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# Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

# JANUARY EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST POLICY-CX**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

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# AFFIRMATIVE

## A2: Trump will roll back diplomacy

#### Trump CANNOT change the fundamentals of U.S. diplomacy and strategy

Cui Liru, the former President of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), November 30, 2016, “The “Trumpquake” and U.S. Diplomacy,” China Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-trumpquake-and-us-diplomacy, Accessed 12-21-2016

Now people are watching the power transfer in Washington with curiosity and anxiety, trying to find clues in the appointments and remarks Trump makes and the measures he takes that may foretell future American domestic and foreign policies. Judging from recent developments, Trump has begun to change tunes on some of his sensational statements during the campaign, and is starting to do some political fence-mending. Obviously Trump will not, cannot, as he bragged on the campaign trail, abruptly change the fundamental lines of US foreign policy and global strategy, or easily reverse major policies.

What determines the basic principles and overall posture of American diplomacy and global strategy has never been any individual president, but always the dominant forces representing Washington and the status of US comprehensive strength. Since the 20th century, when American diplomacy shifted from isolationism to internationalism, the starting points and goals have never deviated from the “America first” principle. In different periods, the differences between US foreign policies under different presidents were only about the paths and forms taken for promoting so-called American “national interests”. After WWII, the internationalist school has dominated American global diplomacy, shaping the unprecedented superpower status the US has enjoyed. In the nearly two decades after the Cold War, the fundamental and main driving force for the US has been to play the world’s policeman, trumpet globalization and preserve the US-dominated world order, the US’ unrivalled status as the world’s sole superpower and its interest in industrial and financial capital expansion.

#### Despite cosmetic changes, the fundamentals of US diplomacy won’t disappear under Trump

Cui Liru, the former President of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), November 30, 2016, “The “Trumpquake” and U.S. Diplomacy,” China Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-trumpquake-and-us-diplomacy, Accessed 12-21-2016

Trump needs to experience a process of transition from a businessman to a president — learning to be a US president. He met with Henry Kissinger, the most veteran and prestigious diplomatic advisor of the US establishment, after getting elected and listened to his advice. Kissinger said afterward that he was optimistic about the new president’s strategic decisiveness, and urged outsiders to avoid dwelling on some of Trump’s campaign rhetoric, and allow him some time. With the new president moving into the White House, the revolving door of the government will see a new team of ambitious individuals many of whom are unfamiliar faces. Some significant issues facing US diplomacy will to a great extent rest on the diplomatic philosophy, policy stance and professional knowledge and experience of corresponding officials in charge. To sum up, Trump’s win was a major political earthquake, some old, fragile entities will inevitably give way to new ones, while the solid ones will stay and continue to function. Other things may suffer damage of various kinds and degrees and require repair. This may well be the American politics and diplomacy we will have to face in the future.

## A2: Diplomatic/Economic relations high now

#### U.S.-China economic and diplomatic relations will continue to decline. The plan’s engagement is essential

Ryan Rainey, Staff Writer, December 14, 2016, “Trump-Related Diplomatic Scuffles Could Hurt U.S. Economic Ties to China,” Morning Consult, <https://morningconsult.com/2016/12/14/trump-related-diplomatic-scuffles-hurt-u-s-economic-ties-china/>, Accessed 12-28-2016

Diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and China have risen since President-elect Donald Trump’s accepted a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, a development that has the potential to damage an already tenuous economic relationship between the two global powerhouses. Scott Kennedy, an expert on U.S.-China economic relations at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview that commercial relations were already on the decline before Trump’s Election Day victory, in part because there’s a general consensus on the U.S. side that Beijing has not been making enough progress on the economic reforms that it promised in 2013. Trump’s comments could deepen those commercial anxieties, he said. The president-elect has already shown he’s willing to be a provocateur on issues related to China. Earlier this month Trump said the country manipulates its currency, indicating that his administration could take official steps on that front. His unprecedented call with Tsai and comments on Sunday suggesting that he would abandon the One-China policy could cause further economic jitters. “Right now, the language of tweeting and TV interviews suggests that the entire relationship could be up for grabs and reconsideration,” Kennedy, who’s director of the Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy at CSIS, said in Monday’s interview. “The boundary between economic issues and political security issues is wiped away, and possibilities of severe disruption cannot be dismissed.”

#### Trump will tank Sino-U.S. trade relations. Confrontational rhetoric is risking a trade war and global economic decline

[Robert Farley](https://twitter.com/drfarls?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor), Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, December 25, 2016, “5 Big Reasons U.S.- China Ties Could Go Up in Flames (and On a Path to War),” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/5-big-reasons-us-china-ties-could-go-flames-path-war-18859, Accessed 12-27-2016

The U.S.-China trade relationship has driven much of global economic growth since the late 1980s. Chinese access to U.S. capital and U.S. access to Chinese labor and resources have laid the cornerstone for the post-Cold War global economy (and perhaps for its financial instability).  Through the years, both China and the United States have treated this relationship with great care, cordoning trade issues apart from political and strategic concerns. The Trump administration has promised to change all that. President Trump has expressed plans to challenge China on a variety of trade issues, some of which go to the core of the relationship.  While China and the United States still need one another, the realization of Trump’s most confrontational rhetoric might well spark a trade war, which could prove disruptive to the entire global economy.

#### Navarro’s position on China will be expressly hostile

Evelyn Cheng, Staff Writer, December 22, 2016, “Future of US-China relations more challenging than Trump expects, Bremmer says,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/22/future-of-us-china-relations-more-challenging-than-trump-expects-bremmer-says.html, Accessed 12-28-2016

Establishing a new U.S.-China relationship may be more difficult than President-elect [Donald Trump](http://www.cnbc.com/donald-trump/) expects, a prominent China watcher said Thursday. "The environment for the entire Trump administration on China is going to be much more challenging to negotiate and I don't think Trump has gotten his head around that yet," Ian Bremmer, president of consulting firm Eurasia Group, said on CNBC's "[Squawk Alley](http://www.cnbc.com/squawk-alley/)." Trump announced Wednesday that outspoken China critic and economist Peter Navarro will head a newly formed National Trade Council. Navarro has run for office as a Democrat. Bremmer said Navarro is a "smart and credible guy," a "real academic" and "not a crazy." Both Navarro and Trump agree on tough tactics such as labeling China a currency manipulator and [opposing the Trans-Pacific Partnership.](http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/chinas-gain-the-collapse-of-the-tpp-could-be-bad-for-everyone.html) "The problem is that [partnership] was the one thing that was a mechanism to get all of America's allies on board with U.S.-led trade as opposed to China-led trade," Bremmer said.

# Kritik Answers Aestheticentrism K

### Framework – Policy Focus Good (1/2)

#### The role of the judge is to weigh the policy effect(s) of the plan against the practical effect(s) of the alt—working within the conventions of the language game is best middle ground.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

First, for all their theoretical engagement with the later Wittgenstein, postmodern writings have fallen short of recognising the practical significance of language games. Many postmodern texts remain buried in a highly abstract and inaccessible language that has, at times, become as predictable as the practices they seek to oppose.56 As a result, the critical insight they may contain has failed to reach the broad audience necessary to achieve social transformation. The issue is, of course, not easy. The innovative potential of a text emerges precisely from its refusal to take existing linguistic conventions for granted, from the attempt to search for new ways of speaking about issues that had been rendered unproblematic through a series of worn out metaphors. But a text can, of course, not depart too radically from existing linguistic conventions either: to do so would be to construct a private language that loses its social dimension. The key task, then, is to walk a fine line between these two extremes; a challenge that remains by and large unmet.

#### We should hold to the boundaries of the IR discipline—depth is better than breadth.

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2006

“Cinematic IR, the Sublime, and the Indistinctness of Art,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 793-818, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/793.abstract> (accessed 5/23/16)

I start off with some general observations which do not presuppose any particular conception of aesthetics or any view about the proper tasks of IR.4 The first point is that anyone wanting to argue that the authors of recent publications in aesthetic IR are not really doing IR would find it difficult. Most of the authors involved work in IR or politics departments, and they usually publish their work in journals with the word ‘international’ or some cognate term (e.g., ‘global’) in the title or subtitle. Ergo, this work is – empirically – part of IR. Such work is now appearing in a wider range of journals; having started in Alternatives and Millennium, it has now reached the Review of International Studies and International Studies Review. It is also increasingly being addressed to the undergraduate students, as well as the colleagues, of the authors. At the same time, the aesthetic tendency within IR remains a predominantly anglophone phenomenon, and even to a considerable extent a British or at least a British-based one. Whether coincidentally or not, the aesthetic turn has been taking place in the location where IR has been considered an autonomous discipline or interdiscipline rather than a sub-field of political science. This does not mean that a fundamental challenge to the turn, on the grounds that it lies beyond the legitimate boundaries of IR, is unthinkable. If no such challenge has been made so far, I suspect this is a consequence of indifference rather than a reflection of widespread agreement. This in turn suggests that IR as a discipline or field has developed to a point at which sub-fields are spinning off from the core under their own momentum. My own position entails a degree of conservatism, or at least caution, about interdisciplinarity, but if one accepts that IR’s disciplinary identity has in practice already become m o re indistinct, further questions about disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity arise which I cannot examine in detail here. For example, is there really anything that can be called a core anymore? And if not, is there much left for disciplinary dissidents to complain about?

### Framework – Policy Focus Good (2/2)

#### This goes beyond methodological pluralism, asking what world we want to bring about.

Claudia Aradau, Reader in International Politics at King’s College London, and Jef Huysmans, Director of the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at the Open University, 2014

“Critical methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, devices and acts,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 596–619, <https://ips.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/56> (Accessed 5/22/16)

This understanding of methods implies that Jackson’s argument for letting a plurality of methodologies coexist misses something important. Arguing for pluralism is an important move in the academic context, of which we are supportive, but it does not bring into focus the politicality of the choices within the pluralist canvas. The field of a thousand blooming methodological flowers is also a field of contestation and struggle, and not simply about what is the best way to do science, but also about what subjectivities and worlds are being brought forward in the enactment of methods. Once one accepts that methods enact worlds, the question of methods necessarily is a question of conflicting, competing, diverse ‘conceptions’ of worlds and subjectivities — a question of both knowledge and politics. As Law et al. (2011: 12) have put it, this means that ‘[w]e’re also trading in politics, in questions about the kinds of social worlds and subjectivities we want to help make more real — to realise — in and through our methods’.

### No Uniqueness – Status Quo Solves

#### 60’s counter-culture and Said’s writings already solved the critique.

Kojin Karatani, Japanese philosopher and literary critic, retired visiting professor of comparative literature at Columbia and Japanese literature at Yale, October 1998

“Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism,” Boundary 2, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp. 145-160, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/303618> (accessed 4/25/16)

In the United States today, very few, if any, intellectuals take this kind of stance toward the non-West, undoubtedly because of Edward Said's Orientalism. But considering that this powerful book, though translated into German and French, has not gotten as much attention in those countries as in the United States, I have to acknowledge that a book, no matter how powerful, cannot change a situation all by itself. What helped make Orientalism so widely accepted in the United States were lessons learned from the 1960s experiences of the Civil Rights and antiwar movements. While intellectuals in America can perhaps be categorized as pre- or post-- Said, the European intellectual paradigm can only be seen as pre-Said or pre-Orientalism. Why?

#### Aesthetic IR is nothing new—if the status quo doesn’t solve then neither will the alt.

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2006

“Cinematic IR, the Sublime, and the Indistinctness of Art,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 793-818, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/793.abstract> (accessed 5/23/16)

If all these things are present, what is missing from current aesthetic IR? T h e re has still been no engagement with the world literature literature , which continues to grow and to merit attention.3 0 Nor is there much political economy in the turn as it stands.3 1 It would be a good thing if aesthetic IR scholars were to take more notice of each others’ contributions and indicate how they are to be distinguished from one a n o t h e r. This is not an argument against diversity in aesthetic IR, which is both desirable and inevitable. However, aesthetic IR has been in existence for the best part of ten years, and those now joining the debate are not venturing onto terra incognita. Aesthetic IRists could also do with a more nuanced view of the discipline’s own history. They have a tendency to claim, or at least imply, that literature was a taboo subject in IR until they came along, but this is inaccurate. Martin Wight can be identified as a kind of literary IR scholar avant la lettre. Kenneth Waltz plays the role of Voldemort, that constant threat to the security of Hogwarts, in ‘critical’ IR’s cosmology, but anyone who re - reads his Man, the State and War will find an elegantly written book in which the author draws on a range of literary sources to illustrate the arg u m e n t .3 2 O f course, Wight and Waltz may be just as guilty as contemporary aesthetic IRists of selecting literary sources to suit their case, but that is not the point here. The range of insights most aesthetic IRists are prepared to have appears fairly limited; one (still) gets the impression that the main purpose of the aesthetic turn is to unmask realists, positivists, masculinists, and other discursive ne’er-do-wells .3 3 Within this conception of the field, the kind of reflections realists might offer, and support with the help of a literary reference – perhaps some view of human nature, or a thesis about the tragedy of inevitable conflict – would not count as insights because they are the sort of insights realists have

### No Link – General

#### The aff has no unifying aesthetic, it’s an ad hoc assemblage.

Claudia Aradau, Reader in International Politics at King’s College London, and Jef Huysmans, Director of the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at the Open University, 2014

“Critical methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, devices and acts,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 596–619, <https://ips.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/56> (Accessed 5/22/16)

Taking our cue from some of these reflections on method and the status of methodology, we argue that method and methodological reflections can be a key site of revisiting critique and politics in IR research. This requires two closely interrelated moves. First, methods need to be understood as performative rather than representational (Law, 2004; Law and Urry, 2004; Law et al., 2011). They are not simply techniques of extracting information from reality and aligning it with — or against — bodies of knowledge. Methods are instead within worlds and partake in their shaping. As performative, methods are practices through which ‘truthful’ worlds are enacted, both in the sense of being acted upon and coming into being. This move implies a reversal of the usual order of discussion that subsumes method and methodology to debates driven by the formulation of a problem-question, an ontology, an epistemology and a conceptual toolbox. The concept of method we propose does not treat methods as an outcome of a particular ontology and epistemology so that a particular method can only be used in relation to certain philosophical positions.2 Methods are instead performative practices experimentally connecting and assembling fragments of ontology, epistemology, theories, techniques and data through which substantive effects are obtained.3

#### Their link arguments reduce method to the expression of a particular aesthetic.

Claudia Aradau, Reader in International Politics at King’s College, and Jef Huysmans, Director of the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at Open University, 2014

“Critical methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, devices and acts,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 596–619, <https://ips.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/56> (Accessed 5/22/16)

Understanding methods as connecting and assembling of ontology, epistemology, concept development, techniques of data gathering and worlds — rather than simply being the expression of ontological and epistemological choices — is an important step. At the same time, something else is implied. If methods are an active practice of bringing these various elements in relation to, rather than being simply the expression of, an alignment that is cascaded down from ontology and epistemology over theory and concept building to methods, then methods must be experimental in their work of connecting and assembling. Philosophical coherence between the various elements is less important than a tentative and explorative assembling of ontological and epistemological perspectives as well as data and concept fragments in relation to a research question or set of issues that drive the development of knowledge, such as the securitization of migration, he transformation of geopolitics, the rise of risk governance, the prevention of human trafficking, the regulation of free movement and so on. The concept of device that we propose is therefore probing and messy rather than logically and procedurally strict. This performative conception of method makes the interferences methods make central to their evaluation rather than the logical systematicity of their alignments (see also the illustration taken from feminist work in the next section). It changes the principles guiding scientific research from rigour and systematicity to experimentation and bricolage. In some sense, this understanding of methodology is self-evident because this is how scientific practice often works despite the systematicity and logicality in which it is presented (Latour, 1999). Yet, making this understanding of method explicit can free research practice from constraints that the demand of systematic alignment poses and encourage more intense and explicit experimental combinations and inventions (Rabinow, 2003).

### No Link – Diplomacy is not Sublime

#### Diplomacy is not sublime, it’s founded in determinate bureaucratic judgment not reflective aesthetic judgment.

Iver B. Neumann, Associate Professor of Russian Studies at Oslo University and Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, August, 2006

“Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 865-888, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/865.abstract> (accessed 5/18/16)

Contemporary diplomacy is an integral part of state bureaucracies. Embryonic foreign ministries emerged in most Euro p e a n states during Burke’s lifetime, and in most states, they were merged with the consular and diplomatic services in the early 1900s. The idea that each case requires a specific response runs directly counter to the very principle of bureaucracy, which rests on what Kant, in contrast to reflective judgement, called determinant judgement. When I was assigned my first task at Norway’s Moscow embassy in 1980 and asked a secretary for advice about how to go about it, her response was ‘you should look in the dossiers’. Lyotard describes the logic as follows: ‘a concept being defined, one must find the available cases to be subsumed under it and so doing begin to validate the concept that each case should be subsumed’.52So bureaucracy is not sublime. To the extent that diplomacy is bureaucratic, diplomacy cannot be sublime, either. A s I have argued elsewhere, however, the self-understanding of diplomats is that they are more than bureaucrats .53Part of this is to do with the fact that, once posted abroad, they are working with information-gathering in other social settings. They gather ‘knowledge of the current situation and how it is likely to develop rather than of the pattern of past regularities’, as Hedley Bull puts it.54 This, however, is exactly what Lyotard thinks characterises the present social order as such: we are always on the outlook for information, always asking what is/is it happening? To Lyotard, this is the exact antithesis of sublimity.

### No Internal Link – Aesthetics not Politicized

#### The sublime cannot be translated into a program for political action even if they win it works the other way around.

Ned O’Gorman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, August 2006

“The Political Sublime: An Oxymoron,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 889-915, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/889> (accessed 4/29/16)

Consequently, Lyotard’s ‘war against totality’, as it is derived from a version of Kant’s sublime, is self-defeating. The radical epistemic indeterminacy that would emerge from the fervent or forc e f u l production of the unpresentable could not offer a political alternative to the status quo, for any alternative must be marked by differentiation, and the very possibility of differentiation is superseded in the advent of the sublime. While the sublime possesses a radical power, this power is sheerly negative; and if it appears to acquire political utility it is only because sublimity has been sublimated, transfigured, or nullified under the name of a programme. Lyotard seems to recognise this. He states of the differend, ‘You can’t make a political “program” with it, but you can bear witness to it.’29 And he says of a politics of the sublime, ‘As for a politics of the sublime, there is no such thing. It could only be terror. But there is an aesthetic of the sublime in politics.’30The distinction Lyotard makes is between a politics of the sublime and the sublime in politics, or between making a political programme with the sublime and testifying to it within politics. But the distinction does not address the central problem of the political sublime. How can the sublime be said to work even in politics if it cannot offer any particular political vision, but only the sheer fact of the unpresentable? The unpresentable per se is not an alternative to the status quo; it is at best a disruption of the status quo. But so is a plane crash, an unexpected missile attack, or a labour strike. And these events have political purchase not because they constitute disruptions to the status quo, per se, nor because they are unpresentable (they are not), but because they can become grounds for differentiation and thus meaning-making. The sublime, as the presentation of the unpresentable, offers no equivalent ground; it can testify only to that which is without politics because it is without any means of differentiation.

#### It’s, by definition, impossible for the sublime to determine politics.

Ned O’Gorman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, August 2006

“The Political Sublime: An Oxymoron,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 889-915, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/889> (accessed 4/29/16)

Nowhere is the univocal character of the sublime more problematic than in the notion of the political sublime, one of the most pervasive invocations of the sublime in contemporary critical and theoretical discourse. In recent decades, the political sublime, the politics of the sublime, the political potential of the sublime, or the sublime within politics – conceptions which do not vary substantially – have been repeatedly presented as offering or opening radical alternatives to the status quo. To be sure, there is something quite radical about the sublime, but nothing that can finally be said to be politically radical. For a sine qua non of all politics except the totalitarian is differentiation. And the sublime, while it can produce a kind of sheer difference, cannot produce differentiation, for the latter requires predication and modification, which the sublime precludes.

### Perm – Unbracketing is not Mutually Exclusive

#### Unbracketing does not entail wholesale rejection—the alt is not competitive with the plan

Kojin Karatani, Japanese philosopher and literary critic, retired visiting professor of comparative literature at Columbia and Japanese literature at Yale, October 1998

“Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism,” Boundary 2, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp. 145-160, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/303618> (accessed 4/25/16)

Similar dynamics of unbracketing exist in the recent achievements of feminist critiques and queer theory. They reveal what heterosexual male readers have always bracketed and been unaware of. In other words, they unbracket what has been suppressed under heterosexual domination. But their unbracketing is not necessarily a denial of works as art. For instance, if, in a text, a woman is described mainly as an aesthetic representation of desire, the unbracketing of the sexual representation is not a simple denial of the work. If the text is strong enough, it will accommodate different interpretations. And when we commit ourselves to rereading the text from alternative positions, we would again bracket that particular critique. Yet the new reading, of course, is not, and should not be, an erasure of the critique.

#### Their dichotomization of critical/uncritical methodologies is reductionist.

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2006

“Cinematic IR, the Sublime, and the Indistinctness of Art,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 793-818, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/793.abstract> (accessed 5/23/16)

Very few of these ‘criticals’ seem to involve criticising anything in particular. What is happening most of the time is that ‘critical’ is being employed as the privileged term in an implicit, hierarchical ‘critical/uncritical’ opposition; the elite does better, ‘critical’ work, while the rest of us are, it seems, ‘uncritical’ and probably watch ‘uncritical’ films. In sum: much of aesthetic IR, whether referring to works of art themselves or to its own self-understanding, revolves around a ‘critical/uncritical’ dichotomy. It is, to say the least, surprising that so many ‘dissident’ IR scholars should have arrived at this point after almost 20 years of problematising binaries such as inside/outside, male/female, and Self/Other.47

#### Unbracketing doesn’t eliminate the need for conventional approaches—casting a wide net is preferable.

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2003

“World Literature and World Politics: In Search of a Research Agenda,” Global Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 229-252, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1360082032000104505> (accessed 5/18/16)

However, in concluding this section it is worth drawing attention to Bleiker’s comment that aesthetic IR does not ‘‘supersede the need for more conventional social scientific enquiries’’. 46 He has therefore left the door leading to the rest of the discipline open, and one hopes it will not be slammed shut by those on the other side of the threshold. My own response to the more narrowly literary concerns of IR’s aesthetic turn is not to assert that these authors have got things wrong, but to argue that the selectiveness of their respective approaches leaves them unable to appreciate alternatives. Casting the net wider will reveal a richer range of traditions of analysis in the area where literature meets politics than either Coker or Bleiker and his colleagues have recognised.

