its involvement, unpalatable circumstances await New Delhi’s policymakers. As a result, India will seek to move closer to Iran, whose interests in Afghanistan are roughly congruent. Both countries may even revive the cooperation that during the 1990s provided critical support to non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. (Already reports are surfacing that the old Northern Alliance may be reconstituting.) The U.S. will grumble about cozying up with Iran, but the geopolitical logic of the U.S. withdrawal leaves New Delhi little choice. The interplay of two conflicting dynamics in U.S.-India relations – growing strategic cooperation in East Asia and unfolding differences over the future of Afghanistan – will be a key factor to watch for in the years ahead.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

\*\*Do **Not** read if also reading link turn\*\*

#### U.S-India relations are bad- creates window for Indo-Pak war

Muhammad Faisal, May, 2016, “India-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Causing Regional Instability?,” South Asian Voices, <http://southasianvoices.org/india-u-s-defense-cooperation-causing-regional-instability/> (accessed 5/29/16)

Secretary Carter set the stage for his visit to India by speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific, and its strategic partnership with India. Answering a question on how deepening engagement with India will impact the Pakistan-United States relationship, Secretary Carter asserted that while both India and Pakistan are “respected partners and friends”, the United States has “much more to do with India today”, sharing a “whole global agenda”, while Pakistan remains an important security partner on issues related to Afghanistan and terrorism. This reflects the current view of South Asia in Washington. U.S. policymakers look at Pakistan as a crucial stakeholder in South and Central Asian regional security. But when it comes to wider Asia (East Asia and the Pacific), Pakistan is considered a peripheral country. Meanwhile, over the past decade, India has emerged as an actor that can operate beyond South Asia, into the Indo-Pacific region. The United States considers India as a possible counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific region. Pakistan, on the contrary, has historically had a competitive and tense relationship with India, and a cooperative political and strategic partnership with China. These historical trajectories and geographical linkages continue to shape Pakistan’s regional security calculus. As India and the United States conclude and operationalize the LEMOA, Pakistan’s security concerns will be heightened. This is because India will be able to access facilities on U.S. aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean region, the Gulf, and other U.S. bases in the region, enhancing operational capabilities of the Indian navy. Indian patrols along the coastline of Pakistan are expected to increase significantly. As Gwadar port, a crucial node of the CPEC, becomes operational, Pakistan will seek anti-access/area denial capabilities. The Arabian Sea will emerge as an active front of Indo-Pak competition. Moreover, the Chinese navy could also increase its patrols in the Indian Ocean region, which will intensify Indian fears.

#### Indo-Pak escalates to nuclear capacity

Daniel S. Geller, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, 2005, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99 (accessed 5/29/16)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons

### 2AC – AT: Impact – Relations Generic

#### Plan won’t break relations, and India doesn’t have incentives for initiating conflict

#### No internal link to the impact- India doesn’t want to be perceived as getting too close to the U.S

S. Amer Latif, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December, 2012, “U.S.-India Military Engagement steady as they go,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (accessed 5/29/16)

For India, military engagement with the United States presents both opportunity and risk. New Delhi will welcome closer engagement with Washington if it will cause Beijing to fret about the nature and direction of U.S.-India defense ties. While the Indian military welcomes closer relations, the civilian officials overseeing security policy are reluctant to take strategic signaling too far. Indian dealings with China are carefully calibrated on a case-by-case basis to ensure that India’s position is communicated without eliciting undue Chinese objections to its activities. After the September 2007 Malabar exercise, Beijing lodged a formal protest against the five countries involved in the exercise due to its perception that an anti-China coalition was taking shape.9 India has been sensitive to these sentiments and has typically eschewed large multilateral exercises in which the United States, India, and other Asian powers (except China) are present.

### 2AC – AT: Impact – Democracy

#### No universal transition to democracy because U.S. and India’s systems are fundamentally different

Vivek S. Sharma teaches at Pitzer College in Claremont, CA, October, 2015, “The Myth of a Liberal India,” National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-myth-liberal-india-14103?page=3> (accessed 5/29/16)

As the American relationship with India deepens, U.S. policy makers and observers will have to accept that India is not now and has never been a liberal democracy. It is, instead, a communalist democracy that features various groups competing for rank, status and privilege in relationship to the state. The position of religious minorities is and will likely remain insecure. The public culture of the Indian state is unmistakably Hindu. Christian missionaries (especially foreign ones) are, as matter of state policy, discouraged. And Muslims remain and will likely continue to remain a vulnerable, disadvantaged group who expect relatively little from an Indian government formed by either by the Hindu right or the ostensibly “secular” parties of the center and the left. In this respect, the current upswing in the electoral fortunes of the Hindu right is likely to make little substantive difference for India’s domestic arrangements.

#### New democracies go to war, Pakistan proves

Paul F. Diehl, Professor of Political Science and Global Studies and Director of Undergraduate Research at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Chair of Political Science Dept. at the University of Iowa, July, 2012, “Caution in what you wish for: the consequences of a right to democracy,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol:48 Iss:2, p289, July, 2012, Academic One file (accessed 5/28/16)

Second, leaders in fledgling democratic regimes may have stronger incentives to use force to secure their tenure in office than their peers in older, more consolidated democratic states. Leaders in democratizing regimes rely on a small group of elites for support, buffering themselves against greater accountability at the ballot box. (121) Military groups may find themselves most disadvantaged in the process of democratization and their interests may be difficult to reconcile with those of the new groups enfranchised in a democratic system, such as the industrialists or the urban working class. This can result in a process of elite logrolling whereby the military's interests can be addressed with policies for military buildup, imperialism, or war. (122) The military's continuing influence in Pakistan, even under democratic rule, and its covert and overt actions against longtime rival India are indicative of this tendency. (123) Leaders may benefit from successful foreign policy adventurism abroad by rallying domestic public opinion. Incentives to initiate force in the face of bad economic conditions or domestic turmoil could challenge the democratic peace, (124) although evidence suggests that autocratic regimes most often use force in response to domestic turmoil. (125)

### 2AC – AT: Impact – Cyber War

#### No impact to cyber-war- defenses in place

Colin S. Gray, 2013, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S. Army War College Press, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf> (accessed 5/28/16)

It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber warfare would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly, let alone damage physically the machines on which they depend**.** These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences ofcyber action**,** which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of conflict.Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weaponanytimesoon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves.On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2. Cyber defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective. The structural advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate.Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶

#### And, cyber-terror attacks don’t escalate

Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation March, 2012, “Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks,” Foreign Affairs 3-14-12, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety> (accessed 5/29/16)

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called **cyberwar.** **Policymakers** and pundits **have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent** “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or **“cyber-9/11.”** In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.” Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, **the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks,** such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, **have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day** by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of **these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place.** Certainly, **none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and** most **can be offset by commonsense** prevention and mitigation efforts.

### 2AC – AT: Impact – China Containment

#### Containment doesn’t happen- relations prevent it

Mohammad Samir Hussain, 2012, “Research Associate at Yashwantrao Chavan National Center of International Security and Defence Analysis (YC-NISDA) University of Pune, Maharashtra,” Journal of Political Studies, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/India-US%20relations-winter2012.pdf> (accessed 5/25/16)

There are many reasons as to why containment of China is less likely to happen. Today India and United States have a much better interactions with China than ever before in the past. And where there is a convergence, there must also be a divergence. The same is the case with India and the United States stance towards the containment of China. Although India and the U.S. have the same concerns over the growing Chinese power and its expanding influence, but still they have the differences over other issues involving China that would seriously undermine India’s strategic security. The growing relationship between India and the United States should not become the sole ground for the containment of China.

### 2AC – AT: Impact – Maritime Cooperation

#### Relations don’t solve the impact- maritime military cooperation is low AND both China and India have the same interests

Sourabh Gupta is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies in Washington, D.C, May, 2016, “A swell in US–India defence cooperation,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/22/a-swell-in-us-india-defence-cooperation/> (accessed 5/27/16)

Its geographic writ is unlikely to extend beyond the sea lines of communication and strategic approaches of the Eastern Indian Ocean and southern Bay of Bengal, except during emergency disaster relief missions. From a functional standpoint, military-grade intelligence sharing and federated defence planning, including joint threat assessment and amphibious operations cooperation, remains off the table. Most of the smaller-scale ‘pathfinder’ defence technology cooperation projects, particularly those that are outside the main maritime sphere or that would entail private-to-private technology transfers, are likely to wither on the vine. A sense of proportion must also inform the understanding of China’s strategic role in the Indian Ocean. The eastern Indian Ocean will remain a decidedly distant ‘far seas’ theatre of operation for the Chinese navy for some time yet. Its South Sea Fleet surface task group conducted its first, and only, training deployment there in 2014. China also has limited, though vital, interests in the region. These interests, including free access and unimpeded navigation, align with India’s own interests east of the Strait of Malacca, meaning they can be effectively managed through diplomatic avenues.

#### EU cooperation solves the impact

Eva Pejsova, February, 2016, “Scrambling for the Indian Ocean,” European Union for Institute Security Studies, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_4_Indian_Ocean.pdf> (accessed 5/29/16)

Although India is striving to assert its primacy in its maritime neighbourhood, it cannot provide for the theatre’s security alone. The EU has been investing heavily into maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, building the capacity of local maritime agencies and enhancing maritime situational awareness to counter piracy, as well as other transnational security threats. While the Union’s efforts have been welcomed by most countries along the Indo-Pacific rim, India’s support has been notably missing. When debating how to revitalise the EU-India strategic partnership, in place since 2004, functional maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean would thus be the most logical starting point.

#### No war from economic decline, best a recent data

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf> (accessed 5/8/16)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

#### And low risk of piracy in the Indian Ocean- threats are manageable

IANS, October, 2015, “Navy Welcomes Reduction of Piracy Risk Area in Indian Ocean,” <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Navy-Welcomes-Reduction-of-Piracy-Risk-Area-in-Indian-Ocean/2015/10/09/article3070539.ece> (accessed 5/30/16)

NEW DELHI: The Indian Navy on Thursday welcomed the reduction in limits of piracy High Risk Area (HRA) in the Indian Ocean by European Union Chair of the Contact Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). "The unanimous agreement by the shipping industry 'roundtable' to now redraw the eastern limit of the HRA is a welcome move which is likely to address some of India's maritime security concerns, which have been highlighted by the government of India in various forums since 2012," a navy statement said. The CGPCS on Thursday announced the revision of the limits of the piracy HRA with effect from December 1. Consequent to the spread of piracy to the East Arabian Sea, the international shipping industry extended the eastern limit of piracy HRA in June 2010 to 78 degree East longitude, thereby including the west coast of India within the HRA. "The extension of the eastern limit of the HRA from 65 degree East to 78 degree East led to security concerns on account of the presence of private security personnel onboard merchant vessels transiting the piracy HRA, and the presence of floating armouries off the Indian coast. The shipping industry also incurred additional costs for insurance and implementation of various recommendations for transit through the piracy HRA," the statement said. India deployed naval ships in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008 for anti-piracy patrols. Both the navy and Coast Guard undertook operation Island Watch, which led to the arrest of 120 pirates from four pirate 'motherships' between January-March 2011.

### 2AC – AT: Impact – Terrorism

#### Transporting materials impossible

Augustine Kwok 13, Policy Assistant - Global Partnership Program at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Evaluating the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: Cutting Through the Rhetoric,” [http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/fr/bitstream/handle/10393/30520/KWOK,%20Augustine%2020139.pdf?sequence=1](http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/fr/bitstream/handle/10393/30520/KWOK%2C%20Augustine%2020139.pdf?sequence=1) (accessed 5/28/16)

Furthermore, if terrorists were able to purchase fissile materials, they would still have to find a way to transport the materials from point of purchase, to assembly point, to destination point. There are a number of initiatives set up in order to prevent such transit from being possible. Through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), the US’ National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Megaports initiative and INTERPOL; countries identified with major transshipment points have had their transport and maritime security infrastructure upgraded and supplemented with equipment to detect the transfer of nuclear material. Such safeguards, in addition to the implementation of norms across the global nuclear industry through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Zangger Committee have ensured that the highest standards are applied to global transport infrastructure. Security is geared to facilitate the safe and secure transport of authorized nuclear materials while detecting, interdicting and preventing any illegal transfers of material.

#### No risk of weapon acquisition – miniaturization and enrichment are too difficult

Adnan Khan, lecturer on political and Islamic issues, September, 2013, “Debunking the Myths of Nuclear Terrorism,” 5 Pillars, <http://5pillarsuk.com/2013/09/14/debunking-the-myths-of-nuclear-terrorism/> (accessed 5/29/16)

Contrary to their popular portrayal in Hollywood, nuclear bombs are actually both difficult to manufacture and challenging to effectively deploy, making it virtually impossible for terrorist groups to acquire them. Nuclear devices initiate nuclear chain reactions, and these reactions generate roughly a million times more energy than comparable chemical reactions. The enrichment of Uranium is probably the most complex aspect of building a nuclear device; It presents numerous challenges for any nation in developing a nuclear programme. The concept requires separating a heavier isotope (atoms of the same element having a different number of neutrons) of uranium from a lighter isotope of uranium in order to enrich or purify the stock to higher than 80% of U235 - sufficient for use in weapons. Achieving this separation on a suitably refined level differentiated by only a few subatomic particles is an extremely complicated process. A series of centrifuges carry out the delicate task of separating isotopes, these are finely tuned machine components, able to spin at high speeds while fully containing and separating highly corrosive gas. It is the combination of appropriate calibration and rotational speed that allow for enrichment to take place, low-quality bearings just would not do the job. Thereafter fabricating fissile material and developing either a gun-type device or implosion device is a process only 9-10 nations in the world have accomplished. South Africa has since renounced it, whilst North Korea is still working on it.[2] Today nuclear warheads sit in missiles and this would be another challenge any nation would face, i.e. delivering a bomb to its intended target. The components of the bomb that actually initiate a nuclear explosion must be miniaturized in order to be placed in a missile. Modern missiles are smaller than a human being weighing only a few hundred pounds. Actually getting a warhead down to this size is no simple exercise. It requires, among other things, precision manufacturing, exceptional quality control and a good understanding of nuclear physics. All of this would be after decades of testing to ensure detonation upon delivery.

# DA Answers U.S. Japan Relations DA

## \*\*\*Uniqueness Answers\*\*\*

### US-China Relations High - Diplomacy

#### United States and China cooperating diplomatically now – perception is key

Shannon Tiezzi, staff writer for The Diplomat and previously a research associate at the US-China Policy Foundation, April 1, 2016, “Obama, Xi Put Positive Spin on US-China Relations,” http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/obama-xi-put-positive-spin-on-us-china-relations/ (Accessed 4/8/2016)

Still, the two sides could — and did — point to some positive progress on nuclear security. In a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation, the U.S. and China pledged to deepen cooperation and coordination to prevent nuclear smuggling and increase the security of nuclear materials. At a press briefing, Laura Holgate, added that Washington was “really quite encouraged by the leadership that China is beginning to show in the nuclear security realm.” In another positive step, a new nuclear security Center of Excellence opened in China earlier this month, at a ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. Moniz described the new center, the result of close U.S.-China collaboration, as “a world-class facility for Chinese, regional, and international nuclear security training and technical exchanges.” Meanwhile, White House officials were also quick to note China’s cooperation over the North Korean nuclear issue. Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes pointed out that the recent UN Security Council sanctions – “the toughest sanctions that have ever been imposed on North Korea” – would not have been possible “without China’s cooperation and support.” “So we’ve seen China step up in many ways in terms of applying pressure,” Rhodes told reporters in a press briefing on Wednesday. “The fact is, it has to over time affect the calculus of the North Korean leadership.”

### US-China Relations High – Security

#### US and China cooperating over regional security

F24, France 24 International News, April 1, 2016, “United States and China vow to work together to curb North Korea nuclear tests,” <http://www.france24.com/en/20160401-united-states-china-vow-work-together-curb-north-korea-nuclear-tests> (Accessed 4/20/16)

Then Obama met Chinese President Xi Jinping and both called for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. China also agreed to implement in full the latest economic restrictions imposed by the U.N. Security Council against Pyongyang. More than 50 governments and international organisations are attending the two-day summit on preventing nuclear terrorism — the last in a series of global meetings Obama has championed on the issue. The risk posed by the Islamic State group tops this year’s agenda but concerns about North Korea are also commanding focus. “Of great importance to both of us is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, which threatens the security and stability of the region. President Xi and I are both committed to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,” Obama said at the start of his meeting with Xi. “China and the U.S. have a responsibility to work together,” Xi said in his comments made to reporters through an interpreter. As for their “disputes and disagreements,” the Chinese leader said the two sides could “seek active solutions through dialogue and consultation.” North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January, followed by a space launch in February, have heralded more convergence among often-fractious powers in East Asia — at least on the need to press the government of Kim Jong Un toward disarming. Japan and South Korea have persuasive reasons to get along. They both host U.S. forces and are both in range of North Korean missiles. But their relations have been plagued by historical differences that date back to Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea in the first half of the 20th century and its military’s use of sex slaves during World War II. But those tensions have eased some. Abe said North Korea nuclear and missile capability is a “direct and grave threat” to them all. “Should it choose to undertake yet another provocation, it is certain to find itself facing even tougher sanctions and isolation,” Park said of Pyongyang. Young leader Kim Jong Un has also alienated the North’s traditional benefactor and main trading partner, China. The U.S. has long urged Beijing to take a more forceful role in pressing North Korea, and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang said after the Obama-Xi meeting that the two sides agreed the new U.N. resolution “should be implemented in full and in its entirety.” The U.S. and China also released joint statements vowing robust collaboration to improve nuclear security and to implement a global climate change deal, and reported progress on the issue of cyber security. But they were at stark odds in other areas.

### US-China Relations High - Predictive

#### US-China relations moving forward – trend expected to continue

Liu Zhen, staff writer for South China Morning Post, March 16, 2016, “China’s relations with US ‘moving forward’, says premier, amid strains over territorial claims in South China Sea,” http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1925794/chinas-relations-us-moving-forward-says-premier-amid (Accessed 4/17/2016)

China’s relations with US ‘moving forward’, says premier, amid strains over territorial claims in South China Sea. China’s relationship with the United States will only improve, whoever wins the US presidential election, as the two nations common interests expand, China’s Premier Li Keqiang said on Wednesday. Li said that as China had become the US’s top trading partner, with two-way trade reaching US$560 billion, differences between two countries have been outweighed. “I believe that in the end no matter who gets into the White House the underlying trend for US-China ties will not change.” Li told a press conference at the end of the National People’s Congress in Beijing.

#### US-China Relationship good now – better balanced than before

Tian Shaohui, Editor of Xinhuanet, April 3, 2016, “Interview: China-U.S. economic relationship "much more balanced" than 15 years ago -- U.S. expert,” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/03/c_135247677.htm> (Accessed 4/14/2016)

The China-U.S. economic relationship is "much more balanced" today than 15 years ago, as Chinese markets and investments become increasing important for U.S. economic growth going forward, Geoffrey Garrett, dean at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, said Saturday. "I think we're also in a transition, that's an incredibly important transition, to a new normal in U.S.-China rel ations," Garrett said at the opening ceremony of the two-day Penn Warton China Summit held here with the theme of "China's New Normal," a term often referring to China's transition to slower growth but with higher quality. Garrett said that current U.S. debates on the economic relations with China focus on the American trade deficit with China and U.S. government debt held by China, which are "the old U.S.-China economic relationship" about 15 years ago and are certainly "out of date." In his view, the economic relationship between the world's two largest economies today is "actually much more balanced" than it's been in the past. On the one hand, the emergence of over 500 million middle class consumers in China "has been and will be so important" to the growth of American economy going forward, he argued.

### A2 South China Sea UQ

#### US-China Relations can persist despite past tensions over South China Sea – empirically proven

David Brunnstrom, Reuters U.S. Asia Policy Correspondent, May 17, 2015, “Despite Tension, Xi Says U.S. – China Relations Are Stable,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-kerry-china-idUSKBN0O203J20150517> (Accessed 4/12/2016)

China's ties with the United States remain stable, Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Sunday, as he sought to defuse tension over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea that has raised fears of confrontation between them. "I look forward to continuing to develop this relationship with President Obama and to bring China-U.S. relations to a new height along a track of a new model of major country relationship," Xi told U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the end of Kerry's two-day trip to China. Kerry's trip has been dominated by deepening security concerns about Beijing's maritime ambitions in the South China Sea. China's rapid reclamation effort around seven reefs in the Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea has alarmed claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Xi told Kerry that China and the United States should handle disputes in a way that would not damage bilateral ties. On Saturday, Kerry urged China to take action to reduce tension in the South China Sea. His call was rebuffed by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who said Beijing's determination to protect its interests in the area is "as hard as a rock". Kerry's trip is intended to prepare for the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue next month in Washington and Xi's expected visit to Washington in September, a trip that Xi said he looked forward to.Xi has repeatedly told Obama of his desire for a "new model of major country relationship," in which China would be viewed as an equal global player. But the model also outlines a respect for "each other's sovereign and territorial integrity as well as political system and development path". "In my view the China-U.S. relationship has remained stable," Xi told Kerry at Beijing's Great Hall of the People at a session partially open to reporters.

#### US cooperating with China to resolve South China Sea tensions

Jose Katigbak, STAR Washington Bureau, April 24, 2016, “US to China: Resolve Sea Row Peacefully,” <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/04/24/1576207/us-china-resolve-sea-row-peacefully> (Accessed 4/24/2016)

WASHINGTON – China has pulled out all the stops in vilifying the Philippines for pursuing arbitration to resolve their maritime disputes in the South China Sea, said Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel. In a speech at the University of Southern California on Friday, Russel said the United States was determined not to let China undermine the interests of other nations with conflicting maritime claims. “We don’t object to China exercising international maritime rights, but we do urge it to clarify its South China Sea maritime claims consistent with international law and to recognize other countries possess the same rights it exercises,” he said. Territorial claims are notoriously hard to resolve, and some disputes pre-date the creation of the People’s Republic of China, he said. Manila filed a case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague contesting the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim over the South China Sea and the West Philippine Sea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China cites “historical facts” for justifying its claim to 90 percent of the sea, which is also being contested by Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia. It has expressed intention to ignore the tribunal’s ruling expected in the coming weeks. “We are committed to a rules-based regional order that benefits all nations and we won’t accept the division of the region into spheres of influence,” he said. Russel said from day one, the Obama administration has been clear-eyed about the potential for both conflict and cooperation with China. Obama has had about 30 face-to-face meetings with his Chinese counterparts so far in addition to phone calls, letters and senior envoys to resolve differences and to shape China’s choices to encourage responsible stewardship and contributions to global leadership.

### US-Japan Relations Bad Now – Presidential Race

#### Japanese-US alliance weakening – presidential race inciting Japanese media

NIN, International News Site for 163 Netease, March 18, 2016, “Trump preselected won four states, said US-Japan relations or public welcome turning point,” <http://www.88p4.com/2016/03/18/trump-preselected-won-four-states-said-us-japan-relations-or-public-welcome-turning-point-143468.html> (Accessed 4/19/16)

Japanese media reported that support the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance mainstream Republican candidates have rout, leading all the way Trump is constantly denounce Japan, the United States accused Japan of not only take away jobs still on the safety and security of the United States to take a ride, incitement to Japanese anger. Do not rely on the United States Japan “coming to an end”? Kyodo News 16 Journal article said that in the previous presidential election in the United States, in a dominant position is supported by the Japan-US alliance in the Republican mainstream. For example, the recent sessions of the Republican candidate, former President George W. Bush, Senator John McCain and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. They strengthen the Japan-US alliance crowd support from advocates, emphasizing Japan-US security, it is proposed to promote the Japan-US economic and trade exchanges. However, those “moderate” Republican candidates this year have been withdraw from the election, Jeb Bush and Rubio as “alien” but Trump leading the way. Trump has repeatedly blasted the Japanese: the Americans should work to win back from the hands of other people, including Japan! Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan asked the United States has the responsibility to protect Japan, Japan is in the “free rider”! Japanese export cheap products by manipulating foreign exchange …… Popular Trump after Republican candidate Ted Cruz places the matter concerns the “isolationism” and anti-free trade “protectionist” doctrine. Kyodo news agency commented: “Republicans seem to be ‘anti-internationalism’ occupation.”

#### Trump comments threaten US-Japanese security

Tetsushi Kajimoto, Reporting by Tetsushi Kajimoto; Additional reporting by Izumi Nakagawa in Tokyo, Emily Stephenson and Amanda Becker in Washington; Editing by William Mallard and Edwina Gibbs, April 21, 2016, “Japan Inc Sees Damaged Security Less US Trade in Trump Presidency: Reuters Poll,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-companies-trump-idUSKCN0XH2PT> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

Most Japanese firms think a Donald Trump presidency would harm the Japan-U.S. security alliance and make the United States a less attractive place to invest, a Reuters poll showed, in a further sign of international angst about his candidacy. The Republican frontrunner, known for his unpredictable style and fiery rhetoric, would also cause bilateral trade to shrink if he became president, a majority of respondents said. Portraying Japan as a free-rider on security, Trump has suggested that the U.S. ally might need nuclear weapons to ease U.S. financial commitment to its defense - anathema to the only country ever attacked by atomic bombs. Trump has also said he might withdraw U.S. troops from Japan unless it pays more to feed and house the 50,000 it hosts, and he has accused Japan of stealing U.S. jobs. His comments have only fueled simmering worries amongst some Japanese in recent years about whether Washington would defend Tokyo in a crisis under their alliance - the lynchpin of Japan's security policy for decades.

### US-Japan Relations Bad – Politics/Okinawa

#### Alliance weak – past Okinawa divisions and complex political environment

Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth, April 2, 2015, “Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=2> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Though the March symposium showed that the allies have made tremendous progress toward Reischauer’s goal of an “equal partnership,” noticeable exclusions remain. Although in 1962 a bold Tachiya brought the issue of Okinawa onto the stage, this time it wasn’t invited back. A second symposium panel focused on the theme of JFK and foreign policy, but paid relatively little attention to contemporary alliance challenges—and no attention to Okinawa. Peculiar, for two reasons. First, although the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan was legislated in 1971, it was actually an important accomplishment of the Kennedy administration. Reischauer believed that a crisis over Okinawa could happen at any time, and would damage or even destroy the alliance. So as ambassador he devoted tremendous energy to negotiating the reversion of Okinawa with both the U.S. military and the Japanese. This effort floundered for a while after the president’s assassination, and was not realized until the Nixon years. But Reischauer’s contribution was an important Kennedy-era legacy, and thus a strange omission from a panel on that topic. But that’s the problem with non-events; though always eager to assign blame for a crisis that did happen, we forget to confer praise for one that didn’t. Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment. In fact, just a few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban location. But Okinawans didn’t want the facility moved to a different part of Okinawa—they wanted it off the island completely, and elected Governor Onaga on that platform. On March 22 he issued a deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit. Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand as “very regrettable,” and suspending the governor’s work stoppage order. Onaga responded by vowing, “I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the will of the Okinawans.” What happens next? “Once again,” wrote DC scribe Chris Nelson, “the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in our face.” The Okinawans are, in Carol Fulp’s words, becoming visible. They’re shouting louder and louder—and want to be onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was Reischauer and Kennedy’s challenge. Averting another one is ours.