### Aesthetic IR Fails – Self-Defeating

#### Aesthetic theory can’t possibly explain IR—subjecting art to functional assessment denaturalizes it as art.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, July-September, 2002

“Theodor Adorno's aesthetic understanding: an ethical method for IR?” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 351, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645053> (accessed 5/15/16)

Menke argues that the features that distinguish aesthetic pleasure from rational-cognitive pleasure are, first, that it finds pleasure in not being able to grasp elements that would help identify and categorize an object: it is not functional and does not have a purpose; and second, that it negates the identificatory process of rational cognition. (37) It is in this sense that a recent attempt in IR theory to utilize aesthetic pleasure to theorize a desirable ethical practice is problematic. Vivienne Jabri, I think, is interested primarily in what results from aesthetics as a sensuous mode of experience. This is, however, to threaten the autonomy of art; it is to subject it to considerations of utility. (38) Aesthetic pleasure becomes subject to functional assessment. It has a particular purpose. This leads to a wariness of the ethical practice that Jabri proposes. Are there not inevitable exclusions when aesthetics is subject to functional assessment? From what form of life, with what desire, is this assessment made?

#### The sublime is especially inapplicable to politics.

Ned O’Gorman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, August 2006

“The Political Sublime: An Oxymoron,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 889-915, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/889> (accessed 4/29/16)

Nevertheless, a Kantian-inspired sublime has been reinvented as a purportedly radical force in postmodern political and critical theory. Postmodernity and sublimity are now so intertwined that it is almost commonplace to conceptualise the former via the latter. Indeed, the sublime has become something like the über-theory of postmodern thought, capturing the ‘essence’ of postmodernism – radical epistemological indeterminacy, interminable signification, extreme affective dislocation, indecipherable social networks, vast technological vistas, and disruptive ruptures. The sublime, however, can be productive only as a way of gesturing towards the complexities and indeterminacies of postmodernity, not as a way of theorising postmodernity. And the sublime is even less adequate as a postmodern political mode, for it leads to tautologies and totality and, via its sheer negativity, precludes differentiation. The efforts of Jean François Lyotard and Hayden White to imagine a sublime with radical political potential, while motivated by a desire to overcome totality, end up showing how the political sublime is self-defeating.

### Aesthetic IR Fails – Eurocentrism Turn

#### Aesthetic approaches to IR are founded on the same Western elitism they reject.

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2006

“Cinematic IR, the Sublime, and the Indistinctness of Art,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 793-818, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/793.abstract> (accessed 5/23/16)

A number of challenges can be noted. In recent exchanges, poststructuralists within IR have noted what they call ‘messianic’ elements in Derrida’s thought and, in at least one case, expressed reservations about this.17 From the Marxist wing of literary and cultural studies, Terry Eagleton criticises the whole ‘bourgeois’ European aesthetic tradition since the 18th century as part of the middle class’s struggle for political hegemony, while arguing that this attempt to find forms of human subjectivity appropriate to the social order also had the capacity to challenge that order.1 8 Eagleton extends his critique to contemporary scholars he identifies (rather sweepingly) as ‘postmodernists’ and ‘culturalists’. The core of the argument is, as Eagleton puts it in After Theory, that ‘postmodern’ work places morality in a ‘sublime, edifying, high-minded’ sphere where it can be gestured at but little of substance can be said about it: ‘The ethical is a privileged realm in which the Other turns his luminous face to us and places upon us some inscrutable but ineluctable claim. It is an ethics bathed in an aura of religiosity – in a rhetoric of religion which has nonetheless emptied religious language of very much determinate meaning’.1 9 Another scholar from the field of English literature, John Carey, has formulated similar criticisms.20 Carey is entertainingly scathing about Kant, calling the Critique of Judgment a ‘farrago of superstition and unsubstantiated assertion’.21 He criticises, among other things, Kant’s view that judgments of beauty involve an inherent claim to universal validity and his belief in a fundamental bond between beauty and goodness. Carey also puts forward a more detailed case about intellectual elitism and snobbery, which he traces from literary modernism up to the idea of ‘theory’ as a new avant-garde, and about what he sees as the equally elitist and quasi-religious claims made for art by a number of authors and artists, from Kant through Hegel, Kandinsky, and George Steiner up to Jeanette Winterson.

#### They presume a Eurocentric subjectivity that responds to art in predictable ways.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, July-September, 2002

“Theodor Adorno's aesthetic understanding: an ethical method for IR?” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 351, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645053> (accessed 5/15/16)

Adorno's coupling of a focus on individuality with a motif of critical, processual questioning is done in such a way that the inherent force of both is watered down. There is a tendency in Adorno's thought to make an ideology of a certain idea of subjectivity. That is, the character of this subjectivity becomes a preordained purpose toward which aesthetic understanding strives: with the consequence that the critical attitude is rendered null at certain points when a structure or foundation is unreflexively placed beyond critique. I have already outlined briefly the antecedent charges against Adorno: his conflation of aesthetic understanding as a negation of identificatory understanding with a critique of "social reality" and the premature halt to the process of processual critique that an advocation of certain types of art brings. This advocation produces a subjectivity that is relevant only within the straitened reach of a Eurocentric and xenophobic definition of art.

### Alt. Fails – Bracketing Inevitable/Good

#### The alt can’t transcend aesthetic bracketing and that has reparative value.

Jonathan E. Abel, associate professor of comparative literature and Japanese at Penn State, and Christopher Reed, professor of English and visual culture at Penn State, Fall 2015

“The utility of aesthetics: exhibition, pedagogy, and critical questions for postcolonialism,” Verge, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p. 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/vergstudglobasia.1.2.0042> (accessed 4/23/16)

Beittel's formulaic final move undermines, but does not obviate, his layered analysis of the cultural and personal contexts of his earlier aesthetic bracketing. We want to use this admittedly flawed model to challenge the way modes of postcolonial critique that disavow aesthetics risk blinding themselves to both the aesthetic qualities of their own performance and to aesthetics' worldly value. To argue that the colonial bracketing out of what Said called the "worldliness" of art had worldly value is not to excuse the original bracketing of worldly concern that produced aesthetic value in those circumstances. Rather, it is to acknowledge that every cultural product--the art of the colonized, the collections of the colonizer, the writings of those who study art and collection--is produced and received in worldly circumstances. To unbracket is not to transcend bracketing but rather to rebracket by highlighting a set of worldly contexts associated with ethics or facts within our own situation. For this realization to work otherwise than as ritualized (aestheticized) disavowal of our privileged position within cultural institutions, we must be prepared to recognize both success and failure. Here we are attentive to Sedgwick's (2003, 124) move from the rather fixated question, Is a particular piece of knowledge true, and how can we know? To the further questions: What does knowledge do.... How, in short, is knowledge performative and how best does one move among its causes and effects? One crucial performative aspect of our work is as teachers in a classroom where students have come, yes, for knowledge, but also for a sense of identity with an institution that is also the source of our identity as professors. Modeling a critical perspective should be more than denouncing institutions of which we remain a part. Our focus on art's contribution to the creation of a postwar order that forged alliances between Japan and the United States allowed us to explore what can be accomplished by the cultural formations--institutions like museums and universities, as well as ideologies like the aesthetic--we work with and in today. These are timely questions, for postcolonialists and others. Former ambassador Cynthia Schneider (2014), advocating for arts-based diplomacy, has observed that the Cold War was a territorial contest fought with cultural tools, whereas the War on Terror is a cultural contest we are attempting to fight territorially. In this context, engagement with collections and exhibitions offers an opportunity to explore the reparative potential of aesthetic bracketing.

#### Bracketing is a key function of exhibition that ensures commentary has an audience.

Jonathan E. Abel, associate professor of comparative literature and Japanese at Penn State, and Christopher Reed, professor of English and visual culture at Penn State, Fall 2015

“The utility of aesthetics: exhibition, pedagogy, and critical questions for postcolonialism,” Verge, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p. 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/vergstudglobasia.1.2.0042> (accessed 4/23/16)

By introducing our exhibition with these publications, labeled to emphasize their role in changing American perceptions of Japan after the war, we attempted to loosen the aesthetic brackets around the collection of objects on display. But the process of creating an exhibition brought us up against some challenges involved with implementing and assessing strategies of bracketing and unbracketing. The bracketing function of the museum, where hushed galleries institutionalize the Kantian isolation of the aesthetic, is an enormously powerful dynamic. On one hand, it was our project's greatest strength. The promise of aesthetic pleasure brings audiences through the door. The power of the museum to confer the status of "art" on particular objects--many of the prints in our show were previously filed away in the library, where some had long decorated a storage area--was manifest in the procedures to gather, conserve, and photograph that accompanied their accession to the museum's collections. That authority helped us marshal resources for our course and draw attention to the results of our work both within the university and beyond: Louise Cort, ceramics curator at the Smithsonian's Freer/ Sackler Galleries, generously offered information about glazes and potters' marks; the local newspaper ran an article on our show that reappeared on many websites and was syndicated in newspapers as far away as Miami and Seattle (Klose 2014).

### Alt. Fails – Bracketing Inevitable

#### Aesthetics can never be purified of power relations.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies and Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

While appreciating its unique insight, it is important to remember that art too is a form of representation; incomplete and problematic by nature. Human relations inevitably engulf the domain of the aesthetic, and this includes forms of visual representation that are seemingly independent of linguistic conventions and restraints. The ‘eye’, says Pierre Bourdieu, ‘is a product of history reproduced by education’.74 This is why aesthetic insight does not necessarily entail good taste or lead to morally commendable positions. Not ‘everything will flower at the edge’, as some would have it.75 Artistic and aesthetic knowledge does not automatically produce convincing insight. Nor is it situated beyond power and domination. Aesthetics can be just as suffocating as mimetic objectifications of oppression, as the poetic ‘transgressions’ of Ezra Pound, Ferdinand Celine or Martin Heidegger amply demonstrate. But that in itself does, of course, not invalidate aesthetic insight. ‘The aesthetic dimension of ethics is clearly susceptible to misuse’, Jane Bennett acknowledges, ‘but so is the commitment to moral command or the scientific method or the exercise of authority’.76 Despite its insinuation into the matrix of power relations, or perhaps precisely because of it, aesthetics is part of an important process of broadening our insight into political dilemmas, and, thus, also the range of possible responses to them.

#### Bracketing is an inevitable feature of representation in debate; their critique can no more change that than labels on museum exhibits.

Jonathan E. Abel, associate professor of comparative literature and Japanese at Penn State University, and Christopher Reed, professor of English and visual culture at Penn State University, Fall 2015

“The utility of aesthetics: exhibition, pedagogy, and critical questions for postcolonialism,” Verge: Studies in Global Asias. Vol. 1, Issue 2, p. 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/vergstudglobasia.1.2.0042> (accessed 4/23/16)

On the other hand, the aestheticizing power of the museum confers a see-but-don't-touch status on the objects on display, both literally--only museum staff wearing gloves could handle the ceramics--and conceptually. It was hard for our literature students to imagine how some of the ceramics they were writing about could be used in daily life or to accept the unbracketing of literature study to include visual culture. Some students resisted the idea that a print or a pot could or should be analyzed in terms more nuanced than the simplest like-dislike dichotomy. Here the museum's confluence of exhibition and consumption (what other academic units do you enter and leave through a gift shop?) triggers habits of aesthetic bracketing well honed in the culture outside the classroom (facts about provenance and their ethical implications are not encouraged by the store displays in which most of us encounter pots or prints). It is not clear that our lengthy labels or the placement of books and magazines--framed or in glass cases--at one of several entrance points to our exhibition disrupted this dynamic enough to unbracket objects the museum setting signaled as purely aesthetic.

### Alt. Fails – Bracketing Good (1/2)

#### The critique is self-righteous finger-wagging—aesthetic appreciation of the other ameliorates cultural antagonism.

Jonathan E. Abel, associate professor of comparative literature and Japanese at Penn State University, and Christopher Reed, professor of English and visual culture at Penn State University, Fall 2015

“The utility of aesthetics: exhibition, pedagogy, and critical questions for postcolonialism,” Verge: Studies in Global Asias. Vol. 1, Issue 2, p. 42, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/vergstudglobasia.1.2.0042> (accessed 4/23/16)

Aesthetic experience, as Said (1983) knew well, is complicated. If we are to be sensitive to the complexities of worldliness he espoused, postcolonial studies must complicate its customary focus on exposing imperialist dynamics in the colonizer's aesthetic valuation of the cultural products of the colonized. Too often, postcolonial analysis vilifies aesthetics altogether as a form of ideological obfuscation, enacting a "hermeneutics of suspicion" that, Eve Sedgwick (2003, 127) argues, allows baby-boom scholars "the continuing illusion of possessing special insight into the epistemologies of enmity." Against this methodology of "paranoid reading," Sedgwick offers an alternative, an ideal of "reparative reading" that embraces what is often dismissed as "merely aesthetic" or "merely reformism" (her scare quotes), challenging us with the question, "What makes pleasure and amelioration so 'mere'?" (144). In bringing this critique of scholarship-as-usual from queer studies, with its deep engagement with alterity and pleasure, to postcolonial studies, we engage the problematic paradox, noted by Christopher Castiglia (2013, 80), that the "methodology of suspicion," in which scholarship is conceived as a project to reveal "dangerous ideological complicities in which [scholars] are themselves unimplicated," perpetuates "the Cold War state's figuration of citizenship" as constant vigilance against other people's plots and hidden agendas. This poses particular problems for writing and teaching about aesthetics and geopolitics in the Cold War era. How do we come to terms with the ways scholarship was--and, crucially, still is--deeply implicated in institutions (universities and museums, funding sources, publishing venues) grounded in the history we analyze without the bad faith of biting a hand that continues to feed us intellectually and materially? How do we involve students in critical analysis of the United States's emergence as a--the--global superpower without countering the bromides of self-congratulatory American exceptionalism with equally simplistic, self-righteous finger-wagging? More specifically, how can we assess the productive dynamics of the postwar cultural politics that brought us to the classroom, the museum, and the scholarly journal in ways that hold these institutional forms to a standard that actualizes potentials--among them the pleasures of interactions across cultures and the potential for those pleasures to contribute to global peace and stability--that are overlooked and even derided in much postcolonial scholarship, even as they are enjoyed by postcolonial scholars.

### Alt. Fails – Bracketing Good (2/2)

#### The aestheticization of culture and space resists cooption in the long-term.

Roland Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland and Sally Butler, Senior Lecturer in Art History, 2016

“Radical Dreaming: Indigenous Art and Cultural Diplomacy,” International Political Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 56-74, <https://ips.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/56> (accessed 5/23/16)

The kind of cultural diplomacy at play here was rather different to how it is sometimes seen: as an exchange of cultural artifacts and ideas in the spirit of increasing cross-cultural understanding (Arndt 2006). Cultural diplomacy, in the case of Australia, was targeted, pragmatic, and political. It had less to do with facilitating understanding than with advancing a calculated strategic effort to promote the national interest. We show that in each case—in 1941–1942 and in 2009—the displayed artworks resisted and subverted this form of diplomatic instrumentalization. Art managed to insert and communicate political claims that highlighted—against governmental intentions and policies at the time—the suppression of Indigenous rights and demands for sovereignty. We employ Rancière’s (2004) concept of the “distribution of the sensible” to show how art became political and politically disruptive in the most fundamental way: by challenging the boundaries of what is visible and invisible, is thinkable and unthinkable, and thus, can and cannot be debated in politics. In each of the two cases, this politically subversive artistic interference took time to develop, and in each case, it manifested itself differently.

#### The deployment of art by dominant institutions facilitates their self-destruction.

Roland Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland and Sally Butler, Senior Lecturer in Art History, 2016

“Radical Dreaming: Indigenous Art and Cultural Diplomacy,” International Political Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 56-74, <https://ips.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/56> (accessed 5/23/16)

We demonstrated that there is much more at stake here than a mere use of art as tools in cultural diplomacy. We argued that art plays an important political role because it can interfere with what Rancière called the distribution of the sensible: the tacit and unquestioned societal conventions, which determined what is visible, thinkable, and doable. Art interferes with these conventions because it seeks to challenge what we see and accept as natural. It aims not to depict the world as is, as a mimetic representation of realities out there. Instead, it “creates realities and worlds” and in doing so triggers emotional and psychological reactions that allow us to reorient what we see and know (Edelman 1995, 6–7, see also Bleiker 2001 509–33.). In each of the cases we examined, Indigenous art conveyed a radical political message that subverted the government’s official objectives. In 1941, the radical political message contained in bark painting was neither intended nor recognized by the government. Deemed mere decorative crafts, bark paintings included in the exhibition contained a range of visual allusions to narratives, governance, and land, thus implicitly claiming a stake for Indigenous cultural and political recognition far ahead of time. By elevating the bark paintings to the level of art and presenting it as such to the international community, the government implicitly recognized the existence of an Indigenous claim to sovereignty. The 2009 exhibition engaged these political themes much more explicitly. It advanced a visual narrative of Indigenous anger about, and continuing resistance to, a long history of colonial occupation and racist governmental policies. But here too, the artworks expressed a claim for a radical rewriting of history and to Indigenous sovereignty that are not yet in the realm of the politically possible. The fact that there is a certain ambiguity to art—that its meaning can never be settled once and for all—renders its political dimensions even more unpredictable. There is always an excess to a work of art, a part of it that defies attempts to define and categorize it. Jenny Edkins (2015, 59) writes of art as “objects that resist an easy narrativisation.” Gabriel Rockhill (2009, 208) sees art as “sites of contestation and negotiation in which meaning is dynamically produced and reproduced.”

### AT: Impact Representations Bad

#### Aestheticized representations of future freedom cultivates respect for the other.

Allan Stoekl is professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State, 2013

““After the Sublime,” after the Apocalypse Two Versions of Sustainability in Light of Climate Change,” diacritics Volume 41, Number 3, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/542886> (accessed 5/5/16)

In this sense we pass from rejection of the sublime to aesthetic representation: we want a certain world, a certain climate, a certain human population, a certain ecology with certain animals. This future will presumably resemble the ecology of the present (minus the continuous degradation). The demand of the future, for the future, cannot be justified on purely practical grounds—it is more practical to discount the future and spend for the present—or calculable ones, given the delirium of external costs, but it can be to the extent that a certain recognition of culture, grounded in aesthetics, can be linked to morality, and to the construction and affirmation of the community. This is the role of fiction: the sustainable future entails representation in a Kantian regime of the recognition of the freedom of the other. But since this other is, precisely, free—we can never simply know it or categorize it or represent it—sustainability will only be posited in possible scenarios. Life in and as (science) fiction: where Brundtland assumed we [End Page 48] knew what the human, the future, and development were, and we knew how to calculate it, in this (second-order) model of sustainability the world as fiction consists of contestations, in practice, of these very notions.15 Thus a sublime subjectivity—our recoil before the destruction of the earth—morphs into an aesthetics grounding community. The work of art—the narration of sustainability in all its guises—opens the possibility of an individual culture that recognizes the other not as a means, but as an end. Sustainable personal culture is a discipline that affirms individual freedom, and specifically, in our era, freedom not to consume (since consumerism posits a subjectivity that is a mere means to the end of consuming physical and energetic inputs).16 Such freedom is what can serve as a larger morality for a post-consumerist society.

#### Emotionally charged policy simulations of nuclear war are pedagogically valuable.

Victor Asal et al, Chair of the Public Administration at Albany SUNY, Justin Conrad, associate professor of Political Science and Public Administration at UNorth Carolina, Steve Sin, senior researcher at START, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at UMaryland, 2013

“Teaching About the End of the World,” APSA Teaching and Learning Conference Paper, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206695> (accessed 5/22/16)

Arguably, the single most important issue in international relations today is the question of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The issue of nuclear proliferation is still highly salient in today’s world, even though much of the world’s population (including nearly all of our students) were not alive during the Cold War. So how do we help students understand the full range of considerations and emotions that go into contemporary decision­making with regards to nuclear policy? Developing a sense of emotional impact in the students is key to providing them with a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges that leaders face, and should bring home the severity of relatively recent developments, such as the threat of non­state actors acquiring nuclear weapons. To give the students the tools they need to properly understand 21 st century challenges, our approach involves three broad steps. First, through the use of multimedia resources, we survey academic and policy debates over nuclear weapons, and emphasize the emotional component of the issue (lacking in most textbook treatments of nuclear weapons). Second, after the students are equipped with a stronger emotional attachment and intellectual understanding of the issues, we conduct an in­class or online simulation to give students a chance to put themselves in the shoes of decision makers. The simulations we describe below force students to decide whether to pursue and/or use nuclear weapons, as well as how to deter others from pursuing them. Finally, the students are given the opportunity to reexamine current issues of nuclear policy using the new information they have gained through the simulations and multimedia tools.