### US-Japan Relations Bad – Vicious Cycle

#### Current alliance trajectory creates a vicious cycle where Japan greatly resents US

Christopher W. Hughes, Chair of the Department of Politics and International Studies, Chair of the Faculty of Social Sciences, and Co-Editor of The Pacific Review, July 29, 2015, “An ‘Abe Doctrine’ as Japan’s Grand Strategy: New Dynamism or Dead-End?”  [http://www.globalresearch.ca/an-abe-doctrine-as-japans-grand-strategy-new-dynamism-or-dead-end/5465317](http://japanfocus.org/events/view/256%29) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

The first problem for the bilateral relationship within this contradiction is that Abe’s hopes for more equal ties with the US cannot by definition materalize as long as Japan continues to lock itself into dependency on the US in a range of political, economic and security affairs. Abe’s attempts to strengthen Japan’s great power profile through deepening integration into the military alliance can only really spell dependency. Japan’s gearing of its security doctrines and capabilities in the proclamation of collective self-defense and the revised Defense Guidelines in the service of US-Japan alliance curtails rather than builds genuine security autonomy. The Abe administration’s determination to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa and the long-term presence of US foreign troops on Japanese soil again indicates a relationship of dependency, as does the constant seeking of security reassurances from the US in regard to Japanese control of the Senkaku islands in its dispute with China. Hence, the reality is that the Abe Doctrine is in many ways reducing Japan’s autonomy in international affairs, and this will only be compounded as its revisionism leaves it more isolated in East Asia with a limited range of other feasible regional partners even when taking into account the burgeoning relationship with Australia. Japan will thus only become more susceptible to US pressure, so breeding concerns over alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment, and potential resentment against the US rather than correcting that tendency. The second problem wrapped up within this third great contradiction, is that whilst the Abe Doctrine may actually be continuing to cede Japanese autonomy to the US and even if Japan might acquiesce in the vulnerabilities and to an extent the resentment that this relationship creates for the security benefits it generally provides, nevertheless this relationship is still likely to be fraught with other difficulties borne of ideological incompatibilities and tensions. Japan’s illiberalism under the Abe Doctrine and fascination with revisionism, as seen in dealings with past statements on colonial history, Yasukuni, and revisiting Occupation reforms, has the potential to place Japan and the US at genuine loggerheads. This type of dynamic has already been witnessed over the US dissatisfaction with Abe’s questioning of the Kōno Statement on the ‘comfort women’ issue and the necessity felt by the US to push Japan back into line on the issue. The consequence of the Abe Doctrine’s seeking autonomy and status through the bilateral alliance—in fact a process of a failed logic leading to enhanced dependence on the US, coupled with enhanced ideological incompatibilities between the US and Japan—is to lock Japan more into the US alliance, and again thus more into the post-war system, and to again generate probable resentment at Japan’s essential subjugation to the US. Resentful Realism redux? In conclusion, therefore, the Abe Doctrine, although a bold attempt by the prime minister to break out of a pattern of a perceived decline in Japan’s international presence and generate a new path for grand strategy, has a strong probability of ultimate failure due to problems in execution and conception. The policy is clearly wrongheaded in attempting to tackle Japan’s international security problems by predicating its approach on an ideological revisionism that contains the potential to undercut cooperation with East Asia and the US. Instead, a truly liberal approach that conversely emphasizes more genuinely Japan’s successes of the post-war period and is borne from the reforms of the Occupation, a desire to remove history from the agenda of ties with East Asia and the US, and conceives of a more autonomous security policy less fettered to that of the US, might actually function as a more effective alternative to Abe’s brand of foreign policy Until Japan corrects the radical revisionism of the Abe Doctrine, the likely outcome for Japan’s foreign and security policy is not a strong and cooperative Japan but one that may be characterized by ‘Resentful Realism’.[vi] In contrast to ‘Reluctant Realism’ that sees a comfortable alliance with the US, careful calibration of ties with East Asia and China, and contribution to a stable balance of power, ‘Resentful Realism’ might see a Japan driven by fear of China, lack of trust in the US, and a continuing desire for the reassertion of national pride and autonomy.[vii] The fact that Japan will be unable to achieve confidence and security given the structures and doctrine promoted by Abe will only aggravate tensions and mean that Japan will be a more unpredictable ally and player in general in the East Asia region, so posing risks for regional ties and security, and Japanese security—the very opposite of what an ‘Abe Doctrine’ originally promised to deliver for Japan’s grand strategy.

## \*\*\*Link Answers\*\*\*

### No Link – Cooperation

#### US-China Relations are cooperative not competitive – won’t upset Japan

Robert Manning, senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council, and James Przystup, senior fellow and research professor in the Institute of National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, October 12, 2015 “Asian Stability Hangs in the Balance of Japan-China Relations, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/12/asian-stability-hangs-in-the-balance-of-japan-china-relations/ (Accessed 4/24/2016)

Abe and Xi met on 22 April in Bandung during the Asia–Africa Summit. Additionally, Abe’s 14 August speech to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II appears to have paved the way for a Beijing summit later this year. But, as Beijing prepared for China’s 3 September victory parade, it was clear that issues relating to history, territory, security and regional vision will continue to trouble this relationship. If the past decade is a prologue, the best that can be hoped is that rationality prevails in managing the critical issues that stalk the bilateral relationship and the region. The likely trajectory of Sino–Japanese relations depends on China’s approach to regional order. Currently there is a bifurcated relationship marked by economic cooperation and security competition. This duality characterises East Asia writ large. Over the coming decade, whether China joins Trans-Pacific Partnership and how it responds to instability on the Korean peninsula will both be inflection points in shaping Sino–Japanese ties. More broadly, whether or not US–China relations are more cooperative than competitive and whether they forge a framework for strategic stability will be a bellwether for the future success of such ties.

### No Link – Empirical Evidence

#### U.S. pivoted from Japan to China before – Alliance survived

Ellis S. Krauss, Professor Emeritus of the School of Global Strategy and Policy at the University of California, Winter 2016, “Japan, the United States, and a Changed Pacific,” <http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-post-obama-world/japan-the-united-states-and-a-changed-pacific/> (Accessed 4/15/2016)

This rift between the United States and Japan was not limited to military issues. Hatoyama’s support for an “Asia-Pacific Community,” modeled after the European Union, tugged Japan a bit further from America’s orbit. And shortly after he took office as prime minister, one of Hatoyama’s first moves was to send a huge delegation, including DPJ Diet members, to Beijing. Chinese president Xi Jinping, pleased by the overtures, visited Japan soon thereafter. The tilt toward China, the attempt to renegotiate the Okinawan military base deal, the withdrawal of support for U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean, the emphasis on a “Pacific community” — all of it irritated Washington. Some observers even saw it as the beginning of the end for the U.S.-Japan alliance. It wasn’t, of course: the DPJ liked and profited from the alliance as much as their predecessors had, and never questioned the joint U.S.-Japan Ballistic Missile Defense that the LDP had pushed for a decade. The blips in Japan’s foreign policy were in fact just a partial readjustment within Japan’s existing post–Cold War “dual hedge” policy: use closer political and economic ties with China and Asia as a hedge against U.S. dominance; use the U.S.-Japan military alliance as a hedge against China and a rogue North Korea.

## \*\*\*Internal Link Answers\*\*\*

#### Encroachment goes the other way – Japan Alliance hurts US-China Relations

Chi Wang, Co-chair of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, advisor on China affairs for several U.S. presidential administrations, 2015, Obama's Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia, p. 184-185

From China’s point of view, the US-Japan alliance is part of the American strategy to contain China's rise Beijing believes that the US is encouraging Japan to rearm so that it can better use Tokyo as a proxy to threaten mainland China. Under this viewpoint, the alliance is not based on mutual defense at all, but is a sort of anti-China club. Indeed, as China is seen as the major threat to regional security by both Washington and Tokyo, criticisms of China are readily apparent in official bilateral statements. The US-Japan Joint Statement issued after Obama's April 2014 trip to Tokyo noted both governments' “strong concern over recent actions that have raised tension in the East China Sea and South China Sea," a clear reference to China.9 The statement also made it crystal clear that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall under the purview of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, enraging China. US and Japanese officials made similar comments at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual Asia-Pacific security summit. After hearing Abe and Hagel denounce China's actions, China’s representative at the talk (deputy chief of the PLA general staff Wang Guanzhong) called their comments “provocative,” and accused the two nations of colluding to railroad China. “The speeches made by Mr. Abe and Mr Hagel gave me the impression that they were coordinated with each other . .. and staged provocations and challenges against China.” Wang said.10 China's reaction to the US-Japan alliance is a direct result of the strategy favored by the US military, which a Carnegie Endowment study described as placing “a stress on deterrence over reassurance” to China." In other words, US analysts at the Department of Defense are most interested in maintaining a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific, particularly by making use of their bases in Japan. Controversial strategies such as Air-Sea Battle would require such a forward presence. And, as Swaine and his colleagues noted, this conception of the US-Japan alliance would require Tokyo to develop something resembling a conventional military power, regardless of Article 9. The Carnegie study argued that this approach would result in further escalation from China as it seeks to respond to the development and deployment of advanced Japanese and US capabilities.12 Unfortunately, this strategy is already being implemented by the Pentagon, and we are seeing just such a reaction from China. The US and Japan are at least partly to blame for the security dilemma underway in the western Pacific, as they have opted to frame their alliance as a deterrent—which Chinese reads as an attempt at containment China has not always viewed the US-Japan alliance as a threat. Back in the 1990s, when economic competition had driven a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, Chinese analysts were concerned that the alliance was about to fall apart. At that time. China agreed with the US view that the alliance was critical to Asia-Pacific security—not because China necessarily approved of the alliance’s strategies, but because Chinese analysts were deeply suspicious of what Japan might do if given sole responsibility for its defense.13 In many ways, Beijing still views its neighbor to the east through the prism of World War II, and thus a remilitarized Japan was seen as far more of a threat than a weakened Japan, dependent on US security guarantees. However, today, the IJS no longer views Japan as its primary economic competitor; China has inherited that position. As US strategic interest in shaping (Beijing would say containing) China’s rise grew, Chinese scholars and officials became increasingly concerned that the alliance would be used to check Beijing. There are two variants on this theory. The first theory says that the US is attempting to use Japan as a proxy to stir up trouble in China's backyard, thus creating disadvantageous conditions for China’s continued development. The second theory' places more blame on Japan, arguing that Tokyo (emboldened by promises of US support) is deliberately stirring up trouble with Beijing, knowing that the US has no choice but to back its ally. Under both these theories. China believes that the alliance is in fact destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. When Xi Jinping outlined China’s vision for Asian security, he made sure to touch on this issue, saying, “To beef up a military alliance targeted at a third party is not conducive to regional common security.”14 China has consistently argued that moves labeled by the US and Japan as provocative (from a general military build-up to the declaration of the East china Sea Air Defense Identification Zone) are in fact necessary steps to counter an adversarial US-Japan alliance. Under these circumstances, China, and the US-Japan alliance are engaged in a classic security dilemma, where each side interprets its own moves as defensive and the other side’s as threatening.

## \*\*\*Impact Answers\*\*\*

### Impact Inevitable

#### Tensions between the United States and China are inevitable

SMC, Stratfor Media Center, Geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world, April 14, 2016, “How U.S. Strategy Impacts China’s Rise,” <https://www.stratfor.com/image/how-us-strategy-impacts-chinas-rise> (Accessed 4/15/2016)

Stratfor recently wrote that China's economic rise has created for it an imperative to secure key trade routes and to protect its overseas resources and markets from foreign interdiction. The United States must respond to China's rise because of its need to control the world's oceans and to prevent the emergence of another regional hegemon, even if this need does not determine the precise nature and timing of that response. Tension between the two nations is inevitable. How this tension plays out, however, is beyond the scope of what could be called fundamental geopolitical analysis, which is concerned with "first principles," the hardwired structural constraints and imperatives that shape the direction of international politics. First principles tell us that so long as China's wealth and power continues to grow, its relationship with the United States will be marked by competition and conflict. To understand the different possible outcomes, it is necessary to look beyond the fundamental constraints and imperatives of the first principles to the process by which states evaluate their environments and formulate policies. In other words, it is necessary to consider grand strategy — in particular that adopted by the United States, the globally dominant hegemon. Insofar as the fundamental geographic, historical and economic realities that shape China's behavior leave its leaders room to maneuver, the most important factor in determining which strategy they choose will be the United States.

#### Regional war inevitable – SCS simulations proves

Riccardo Cociani, King's College London and Chair of the KCL Crisis Team, April 18, 2016, “Is War with China Inevitable,” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-inevitable/> (Accessed 4/19/2016)

War breaks out between North Korea and Japan, and between China and the US. While China continued the militarisation of their artificial islands in the South China Sea, the US responded by increasing their naval and military presence in the South China Sea, eventually leading to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. While the US was distracted and focused on Chinese military activity, North Korea took the opportunity to conduct false-flag operations in order to attack and destroy Japan. Diplomatic solutions did not even seem close to the horizon. While this was only a crisis simulation, it raises concerns over the current situation. Will war break out between China and the US, or between China and Japan? Will North Korea attack Japan? Our simulation suggests that if China continues to increase their military and naval activities in the South China Sea, without being transparent and communicating the purpose of their activities, misunderstandings and rising tensions could be the spark that starts a war. Over the East China Sea, on the other hand, while the US and China went at it against each other, North Korea took the opportunity to increase their military activities by launching attacks against an ‘abandoned’ Japan, as the US was too ‘distracted’ about China. South Korea found itself in between all this, and had to make difficult decisions over which side to be with. Chaos reigned the waters, and the perfect storm hit.

#### China war inevitable – China says

Sounak Mukhopadhyay, International Business Times Staff Writer, June 24, 2015, “War Inevitable Between U.S., China: Russian, China Media,” <http://www.ibtimes.com/war-inevitable-between-us-china-russian-chinese-media-1982123> (Accessed April 18, 2016)

Chinese and Russian media have started suggesting the possibility of a China-U.S. war. While the national news agency in China calls it “inevitable,” a Russian news agency listed a number of indications that it said “proved’ the two nations were heading toward a military conflict. Clearly, there has been growing diplomatic tension between China and the United States. And according to reports, both countries have been spending lots of money on military preparations. China's Xinhua News Agency reported that the present political situation put a question mark on building peaceful coexistence between China and the U.S. “The situation has many people pondering how the two countries can avoid 'Thucydides's trap' -- the notion an established power becomes so anxious about the rise of a new power that a struggle leading to war becomes inevitable,” Xinhua reported.

#### Impact is inevitable – self-fulfilling prophecy

Joseph A. Bosco, member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest, April 6, 2016, “China Expects the US to Roll Over,” <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/china-expects-the-us-roll-over-15688> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

The report lists "policies of the United States" as the first among the "external factors [that] will certainly influence China’s future course." But it describes the official American perception of China more in terms of diplomacy and engagement than deterrence and containment. The United States views China less as an existential threat than as a challenge to its friendships, alliances, and military and economic leadership in the region. Additionally, the study sees Japan as having an equally muted reaction to China’s saber-rattling: “[B]oth the United States and Japan have extensive commercial ties to and personal contacts with China, and China presents only an ambiguous military threat. The underlying Western fear since Nixon's opening to China and through eight subsequent administrations is that "treating China as an enemy will make it one." There is the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the United States and Japan base their policies on the expectation of a powerful and aggressive China, and take preparatory measures that Beijing interprets as a containment strategy, China might decide to adopt aggressive policies to defend itself, leading to a cycle of armament and tension that neither side desired. China's leaders clearly understand this Western reticence and consistently exploit it to their advantage, pressing at each incrementally assertive point and expecting the West to exercise the necessary prudence to avoid confrontation and escalation. In the military and security areas, China has been deterred from direct aggression, but has advanced its interests using sophisticated forms of military coercion and simple gunboat diplomacy, as well as a wide range of nonmilitary activities.

### Empirically Denied

#### Military and security issues empirically don't harm relations

Bree Wellington, Tokyo’s Sophia University, March 25, 2014, “Japan/US Alliance,” <http://asiancenturyinstitute.com/international/522-japan-us-alliance> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Despite some undeniable challenges, US and Japanese relations are actually quite strong, argues Australia's Bree Wellington, who recently studied at Tokyo's Sophia University. The Japanese-US alliance is of great importance, having both been leaders of the world political economy for the most extensive period of the 21st century. Hence, whilst their underlying philosophical structures may differ quite dramatically, their cooperation on both economic and political levels remains quite pivotal to the rest of the world. US-Japanese relations have been most noticeably shaken following the 2008 global financial crisis. Both the US and Japan pose as highly influential states, accounting for more than 40% of the domestic product of the world. Trade relations since 2008 have suffered a noticeable blow in response to the crisis, and hence trade between the two states has naturally fallen in response. The United States has also consequentially fallen into greater deficit with Japan, compromising the US position in relation to Japan much more apparently than has been seen in the past. This fall in trade has not in itself caused any great tensions between the states. However, their compromised economic positions have certainly reduced the trade that occurs between the states, and therefore weakened the strong trade relationship that underpins the rest of their cooperation. Maintaining cooperation despite a somewhat humbled trade position of both parties remains pivotal not only to the two states, but also to the world. Whilst trade has not suffered an irreparable blow, it is interesting to see how much their diplomatic relations rests on their economic partnership.

#### No Impact – risk reduction between cooperating China and Japan prevents

Sheila Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2015, “The United States, Japan, and the Rising China,” <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/united-states-japan-rise-china/p37156> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

This is a conversation that we’re going to have about Japan and the United States and Asia. We labeled it “Japan, the United States and a Rising China,” but I think we all know that this is not just a conversation about China; it’s really a conversation about how the region is adjusting to this transformation of power—economic, military power—in the region, but also just how the United States and Japan are going to position themselves in this emerging Asia. I just returned—as I said in the introduction, I’ve just returned from a trip to Beijing and Tokyo, and I was—in some senses I was delighted to see that the Japan-China relationship is better than it was this time last year. There has been numerous meetings between Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe. In the government-to-government relationship now there is more traction. There is a discussion on risk reduction mechanisms in the East China Sea, and business leaders—Japanese business leaders have spent—invested some time going to China, re-opening conversations about their role in the Chinese economy. At the end of this month I think you’ll see a large delegation of Keidanren and Japanese Shokokai—so the Japanese Industrial Association leaders—going to China.

### A2 Asian Stability

#### US-China economic dependence provides incentive for conflict not to escalate

Charles V. Pena, DC-based senior fellow with the Independent Institute, April 21, 2016, “War in the South China Sea, Not Worth It,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-the-south-china-sea-not-worth-it-15875> (Accessed 4/22/2016)

Indeed, U.S. allies in the region are more than capable of underwriting military expenditures for their own collective security needs. The combined economy of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia— South China Sea—is on the order of $9 trillion, which compares favorably to China’s $14 trillion economy. Arguably, Thailand (GDP $1 trillion) and India (GDP $2.4 trillion) also have an interest. There is also this to consider: China is America’s second-largest trading partner, and the United States is China’s largest trading partner. In other words, both countries have every reason to avoid needless confrontation. Ultimately, China’s man-made islands in the South China Sea do not imperil U.S. national security. Certainly, they are not worth the possibility of U.S.-Chinese military confrontation. Instead of being the first line of defense and directly involved in a regional dispute, the United States would be better off untangling itself from a needless entanglement.

### A2 China War

#### China war/conflict won’t escalate – trade relations prove

Geoff Garrett, Professor Geoffrey Garrett is dean of the University of Sydney Business School and a professor of politics at the United States Studies Centre, November 13, 2012, “No Cold War - US Will Ensure China Follows the 'Road Rules'”, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/no-cold-war--us-will-ensure-china-follows-the-road-rules-20121112-298f1.html> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

China and the US will never be friends. But they need each other desperately. Last week's American elections did nothing to alter this key fact of the Asia-Pacific century. America re-elected the President, Barack Obama, despite record high unemployment because the country agreed now is not the time for fiscal austerity. Meanwhile, the Republicans will have to change their symbol from the elephant to the dinosaur unless they can expand their base beyond southern white men. The elections didn't change the balance of power in Washington, so continuity in policy seems a given. Expect more Band-Aid solutions to the US's fiscal woes born of an implicit belief the country can grow its way out of debt. Obama's strategic focus abroad will be on rebalancing American foreign policy towards Asia with a view to influencing the trajectory of China's rise along US lines. But Obama knows the American and Chinese economies are codependent. More active American presence in Asia will be matched with a continuing resolve to ensure tensions with China do not spiral out of control. Advertisement Job one for Obama II is the fiscal cliff the US could walk off on New Year's Eve when Bush's post-September 11 income tax cuts and Obama's post-global financial crisis payroll tax cuts will expire and more than $100 billion a year in automatic spending cuts will kick in. This would halve the US budget deficit. But it would also tip the country, and most likely the world, immediately back into recession. Despite the vitriol and rancour of the election campaign, few in Washington want to commit suicide. The most likely outcome is a new deal in the shadow of Christmas. On the tax side, the path of least resistance is to extend the Bush cuts for individuals earning more than $250,000, so long as they qualify as small business owners. With respect to spending, expect a deal that pushes the pain of cuts further into the future, with lots of grand statements about the need to make the US's true fiscal nightmare, its government-funded aged healthcare program Medicare, more sustainable. This makes more sense than you might think. The US is demographically the third-youngest country in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and its welfare state is relatively small. The US remains the world's innovation engine and its immigration magnet. Betting on a return to the 3 per cent-plus economic growth needed to make inroads into public debt seems reasonable. Of course, like the rest of the world, the US's economic future depends on China's rise. The US benefits from cheap Chinese imports, cheap Chinese credit and the explosive growth of the Chinese market. But China needs the US equally, not only to buy its goods but also for the technology and know-how it gets from American multinationals operating there. It is this economic codependence that means China and the US will never enter into a second cold war. But Sino-American relations will always be stressful because of the very different world views of the two superpowers.

### A2 China/Economy

#### Chinese economic downfall inevitable – growth model proves

David Scutt, Markets and Economics Reporter, April 20, 2016, “The Chinese Economy is Heading Towards the Trainwreck Japan Experienced in the Late 80s” <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/china-could-end-up-looking-like-japans-economy-25-years-ago-2016-4> (Accessed 4/21/2016)

For every China bull out there, there now seems to be a bear — a complete about-face from only a few years ago when almost everyone was singing China’s economic credentials. To Roy Smith, an academic at New York University, the breakneck growth seen in recent decades may be nearing its end, suggesting that he sees parallels with Japan’s build-up of bad loans in the late 1980s, which ended up hobbling the once high-flying economy. “China has now arrived at an existential moment after nearly 40 years of extraordinary economic progress,” said Smith in an interview with Bloomberg. “China has followed Japan’s economic development model, and may now too be facing a financial crisis like Japan’s that it may not be able to control, and that could diminish its ability to become the next Asian superpower.” Like Japan before it, the concern with China is the rapid accumulation of debt could lead to a full-blown banking crisis hitting the nation’s banks as great swathes of assets sour in the period ahead. According to analysis from Gerard Burg, senior Asia economist at the NAB, combining bank loans, shadow banking, government bonds and non-shadow banking aggregate financing, China’s total debt levels stood at 308% of GDP at the end of 2015. Based on figures released by China’s Bureau of Statistics and the analysis from the the NAB, that equates to over $30 trillion in debt. Enormous. The chart below from the NAB shows the sharp increase in China’s debt-to-GDP ratio over the past decade, fueled primarily by a huge increase in lending from the shadow banking system. Big, and in all likelihood growing, numbers. Lost in the chaos of the March quarter GDP, the People’s Bank of China released new lending figures for March that revealed an enormous increase in March. New lending rose by 1.37 trillion yuan, having increased by 2.51 trillion yuan in January, the largest gain seen since records began in January 2004. Total social financing – the broadest measure of liquidity that captures lending from non-traditional sources including shadow banking – also accelerated, rising from 780.2 billion yuan in February to 2.34 trillion yuan. Is it any wonder the economy grew at 6.7% with credit growth of that magnitude? Based off recent economic indicators such as new home prices and fixed asset investment, along with the recent surge in commodities such as steel and iron ore, it’s likely that a lot of that newly created credit found its way into the nation’s property market and industries that support it. After backing stocks in 2014 and 2015, it appears the government’s chosen growth engine for 2016 is the property market — the same market where a glut of two to five years of unsold inventory exists in smaller Chinese cities, according to analysis from the Commonwealth Bank. Not exactly the what you’d expect from the “new” China growth model of services and consumption, nor the sectors that you’d expect to be humming given the government’s pledge to reform these industries given severe levels of overcapacity and mounting levels of indebtedness. As Linette Lopez wrote earlier this week, this is old China — the sectors the government is supposed to winding down and restructuring — coming in to save the world with its incredible growth machine. The Chinese government showed us very clearly in its GDP data that it is not quite ready to let that party end, says Lopez. Picking up on that theme, Societe Generale’s Wei Yao suggested that the acceleration in credit growth and rebound in property-related industries exhibits all the hallmarks of the unprecedented stimulus package adopted by the Chinese government in the wake of the great recession (known in Australia as the GFC). “This looks like an old-styled credit-backed investment-driven recovery, which bears an uncanny resemblance to the beginning of the “four trillion stimulus” package in 2009,” she wrote. “The consequence of that stimulus was inflation, asset bubbles and excess capacity.” Not exactly what China, let alone the global economy, needs a repeat performance from. For all the talk from the government about the need for reform, be it financial markets or industry specific, they’re noticeably absent at present. Instead of long-lasting market-based based reforms, all we’ve seen from policymakers is a series of attempts to boost growth in the short term, using the same methods of the 2009-2012 era that created the enormous problems the economy is grappling with at present. Like others, Smith suggests that policymakers need to “move much further to adopt reforms that allow the country meaningfully to be shaped by market forces in the future”. Seemingly a big “if” based on recent developments in steel, stocks and property. In the meantime, the debt is accumulating as are the levels of toxic assets sitting on the balance sheets of Chinese banks. As long as that continues, the risk of a “Japanification” of the Chinese economy will continue to grow, as will the risks of a more pronounced global slowdown, or worse, given the sheer size the Chinese economy has grown to.