### AT: Literary Analysis

#### Drawing on literature to support claims about IR begs the question of interpretation

Gerard Holden, Associate, Centre for Advanced International Theory at the University of Sussex, 2003

“World Literature and World Politics: In Search of a Research Agenda,” Global Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 229-252, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1360082032000104505> (accessed 5/18/16)

The majority of the IR scholars whose work has been discussed in this section use literature to support or illustrate political or philosophical views they already hold. They are entitled to do this if they wish, but they cannot explain why their readers should share these views if they do not already do so. Coker equates literary merit with historical insight, and Bleiker and his colleagues equate it with the destabilisation of orthodox identities. In neither case is the assumption provided with adequate support. The selection of some works rather than others is not in itself problematic and is indeed (as I argued above) inevitable, but it is important that authors should be aware of the limits of their own samples and the partiality of their own visions. The authors I have dealt with up to now also write at times as though they consider themselves to be creating a tradition of politically aware literary scholarship from scratch, which is misleading. Equally curiously, these authors seem determined to ignore each other. As far as I can see, Coker and Bleiker do not mention each other’s work, even though they share philosophical inspiration (both are Nietzscheans), and Coker and Shapiro even have some literary tastes in common, both being admirers of Don DeLillo’s novels. If one takes the core of Bleiker’s own position to be the belief that poetry, and poetry alone, is capable of having the desired effect on existing identities, an even more fundamental problem arises: why should we then bother to write and read academic articles, in prose, about the matter?

# NEGATIVE

# Neg China Health Care Cooperation

### Sweden CP – 1NC

**The Kingdom of Sweden will engage with the People’s Republic of China by creating a working group with the subjects, including but not limited to, market access, intellectual property protection, patent protection duration, corporate responsibilities, and programs for the training of Chinese family physicians and general practitioners.**

#### Sweden has established health care cooperation networks with China and can solve the Aff.

Growth Analysis, Swedish marketing analysis organization that plays an active role as part of the Swedish diplomatic mission abroad, and we serve as the Office of Science and Innovation of the Swedish embassies, August 16, 2016, “The digitalization of the Chinese healthcare system,” https://www.tillvaxtanalys.se/in-english/publications/direct-response/direct-response/2016-08-16-the-digitalization-of-the-chinese-healthcare-system----an-increased-focus-on-efficiency-and-accessibility-may-create-business-opportunities-for-swedish-companies.html, Accessed 12-16-2016

Another important area is the development of technology and platforms for analysis of big data. There is, for example, a strong interest to use big data analysis in the development of new preventive health strategies. The establishment of international databases for analysis and data sharing is also an area with potential for international research cooperation. Sweden has established research cooperation with China in the area of health care and should be well position to extend cooperation to this field. In conclusion, the demand for digital health products and services in China is very strong, especially since they are believed to constitute a solution to several challenges within the health care sector. Emphasizing digital components that are part of broader health concepts may therefore be an example of Swedish strategic marketing in technology-friendly China.

#### China is utilizing the Swedish model for reforms now. This is the benchmark for new Chinese health care plans

Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA), Press Release, June 8, 2016, “Agreement anniversary puts the spotlight on Chinese healthcare project,” Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA), <http://www.sca.com/en/Media/News-features/2016/Agreement-anniversary-puts-the-spotlight-on->Chinese-healthcare-project/, Accessed 12-16-2016

SCA and Vinda - one of China’s largest hygiene companies - met Swedish and Chinese Ministers of Health in Stockholm recently at the tenth anniversary of a Memorandum of Understanding, MoU, in health care between the two countries. The agenda included an ongoing pilot project in the city of Shijiazhuang, where SCA and Vinda contribute with incontinence expertise. Ambitions are high for Shijiazhuang, heralded as becoming the “China Healthcare City”, where pilot programs for the reform of the Chinese health care sector are run. One example is the development of a primary health care clinic for the elderly in a new urban development called Zhengding New Area, just outside the city. Here a Swedish model and Swedish solutions are used as benchmark. As a leading hygiene company and member of [Swecare](http://www.swecare.se/), a network promoting export in the Swedish healthcare, SCA in partnership with Vinda have an important role to play.

### Sweden CP – Solvency Extension

#### Double-bind: Either the CP solves 100% of the Aff. or the status quo solves now. Cooperation with Sweden is already causing reforms to increase access and efficiency

Growth Analysis, Swedish marketing analysis organization that plays an active role as part of the Swedish diplomatic mission abroad, and we serve as the Office of Science and Innovation of the Swedish embassies, August 16, 2016, “The digitalization of the Chinese healthcare system,” https://www.tillvaxtanalys.se/in-english/publications/direct-response/direct-response/2016-08-16-the-digitalization-of-the-chinese-healthcare-system----an-increased-focus-on-efficiency-and-accessibility-may-create-business-opportunities-for-swedish-companies.html, Accessed 12-16-2016

The aim of this report is to describe current digitalization trends in the health care sector in China, as well as opportunities for Swedish companies in this sector. The report, which contributes to the Swedish export strategy, shows how digitalization is contributing to changes in China’s health care sector, focusing especially on information systems in hospitals but to a lesser degree also on online health care and mobile health applications. A key component of the reform program Healthy China 2020 is to use digital health products to create better accessibility and efficiency in China’s health care sector. Until today, digital information systems in hospitals and telemedicine platforms have already contributed to some improvement in China’s health care, such as reduced waiting time in some over­crowded hospitals and higher quality in primary care centers. Health care digitalization is at the same time creating new market opportunities for both domestic and foreign companies. However, the opportunities and challenges differ for different digital products and services.

#### Previous cooperation proves Sweden has experience cooperating with China on antibiotic resistance

Anette Hulth, Public Health Agency of Sweden, “Sino-Swedish bilateral cooperation on management of antibiotic resistance,” 2016, Public Health Agency of Sweden, https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-disease-control/antibiotics-and-antimicrobial-resistance/international-collaboration/completed-projects/sino-swedish-bilateral-cooperation-on-management-of-antibiotic-resistance/, Accessed 12-16-2016

The importance of a long term commitment for collaboration between China and Sweden on containment of antibiotic resistance was manifested at the China-Sweden conference on antibiotic resistance in Beijing, April 2009. The objectives of the project Sino-Swedish Bilateral Cooperation on Management of Antibiotic Resistance sprung from the thematic areas specified in the Plan of Action on Health Cooperation signed one year later (2010) by the Chinese and Swedish health ministers. These objectives were subsequently realised as five subprojects, demonstrating the importance of collaboration and joint action between political commitment and research interest. The project lasted over the period 2011–2013.

### Canada CP – 1NC

**The government of Canada** **will engage with the People’s Republic of China by creating a working group with the subjects, including but not limited to, market access, intellectual property protection, patent protection duration, corporate responsibilities, and programs for the training of Chinese family physicians and general practitioners.**

#### Canada wants greater diplomatic engagement with China over health care

Guy Saint-Jacques, Ambassador of Canada to China, May 4, 2016, “New Opportunities for China-Canada Bilateral Ties,” China Today, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/columns/2016-05/04/content\_720139.htm, Accessed 12-20-2016

Of course we also have some differences, but as I have mentioned earlier, we want to create more to openly discuss such differences, and to try to seek more common ground. Our goal is to help make China more successful, because the more successful China is, the more successful we will be. Many people mention human rights as a problematic issue in China. We recognize that tremendous progress has taken place over the past 30 years and hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The living standards of most Chinese people are much higher, and the healthcare system has been improved. In some senses, Canada might be seen as a more ‘socialist’ country than China because we have a very good public health insurance and pension system. If you fall sick and need special treatment you won't go bankrupt because the public healthcare system will take care of you. This is another area we wish to share our experience with China.

#### China will say yes. The joint statement from September shows both sides want greater diplomatic engagement on mutual areas of interest. This spreads peace and prosperity across Asia

Xinhua News, Staff Writer, September 23, 2016, “Fulltext: Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and Canada,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-09/24/c\_135710572.htm, Accessed 12-21-2016

At the invitation of the Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, His Excellency Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China is paying an official visit to Canada from September 21 to 24, 2016, with a view to further building a strong and stable foundation for the China-Canada relationship. While in Ottawa, Premier Li Keqiang met with His Excellency, the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General of Canada, held talks with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, inaugurating the Annual Dialogue between the Premier of China and the Prime Minister of Canada, and had meetings with the Honourable George Furey, Speaker of the Senate and the Honourable Geoff Regan, Speaker of the House of Commons. Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also attended the 6th China-Canada Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Montreal. Both sides spoke highly of the recent official visit to China by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and agreed to take further actions to open a new chapter in the China-Canada strategic partnership. The two sides believed that the back-to-back visits by the two Leaders demonstrate a renewed commitment for a growing relationship. Recalling their conversations in Beijing, Premier Li and Prime Minister Trudeau reflected on the important development of China-Canada relations during the past 46 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, and agreed to strengthen engagement between China and Canada in order to foster greater economic and social benefits for both countries and to promote peace, stability and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Both sides agreed the Leaders of the two countries should keep in close contact through bilateral visits, meetings on multilateral occasions, and telephone conversations as well as correspondence, to strengthen communication on important issues of mutual interest. Both sides agreed to make full use of existing high-level dialogues and consultation mechanisms, and recognized the importance of regular, respectful and frank discussions on both opportunities and challenges as part of a robust and comprehensive bilateral relationship. Frequent dialogue not only promotes new areas for growth and deepened cooperation, but creates new avenues to promote common understanding on issues such as human rights and rule of law.

### Canada CP – Solvency Extension

#### Canada is eager to build on its existing health care cooperation with China

CRI English News, Staff Writer, April 1, 2015, “Canada and China Hold Dialogue in Public Health Cooperation,” http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/04/01/3941s872380.htm, Accessed 12-20-2016

A senior Canadian official says Canada is looking forward to cooperating with China on healthcare reform issues in the future, as part of further health collaborations between the two countries. Canada's Ambassador to China, Guy Saint-Jacques made the remarks on Tuesday evening over an event to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of Canada-China Health Cooperation. He says Canada is keen to share its experience in universal healthcare to assist with China's health care system reform. The ambassador stresses that health is one of the pillars of Canada-China cooperation.

#### Any differences will be mitigated by dialogue. The new Trudeau government wants more diplomatic engagement

Guy Saint-Jacques, Ambassador of Canada to China, May 4, 2016, “New Opportunities for China-Canada Bilateral Ties,” China Today, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/columns/2016-05/04/content\_720139.htm, Accessed 12-20-2016

When I look at the complementarities between our two countries and how much we can share, I believe that we have a very good basis and as time goes by, the differences are becoming fewer and fewer. China now is playing an important role in international relations, in financial and trade issues and other fields that can assist countries around the world. These days, China is more active in global affairs, for example, in the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which we see is an important response to the needs of Asian countries, and also something we would like to seek possible collaboration with China in the future. Considering the open attitude of the new Canadian government, I am very confident that we will have more and more dialogue and collaboration, and we’ll find ways to resolve differences when they come up.

### Chinese Economic Growth Links

#### Deficits in China health care system will substantially drag down the economy now. The plan ensures they recover

Bloomberg News, Staff Writer, July 22, 2016, “World Bank Urges China Health-Care Reform to Save 3% of GDP,”

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-22/world-bank-urges-china-health-care-reform-to-save-3-of-gdp>, Accessed 12-20-2016

A series of structural changes to China’s current health-care system could save Asia’s largest economy up to 3 percent of GDP, according to a study released Friday. Conducted jointly by the World Bank Group, the World Health Organization and Chinese government agencies, the report suggests China take ten years to fully implement changes, including bolstering its primary care system and allowing private sector players fair competition with the public sector. Without such measures, the World Bank projects that health expenditure in China will increase in real terms from 3.5 trillion yuan ($529 billion) last year to 15.8 trillion yuan in 2035, and from 5.6 percent of GDP to 9.1 percent in the same time frame, according to the report. In recent decades, China has made efforts to improve health-care access, extending a basic public health insurance network to virtually all of its people in some form since 2009. But public hospitals are overwhelmed by the task to treat close to 90 percent of patients for conditions ranging from the common cold to terminal cancer.

#### Health care reform is vital to the Chinese economy

[Nyshka Chandran](http://www.cnbc.com/nyshka-chandran/), Staff Writer, July 22, 2016, “China's health care system needs to be more people-oriented, says World Bank,” CNBC News, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/22/chinas-healthcare-system-needs-to-be-more-people-oriented-says-world-bank.html, Accessed 12-20-2016

Health costs have grown at a rate higher than gross domestic product (GDP) growth since 2008, the report flagged. The situation was further magnified by a rapidly aging society and the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), which were already China's number one health threat, the report stated. "Business as usual, without reform, would result in growth of total health expenditure from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2015 to 9.1 percent in 2035, an average increase of 8.4 percent per year in real terms." Health care is a vital component of China's 'new economy,' a hot-topic term that tends to dominates foreign investor interest in the mainland. Consisting of consumer-led sectors that also include internet and renewable energy, the 'new economy' has been a key beneficiary of government spending as President Xi Jinping seeks to make it the country's key growth engine, replacing 'old' sectors such as heavy industry. If Beijing can moderate the main drivers behind soaring health expenses, which include prices per treatment and unit cost increases, the government could achieve savings equivalent to 3 percent of GDP, the report said.

### China Reforming Health Care Now

#### China is reforming its health care system now toward universal care

China Daily, Staff Writer, April 29, 2016, “China spends trillions on health care improvement,”

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/29/content\_24952118.htm, Accessed 12-20-2016

China has spent 5.64 trillion yuan (871 billion U.S.dollars) in the reform period since 2009 to improve its healthcare system. The health budget for 2016 is 1.24 trillion yuan, said the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) on Thursday, adding that the average annual growth rate of medical input has surpassed 20 percent over the past seven years. Healthcare reform is designed toward the ultimate goal of creating a universal health security system, which focuses on equal access to basic public health services for all, the commission said.

### No Solvency – Multiple Barriers to Coop

#### Their author admits: China says health care coop is dependent upon both sides making reforms the plan does not do

Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations and an associate professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy, March 22, 2016, “Prospects of U.S.-China Cooperation over Healthcare,” China-US Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/prospects-of-u-s-china-cooperation-over-healthcare>, Accessed 12-16-2016

Cooperation by definition is not a one-way street. As Vice Premier Wang Yang noted at the event, in order to ensure effective Sino-U.S. cooperation over healthcare, China would ease the market access and strengthen the efforts in IP protection, but it also hoped the U.S. side to consider positively China’s concerns in patent protection duration and corporate social responsibilities. Policymakers and business leaders of both sides are challenged to seize the new opportunities and promote the bilateral cooperation to a new high, as this is good for not only the health of the bilateral relationship, but also the health and well-being of people in the two great nations.

#### Their “solvency” author says Congress and Executive branch would have to pressure China to reduce business hostility. That’s not the plan so they cannot solve any of their internal links

Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations and an associate professor at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy, April 27, 2016, “China’s Healthcare Sector and U.S.- China Health Cooperation,” Prepared statement Before the U.S.‐China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s 13th Five-Year Plan,” http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Yanzhong%20Huang\_Written%20Testimony042716.pdf, Accessed 12-16-2016

Meanwhile, in seeking cooperation with China we have to keep in mind the inherent dilemmas and contradictions in China’s health policy processes. While the 13th Five Year Plan suggests that China is willing to allow the market to play a more decisive role, it continues to rely on heavy-handed industrial policy in pursuit of the growth of its healthcare and pharmaceutical industries. While the government welcomes the entry of foreign business and investment, it has increased information and ideological control while sustaining its devotion to bolstering domestic industrial competiveness. Against this background, the U.S. Congress is advised to work more diligently and closely with the executive branch to pressure Beijing to improve the operating environment of U.S. businesses in China.

### No Solvency – Antibacterial/Antimicrobial Resistance (General)

#### The pharmaceutical industry is to blame for Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) worldwide. The plan makes this worse

Sum Of Us, Staff Writer, Watchdog Group, June 2015, “Bad Medicine: How the pharmaceutical industry is contributing to the global rise of antibiotic-resistant superbugs,” https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.sumofus.org/images/BAD\_MEDICINE\_final\_report.pdf, Accessed 12-16-2016

Our research has revealed that the pharmaceutical industry, with its complex web of interconnections and opaque supply chains is also playing a role in fuelling the international AMR crisis. China supplies the vast majority of antibiotic raw materials to the global market; it seems from extensive research that several multinational drug companies are sourcing antibiotics from Chinese factories which have been exposed in the media as dumping waste water and antibiotic APIs in the environment. Some of these factories have been fined or have promised to relocate, but there is little evidence that more serious measures are being taken to effectively address the problem.

#### The plan cannot solve. Only a comprehensive transparency and corporate responsibility approach can prevent resistance

Sum Of Us, Staff Writer, Watchdog Group, June 2015, “Bad Medicine: How the pharmaceutical industry is contributing to the global rise of antibiotic-resistant superbugs,” https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.sumofus.org/images/BAD\_MEDICINE\_final\_report.pdf, Accessed 12-16-2016

It is only by adopting a global and truly comprehensive approach to antibiotics manufacturing, with companies at every step of the way accepting responsibility for their actions, that the world will be able to prevent the dawning of a post-antibiotic era, where the contraction of a currently harmless infection once again becomes a potential death sentence. At present, this is neither part of the WHO’s international strategy nor of action plans being developed at national level. It is time for the pharmaceutical industry to embrace transparency from the very beginning to the very end of the supply chain, and take on an active role in heading off a public health disaster of global proportions, a move that would once more make it part of the solution, rather than the problem.

### No Solvency – Antibacterial/Antimicrobial Resistance (CAFOs)

#### Superbugs are inevitable and happening now. The plan does not get rid of CAFOs

Joseph Mercola, MD, board-certified in family medicine and served as the chair of the family medicine department at St. Alexius Medical Center, December 20, 2016, “CAFO Meat Is Even More Dangerous,” <http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2016/12/20/> dangerous-cafo-meat.aspx, Accessed 12-22-2016

Antibiotic-resistant bacteria infect at least 2 million Americans every year. At least 23,000 die as a result.[1](http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2016/12/20/dangerous-cafo-meat.aspx" \l "_edn1) The growing threat of antibiotic-resistant disease is one of the biggest health threats facing the globe, yet, unlike some other pressing health threats, it has a clear and well-known cause: overuse of antibiotics. “The use of antibiotics is the single most important factor leading to antibiotic resistance around the world,” the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) notes, explaining “simply using antibiotics creates resistance.” The drugs are one of the most commonly prescribed drugs in human medicine, and up to 50 percent of the time they’re prescribed when not needed or using incorrect dosing or duration, according to the CDC. This is problematic, but it pales in comparison to the use of antibiotics in food animals, which is driving rates of antibiotic resistance sky high.

Camilo Pacheco, Staff Writer, April 15, 2016, “‘Pressing health issue’: Antibiotic resistance in humans is affected by animal feeding operations,” Pulse Headlines, http://www.pulseheadlines.com/antibiotic-resistance-humans-linked-concentrated-animal-feeding-operations/26215/, Accessed 12-22-2016

Antibiotic resistance is increasing throughout the world due to concentrated animal feeding operations, according to researchers from Michigan State University (MSU). It appears that multidrug-resistant bacteria are prevalent in large swine farms, where drugs are used in feed for prevention of diseases. A team of researchers has analyzed extensive pork farms in China and one population of swines in the U.S. In those places, they discovered partner genes, which are resistance genes and mobile genetic elements found together, said MSU in a press release issued Tuesday. When a gene augments or declines in abundance, partner genes follow almost the same behavior. James Tiedje, co-author of the study and MSU professor of microbiology, said that detecting the source of antibiotics resistance is not an easy task since its use is widespread and resistance can even spread between bacteria. “In the fight against the rise of antibiotic resistance, we need to understand that the use of one antibiotic or, in some cases, antibacterial disinfectants may increase the abundance of multidrug-resistant bacteria,” said professor Tiedje in a press release. How can humans be impacted by the extended use of antibiotics in swine farms? Professor Tiedje explained that Chinese farms are located nearby large cities. As a response, it is important to control antibiotic resistance in pigs and farms, as a preventive measure to minimize human risk, researchers suggested. Finding sources of antibiotic-resistant bacteria is a major health concern that costs about $20 billion in health care costs per year, to the United States. Professor Tiedje explained that “this global issue” is not exclusive to China since multidrug resistance is “just a plane ride away”

Joseph Mercola, MD, board-certified in family medicine and served as the chair of the family medicine department at St. Alexius Medical Center, October 2, 2013, “CDC Reveals Disturbing Truth about Factory Farms and Superbugs,” Mercola.com, http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/10/02/factory-farms-superbugs.aspx, Accessed 12-22-2016

As reported in 2011, you have a 50/50 chance of buying [meat tainted with drug-resistant bacteria](http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2011/05/07/nearly-half-of-us-meat-tainted-with-drugresistant-bacteria.aspx) when you buy meat from your local grocery store. This shocking finding came from a study by the Translational Genomics Research Institute,[12](http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/10/02/factory-farms-superbugs.aspx" \l "_edn12) which revealed that 47 percent of the meat and poultry samples tested contained antibiotic-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteria. These were samples from 80 different brands of beef, chicken, pork, and turkey from more than two dozen grocery stores scattered across the United States, in large cities from Los Angeles to Washington D.C. The fact that antibiotic-resistant superbugs are found so widely in US meat supplies is a major red flag, a sign that we are nearing the point of no return where superbugs will continue to flourish with very little we can do to stop them. While I am not one to recommend many medications, antibiotics can be VERY useful when you need to treat a serious bacterial infection. When used properly, in the correct contexts and with responsibility, antibiotics can and do save lives that are threatened by bacterial infections. But they will only remain effective if urgent changes are made to curb the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria and disease… and this will only happen with a serious reduction in their use now.

# Neg China Services Supplement

### No Solvency: Chinese Business Climate Bad

#### Business climate determines downstream success of service liberalization—good economic governance is a necessary condition for solvency

Cosimo Beverelli, Researcher, World Trade Organisation, October 19, 2015

"What Impact Does Liberalising Trade-in-Services Have on Manufacturing?" World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/what-impact-does-liberalising-trade-in-services-have-on-manufacturing/ (accessed 7/18/2016)

An important question is whether reducing services trade restrictions is a sufficient condition to trigger higher productivity in downstream manufacturing, independent of initial conditions that are reflected in levels of economic development (per capita incomes) and the institutional environment that prevails in a country. A key feature of most services is that they are intangible and not storable. This has implications for both services production and exchange. Non-storability gives rise to a proximity burden – the agent providing a service must be in the same location as the buyer or consumer. Accordingly, exporters of services often must perform some stages of their economic activity in the importing country, and thus will be affected by local regulations and the prevailing business environment, i.e. the quality of economic governance and related institutions. These factors can shape the downstream impacts of services trade policy. Good economic governance – proxied by variables such as control of corruption, the quality of regulation, and strong rule of law – is likely to be a necessary condition for an economy to fully benefit from services trade liberalisation.

#### Sino-U.S. business climate is awful—Chinese regulations too complex and U.S. businesses lack confidence

William Ide, Beijing Bureau Chief at Voice of America, June 7, 2016

"China-US Cooperation Expands, Business Climate Worsens," Voice of America, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-china-cooperation-expands/3365576.html (accessed 7/23/2016)

The Strategic and Economic Dialogue has helped the United States and China build an expansive cooperation network; but, as the two sides are finding a growing number of fields in which to cooperate, the business climate in China for U.S. and foreign companies is worsening. After two days of high-level talks between scores of officials from both sides, Washington and Beijing talked frankly about their differences and the need for more progress. “American companies operating in China have expressed growing concerns about the business climate and it is important that our two countries continue to engage with one another and our respective business communities,” said U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew. It wasn’t the first time Lew brought up the issue, noting as others have, the increasingly complex regulatory environment U.S. and foreign companies face in China and the bigger question of whether they are welcome.

### Business Climate Bad—No Solvency Extensions

#### Service economy is unique—no growth gains without good economic governance

Cosimo Beverelli, Researcher, World Trade Organisation, October 19, 2015

"What Impact Does Liberalising Trade-in-Services Have on Manufacturing?" World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/what-impact-does-liberalising-trade-in-services-have-on-manufacturing/ (accessed 7/18/2016)

Services trade liberalisation may not be sufficient to trigger higher productivity in downstream manufacturing. Given that services often must be traded through establishment of a commercial presence in a market, the quality of economic governance that prevails in the importing country matters for (potential) foreign services providers. Our analysis suggests that the economic payoffs to liberalisation of services transactions will be higher the better is the economic governance that prevails. We know that institutions matter for growth. They seem to matter in particular for the benefits of services trade reform.

#### Vast majority of American firms feel unwelcome in China

Jethro Mullen, correspondent at CNN Money, June 7, 2016

"Western businesses say China is 'increasingly hostile,'" CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/07/news/economy/china-western-companies-business-environment/ (accessed 7/23/2016)

In a survey earlier this year by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 77% of firms who responded said they felt less welcome in the country than before. "Our members are concerned about measures they see as being used against them," James Zimmerman, the group's chairman, said last week.

### No Solvency: China Increasing Trade-in-Services with Hong Kong

#### China just gave preferential access to Hong Kong service providers, a huge increase in service trade

Dezan Shira & Associates, pan-Asia, multi-disciplinary professional services firm, December 2, 2015

"Hong Kong and China Sign Trade in Services Agreement," China Briefing, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2015/12/02/hk-and-china-trade-in-services-cepa-supplement.html (accessed 7/18/2016)

On November 27, an agreement on trade in services under the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) was signed and will take effect from June 1, 2016. The aim of the agreement is to ease the trade of services between the two regions, removing existing restricting measures which hinder market access. The CEPA was established in 2003, with clauses on the trade of services stating that Hong Kong service providers (which in most cases possess competitive advantages) are to enjoy preferential treatment when setting up enterprises in the Mainland’s fast expanding services sector. Such incentives include allowing the establishment of wholly owned enterprises, reducing registered capital requirements and relaxing restrictions on equity shareholding and geographical location or business scope. Ultimately, this agreement facilitates preferential market access to Hong Kong service providers. This latest supplement – a standalone subsidiary agreement made under the trade of services section in the CEPA framework – adds a further 28 liberalization measures to the Arrangement, opening 153 Mainland sectors up to Hong Kong and giving the SAR “most favored treatment” status.

#### Hong Kong services sector expanding and key to its diversification

Dezan Shira & Associates, pan-Asia, multi-disciplinary professional services firm , December 2, 2015

"Hong Kong and China Sign Trade in Services Agreement," China Briefing, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2015/12/02/hk-and-china-trade-in-services-cepa-supplement.html (accessed 7/18/2016)

Hong Kong’s services sector has seen rapid expansion during the last decade. It has now become one of the most advanced in East Asia, generating nearly 93 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP in 2013. The four main pillar industries of trading and logistics, financial services, professional and producer services, and tourism are the primary driving forces of the services sector. The Hong Kong government has also identified and promoted six industries, namely the cultural and creative industries, medical services, education services, environmental industries, innovation and technology and testing and certification services, in which to diversify the local industry structure previously dominated by the ‘four pillars’.

#### Chinese elites prefer Hong Kong—more compatible legal framework

Andrew Barber, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Waverly Advisors, March 22, 2016

"Despite Crackdown by Beijing, Chinese Wealth Keeps Flowing Abroad," Institutional Investor, http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3539778/investors-registered-investment-advisers/despite-crackdown-by-beijing-chinese-wealth-keeps-flowing-abroad.html?ArticleId=3539778#/.V5OfwrgrLIU (accessed 7/23/2016)

For companies and affluent families, Hong Kong plays a key role in shifting assets from the mainland. The semiautonomous region is part of China but retains control over domestic and economic policy. "There may be short-term impact due to negative market sentiment given the stock market sell-off and the renminbi's depreciation," says Ivan Wong, HSBC Private Bank's Hong Kong-based head of investment services and product solutions for Asia. "The implication in the longer run can be more positive, given that Hong Kong has always been a gateway for outbound investment for Chinese investors due to established legal and tax frameworks."

### No Solvency: China Economic Downturn Inevitable

#### China has a trillion dollars in bad debt--hard downturn is inevitable, halting investment

Jim Edwards, founding editor of Business Insider UK, May 1, 2016

"China is carrying $1 trillion in bad debt and 'unless this vicious cycle is broken, financial crisis or at least a sharp slowdown is an inevitable ultimate outcome'," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-1-trillion-in-bad-debt-2016-5 (accessed 7/23/2016)

The amount of debt being carried in the Chinese economy — mostly by state-owned "zombie" companies — is now so high that it could lead to a financial crisis, according to Macquarie analyst Viktor Shvets and his team. "Unless this vicious cycle is broken, financial crisis or at least a sharp slowdown is an inevitable ultimate outcome," he wrote in a note to investors on April 29. The China debt problem is simple, at least in concept. To grow its economy, the Chinese government and its central bank have extended credit generously to all sorts of Chinese companies. Many of those are "state owned enterprises," which are often old-fashioned, uncompetitive, or kept alive by political will rather than economic necessity. These "zombie" companies exist largely to pay back those debts, but as time goes by some of them default, or fail to pay back all if their loans. This was not much of a problem until recently, Shvets argues, because China's economy was growing so robustly that it eclipsed the rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). But as the economy has grown, so has its debt, to roughly $35 trillion, or nearly 350% of GDP: If too many companies fail to repay their debts, private lenders and banks will become fearful of lending more. And when that happens, it would plunge China into a financial crisis as liquidity dries up. The size of the debt at risk is so large — and the Chinese economy is such a global driving force — that such a crisis would cause a contagion into the markets of the rest of the world.

#### China’s increasing debt and lack of new investment means no growth

Anjani Trivedi, China correspondent for Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2016

"China's Trapped Economy Won't Find Easy Escape," Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-chinas-trapped-economy-wont-find-easy-escape-1469089011 (accessed 7/23/2016)

No matter how much debt China piles on, it isn’t generating much growth. A dearth of high-returning investment prospects has pushed companies to hoard cash, which they’ve been shoveling into short-term, high-yielding deposits. One example can be seen in real-estate developers, who have sold excess inventory, pocketing the cash in deposits, but are too skittish to spend that cash on new projects. High debt levels are also dissuading companies from spending.

### No Solvency: China Economic Downturn Inevitable

Caiman Valores, Colombia-based independent investigations and risk management firm, March 3, 2016

"China's Hard Landing Increasingly Appears Inevitable: Will It Trigger The Next Financial Crisis?" Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3950986-chinas-hard-landing-increasingly-appears-inevitable-will-trigger-next-financial-crisis (accessed 7/23/2016)

With emerging markets now responsible for generating 57% of global GDP this would be a significant blow for the global economy and make investing in emerging markets particularly unattractive because of stagnant economic growth. It is difficult to predict whether a hard landing in China would trigger the next global financial crisis. We have already witnessed the alarm bells that were rung over the potential for a financial crisis triggered by the commodities rout and the possible failure of deeply indebted commodities miner Glencore (OTCPK:GLCNF). This highlights that it is certainly possible but extremely plausible. What is clear is that a hard landing is appearing more and more inevitable and this will have a substantial impact on the global economy with even those countries insulated from China set to feel the effects because of its marked impact on other emerging economies. The most vulnerable of which could slip into a long-term economic malaise. It would also trigger considerable panic among investors which would cause volatility to rise making markets even more difficult to predict, while deflationary pressures would lead to a further disconnect between asset prices and financial markets.

#### Currency crash inevitable in China now—and history suggests the regime will collapse soon

Sue Chang, Markets Reporter for Market Watch, July 6, 2016

"This Economist Thinks China is Headed for a 1929-Style Depression," Market Watch, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-economist-thinks-china-is-headed-for-a-1929-style-depression-2016-06-30 (accessed 7/23/2016)

Today’s regime in China recalls the U.S.-backed Chinese National Party, or Kuomintang, that ruled the country until its defeat at the hands of the Communist rebels in 1949, according to Xie. The Nationalists, he says, flooded the economy with easy money to support speculation that led to runaway inflation. That, in turn, shifted public sentiment in favor of the Communists, who drove the Nationalists out of the country. “It was very similar to what is going on right now,” said Xie. “If you keep on printing money to use for speculation, you will have hyperinflation and a currency crash,” he said. “The Communist Party isn't compatible with the future of China.”

### Pakistan Growth Disadvantage: Trade with China Good

#### China has liberalized services with Pakistan

Chunding Li, researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research, et al, January 2014

"China's Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements," National Bureau of Economic Research Workig Paper 19853, http://www.nber.org/papers/w19853 (accessed 5/27/2016)

China and Pakistan started negotiations on a free trade area in April 2005 and reached a Free Trade Agreement in November 2006, which took effect in July 2007. China and Pakistan signed an Agreement on Trade in Service on February 21, 2009, which entered into force since October 10, 2009. The contents of the agreements include an early harvest program, free trade agreements, trade in services, and supplementary agreements.

#### This ensures Pakistani economic growth

James M. Roberts, Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth, Center for Trade and Economics (CTE), and Huma Sattar, visiting analyst at Heritage Foundation, June 30, 2015

"Pakistan’s Economic Disarray and How to Fix it," Heritage Foundation Special Report 172 on Pakistan, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it (accessed 5/28/2016)

Despite the power crisis and the current government’s lackluster performance to date, there may still be hope for Pakistan. GDP growth has had a smoother upward incline since 2008. According to a report by the State Bank of Pakistan, the contribution by the industrial and manufacturing sectors to GDP jumped significantly in 2012–2013 (by 5.4 percent) despite power shortages. Also encouraging is that 58 percent of the GDP share came from growth in services.

#### Pakistan uniquely benefits from Chinese trade

James M. Roberts, Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth, Center for Trade and Economics (CTE), and Huma Sattar, visiting analyst at Heritage Foundation, June 30, 2015

"Pakistan’s Economic Disarray and How to Fix it," Heritage Foundation Special Report 172 on Pakistan, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-to-fix-it (accessed 5/28/2016)

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s exports to China still grew dramatically during the first phase, increasing from $259 million to $2.6 billion, a rate of increase relatively greater than growth of exports to other countries. Even though it is also true that more Chinese exports were coming in than Pakistani exports going out, and Chinese trade with other countries also increased, Pakistan benefitted from the higher export growth rates.

### Pakistan Growth Disadvantage: Terrorism Impact

#### Pakistan economic growth necessary to stop terrorism

Sabir Michael, professor of social sciences, SZABIST, Karachi, Spring 2007

"Terrorism: A Socio-Economic and Political Phenomenon with Special Reference to Pakistan," Journal of Management and Social Sciences, vo. 3 no. 1, http://biztek.edu.pk/qec/jbs/3.1/4.%20Terrorism%20a%20Socio-Economic%20and%20Political%20Phenomenon%20with%20Special%20Reference%20to%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed 5/27/2016)

Meanwhile, political instability, corruption, social injustice and economic disparity added fuel on fire in giving rise to different forms of manifestation of terrorism. With the collapse of Russia from the world order the geo-political situation of Pakistan changed. In this changed scenario the terrorism strongly gripped and swiftly spread in Pakistani society.

#### Economic growth solves terrorism

Gary Becker, former professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, January 6, 2008

"Does Economic Development Reduce Terrorism?" The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/01/does-economic-development-reduce-terrorism-becker.html (accessed 5/27/2016)

Similar changes toward greater economic, political, and social freedom will take place in Pakistan, Egypt, and other Muslim countries if they too take off economically. Terrorist groups rely on populations that are sympathetic to their cause to hide and protect their members. They also recruit disaffected youth in significant numbers who are willing to commit suicide to destroy enemies. Just as economic progress greatly affects family structure and the amount of freedom available, it also sharply reduces the willingness of people to hide or otherwise protect terrorists because they have more to lose if they are caught. Although leaders of terrorist organizations usually come from more educated classes, these organizations rely on numerous foot soldiers to do a lot of the dirty work. They are generally recruited from younger and less educated groups. It becomes much harder to recruit many of these soldiers when good jobs are available, especially if these recruits are asked to commit suicide.

# Neg TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership

## Generic Disad Links

### 1NC – Link: Heg

#### Plan decks U.S. heg- excluding China key to economic might that prevents China rise

Sean Mirski, July, 2015, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: China, America and the Balance of Power,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trans-pacific-partnership-china-america-the-balance-13264> (accessed 5/3/16)

Besides creating jobs, the TPP may also alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. The treaty will increase the rate of economic growth in the United States and in an array of friendly nations while simultaneously diverting trade flows away from Washington’s greatest competitor, China. More important than any of these absolute changes in economic output, though, is the relative change in national power, itself the product of economic might. Whereas trade is often discussed in absolute terms, relative gains are more important in the often zero-sum world of international politics. If the TPP can change the trajectory of American power relative to China’s, it may be the single most important factor in whether the United States retains its “indispensable” role in the 21st Century. Given the treaty’s strategic significance, it is shocking that the TPP almost met its end at the hands of Congress recently. While treaty negotiations will continue for now, the TPP will come before the nation’s lawmakers again. At that point, Congress needs to recognize that the TPP is not just about economics, and that it has the potential to be a pillar of American grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.

### 2NC – Link: Heg

#### TPP without China key to U.S. hegemony- its foundational for U.S. power

Cary Huang, November, 2015, “It's the geopolitics, stupid: US-led TPP trade pact less about boosting economies than about containing China's rise,” South China Morning Post, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1876024/its-geopolitics-stupid-us-led-tpp-trade-pact-less-about> (accessed 5/11/16)

The pact will strengthen US political and military leadership in the region, amid the escalating maritime disputes flaring up across the South China Sea and East China Sea between China and several of its neighbours, the perennial friction between China and Taiwan, and the growing tensions over North Korea's nuclear stockpile. With the TPP, the US will be more inclined to intervene in a serious spat over territorial claims in the region if a situation threatens its growing trade interests. The pact has, in effect, helped to reassert US influence in the region and shore up the long-term foundations of American power. The Nobel Prize-winning American economist Thomas Schelling noted that "trade is what most of international relations is about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy". In this sense, the TPP is not only US trade policy, but is also America's national security policy. Furthermore, it is a product of the Sino-US rivalry for control of trade and finance - the foundation of today's global politics, as well as the global economy.

### 1NC – Link: U.S.-Japan Relations

#### Leaving China out of the deal key to U.S.-Japan alliance- plan flips that

Cai Hong, October, 2015, “TPP a key component of Japan's deepening alliance with the US,” China Daily, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-10/12/content_22160339.htm> (accessed 5/12/16)

For some of the countries, though, the TPP is more than just a trade deal. The United States and Japan have made no secret of its geopolitical implications for competing with, if not confronting, China. Shortly after the broad agreement on the TPP was reached, the White House declared that the US does not want competitors, such as China, who don't share its values, to write the rules of the global economy. The US wants to ensure that Washington, not Beijing, has the leadership in the development of trade rules governing the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese minister of economic revitalization Akira Amari, who took charge of the country's TPP negotiations emphasized the significance of the trade deal to keep the US pegged to East Asia so that its continued presence will prevent China's military buildup from destabilizing the region. Participants in the TPP talks account for a combined 40 percent of the world's gross domestic product. Joining a free trade regime of such a scale would be significant for Japan. Japan's government estimates the economy will expand by 0.66 percent as a result of the elimination of tariffs. When non-tariff deregulation is included, the economic benefits would be larger, probably to the tune of 2 percent of GDP. This requires a long-overdue opening and restructuring of Japan's protected but lackluster economy. To stoke its economic growth and promote the interests of domestic consumers, Japan needs to liberalize trade and investment to capitalize on the economic vigor of other nations, especially those in the fast-growing Asian region. For Abe, the TPP provides a geopolitical counterweight to a rising China. The Abe administration, which plays up China's growing threat in East Asia, views the TPP as a key component of deepening Japan's alliance with the US alongside closer bilateral security ties. It is obvious that the pact is an alliance in which some nations build to isolate two Asian powers - China and Russia. Japan's Diet or parliament has approved the new security-related bills giving the cabinet the authority to send troops overseas despite Article 9 of the country's pacifist Constitution banning the settlement of international conflicts by force. On top of economic interests, the Abe administration has pursued the TPP deal with an eye on aligning Japan's position with the US strategy vis-a-vis China.

### 2NC – Links: U.S-Japan Relations

#### Japan doesn’t want China in the deal- views TPP as counterweight

Benny TEH Cheng Guan, School of Social Sciences Universiti Sains Malaysia, March, 2016, “Japan, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a Strategic Tool of Choice,” Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies, <http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/workingPapers/RWP_15003.pdf> accessed 5/12/16

China’s rapid economic rise and the political clout that it commands in the Asia Pacific region creates unease in Tokyo and Washington. The development of the TPP is therefore seen as a response to check China’s growing influence in the region. However, is the TPP designed to contain China by keeping it out or to include it under US-Japan determined rules? Some scholars and observers such as David Piling (2013) have argued that the TPP is an economic containment strategy to prevent China from developing its own regional economic order (see also Drysdale, 2011).3 Arguing that the TPP deliberately targets China, Professor of International Studies at Peking University, Wang Yong, argued that China’s rise is eroding “the economic foundation of the US-led security order in East Asia” and by centering on the TPP, where the US could take the lead, instead of the EAFTA or RCEP, it hopes to thwart “the emergence of a China-centered East Asian economic bloc”, constraint “the centrifugal tendencies of allies Japan, South Korea and Australia, which are attracted by China’s growing economic power”, and have “a decisive say over the direction of the multilateral trading system, and dealing with the challenges from China and other emerging economies” in order to wrestle back control of the region (Wang, 2013).

#### Japan wants China constrained- it’s a major policy goal

Terada Takashi, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University, October, 2015, “Japan and the TPP Conclusion: Regional Order, Negotiations, and Domestic Adjustment,” The Asian Forum, <http://www.theasanforum.org/japan-and-the-tpp-conclusion-regional-order-negotiations-and-domestic-adjustment/> (accessed 5/12/16)

Led by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan currently views TPP as an important instrument for accessing Asian-Pacific economic growth and for putting Japan’s economy back on track. As a keystone of Abenomics and its trade strategy, the agreement has been promoted in Japan for its strategic value in pressuring China through economic means to comply with TPP-supported trade and investment rules. Similar to other TPP members, Japan needs to achieve further deregulation and liberalization in line with consensual TPP provisions, domestic reforms that Abe views as necessary steps toward realizing two major policy goals: constraining China’s foreign policy ascendancy and promoting economic reform at home.

#### Japan doesn’t want China in the deal-

C. Fred Bergsten, November, 2015, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Japan,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/trans-pacific-partnership-and-japan> (accessed 5/12/16)

Japan will also benefit from the side agreement on macroeconomic and exchange rate issues that is being organized by the monetary authorities of the TPP countries. The main goal of that agreement, responding in part to the TPP "negotiating objectives" for the United States adopted by the Congress, is to avoid future currency manipulation by partner countries that could undermine the agreement's trade liberalization and balance. Japan has suffered from such manipulation by China and Korea, two of its major competitors that might join the TPP in the future. Those countries have frequently and substantially intervened in the foreign exchange markets, including in yen, to depress their currencies and strengthen their competitiveness, and the TPP group would provide a useful forum to help deter and, if necessary, counter such practices. It would also enable Japan to join with the United States in further reinforcing the widespread consensus that domestic implementation of monetary policy, including quantitative easing, should not be regarded as currency manipulation and is thus fully acceptable internationally. In any event, Japan itself has already committed to avoid future manipulation through the very firm G-7 agreement of February 2013.

### 1NC – Link: China Appeasement

#### Plan appeases China and their economic interests

Steve Mollman, June, 2015, “Obama says China might want in on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Quartz, <http://qz.com/419565/obama-says-china-might-want-in-on-the-trans-pacific-partnership/> (accessed 4/26/16)

A key question about the TPP has been how China would react to the deal, which calls all nations to agree to environmental, intellectual property, and labor standards. Said Obama: The fact is that if we have 11 of the leading economies in the Asia-Pacific region, who have agreed to enforceable labor standards, enforceable environmental standards, strong I.P. protections, non-discrimination against foreign firms that are operating access to those markets, reduced tariffs, then China is going to have to at least take those international norms into account. And, we are still pursuing strong bilateral economic relations with China, we still pressure them around issues like currency, or the subsidies that they may be engaged in, or theft of intellectual property… So, part of what we’re doing here is we’re leveling up, as opposed to a race to the bottom, which means no labor protections, no environmental protections. We want to make sure that there is a level playing field that’s going to allow us to be successful, and will help to shape trade and commerce, not just in the region, but in the world for a long time to come. While China seemed to perceive the TPP as a threat a few years ago, more recently it’s become quiet on the issue, as reported in late April by The New York Times. China’s vice finance minister Zhu Guangyao said the pact would be “incomplete” without China, and hinted that China might want to participate someday. “As China becomes more open,” he said, “it’s very important for us to be integrated into the global trade system with a high standard.”