### A2 Russia War

#### No impact to Russia war - no Russian aggression

Suren Grigoryan, Political analyst who worked for the Ministry of Defense of Armenia for 10+ years, Masters in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, January 15, 2012, “US-Russia: My Enemy, My Partner?” <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/01/15/u-s-russia-my-enemy-my-partner/0/> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

All this is in the past, official Washington says. As President Barack Obama put it in 2009 during his visit to Moscow, America wants to see Russia strong, peaceful, prosperous, and self-confident, because the United States needs exactly this kind of partner in the twenty-first century. The words of U.S. Ambassador to Russia John R. Beyrle on the same subject are even more emotional: “We are not interested in weak Russia. Weak Russia is the worst nightmare for the US. We understand perfectly what challenges we are faced with…and we must cope with them in alliance with strong partners. Thanks to its geostrategic position, immense resources and human capital, Russia may be exactly…such a partner”. 15 Indeed, Russia has the historical experience, the human and material resources, and the political will necessary for controlling and even managing regional processes. However, is Russia comfortable with the role of “regional regulator” after being a global actor for 150 years? Most probably it is. First, it has learned to assess its capabilities realistically, especially in the economic sphere, and it understands perfectly its subordinate position compared to other rising powers of Eurasia, let alone the United States. Secondly, it has not only offered to coordinate the situation in the post-Soviet space, but also to become a rightful (in some cases even irreplaceable) mediator in solving the most acute problems with neighboring regions (the Middle East, Central Asia) and states (Iran, North Korea, and others), which contemporary Russian strategy considers extremely important in terms of the country’s national security interests. Furthermore, under the circumstances, when Russian political thought continues searching for a new geopolitical identity, even the role of regional regulator not only satisfies Russia’s imperial ambitions but also facilitates the realization of the post-Soviet area integration project within the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). 16 However, the question arises, why does the United States need Russia to realize its imperial ambitions? The most obvious reasons are as follows: First, Russia is capable and willing to assume the role of regional regulator. Throughout the last 20 years (i.e., after the collapse of the Soviet Union), Moscow has de facto played the role of regional coordinator, despite Russia’s economic chaos, political reorganization, weakness of its central government, and demoralization of its armed forces in the 1990s. Russia continued holding the keys to resolution or at least freezing of regional interethnic (the South Caucasus, Transdnistria) and civil conflicts (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) in the post-Soviet area. Moreover, the states that have had acute conflicts with the West (e.g., Iran, North Korea) were always more willing to have contact with Russia rather than other powers; even the most radical movements of the Arab East continue maintaining contacts with her. Today, when Russia has overcome (although with tremendous material, moral, and political losses) one of the most difficult periods of her history—when the power vertical has been rebuilt, significant financial recourses have been accumulated allowing the country to proceed with economic and technological modernization, and the armed forces are reviving—it is more beneficial for the United States to have Russia as a partner rather than a rival in the extremely complicated region of Eurasia. Americans have not forgotten the many unexpected problems they were faced with after the demise of the USSR: the WMD proliferation threat, uncontrolled trade of conventional weapons, separatism, illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking on an immense scale, and so forth. Most of these remain serious issues even today. Among all countries pretending to regional leadership, only two have enough historical experience and appropriate capabilities for solving these problems—namely, Russia and China. However, China still refrains from partaking in solving such issues (perhaps except through mediation in negotiations with North Korea). Some experts insist that this is because Beijing is still mainly focused on expanding its potential. 17 As for our judgment, perhaps arguably enough, Chinese political culture is less predisposed to expansionism, whereas it still dominates in Russia. This is exactly the reason the role of regional “gendarme” suits her mentality very well, as it in essence remains imperial. Second, economically, Russia is much weaker than the European Union or China. Given this fact, the United States’ desire to see Russia in a position of regional political manager appears quite logical. Given its economic and technological weakness, Russia in the foreseeable future will not be able to compete with the U.S. on a global scale. Meanwhile, Europe and China can definitely do so.

### A2 Diseases

#### No deadly pandemics – disease threats are hyped

Wendy Orent, Freelance Science Writer and American Anthropologist and Author with Special Interest in Pandemics, January 11, 2015, “Why Predictions of Lethal Pandemics Should Be Ignored,” <http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/columnists/wendy-orent-why-predictions-of-lethal-pandemics-should-be-ignored-ep-867527657-353687451.html> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Prophets of doom have been telling us for decades that a deadly new pandemic ? of bird flu, of SARS or MERS coronavirus, and now of Ebola ? is on its way. Why are we still listening? If you look back at the furor raised at many distinguished publications ? Nature, Science, Scientific American, National Geographic ? back in, say, 2005 about a potential bird flu (H5N1) pandemic, you wonder what planet they were on. Nature ran a special section titled "Avian flu: Are we ready?" that began ominously and went on to present a mock aftermath report detailing catastrophic civil breakdown. Robert Webster, a famous influenza virologist, told ABC News in 2006 that "society just can't accept the idea that 50 percent of the population could die. And I think we have to face that possibility." Public health expert Michael T. Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, at a meeting in Washington of scientists brought together by the Institute of Medicine, warned in 2005 that a post-pandemic commission, like the post-9/11 commission, could hold "many scientists ? accountable to that commission for what we did or didn't do to prevent a pandemic." He also predicted that we could be facing "three years of a given hell" as the world struggled to right itself after the deadly pandemic. And Laurie Garrett, author of what must be the ur-text for pandemic predictions, her 1994 book "The Coming Plague," intoned in Foreign Affairs that "in short, doom may loom." The article went on to paint a terrifying picture of the avian flu threat. And such hysteria still goes on, whether it's over the MERS coronavirus, a whole alphabet of chicken flu viruses, a real but not very deadly influenza pandemic in 2009, or a kerfuffle like the one in 2012 over a scientist-crafted ferret flu that also was supposed to be a pandemic threat. Along the way, virologist Nathan Wolfe published "The Viral Storm: the Dawn of a New Pandemic Age," and David Quammen warned in his gripping "Spillover" that some new animal plague could arise from the jungle and sweep across the world. And now there's Ebola. Osterholm, in a widely read column in the New York Times in September, wrote about the possibility that scientists were afraid to mention publicly the danger they discuss privately: that Ebola "could mutate to become transmissible through the air." And Garrett wrote in Foreign Policy, "Attention, World: You just don't get it." She went on to say, "Wake up, fools," because we should be more frightened of a potential scenario like the one in the movie "Contagion," in which a lethal, fictitious pandemic scours the world, nearly destroying civilization. But there were fewer takers this time. Osterholm's claims about Ebola going airborne were discounted by serious scientists, and Garrett seemingly retracted her earlier hysteria about Ebola by claiming that, after all, evolution made such spread unlikely. The scientific world has changed since 2005. Now, most scientists understand that there are significant physical and evolutionary barriers to a blood- and fluid-borne virus developing airborne transmission, as Garrett has acknowledged. Though the Ebola virus has been detected in human alveolar cells, as Vincent Racaniello, virologist at Columbia University, explained to me, that doesn't mean it can replicate in the airways enough to allow transmission. "Maybe ? the virus can get in, but can't get out. Like a roach motel," wrote Racaniello in an email. H5N1, we understand now, never went airborne because it attached only to cell receptors located deep in human lungs, and could not, therefore, be coughed or sneezed out. SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, caused local outbreaks after multiple introductions via air travel but spread only sluggishly and mostly in hospitals. There probably will always be significant barriers preventing the easy adaptation of an animal disease to the human species. Furthermore, Racaniello insists that there are no recorded instances of viruses that have adapted to humans, changing the way they are spread. So we need to stop listening to the doomsayers, and we need to do it now. Predictions of lethal pandemics have always been wrong.

### Plan Solves the Impact

#### United States and China concrete steps de-escalate regional conflict

Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), April 18, 2016, “How the US and China Can Talk Each Other Out of a Nuclear Arms Race,” <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/both-sides-now-how-us-and-china-can-talk-each-other-out-nuclear-arms-race/127569/> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Joint Views: While there are and will remain major disagreements between the two sides, there are nonetheless also substantial areas of overlap and a potential for a shared conceptual approach to managing risks. Accordingly, Washington and Beijing should seek to apply some of the concepts associated with the idea of strategic stability in managing their relations in the nuclear domain. The essential idea of strategic stability is that if both sides field forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and can credibly demonstrate to one another that their current and future capabilities cannot deny the other side a viable strategic deterrent, this confidence would eliminate the fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early, either as irritants in a crisis or as dangers in conflict. This would reduce the danger that nuclear war might begin because of essentially technical “use or lose” or “itchy trigger-finger” fears – concerns that can become very real in crises and conflicts. Proceeding from this logic, the two sides should agree to the following principles: Mutual restraint is important to maintaining strategic stability. Both sides should seek areas where their restraint can contribute to stability in the relationship. The United States is not orienting or designing its national ballistic missile defenses against China. Rather, they are motivated with respect to the Asia-Pacific by North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. Nonetheless, missile defense programs designed against intercontinental-range systems have the potential to undermine the viability of the other side’s second-strike capability. Measures designed to validate that such BMD systems do not threaten to negate the other party’s second-strike capability are therefore to be encouraged. The deployment of theater-range missile defense systems is understandable and need not undermine strategic stability. Because components of such systems can potentially threaten strategic-range missiles, or may be perceived to do so, each side should strive to differentiate its theater-range defense systems from its national defense systems. Steps that can validate to the other party that TMD systems do not have capabilities against long-range systems should be encouraged. Efforts to differentiate both sides’ nuclear (especially strategic nuclear) forces, bases, networks, and other assets from their conventional analogs should be encouraged. Because North Korea’s advancing missile and nuclear programs are driving U.S. national missile defense developments with respect to the Asia-Pacific, satisfactorily addressing these programs is crucial for stability in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear program, in particular, is a grave challenge for regional stability, and a worsening one. A conventional conflict between China and the United States would involve serious risks of escalation, and a major conventional conflict would involve grave risks of escalating to the nuclear level. Both sides should therefore focus on ensuring that their military plans, capabilities, doctrines, and postures seek to avoid encouraging nuclear escalation on the part of the other. Accordingly, both sides would benefit from a clearer understanding of the other’s nuclear doctrine, red lines, and conceptions of escalation, thereby lessening the risk of conflict arising or one that has already broken out escalating due to a preventable misunderstanding. Engagements that illuminate each side’s perspectives on these issues should therefore be encouraged. As well, crisis management cooperation should be encouraged to enable both countries to stem or stop inadvertent or accidental escalation. In addition, potential concrete measures that would promote strategic stability include reciprocal steps such as visits to national missile defense sites, observations of BMD tests, notifications of BMD and hypersonic weapon test launches, and visits to military reactors, enrichment, and reprocessing facilities; Chinese participation in New START practice inspections; official discussions on submarine security issues and verification techniques; and joint studies on key issues, to name a few. Such steps will not solve deeper political disagreement, but they could promote stabilizing postures and reduce the chances of misperception which could result in more severe tensions, or even worse.

#### US-China cooperation emboldens regional security

Roy D. Kaphausen, Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the Washington, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and Jessical Drun, Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, April 22, 2016, “What are Mil-Mil Ties Between the U.S. and China Good For?”, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/what-are-mil-mil-ties-between-the-u-s-and-china-good-for/> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Yet the mil-mil program between the United States and China could be further optimized in the near term through collaboration in areas of shared interests. This includes enhancing communication mechanisms to reduce miscalculations and assuage differences. For example, they could mutually determine the correct mix of mil-mil activities or clarify interests to the other party. Longer term, the development of a collaborative agenda could both increase security and strengthen the relationship in important ways. There seems to be scope — based off the success of extra-regional initiatives such as the Gulf of Aden exercises — for the United States and China to develop a framework of mil-mil engagement through activities that manage each other’s important constraints and deal with existing challenges.

### US – China Relations Good – Pak – China Relations

#### US-China Relations boost Pak-China bilateral ties resolving regional conflict

Pakistan Today, Staff Report, April 4, 2016, “China-US alliance will have positive impact on Pak-China relations,” <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/04/04/national/china-us-alliance-will-have-positive-impact-on-pak-china-relations/> (Accessed 4/16/2016)

China’s alliance with the United States and their unanimous position on international and regional issues will have positive impact on Pakistan-China bilateral ties. This was stated by Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University while commenting on the new phase of the Sino-US ties in the wake of President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the US. He said that forming alliances abroad can help China smooth bilateral ties, like in the context of Pakistan, the two-countries’ growing relation which are cited as exemplary the world over. The comments are based on Yan’s recent lecture “Strategies for China’s rise and changing international environment.” These appeared in the Global Times, a Chinese tabloid published under the auspices of People’s Daily newspaper. He believes that alignment between two powers is a solution of many conflicts. For instance, Pakistan is in alliance not only with China, but also with the US. In terms of issues concerning Pakistan, there is no divergence between Beijing and Washington. If China can ally itself with every single ally of the US, there will be far less controversies between the two. But the problem is China is not willing to ally with the US partners. According to Yan Xuetong, some say that forging an alliance is a Cold War mind-set. On the contrary, he says, it is nonalignment that demonstrates the Cold War mentality. The proposal of nonalignment was raised in 1956 by India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s second president Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslavia’s then president Josip Broz Tito.

### US-Japan Alliance Bad – China Conflict

#### Weakening US-Japan Alliance causes China conflict

Evelyn Goh, Professor of Strategic Policy Studies ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, July 1, 2011, “How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asian Security Order,” <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01009.x/full> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

Japan has also helped to uphold the ‘stick’ part of the regional strategy of socializing China in more overt ways. Fundamentally, its stable alliance with the US ensures credible regional deterrence against potential Chinese adventurism, or other defection from regional norms. Indeed, Japan’s support of regional security institutions such as the ARF was motivated by the need to reassure the region about its own role in regional security, including the continuation of its alliance with the US. Put crudely, Japan is the linchpin of East Asia’s ‘hedging’ strategy vis­à­vis both potential Chinese aggression and possible US abandonment. This requires Japan to perform a difficult balancing act: it has to pull enough weight within the alliance to ensure that the US security guarantee continues, but not so much as to aggravate China’s fears of being encircled. China has engaged in some provocative actions—domestic legislation in 1992 laying claim to all of the East and South China Sea, a nuclear test in 1995, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and incursions into Japan’s maritime exclusive economic zone throughout the late 1990s. In this context, the revised Japan–US alliance did help to strengthen regional deterrence and to persuade China to adopt multilateral negotiations on the South China Sea disputes, for instance. 29 On the other side of the equation, after 2001 the Koizumi administration’s eagerness to operationalize and globalize the US alliance generated repercussions for China. In 2005, the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee drew up for the first time a list of ‘common strategic objectives’, prominent among which was the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait.30 In the same year, a Japan–US joint military exercise involved simulating the defence of a Japanese island against external aggression; and from 2006 Japan’s Self-Defence Force began battle planning for three China invasion scenarios involving a Taiwan Strait crisis, the Senkaku islands, and disputed gas fields in the East China Sea.31 Japan’s latest defence planning document states that Beijing’s ‘insufficient transparency over its military forces and its security policy are of concern for the regional and global community’.32 These developments are accompanied by Japanese military acquisitions—in respect of which the key point is not how much new hardware Japan acquires, but rather what it could be used for (much like China’s own acqui- sition of asymmetrical warfare capabilities oriented towards a conflict with the US in the Taiwan Strait). Japan’s emphasis on acquiring more significant air and naval projection capabilities that will enable it to conduct offensive operations within the region, and its defensive repositioning of ground forces in the remote south-western islands facing Taiwan, can only be read by China as targeted against itself.33 As the US–Japan alliance risks tipping over into becoming an overt front for containing China, Tokyo needs to reassess this perhaps unintentional entrapment, especially since domestic and external political pressures are unlikely to ease in the foreseeable future. On the home front, although the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government has adopted a rhetorical stance critical of over-reliance on the US and in favour of closer ties with China,34 it proved quick to fall back on the US alliance during the Sino-Japanese standoff in October 2010, when Japan detained a Chinese trawler near the Senkaku islands.35 At the same time, US demands on Japan for greater alliance burden-sharing will increase in the face of the continuing global realignment of US forces and expanding US military interventions overseas. In this context, it is instructive to bear in mind that American expectations of the alliance since the late 1950s have favoured fewer constraints on Japan than the Yoshida doctrine imposed.36 As a great deal, if not all, of Japan’s force modern- ization is taking place within the constraints of the US alliance—for instance, the joint development of ballistic missile defence systems—this may significantly exacerbate Japan’s security dependence on the US and thus limit Tokyo’s future ability to hedge against entrapment within the alliance. On the other side of the renewed security dilemma, though, China also needs to rethink its expectation that Japan ought to be kept subordinate to the US indefinitely, and that any divergence from this state of affairs contravenes Chinese security interests. Socializing China into accepting a more ‘normal’ Japan and/or the legitimate place of the US–Japan alliance in the regional security order may be the ultimate challenge. China must get to grips with this dilemma: the strength- ening of the US–Japan alliance may indicate containment, but the weakening of the alliance may well cause an insecure Japan to remilitarize even faster. Essen- tially, Beijing has two options: it can face up to and engage in blatant military balancing against Japan, either along with or separate from the US; or it can try to find some way to come to terms with the evolving alliance as its own power grows. Within East Asia more broadly, the gathering momentum towards creating some sort of ‘regional community’ and building ‘regional security architecture’ suggests that other states aspire to the latter.

### US-Japan Alliance Bad – US-South Korea Relations

#### The US-Japan alliance negatively impacts US-South Korea relations

Shim Jae Hoon, YaleGlobal Journalist, October 10, 2013, “US-Japan Defense Accord Upsets Seoul” <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-japan-defense-accord-upsets-seoul> (Accessed 4/23/2016)

But it was not just bilateral issues dividing them. Broadening US security ties with Japan is fueling resentment in South Korea that the US is eroding Seoul’s strategic options by beefing up Japan. The October 3 US-Japanese agreement to revise their defense cooperation guidelines next year has raised the specter of Washington drastically strengthening Japan’s independent military capability. This prompts concerns in Seoul that Japan, an ancient foe, may assume greater responsibility for regional defense on behalf of the United States. South Korea analysts fear that their country might once again become the proverbial shrimp caught between two Asian whales – Japan and China. Such a prospect evokes unpalatable memories of Japanese invasions, occupation and brutalities – smack in the face of nuclear threats from the North. Increased Japanese responsibility not only augurs negatively for Seoul’s independent strategic space but interferes with Seoul’s attempt to forge stronger ties with China and use Beijing’s leverage in containing North Korea’s nuclear capability. The US is shifting more responsibility to South Korea, too. During his four-day trip to Seoul for assessment of North Korea’s military capability, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a series of steps that would bolster the bilateral military alliance. His visit came against the backdrop of increasing US commitment for the defense of South Korea, which hosts 28,500 US troops. In their assessment of South Korean capability, Hagel and Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin came close to agreement on delaying the transfer of command authority of the combined forces to a Korean general in 2015. They also signed a new “strategic framework” authorizing what Korean officials described as “preemptive attack” on the North’s nuclear facility in the event of a nuclear or missile attack against the South. Then, Hagel traveled to Tokyo on October 3. Joined by US Secretary of State John Kerry, Hagel signed an agreement calling for revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation guidelines next year. The Obama administration did not consult Seoul on the decision to beef up the Japanese military capability. The angst in Seoul was exacerbated by the fact that the agreement came in the midst of the Abe government seeking what it called collective self-defense, which would allow Japan to consider an attack on its ally as attack on itself. That not only would make Japan a significant military force in the region, it would necessarily involve reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that prohibits its rearmament. The new guidelines clearly target North Korea with its nuclear arms and missile launches. Although China wasn’t mentioned in the agreement, the guidelines suggest that China is becoming a new source of tension for Japan over territorial claims for nearby islets called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China. The prospect of being sandwiched between a military superpower of China to the north and an unrepentant former colonial power, newly arming itself with help from the United States, discomfits Seoul. The strategy also interferes with President Park’s policy of forging better relations with Beijing, which has considerable leverage over North Korea. At the same time, China is also a massive economic partner for South Korea, claiming a quarter of the country’s global trade volume. In contrast to frosty relations with Tokyo, Chinese President Xi Jinping at APEC offered more assurance of China’s involvement in keeping North Korea under control. Meeting on the sidelines of summit, Xi assured Park that China not only banned a long list of export items that the North could use for developing its nuclear weapons technology, he declared Beijing stood “resolutely” against another nuclear test by the North. Indeed, he promised, China will scrupulously adhere to the UN Security Council resolution keeping North Korea under strict sanctions. In short, China is going an extra mile to woo South Korea, in the hope of keeping the latter neutral if not on its side in the current competition for influence in East Asia. South Korea is disconcerted over the US policy of beefing up US-Japan alliance without regards to Seoul’s geopolitical interests. When Hagel met with Park on October 1 and asked if it wasn’t time for Seoul to mend relations with Tokyo, Park is reported to have sharply responded: “I understand the importance of Korea-Japan relations, but it’s Japan that’s constantly rubbing salt to our wounds (of past history).” The testy response notwithstanding, she has little choice. She cannot reject US or Japanese overtures at this stage unless Beijing takes full control of forcing Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arms. Nor is it wise for Seoul to try and keep Tokyo and Washington apart in the face of Beijing’s aggressive territorial stance. A good indication of this strategic dilemma was Seoul’s agreement to hold a trilateral military exercise in Korean waters, October 8 to 10, involving the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and warships from Japan and South Korea. For all that, the prospect of cobbling a strong trilateral alliance will not be smooth. Seoul is suspicious of Washington’s design of giving Japan a bigger role in the defense of East Asia. A lingering suspicion here is that Washington is building Japan as the next defense linchpin as the US faces steady cuts in defense spending. “The US is outsourcing its anti-China policy to Japan,” announced a front-page headline in the conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper on October 6 shortly after Hagel’s Tokyo agreement.

### US-Japan Alliance Bad - Senkaku

#### US-Japan Alliance causes Senkaku conflict

Daniel Flores, M.A. Stanford University, Security Studies, June 2014, "The Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The US Commitment to Japan." [https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:hp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid%3Ahp710pd1945/The%20Credibility%20of%20Extended%20Deterrence%20and%20Assurance-%20The%20US%20Commitment%20to%20Japan.pdf) (Accessed 4/23/2016)

In sum, the US security commitment to Japan is more than a mere pledge to defend it against attack. The United States pledges to respond imminent attacks against Japan and situations in areas surrounding Japan that could threaten Japan’s peace and security. The two states will work closely together to plan for the defense of Japan. The respective armed forces will conduct bilateral training and exercise. During a military conflict, the United States will coordinate its operations and support activities with Japan in order to deliver the most effective response. The United States will maintain an effective, credible nuclear deterrent to protect Japan. In extreme circumstances, it will be willing to use nuclear weapons to against an armed attack. Japanese Security We return to the introduction of this thesis to once again consider the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. President Obama’s April 2014 visit to Japan revealed how the specifics of the US commitment matter a great deal. The precise wording of Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty allows the United States to maintain that it acknowledges only that Japan administers the islands while stressing that the islands fall under the purview of that treaty. Our analysis of the commitment reveals further important details. President Obama made it clear the islands fall under Article V of the security treaty. Article V dictates that the United States will respond to an armed attack against Japan. This only tells us part of the story however. If China attacks Japanese ships in the surrounding waters or shells Japanese troops on the islands, the result is clear. The United States will become militarily involved to defend Japan. But how will the United States support Japan other than by responding to an armed attack? Article III dictates that Japan and the United States will work together to strengthen their ability to resist armed attack. Article IV states that the two states will consult with one another to determine how best to do so. In a general sense, these two articles apply to preparations for any conflict in the East China Sea. The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation state that Japan and the United States will work together when an attack against Japan appears imminent by conducting close consultation and making the necessary preparations to jointly respond if an attack does occur. This would seemingly apply if the situation between Japan and China in the East China Sea becomes tense. The guidelines further call for the two nations to conduct joint planning studies to prepare for likely contingencies. A conflict in the East China Sea is in all likelihood near the top of the list of contingencies Japan would be interested in planning and preparing for in conjunction with the United States. Finally, we consider the concept of situations in areas surrounding Japan. The text of the defense guidelines leaves some ambiguity as to what might actually constitute a situation in areas surrounding Japan. We can then consider whether this aspect of the US commitment to Japan would apply to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. An attack against Japanese ships surrounding the islands would be covered by the security treaty. A large amassment of military ships surrounding the islands would certainly be considered a likely imminent attack and be covered under the security treaty, as explained in the defense guidelines. But would the “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” section of the defense guidelines compel the United States to respond to any other situation in the East China Sea? China regularly sends ships boats to patrol the islands. At any point would these incursion be considered a situation in areas surrounding Japan? Would any other actions China takes to assert their claim to the islands or exploit the islands’ resources constitute such a situation? Furthermore, to what extent would the United States be willing to act in response to a situation in areas surrounding Japan? This aspect of the US commitment presents the possibility that the United States will take very proactive action to support Japan in its dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, but clearly there are many questions left to be answered.

# DA Answers Russia DA

### N/U: China-Russia Coop Low

#### Russia’s pivot is failing

Catherine Putz, special projects editor for The Diplomat and a graduate of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, where she studied international security and Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania, where she majored in history with a focus on U.S. diplomatic and conflict history and previously, Katie worked in several positions at the Atlantic Council and as a communications consultant at the World Bank, April 24, 2016

“Why Did Russia’s Pivot to Asia Fail?” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-did-russias-pivot-to-asia-fail/>, (accessed 5/12/16)

On the surface, the concept of a Russian pivot to Asia made sense, particularly greater cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. But, as a pair of fellows from the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin and a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center made clear in separate articles published this month, Russia’s Asia pivot has failed so far to bring benefits to Moscow.

“Two years after the Kremlin’s rift with the West, Moscow’s hopes that a new business relationship with Asia would make up for Russia’s losses have not materialized,” Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center[begins his analysis](http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/04/22/pivot-to-nowhere-realities-of-russia-s-asia-policy/ixfw) of Russia’s pivot to “nowhere.”