### 2NC – Link: China Appeasement

#### Plan is China appeasement- gives a backdoor into multilateral economic blocs

Alicia Garcia Herrero is a senior fellow at Bruegel and a non-resident research fellow at Real Instituto El Cano. She is also Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at NATIXIS. She is currently adjunct professor at City University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, October, 2015, “Where does the TPP leave China and Europe?,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/17/where-does-the-tpp-leave-china-and-europe/> (accessed 5/3/16)

The United States has been very successful in its negotiations with its TPP partners. Cornerstones of its success are evident in the primacy of the protection of brand names over the protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and the prioritisation of the protection of trade secrets over press freedom in the final deal. These conditions show the price that countries like Japan are willing to pay for US-led security. The high price to pay in terms of US supremacy on the negotiation table makes it all the more unlikely that China will seriously consider joining the bloc in the near future. The treatment of state-owned enterprises and data protection in particular are two stumbling blocks. The latter is also a key deterrent for Europe’s TTIP negotiations. The question, then, is what should China and Europe do against the background of a huge economic block like TPP? Having lost hope of a multilateral process under the axis of the WTO, both China and Europe have been piling up bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) with countries of interest, some of which are also part of TPP. For example, China recently closed a deal with Australia while Europe has done the same with Singapore and Vietnam. But China is aware that such bilateral FTAs will remain quite futile compared to TPP, both in terms of size and coverage. It is therefore gearing towards a regional strategy, participating in talks on another mega-regional trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which would link it to 10 Southeast Asian Nations and Japan. Yet it remains unclear whether these countries will pursue such deal once TPP is up and running.

### 1NC – Link: Russia

#### Russia’s not worried about the TPP now BECAUSE China’s not involved- plan flips their perception

Jan Teresiński, Economist at CASE. He graduated with distinction from the University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences and holds Master’s degree in Economics (specialization: International Economics) and Bachelor’s degree in Economics, May 2015, “What the Trans-Pacific Partnership means for Russia,” <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/what-trans-pacific-partnership-means-russia> (accessed 5/12/16)

But there is great potential for the TPP agreement to stall the momentum that Russia has made in Asia; it is estimated that Russia will lose on TPP in economic terms, by 2025 sustaining a $1 billion welfare loss. Again, this is measured by equivalent variation – how much money needs to be deducted from the Russian economy in case of no TPP to make it as well-off as when TPP comes into force. Equivalent variation is here negative, which means that Russia would be better-off without TPP. Russia loses because enhanced trade takes place somewhere else, it cannot enjoy productivity gains and better allocation of resources resulting from trade and Russian consumers do not have access to more varieties. Moreover, the additive effect of TPP in the east, coupled with another big free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU, i.e. the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in the West, will contribute to the further economic isolation of Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin recognizes this possible threat and has treated TPP as “another U.S. attempt to build an architecture of regional economic cooperation that the U.S. would benefit from.” Moreover, Russian leaders have expressed the belief that TPP will be mostly ineffective without the participation of Russia and China. Indeed, some experts claim that TPP is merely a basis for a broader trade agreement between all 21 countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, including Russia and China. Such an eventuality could mean Russia would be able to blunt U.S. influence in the Pacific Rim.

## Disadvantage – China Containment Good

### 1NC – China Containment DA

#### China rising rapidly now- plan stops key economic containment strategy

Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Methodist University, August, 2015, “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics,” <http://hirokitakeuchi.com/upload/5897/documents/Political%20Economy%20of%20TPP%20Stanford%20Workshop.pdf> (accessed 4/30/16)

Observing the ongoing negotiation of the TPP, China has identified three potential outcomes. The first scenario is that in whatever way the TPP negotiation is concluded, China will not be able to join the TPP in the future. The United States might consider the TPP as a tool to contain China by creating an alliance to balance against rising China. This scenario is supported by the following realist theory argued by John J. Mearsheimer and others: states are never secure until they completely dominate the system, so they have to maximize power relative to others; and because it is impossible for any state to completely dominate the whole world system, a state will never be able to acquire sufficient power so that it is secure enough to have goals other than seeking relative power.25 From this perspective, the TPP would be the tool to secure U.S. alliances and ensure a preponderance of U.S. power over China. Therefore, the United States should lead the TPP to maximize U.S. power relative to China, and would find the TPP—excluding China—to be a better place to exercise its strong leadership in trade negotiations than the WTO—including China. In short, this perspective implies that the United States should use the TPP to reduce China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. If, after deliberation on policy toward China the United States concludes that China will not have the intention to follow the rules in the U.S.-led international order, those who argue for the containment policy will be empowered in the debates over China policy, and then the United States will find the TPP and the other U.S.-led international institutions to be a tool to contain China’s rise.

#### Unrestrained Chinese economic rise decks U.S. hegemony- make war inevitable

Amrita Jash, October, 2015, “China and the ‘Thucydides Trap’,” E-International Relations, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/16/china-and-the-thucydides-trap/> (accessed 5/11/16)

China’s rapidly expanding economic clout also raises concerns. China’s ‘charm offensive’ as witnessed in terms of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and others – directly challenge the U.S.’ longstanding strategic supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Such actions on the part of China clearly reflect its revisionist tendencies as they call for changing the existing norms of the international order. These actions exemplify China’s aspirations of fulfilling the ‘dream’ of getting back its due in world politics, that is, achieving the great power position that it held centuries ago. Additionally, it also clarifies that Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “keeping a low profile” is now a legacy of the past, for the present China is bold and confident in its actions. China’s rise may be bringing an end to the Gramscian notion of western hegemony and thereby, creating a new kind of balance of power. It is clear that ‘China’s rise’ mainly challenges the U.S. dominated status-quo. This creates uncertainty in terms of China’s intentions and futuristic actions, of which, one of the gravest concerns lie in evading a military collision between China and U.S. In response to the growing intensity in power dynamics, Graham Allison has raised a crucial query ‘whether China and United States can escape the Thucydides Trap’. Drawing from historical precedents, it is an accepted fact that when a rising power rivals a ruling power, war is inevitable. In understanding Athens’ challenging posture to Sparta in ancient Greece, Thucydides explained that: “it was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Along these lines, Allison states that: “the preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia” but “the impact that China’s ascendance will have on the U.S.-led international order.” While contradicting the idea of the ‘Thucydides trap’, Chinese President Xi Jinping in his recent visit to the U.S. said: “there is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistake of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”

#### The impact is catastrophe war

Robert **Kagan,** Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, February, **2012, “**Why the World Needs America --- Foreign-policy pundits increasingly argue that democracy and free markets could thrive without U.S. predominance; If this sounds too good to be true, writes Robert Kagan, that's because it is, [Wall Street Journal](http://search.proquest.com/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Wall+Street+Journal/$N/10482?t:ac=920985495/fulltext&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks),” [New York, N.Y] <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448> (accessed 4/13/16)

If and **when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too**. Or more likely, **if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder.** We may discover then that **the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.**

### 2NC – I/L: Containment Solve China Rise

#### Containment good – key to prevent China rise

Peter Navarro, professor at the University of California-Irvine, March, 2016, “Crouching Tiger: Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling_b_9417476.html> (accessed 5/8/16)

On the inevitably of conflict between the US and China, its roots lie in the necessity of adopting a “containment strategy” much as the US had to do with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Says Mearsheimer: I think that the optimal strategy for the United States for dealing with China is to pursue a containment strategy similar to the one that we pursued with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There will be some people who will argue for preventive war or for a rollback strategy, but it would be remarkably foolish, in my opinion, to pursue that option. It makes much more sense for the United States just to work with China’s neighbors to try and contain it and to prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon. The problem that we face, however, is that as we move towards a containment strategy now, we almost certainly guarantee that there will be an intense security competition between the United States and China. One might say to me: “John, the argument you’re making for containment now, basically creates a situation where you have a self-fulfilling prophecy, where it guarantees that China and the United States will compete for security and they will always be a danger of war.” My response to that is it’s true, but we have no choice because we cannot afford to let China grow and dominate Asia for fear that it might have malign intentions. So, therefore, we have to contain it now, and it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. And my argument is that this is the tragedy of great power politics.

### 2NC – I/L: Economic Containment K2 Military Containment

#### Economic containment key to military containment of China- it’s the basis for their security

Hans Kundnani, April,2015, “Economic and military power in Asia,” European Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_economic_and_military_power_in_asia3006> (accessed 5/12/16)

In turn, this suggests that economic and military power may be more intimately connected than Feigenbaum and Manning suggested in their article. At one level, of course, economic power has always been the basis for military power: countries with expanding economies can also increase their military capabilities. The best current example of this is the way China’s spectacular economic growth has allowed it to increase defence spending by more than 10 percent each year for a decade, so that it now has the second-largest defence budget in the world after the US. It is for this reason that, in his book, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy, Edward Luttwak argued that the US should actually seek to impede China’s economic growth. This is, of course, not the official policy of the US, which insists it welcomes the rise of China as part of a win-win logic. Where current developments in Asia are particularly interesting, however, is in the even more subtle connections between economic power and military power. In particular, powers such as China seem increasingly to be using economic means for strategic purposes within a context of interdependence. The aim seems to be not so much to reduce interdependence, let alone to interrupt it, but to shift its balance in their own favour – in other words, to create asymmetric interdependence. In recent years, there has been much discussion of the way China has used investment to create such relationships of dependence through strategic investment in Africa, Latin America, and even Europe. Initiatives such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road seem to develop this approach further. The silk road initiatives have led analysts to speculate about a shift – or even a “reset” – in Chinese foreign policy. After several years in which China was increasingly aggressive, particularly in the East and South China Seas, it now seems to be becoming more cooperative. But according to Chinese political scientist Shi Yinhong, the shift is from “strategic military” to “strategic economy” – in other words, it is the means rather than the ends that have changed. China’s objective remains the same: to increase its influence in Asia at America’s expense. But after its aggressive approach in the last few years sparked fear among its neighbours, who increasingly began to increase security cooperation with each other and with the US, China switched to the use of economic tools to achieve the same objective.

### 2NC – Link: Plan Stops Containment

#### Plan decks China economic containment- let’s China run international trade asymmetries

Stephen Gowans, Writer and Political Activist, October, 2015, “Why the Trans-Pacific Partnership Equals a U.S. Aircraft Carrier,” Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-the-trans-pacific-partnership-equals-a-u-s-aircraft-carrier/5482877> (accessed 4/27/16)

Coverage of the TPP in the two principal elite U.S. newspapers, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, has portrayed a major aim of the pact as containing China. “The pact…is seen as a way to” raise “a challenge to Asia’s rising power…which has pointedly been excluded from the deal,” wrote Kevin Granville in The New York Times. [6] Jane Perlez in the same newspaper described the pact “as a win for the United States in its contest with China for clout in Asia”. [7] “Critics in China,” noted The Wall Street Journal, are on the same page, viewing “the Trans-Pacific Partnership with suspicion, seeing it as one more way for Washington to seek to contain China’s influence.” [8] What U.S. ruling circles seek to contain in the Asia-Pacific region is Chinese encroachments on U.S. profits. Chinese industry is taking an ever growing share of the region’s trade, at the expense of corporate USA. “Time is running out,” warns the U.S. defense secretary. “We already see countries in the region trying to carve up these markets.” [9] As recently as 2004, the United States was the largest trading partner of Asean, a 10 country association of Southeast Asian economies, with total trade of $192 billion. “But now China, which was an inconsequential trading partner of Asean as recently as the late 1990s, is by far the region’s largest trading partner, with two-way trade of $293 billion in 2010.” Not only is China Asean’s biggest trading partner, it’s the top trading partner of Japan, Korea, India and Australia, notes Cui Tiankai, a Chinese vice foreign minister. [10] What’s more, “the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China now provide more loans to the region than the (U.S.-dominated) World Bank and Asia Development Bank combined.” [11] And China “has picked off American allies like Britain, Germany and South Korea to join…the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a project started by China in part to keep its own state-owned firms busy building roads, dams and power plants around Asia. China is at the same time setting up other trade pacts around the region so it can use its cash and enormous market leverage to strike deals more advantageous to its interests.” [12] Needless to say, the deals China strikes, the roads, dams and power plants it builds, and the trade it carries out, represent lost opportunities for U.S. banks, corporations and investors. China’s growing economic clout has raised concerns on Wall Street and in Washington of “being left on the outside, looking in.” Fearful that U.S. firms and investors “risked being shunted aside in Asia,” Washington initiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership [13] as a means of defending the interests of U.S. finance and business in Asia.

#### Key to contain China’s rise and China perceives it as containment

Larry Catá Backer, 2014, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order,” Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 049, <http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6> (accessed 5/11/16)

Indeed, Wen Jin Yuan notes the sense among Chinese academic and policy circles that “the main reason behind the Obama Administration’s support for the TPP agenda is the US’s desire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise.”128 Wen notes, for example, reports published in the People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, that refer to TPP as “superficially an economic agreement but contain[ing] an obvious political purpose to constrain China’s rise.”129 More importantly, a successfully negotiated TPP would result, according to other Chinese scholars, in trade diversion to the detriment of Chinese economic interests.130 Yet, according to Wen’s research, United States officials insist that the ultimate goal of the United States was not containment, but incorporation. The “U.S.’s ultimate goal is to integrate China into this regional trade system, rather than keeping China out, and the TPP initiative is actually similar to the strategy led by several U.S. agencies to incorporate China into the WTO system.”131 Yet incorporation can be understood from the Chinese side as another form of containment. Rather than have China lead a new effort at refining the rules and culture of trade in the Pacific, it would be forced to participate as a junior partner in a regulatory exercise directed by the United States and its principal ally, Japan. For the Chinese, the substantial effect might well be understood as containment, though that view/perception is lost on the United States.132

### 2NC – AT: China Rise Not a Threat

#### China rise is a threat

Ming Xia, 2006, “"China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?,” The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html> (accessed 5/15/16)

Will China become a threat to the United States, Japan, and surrounding countries? The reason for American concern mainly arises from its hegemonic status in the world politics and the ideological incompatibility of China with the Western value system. China's stunning economic growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a world superpower. But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary power that is threatening both to the United States' status and global structure. Three different logics have been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First, ideological and cultural factors make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration, the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes view it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the "unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilizations" is the most fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the sensible response from the U.S. is, in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is possible if needed; in the long run, the promotion of a peaceful transformation within China. Second, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. For many realists, even China has shed off its ideological straitjacket, as a great power in size (territory, population, and economy), China has to pursue its own interest and respect. Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash with the United States, if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China as a rising power. Some scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong nationalism and popular nationalism can make China even more aggressive toward the United States. Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives, some people are concerned that if China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of control, it can create an even worse scenario. The sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state and the followed crises (warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to deal with. Due to these three different considerations, the United States often oscillates from demonization to romaticization of China, from containment to engagement. The U.S.-China relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to competition and back to conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One American China specialist characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American relationship."

### 2NC – AT: No L: ‘TPP Not Containment’

#### Even if it isn’t, China perceives it

Larry Catá Backer, 2014, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order,” Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 049, <http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6> (accessed 5/11/16)

In either case, China is particularly sensitive to any action or policy that can be understood as fostering Chinese containment. To that end, China is seeking to resist policies that might produce containment to the advantage of its trade competitors. More importantly, China is also seeking to avoid containment through its own trade strategies. These include expanding FTA-type relations within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) group, strengthening trade with Canada, and aggressively pursuing FTA agreements with Japan and Korea.114 Chinese military arrangements are also growing through the Shanghai Cooperation Group and similar strategies.115 This may be a harder policy to operationalize now as China begins its transition to status as a developed state, and with it a substantially higher cost of labor and a switch in the mix of industrial production. The shift—illustrated in weakened foreign investment in China— has pluses and minuses for an economy key to global growth. Beijing wants to shift to higher-value production and to see incomes rise. But a de-emphasis on manufacturing puts pressure on leaders to make sure jobs are created in other sectors to keep the world's No. 2 economy humming.116 But that may matter less as investment increasingly becomes internally generated in China.117 Concern over China’s growing military power may also drive its neighbors to establish alliances with the United States, as demonstrated by Vietnam.118 But the issues run much deeper than economic policy for China. The fear of encirclement runs deep in Chinese strategic thinking, whether that encirclement is military, economic, or related to governance.119 Official Chinese media sources speak to these fears: On a strategic level, Washington wants Southeast Asia to form the center of an “Asian strategic alliance” that includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and India. On a political level, the US continues to export “democracy” and Western values to Southeast Asian countries. On the economic level, the US has close ties with Southeast Asia in terms of trade, finance and investment and considers the latter an important overseas market, resource supplier and investment destination. At a military and security level, the US wants to set up more military bases and positively interfere in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.120

## CP – China Trade

### 1NC – China Trade Agreements CP

#### Text: The People’s Republic of China should continue current negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and negotiate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Six framework and the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement. The People’s Republic of China should negotiate bilateral free trade agreements with trans-pacific-partnership participants. China should not join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

#### Counterplan solves entirety of trade advantage- bolsters their economy and secures trade relations

Li Chunding and John Whalley, May 2016, “China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” CIGI Papers, <https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/paper_no.102.pdf> (accessed 5/13/16)

China clearly sees both regional and bilateral FTAs as an increasingly key element of its integration into the global economy, a broader strategy that still underpins its overall growth strategy. The current focus of these agreements is mainly within Asia, and to a further degree in the Pacific. The idea is to use RTAs to further open up the economy to the outside world and speed up domestic reforms. RTAs are seen as strengthening economic cooperation with other economies, as well as providing a supplement to the WTObased multilateral trading system at a time when, given the post-Doha Round’s impasse, major progress in the WTO on access seems unlikely (Li, Wang and Whalley 2014a). As Table 2 indicates, China now has 14 FTA partners (with 35 separate economies) with which it has signed 13 agreements. These 14 partners are: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macao, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan. Most of the existing FTAs are bilateral and most partners are from Asia and belong to developing countries or country groups. Within the group of existing agreements, the China-ASEAN FTA, Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) (Hong Kong and mainland China) and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (China and Taiwan) are important FTAs since they involve partners with whom there are large trade volumes (Li, Wang and Whalley 2014b). China should negotiate the RCEP within the ASEAN plus Six framework and the China-Japan-South Korea FTA. For China, the RCEP is an important instrument to counterbalance the TPP. It may exert greater pressure on its neighbours, or even offer attractive concessions, to ensure the completion of the RCEP negotiation. Up until now, China has created its own FTAs with many of the TPP members, such as Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru and Vietnam. China should accelerate this step and negotiate bilateral FTAs with TPP member countries and thus weaken the TPP effects on China. In the FTA negotiations, China should emphasize its main concern of trade and security of market access. For example, China could include an anti-dumping clause into the agreement and use FTAs to solve the anti-dumping problem (Sun and Whalley 2015).

### 2NC – Solvency

#### Counterplan is sufficient to solve their impacts- Bilateral Trade agreements maintain relationships and maintain China’s economy

Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Department of Political Science Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University and Mary E. Lovely Department of Economics Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, November, 2015, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Perspectives from China (accessed 4/29/16)

Arguably, joining in on the TPP would be the best way for China to signal its regional benevolence and commitment to economic cooperation. However, the TPP is not the only option China has for sending such signals.Since the mid 1990s China has entertained the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement with the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which includes many of the current TPP negotiation constituents. In 2004, China concluded the China ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and is poised to adopt a larger and more significant Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with the ASEAN states in 2015. Underneath these regional arrangements lies a tangle of Chinese bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), which offer China various avenues through which to maintain existing trade relations.27 The TPP is, by far, a ‘higher quality’ agreement than anything China already has in place. However, it is not clear whether China is interested in, or even capable of, subscribing to such high standards. Chinese trade representatives, for example, have already criticized the "one size fits all" approach to the TPP negotiations, arguing that there are “developed” as well as “developing” countries at the negotiation table and that no single menu could satisfy everyone. What China is offering is options and it has been busy marketing several alternatives, some of which appear to be resonating with ASEAN members. During the inaugural 2013 USASEAN summit, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak stated that a more flexible approach was needed in future trade negotiations, as ASEAN members were not simply “yes men” in the TPP initiative. 28 In a rare case of common opinion, Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian opposition leader, has also come out in criticism of the TPP as an attempt by the US “to impose its brand of economic model” on unwilling partners. More recently, Japan’s chief TPP negotiator remarked that the TPP provides a blank check on monetary policy but imposes strict restrictions on exchange rate policy, terms that seem to benefit the United States at the expense of exporters.29

#### Counterplan solves for China’s economy

Peter Drysdale, Emeritus Professor and Co-Editor of East Asian Forum and Head of the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in the Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University, April, 2016, “The regional trade deal with China and India that's twice the size of TPP,” Financial Review, <http://www.afr.com/opinion/the-regional-trade-deal-with-china-and-india-thats-twice-the-size-of-tpp-20160426-goeyzj> (accessed 5/11/16)

Because China, India, Indonesia and other developing countries in Asia will have trouble joining the TPP in the foreseeable future, an ambitious and high-quality RCEP can help integrate the entire Asia Pacific region. But if it is to really maximise the value of economic integration and free trade, RCEP governments will need to go beyond negotiating a single-undertaking trade deal along TPP lines. A comprehensive RCEP can aspire to be a model for a global set of principles-based rules for managing trade and other forms of international commerce in the 21st century. The numbers speak for themselves. Even at a lower rate of 6 per cent growth over the coming decade, the massive Chinese economy can still grow at two to three times the rate of global growth. India is on the way back towards its growth potential, upwards of 8 per cent over the next decade in which the young will be pouring into its labour markets.