#### Russia’s economic pivot to China is failing now

Thomas S. Eder, Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, and Mikko Huotari, Head of Program, Geoeconomics and International Security, at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, April 17, 2016

“Moscow’s Failed Pivot to China” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-04-17/moscow-s-failed-pivot-china>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Unfortunately for Moscow, this strategy has failed. Russia has been unable, despite its efforts, to sufficiently [step up trade and investment with China](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia)in its hydrocarbons, nuclear, and defense industries, among other things. To be sure, Russia has made several deals with China that, when implemented, could see oil and gas trade skyrocket. But the construction of two gas pipelines—the “Power of Siberia” and “Altai”—intended to bring gas from Siberia to parts of China have been postponed to the 2020s. To make matters worse for Moscow, low oil and gas prices have cast doubts over these projects’ profitability, and Russian energy companies, constrained by the Western sanctions regime, are also struggling to develop oil and gas fields in eastern Siberia.

### N/L: Not Zero Sum

#### Relations aren’t zero sum – Sino-US relations don’t affect Russia-Sino coop

Ye Zicheng, professor of political science in the School of International Studies at Peking University, 2011

“Inside China’s Grand Strategy” pg. 136 (accessed 5/29/16)

A rising China should keep the following points in mind when dealing with Sino-Russian relations. First is that, with respect to China's relations with all the major powers, the Sino-Russian relationship is the best one, based on mutual respect and trust and a model for the relations with other large countries. Second, Russia plays a unique strategic role in the pro-cess of China's rise to world power status. It has been the largest supplier of modern military technology and equipment, induding Kirov-dass submarines, modern destroyers, SU 27-37 fighters, and radar guidance systems to the People's Liberation Army, and has, thereby, made major contributions to upgrading China's military capabilities. In addition, Rus-sia's abundant natural resources, such as oil, gas, and timber, are in great demand in China's economic construction. Third, cooperation with Rus-sia to promote security and stability in Central Asia is vital for the secu-rity and stability of China's northwest border. Fourth, settlement of the Sind-Russian boundary has given China a secure northern border for the first time since Russia became China's northern neighbor in 1688. Fifth, the Sino-Russian relationship is a normal friendship not aimed against any third country. Therefore, Russia and China can separately develop their own relations with the United States, Japan, and Europe without undermining their relations with each other. China did not think that Russia would sacrifice the Sino-Russian relationship to attract the United States when Moscow improved its relations with Washington after 9/11, nor does it regard Russia as a potential enemy or threat. It firmly believes that any attempt to undermine Sino-Russian relations would cause equal harm to both countries and would not be in accord with Russian interests as long as the present relations are mutually beneficial. Therefore, China should not respond to the small number of Russians who clamor about a so-called China threat by invoking a Russia threat. China is not a threat to Russia, nor is Russia a threat to China. The strategic interests of the two countries impel them to carry out strategic cooperation. Sixth, the rise of China and Russia points to a multipolar world. It is in the interests of both countries to protect and promote the cause of multipolarization. The rise of only China or only Russia would not lead to a stable multipolar world.

#### The link is wrong – the China-Russia relationship is not about the US but other shared interests

Ye Zicheng, professor of political science in the School of International Studies at Peking University, 2011

“Inside China’s Grand Strategy” pg. 138 (accessed 5/29/16)

When Russia temporarily drew closer to the United States, this posed no threat to the Sino-U.S. relationship. Later, when Russia pulled fur-ther apart from the United States, this likewise had little, if any, effect on Sino-U.S. relations. Despite China's and Russia's shared strategic interests, relations between Beijing and Moscow should not be seen as fundamen-tally directed against the United States. This would be an unrealistic view. Every country pursues its own national interest. Russia and China are no exceptions. Even when Moscow moves closer to Washington, there is no need to worry that Russia will sacrifice the Sino-Russian relationship to improve its relations with the United States. Of course, within the tri-angular relationship among China, Russia, and the United States, there will continue to be adjustments, but the possibility of an alliance between Moscow and Washington directed against Beijing is too far-fetched to take seriously. The strategic partnership and cooperation between China and Russia rest on a solid footing, and their good-neighborly relations are in accord with their national interests. In addition, there are broad pros-pects for further developing Sino-Russian relations, especially in econom-ics and trade. To sum up, the connection between Russian-U.S. relations and Sino-U.S. relations is not a zero-sum game. Russia's development can parallel China's rise, and China should support Russia's efforts to rees-tablish itself as a world power because this will hasten the transition to a multipolar world that is in the best interest of both China and Russia.

### N/L: Ties Inevitable – Shared National Identity

Sino-Russian relations are resilient regardless of the actions of other nations – our evidence is reverse causal

Gilbert Rozman, Associate Faculty member in the East Asian Studies department at Princeton University, October 29, 2014

“Asia for the Asians” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-10-29/asia-asians>, (accessed 5/12/16)

China’s rhetoric in support of Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Russia’s rhetoric endorsing Xi’s thinking about East Asia is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a feature of a new, post–Cold War geopolitical order. As long as the current political elites in China and Russia hold on to power, there is no reason to expect a major shift in either country's national identity or in the Sino-Russian relationship. Countries hoping to create a divide between the two—including Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—are bound to be disappointed. It is no accident, in other words, that the United States has failed to win China’s support against Russian expansionism in Ukraine. Whether the issue is North Korea, Iran, or some other challenge to the West, one should be prepared for more Sino-Russian competition, not less.

#### Discount their evidence – western observers misunderstand motives behind the current relationship

Gilbert Rozman, Associate Faculty member in the East Asian Studies department at Princeton University, October 29, 2014

“Asia for the Asians” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-10-29/asia-asians>, (accessed 5/12/16)

Recently, China and Russia have challenged the international order by giving each other diplomatic backing to confront Ukraine and Hong Kong, respectively. But Western observers have mostly misunderstood the countries' reasons for building closer ties with each other. They have been motivated less by shared material interests than by a common sense of national identity that defines itself in opposition to the West and in support of how each views the legacy of traditional communism. Moscow and Beijing have disagreements about the future order they envision for their regions. But they agree that the geopolitical order of the East should be in opposition to that of the West—and that has led to significantly closer bilateral relations.

### N/L: Ties Inevitable – Economic Concerns

#### Economic concerns for both nations make ties inevitable

The Economist, May 9, 2015

“An Uneasy Friendship”, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21650566-crisis-ukraine-drawing-russia-closer-china-relationship-far-equal>, (accessed 5/9/16)

All that has changed. The Ukrainian crisis is, as Russian media put it, forcing Russia to “pivot” its economy towards Asia in an effort to lessen the impact of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets and sources of capital. For China it is a golden opportunity to gain greater access to Russia’s natural resources, at favourable prices, as well as to secure access to big infrastructure contracts that might have gone to Western competitors and to provide financing for projects that will benefit Chinese firms.

### No IL: Other Countries Solve

#### Russia is likely to get new deals with many other Asian nations – they offset the loss of Chinese sales

Matthew Bodner, Defense News, November 1, 2015

“Russia Seeks To Energize Asian Presence” <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/weapons/2015/11/01/russia-seeks-energize-asian-presence/74861392/>, (accessed 5/12/16)

“Russia may have a bigger share in the Asian arms markets due to offering attractive conditions for its deals with regional powers,” said Pyotr Topychkanov, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center, a think tank here.

In particular, Russia has a chance to expand deals with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, Topychkanov argued.

#### Southeast Asia solves

Ruslan Kotyuk, staffwriter for Russia Direct, May 27, 2016

“Russia and Southeast Asia might become economic partners” <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russia-and-southeast-asia-might-become-economic-partners> (accessed 5/29/16)

Current economic challenges in Russia and the unfavorable international situation with its traditional Western partners are forcing Moscow to pay [more attention to the East](http://www.russia-direct.org/archive/june-monthly-memo-russia-reorients-orient). Apart from Russia’s extensive economic and political [cooperation with China](http://www.russia-direct.org/debates/pivotal-questions-about-russias-china-pivot), the Kremlin is looking to expand its cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia, which are very attractive both economically and technologically.

### No IL: China Not Key

#### They have it backwards – Russia’s economy has to improve BEFORE it can develop sustainable economic relations with any Asian nation or they won’t be seen as a useful partner

Catherine Putz, special projects editor for The Diplomat and a graduate of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, where she studied international security and Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania, where she majored in history with a focus on U.S. diplomatic and conflict history and previously, Katie worked in several positions at the Atlantic Council and as a communications consultant at the World Bank, April 24, 2016

“Why Did Russia’s Pivot to Asia Fail?” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-did-russias-pivot-to-asia-fail/>, (accessed 5/12/16)

Putin is famous for disliking multilateral events and only attending them for the sake of one-on-one meetings. But Putin’s snub of APEC, where symbolic gestures are fundamental to policy and international relations, was interpreted to mean only one thing: Russia was not pivoting to Asia, it was pivoting to becoming China’s junior partner.

In the end, Russia’s pivot to Asia will continue to underperform as long as the Russian economy is withered and its relations with Europe tense. That said, the two share a number of strategic interests and the failure of this pivot doesn’t necessarily undermine the political sympathy Beijing has for Moscow.

#### China will never be a committed partner

Nat Brown, associate editor of National Review Online, December 1, 2014

“Could Economic Troubles Doom Putin’s Plans?” <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/393689/could-economic-troubles-doom-putins-plans-nat-brown>, (accessed 5/9/16)
In the midst of Russia’s general economic malaise, some have touted its recently signed $400 billion gas deal with China as a sign of an economic pivot to Asia away from Europe, even of a burgeoning political alliance between the two countries. But Aron is skeptical, arguing the deal is uniquely advantageous to China and will have little effect on Russia’s continued dependence on exporting gas to Europe. “Gas sales to China — even if everything goes as planned — are not likely to reach even one-fifth of Russia’s exports to Europe,” he says. Unlike Europe, he explains, China still gets most of its energy from coal, and has signed the agreement only because it came at a steep discount to the prices Russia offers to Europe and because China only has to make minimal investments. And with an economic model is grounded in exports to the West, China isn’t about to join Russia in a political alliance against the West. Pursuit of that chimerical alliance is a sign of Putin’s desperation, Aron says — it’s “something that Putin wants from China so much that he is willing to conclude energy agreements that most Russian independent economists have described as at best questionable and at worst losing money for Russia in the long run.”

### Impact D: Russia Econ – Resilient

#### The Russian economy is resilient

Actuarial Post, July 19, 2011

“Russian recovery continues to gather momentum,” <http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/article/russian-recovery-continues-to-gather-momentum-623.htm>

In terms of GDP growth Barings believes this will remain solid, although Russia's economic recovery has been slower to gain momentum compared to other emerging European nations. Siller says: "Russia's late cyclical recovery means that whilst consumer spending is only just starting to pick up, its monetary pressures are less strained than other European countries. Consumer spending, supported by a revival in retail loan growth since early 2010, points toward a strong, sustained recovery. Evidence of growth in consumption can be seen in rising new car sales which for example are well above Turkey's." Barings believes the Russian economy has been relatively resilient to the financial crisis, and currently its budget deficit forecasts are significantly better than some other European emerging economies. While other European governments' support of growth via deficit spending comes to an end, Russia is an exception to the trend. A deficit spending increase in Russia will continue to underpin wage growth and consumption**.** Barings also expects privatisation efforts to increase and generate more growth for businesses.

### Impact D: Russia Aggression – Econ Not Key

#### No impact to Russia econ – doesn’t affect its foreign policy

Robert D. Blackwill, former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, 2009

“The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution”, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf> {accessed 5/9/16)

Now on to Russia. Again, five years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). **Did it produce a serious weakening of** Vladimir **Putin’s** power and **authority** in Russia? **No, as recent polls** in Russia **make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO** enlargement and defense measures eastward? **No.** Did it affect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, **Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as** follows: to **resurrect Russia’s standing** as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western efforts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to **extend** the reach of Russian **diplomacy** **in Europe**, Asia, and beyond; **and** to **oppose** American global **primacy. For Moscow, these** foreign policy first **principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries**. 26 **None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed** in any serious way **by** the **economic crisis.**

#### Stagnant innovation hollows out the Russian military

Nicholas Eberstadt, Chair in Political Economy @ AEI, Senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research and PhD in political economy and government from Harvard University, November/December 2011

“The Dying Bear: Russia's Demographic Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, http://tinyurl.com/otrhvvr

Russia’s brief war with Georgia in August 2008 was taken by many, including some in the Kremlin, as a sign that Russia was once again militarily resurgent after a decade of post-Soviet weakness. But the military contest with Georgia, a tiny neighbor with barely 20,000 soldiers, hardly qualiﬁed as a test of great-power capabilities, much less a test of Russia’s global reach. Beyond the question of military manpower, Russia’s defense potential today is compromised by the country’s crisis in higher education and technical training. The same poor performance in knowledge creation reﬂected in the number of Russia’s international patent awards can also be seen in the defense sector’s research and development efforts. Russia’s armaments industries have not been knowledge-driven innovators; instead, the defense sector appears largely to be living off the intellectual capital of the Soviet era. Unlike Beijing, which is committed to military modernization in the coming decades, Moscow is in effect preparing to ﬁght this century’s wars with last century’s technology. In fact, as the Russia analysts Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins noted in 2009, as China’s military capabilities have improved, Beijing has “reduced its imports of Russian military technology and even exports its own versions to traditional Russian clients such as Angola, Ethiopia and Syria.” Russia’s dwindling conventional military is on track to become the Polish cavalry of coming generations.

#### Empirics prove the economy has no impact on Russia’s power and ambitions

George Friedman, Chief Executive Officer and founder of STRATFOR, August 2, 2009

“The Russian Economy and Russian Power” <http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2009/08/02/russia-4/> (accessed 5/9/16)

Russia has been an economic wreck for most of its history, both under the czars and under the Soviets. The geography of Russia has a range of weaknesses, as we have explored. Russia’s geography, daunting infrastructural challenges and demographic structure all conspire against it. But the strategic power of Russia was never synchronized to its economic well-being. Certainly, following World War II the Russian economy was shattered and never quite came back together. Yet Russian global power was still enormous. A look at the crushing poverty — but undeniable power — of Russia during broad swaths of time from 1600 until Andropov arrived on the scene certainly gives credence to Putin’s view.

### Impact D: Russia Aggression – No Impact

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, and nuclear security

Thomas Graham, Russia in Global Affairs, 2007

"The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### War is unlikely

Victor Baranets, retired Colonel, July 20, 2007,

“Will America Fight Russia?” DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia), lexis

Ivashov: **I do not think that the war on Russia will deteriorate into WWIII**. Russia lacks strategic allies. More to the point, the Russian military potential is incomparable with the combined forces of Europe and America.
Yesin: Should the Russian-American war begin, it will inevitably deteriorate into the Third World War. The United States is a NATO member and this bloc believes in collective security. In fact, collective security is what it is about.
Vladimirov: Deterioration of the Russian-American armed conflict into **WWIII is unlikely** because the rest of the world will hold its collective breath and sit tight waiting for the winner to emerge from the fracas. It is America's small satellites like Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and even the western Ukraine whose military activeness is possible. As for China, it will merely gloat from a distance. Like the proverb where someone watches from a mountaintop how the tigers were fighting down below..

### Impact D: No Miscalc

#### Numerous checks and balances

Kathleen Bailey, Senior Fellow @ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August 1998

http://www.nipp.org/5.php

**Neither U.S. nor Russian nuclear weapons can be fired accidentally, nor can an illegitimate order to fire be acted upon.** There are **numerous checks and balances** to **assure a very high level of control over weapons** (see Table 2). **Nuclear weapons require a series of steps not only to issue the order to fire** (and for the recipient to authenticate the order once received), **but also to execute the order**. For example, instruction **codes** to issue a command to fire U.S. nuclear weapons **are kept in a safe. To open the safe requires** that an order from the commander-in-chief (or his successor) be received and de-coded. Two individuals, each with complementary components of the combination or key to the safe must then participate in opening it. (In Russia, there are t**hree individuals.**) A single person cannot do the action, nor can it be done by only the two people with the key; others must be aware and complicit in the action. **The weapons themselves** also **have** codes and/or **mechanical devices, which must be** implemented or **activated** correctly to enable the weapon to be fired.

### T/: Russia Aggression – Econ Decline Good

#### Lack of exports kills Russia’s ability to fund its aggression

Jayant Singh, Researcher at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, June 6, 2015

“Russia and India: A 21st Century Decline” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/russia-and-india-a-21st-century-decline/>, (accessed 5/9/16)

This shift is significant, and is driven by what IDSA scholar, Jyotsna Bakshi, calls Moscow’s “compulsive” need to sell weapons. One of the most important issues following the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the distribution of its external state debt and assets among the fifteen successor states. Russia inherited a mammoth military-industrial complex (MIC) that comprised 1,600 defense enterprises staffing nearly two million people. Today, that number has grown to include between 2.5 and 3 million workers, representing 20 percent of all manufacturing jobs in Russia. However, Russia did not inherit an equally robust economy to support its expansive MIC. Average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the three years leading up to the break-up of the Soviet Union was 14.1 percent, compared with 3.8 percent for Russia between 1992 and 2013 was 3.8 percent. To make up for the deficit in military expenditure and maintain the economies of scale to sustain its resource hungry defense and R&D facilities Russia became increasingly reliant on military exports. As Bakshi [points out](http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-100.html), former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov once stated that arms exports were the “life buoy for our defense industries now that the defense budget is so small and military state orders are so few.” Thus, in addition to fostering strategic cooperation with other countries, the sale of Russian weapons to foreign nations is driven by the financial imperative of bankrolling its own domestic defense industries. In all likelihood, Russia’s decision to revive military exports to Pakistan and others is essentially motivated by the economic need to maintain a high level of military exports.

#### Military spending is partially to blame for the current decline – means it will be the first thing cut in the event of economic collapse

Nat Brown, associate editor of National Review Online, December 1, 2014

“Could Economic Troubles Doom Putin’s Plans?” <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/393689/could-economic-troubles-doom-putins-plans-nat-brown>, (accessed 5/9/16)
One might hope that the economic consequences of Russia’s actions abroad will lead to political pressure on Putin at home, but that’s never a sure thing. According to the Levada Center, Russia’s most trusted polling source, Putin’s approval rating hit an all-time high of 88 percent in October 2014.

Yet it’s clear that Putin’s rule and Russia’s actions in Ukraine increasingly come at a real economic cost to Russian citizens.

#### Empirically Russian economic decline increases global cooperation and arms control

Jeffrey Mankoff, specialist in Eurasian/Russian affairs, adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, April 2010

“The Russian Economic Crisis” Council Special Report No. 53 <http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/russian-economic-crisis/p21803> (accessed 5/9/16)

**The weakening of Russia’s** energy, military, and **financial clout has made it more difficult for Moscow to openly flout international norms or aggressively challenge U.S. hegemony. Although Washington and Moscow remain far apart on many issues, relations have improved since early 2009.** In part, the improvement seems connected to President Obama’s commitment to resetting relations with Russia, but **Moscow’s changed international priorities in the context of the crisis appear to be playing a role too. The recognition that Russia’s lack of competitiveness threatens its security has made elements of Russia’s recent assertive foreign policy unsustainable. One example is arms control negotiations, where financial constraints imparted a new urgency to Russian leaders’ calls for cutting the two sides’ strategic arsenals** in the accord signed in April 2010 to replace the expired 1st Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1). Moreover, **trade between the two countries continues to increase despite the crisis,** and **Moscow has expressed a clear interest in deepening economic ties, arguing that “economic cooperation is the basis for the ‘reset.’”15**

#### Exports key to Russia affording military aggression

[Nikolas K. Gvosdev](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/nikolas-k-gvosdev), Professor of National Security Studies at the US Naval War College and contributing editor at The National Interest, “The Bear Has No Claws: Is Russia's Massive Military Modernization Over?” October 10, 2014

“<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-bear-has-no-claws-russias-massive-military-modernization-11445>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Russia's ambitious, decade-long plan for the modernization and expansion of its military capabilities is imperiled by current trends in the global economy. Economic slowdowns combined with more sources of supply—especially as previously inaccessible reserves have come online as a result of new technologies—are producing a glut of both oil and natural gas on world markets—decreasing prices and thus the export tax revenue which sustains the Russian federal budget. On top of that, the current expenses being generated as a result of Russian policy on Ukraine—the costs of absorbing Crimea (and the potential expenditures to support the separatist regions of southeastern Ukraine) plus the spending needed to cushion the impact of Western sanctions—are growing. In addition, sanctions are likely to shave at least 1 percent from Russia's planned economic growth for 2014, putting the economy into recession. Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov has bluntly noted that, in reviewing the defense program, the government needs “[to reconsider the amount of resources devoted in the course of this new program, so that they are more realistic](http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/finance-minister-urges-defense-budget-rethink-amid-bleak-economic-forecast/508569.html).” At the same time, however, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who oversees the Russian military-industrial complex, [has vowed that the plan will stay on schedule](http://news.yahoo.com/finance-minister-warns-russia-cant-afford-military-spending-150729690--sector.html).

#### Exports key to Russia’s defense industry

Rakesh Krishnan Simha, writer for Russia Beyond the Times, March 22, 2014

“All guns firing: Russian arms trade on the rebound” <http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/03/22/all_guns_firing_russian_arms_trade_on_the_rebound_33927>, (accessed 5/9/16)

But for Russia exports are bread and butter. “For post-Soviet Russia, the arms trade became a major source of revenue for the defence industry, which for two decades virtually stopped producing for the domestic market,” [says Dmitri Trenin](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756577.shtml), director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

#### Recent empirics prove Putin will be forced to divert resources away from the military

Nat Brown, associate editor of National Review Online, December 1, 2014

“Could Economic Troubles Doom Putin’s Plans?” <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/393689/could-economic-troubles-doom-putins-plans-nat-brown>, (accessed 5/9/16)

An example: This summer, massive capital flight forced Putin to divert funds from Russia’s main pension fund in order to finance infrastructure projects, something he had promised he would never do just a year before. One of Putin’s early accomplishments in office was to stabilize Russia’s pensions, which had been ravaged by the economic turmoil of the 1990s; one of his main blocs of support is state workers and retirees. Aron asks, “Will Putin’s political base — the pensioners and the state employees (doctors, teachers) — accept beggaring?”

### Impact D: China Aggression – Gradualism

#### China has a very long-term view of strategy, which makes restraint easier

Zachary Keck, associate editor of [The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/), January 6, 2014

“AirSea Battle vs. Blockade: A False Debate?” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/airsea-battle-vs-blockade-false-debate-9665?page=1, (accessed 5/9/16)

Thirdly, the gradualist approach is consistent with Chinese culture. The most difficult aspect of pursuing the gradualist approach is having enough patience to exercise restraint over the course of many decades. Yet China, more so than any other country, is positioned to act with such restraint given its long-term view of events. This outlook is largely rooted in the fact that, as Henry Kissinger put it, “No other country can claim so long a continuous civilization, or such an intimate link to its ancient past and classical principles of strategy and statesmanship” as can China.

#### No Chinese aggression – they will stick to a gradualist approach to avoid escalation.

James Holmes, Associate Professor of Strategy at the US Naval College, and Toshi Yoshihara, holds the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies, April 23, 2012

“Small-Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/small-stick-diplomacy-the-south-china-sea-6831?page=3>, (accessed 5/9/16)

Third, employing nonmilitary means eschews escalation while keeping disputes local. Using a blunt military instrument like the PLA Navy would internationalize any minor incident, bringing about the outcome China fears most. Shots fired in anger by PLA gunners likely would provoke regionwide protests while igniting nationalist passions. Unobtrusive methods, by contrast, keep contests bilateral while stacking the deck in China's favor.

Fourth, nonmilitary vessels empower Beijing to exert low-grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses in coastal states' maritime-surveillance capacity while testing their political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant.

#### China wants gradualism – they have a long-term view of their goals based on history

Zachary Keck, associate editor of [The Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/), January 6, 2014

“AirSea Battle vs. Blockade: A False Debate?” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/airsea-battle-vs-blockade-false-debate-9665?page=1, (accessed 5/9/16)

Additionally, China’s expansive history has seen repeated instances of the Chinese state rising and falling, further encouraging Chinese leaders to take such a long-term view of their current strategic environment.

### Impact D: China Aggression – Unsustainable

#### Chinese aggression isn’t unsustainable – huge economic problems coming now that will force a shift to domestic focus

Salvatore Babones, associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, August 5, 2015

“Why China's Massive Military Buildup Is Doomed” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-chinas-massive-military-buildup-doomed-13494>, (accessed 5/9/16)

As a result, China's military spending will be caught between a rock and a hard place. The PLA may be able to maintain some fiscal momentum by improving efficiency and reducing corruption, but the days of double-digit budget increases are over. Soon the Chinese government will be asking the PLA to "do more with less." American generals may come to sympathize with their Chinese peers.

#### China can’t even sustain current aggression for much longer

Salvatore Babones, associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, August 5, 2015

“Why China's Massive Military Buildup Is Doomed” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-chinas-massive-military-buildup-doomed-13494>, (accessed 5/9/16)

This is bad news for corrupt officers at all levels of the PLA, many of whom will have paid premium prices for their jobs at the top of the military market bubble. But it is good news for China's neighbors and the security of the[Asia-Pacific region](http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=5497#top-content). The South China Sea may not break out in peace overnight, but China simply will not be able to sustain the current pace of its buildup in the region.’

### Impact D: NK Aggression – Won’t Happen

#### No aggression – Econ concerns are pushing North Korea towards dialogue

Korea Herald, September 3, 2015

“Economic revival appears to be behind N. Korea's push for dialogue with S. Korea: U.S. expert” http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150903000182

North Korea is believed to have used the latest military standoff with South Korea to get inter-Korean talks started so as to win economic cooperation and investment necessary to rebuild its broken economy, a U.S. expert said Wednesday.
The military standoff, which began with the explosion of landmines secretly planned by the North and led later to an exchange of artillery fire across the border, was defused with a peace agreement reached after days of marathon negotiations first proposed by Pyongyang.
"Whatever the motivation for the mine incident was, I think the motivation for the resolution of the crisis was to get a dialogue started again, which is where the North Koreans had suggested in January they wanted to be," Robert Carlin, a North Korea expert, said during a discussion organized by 38 North.

#### No North Korean military aggression – empirics prove it’s just posturing

Jethro Mullen and Kathy Novak, CNN correspondents citing Jamie Metzl an Asia expert for the Atlantic Council, August 21, 2015

“North Korea ratchets up tensions after trading fire with South” http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreas-tensions/

Jamie Metzl, an Asia expert for the Atlantic Council in New York, said he thought it was unlikely that the current crisis would escalate further. "North Korea has more to gain from conflict theater than from a conflict that would quickly expose its fundamental weakness," he said, suggesting leaders in Pyongyang might be trying to "make trouble because they feel ignored by the international community and feel they have something to gain negotiating their way out of a mini-crisis."