### 2NC – AT: PDB

#### Perm do both links to the net benefit/disadvantage because it still incorporates the invitation into the TPP

#### And, perm undermines the RCEP negotiations via American trade interference

Roberta Rampton, May, 2016, “Obama says Chinese-led trade deal shows need for TPP: Washington Post,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-obama-idUSKCN0XT1WZ> (accessed 5/10/16)

"China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the fastest-growing markets in the world at our expense, putting American jobs, businesses and goods at risk," Obama said in the piece. Obama was referring to the 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, and noted that China was seeking to finalize the deal by the end of the year. "That trade deal won't prevent unfair competition among government-subsidized, state-owned enterprises. It won't protect a free and open Internet," Obama said, also criticizing the RCEP's lack of protections for intellectual property, labor standards and the environment. Obama, who plans a visit to TPP partners Japan and Vietnam later this month, argued the TPP would allow America to "call the shots" on trade with Asia. "That's why my administration is working closely with leaders in congress to secure bipartisan approval for our trade agreement, mindful that the longer we wait, the harder it will be to pass the TPP," he said. Asked about Obama's comments, China's Foreign Ministry said global trade rules should be discussed by all countries, not just set by one.

### 2NC – AT: CP Not Feasible

#### China already in litany of trade negotiation and deals that proves it will retain strong trade relations- CP ensures it

Sara Hsu, October, 2015, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership/> (accessed 4/26/16)

China was invited to join the TPP by Hillary Clinton in 2012. Some have speculated that China would not join the bloc because it is a “high standards agreement,” even speculating that this was put in place to lock China out of the agreement. However, it is not clear how these “high standards” will be enforced. Past trade agreements, such as NAFTA and CAFTA, with similar labor or environmental standards, have not been enforced by the United States. Whether the lack of enforcement renders more or less attractive to China is unclear. The benefits of the treaty may be attainable by China by creating separate free trade agreements with participating nations. Interestingly, Hillary Clinton herself has now come out against the pact due to concerns over aspects of the agreement, such as currency manipulation, that are insufficiently addressed. China appears to currently have enough international economic negotiations on the table to keep it occupied, and it is unlikely that it is really concerned about the TPP. The nation is a sufficiently large player in the world economy to negotiate successfully with trading partners. China is already in the process of participating in the Silk Road project, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and other high-level economic structures. If the TPP proves valuable, perhaps China will join the alliance in the coming months. Hence it may prove beneficial if the treaty is not positioned as an anti-China agreement going forward.

### 1NC – Solvency: Relations

#### TPP doesn’t solve relations and China says no to joining

David Dollar is a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development programs, June 30, 2016, “Trump and China,” Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/30-trump-and-china-dollar> (accessed 7/22/16)

Third, on TPP: China is not a negotiating party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and if the agreement is implemented, China cannot join without the approval of the United States. U.S. relations with the countries negotiating the TPP provide an interesting contrast to U.S. relations with China. It happens that the TPP partners have about the same sized economy as China—around $10 trillion. But the United States has much more balanced trade with the TPP partners: We export six times as much to them as to China. And we have 15 times as much investment in the TPP partners as we have in China. In other words, the TPP group is a much more open set of economies. The TPP agreement would deepen the integration among us while addressing important issues of labor and environmental standards. The fact that China remains relatively closed to imports and to inward investment is a source of frustration for the United States. Frankly, we have little leverage over China to force them to open up. China’s communist leaders are much more concerned with domestic political control and territorial disputes with neighbors than with economic relations with the United States. Protectionist measures aimed at China are likely to be met by Chinese retaliation, not by China suddenly opening up. For the United States, deepening integration with the like-minded countries that have negotiated the TPP, as well as with European partners, is a sensible strategy. There are many good jobs in the United States tied to our exports and we want to encourage the expansion of a rules-based trading system, not spark a trade war that is likely to have no winners.

### 1NC – Solvency: China Economy

#### Excluding China from the TPP has no impact on its economy and China says no

Kim Iskyan, June 8, 2016, “Why Donald Trump Just Might Be Right About the TPP and China,” The Street, <https://www.thestreet.com/story/13600140/1/why-donald-trump-just-might-be-right-about-the-tpp-and-china.html> (accessed 7/21/16)

As a result of not being included in the TPP, China could miss out on an estimated $46 billion in trade and investment each year. That might sound like a lot, but in the context of China's economy, it's small. And in any case, China may be able to get a lot more out of the TPP without being a part of it. Over the past 10 years, China has signed free-trade agreements with at least two-thirds of the TPP members. It signed free trade agreements with Australia and Chile in 2006, then with New Zealand and Singapore in 2008. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes TPP members Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia, made a deal with China in 2015. These side deals may not be as comprehensive as the TPP, but they are a good foundation. They mean that being left out of the TPP won't hurt China's economy as much as it would otherwise.

### 1NC – Solvency: Global Economy

#### TPP doesn’t solve the economy- drop in the bucket

Stan Sorscher is on staff at Society for Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), a labor union representing aerospace engineers, scientists and technical workers, and is President of the Washington Fair Trade Coalition, June 11, 2016, “How Low Would We Go for TPP?,” Common Dreams, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/06/11/how-low-would-we-go-tpp>) (accessed 7/19/16)

But “our” rules were written by and for global investors. Those rules are very favorable to corporations who want to move production to low-wage countries with weak social and political systems. Using very optimistic assumptions, the International Trade Commission estimates TPP would increase GDP by 0.15% after 15 years – a number too small to measure. Our lived experience with NAFTA CAFTA, and other deals tells a different story. Under those NAFTA-style deals our economy has steadily de-industrialized, and millions of jobs have moved to low-wage countries. TPP’s rules for dispute settlement create corporate friendly tribunals, which pay no attention to our Constitution, our Supreme Court, or our legal traditions, and are not accountable to any political process. These tribunals shield global companies from government actions intended to protect public interests. TPP’s toothless rules on currency rates allow China, Korea, Japan and other countries to distort trade, favoring goods produced in their countries for export to the US. This is great for US corporations who produce in China, but is bad for workers and communities in the US. TPP’s weak “Rules of Origin” encourage high-wage countries to source more of their products in low-wage countries. Countries with terrible labor and environmental standards can ship parts to 11 other TPP countries, and voilà! – those parts are now TPP-qualified for favorable access to our markets. TPP’s rules on labor and human trafficking are pathetic. Malaysia qualifies as one of our TPP partners, even though our State Department ranks Malaysia among the worst in the world for human trafficking. Malaysia has a documented history of forced labor and the worst forms of child labor. Malaysia knows that we will never hold them accountable for improving conditions. Our indifference to global labor standards is so deep that Vietnam can embarrass President Obama - to his face - during his latest trip there, by forbidding labor activists from accepting Obama’s invitation to meet with him. President Obama inspires us with soaring rhetoric on human rights in Vietnam, but Vietnam’s leaders know we will never hold them accountable for improving labor conditions. TPP’s environmental protection rules are a step back from earlier standards. That is neither here nor there, because we have never enforced any environmental rules in any trade deal, in spite of repeated documented violations. Peru and other countries with sorry records for environmental standards know we will never hold them accountable when they ignore environmental standards. Berta Cáseres, an internationally recognized Honduran environmental activist, was assassinated in her home. Honduras is one of our CAFTA trading partners. Honduras is arguably the most dangerous country on earth for environmental activists. Civil society around the world condemned Berta Cáseres’ murder, but not a word can be found on the web sites for the White House or the US Trade Representative. Another CAFTA trading partner is Guatemala, which is arguably the most dangerous country in the world for labor activists. Our trade officials have “consulted” with Guatemala, and an 8-year old inquiry is underway into Guatemala’s dismal record regarding labor standards. Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia [another free trade partner] know we will never hold them accountable for improving labor conditions.

### 1NC – Solvency: China Says No

#### China says no- they want regional cooperation and have the incentive to exclude the U.S.

Daniel Twining, Director and Senior Fellow for Asia, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, USA; Hans Kundnani, Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, UK; and Peter Sparding, Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Germany, June, 2016, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: geopolitical implications for EU-US relations,” European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535008/EXPO_STU(2016)535008_EN.pdf)> (accessed 7/19/16)

Recently, China has pursued initiatives that exclude the United States, reinforcing its strategic objective of leading an Asian and Eurasian economic order that is less trans-Pacific in nature (therefore excluding the United States) and centred on tying China more closely to its maritime and continental neighbours. Building on agreements like the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, China is promoting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a liberalised regional trading arrangement currently under negotiation, which includes Asian economies, but does not include the United States (see Figure 3). China has also launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which it has a dominant voting share, but which includes stakeholders from across Eurasia, excluding the United States and Japan who question a new institution whose objectives mirror those of existing institutions like the Asian Development Bank. Shanghai is home to the New Development Bank (NDB), an institution akin to a miniWorld Bank in which China is the leading stakeholder, alongside India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. China is also promoting its ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) scheme – a network of ports, pipelines, roads and railways connecting China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe – reorienting Asia’s Pacific-oriented economy westwards, and placing China at the centre of new webs of connectivity.

### 2NC – Solvency: China Says No

#### China says no- they don’t want to play second fiddle to U.S. trade initiatives

Amitendu Palit, June 10, 2016, “How US put India in spot after branding RCEP ‘Chinese effort’,” The Financial Express, <http://www.financialexpress.com/fe-columnist/overplaying-the-china-card/279576/>) (accessed 7/19/16)

It is ironical that the TPP—supposedly a 21st century gold standard trade agreement—is ultimately being justified for containing China. During the TPP negotiations, the China containment angle was kept as peripheral as possible. Despite arguing the TPP as symbolising the US’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific, it was not branded by the US administration as brazenly anti-China as now. The shift might have occurred due to the Obama administration’s realisation that China-bashing is perhaps the only way for obtaining bipartisan support for seeing the TPP through. The anti-China branding of the TPP has several implications. China, which from the beginning of the TPP negotiations had been wary of the TPP, is now convinced about the US’s intention to displace it from the trade rule-writing space in the Asia-Pacific. This might result in China revisiting its strategy towards TPP and trade regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific. During the last couple of years, the Chinese leadership had given enough signals of a positive interest in the TPP. Joining the TPP could have been China’s next big opportunity to carry out large-scale domestic reforms, as it did after joining the WTO in 2000. The positive perception might change with China realising that even if it joins the TPP in the foreseeable future it is unlikely to be in a position to be able to contribute meaningfully to the governance of the agreement as the US would want it to play second fiddle. China might also begin looking firmly at the TPP as a long-term geostrategic alliance of the US and its partners in the Asia-Pacific. With more US strategic partners like Korea and Taiwan slated to join the TPP in the next round, such an impression on part of China is bound to strengthen.

#### China says no- AIIB and OBOR prove they want regional economic cooperation

Daniel Twining, Director and Senior Fellow for Asia, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, USA; Hans Kundnani, Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, UK; and Peter Sparding, Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Germany, June, 2016, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: geopolitical implications for EU-US relations,” European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535008/EXPO_STU(2016)535008_EN.pdf)> (accessed 7/19/16)

TPP was gestating before China’s more recent economic initiatives like the AIIB and OBOR, so it is not a direct response to them. But it is, in many ways, a US-led institutional alternative to China’s apparent strategy of organising more of Asia’s economic activity around itself. TPP can also be viewed as the preferred strategy of maritime Asia – island nations like Japan, Australia and Singapore that are dependent on the open maritime commons for their economic lifelines – versus the more Eurasian orientation of continental Asia, with its ancient overland trading links connecting the wealth of China to the markets of the wider Middle East and Europe. Many Asian countries will benefit from both the Chinese and US-led initiatives. But there is little mistaking the geo-strategic overtones of the very different visions for economic connectivity offered by the world’s two leading economies.

### 1NC – Solvency/Inherency: TPP Doesn’t Get Ratified in US

#### TPP won’t get ratified in the U.S.- election turmoil and the candidates won’t vote for it, means aff can’t solve their advantages

Paul Kane, July 12, 2016, “Obama’s trade agenda losing critical support as McConnell calls TPP passage unlikely,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/07/12/obamas-trade-agenda-losing-critical-support-as-mcconnell-calls-tpp-passage-unlikely/> (accessed 7/22/16)

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Tuesday cast deep doubt on winning approval for President Obama’s trade agenda during his last weeks in office, suggesting that it will be up to the next occupant of the Oval Office to determine the direction of trade policy. Acknowledging publicly what had become increasingly clear in private, McConnell said that the presidential campaign had produced a political climate that made it virtually impossible to pass the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the “lame duck” session after the November elections. “The chances are pretty slim that we’d be looking at that this year,” McConnell told reporters at his weekly press briefing. Both Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee, and Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, are opposed to the trade deal involving 12 Pacific-rim nations. Trump, abandoning Republican orthodoxy of the past 50 years, has made an anti-trade message a cornerstone of his campaign, stunning party leaders such as House Speaker Paul D. Ryan (R-Wis.), who had recently helped write new rules that created a fast-track process for considering TPP and other trade deals.

### 2NC – Solvency/Inherency: TPP Doesn’t Get Ratified in US

#### TPP doesn’t get ratified by the U.S- election opposition

Alan Wolff, May 5, 2016, “There's Only a Slim Chance TPP Will Be Ratified This Year,” Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2016/05/05/trans-pacific-partnership-ratification/> (accessed 7/22/16)

The web offers two definitions for the term “lame duck.” One refers to politicians who are still in office after an election that they did not run in—or lost. The other is historical—the term was used to describe a broker in the 19th Century London Stock Exchange who could not pay his debts. Both of these definitions apply to the future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement: It’s not going to pass Congress before the election, and American trade policy will appear bankrupt the longer Congressional action is delayed. The United States signed the deal at the end of last year, but still needs to implement it, which requires Congressional action. If it does not ratify, America will have defaulted on its promise to 11 trading partners who also signed the deal, and to the more than half dozen other countries that have expressed an interest in joining. So the question is: When can the agreement receive Congressional action? Not in the run-up to the election when Congress is focusing solely on that career-determining event, but afterwards, possibly during the post-election session. Why can’t Congressional approval just wait until next year? That’s where presidential politics comes in. President Obama is strongly in favor of the agreement, as are most Republican members of Congress and a few dozen or more Democrats. The results of the Indiana primary and the campaign rhetoric to date make it plain that none of the frontrunner candidates wants to implement this trade deal, at least not as is. Donald Trump called TPP “a horrible deal,” and Bernie Sanders has said “kill it.” Hillary Clinton hasn’t completely opposed it, but has said she wants to see changes, which might require renegotiation. The bottom line: The next president of the United States is not going to send the current agreement to Congress in its current form. It might take years to get to a new agreement, were that even possible, and that would be a long shot.

#### U.S. doesn’t ratify TPP- can’t overcome the political obstacles

Patrick O'Meara, Economics Correspondent, June 20, 2016, “Will US approve TPP in lame-duck period?,” RadioNZ, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/306796/will-us-approve-tpp-in-lame-duck-period> (accessed 7/22/16)

But another TPP opponent, Auckland law professor Jane Kelsey places the odds of a lame-duck vote as next to zero. Professor Kelsey argues Republicans have continued to play hardball in demanding the monopoly protection period for next generation drugs called biologics will be beefed up from 5 to 12 years. "The gatekeeper to that, (Republican Senate Finance Committee chairman) Orrin Hatch, has just upped the ante on it. So, unless he's satisfied, he has said he won't allow it into the Congress for a vote during the so-called lame-duck period," Professor Kelsey said. TPP supporter and New Zealand International Business Forum executive director Stephen Jacobi has a warning for American business wanting to rewrite the TPP to their advantage. "None of us are entirely happy with the outcome in TPP. In New Zealand we certainly aren't for a number of reasons in relation to dairy products for example. But we think this was the consensus agreement that was reached and it needs to be done now." The TPP overcame considerable odds to reach agreement in October 2015 after five-and-a-half years of negotiations. Whether that track record can be maintained as the controversial deal tiptoes through the complex minefield of US politics remains to be seen.

### 1NC – Containment DA: Link

#### Keeping China out of the TPP key to reassure allies and contain China- inclusion tanks that perception

Daniel Twining, Director and Senior Fellow for Asia, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, USA; Hans Kundnani, Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, UK; and Peter Sparding, Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Germany, June, 2016, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: geopolitical implications for EU-US relations,” European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535008/EXPO_STU(2016)535008_EN.pdf)> (accessed 7/19/16)

Indeed, Japan’s calculation vis-à-vis the United States is mirrored by a number of Asian TPP partners. The Asian members of TPP broadly view the agreement as one that will help catalyse economic growth at home, while at the same time diversifying trade and investment ties with the United States and each other. In doing so, Asian TPP members are hedging against the risks of excessive economic dependency on the Chinese market at a time when political and economic risk is rising there on account of a lack of transparency and rule of law, a playing field that is tilted towards Chinese firms and state-owned enterprises at the expense of foreign corporations, surging nationalism, slowing economic growth, and spiking labour costs. At the same time, the broader geopolitical significance of TPP means that Asian signatories are also hedging against the risks to their security and foreign policy autonomy posed by China’s growing economic power, and the diplomatic leverage that gives China against lesser neighbours. Tightening economic integration with the United States is one way to diversify not only economic ties but also security relationships, drawing the USA deeper into regional affairs as a way to check Chinese influence. As US Trade Representative Michael Froman puts it, ‘Given recent developments in Asia and Europe - tensions over the East China and South China seas, the crisis in Ukraine - the strategic implications of US trade policy have rarely been clearer. For many of the countries that would be party to the TPP, the economic benefits of the agreement are further sweetened by expectations that the United States will become more deeply embedded in the region.’ 21 China’s Asian neighbours face a conundrum – that the economic magnetism of their giant neighbour risks pulling them ever more tightly into its strategic sphere of influence. TPP members, Japan and Australia, are US treaty allies; Singapore is a quasi-ally, with an alliance-like military relationship with Washington, even if it does not officially go by that name; while countries like Malaysia and Vietnam are security partners of the United States that cooperate variously in intelligence-sharing, defence exchanges and military supply and training. China is the top trading partner to all of these countries, given its proximity and sheer scale; however, they look to Washington for security partnerships. In addition to the economic boost it promises to their domestic economies, TPP also offers the chance to align more closely with the United States – not only on trade and investment ties, but also on issues like the freedom of Asia’s maritime commons, where the openness of the region’s trade highways is threatened by Chinese military pressure, for instance in the South China Sea.

# Kritik Aestheticentrism K

### Explanation

#### The main premise of the critique is that the affirmative is not only a set of descriptive and prescriptive claims, but also a work of art. Therefore, it is not only judged according to its cognitive and ethical content, but also its aesthetic value. Your argument is that their aesthetic is bad—their arguments are bad reasons to support the topic. Criticizing the aesthetics of their impact claims is the best way to get around ‘aff outweighs’ arguments, but as always it will be important to win case defense in addition to your links. The alternative is to unbracket the affirmative, which essentially means to expose the aesthetic dimension of the case and reveal how it subconsciously affects “objective” evaluations. Remember that it is not about aesthetics being good or bad in the abstract, but since aesthetic judgments are inevitable we should be critically aware of how they affect international relations and debates about them.

### 1NC Aestheticentrism Kritik (1/4)

#### The force of the affirmative’s foreign policy prescription is based on a neocolonial ideology that affirms the superiority of the Western Cartesian mind in its ability to bring order to dystopic space.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, October 2006

“Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 475-506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645197> (accessed 5/2/16)

A number of scholars show that European colonialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may be read in terms of a het-erogeneous discourse of normalization, where an unruly space is transformed or is always undergoing a process of transformation into an orderly dominion populated by more or less knowable identities.3 The discourses of normalization whereby normal forms of living within the gridded colony are identified and policed are representational practices. Such representational practices evoke complex structures of affect and aesthetics: The known dominion is essentially an imagined one. The discipline of organization is in a relation to the spectacle of representation. The organization of lives and living in the colony signify a greater and enveloping abstraction: that of a more or less metaphysical "framework."4 The representation of bodies and identities on an orderly grid harks to an absent conceptual frame - in the colony, perhaps notions of "progress, reason, law, discipline, history, colonial authority and order."5 This order is the form of the colony, taken now as an aes-thetic creation or landscape - a form that orders and enables the content. It is the framework that instantiates a way of thinking about the self and its relation to the past, the present, and the future (and to how each of these concepts is articulated); in short, it is the framework - of order, reason, progress, or what have you - that provides an arena of secure predictability. The power of the colonial order is not to be studied solely in its effects (docile and knowable bodies) but in what the sum of organized bodies represent (a par-ticular European or Western mode of thinking about the self, its relation to external reality, and the extent to which the principles of order can be discerned in an external reality) . This is thus the hier-archy and the dystopia. The systematic completeness of the West-ern Cartesian mind, able to grasp and desirous of grasping the ordering structures of external realities, presumes and is founded on its opposite - the irregular and disorderly non-European mind: "When we pass from works of imagination to works in which facts are recorded, and general principles investigated, the superiority of the Europeans becomes absolutely immeasurable."6

### 1NC Aestheticentrism Kritik (2/4)

#### In particular, they construct the Pacific Rim as an aesthetic object in order to launch US imperial expansion globally.

Russ Castronovo, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2007, “Geo-aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Beautiful Democracy, p. 185

Such a project offers U.S. industrial modernity no small thing: aesthetics hold out the promise of form, explaining how at the start of the twentieth century, for instance, the international crisscrossing of markets, commodities, and value comes to be conceptualized as a unified structure— the globe. The political economy of globalization literalizes the universal aspect of the aesthetic ideal. Once aesthetic judgment garners widespread accord, as Eagleton argues in his reading of Kant, it “come[s] mysteriously to assume all the compelling logic of a global decree.” 9 Eagleton intends “global” as a stand-in for the philosophical universal, but we might well ask how it translates to the domain of political economy. When global aesthetics (as a heady fantasy of shared subjective judgment) encounters global economy (as an actuality of geopolitics), the formal principles of beauty and art not only buttress but help develop commerce and militarism on a previously unimaginable worldwide scale. The agreement of everyone, the unanimity of all judging subjects, sensus communis, and other notions of the universal are susceptible to the imperatives of political economy that misrecognize the globe as the universal. Aesthetics provide criteria of symmetry, unity, and balance that launch empire as a global idea, a geopolitical formation far beyond continental or hemispheric mappings. Ironically, then, symmetry, unity, and balance were invoked in ways that were completely asymmetrical, partisan, and lopsided in favor of an incipient globalization that U.S. interests were intent on pushing to every corner of the earth. Such skewed formalism becomes routine once a prototypical stage of globalization seemed inevitable in the 1890s as the West was won and the American frontier closed. Expansionism was at a dead end until the U.S. reconceived of itself as a unifying power that would make coherent sense of the world by defining it as a globe, that is, as a perfect sphere. An emerging aesthetic sense of the Pacific Rim—a sensibility as local and historically specific as a San Francisco bar named the Imperial—proved indispensable to this process.