### Impact D: NK Aggression – No Escalation

#### The whole historical record agrees there won’t be escalation

Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, and Hannah Suh, Program Coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, The National Interest, The Biggest Myth about North Korea, July 9, 2015

“The Biggest Myth About North Korea” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290> (accessed 5/9/16)

This bears out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavior—even during the so-called “second Korean war” of the late 1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks. Today, North Korea threatens South Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. In repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows and suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. North Korea has had countless opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint. Whatever North Korea’s rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track record shows a preference for not taking actions that would jeopardize the regime, and the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that.

#### More evidence – war would be suicide for North Korea which means they don’t want it

Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, and Hannah Suh, Program Coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, The National Interest, The Biggest Myth about North Korea, July 9, 2015

“The Biggest Myth About North Korea” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290> (accessed 5/9/16)

Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a pathology based on an imaginary North Korea. No matter one’s political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk.

# Kritik Answers Securitization K

### Perm: Do Both - Solvency

#### Either the perm solves or case is a disadvantage to the alternative

Nik Hyneka, Department of International Relations and European Studies Metropolitan University Prague and David Chandler,

Department of International Relations, Charles University and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminister, 2013, “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, p. 50

The rejection of states as the subjects of security study was a critical attempt to posit an alternative ontology of security. This was, from the beginning a project based on normative ideals rather than contestation based on real-world struggles and alternatives. For many authors, advocating an alternative normative vision was more important than engaging with real-world practices and understandings. The acceptance and wide appeal of such an approach can only be understood in the context of the fact that just such normative claims were being made by Western governments, appealing to normative justifications for their projection of power. Without this link to policy-making discourses, these normative views would have remained marginal to security studies.

#### Either the alternative is a hollow gesture that privileges the State, which takes out their internal link, OR the permutation solves and the alternative is not mutually exclusive

Mandy Turner, director of the Kenyon Institute, former lecturer in conflict resolution at the University of Bradford, former research fellow at the University of Bradford, and Neil Cooper, PhD, professor of international security studies at the University of Bradford, 2013, “The Iron First of Liberal Intervention Inside the Glove of Kantian Idealism: A Response to Burke,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 35-41

The second problem we have with the article lies with its treatment of the state and of power. The article begins well enough, by offering the usual cosmopolitan promise of radical critique of the state-centric approaches to security. For Burke, states continue to be ‘profound sources of insecurity’ and prone to the pathological security logic of autoimmunisation, whereby responses ostensibly geared to protecting the social body end up threatening to destroy it. Moreover, ‘dominant patterns of analysis remain imprisoned within the nation state and its structure of existence, identity and being’. Global security governance is ‘overly beholden to the interests of major powers’ (understood as states) and such problems are inherent in the state-centric conceptual history of collective security. In contrast, insecurity processes are really globalised and ‘transnational’. Indeed, as a result of ‘historical, social and systemic processes, human beings have unified their life and death processes on a planetary scale’ (e.g. via nuclear strategy or environmental degradation). Instead, Burke promises a cosmopolitan project predicated on ‘profound transformation of the national security ontology’. Ultimately, however, the radical transformatory promise of Burke’s security cosmopolitanism turns out to be rather hollow. After all the rhetoric, he merely wants us to treat the security of states and human beings as ‘of equal weight’ [our italics]. This not only falls well short of Booth’s far more radical call to treat individuals as the ends rather than the means of security but it does not even accord with human security frameworks, which (however problematic) do ostensibly privilege the security of the human over the security of the state. In sum, Burke’s is not actually as radical a vision of security as it purports to be. Similarly, it is the state that tends to be privileged as a principal security actor. For example, although Burke rejects the idea that national governments can contain their communities within a prophylactic cocoon of safety, this simply means that, instead, ‘states must ensure that the world is secured’. Admittedly, this is predicated on a simultaneous cosmopolitan transformation of the identity forms and policies of states but it is never really spelt out exactly how this is to be achieved and even if it was, this still remains as an approach that privileges the state as an agent of security.

### Perm: Do Both - Solvency

#### Critical theory must be tied to material and structural change. Otherwise the alternative does not solve

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, 2015, “Security cosmopolitanism: the next phase,” Critical Studies on Security, [3](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1):[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), p. 197

The theory of security cosmopolitanism in fact develops out of my own earlier critique of the power, history, and danger of the state security ontology derived from Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Hegel and is framed as an answer to the lethal power of its ontology. In both phases of my career, I would see myself as agreeing with Ken Booth that ‘it is not the meaning of security that is the challenge facing us. . . but the politics of the meaning’. In my previous work, I had shown how the claim and promise of security was deeply implicated with the historical development of political sovereignty – and the nation-state – as a socio-political formation, which certainly raised a question as to whether we could escape or transform such formations and whether ‘security’ would form part of such a language. Yet the Hobbesian ontology had such power, in part, because it understood that insecurity was immanent to the social. Security is not merely a discourse, a politics, or an abstraction, but is also what Booth terms an ‘instrumental value’ to all humans; it is an objective need for physical and psychological safety, sustenance, health, education, culture, and opportunity that enables humans to do more than merely survive. Given the collective threat that human activity poses to ecosystems, one could also argue that security from destructive human activities is something needed for ecologies to survive and prosper. A critical theory of security thus needs to balance a critique of the politics and ontology of security with an appreciation of its material and structural necessity.

### A2: Social construction/ discourse

#### Viewing security solely through the lens of speech acts overdetermines the act as significant, which means they have no impact to single event discourses

Stefano Guzzini, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen and Professor of Government at Uppsala University, Sweden, 2015, “A dual history of ‘securitisation’,” DIIS· Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 2015: 02, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:857327/FULLTEXT01.pdf, Accessed 5-8-2016

Conceiving of security as a speech act is important, because it shows that the form/performance of security can be seen as the politically most relevant component of its content. However, it cannot show that this is all that there is to its content. For, unlike the original conception of a ‘speech act’, security speech does not in itself constitute the significant act, as does, for instance, a promise. Only in its most legal sense can security be empirically conceived of as a ‘speech act’ in terms of a single event. This rare case would apply to those moments where a formal national security speech constitutes a threat of war, an offer of peace or, paradigmatically, a declaration of war or surrender. Lawyers have little difficulty understanding the idea of a ‘speech act’, since they have defined the practical effects of such statements in laws or customs. However, this was never the case for the paradigmatic case from which securitisation – indeed desecuritisation – initially derived; German ‘Ostpolitik-isation’ makes most sense as an ongoing process, not a single event. Hence, for me, stressing the procedural character of the original securitisation analysis means that its performative component is simply part of an ongoing social construction of (social) reality. In this, securitisation refers to the successful mobilisation of the logic of the discourse of security, the reversal of Clausewitz, which allows extraordinary means, and desecuritisation refers to those processes that mobilise other discourses and diminish the role of the discourse of security, its successful demobilisation, if you wish. That means that all the discussions about the factors which are necessary to make securitisation successful are correct, but do not touch the underlying continuity and latent effect of such security discourses. That is, the discourse of security is stable; its (de)mobilisation is the variance in the study. Put more sharply: the discourse of security does securitisation, always; it is what defines it. But the discourse of security is not always mobilised or prevalent. It is a discursive resource for some. To have this capacity, however, it needs to be a constitutive component of the way of thinking and of legitimate politics for all.

#### The relational action is more important than the security speech act, which is also able to de-securitize politics

Paul Roe, Associate Professor of International Relations and European Studies at Central European University, 2012, “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics,” Security Dialogue, 43.3, p. 249

It is indeed the case that the Copenhagen School has underconceptualized the role of the audience. This is something of which Wæver (2003) himself is well aware. But, it is debatable whether the Copenhagen School favours an internalist reading of the securitization concept. Although Wæver is keen to stress the importance of the ‘moment’ of the speech act, and thus retain its illocutionary force, he nevertheless also leans towards the importance of the relation­ship between securitizing actor and audience. Wæver warns of viewing securitization as a ‘uni­lateral performance’ – that undertaken only by the sovereign – and thus its equivalence to a ‘Schmittian anti-democratic decisionism’. Rather: We [members of the Copenhagen School] preserve the event-ness of the speech act and the performative moment, but locate it in-between the actors.... This might look like perlocution because it includes something after the speaker’s first action, but if the speech act is viewed as a larger whole including audience, it is more appropriate to see securitization as what is done in the (collective) act, rather than dissolving the move into one component of a larger complex social explanation of processes. The important point here is how the security speech act moves away from a Schmittian to an Arendtian conception of politics, ‘because the theory places power in-between humans ... and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with “things” external to a community but internal to it’. For Wæver, securitization thus takes place in a context where there is space for open politics: actors and audi­ences together agree as to what constitutes security and what does not. This is not to say that agreement is necessarily reached on an equal basis, as actors often pos­sess, and indeed employ, the resources to cajole and bully audiences into acquiescing to their depiction of events. But, it is to say that some kind of agreement is nevertheless required. Indeed, the potential for securitization to avoid its Schmittian connotations in this way is also recognized by Williams. For Williams, the importance of the audience relates to a ‘discursive ethics’ that goes against the decisionist account of securitization. The security speech act entails the possibil­ity of dialogue and thereby also the potential for the transformation of security. And although Williams seems somewhat sceptical as to the extent to which securitizations are subject to such ‘discursive legitimation’ – also noting how security issues often ‘operate in the realm of secrecy, of “national security”, of decision’ – he nonetheless makes clear the potential for securitizations to be ‘pulled back’ into the public realm, ‘particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both’.

### “Critical” Turn

#### “Critical” security studies has lost its emancipatory edge and collapsed into Western understandings that are anti-emancipatory

Nik Hyneka, Department of International Relations and European Studies Metropolitan University Prague and David Chandler,

Department of International Relations, Charles University and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminister, 2013, “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, p. 48

We wish to argue that the exhaustion of the emancipatory impetus of CSS is evident in the ways in which the space for ‘critical’ advocacy and policy collaboration between academics and foreign policy think tanks and organisations has diminished since the early 2000s. In the 1990s, when policy-makers made radical claims of transformative policy practices, critical security theorists were feted on all sides. In the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, these theorists were out-manoeuvred by post-structuralist theorists who could use these radical claims couched in universal and liberal understandings of rights and freedoms in order to argue against the emancipatory project per se. Especially since 2001, the war on terror provided much less room for emancipatory alternatives and also facilitated a critique of modernist (liberal) universalist aspirations, as critical theorists argued against liberal articulations of emancipatory goals as merely the ideological gloss for unending ‘global war’. Today we are left with very little of the emancipatory aspirations of CSS. In fact, it could well be argued that most of the current strands of what we call ‘critical security studies’ would reject emancipatory approaches altogether. Rather than imposing Western understandings of emancipation, advocates of emancipatory security approaches today recognise that there is a problem of which actors have emancipatory agency in these approaches. It seems clear from today’s vantage point (at least) that even the first generation of critical theorists lacked Cox’s (1981, 130) emphasis on the alternative emancipatory actors that could enable critical approaches to be a guide to strategic action. For Cox (1981, 128), the statement that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ was not a passive declaration of who the asserted beneficiaries of the theory would be but an understanding that theory reflects a certain practical ‘standpoint in time and space’. The major problem at the heart of CSS was that, from the start, CSS in Western academia posited the possibility that emancipatory theory could exist independently of an emancipatory subject. While Cox (1981, 150) understood the role of critical theory as a challenge to the concerns of power and as a guide to emancipatory – ‘counter-hegemonic’ – actors struggling to challenge the hierarchies of power and the system of social relations which enforced them, critical theory was imported into security studies at precisely the moment that the dominant counter-hegemonic forces of the modern era (socialist or state based attempts to resist free market domination) had terminally collapsed.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – General Turns / No Solvency

#### The alternative oversimplifies applications of cosmopolitanism which scuttles attention to climate change, poverty and inequality. It robs “security” of any meaning for criticism

Rita Floyd, Department of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Birmingham, 2015, “The question of value-added: a response to Burke,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 163-164

In my view, security cosmopolitanism suffers the same fate as being about everything and consequently nothing for the following interrelated reasons. For Burke, insecurity arises out of modernity and accordingly is omnipresent; indeed, he uses the label ‘insecurity’ to describe a large number of world ills, including: inequality, underdevelopment, poverty, environmental degradation, and climate change, whereas security is defined as the absence of ‘serious threats to human survival [and] flourishing’, and the presence of ‘peace at the global level’ (2013, 13). Moreover, he holds that security actors are those persons ‘whose decisions and operations will affect security of others’, yet if security, as a valuable state of being, is conceived in the way he does, it follows that practically every action is a security action and every actor a security actor. In short, and to paraphrase a well-worn phrase: there is nothing outside security. But what is the value-added of conceptualizing the world in this way? In my view, it runs the risk of oversimplifying very complex relationships and dynamics. It is not clear, for example, how this argument compares to that of well-established cosmopolitan thinkers who do not evoke the terms ‘security’ and/or ‘security action’ and who have produced highly distinct accounts on how to address, among other things, global poverty, just emissions, inequality, and rights from a broadly cosmopolitan perspective. If everything is a matter of security and for security action, moreover, it will be very difficult to settle which of these ills should be prioritized. But then Burke does not really mean or envisage security action when he uses this term, instead he means any kind of political, economic, or developmental policies that would enhance ‘security as a state of being’ (see Herington 2012 for these distinctions). While it is not impossible that security action is non-exceptional in nature and thus simply takes the form of ordinary politics, however, that kind of action would still require that security practitioners conceive of their actions as security actions, as opposed to scholars telling us that this is what they are. In other words, it confuses our understanding to refer to all those policies that we as scholars perceive as making the world a safer or more secure place as security actions.

#### Burke’s alternative is a self-reinforcing and counter-productive discursive frame

Fiona Robinson, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2015, “A modest proposal: comments on Burke’s security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, 3:2, pp. 173-174

Second, despite its emphasis on relationality and solidarity, security cosmopolitanism seems to reproduce categories of ‘governed’ and ‘governing’, emphasizing the agency of only the former: ‘an ethic of responsibility of the governing not merely to those they govern but to all those whom they affect and should be accountable, especially the marginalized and vulnerable’. Moreover, his three guiding ethical principles refer to the responsibilities of states and ‘security actors’, where the latter are defined as ‘those non-state and civil society actors, such as corporations, NGOs, or militant organizations, whose decisions and operations will affect the security of others'. This dyadic logic of who provides security for whom rests upon a self-reinforcing, and ultimately counterproductive, discursive frame. Like Laura Sjoberg, I am particular unsettled by Burke’s reference to his faith in the ‘ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous processes and actions’. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of governance – through the securitization of ‘dangerous’ processes, and governance through consent – about which the so-called ‘hypercritical’ post-structuralists are so (rightly) concerned.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – General Turns / No Solvency

#### Burke’s cosmopolitanism only reproduces a securitopia and locks in the subaltern into submission. Universality results in hegemony

Oliver P. Richmond, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK; College

of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea; Centre for Peace Studies, University of Tromso, 2015, “Security cosmopolitanism or ‘securitopia’: an ontological trap and a half-hearted response to structural war?,” Critical Studies on Security, [3](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1):[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), pp. 182-183

He argues that this evolution does not represent a new security utopia (or what I term securitopia). It balances the architecture of security with the subjects of security, placing the already secured in league with the unsecured subaltern. His approach attempts also to accept the agonism that goes with the impossibility of fully reconciling security preferences and explains what this means for cosmopolitan thought concerned with universal norms, or alternatively, for global solidarity. He also builds a longer-term perspective of some considerable complexity, including future generations, and a multidimensional awareness far beyond the standard two-dimensional political analysis often connected with binary-code versions of security in the mainstream securitised, territorialised, nationalistic yet globalised, policy environment. Burke’s approach also acknowledges the certainty of unintended and unknowable consequences. Yet, I still suspect that his argument reproduces another securitopia because the already secure (ontologically and/or epistemologically) have such an enormous head start over the insecure subaltern. Much of what Burke offers draws on and refreshes a 1990s era understanding of Critical Security theories, updated in view of new understandings about mobility, networks, technology, environmental issues, and the capillary circulation, rather than immobility and capture of power. His attempt to bring together (whilst taming) post-structuralist insights with post-English School debates on critical security uses the common critical theory gambit of retaining a long-standing liberal international expectation that universality and globality are necessary (though perhaps ‘thin’) and may yet offer ethical and epistemological perspectives about a deeper understanding of universal security capable of incorporating subaltern claims. However, this is despite much evidence throughout history that concepts of universality tend to follow hegemony rather than the subaltern, merely to knock off its rough edges and domesticate it. His argument of course retains a strong hint of the other critical internationalist mode of thought – Marxist structural accounts of power and its impact on the social, taken up by many critical and post-structural theorists. Thus, he touches upon the contradiction between any universal understandings of security and the social implications of insecurity, which any subaltern rendering of security immediately lay bare. What he argues bears repetition as an example of the potential for incremental development in our understanding of the relationship between security and emancipation.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – Colonialism / no solvency

#### Their emancipatory goal is an illusory hubris that locks in static understandings of the world. The alternative assuages Western policymakers and makes transformation impossible

Nik Hyneka, Department of International Relations and European Studies Metropolitan University Prague and David Chandler,

Department of International Relations, Charles University and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminister, 2013, “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 56-57

We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the ‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other. Judging policy-making and policy outcomes, on the basis of this imputed goal, may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative standpoints but it does little to develop academic and political understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater straw man could have been imagined, than the ability to become ‘critical’ on the basis of debates around the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory policy missions. Today, as we witness a narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere. Some academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local demands’.

The double irony of the birth and death of CSS is not only that CSS has come full circle – from its liberal teleological universalist and emancipatory claims, in the 1990s, to its discourses of limits and flatter ontologies, highlighting differences and pluralities in the 2010s – but that this ‘critical’ approach to security has also mirrored and mimicked the policy discourses of leading Western powers. As policy-makers now look for excuses to explain the failures of the promise of liberal interventionism, critical security theorists are on hand to salve Western consciences with analyses of non-linearity, complexity and human and non-human assemblages. It appears that the world cannot be transformed after all. We cannot end conflict or insecurity, merely attempt to manage them. Once critique becomes anti-critique and emancipatory alternatives are seen to be merely expressions of liberal hubris, the appendage of ‘critical’ for arguments that discount the possibility of transforming the world and stake no claims which are unamenable to power or distinct from dominant philosophical understandings is highly problematic. Let us study security, its discourses and its practices, by all means but please let us not pretend that study is somehow the same as critique.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – Military Intervention Turns

#### Burke’s cosmopolitanism is a useless path of universalism that collapses into the same liberalist impulses which cause military intervention into Libya

Simon Dalby, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2015, Security: cosmopolitan, human, critical? Comment on Tony Burke’s ‘Cosmopolitan security,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 167-168

Burke’s attempt to join up formulations of security that involve states, the international system, communities and individuals runs through numerous themes that have been discussed at length in scholarly journals in the last couple of decades. In particular, his efforts to rework some of Kant’s concerns into a framework of desirable principles engage key themes in the post-cold war discussion of globalization and the violence of what was frequently termed a ‘global’ war on terror. The tensions between various modes of thinking keep breaking through in Burke’s text, and in doing so they highlight why continuing to contest security is an essential political practice for those who take critique seriously. The tensions also point to the great difficulties that arise in attempting to discuss matters in terms of how ‘we’ get from ‘here’ to ‘there’ and the difficulties that Kant struggled so much with in his cosmopolitan arguments, political difficulties that scholars ignore at their intellectual peril. Phrasing matters in these terms emphasizes the difficulty of juxtaposing security and critique, something that other authors in the first issue of this journal have also suggested at some length. Scholars who draw on Robert Cox’s (1981) elaboration of the distinction between problem solving and critical theory emphasize the point that theory is always for some purpose and for some social entity too. Those that focus on problems assume the context for analysis and suggested solutions as given; those who look to critical theory suggest that understanding the historical formation of the context in the first place is key to a better politics, a more complete understanding of structural violence, injustice and the need for political struggles to rectify these matters. The possibilities of critique per se as scholarly practice often get short shrift in this discussion. Without an obvious emancipatory subject, Hynek and Chandler (2013) suggest that critical security studies are politically pointless. Presumably, following this line of argument, critical security studies ought to have a fairly direct connection with some social movements if they are to be politically efficacious. If it is not to be politically effective why bother at all!? It would also seem that critical security’s connections with human security ought to be obvious. Here is an ambitious formulation of freedom from numerous constraints to human flourishing, analogous to the liberal emancipatory impulse that Booth (1991) long ago called for as the key to some notion of critical security. The assumption that military action could provide human security dissolved fairly quickly after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Formulated in terms of the responsibility to protect, a principle that, while notable in its extension to supposedly encompass all humanity, was quickly invoked as a justification for an old fashioned imperial military intervention in Libya’s civil war in 2011, human security by military means became untenable.

#### Security Cosmopolitanism masks structures of oppression. Burke’s veiled universalism is a guise for military intervention

Mandy Turner, director of the Kenyon Institute, former lecturer in conflict resolution at the University of Bradford, former research fellow at the University of Bradford, and Neil Cooper, PhD, professor of international security studies at the University of Bradford, 2013, “The Iron First of Liberal Intervention Inside the Glove of Kantian Idealism: A Response to Burke,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 35-41

The less generous interpretation is that Burke actually helps to mask rather than uncover the iniquitous structures of the current global order. Worse still, one can also detect a rather dangerous authoritarian streak in the discourse and system of security cosmopolitanism. Burke critiques teleological visions of change as ultimately leading to a remote and ineffective global governance structure, but then proposes that security cosmopolitanism should be predominantly ‘results-based’ and that these results can be assessed against a universal categorical imperative: act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human beings. For Burke, this is possible for two reasons. First, because he considers that all actors and institutions can ‘meet the test that they are advancing the global security of humanity and ecosystems without bias or discrimination’. Second, however, this is only really possible because Burke adopts the expedient strategy of simply ignoring the extensive literature discussing the processes by which issues become labelled as security problems, the debates over who gets to define them as such and whether, indeed, attaching the security label to an issue represents a progressive or a regressive move. To be clear, all security issues are subject to processes of social construction and, therefore, emerge as a result of particular sets of relationships between power and interest. As David Campbell has powerfully illustrated, this includes something as apparently material as a bullet in the head, the meaning of which is subject to numerous processes of social construction. It most definitely includes the question of what constitutes a secure life for all. This is not to advocate a retreat into relativist resignation, but rather to argue that the kind of emancipatory approach to security we would advocate has to be founded on a deep interrogation of these relationships combined with a project to identify the emancipatory potentials that reside within them. For all his emphasis on the needs of the governed then, Burke ultimately ends up prescribing a form of universalism to be managed by global elites and experts imbued with cosmopolitan values and underpinned by ‘the exercise of (occasionally coercive) power’ – what we would refer to as the iron fist of liberal military intervention hidden inside the velvet glove of Kantian idealism.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – Subjectivity Turn

#### The alternative is normatively dangerous and reifies insecurity. The very act of invoking cosmopolitanism silences opposition and erases subjectivity by obscuring difference

Laura Sjoberg, PhD in international relations and gender studies, Associate Professor of political science and affiliate faculty in Women’s Studies at the University of Florida, 2013, “The Paradox of Security Cosmopolitanism?,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 29-34

Even on these terms, though, I am concerned about the promise of the idea of security cosmopolitanism. My concerns are grounded in Vivienne Jabri’s (2012, 640) critique of security cosmopolitanism as a practice of government that can be implicated in ‘modes of dispossession, variously of history, territory, the right of access to the international and political subjectivity itself, the right to politics.’ Burke, in fact, recounts Jabri’s critique, remembering that ‘in a powerful recent article Vivienne Jabri argues – in effect – that joining cosmopolitanism with security is normatively dangerous and politically disabling for the populations of conflict-ridden states subject to intervention’ (p. 20), marking it as ‘contradictory and aporetic’ (p. 21). Burke suggests that his version of security cosmopolitanism abandons the tendency to ‘identify security exclusively with coercion, governmentality, and violence’ and instead ‘aims to drive the ethos of human solidarity, dignity, and agency’ into the theory and practice of security (p. 21). In this response, though, Burke has missed (my reading of) the force of Jabri’s critique: that the very act of depoliticizing identities, norms, and forms of government that seems foundational to Burke’s idea of security cosmopolitanism is actually itself a political act of taking the politics away from those whose insecurity is the greatest in the current political order. In other words, if insecurity is a function of histories, choices, powers, relations, and systems of modernity that have created it, then the move to security cosmopolitanism could be (and likely will be) another one of those histories and choices that reifies and creates insecurity – if of a different type. One of the major lessons of feminist work in security studies is that it is important to study insecurity, and it is important to look first with a political commitment to understanding the insecurity at the margins of global politics. Doing so with a gaze toward security cosmopolitanism as functional in politics reveals two significant problems: the potential to reify existing power structures (as discussed above) and the potential to silence or erase the history of injustice imprinted on those at the margins. In being ‘forward-looking’ (p. 22), committing to a cosmopolitan notion of human security (p. 22), being guided by a liberal politics of the inclusion of the excluded (p. 22), and looking to enable humans universally (p. 22), Burke at once erases histories of oppression and subordination, differences, and identities that perhaps justify past-looking, difference-parsing, critical approaches to the politics of insecurity. The very act of looking for a cosmopolitan approach to security itself silences the ripples in cosmopolitanism, making, in Burke’s terms, a government by the governing in solidarity with the governed, effectively impossible. Instead, it risks erasing histories, taking away territory, and destroying subjectivity by obscuring difference, much like the theories Burke simultaneously critiques and builds on to produce this approach. To me, this makes security cosmopolitan problematic on its own terms, and potentially paradoxical.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – Ethics / Universalism

#### Ethics should not come from security and universalist notions. The alternative guarantees we make bad ethical decisions

Fiona Robinson, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2015, “A modest proposal: comments on Burke’s security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, 3:2, pp. 172-173

In Security Cosmopolitanism, Burke seeks to ‘extend and innovate’ the body of work in international relations (IR) on cosmopolitanism to the problems of global security. In so doing, Burke claims that he will draw upon and contest all of the major critical approaches to security. His approach ‘strongly reflects the norms and agendas of “justice” or “moral cosmopolitanism” as a method of addressing the so-called “dilemma of increased global interconnection”’. This he sets apart from ‘traditional’ cosmopolitan thinking through reference to an ontological picture of the world as a ‘networked set of interdependencies and obligations beyond all borders’. This ontology is described as both relational and ‘historical’. His argument culminates in the statement of the key moral principle guiding his cosmopolitan approach – a global categorical imperative: ‘act as if both the principles and consequences of your action will become global, across space and through time, and act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human beings closer’. I must admit that, right from the outset, Security Cosmopolitanism is a tough sell on me. Burke is no doubt correct in claiming that, notwithstanding the work of Kaldor and Booth, there is a lacuna in security studies with respect to work that is explicitly and selfconsciously ‘cosmopolitan’. But I do wonder whether the observation that major surveys and handbooks in the field of security ‘have no entry or chapter for cosmopolitanism’ actually means that cosmopolitan thinking is or has been absent from security studies. I will elaborate on this point below. Furthermore, I am immediately sceptical of any ‘security paradigm’ that is supposed to be able to ‘generate guiding ethical principles’. I wonder: from what source are these principles generated, and on what grounds are they justified? And why do we rely so heavily on ‘guiding ethical principles’ anyway? Feminist moral philosophers have long questioned the dominant view of ethics as a codifiable and usually compact set of moral formulas or principles that can be applied by any agent to a situation to yield a justified and determinate action-guiding judgement. When we think of morality differently – not as a set of rules, but as practices of responsibility that emerge in the thick context of sustained social interactions among moral subjects – we become less sure of the need for, and benefits of, guiding ethical principles.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – No solvency

#### Security cosmopolitanism reifies the international statist order. Internal contradictions will prevent radical change and entrench dominant modes of governmentality

Laura Sjoberg, PhD in international relations and gender studies, Associate Professor of political science and affiliate faculty in Women’s Studies at the University of Florida, 2013, “The Paradox of Security Cosmopolitanism?,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 29-34

Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and dependencies,’. This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the responsible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but there is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. Security cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially stalled by its internal contradictions and further handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the (potential) reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a non-anthropocentric ‘human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more insidious than the nihilism of which many post-structuralists are accused, as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – No solvency

#### Their impacts are predicated on transforming governments and technocrats, yet Burke offers no path for change

Mandy Turner, director of the Kenyon Institute, former lecturer in conflict resolution at the University of Bradford, former research fellow at the University of Bradford, and Neil Cooper, PhD, professor of international security studies at the University of Bradford, 2013, “The Iron First of Liberal Intervention Inside the Glove of Kantian Idealism: A Response to Burke,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, pp. 35-41

Moreover, Burke not only provides a profoundly anaemic conception of power, but does so whilst failing to offer any theory of change. Somehow, elites and experts will be transformed into benign technocrats operating in the interests of the dispossessed, but it is not clear how this is to occur. Burke’s approach would have been strengthened if he had considered how cosmopolitan norms emerge and become dominant. Indeed, other cosmopolitan approaches have tried to develop a theory of change through the concept of ‘norm entrepeneurs’ and the idea of global public policy networks of experts, but these are both relegated to footnotes and dismissed as insufficiently cosmopolitan. Moreover, the idea that laws, norms, dominant paradigms of security and even the subjectivities of ‘experts’ ever emerge outside of particular sets of power relations ignores the lessons learned even from numerous analyses of the policy-making process let alone Marx, Gramsci or Foucault. Cox’s formulation that all theory is for some purpose and for some interest is equally applicable to modes of governance. Thus, as Mike Pugh has noted, a more radical and critical approach to issues of power and governance would be to adopt the position of the British politician Tony Benn in a parliamentary debate on the EU and to always begin by first asking security elites: ‘what power do you have; where did you get it; in whose interests do you exercise it; to whom are you accountable; and how can we get rid of you?’ (cited in Pugh 2013, 12).

### A2: Cosmopolitanism – Ontology Answer

#### Their cosmopolitanism will not value ontology equitably. Its grounding in liberal internationalism will ignore solidarity and will fail to decenter power relations, which makes their impacts inevitable

Oliver P. Richmond, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK; College

of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea; Centre for Peace Studies, University of Tromso, 2015, “Security cosmopolitanism or ‘securitopia’: an ontological trap and a half-hearted response to structural war?,” Critical Studies on Security, [3](http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcss20?open=1&repitition=0#vol_1):[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcss20/1/1), pp. 183-184

Emancipation might be understood in Balibarian terms. More or less, it may start from a subaltern positionality in order to represent and balance rights, material equality, environmental sustainability, identity, culture, norms, through social and transversal consensus, law, institutions, the state, regional and international institutions. It may be described as ‘equa-liberty’, and is significant especially where contemporary radical thought has become increasingly wary of even discursively offering suggestions for deep, structural reform. There are hints of such thinking throughout his argument (such as with the questions of normative principles, future cohabitation, and difference), but they seem to remain in submission to cosmopolitan versions of power, emancipation, and subjectivity (which can be seen as liberal-vanguardist version of liberty). Though cosmopolitan thought often conjures up an image of global polycentricity, and confederal forms of global governance, in practice it is often centred on the historical emergence of Western power, the relationship between liberal subjects, legitimate governance at state and international levels, and global capital: it is grounded in a shaky liberal international order, in other words. As Mazower’s recent work on the historical evolution of international institutions implies, cosmopolitanism points to an anti-Copernican, post-Cold War dynamics in which ethical politics are centred on the west, and spiral out into the rest of the world as it emerges from colonialism and communism. This makes the brute force upon which the postcolonial/post–Cold War, and now neoliberal world, has emerged appear to be ethically plausible. Does security cosmopolitanism perform the same function, hiding the dark side of securitopia’s continuing ‘use of slaves’? Regardless of the problem of whether ontology is freely reshaped, is polycentric, or dispersed, hegemonic power across the ages has done its best to ignore arguments about the equal weight of humans, and implications for their material, abstract, and identity rights. Similarly, it ignores the scale of solidarity across political communities, about the de-centring of power, and about the superiority of the underlying ethical systems that might make such a milieu possible. Yet, who could not agree with such ethics, apart from the most ardent of liberals, the most conservative of realists, or the most brutal authoritarian moderniser? Even so, concessions have been slow in coming throughout history, and grudging when they arrive. Power – even a variant of liberal power – justifies its reluctance to concede on the grounds of divine right translated in modern stratification, leadership, economy, and management based upon epistemic superiority, and ultimately as the guardians of the security of the less capable.

### Rejecting Security Bad

#### Rejecting security causes a military “fill-in”, which escalates military violence

Simon Dalby, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2015, Security: cosmopolitan, human, critical? Comment on Tony Burke’s ‘Cosmopolitan security,” Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, p. 170

The alternative is to follow Mark Neocleous (2008) in suggesting that security is so compromised, so inextricably bound up with the violence of a predatory global political economy, that its political terrain should be abandoned by scholars interested in thinking seriously about other political logics and societies free from both the violence of contemporary political economy and the practices of militarization. Recognising security’s function in maintaining the necessary conditions for global capitalism suggests that abandoning it is sensible; a progressive emancipatory political project will, his logic suggests, have to come up with a very different language. But to do so in the short term is to surrender the language of security to military formulations and militarized ‘policing’, rather than trying to reclaim it for people in the dire circumstances frequently caused precisely by the operation of violent modes of ‘security’ provision.

### A2: Reject the word “Security”

#### Security is not a dirty word. Their alternative reifies privilege

Fiona Robinson, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2015, “A modest proposal: comments on Burke’s security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security, 3:2, p. 174

In their response to ‘Security Cosmopolitanism’, Cooper and Turner suggest that attaching the ‘security’ label to human life – and hence to ethics – will inevitably lead to undesirable consequences. Instead they argue for the need to develop an unsecuritized language that critiques the ‘economies of power in different forms of governmentality and places centre stage the construction of new geographies of power which foster social contracts at both the global and the local level’. While I am sympathetic to the spirit of this critique, I worry about the assumption that any mention of ‘security’, ever, will always lead to ‘securitization’. I would suggest, instead, that there may be some kernel of human security worth saving, after we peel back all the layers of moralization, co-optation, and governmentality that currently shroud the concept. I agree that we need an ‘unsecuritized’ language, but I am not sure that means that a more everyday notion of security – the confidence that your household or community will be safe from harm and sustained with adequate nourishment and shelter – is something that most people can have the luxury of jettisoning. I am compelled by the spirit of Cooper and Turner’s ‘life welfare’ concept, but I am not convinced that it will necessarily be able to rise above the logics of discursive power that have entwined security discourse.

### Securitization Good – Coop on climate change

#### Security should form the nexus for greater U.S.-China cooperation on climate change

Wilson VornDick, a Commander in the U.S. Navy at the Pentagon, August 25, 2015, “Climate Change and U.S. Military Strategy,” Real Clear Defense, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/25/climate_change_and_us_military_strategy_108406.html>, Accessed 5-1-2016

Despite the atmosphere of cooperation reached last year between the two governments on climate change, the nascent and mercurial relationship between their military and security elements has not fared as well. It may even be in peril from two recent events. First, China’s [terriclaims](http://amti.csis.org/terriclaims-the-new-geopolitical-reality-in-the-south-china-sea/) in the South China Sea (SCS) have evoked widespread protests from SCS claimants and others, including the U.S. Second, repeated cyberattacks have vexed the American security community, such as the recent OPM breach identified this summer. Even though the repercussions from these two events have not completely rippled their way through all facets of the complex U.S.-Sino relationship, they could significantly dampen or derail the prospects for further U.S.-Sino military relations or dialogue. This is precisely why a new cooperative and collaborative approach between the U.S. and China focused on climate change preparation and securitization is so important and needed. Already U.S.-Sino military planners have made significant progress in ongoing, shared security concerns that include anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, [humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations](http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/hadr-and-us-china-military-cooperation/), and the [Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf). Shared climate change securitization and planning would build on these successes and offer a host of new benefits. It would not threaten operational security and it would be in-line with both nations’ goals. First, it generally leverages low-tech, non-sensitive, and non-proprietary techniques and technologies such as climate change modeling. These could easily be shared without making either nation’s security officials anxious. Second, it is scalable and modular for both nations’ security communities at the local, regional, or national level between a variety of military services and components. For example, interactions could be as small and targeted as a small group exchange between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State Oceanic Administration to assess coastal dyke construction in Fujian Province, or as large and broad as a complex disaster response exercises. Third, planning and securitization could be broadened to include security planners from other interested nations or supranational organizations, such as China’s strategic neighbors, Japan and Korea, and the United Nations. Indeed, each of these benefits could be implemented individually or in total.

### China IS a threat

#### China’s creeping hegemony in the S. China Seas is China’s is a clear threat to peace and stability

Bill Gertz, Staff Writer, [September 22, 2015](http://atimes.com/2015/09/the-china-challenge-island-building-a-military-threat-in-the-south-china-sea/), “The China Challenge: Island-building — a military threat in the South China Sea,” Asia Times, <http://atimes.com/2015/09/the-china-challenge-island-building-a-military-threat-in-the-south-china-sea/>, Accessed 5-12-2016

New details surfaced last week outlining Chinese military activities in the South China Sea where construction on several thousand acres of disputed islands is now the center of Beijing’s bid to gain control the strategic waterway. Despite appeals from US leaders to halt the island construction and militarization on them, the build up of military facilities by China in the South China Sea is continuing. And the volume level of US and Chinese military posturing on the matter is increasing. China’s creeping hegemony in the Sea is expected to be a key topic of talks between President Obama and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Washington on Friday. “The South China Sea, as the name indicated, is a sea area. It belongs to China,” declared PLAN Vice Adm. Yuan Yubai at a conference in London last week. “The South China Sea is no more China’s than the Gulf of Mexico is Mexico’s,” Adm. Harry Harris, Jr., commander of the US Pacific Command said days later. During testimony before the US Senate, Harris, who described himself as “very critical” of Chinese behavior over the past two years, warned that peace and stability in the Asia Pacific are “at risk” by China’s military buildup and maritime encroachment.

#### China is modernizing its forces for greater warfighting capabilities

[Lauren McCauley, Staff Writer](http://www.commondreams.org/author/lauren-mccauley-staff-writer), May 26, 2015, “Threat of 'Inevitable' War Looms Between US and China Over Pacific Island Row,” [Common Dreams](http://www.commondreams.org/), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/05/26/threat-inevitable-war-looms-between-us-and-china-over-pacific-island-row, Accessed 5-12-2016

On Tuesday, the Beijing government issued a [white paper](http://www.cctv-america.com/2015/05/26/full-text-chinas-military-strategy-white-paper)outlining its military strategy, in which it says that the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region "has caused grave concerns." "Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs," the paper continues, adding that "a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China." Further, the Telegraph [reports](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11630185/US-China-war-inevitable-unless-Washington-drops-demands-over-South-China-Sea.html): China's forces will no longer be limited to defence of the nation's territory but will project its military power further beyond its borders at sea and more assertively in the air in order to safeguard its maritime possessions, the white paper states. While the air force will shift focus from "territorial air defence" to both offence and defence, the Chinese army will increase its global mobility and its artillery will improve its "medium and long-range precision strikes", it said. Meanwhile, also on Tuesday it was reported that Japan, for the first time, will be joining the U.S. and Australia in joint military exercises around Australia this summer, which security experts [say](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-australia-usa-japan-idUSKBN0OA1GE20150526) is being done to counter threats that China will impose air and sea restrictions in the Spratly island chain.

#### China is developing overt hegemony in East Asia

The Guardian, Staff Writer, February 21, 2016, “China seeks to control east Asia, US commander tells senators,”

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/south-china-sea-east-asia-control-us-military, Accessed 5-12-2016

The commander of US forces in the Pacific has said that [China](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china) is seeking control of east Asia, in comments that could further inflame tensions between the two world powers. Adm Harry Harris Jr told a congressional hearing that China’s construction and military facilities are changing the operational landscape in the disputed [South China Sea](http://www.theguardian.com/world/south-china-sea), where Beijing has undertaken a massive land reclamation effort to press its sweeping territorial claims. Harris told the Senate armed services committee that China is militarizing the South China Sea, “and you have to believe in a flat Earth to think otherwise”. Asked what about the strategic goal of China’s military buildup in the region, Harris told lawmakers: “I believe China seeks hegemony in east Asia.” When asked if that meant regional control, Harris concurred.

### China IS a threat

#### China’s “China Threat” theory stems from their own securitization psychosis. It discounts very real reasons neighbors might feel threatened by Chinese actions

Shannon Tiezzi, Editor at The Diplomat, June 3, 2014, “Beijing’s ‘China Threat’ Theory,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/beijings-china-threat-theory/, Accessed 5-1-2016

By now, even causal Asia watchers know that the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore [got a little testy](http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/shangri-la-dialogue-highlights-regional-tensions/). Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel [warned about China’s provocations](http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shangri-la-dialogue-the-aftermath/) and lack of respect for international law. China’s representative, deputy chief of the PLA general staff Wang Guanzhong, [fired back](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-06/02/c_133377713.htm), accusing the U.S. and Japan of coordinating their remarks to smear China.

While the accusations and counter-accusations on display at Shangri-La were predictable, they can still be useful in understanding an underlying problem — namely, China’s “China threat” theory. This idea, which is alluded to by Chinese officials throughout the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense, suggests that nefarious forces in the U.S. and Japan are hyping the “China threat” to achieve their own political goals. In the case of U.S. politicians, the motivation is assumed to be positioning candidates to win the next election, as one post-Shangri-La [Xinhua commentary](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-06/02/c_1110956345.htm) mentioned. Another theory goes that the “China threat” is an excuse to help defense industry insiders keep the power and prestige they gained during the Cold War by creating a new existential threat supposedly facing the U.S. Meanwhile, Chinese analysts assume that Shinzo Abe and his supporters have manufactured the “China threat” so that they can proceed with their long-held dream of remilitarizing Japan. There may be some truth to these ideas, of course. But the problem with Beijing’s “China threat” theory is that is utterly discounts the possibility that other countries might actually feel threatened by China’s actions. Wang himself, speaking to Chinese reporters, [dismissed the idea of a “China threat”](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-05/31/c_1110948174.htm) as “completely baseless and completely without merit.” In other words, the “China threat” theory absolves the Chinese government of any and all blame for concerns stemming from the use of Chinese power, both economic and military.

#### Island militarization gives China de facto control over the entire S. China Seas. It’s a clear threat to the entire region

Bill Gertz, Staff Writer, [September 22, 2015](http://atimes.com/2015/09/the-china-challenge-island-building-a-military-threat-in-the-south-china-sea/), “The China Challenge: Island-building — a military threat in the South China Sea,” Asia Times, http://atimes.com/2015/09/the-china-challenge-island-building-a-military-threat-in-the-south-china-sea/, Accessed 5-12-2016

Harris, in his Senate Armed Services Committee testimony Sept. 17, disclosed that the Chinese are building 10,000-foot runways on three new islands, including Fiery Cross Reef. The runway construction “gives me great concern militarily.” The island-building and now runway construction and militarization have been captured by commercial satellite [images](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/world/asia/china-building-airstrip-on-3rd-artificial-island-images-show.html) published over the past several months. Two other runways are being built on the Spratlys’ Subi Reef and Mischief Reef. “And they’re also building deep water port facilities there which could put their deep water ships there, their combatant ships there, which gives them an extra capability,” he said. “And if you look at all the facilities then you can imagine a network of missile sites, runways for their fifth-generation fighters and surveillance sites and all of that,” Harris said. “It creates a mechanism by which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of war.” Shear, the assistant defense secretary, also voiced his concerns about the military buildup on the islands. “The Chinese have not yet placed advanced weaponry on those features and we are going to do everything we can to ensure that they don’t,” he said. Harris was quick to note that the Chinese military bases in the sea are “easy targets in war.” “But short of that, the militarization of these features pose a threat against all other countries in the region,” he said.

### China Threat - Guam

#### Militarization is directly aimed at Guam in a bid for greater adventurism

Keith Johnson, Senior Staff Writer, May 11, 2016, “[China’s ‘Guam Killers’ Threaten U.S. Anchor Base in Pacific](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific/),” Foreign Policy,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific/, Accessed 5-12-2016

Friction with China now seems to be spreading — at least potentially — to the waters of the central Pacific. What’s concerning about China’s apparent longer reach is that it specifically targets Guam, which has become [central](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf) to the U.S. military’s ability to project power in the region — especially since the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia. Guam is already home to a stable of nuclear submarines, a rotating host of heavy bombers, and a constantly changing group of fighters. The Pentagon also plans to move thousands of U.S. Marines who are currently on Okinawa to Guam. The report released Tuesday stressed that Chinese military thinkers and state media see Guam as a “chess piece of the utmost importance” in U.S. military strategy. Indeed, airbases there have played a role in pushing back against recent Chinese adventurism. In 2013, after China declared an air-defense identification zone over the disputed East China Sea, two B-52 bombers from Guam immediately challenged what amounted to a no-fly region imposed by Beijing.

#### Chinese missile modernization presents a direct threat to Guam, risking a big conflict in Asia

Keith Johnson, Senior Staff Writer, May 11, 2016, “[China’s ‘Guam Killers’ Threaten U.S. Anchor Base in Pacific](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific/),” Foreign Policy,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific/, Accessed 5-12-2016

Long-range Chinese missiles are becoming an increasingly acute threat to U.S. military forces on Guam, the island anchor of the American strategic position in the Pacific, according to a new report. While the weapons probably don’t represent an immediate direct threat, continued advances in range and precision could put the still-expanding U.S. bases on Guam in China’s crosshairs in the event of a big conflict in Asia. The [report](http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf), prepared by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and released Tuesday, highlighted advances Beijing’s military has made in bolstering its ability to push U.S. forces farther away from Chinese shores. Those advances include new kinds of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as ships, subs, and bombers that can launch them. The weapons in the Chinese quiver, according to the report, can easily reach Guam, the western-most U.S. territory and home to a naval base, an air base, and regionwide fuel and ammunition depots. “China’s commitment to continuing to modernize its strike capabilities indicates the risk will likely grow going forward,” the report noted. Defense experts stress that rapidly improving Chinese strike capabilities pose a particular risk to the Guam garrison, which has been steadily expanded in recent years to give the U.S. military a stand-off base in the Pacific that would be less vulnerable than bases on Okinawa.

### China Threat - Space

#### China’s space modernization is targeting U.S. orbital assets

Brian Chow, (retired) senior physical scientist specialized in space and other national security, January 18, 2016, “China’s new space threat and the justification of US pre-emptive self-defense,” Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2903/1>, Accessed 5-14-2016

The US has long been avoiding the sensitive issue of pre-emptive self-defense in space, which is exercised before a space attack has actually started. However, facing a new game-changing threat under development in China and Russia, the US must address the issue and let the world know its position now. Bringing the issue up on the eve of pre-emption would be too late and could lead to a war both sides would want to avoid. In November 2015, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its 2015 Annual Report to the Congress. It stated that “since 2008, China has tested increasingly complex space proximity capabilities.” It confirmed what it and the Department of Defense have been suggesting, that “China’s recent space activities indicate that it is developing co-orbital antisatellite systems to target U.S. space assets. These systems consist of a satellite armed with a weapon such as an explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.” It also confirmed that, in July 2013, “once all three were in orbit, the satellite with the robotic arm grappled one of the other satellites, which was acting as a target satellite.” A robotic arm could be used to disable a satellite while producing little space debris.

#### China is aggressively modernizing and militarizing its space forces, risking full blown war

Lee Billings, editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, August 10, 2015, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever,” Scientific American, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/>, Accessed 5-14-2016

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations.

### A2: They think war with China is inevitable

#### Just because we retain a large military does not mean we think a China war is inevitable

James Fallows, Staff Writer, June 4, 2015, “Just How Great a Threat Is China?,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/about-the-china-threat-on-the-the-35th-of-may/394988/, Accessed 5-12-2016

The point, again, is that “Chinese intentions” are very hard to be sure about, and (as with Under the Dome) may still be contested inside the leadership. A five-year-old book like Liu Mingfu’s is one sign, to be weighed against others. China’s recent fortification of new islands is a more ominous sign, as [these China File essays](http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/did-game-just-change-south-china-sea-and-what-should-us-do-about-it) discuss. But is this a deliberate, frontal challenge to the United States and the existing Pacific order? Is it a feint, which the government will back away from as it has some others? Is it mainly a chest-beating gesture aimed at an audience inside China, to demonstrate that the country’s leaders are strong, strong, strong? I contend that no one knows for sure. The United States has to prepare for the possibility that this is a deliberate challenge—while remaining aware of the other possibilities, and gaming out its own reactions accordingly. That means being ready for a confrontation with China if it comes, but not acting as if one is inevitable and thereby insuring that it becomes so.

# Kritik Answers Orientalism K

## Links

### East/West distinction

#### The negative is trapped in colonial thinking as shown by their reliance on literal geographic underpinnings of power—instead we need to move beyond these static ideas

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 385-386, sdi.sagepub.com

Before addressing the entangled histories of (in)security governance, it will be necessary to analytically differentiate between postcoloniality, or the postcolonial condition, and the notion of the postcolony. With the postcolonial condition, or postcoloniality, we refer to a global phenomenon of interactions based on unequal power relations in an era that goes beyond the world of colonialism but that has been (and continues to be) decisively shaped by the logic of coloniality (Mignolo, 2005: 69). In this regard, the notion of postcoloniality has a global analytical scope and stresses the legacies of colonial forms of rule, knowledge production and subjectification that continue to shape our contemporary world, where ‘real’ colonies have nearly ceased to exist (Hall, 1996; Gupta, 1998). While colonies have nearly disappeared, ‘coloniality’ and the underlying ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ can still be observed today (Mignolo, 2005). Postcoloniality thus designates situations of rule and subjectification that are based on ‘us versus the inferior other’ constructions and recourse to civilization and modernization discourses justifying asymmetrical interventions expressing ‘the privilege of possessing dominant categories of thought from which and where the rest of the world can be described, understood, and “improved”’ (Mignolo, 2005: 36, emphasis in original). This Western ‘will to improve’1 is based on a particular polarized and hierarchical form of representation and knowledge production that Coronil (1996: 57) has called ‘Occidentalism’, which he defines as the ensemble of representational practices that participate in the production of conceptions of the world which (1) separate the world’s components into bounded units; (2) disaggregate their relational histories; (3) turn difference into hierarchy; (4) naturalize these representations; and thus (5) intervene, however unwittingly, in the production of existing asymmetrical power relations. Thinking about the postcolonial condition thus implies moving beyond the static analytics of ‘bounded units’ and fixed territorial spaces (such as ‘the South’ or particular taken-for-granted world regions) (Coronil, 1996; see also Mignolo, 2005). With the term ‘postcolonial’, we furthermore read colonialisms (of different kinds) ‘as part of an essentially transnational and transcultural “global” process’ (Hall, 1996: 247), shaping and reorganizing always entangled ‘local’ and ‘global’ power relations, even beyond those cases with histories of direct colonization – be that as colonizing or as colonized societies. The term therefore introduces a different reading of capitalist modernity, in that it emphasizes the centrality of entangled power/knowledge/practice fields through which unequal power relations emerge and are being transformed and challenged.

### Modernity

#### Pursuing modernity is not enough to justify exploitation, China’s efforts at modernization have emerged in complex ways that allow for self-definition

Grace Yan, doctoral student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Carla Almeida Santos, Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009, “’CHINA, FOREVER’: Tourism Discourse and Self-Orientalism,” Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carla\_Santos12/publication/222509059\_China\_forever\_tourism\_discourse\_and\_self-Orientalism/links/0912f50cba5dae7ed4000000.pdf Pg. 310-311

‘‘China, Forever’’, while located in tourism discourse, is intricately connected to, as well as a part of social reality. Underlying this profound socio-cultural phenomenon is, however, the unresolved question of modernity. Indeed, modernity, conceived in complicated and conflicting ways, has increasingly provided the grounds for thinking about the past, the present and the future. In particular, representations of China have acquired greater complexity in response to China’s incorporation into both global capitalism, as well as the values and practices of the global socio-cultural system. On one hand, conformity to the Western definition of modernity has become a self-inscribed subjectivity in China’s pursuit of modern identity. Conversely, the presence of such ‘‘Westernized’’ modernity should not, however, be simply understood as a force of intrusion in Chinese cultural space or the erasure of the pre-existing Chinese cultural space (Dirlik 2002). Instead, different modalities of modernity emerge through complex trajectories mapped on the lived experiences of Chinese society (Sun 2002). Under this social condition, returning to the Orientalized imagination becomes an aestheticized project; explicitly glorifying China’s historical past.