### 1NC Aestheticentrism Kritik (3/4)

#### Alternative: Vote negative to endorse our unbracketing of the affirmative. Learning to refuse the perverse pleasure of art is a prerequisite for ethical engagement.

Kojin Karatani, Japanese philosopher and literary critic, retired visiting professor of comparative literature at Columbia and Japanese literature at Yale, October 1998

“Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism,” Boundary 2, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp. 145-160, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/303618> (accessed 4/25/16)

It is possible to say, therefore, that Kant's reflection involves a modernist statement but also its immanent critique. For instance, Marcel Duchamp exhibited a urinal with the title "Fountain" and urged us to see it by bracketing our daily concerns. In this case, the signal "This is an artwork in an exhibition" demanded that we bracket it. An object seen in this context is no longer an object with use value but a material thing that constitutes the form of art. Duchamp showed that what makes art art lies only in the signal "This is an artwork." To me this means "Let's bracket it." Duchamp showed us that anything can be an art object, not just the objects that are customarily exhibited in museums and galleries. But this manipulation works only insofar as the convention-that being exhibited in museums and galleries guarantees the "art-ness" of the objects-is mutually understood. Using the example of "Fountain" and its constituting frame of "artness," one can access various problematics embedded in Kant's reflections. First of all, what Duchamp presented was an object that, in the ordinary context, is associated with dirtiness. In the context of art, we are compelled to bracket this feeling. But, importantly, Kant maintained that the act of bracketing displeasure gives pleasure on another level, that is, metaphysical pleasure. In romanticism, this bracketing was pushed to the point of perversion. For instance, an evil that calls for ethical opposition can offer pleasure in the subjective project of bracketing the ethical concern. For this reason, aestheticism rather needs evil or abjection. Kant certainly did not appreciate the extremism. But he revealed to us that it is by bracketing that the domains of truth/good/beauty can be established and, furthermore, that the bracketing must be removed when necessary. That is to say, he refused to grant superiority to any one of these categories over any other; instead, he requested that we perform the most difficult task, that is, to bracket and unbracket flexibly, whenever required.

### 1NC Aestheticentrism Kritik (4/4)

#### Challenging the cultural underpinnings of US imperialism is the only way to prevent extinction.

Ashley Dawson, Professor of English at CUNY, and Malini Johar Schueller, Professor of English at the University of Florida, 2007, “Introduction: Rethinking Imperialism Today,” EXCEPTIONAL State Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism, pp. 20-21

To engage in the critique of contemporary US imperialism is therefore to examine and disturb the nexus of raced, gendered, and classed representations of imperial national identity articulated by the Bush regime. The political implications of such scholarly work are clearer today than ever before. The Bush administration explicitly set out to cow critics of its policies by invoking a strident patriotism that viewed all dissent as treason. Scholarly work in the humanities has been particularly targeted for surveillance and disciplining with neocon ideologues such as Lynn Cheney and Daniel Pipes engaged in a project to purge US academia of progressive scholars. Witness Daniel Pipes’s Web site Campus Watch, which published dossiers of eight supposedly antiAmerican Middle East studies faculty in an attempt to discredit their work. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni (acta), the group with which Lynne Cheney and Joe Lieberman are associated, issued a report entitled ‘‘Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America.’’ This report published its blacklist of forty professors and argued that colleges and university faculty were the weak link in America’s response to September 11.π≠ More ominously, hr 3077 seeks to monitor Middle East studies through a board that includes members from the Department of Homeland Security. Given such repressive moves by the state, including the attempt by the University of Colorado to fire professor Ward Churchill for the remarks he made about 9/11, we believe that we have a responsibility to challenge the seemingly inexorable slide of the United States toward belligerence and authoritarianism at home and abroad. Let us be very clear about one thing: imperial US policies threaten the future of humanity and the planet in the most immediate way. By providing prominent and emerging scholars with a venue to analyze the cultural contradictions of contemporary US imperialism, we intend to highlight and challenge the role of US culture in perpetuating popular authoritarianism. In addition, we believe that Exceptional State contributes to the struggle against the new imperialism by delineating strains of anti-authoritarian culture in the United States today that resonate and articulate solidarity with the emerging movement for global social justice. We thus intend our work to provide tools with which to dismantle coercive US power both domestically and internationally. Although the past thirty years have offered scant hope, we believe that there are viable alternatives to a world of indefinite detentions, preemptive strikes, and perpetual warfare.

### Link – Economic Engagement (1/2)

#### Calls for economic engagement aestheticize the Pacific and the globe in order to silence dissent and paint over imperial violence.

Russ Castronovo, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2007, “Geo-aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Beautiful Democracy, p. 208

The trans-Pacific circulation of commodities pivots on the work of geopolitical art. Not to be confused with the universal social collectivity envisioned by aesthetics, “geo-aesthetics” depend on commercial arrangements that confi gure the antipodes, heterogeneity, fremde Sitten, foreignness— all the constitutive antagonism that energizes aesthetic imagination— as untapped markets ready for development. This global perspective asks little in the way of ethical interiority, requiring only a boatload of commodities. As opposed to the theoretical ether of an ethical commonwealth, implementing community through the impersonality of commodity exchange seems feasible and commonsensical, but it is worthwhile to remember Kant’s brooding over the fact that the idea of world solidarity “dwindles markedly under men’s hands.” 57 In Norris’s world, ruthless business tactics and military intervention in the Pacific are swept aside by the infi nite circle of global exchange. “Geo-aesthetics” envelop any unharmonious matter in his novel’s fi nal image of wheat pouring out of a grain chute into an “ever-reforming cone . . . the rushing of the Wheat that continued to plunge incessantly from the iron chute in a prolonged roar, persistent, steady, inevitable” (646). Whether it is the marines who opened China’s door or wheat-growers hurt by international destabilizations of the 1890s, the never-ending formalism of the cone of wheat eliminates tension and discord. Totalizing and complete, this cone is global in more ways than one: the mound of wheat rises in the hold of a ship bound for the East. Flowing over the asphyxiated body of S. Behrman, the wheat prioritizes a unitary, global form over the discordant horror of political content suggested by the capitalist’s corpse. The materials of global economy—for Norris, grain is the fundamental stuff of exchange—hold together as a geopolitical artwork, exemplifying how aestheticization “becomes the means through which the discontents in contemporary civilization are to be answered—or stifled.” 58 Nothing can stop the cone from returning to the form of a cone just as nothing can prevent Anglo-Saxon civilization from advancing westward until arriving at the East, in effect, returning civilization to its birthplace. “The space of imperial sovereignty,” write Hardt and Negri, “is smooth.” 59 Like the cone of wheat that suffers neither break nor interruption, West flows into East without a trace of suture or conflict.

### Link – Economic Engagement (2/2)

#### Empirically, efforts to open up Chinese markets devolve into spectacular violence; this is the history the aff tries to cover up.

Erik Ringmar, Professor at the Center for Cultural and Social Studies at the National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan, August, 2006

“Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime: The European Destruction of the Emperor’s Summer Palace,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp 917-933, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/917.abstract> (accessed 5/12/16)

It was with these considerations very much in their minds that the Europeans returned to the Yuanmingyuan in 1860. Lord Elgin and his French counterpart, Count Montauban, were both gentlemen and members of polite society, and as such they knew exactly what was wrong with the Chinese state. Elgin was no monster; on the contrary, he was a liberal – a very reasonable man – and if anything a rather reluctant imperialist.51 He came to China not in order to destroy and dominate but in order to open the country to foreign, and mutually advantageous, trade. But it was as a liberal that he knew what was wrong with the Chinese state. It was incredible to him that the Chinese emperor had such a faulty conception of himself and the role his country played in the world. Moreover, the emperor had treated Britain and its subjects with contempt. The lesson Elgin wanted to teach concerned exactly this: to point out that behind the awe-inspiring symbols there was absolutely nothing; to demonstrate that the sublime was a mere illusion; to reveal the emperor as stark naked. Burning down the Yuanmingyuan made these points perfectly. Yet on the day everyone seemed to go crazy. There is probably no way of destroying a marvel while keeping a level head. The sublime, even if you do not believe in it, still has the power to enchant you, and ordinary soldiers were surely far more susceptible to enchantments than their commanding officers.52 Less inoculated by the commonsensical culture of polite society they were more prone to be struck by awe. At the precise moment of committing their crime the Europeans were taken over by the very forces they were seeking to destroy; they became furious in order not to be destroyed by the furies; only as barbarians could they effectively spread the blessings of civilisation. It was only once the work was done – once there was nothing left of the Yuanmingyuan but a smouldering heap – that things returned to normal and the Europeans gradually returned to themselves.53 The point was conclusively proven, the ghosts were effectively exorcised, yet the Europeans were at the same time surprised and shocked at their own actions. At the moment when the Yuanmingyuan was destroyed they had themselves come under the spell of the sublime.

### Link – Diplomatic Engagement (1/2)

#### Diplomatic engagement depends on sublime aesthetics that instate the superiority of the Western insider.

Iver B. Neumann, Associate Professor of Russian Studies at Oslo University and Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, August, 2006

“Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 865-888, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/865.abstract> (accessed 5/18/16)

I should like to conclude in a rather more speculative vein, however. My analysis was mainly synchronic, in the sense that it focused on how the understanding of the sublime in a specific period relates to that period’s diplomatic practice. However, I have also made the diachronic point that the understandings of the sublime under discussion here build on one another. Lyotard’s main re f e rence is Burke, and Burke’s main re f e rence is Longinus. Furthermore, Burke and the eighteenth century kept invoking Longinus as an authority, someone who could s e c u re a long, honourable and serious-minded history for the topic of the sublime.60 We could make a similar, if slightly different, argument where diplomacy is concerned. Different, because given Byzantine’s diplomacy current bad press, invoking it may prove diplomacy’s long history, but it would undermine diplomacy’s standing as an honourable and serious undertaking. Similar, because I would suggest that there is a sense in which the three ways in which diplomacy has been pronounced sublime by the three ages discussed here may be said to be cumulative. The intimidation that knocked out the visitor to the Byzantine emperor survives in the timorousness with which the uninitiated approach diplomats at work. These days, ambassadors abroad will often arrange dinner parties for people in their host country who have made their mark in some way, or who have a certain tie to the country that the ambassador re p resents. A number of these people will be outsiders both to diplomatic culture in general, and to the idea of a set dinner with all its paraphernalia in particular (chauff e u red cars in the driveway, footmen, diff e rent knives and forks, printed menus, port that is passed this way and not that, etc.). As an effect of this, they will be more receptive to the ambassador’s way of running things than they would have been otherwise. Another practice in which one may observe the same effect at work is how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will always list itself first when it co-arranges a meeting or co-sponsors an event, re g a rdless of the division of the workload. The fact that diplomats not only get away with this, but are hardly ever even called on it, means that the superiority of diplomats remains in the doxic realm. A precondition for this seems to be that diplomatic splendour results in a nimbus that has a knock-out effect on outsiders. The sublimity of the Byzantines may not be dead.

### Link – Diplomatic Engagement (2/2)

#### Specifically, representing diplomacy as a means of keeping global catastrophe at bay advances diplomats’ sublimity.

Iver B. Neumann, Associate Professor of Russian Studies at Oslo University and Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, August, 2006

“Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 865-888, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/865.abstract> (accessed 5/18/16)

S i m i l a r l y, the new precondition that made it possible for old diplomacy to appear sublime at a distance, namely the formation of a public sphere, is still with us in a matured and increasingly globalized form. People still follow and guess what was going on in diplomacy, and they are suitably relieved when terror was kept at bay. The mystique of diplomacy is still at work, particularly when diplomats seem to succeed in averting terrible situations, or keep them from spreading. This seems to be the reason why someone like Richard H o l b rook became a darling of the media. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, apprehension was often running high in a neighbouring state like Norway. I ran into a former fellow student one day in 1991, and she burst out that she felt so ‘relieved’ (l e t t e t) when the f o reign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, appeared on the nine o’clock news to announce that the Foreign Ministry had the situation in hand and that everything was all right. This is the sublimity of Burke, at work in contemporary diplomacy. We may conclude that, despite the increasing bureaucratisation of contemporary diplomacy, it retains certain sublime qualities. Here as elsewhere, however, diplomacy seems to be living off old fat rather than evolving new resources. I set out by quoting the Concise Oxford Dictionary’s definition of the sublime. I only quoted the first part, h o w e v e r. The second part goes as follows: ‘Sublíme […] (of indifference, impudence, etc.) like that of one too exalted to fear consequences’. Contemporary diplomacy’s resistance to innovation in an era of galloping change in global politics smacks of hubris. Even the Byzantine emperor had to work hard in order to maintain his sublimity. So should diplomats.

### Link – USFG Action

#### State action creates an affective community of commonality that surrenders the individual capacity to know or act.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, October 2006

“Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 475-506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645197> (accessed 5/2/16)

The process of changing standards of interrogation occurred soon after September 11, 2001. Cofer Black, in charge of counter- terrorism at the CIA, briefed the US House and Senate Intelligence Committees, "All you need to know is that there was a 'before 9/11' and there was an 'after 9/11.' After 9/11, the gloves came off."39 The succinctness of this is appropriate to the visceral nature of the power relations instantiated. There is a certain amount of posturing and an entry into the world of affect that Gerard Toal suggests characterizes the US response to September 11, 2001. 40 "American affect" for Toal is characterized by the identification of an affective community of commonality. As aestheticized landscapes, political spaces become susceptible to affect, to a conception of the value of a political space that is not to be contained by legal or political cal-culations but that is made to sit atop it, giving the space an inher-ent affective value: a conception of home, a space of stability, the basis from which tensions, anomaly, and conflict are read and solved.41 Politics of affect ostensibly center on the identification of a desirable community worthy of protection. However, affect con- tributes to a certain machismo: The gloves have come off, an evocative language of street fighting denoting a war not bound to rules but to the memory of a threat to an affective community of commonality. Such evocations limit what we need to know: We place ourselves in the hands of steely (male) guardians.

#### USFG action is desirable only insofar as it violently imposes unity on a differentiated apparatus of domination

Russ Castronovo, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2007, “Geo-aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Beautiful Democracy, p. 190

When aesthetic criteria determine the course of political action, violence often ensues. Yet violence can be reshaped into beautiful forms: the freedom that seemed so threatening in revolutionary France is channeled into art where it acquires order and predictability. “Aesthetics are meant to give a differentiated apparatus of domination the look of unified and resolute action,” Lutz Koepnick argues.26 But not only does art clean up the traces of domination; it also acts as domination. Coherence, unity, and beauty contribute to an artwork’s perfection, but these same qualities invite authoritarian control when translated to a political register. Schiller uses the analogy of a sculptor and a block of stone to suggest the dangers of conducting politics with an eye toward the overarching unity of form. To lend form to the “formless block,” the sculptor resorts to violence, splintering and chipping away at parts of the stone deemed incongruent with the ideal design housed in the artist’s brain. At a governmental level, this concern with form sacrifices the citizen to the overall work of the state. In order to achieve perfect functionality and unity, the state “must ruthlessly trample underfoot any such hostile individuality.” 27 The annihilation of particularity is the tradeoff for political unity.

### Link – Democracy Promotion

#### The affirmative abuses democracy as a spectacle to justify the imperial ideology of war-making.

François Debrix, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Florida International University, August, 2006

“The Sublime Spectatorship of War: The Erasure of the Event in America’s Politics of Terror and Aesthetics of Violence,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 767-791, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/767.abstract> (accessed 4/12/16)

International relations today and those who think them need to take advantage of opportunities presented here and there in the global p o l i t y, particular in the age of the global war on terro r, to actualise a certain sublime event. This, I believe, is the democratic task to come, a political intervention that cannot be forecast, and yet has to take place lest international relations becomes the undisputed conceptual and geopolitical terrain of an imperial ideology of war-making as humankind’s new humanity. The critical task to come is on the lookout for other, dominant, and allegedly sublime usages of democracy, for mobilisations of a democracy always already doomed because it has been surrendered from the beginning to a larger-than-life ideal. The critical sublime event today, as a political intervention, can be on the lookout for attempts at abusing the name of democracy in contemporary American military operations and in their visual, generally spectacular, re presentations on television, on film, or in news magazines. But the critical sublime also needs to keep an eye on far less obvious, but no less ideological and abusive, manifestations of a desire to put democracy to the service of today’s American imperial ideas, such as when photos of tortured Iraqi prisoners or of maimed Iraqi civilians are released to the public.

### Link – Representations of War (1/2)

#### Their representation of extreme violence is merely an aesthetic tool to advance dominant ideologies.

François Debrix, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Florida International University, August, 2006

“The Sublime Spectatorship of War: The Erasure of the Event in America’s Politics of Terror and Aesthetics of Violence,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 767-791, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/767.abstract> (accessed 4/12/16)

By steering spectatorship towards expectant stances and an evocation of ideational constructs, the sublime is, I believe, a controlled emotion provided by images or objects that, at first glance, shock or do not make sense. This is precisely why cultural studies scholars have turned to the notion of the sublime in their analyses of film, media events, photography, artistic objects, or everyday culture in general. For them, the sublime is understood as ‘moments of intense and surprising visual power’ provided for spectators, viewers, or consumers by means of technological media, artists claiming to be endowed with superior vision or a greater intellect, or social, economic, and political institutions in search of clarification or imposition of cultural meaning. What cultural studies scholars using the notion of the sublime intimate (not always directly though) is that the controlled emotion or experience of the sublime image is crucial to the establishment and propagation of certain ideas and ideological beliefs in society and culture. In this article, I argue that the guiding of apparently individualised emotions (of fear, terror, shock, or incomprehension) towards some ideas that supposedly can provide solace, understanding, and ultimately pleasure to the spectator by evoking unpresentable (but highly desirable) justifications or rationalisations is a powerful ideological operation that needs to be recognised. Indeed, it is often by means of the sublime image (of war and terror in particular) that dominant and violent political ideologies take hold of our contemporary global cultural and political landscape.

### Link – Representations of War (2/2)

#### You should refuse to take pleasure in the images of violence they present in order to re-energize American politics as the solution to global problems.

François Debrix, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Florida International University, August, 2006

“The Sublime Spectatorship of War: The Erasure of the Event in America’s Politics of Terror and Aesthetics of Violence,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 767-791, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/767.abstract> (accessed 4/12/16)

This article provides a reflection on the meaning and force of the sublime in contemporary American spectacles of war. The sublime has been commonly described as the pleasurable experience through visual representation of a situation that is otherwise normally painful, terrorising, or destabilising.4 The sublime is a way of capturing an idea of reality that is not readily apparent to us, and thus requires of us a mental or conceptual undertaking that can nonetheless be facilitated by certain visual strategies. The United States’ politics and aesthetics of violence after 9/11 are grounded in the conceptual and visual experience of the sublime. The experience of the sublime allows the American public to achieve an aesthetic apprehension of images of violence and terror (often in warfare) that are made pleasurable not so much because they evince an immediately evident beauty, but because they require of the public to reach for ideas, not available through dire c t re p resentation, with which it can make sense of and find satisfaction with what is going on in the world and what is apparently displayed in front of its eyes. This attraction to the sublime, I believe, is also indicative of a time when political crisis and cultural tension are more likely to re - e m e rge as a result of a shortage of available images of success and victory in the war on terro r, and particularly in the conflict in Iraq. The sublime fulfils a re - energising role in contemporary American politics and culture by pushing audiences to go beyond what otherwise would be visually evident (dead US soldiers, a growing civil war in Iraq, and so on) if it were not for the desire, induced by certain media, for an image that can transcend/mediate representation.

### Link – Representations of Terrorism

#### The aesthetic counter-terrorism is self-congratulatory American exceptionalism.

Roland Bleiker, Reader in Political Theory and International Relations at the University of Queensland, and Martin Leet, Senior Researcher at The Brisbane Institute, August 2006

“From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and Wonder in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.34, No.3, pp. 713-73, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/713.abstract> (accessed 5/7/16)

A second key feature of the sublime is a certain distance from the events in question, a distance that explains why one is not simply overwhelmed by pain and fear, but why there are also seemingly misplaced feelings of pleasure and delight. The latter, Burke points out, e m e rge when one feels relief, when one realises that the threat posed by the overwhelming source of terror is not immanent, that it is suspended or held at a distance. Burke points out that satisfaction emerges from contemplating our freedom from evils we see represented, stressing that this is why ‘terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too close’.20 Someone directly affected by a terrorist attack, for instance, may be either dead or so traumatised that she or he is under severe shock or paralysed by physical and mental pain. As soon as we experience fear we recognise, in a sense, that we have not been consumed by the event, that we are located at a certain distance from terror. Maurice Blanchot tries to understand this dynamic by stressing that disaster is both total destruction and salvation, in the sense that ‘disaster ruins everything, all while leaving everything intact’. A disaster is an ‘experience none can undergo’, for those who are sucked into it are no longer here to talk, and those who are spared by it are, by definition, outside it, or at least have survived.21 The realisation that terror has not overwhelmed us can give us a sense of relief, perhaps even the illusion that our power is equal to that which threatened to destroy our very being. We may thus feel exultation, for we are affirmed in our existence by having survived a direct confrontation with our vulnerability. If we can overcome a challenge as gargantuan as a terrorist attack, then we can overcome anything.22

### Link – Representations of Ecological Catastrophe

#### The sublime aesthetic of ecological destruction takes pleasure in imagining the world roasting.

Allan Stoekl is professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State, 2013

““After the Sublime,” after the Apocalypse Two Versions of Sustainability in Light of Climate Change,” diacritics Volume 41, Number 3, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/542886> (accessed 5/5/16)

Trembling before not only the prospect of the destruction of the world as we know it—the world in all its ecological finitude nevertheless more contingent than an artificially contrived economic model—but above all the fundamental incalculable nature of externalities, we can affirm only our own consciousness. We revel in the thought of apocalypse, of the fate of the earth both in our hands and somehow out of them. Ferguson hints that the real problem of apocalypse is claustrophobia: the subject wishes to free itself of the hell that is, as Sartre famously wrote, other people. In 1984 that hell was the oppressive threat of nuclear holocaust; today it is the pressure of seven billion consumers, ever multiplying, pumping and dumping, and always churning out more and more greenhouse gases. Freedom from climate change, one can easily imagine, from the perspective of the sublime is freedom from the massive pressure of so much consumption, by so many people. What’s left, after the sublime contemplation of the roasting of the earth, the dizzying play of unthinkable calculations and representations, is just me, alone in a garden of pristine earthly consumption-delight, fully, somehow, magically, sustainable. My radical negation of the earth in its fallenness is the affirmation of my freedom and the separation of the moral law from the vicissitudes and representation of nature (in its destruction).