### China

#### Said’s theory may be correct in terms of his case study of Islam and the Arab World but it is not applicable to China, US interests massively change how the government engages with whom they view important

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 389, sdi.sagepub.com

Second, as a result of this, colonial security governance, protection and coercion-wielding were highly selective, privileging, in terms of protection as well as repression, places and populations that were of central economic and/or political importance for the maintenance of colonial rule and the reproduction of colonial power. This selectivity – largely out of fiscal, economic and political (including racial) reasoning – explains the widespread practice of ‘outsourcing’ political authority, coercion and repression to companies (Hönke, 2010, forthcoming) and to local intermediaries, the famous ‘big men’, ranging from the caciques in Latin America (Kern, 1973) to the zamidar landlords in India (Cohn, 2006), to ‘traditional’ chiefs in Africa (Mamdani, 1996), to name just some of the most prominent mediating local authorities. In addition to this, through their linguistic capabilities, native colonial bureaucrats and low-level employees were also frequently able to influence and transform the information, knowledge and actions of colonial powers, and to appropriate the symbols of the latter for their own purposes, thereby mediating colonial power and brokering between local elites and colonial officials (Osborn, 2003). The result of this situation has been the widespread ‘rule of intermediaries’ (Schlichte, 2005) throughout the (post)colony, the related informally negotiated character of political power (see, for example, Müller, 2012; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010), the presence of multiple forms of ‘private indirect government’ (Mbembe, 2001: 67–101), as well as the related dispersion of violence and fragmentation of sovereignty (Davis, 2010; see also Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006: 35).

### Colonialism

#### The critique’s analysis is wrong—the US’s relationship with China is fundamentally different than what Orientalism is designed to critique

Chiann Karen Tsui, PhD in German Studies at Stanford University, focus on the dynamics of cultural transference, her current research interests include an expanded study of German literary works adapted into the post-Mao Chinese context, and Russell A. Berman, Walter A. Haas Professor at Stanford University, with appointments in the departments of Comparative Literature and German Studies, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2015, “The Dialectic of Recognition and the Rediscovery of China: After Orientalism,” European Review / Volume 23 / Issue 02 / May 2015, Pg. 181, <http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1062798714000660>

That sort of deep and structural estrangement is insufficient to describe western encounters with China. Western knowledge of China is ancient; that knowledge may have often been inaccurate or even mythological, but the fact of a Chinese empire was not a secret in the West. China was not unknown in the way the western hemisphere, the so-called new world, was at one point unknown in Europe. The first encounter paradigm is additionally inappropriate for the relationship between the West and China because it assumes a significant gap in wealth and science, prosperity and technology; at stake, in other words, is the encounter between a notionally advanced western culture and the underdeveloped societies it deems primitive. This model does not work for China. China – initially viewed as an exemplar of non-religious, rational society in the West, especially during the early Enlightenment era – may have fallen behind western economic modernization in various ways, but the discrepancy with the West was never as great as was the gap between the West and the so-called ‘primitive’ world. The first encounter scene does not work for China, and the hypothesis of a ‘rediscovery’ does not depend on the crucial event that stands at the centre of post-colonial theory.

### Humanism

#### The affirmative is an act of empathy which does not lead to the problems indicated by the negative but rather shapes both of the actors in the exchange in a productive way

Andrea Lobb, Gender, Sexuality and Diversity Studies College of Arts, Social Sciences and Commerce La Trobe University, 2015, “Technologies of the Other: Renewing ‘empathy’ between Foucault and psychoanalysis,” Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 218-235, December 2015, Pg. 224, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/4938/5364

Empathy is the name given to one of the main techniques in these primary care systems for communication with a dependent other who does not yet possess language. Empathy is the correlate of that first ‘dance of intimacy’ of bodies, pleasures, and affects. We might think of these, then, as pre-verbal “technologies of the other” and empathy as a privileged technique within them. Primary empathy, in this psychoanalytic tradition, therefore does not just constitute a form of ‘knowing’ the object—as if the subject were somehow a fixed entity prior to the encounter with empathy itself—but rather empathy has an essential form giving function. We might say, then, that empathy is a techné in the very broadest sense of that work of ‘art of making’ because empathy also transforms and changes what it finds; it does not just ‘discover’ the truth of that other in accord with pre-given normative codes, but it co-creates the other it finds through the aesthetics of their relational exchange.18 In this sense empathy can meet the criteria of the aesthetic (co-)formation of living substance, or “the idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art.”19

### Imperialism

#### Post-coloniality studies do not accurately describe the West’s relationship with China, the relationship between China and the US has historically been much more nuanced than the Orient/Occident dichotomy allows for

Chiann Karen Tsui, PhD in German Studies at Stanford University, focus on the dynamics of cultural transference, her current research interests include an expanded study of German literary works adapted into the post-Mao Chinese context, and Russell A. Berman, Walter A. Haas Professor at Stanford University, with appointments in the departments of Comparative Literature and German Studies, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2015, “The Dialectic of Recognition and the Rediscovery of China: After Orientalism,” European Review / Volume 23 / Issue 02 / May 2015, Pg. 183-184, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract\_S1062798714000660

In fact, the binary division between East and West, the core of the Saidian critique of western scholarship and the colonial experience in general, was never as hermetic as its radical advocates claimed. If colonizer and colonized existed in separate spheres in the realm of ideology, in terms of lived experience more complex forms of contact and exchange prevailed. To speak of ‘rediscovery’ today does not mean that a previous knowledge was fully obliterated, requiring reconstruction from ground up. On the contrary, it is urgent to understand the ‘rediscovery’ against the backdrop of a separation that was never fully separate, despite Said’s division of the world into unequal ‘Oriental’ and ‘Occidental’ halves, each with its correspondingly unequal political, intellectual, cultural, historical, economic and sociological distribution of power.3 In other words, to posit a current opening-up requires us to consider not only the reforms in China that have made it more amenable to contact with the West; we should also recognize nuances in the western perception of China that was never as exclusively imperialist as post-colonial theory would assert. Even at the height of imperialist adventure, there were possibilities for reciprocity and recognition. At least as far as China and the West is concerned, Orientalism does not provide an accurate description. This is not to say that imperialism was not a relevant factor; yet simultaneous with imperialism and its ideological consequences – the radical binary structuring of space and experience – counter-tendencies toward a critique of imperialism and Orientalism, as well as toward universal human solidarity were also evident. It is against the background of that solidarity that the current rediscovery unfolds.

## Permutation

#### Permutation: do both. The alternative is purely theoretical which subverts the question of how the theory is implemented. Only the permutation solves by combining both theory and action

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 384-385, sdi.sagepub.com

For uncovering the entangled character of transnational fields of postcolonial (in)security governance from a de-exoticizing perspective, fresh theoretical and methodological approaches are needed – approaches that are suitable for and sensitive to the particularities of governing (in) security under postcolonial conditions and the related questions of local agency, processes of translation, appropriation and resistance. In this regard, this special issue calls for an empirical postcolonial security studies research agenda that moves beyond the predominant abstract thinking that dominates much of the related international relations scholarship, which, while correctly challenging the epistemological violence and blind spots of Western-centrism, remains overly situated at the level of macro-/meta-theoretical analysis. In our view, such a level of analysis provides little insight into a deeper understanding of how those transnational fields of security governance in our postcolonial world work ‘on the ground’. Of course, this is not to deny the relevance of such studies, nor is this a plea a for a naïve ‘theory vs empirical research’ argument. Rather we follow Bourdieu’s (1988: 774–5) dictum that ‘theory without empirical content is empty, empirical research without theory is blind’. Therefore, all contributions to this special issue bring into productive dialogue both theory and empirical research – a dialogue that we consider to be essential for understanding and explaining transnational fields of security governance from a non-Western-centric perspective. For this endeavour, we also regard it as essential to work with empirical material that includes but goes beyond written text and includes everyday social practices, and this is another engagement that is shared by the contributions to this special issue.

## Impact

### Alt Causes

#### No impact—there are alternate causes. The alternative is textual-linguistic idealism that forecloses the possibility of analysis of other modes of domination such as capitalism and the political economy surrounding the violence they describe

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 122-124, September 2010, Pg. 115, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

The second major group of criticisms of Said’s analysis of “colonial discourse” is that it is reliant upon a form of textual-linguistic idealism. This criticism can be further broken down into the two problems of (a) the use of literary texts as devices for the “expression” of a given period and (b) the (implicit or explicit) reliance upon the sovereign status of the speaking (or writing) author.41 In both variants, critics, particularly from Marxist and neo-Marxists traditions, have argued that Said—and, by association, Foucault—displaced more materialist concerns. A good example of this line of argumentation is work by Aijaz Ahmad.42 Although Ahmad has numerous complaints against Foucault43—and, more precisely, Said’s use of him— I will focus on the one that is most pertinent to the matter at hand. The charge of textual or linguistic idealism begins as an attack on the notion that a text (particularly a literary one) is an adequate or appropriate representation of a given era.44 Deploying a longstanding Marxist critique of such assumptions, Ahmad argues that the narrative of the convergence between colonial knowledges and colonial powers simply cannot be assembled within Cultural Studies itself, because histories of economic exploitation, political coercion, military conquest play the far more constitutive part; those other histories are the one which provide the enabling conditions for the so-called “Orientalist Discourse” as such.45 A familiar base/superstructure distinction is deployed here to argue that “discourse” is mere epiphenomenal effect to the substantive cause of economics and material interaction of political powers (such as in war).46 Ahmad notes an irony in Said’s use of Foucault on this question. Because Said (supposedly) accepts Foucault’s critique of Marx,47 but refuses to accept the antihumanist presuppositions that come with this critique, he uncritically deploys a modified (and, for Ahmad, ultimately incoherent) humanist narrative of textual representations unified across space and time by a single general structure called “Orientalist discourse.” It is not merely that Said falsely unifies figures as diverse as Dante and Kipling as somehow representative of a similar “discourse,”48 but, moreover, that the “specific set of beliefs and values” that they represent remain immanent in—and therefore available for reconstruction through—the canon of [their] great books. Said subscribes to the structure of this idealist metaphysics even though he obviously questions the greatness of some of those “great” books. In other words, he duplicates, all those procedures even as he debunks the very tradition from which he has borrowed them.49 Thus, Ahmad supplements the charges of ahistoricism with that of textual idealism. While recognizing that the first of these clearly cannot be attributed to Foucault himself and derives rather from Said’s reinterpretation of the notion of “discourse,”50 Ahmad is more ambivalent with respect to the source of the second problem. At times he traces this idealism back to Said’s desire to preserve an “Auerbachean High Humanism.”51 In other places, however, he attributes the avoidance of “material concerns” in favour of texts to the influence of “faddish” use of (particularly French) poststructuralist theory that reduces all conflicts of colonialism to “transhistorical” problems of Identity/Difference.52

### Popular Opinion

#### The actions of the government are constrained by public approval—the impacts described by the criticism are not going to happen, Bush War Doctrine proves

Kenichi Yamaguchi, completing his doctoral dissertation, on the “state of exception” in American-occupied Okinawan Islands in the Pacific, at the University of Saskatchewan, 2012, “Rationalization and concealment of violence in American responses to 9/11: Orientalism(s) in a state of exception,” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 48:3, Pg. 245-246, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.678708

Such concealment and secrecy of violence has been an endemic trait of American post-9/11 governance. However, as Harvey suggests, the “leaks from the intelligence community in the United States suggested that some of its members were unhappy with the way in which their information was being doctored by the administration” (11–12). In other words, despite the fact that concealment of information becomes a political imperative to the process of democratizing the Other, the interests of the state are not shared by all Americans alike, let alone those who work for its state. A case in point: American soldiers’ violence on Iraqi civilians and the Guantanamo Bay Camp detainees scooped by several media outlets was largely based on “insider” information leaks. Supposing that Agamben is right in his claim that a totalitarian state structure still survives in today’s “democratic” regimes, the concealment and secrecy of physical force is one significant factor that allows for such a survival. However, without the support of the general public, the complicity of the civilian population at large, it is difficult to maintain concealment and secrecy thoroughly and unequivocally. It would not take exceptional wisdom to uncover the forged complicity of the American public in and through Bush’s feverish rhetoric on the threat to the American people and its civilization. As Foucault reminds us, “the propagation of knowledge [ … ] often cause[s] mistaken beliefs or systematic misconception to circulate” (History 12). And any honest and unbiased study of Bush’s war doctrine could explicate such systematic circulation of fear through which the popular support was solicited, normalized and institutionalized.

### Orientalism good

#### The engagement with China, even if Orientalist, is beneficial because the structure of the relationship is agonistic and attempts to dismantle the power asymmetry that exists between the US and China currently

Andrea Lobb, Gender, Sexuality and Diversity Studies College of Arts, Social Sciences and Commerce La Trobe University, 2015, “Technologies of the Other: Renewing ‘empathy’ between Foucault and psychoanalysis,” Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 218-235, December 2015, Pg. 222, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/4938/5364

What I am calling here the technologies of the other share with technologies of power the structural feature of being asymmetrical and hierarchical relations (and both are, in some sense, about regulating the conduct of the subordinate other). What distinguishes the former (potentially but not necessarily found in master-pupil; parent-child; analyst-patient relations) from the latter is the way they deploy that hierarchical difference in the service of the gradual modification, displacement and ultimate dismantling of precisely that asymmetry.8 It is this characteristic, I want to suggest, that might serve as a distinctive marker of this ‘system of techniques.’ They move towards the moment of a success that coincides with their immanent redundancy. The transforming effect they exert changes the other in such a way as to modify and undermine the original asymmetry of the relation in which such techniques were (initially) appropriate. In this sense they are the catalyst for the radical dismantling of their own conditions of practice, because they succeed ‘technically’ precisely in so far as they help shift the other from the position of subordinate recipient of care to that of an equal capable of reciprocity, mutuality, but also therefore capable of agonism and contest. As Foucault tells us, when technologies of power succeed (too well?) in completely closing down all movement and reversibility in their asymmetrical relations, they have become technologies of domination. At one point Foucault explains that what mitigates against such a collapse (of relations of power into those of pure domination) is the agonism internal to power relations themselves (i.e. my will to power—my bid to get you to do what I want—runs head on into your will to power to do the same to me, and we therefore enter into various interpersonal and political struggles).9

## Alt

### Fails—Abandonment

#### We can’t just abandon Western knowledge—it is enough to recognize the implications of Western scholarship on the Orient, we can revise and still do the affirmative. Abandonning does nothing to solve the problem, it just hides the fact that there was a problem in the first place.

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 390, sdi.sagepub.com

Consequently, our critique of Western-centric analytical categories does not imply a call for abandoning all Western theory. Without denying that much, if not most, European theory is marked by the above-mentioned problems stemming from Occidentalism and Western-centrism, instead of simply abandoning these theories, we share Bhabha’s (1994: 18–28) ‘commitment to theory’. While challenging the ‘fictitious universalism’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 65) of Western theories, such a commitment, in our understanding, enhances their analytical scope through what Jackson, following Hall, called ‘theoretical transculturation’. This implies ‘demonstrating that such [Western] theory does not in fact describe or map the entire planet, and that despite pretensions to universalism it suffers from gaps and lacunae, and for this reason needs to be revised in the light of local empirical conditions’ (Jackson, 2003: 73).

### Fails—revolution

#### Anti-colonial revolutions fail—the negative’s theory is premised on the idea that practice follows directly from theory which obscures the lived reality of the subaltern

Neil Lazarus, postcolonial studies scholar, Professor of English at the University of Warwick, editor of The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies, 1993, “Disavowing Decolonization: Fanon, Nationalism, and the Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” Research in African Literatures, Vol. 24, No. 4, Special Issue in Memory of Josaphat Bekunuru Kubayanda (Winter, 1993), Pg. 79-80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3820255

It is worth noting, therefore, that to the extent that Fanon's contemporary followers remain faithful to his own ideas in this respect, their writing tends itself to be revealingly intellectualist. Consider the following two passages from Patrick Tay- lor's The Narrative of Liberation, for example. In the first, Taylor is glossing Fanon's theorization of decolonization: Decolonization, Fanon writes, is the process whereby "spectators crushed with their inessentiality" are transformed into "privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them" [Wretched 36]. The colonized rise above the Manichaean conception of the world as a tragic drama to assume a historical conception of the world as infinite possibility. They recognize human agency and responsibility in an open and unknowable history. Fanon's notion of the entry into history must be understood, not in Manichaean terms, but in terms of the stepping out of drama (mythical, tragic understanding) and the assumption of historical, national, and human responsibility. (70) In the second, Taylor is referring to Fanon's theory of the role of violence in the anticolonial struggle: It is not the act of violent struggle that is the key to decolonization but, rather, the revolutionary leap, the "willed" entry into history, the consciousness of the categorical imperative. What moves the Hegelian dialectic from a situation of mutually exclusive protagonists to one of mutual recognition, is the recognition of the other and the recognition of oneself as an active, freely creative being. (85) I cite these passages both because I believe that they provide a reliable (if, perhaps, one-sided) account of Fanon's own conception of decolonization, and because I believe that their weaknesses as representations of popular anticolonial struggle are very clearly marked.9 Briefly put, the problem emerges from the fact that the radical intellectual positions subaltern thought and action as the exact substantification of his revolutionary theory. Theory and practice are so closely aligned that it almost seems as though the latter exists principally to confirm the former. One is reminded of those passages in the early Marx-the Marx of the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right ( 1844)-that give the impression that the European pro- letariat will soon be rising up to smash private property and the capitalist system because, as an emergent class, it represents the negation, "the effective dissolution of this order" (59). Comprehensively theorized in this way, how could the proletar- iat fail to overthrow capitalism, and, with it, class society as such! Similarly Fanon and Taylor are often tempted to "overread" anticolonial militancy, to construct it as the objective correlative of a revolutionary philosophy. That the masses act; that they act against the colonial order; that they act under the banner of the national liberation movement-all of these things are true. But the interpretation of these mass actions as corresponding to "the consciousness of the categorical imperative" or to a recognition of "human agency and responsibil- ity in an open and unknowable history" seems appropriative in its externality. I should stress that I do not doubt the legitimacy of Fanon's authority as the spokes- person of the masses in the anticolonial struggle; at the same time, however, a cer- tain unwarranted "speaking for"-that is, speaking in the place of or instead of-seems to be involved here. It is precisely in this context that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's warning about the need to "watch out for the continuing construction of the subaltern" seems especially timely ("Subaltern" 295). One of Spivak's insistent contentions, after all, is that the "genuinely disenfranchised" among the colonized are repre- sented as subalter not only in the texts of empire, but also in "the great narratives of nationalism, internationalism, secularism, and culturalism," whose unfolding marks the trajectory of anticolonialism ("Practical" 102). In Fanon's world, the "genuinely disenfranchised" are plainly the peasant classes, of whom he writes that they are "systematically disregarded for the most part by the propaganda put out by the nationalist parties. And it is clear that in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain" (Wretched 61 ). Fanon's own work distinguishes itself sharply from nationalist propa- ganda in this respect. But even in his representations of the Algerian peasantry as a revolutionary force, there is no sustained consideration of the ways in which the peasants' views fail to match those of the FLN leadership or aim at different ends, or reflect another social logic.

### Fails—Interpretation

#### The alternative can’t solve—it fails to solve for the Orientalism that occurs in other stages of dialogue between the US and the Orient, just allowing the Other to “speak for itself” is not enough

Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor of Indian History and Culture, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, and David Washbrook, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, 1992 “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), Pg. 162-163, http://www.jstor.org/stable/178988

To question these basic suppositions is not to deny that indigenous au- diences are sharply alive to the political consequences of novel cultural in- terpretations and interventions. The dissemination of Brahmanical religious values was consciously and bitterly contested in nineteenth-century India and continues to be fought by rather different groups at present. But it is quite a different thing to posit, as Clifford appears to here, a shared ethnographic consciousness, a common participation in the textualization of cultures and in what he calls the "distanced, analytic, even ironic view of custom" that ethnographic consciousness entails.65 Most obvious, it seems unlikely that those amongst indigenous audiences who are neither powerholders nor spe- cialist purveyors of knowledge will be able to afford a detached or abstracted view of custom, particularly when its terms are being reinterpreted from outside as well as from above. Even within the terms of a dialogical approach, which focusses much more narrowly on exchanges between ethnographers and their selected writer-collaborators, it is hard to see how we can speak of a dialogue or negotiation which both share on near-equal terms. The issue is not simply the problem of a text's internal composition, which is the chief concern of dialogical approaches. It is also, as Bob Scholte has argued, that eth- nographic texts are subject to external as well as to internal relations of production, which include a professional academic apparatus of seminars, lectures and conferences, funding bodies, research councils and committees of appointment.66 It would be very difficult to deny that this intellectual and institutional apparatus helps set to a considerable extent the agendas and framing questions which ethnographers take with them into the field and that it also exerts a large control in shaping professional standards, styles of writing, and access to publication; in awarding recognition and conferring academic authority; and in approving and financing further research. Local writer-collaborators may indeed have long-lasting and intimate connections with individual ethnographers. It is much less clear what access and influence they, let alone wider and less privileged indigenous audiences, are able to command in these complex external contexts of a text's production.

### Fails—Occidentalism flawed

#### The natural response to Orientalism is Occidentalism which in China has failed—the populous is split between desiring Westernization or despising it, the alternative is unable to overcome this split

Wang Ning, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University and Director of the Research Institute for Postmodern Studies, 1997, “Orientalism versus Occidentalism?,” New Literary History Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 1997, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/24344

It should be admitted, however, that the presence of Occidentalism in China is not strange at all. It has been in the collective unconscious of modern Chinese people ever since the aggression and penetration made by Western powers in China during the Opium War in 1840. When Chinese people drove these powers out of China and founded our People’s Republic in 1949, it was pushed to an extreme, manipulating the thinking of the Chinese people and their political, economic, and cultural strategies during the cold-war period. Undoubtedly, in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic, Occidentalism did play a certain positive role in establishing China’s position in the world and breaking through its isolation and economic sanction issued by the Western clique. But if we still go to that extreme as practiced forty years ago, it would put China into a new state of isolation, which would repeat the bitter lesson of the past. In those years before China’s openness to the outside world and economic reform, Occidentalism manifested itself in different forms during different periods, but its fundamental tone was hostile to the West, especially the U.S. imperialists, and sometimes even the Soviet social imperialists. In China today, due to the flood of various Western theories, trends, and values into China since the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese people’s original protective mechanism has collapsed, 10 and their view of the West has changed dramatically. To some people, the plentiful and prosperous Western material civilization and its culture are considered superior to Oriental culture; to them the Western world is a heaven. They seek an opportunity to pay respects to it or enjoy themselves there. But to other people, at least in their subconscious, because of the education they have received, the West, and the U.S. in particular, has always been our enemy, oppressing us, invading our motherland, and even killing our countrymen. To these people, the West is in decline, its outward prosperity merely a false mask through which we can see its implied crisis; to them the twenty-first century will surely be the century of China or the Orient, and Oriental culture is superior to Western culture and is bound to dominate the world. 11 In short, the West to these people is nothing but a hell and even an evil spirit. Obviously, the two attitudes show that if we could have dialogue with the West, this kind of dialogue is by no means equal: either Chinese culture dominates or is dominated. Will there be no other way out of these simple modes of thinking characterized by binary opposition?

### Fails—Universalism

#### The alternative replicates the universalism Said criticizes and creates possessive exclusivism where differing perspectives are shut out of discussion

Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor of Indian History and Culture, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, and David Washbrook, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, 1992 “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), Pg. 157, http://www.jstor.org/stable/178988

The point about consistency is certainly true, for what comes out of all this is a very strained and contradictory position. Said recommends that we aban- don totalization and systematization in favour of the off-centre and the margin- al. But what view could have been more centrally focussed and systematising than that which he presented in Orientalism? What gave the latter its power was precisely its ability to reinterpret, within a single analytical framework, core elements in the European intellectual and political tradition for a very long period and, indeed, to reinterpret them in ways that obscured internal relations of contestation and resistance in Western cultures. If Said had fol- lowed his own injunctions, now echoed in Prakash, Orientalism would never have been written, with much loss to the whole scholarly community. Again, Said advocates humanist values and a set of universal moral imperatives regarding politics and human freedom, the fundamental obligations of intel- lectuals, the proper role of cultural criticism. But how are these strong and central normative themes reconciled with the secular and marginal position, the extreme relativist "plurality of terrains, multiple experiences and different constituencies" which Said commends elsewhere?48 Ambiguity also marks Said's position on representation. He repudiates the view that only women can write about women, blacks about blacks, that only criticism which treats them well is good criticism. But as he himself says, the kind of local and self- committed intellectual projects he commends are always in danger of slipping into a kind of "possessive exclusivism," which holds that the only valid kind of representation is the self-representation of insiders.49

#### Analysis of Orientalism cannot be a unidirectional process—we must look at local politics and analyze how the Orient shapes the process as well

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 387-388, sdi.sagepub.com

These studies, while being sensitive to the unequal power relations that underpin (post)colonial entanglements, tell us that such encounters cannot be analysed as unidirectional processes in which seemingly all-powerful ‘Western’ actors and interests simply impose their will and ‘domestic’ institutions upon ‘the rest’. Rather, they demonstrate that the actions of ‘Western’ actors are decisively shaped and transformed in and through (post)colonial entanglements and interactions. This also implies that seemingly subaltern actors can and do appropriate, and even ‘refine’, ‘Western’ security ideas, practices, institutions and discourses for their own interests. For instance, and in contrast to the longstanding exclusive focus on the central role of the United States in exporting counterinsurgency doctrines to Latin America throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, recent studies have demonstrated how Latin American security apparatuses themselves formed a transnational counterinsurgency network that appropriated and remodelled US (and French) counterinsurgency doctrines for their own practical needs and, as in the case of Argentina, exported their own knowledge and technologies of counterinsurgency to countries like Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – in large part as a response to the ‘alienating’ foreign policy of the Carter administration and its human rights focus (Armony, 2008). In decentring, while not denying, the role of Western powers such as the United States, recent studies on state repression in Latin America also call for locating the ‘local’ histories of (transnational) (in)security practices and state terror ‘within the region’s broader colonial and postcolonial background and the formation of highly polarized societies based on class, race and ethnicity’ (Esperanza, 2010: 3).

#### Even Said would disagree with the alternative—the pure theory of the alternative removes any incentive for material change

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 111-144, September 2010, Pg. 132-133, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

On the first issue, Said is keen to draw a sharp distinction between “postcolonial” perspectives—which are purportedly driven by more specific, concrete and “real” historical and political concerns—and “postmodern” perspectives, derived as they are largely from continental philosophy—largely concerned with “grand” theorizing on questions of epistemology, textuality and language. In later work Said argues that “postmodern” theory is characterized by “a much greater Eurocentric bias,” and a preponderance of theoretical and aesthetic emphasis stressing the local and the contingent, as well as the almost decorative weightlessness of history, pastiche, and above all consumerism. The earliest studies of the post-colonial were by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C.L.R. James, almost all based on studies of domination and control done from the standpoint of either a completed political independence or an incomplete liberationist project… This crucial difference between the urgent historical and political imperatives of post-colonialism and post-modernism’s relative detachment makes for altogether different approaches and results, although some overlap between them (in the technique of “magical realism,” for example) does exist.97 He is increasingly critical of the use of such theory, elsewhere arguing that instead of contextualizing the subject (as it purports to do), so-called “postmodern” theory.98 with its aesthetic of quotation, nostalgia, and indifferentiation, stands free of its own history, which is to say that the division of intellectual labor, the circumscription of praxes within clear disciplinary boundaries, and the depolitization of knowledge can proceed more or less at will.99

### Fails—Orientalism Inevitable

#### The West will always create representations of the Orient—Said’s theory is flawed because it offers no feasible alternative and does not come to terms with the idea that some representations are true

Eric Hayot, professor in the department of Comparative Literature at Penn State, 1999, “Orientalism, Modernism, and the Meaning of Pound's China,” Twentieth Century Literature, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter, 1999), Pg. 517, http://www.jstor.org/stable/441950

This would seem to suggest that Eliot's understanding of cross-cultural influence is more complicated than Said's. But Said's complication is not in the same place as Eliot's. Said never demands that the West stop represent- ing the East. When he declares that the "brute reality [of Eastern nations and cultures] is obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West," Said puts the West in a difficult position, one it cannot escape simply by shedding the burden of representation. Even when the representation seems substantially accurate, it still must confront the stric- tures of orientalism. For instance, if I reproduce (as Pound did) Chinese poetry's tendency to make each line a complete sentence in my English verse, I am taking something from genuine Chinese poetry, and yet I am still (if I announce to the world that my methodology is Chinese) partici- pating in a Western invention of China-I am helping the West create a China as it knows it. While any single Western perception of China may be accurate and true to the real China, it is also necessarily inflected to some degree by Western ethnocentrism, in its reception as well as its production. (The reverse of this is also the case: just because something is orientalist doesn't mean it's not true.) In both cases, the basic problem revolves around the possibility or im- possibility of truth in representation, more specifically the capacity of rep- resentations to seem real while being unreal. What is for Eliot, however, an ontological and aesthetic problem becomes for Said a political and histori- cal one. This difference depends as much on the difference between Eliot's and Said's historical periods and interests as on anything else. Ultimately, the demand or need for representation outweighs the fear that it will fail to adequately represent its object; both Eliot and Said are well aware of the repercussions of that demand.

#### Methods like the alternative have already been introduced and are never taken seriously or realized

Jana Hönke, a Researcher at the Research Centre SFB 700: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin, and Markus-Michael Müller, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies, Universität Leipzig, 2012, “Governing (in)security in a postcolonial world: Transnational entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice,” Security Dialogue 43(5), 2012, Pg. 384, sdi.sagepub.com

Of course, this is not to suggest that questions of postcoloniality have been completely ignored by security studies. In addition to the somewhat pioneering works of Ayoob (1995) on the ‘third world security predicament’, there have been a number of attempts to analyse the governance of (in)security under postcolonial conditions (e.g. Agathangelou and Ling, 2004; Krishna, 1999; Muppidi, 1999). And even some introductions to the field of critical security studies include sections on or chapter-long engagements with the broadly conceived issue of ‘postcoloniality’ (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010; Acharaya, 1997). However, such efforts have been of marginal interest to the various research agendas within security studies, and convincing calls for a ‘postcolonial moment in security studies’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006) have received remarkably little attention thus far. As a result, security studies continues to be haunted by a ‘Western-centrism’ that makes the knowledge production within the field parochial and peripheral, because it ‘mistakes “Western” experiences for the universal, thus failing to take note of different insecurities and responses in other locales’ (Bilgin, 2010: 619)

### Fails—Backfires

#### The alternative fails to come to terms with the actual cause of their impacts which destroys any solvency they claim. Their intellectual resistance without any means of legitimate solvency serves only as an ideological mask for elitism in their knowledge production

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 111-144, September 2010, Pg. 124-125, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

Three consequences flow from this supposed textual idealism. First, Said (and the Foucaultian-inspired students of “Colonial Discourse Analysis” in general), simply fail to understand the true causes of colonial and imperial power of Europe over non-European peoples. The sources of this domination can be found in—and are thus only analyzable in terms of—the political-economy of modern European societies. Contra Said’s construal of imperialism, which at times ‚appears to be an effect mainly of certain kinds of writing,‛ 53 Ahmad argues that What gave European forms of these prejudices their special force in history, with devastating consequences for the actual lives of countless millions and expressed ideologically in full-blown Eurocentric racisms, was not some transhistorical process of ontological obsession and falsity—some gathering of unique force in domains of discourse—but, quite specifically, the power of colonial capitalism, which then gave rise to other sorts of power.54 Because the Discourse Analysis approach fails to apprehend the source of imperial and colonial power, it also fails to understand the possibilities of resistance to it. This is the second mistake. According to Ahmad, insofar as Said has included counter-hegemonic politics at all,55 this is a politics of writing. Because Said understands imperialism to primarily be a “cultural phenomenon,” it is “to be opposed by an alternative discourse.” 56 This “textual resistance” is not only inadequate,57 it serves, in Ahmad’s view as an ideological mask for the elitism and conservatism of the academic community in the West of the late Cold War era. This is the third consequence of the move to “discourse”: a (self) concealing of the implication of “postcolonial theory” within imperial-capitalism itself. As he writes, In this sort of formulation [Colonial Discourse Analysis] the “contest over decolonization” becomes mainly a literary and literary-critical affair, and the elite academic intelligentsia claims for itself, in an amazing gap between fact and self-image, the role of the world’s revolutionary vanguard.58 The intellectual elite (exemplified by Foucault and Said) are able to assert the radical revolutionary potential of their “textual intervention”—elsewhere he writes that such thinkers assert “the centrality of reading as the primary form of politics”59—and simultaneously mask the conditions of their own possibility as elites, namely the “unprecedented imperialist consolidations of the present decade”60 and subsequent collapse of the traditional (Marxist) left. Ahmad insists on reading Orientalism and its reliance upon an “anti-humanist” and “textualist” philosophy such as Foucault’s as an effect of the ‚”lobal offensive of the Right, global retreat of the Left, and retreat also of that which was progressive even in our canonical nationalism.”61

#### The alternative fails and will recreate the domination they criticize by casting aside and demonizing those who do not fit into their model of Orient/Occident, like China

Chiann Karen Tsui, PhD in German Studies at Stanford University, focus on the dynamics of cultural transference, her current research interests include an expanded study of German literary works adapted into the post-Mao Chinese context, and Russell A. Berman, Walter A. Haas Professor at Stanford University, with appointments in the departments of Comparative Literature and German Studies, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2015, “The Dialectic of Recognition and the Rediscovery of China: After Orientalism,” European Review / Volume 23 / Issue 02 / May 2015, Pg. 190, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract\_S1062798714000660

The close analysis of the vicissitudes of Orientalism in Schnitzler’s prose fragment provides an opportunity to return to the opening question as to the nature of the ‘rediscovery’ of China. The term implies, as discussed above, an original familiarity – akin to the lieutenant’s initial use of the informal du – followed by a historical process of distancing and loss which, however, is currently being overcome in a recognition regained. In addition to our earlier efforts to parse this trajectory across historical developments of the past two centuries, ‘The Boxer Rebellion’ provides another perspective: at stake is not ‘post-Deng’, ‘post-Mao’, or ‘post-Nixon’, not even ‘post-Soviet Union’ or ‘post-Communist’, but rather: post-Orientalism in its broadest sense – the importance of moving beyond the boundaries of Orientalism and the Orientalist critique.14 The current rediscovery of China transpires in the context of the obsolescence of the Orientalist thesis that projected an excessively binary paradigm onto the complexities of international and cross-cultural relations, and its insufficiency is no more evident than with regard to China and its encounter with West. The dichotomous world of the anti-imperialist imagination never could understand the semi-permeable character of the divide and the complexity of relations of culture and power in colonial settings. Hence the predisposition for the harshness of anti-imperialist judgement on figures who did not fit neatly into either camp, even though the mass of human experience transpired in such grey zones. The binaries of the Orientalist thesis were, when all is said and done, the western academic articulation of the ideological formulations of a dogmatic anti-imperialism for which figures such as Arthur Schnitzler or – to name an analogous Chinese counterpart – Zhang Ailing were too ambiguous, ideologically elusive, and dangerously close to the politically unstable dimensions of lived life. The rediscovery of China may, perhaps, have something to do with convergences in the economic systems, although China and the West remain very far apart in terms of institutional structures. What drives the rediscovery more strongly, however, is the collapse of the ideological blinders of the Orientalism paradigm, as it unravels due to its own internal inconsistencies, in the same way that Schnitzler’s lieutenant found his own subject position untenable as imperialism at its height was already beginning to collapse.

## Framework

### Political engagement

#### Postcolonial theory is only interested in theorizing about issues, it never engages in actual decoloniality projects—they can’t solve their impacts without the permutation

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 111-144, September 2010, Pg. 115, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

The second use of the term “postcolonial” is more specific. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a field of academic study emerged, mostly associated with literary studies, which went by the name “postcolonial studies.” While recognizing a common heritage with and indebtedness to earlier critical reflective practitioners and postcolonial political thinkers such as Fanon and Gandhi, this new generation of theorists most often understood their project to be entering a new and different era. Instead of thinking of postcolonialism as primarily or exclusively a form of historical periodization, these thinkers began to use the term to also refer to a mode of theoretical analysis. Instead of primarily asserting an independent space for non-European peoples in a direct political sense—a space of self-determination—these new postcolonial theorists began to “invade” the history, culture and philosophy of the West in new ways. Their texts were often not about non-Western forms of life at all. Rather, their primary objective was to “provincialize,” “de-naturalize” or “de-transcendentalize” Western forms of knowledge and the universalist pretentions that came with them.10 Generally speaking then, postcolonial theorists were less interested in the “formal” struggle to decolonize land (such as India or Algeria) than in what happens after this process. They were and are predominantly concerned with questions of identity, representation, hybridity, diasporas, migration, etc., than with direct anti-colonial struggle.

## Flawed Theory

### History

#### The historicism of Orientalism reproduces the problems it criticizes—the history the affirmative utilizes is key to actual understanding

Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor of Indian History and Culture, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, and David Washbrook, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, 1992 “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), Pg. 148-149, http://www.jstor.org/stable/178988

This all makes it very difficult to grasp the character of postfoundationalist understandings of the past or to see what they are meant to achieve. These confusions seem to us to arise out of a wish to generate an historical praxis from Derridean and postmodernist perspectives that are inherently inimical to it. These perspectives undermine possibilities for such a praxis in two ways. First, because they regard any intervention by the historian or interpreter in the past as inherently illegitimate, a kind of complicity, they fail to acknowl- edge the particular and specific means by which that scholar acquires knowl- edge of the past. Prakash objects to our giving some analytical categories privilege on the grounds that this "occludes the histories that lie outside of the themes which are privileged in history." But this suggests that the themes of history are or should be given in the material of history itself, exposed or not exposed by the historian, whose cognitive relation to them is passive. What this objection reflects is actually a rather old-fashioned, even positivistic assumption about the sources of historical knowledge, but one also which may not surprise us. For as Searle has argued, Derrida's own obsession with the non-problem of objectivity and his failure to recognize our subjective need for knowledge as primary and legitimate, leaves his concerns also laden with residues of positivism.24 The objection entirely misses the fact that the past, including its historical subjects, comes to the historian through fragmentary and fractured empirical sources, which possess no inherent themes and ex- press no unequivocal voices. In and of themselves, these sources and voices are just noise: "Other" histories uncovered do not speak for themselves any more than the "facts" of history do. To state the obvious, the historian must undertake the prior, and in part subjective, tasks that only the historian can do: to turn the noise into coherent voices through which the past may speak to the present and to construct the questions to which the past may give the present intelligible answers. Prakash seems to refuse to acknowledge the inevitability (and the responsibility) of this task. Indeed, he offers us a methodology that would seem to rule out even the refusals of which he speaks. He enjoins us to refuse particular themes and categories, most notably those pertaining to the global transition to modern capitalism, lest simply by engaging with them we become implicated in and so reproduce the hegemonies which they represent. But how can we refuse certain themes if we do not know what they are and how can we know what they are if we are not permitted to engage and study them?

### Limitations

#### Said’s theory of Orientalism is geographically, ideologically, and culturally limited—his particular focus is not generalizable to China and not applicable to current international relations

Wang Ning, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University and Director of the Research Institute for Postmodern Studies, 1997, “Orientalism versus Occidentalism?,” New Literary History Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 1997, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/24344

First, we should point out its geographical limitation, which is restricted by his family background, as well as his scope of knowledge and learning. As is well known, the “Orient,” geographically speaking, covers at least the wide areas of Asia, Africa, and Australia, but in Said’s book, the boundary line stops at the Near East and Middle East. Such regions as Southeast Asia and such important Oriental countries as China, India, and Japan are seldom touched upon; they pose a serious limitation to his theory although he has added certain corrective analyses in his new book Culture and Imperialism. Second, his “Orient” or “Orientalism” also has its ideological and cultural limitations. As far as its ideological and cultural significance is concerned, the “Western” idea or culture that we usually deal with in effect refers to the ideology or cultural concepts based on the bourgeois value standard prevailing in Western Europe and North America, while those contrary to them are normally regarded as the “Oriental” concepts. It is on the basis of this striking difference in ideology and culture that the East and the West were in a state of opposition during the cold-war period after World War II; with the end of the cold war, East-West relations have entered a post-cold war period, during which, according to Samuel Huntington, “The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.” 6 Among Oriental cultures, the “most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power” (45). Huntington has here correctly grasped the two origins of Oriental cultures, the Arab countries and China, which have, especially the latter, been overlooked by Said.

#### The field of postcoloniality has no external referent, instead all of the authors the negative is citing are subject to massive groupthink—there is no external validity to any of their theory

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 111-144, September 2010, Pg. 139-140, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

What I think we can see here is the formation of Foucault as a discourse (at least in Said’s sense of the term). I am interested in demonstrating how “Foucault” has become a name that stands in for and evokes a position within a general field of questions and problems. “Foucault” comes to serve as a point of reference within the field of postcolonial studies that one can variously be for or against. This position is associated with discourse, the ubiquitous circulation of power, the “production” of knowledge, the total scripting of subjects (and, paradoxically, the exhalation of their total emancipation), etc. In each of the cases discussed above the theoretical insufficiency of “discourse” as a frame of analysis is the ground of questions from which subsequent debates in postcolonial theory emerged. While various commentators have positioned themselves as either for or against Said’s early formulation—including Said himself—they have almost without exception taken his to be an accurate representation of “discourse” as a concept derived from Foucault. In this way, Foucault himself has become a discourse—at least in Said’s sense of the term: a tradition of representation held together by the linguistic iterations within a specified domain of study rather than any truth-value in relation to an external referent. Once Said set in place the underlying premise that postcolonialism is, as Bhabha phrases it, an interrogation of the “mode of representation of otherness,” many other thinkers come to inhabit the field marked by such a position. In many cases, these thinkers do not refer to almost any texts in their declarations of what ‘Foucault’ stands for, or they freely move between speaking of ‘Foucault,’ “Foucaultian analysis” and “Colonial Discourse Analysis.” When they do return to Foucault himself (as, say, with Robert Young) the Foucault who matters is captured almost entirely by texts from the late 1960s and early 1970s. My worry in this is not, however, that this “postcolonial Foucault discourse” is an inaccurate representation of what Foucault actually said (though it may also be that), but mainly that it has become a field of thought with no external referent and thus many of the problems within are pseudo-problems, created because all positions take as their point of departure a similar set of background presuppositions. In almost all cases— Said, Bhabha, Ahmad, Spivak, Young—the three basic underlying presuppositions are held in place, namely, that (a) Foucault is central to “postcolonial studies,” (b) the centrality of his work is attributable to his notion of discourse and, (c) that discourse is best understood as a system of textual representation synchronically organized across a series of texts. This leads to all kinds of debates, criticisms and reversals of course. One might argue that Foucault should not be central to postcolonial studies (pace Ahmad or Spivak at times). One might hold that “discourse” as originally formulated is too undifferentiated a concept (pace Bhabha). One might even hold that “discourse” must also include features outside of mere textual representation (pace Young).119 While the answers vary and conflict with each other depending on the thinker here, the ground of questions remains substantially the same.120

### Self-fulfilling prophecy

#### Orientalism as a theory is a tool by which one furthers Orientalism rather than dismantling it

Graham Huggan, Chair of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Literatures in the School of English at the University of Leeds, where he also directs the cross-disciplinary Institute for Colonial and Postcolonial Studies, 2005, “(Not) Reading ‘Orientalism’,” Research in African Literatures, Vol. 36, No. 3, Edward Said, Africa, and Cultural Criticism (Autumn, 2005), Pg. 126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3821368

A second pattern of response to Orientalism emerges here that we might call the "re-Orientalization" of Orientalism (the book). Within this pattern, Orientalism's exclusionary and immobilizing strategies are either inadvertently reproduced by those who seek to uncover alternative examples of its workings ("anti-Orientalist Orientalism") or are consciously deployed by those who, constructing themselves as the West's victims, turn against their adversaries in uncompromising gestures of collective pride and righteous anti-imperialist revenge ("Occidentalism"). The phenomenon of "anti-Orientalist Orientalism," in particular, begs the question as to the self-replicating tendencies of Orientalism, neatly captured in James Clifford's almost apologetic suggestion that Said's book, for all the power of its criticism, "sometimes appears to mimic the essentializing discourse it attacks" (262). I will come back to this suggestion in detail later, via Aijaz Ahmad's caustic reading of Orientalism. For the moment, suffice to point out a third category of response to Said's text that draws attention, explicitly or implicitly, to the unreflected Orientalism of Orientalism itself. This largely hostile view of Orientalism (the book) is founded on a series of apparently embarrassing paradoxes: that it reproduces the enumerative, patiently cumulative, and paternalistic methods of the "master" Orientalists; that it reinstates broad transhistorical and cultural generalization in the service of magisterial expertise; that its seemingly counterintuitive insistence on the internal consistency of Orientalism is inconsistent with Said's own Foucault-inspired discursive methods (but remains uncannily consistent with the self-authorizing maneuvers of classical Orientalism itself); that it assembles a textualized Orient with a view to establishing intellectual authority over it, even if this "textual, contemplative" Orient is never allowed, like its nineteenth-century historical counter part, to facilitate the control of the geographical Orient as an "economic, administrative and even military space" (Orientalism 210).

#### Post-colonial theory criticizes Western knowledge production by utilizing Western modes of thought rather than culturally diverse scholarship—reentrenching Orientalism

Leigh Kathryn Jenco, Postdoctoral Research Associate, The Political Theory Project, Brown University, in July 2008, she will be Assistant Professor of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 2007, “’What Does Heaven Ever Say?’ A Methods-centered Approach to Cross-cultural Engagement,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), Pg. 742, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644482

Before examining the methodological insights of Kang and Wang, however, it may help to clarify how my methods-centered approach shares similar goals, but contrasts in important ways, with other critical approaches to the cross-cultural encounter advanced by scholars in postcolonial studies, political science, and the emerging field of comparative political theory. Scholars in these fields have done a great deal to question the "universalism" presumed by mainstream liberal or social science models of politics, explaining the need for culturally diverse perspectives in political and social analysis. Oddly, however, their critiques of ethnocentrism more often takes cues from competing Western discourses (e.g., Marxism, German hermeneutics) than from the culturally diverse scholastic traditions whose ideas they are scrutinizing (say, classical Chinese Confucianism, or twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism). In this section, I consider how and why such approaches, designed to counteract Western centric universalism, make it more difficult to move beyond it—often by picturing the cross-cultural en counter as an exchange of subjective "voices" rather than of the scholarly traditions that give meaning to those voices. This is not to say that my own approach is somehow "objective" or free of ethnocentrism. I am simply pointing out that because most cross-cultural theory sees its task as the inclusion of culturally situated ideas or experiences, it remains unable to recognize modes of scholarly inquiry that exist independently of any one particular subjective viewpoint. Most cross cultural theorists, therefore, lack the resources to challenge Chakrabarty's insistence that all modern inquiry must be, in some form or another, Europeanized. With out these resources, these theorists continue to build frames of inquiry that turn on European categories and experiences—the very outcome their analysis seeks to hedge against.

### Identity

#### Said’s failure to determine whether or not identities exist negates any practical utility Orientalism provides

John Whalen-Bridge, Dept of English Language and Literature Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences National University of Singapore, 2001, “Orientalism, Politics, and Literature,” Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2001), Pg. 197, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23653932

This (arguably) minor critical impasse in American literary studies arises from a central problem in Said's work which is, in its widest extrapolations, anything but minor. The problems arise from Said's less-than satisfactory way of handling a crucial notion, that of "identity." By arguing that Orientalism, as an academic discipline and as a style of thought, is essentially a process of intersubjective self-definition, Said is able to call attention to the "cloaking device" that has for centuries hidden the ways in which European and American self-definition have often come at the cost of other kinds of identities. However, he then faces a huge dilemma when the question arises, Do identities exist, or are they merely intersubjective fantasies? If identities do exist, then some writers will describe them well, some writes will describe them poorly, and all intellectuals after 1968 win accuse Said of "naive realism."4 But Said's ability to point out the existence of an ideological cloaking device will fail, since a discourse of historical error-and-correction will entirely displace Said's quasi-Foucauldian description of a discourse that shapes knowledge in ways that benefit Western knowers. If identities do not exist, then why should the Palestinians have a homeland? One could just say "Jews and Palestinians do not exist" with the nonchalance of a Lacanian marriage counselor telling us that "sexual relations do not exist." The point is philosophically viable but not terribly helpful in an immediate practical sense.

#### Said’s totalizing discourse on Orientalism fails to come to terms with or even acknowledge difference within the Orient which dramatically undermines the applicability and relevance of his theory in practice

Robert Nichols, Assistant Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota and Humboldt Faculty Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 2010, “Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies, No. 9, pp. 120-122, September 2010, Pg. 115, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3062/3195

The first critique of Foucaultian discourse as deployed by Said is that this form of analysis is too totalizing, that it gives too undifferentiated an account, one that leaves no room for diversity and conflict in the views expressed within the range of authors studied. In asserting the existence of (a supposedly singular, homogeneous) “Orientalist discourse,” Said took insufficient account of the differences of time, place and authorial intent.29 As Leela Gandhi puts it, “If Orientalism is a limited text, then it is so primarily because it fails to accommodate the possibility of difference within Oriental discourse.” 30 A good example of this kind of critique from within postcolonial theory31 can be found in work by Homi Bhabha. In his 1983 essay “Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism,”32 and again in an expanded form eleven years later in The Location of Culture,33 Bhabha sought to demonstrate that “the construction of the colonial subject in discourse, and the exercise of colonial power through discourse, demands an articulation of forms of difference—racial and sexual.”34 Bhabha’s own project, comprising the internal differentiation of colonial discourse along lines of “race” and sexuality, is repeatedly contrasted with Said’s “refusal to engage with the alterity and ambivalence in the articulation of these two economies which threaten to split the very object of Orientalist discourse as a knowledge and the subject positioned therein.”35 He attributes the totalizing tendencies of Said’s notion of discourse to his “inadequate attention to representation as a concept,” which is “undermined by… the polarities of intentionality,” meaning that “the terms in which Said’s Orientalism is unified—the intentionality and unidirectionality of colonial power—also unify the subject of colonial enunciation.”36 Bhabha goes on to argue for a revised notion of discourse, modifying Said and, at the same time, Foucault. He calls upon “Foucault’s post-structuralist concept of the dispositif or apparatus” as a means of correcting Said’s (and the earlier Foucault’s) earlier search for “discursive regularity.”37 Bhabha then proceeds on to a reading of Fanon through the Lacanian schema of “the Imaginary,” which attempts to account for the “ambivalence…of “consent” in objectification,” which “Foucault asserts but… fails to explain.”38 The resulting discussion of fetishism is used as a means of demonstrating that “racist stereotypical discourse, in its colonial moment, inscribes a form of governmentality that is informed by a productive splitting in its constitution of knowledge and exercise of power.”39

### Contradictions

#### Said is full of contradictions—rapidly changing his mind and concluding that the post-modernist refusal of the universal perspective of the Orient is impossible

Rosalind O'Hanlon, Professor of Indian History and Culture, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, and David Washbrook, Faculty of History, University of Oxford, 1992 “After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, and Politics in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), Pg. 157-158, http://www.jstor.org/stable/178988

Of course, it is true that such contradictions can be very fruitful, particu- larly in hands as deft as Said's. But their fruitfulness lies surely in prompting us to recognize and go beyond them. Moreover, there do seem to be levels in Said's wider position at which creative tensions begin to look like submerged self-contradictions. This was perhaps most interestingly so, for our purposes, in what he said early in 1989 during the battles over Salman Rushdie's work. Rushdie's "fundamental rights" should be protected, Said argued, because the contemporary world, for all its particularities, must be regarded as one world and human history as one history. (But not, to paraphrase his earlier remarks, a human history seen from Europe's vantage point.) This meant that there was no pure unsullied essence to which Muslims or anyone else could return; this single world was irredeemably heterogeneous, and Rushdie's work was a part of that. At the same time, one feature of his work that made it legitimate was that "Rushdie, from the community of Islam, has written for the West about Islam. The Satanic Verses is thus a self-representation."50 This brings Said very close to what he rejected earlier about self-representation: its tendency merely to invert the essential categories of Orientalism. It is simply very difficult to combine arguments concerning fundamental rights and pos- sibilities for emancipation with a postmodernist refusal of any kind of unitary or systematizing perspective as to what these rights might be or what eman- cipation is from or into. Consequently, rights, dominance, and emancipation are defined only from the extreme relativist perspective of the multifarious struggles of oppositional groups. And when one version of emancipation conflicts with another, the natural defence for both becomes the principle of self-representation as such.