### Link – Representations of Nuclear Holocaust

#### The sublime aesthetic of nuclear apocalypse seeks pleasure in absolute annihilation.

Allan Stoekl is professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State, 2013

““After the Sublime,” after the Apocalypse Two Versions of Sustainability in Light of Climate Change,” diacritics Volume 41, Number 3, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/542886> (accessed 5/5/16)

Is the recognition of the sublime in this case a defense strategy, a way of affirming ourselves before the horror of an incipient apocalypse—the roasting of the world caused by mindless overconsumption? Back in 1984 diacritics put out an issue devoted to “nuclear criticism.” The issue of the day was the threat of nuclear warfare, which had been revived in the first presidential term of Ronald Reagan. People were looking nuclear apocalypse in the face, so to speak—there were even TV shows devoted to its eventuality—and literary critics felt compelled to respond. Frances Ferguson, in her article “The Nuclear Sublime,” posits a sublime that, following Kant, is “found in the mind, for no sensible form can contain the sublime properly so-called.” We, observers, seek the sublime “merely in ourselves and in our attitude of thought, which introduces sublimity into the representation of nature.”7 This in turn enables Ferguson to state that this sublime allows the observer to “identify himself, to attach himself to a consciousness of his own individuality.”8 The sublime is not to be found in the object, but in the observing subject. Ferguson states: “The virtue of the sublime is that it cannot be exchanged, that each experience of sublimity is permanently bound not just to a subjective judgment but to its particular subjective judge.”9 Further, the sublime is linked to apocalypse—in this case nuclear holocaust—because “to think the sublime would be to think the unthinkable and to exist in one’s own nonexistence.”10 By affirming the transience of objects—indeed their obliteration—the subject affirms itself; the subject after all “gives things their force,” even in imagining its own annihilation.11 In other words the subject splits itself, affirming itself by contemplating the apocalypse of all things and all subjects, including that of the observer.

### Link – K Affs

#### Challenging colonialist-imperialist-capitalism as sadistic domination implicitly authorizes aestheticentrism.

Kojin Karatani, Japanese philosopher and literary critic, retired visiting professor of comparative literature at Columbia and Japanese literature at Yale, October 1998

“Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism,” Boundary 2, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp. 145-160, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/303618> (accessed 4/25/16)

Colonialism and imperialism are accused of being sadistic forms of invasion and domination. But the most typical subversion of colonialism is its aestheticentrist way of appreciating and respecting the other. I believe this is what Said meant by the term Orientalism. Orientalism could never be characterized as an attitude that neglects the other but as that which exists within the aesthetic exceptionalization of the other. Had expansionism not had the twisted admiration to savor, that is, had it been simply the will to rule and to know, we would not have accumulated such a colossal Orientalist corpus. Aestheticentrism refuses to acknowledge that the other who does not offer any stimulative surprise of a "stranger" lives a life "out there." Aestheticentrists always appear as anticolonialists. In the same way, they always appear as anti-industrial capitalists, although their aesthetic stance was produced by the advent of industrial capital. Furthermore, aestheticentrism is at the core of fascism: Appearing to be anticapitalist, it attempts to aesthetically sublimate the contradictions of the capitalist economy.

#### Even the affirmative’s challenge to dominant ideology attempts to impose beauty and order on the democratic event to come.

François Debrix, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Florida International University, August, 2006

“The Sublime Spectatorship of War: The Erasure of the Event in America’s Politics of Terror and Aesthetics of Violence,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 767-791, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/767.abstract> (accessed 4/12/16)

At a time when the practice and idea of international relations , particularly in the United States, are increasingly tempted to acquiesce to a US-dominated geopolitics and aesthetics of violence supposedly justified by the war on terror and the attacks of 9/11, the chances of success of such a diff e rent violence, one that may cause damage to a l ready announced or programmed ideas and ideologies can never be guaranteed. The power of this different sublime event is as unpredictable and unconditional as its happening remains. Unlike some other critical theorists who, faced with the advent of imperial war machines or global imperial ideologies today, incant the arrival of a new democratic spirit and movement in the shape of a so-called multitude and, in the process, position themselves as the prophets of a new collectivist religion,51 the proponents of a democracy to come have no hope for democracy as a project. In fact, it is precisely because democracy is currently presented as an inevitable project by contemporary ideologues of statecraft, empire, and warfare that critical thinkers and practitioners of the sublime event suggest that a democracy to come can only be actualised as a mode of questioning regarding what democracy means.

### Impact – Dystopic Space

#### Aestheticentrism constructs dystopic spaces where bodies are made worthy of violence just by existing within them.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, October 2006

“Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 475-506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645197> (accessed 5/2/16)

This topography of exploitation or geography of dystopia thus, I argue, has its roots in the considered distribution of a discourse of order perpetuated by colonial empire. The geography is discontinuous and fragmented; it accounts for seemingly divergent inci-dents of US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the maltreat-ment of irregular migrants in detention camps in Malaysia. While discontinuous and fragmented, this geography makes a link or con-nection through the rubric or motif of boundarying and dystopia, where bodies are operatively placed beyond the margins. The process of ordering, I have argued, is premised on the naming of those bod-ies that do not fit and their placement in spaces of exception where the normal law is suspended. Such disciplinary fixing of bodies is also an aesthetic represen- tation, creating at once a desirable landscape of normality and a dystopic outside populated by bare lives. There is thus an inter-action between sovereign power and the diffuse Foucaultian notion of power being relayed. The relation to bare lives is one of aesthetic engagement. By that I mean such engagements are not ordered through relations of law (or economy) but by a visceral relation to a body stripped bare and invested with aesthetic repre-sentations of threat or fear (among perhaps other forms of visceral representation). It is through this representation that bodies be-come legitimized as recipients of a relayed violence that imprints and makes known the structure of colonial power.

### Impact – Colonialism

#### Colonial power subjects both the colonizer and colonized to brutalization.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, October 2006

“Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 475-506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645197> (accessed 5/2/16)

For Michel Foucault (in Allen Feldman's reading), the body serves as "an exemplary site for the coming together of political forces and constitutes a formation of domination, a place where power is ordered and a topos where that ordering attains a certain visibility, a collective resonance and publicness."10 The colonized body is the base point at which colonial power as disciplinary mechanism and aesthetic spectacle becomes evident. The colonized body is subject to processes of humiliation, recreation, and exhibition - complex outcomes of power ultimately inadequately contained by the twin tropes of discipline and aes-thetic representation that I have chosen. The colonized body, at once subject to improvement and extermination, to civilizing mis-sions, and to brutalization, is perhaps the site were multiple aspects of the economy of colonial power become evident. On the other side, the body of the colonizer was similarly subject to processes of transformation: Those bodies were at once hypermasculine and physically fragile (in the intemperate colony) - at certain times and places highly militarized, at other times and places bureaucra-tized;11 sometimes they were frigid and chaste, at other times hyper- sexualized, and, indeed, also brutalized.12

### Impact – Assimilation

#### Colonialism empirically results in cultural genocide through assimilation.

Elva Orozco-Mendoza, doctoral student currently concentrating in political theory at UMass, 4/24/2008

“Borderlands Theory: Producing Border Epistemologies with Gloria¶ Anzaldúa,” Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, <https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05062008-175949/unrestricted/Final_thesis_corrected.pdf> (accessed 5/21/16)

Thus, the following step in colonization consisted of imposing assimilation into European settler cultures; that is how the Nahuatl and Maya languages were changed into Spanish, the Congolese, Kituba, or Lingala into French, or the Dahomeyan into English. This was also the reason why millions of people were forced to abandon their religion in order to be converted into Christianity. In sum, the culture, traditions, and religion of colonized people were used against them to justify oppression. For instance, the art and writing of the Maya civilization was destroyed under the justification that Maya texts were considered pagan. Similarly, the religious rites and human sacrifices of the Aztec culture were used as a justification for the destruction and subjugation of the Aztec people.

### Impact – War

#### The dual aestheticization of ordered empire and irrational other makes war inevitable.

Roland Bleiker, Reader in Political Theory and International Relations at the University of Queensland, and Martin Leet, Senior Researcher at The Brisbane Institute, August 2006

“From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and Wonder in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.34, No.3, pp. 713-73, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/713.abstract> (accessed 5/7/16)

Powerful emotions emerge from the mixture of pain and pleasure , d e s t ruction and aestheticisation that is part of a sublime event like war or terrorism. But most of these emotions remain misunderstood and u n e x p l o red. Instead, politicians frequently manipulate the feelings of fear and anger that are associated with the sublime. Look at some of the responses to 9/11, particularly in the United States. Wa s h i n g t o n ’ s f o reign policy became immediately centred around this major event. Couched in a rhetoric of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, the US response to 9/11 re - established the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of P resident George W. Bush, ‘you are either with us or against us’.12 B u t this very rhetoric of evil removed the phenomenon of terrorism into the realm of irrationality. Evil is a term of condemnation for things that can neither be fully comprehended nor addressed, except through militaristic forms of dissuasion and retaliation. This is why a variety of commentators believe that the rhetoric of evil is an ‘analytical cul-desac’ that prevents rather than encourages understanding.13 The presentation of ‘evil’ as irrational and incomprehensible provides an ideal opportunity to engage in political manipulations. In the absence of rational or even knowable phenomena, virtually all forms of legitimisation become defensible. The ensuing policy positions have thus become very difficult to challenge. This is the case even in the face of highly convincing conceptual or even empirical evidence, such as the fact the war in Iraq was presented as essential in fight against global terrorism, even though it was waged against a government that had no known links to the perpetrators of 9/11. Add to this that the war was directly legitimised by the immanent need of a pre-emptive attack designed to destroy dangerous weapons of mass destruction which, as it later turned out, never existed. But even in the absence of legitimacy the respective policy discourses could not be seriously challenged, for all critique was dismissed as unpatriotic subversion.14 No matter how authoritarian the Iraqi regime may have been, and no matter how much its removal may have been desirable, one can view the US legitimization of the war in the same terms that were used by Al Gore to characterise terrorism itself: ‘the ultimate misuse of fear for political ends’.15

### Alt. Solvency – Trivial Sublimity

#### The alternative trivializes the sublime by delinking images of violence from the transcendental ideas and concepts that underwrite the American war.

François Debrix, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Florida International University, August, 2006

“The Sublime Spectatorship of War: The Erasure of the Event in America’s Politics of Terror and Aesthetics of Violence,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 767-791, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/767.abstract> (accessed 4/12/16)

No violent image was attached to the Cindy Sheehan event.48 Yet, it was perhaps the bearer of another violence to come, one that encourages, against all hope, a different image, a different sublimity, and a different political and democratic eventness. By happening, as a surprise, this kind of event tried to make possible a (re)turn to the real, to everyday materiality, where individuals (US soldiers and Iraqis) die violent deaths as a result of the American war. Tréguer uses the term ‘trivial sublime’ to refer to this kind of anodyne, almost uneventful, yet symbolically and conceptually violent event.49 Claiming a presence in a reality without conceptual horizon or ideological depth, the ‘trivial sublime event’ manages to do violence to already programmed ideas and concepts by no longer providing a linkage to them, by opening onto nothing.50

### Alt. Solvency – Thinking Justice

#### Unbracketing enables a reorientation of the polity away from order and towards justice.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, October 2006

“Dystopic Geographies of Empire,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 475-506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645197> (accessed 5/2/16)

It is of fundamental importance that the aestheticization of the polity that is part and parcel of this colonial spacing process I have identified makes, by default, the polity's overarching goal to be order and its maintenance. Order, not justice. This arises from a remarkable sleight of hand. We have come to think of justice and order in closely related terms: in terms of the maintenance of a society and what it represents (that absent metaphysical framework to which Timothy Mitchell has pointed so effectively) . This is a stul-tifying aesthetics, where what is fundamentally being imposed is a way of orienting the future and restricting what it is to be human. Thinking justice, on the other hand, necessarily questions the imposition of stultifying orders and identifies those elements and groups it serves. It identifies the colonial present in ongoing processes of polity formation and maintenance in the contempo-rary world.

### Alt. Solvency – War/Structural Violence

#### Unbracketing is key to open up new forms of inquiry to solve global war and inequality.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

### Framework – Aesthetics key to IR Education

#### We control uniqueness—orthodox IR has failed to produce practical knowledge

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

Those who make the analysis of these political events their professional purview—the students of international relations (ir)—adhere to representational habits that have become equally objectified and problematic. Many of them are social scientists for whom knowledge about the ‘facts’ of the ‘real world’ emerges from the search for ‘valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures of inquiry’.3 But relatively little practical knowledge has emerged from these efforts, even after successive generations of social scientists have refined their models and methods. Our insights into the international have not grown substantially, nor have our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the modus operandi of world politics. Even proponents of scientific research lament that ‘students of international conflict are left wrestling with their data to eke out something they can label a finding’.4

#### Arguing about aesthetics in IR debates is key to expand our knowledge.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, July-September, 2002

“Theodor Adorno's aesthetic understanding: an ethical method for IR?” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 351, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645053> (accessed 5/15/16)

One of the central aims of the recent critical turn in IR theory has been to show that the pseudoscientific epistemology employed by the orthodox perspective on international relations renders invisible a myriad "subaltern" peoples. (1) The propensity of scholarly and political work in this area has been to deduce central characteristics of the international realm--agents and forces that then structure and limit further thinking on the subject. This deduction does not occur objectively. How one conceives of oneself and others will determine what one sees and, very importantly, what one does not see. This is a familiar argument, a familiar cry of poststructural, postcolonial, and feminist critiques of the epistemology of international relations as a scholarly discipline as they insist on the important constitutive role of culture, class, gender, history, and geography in our senses of ourselves. I am similarly interested here in the epistemology, the account of a proper scholarly understanding and the methods it enables, that has contributed to these blind spots, where the subalterns of international relations would fit. I want, first, to show that the claims of this epistemology are dependent on an ongoing exclusion of other ways of understanding; and, second, to introduce Theodor Adorno's account of the "aesthetic understanding" through which he attempts to address the ideological commitments behind exclusionary epistemologies and to suggest a revised account of knowledge. The compartmentalization, codification, and watering down of experience, Adorno suggests, depends on the suppression of those qualities of the human being that would resist pseudoscientific quantification. The expansion of the meaning of "knowledge" enabled by an aesthetic understanding involves highlighting the "sensuous," precisely those resistant qualities of the individual that remain after the violence of naming and categorizing. Aesthetic understanding makes note of the sensuous, the nonrational that is so often dismissed as merely irrational and that cannot be exhausted by rational codification. Orthodox forms of IR theory, this argument implies, should not presume to claim certain knowledge of structures and processes into which conceptions of ethics and politics must be made to fit, for the excess of the sensuous, that which cannot be rationally codified, always puts into doubt the secure conclusions that the theory of international relations works to affirm as a practice of exclusions.

### Framework – Aesthetics key to Portable Skills

#### Critical aesthetics teaches ethical decision-making in conditions of uncertainty.

Roland Bleiker, Reader in Political Theory and International Relations at the University of Queensland, and Martin Leet, Senior Researcher at The Brisbane Institute, August 2006

“From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and Wonder in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.34, No.3, pp. 713-73, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/713.abstract> (accessed 5/7/16)

The most typical objection to such an open-ended approach to ethics is, of course, the accusation that it inevitably leads into a re l a t i v i s t void from whence it becomes impossible to separate good and evil: that only a categorical approach to ethics can save us in a time of moral need. But our most difficult ethical decisions must usually be taken p recisely at a time when subliminal events have shaken the very foundations of our principles, at moments when the boundaries between good and evil need to be revisited and redrawn. Falling back into old intellectual habits, whether they are codified or not, will not give us any answers, at least not those we need to deal with the issues in an innovative, sensitive and fair way. Finding ethical solutions at such times of dearth requires a leap of faith into the unknown. Søre n K i e r k e g a a rd already knew that the results of such a leap can never be k n o w n , that the ensuing decisions are, by nature, terrible.6 3 No foundation can ever guarantee to save us from a fall. No pre - established principles can give us certainty that we are on the right path. Nothing, in short, can absolve us from the terrible burden of decision-making. But we are most likely to face the ensuing challenges successfully when equipped with an aesthetic and ethical sensibility that the conscious alone cannot provide. It is at such moments of need that the lessons learned from the sublime and the subliminal can become most useful – as long as we have discovered ways of embracing the sense of wonder and enchantment they engender.

### Framework – Aesthetic Education DA

#### Reject their education, it squelches human difference and forces identification with the model citizen who must direct all their unruly affect toward socially utile action.

Russ Castronovo, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2007, “Geo-aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Beautiful Democracy, p. 190

Schiller is not thinking of mass “communication” here. Aesthetic education instead targets the individual, engendering a subject who channels emotion into well-regulated expression. Law operates as an interior ethical program rather than an external disciplinary operation. This lesson is cultivated with the development of aesthetic consciousness as self-governance; art interpellates “the inward man” who “begins finally to take possession of himself” by approaching his own subjectivity with the coolness of the bourgeois merchant who appreciates his possessions, including his own self. Just as the sculptor liberates a pleasing shape from the amorphous, unwieldy block of stone, the citizen judiciously crafts ethical, socially utile behavior from an undifferentiated realm of affect: “The lawless leap of joy becomes a dance, the shapeless gesture a graceful and harmonious miming of speech; the confused noises of perception unfold themselves, begin to obey a rhythm and weld themselves into song.” 31 Where the sculptor manipulates an exterior object, the citizen molds an interior subject. Aesthetically trained citizens aspire to a generic identity that squelches difference by bracketing off particularistic human experiences and distinctive human accents. Caution sets the tone of the dance distilled from “lawless leap of joy” that once animated the subject; a melancholy note of restraint echoes through the lyrical form that once was “confused noises.” As Eagleton remarks, “Schiller’s ‘aesthetic’ is . . . Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’ in a different key.” 32 Consensus hinges on a formalist transcendence that represses the specific content of social antagonism as an impediment to the totalizing beauty of political freedom.

### AT: Perm: Do Both

#### You can’t just add aesthetics and stir, unbracketing presents a forced choice between critical/uncritical approaches.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

To broaden our knowledge of the international does, however, require more than simply adding a few additional layers of interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thought and action: a shift away from harmonious common sense imposed by a few dominant faculties towards a model of thought that enables productive flows across a variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter, from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbing thought towards approaches that add to our understanding and, indeed, force us to think.44

#### The synthetic logic of the perm resorts to an aesthetic of order and unity that is responsible for a great deal of immorality.

Roland Bleiker, Reader in Political Theory and International Relations at the University of Queensland, and Martin Leet, Senior Researcher at The Brisbane Institute, August 2006

“From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and Wonder in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.34, No.3, pp. 713-73, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/713.abstract> (accessed 5/7/16)

Promoting aesthetic engagements with politics is not to replace social scientific enquiries or to suggest that art offers a solution to all problems. The point, rather, is that the key political challenges of our time, from terrorism to poverty, are far too complex not to employ the full register of human intelligence and creativity to deal with them. Aesthetic engagements with the sublime are central to this endeavour. But to remain valid, such engagements must go beyond a mere process of aestheticising the political. Establishing societal models based on beauty and harmony has led to dangerous political experiments. We need to acknowledge, along with George Kateb, that the aesthetic is a dominant force in human life. But we need to do so while recognising the potentially problematic practice of searching for stability amidst chaos and contingency through a resort to beauty as the ultimate value. In his view, such ‘unaware and unrationalized aestheticism’ is responsible for a great deal of immorality.60 In attempts to transform the ambivalent experience of the sublime into something unambiguously ‘beautiful’, moral limits are often ignored. In contrast to aesthetic ‘cravings’, then, the challenge is to cultivate an appreciation of sublimity in the everyday, and to use the aesthetic not to mask our fears of the uncertain, but to recognise them and search for ways of living comfortably with the contingent dimensions of life

### AT: Perm: Do Plan then Alt

#### Unbracketing comes first—the permutation reproduces aestheticentrism but the alt alone recognizes the aesthetic value of the affirmative while being aware of its discriminatory stance

Kojin Karatani, Japanese philosopher and literary critic, retired visiting professor of comparative literature at Columbia and Japanese literature at Yale, October 1998

“Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism,” Boundary 2, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp. 145-160, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/303618> (accessed 4/25/16)

Duchamp's example leads us to another aspect of bracketing and unbracketing. The African American novelist James Baldwin did not feel like reading Shakespeare's Othello because of its discriminatory stance toward blacks. However, while living in Paris, where English is not generally understood, he became aware of himself as a black writer, and as one who writes in English, which finally enabled him to accept Shakespeare.8 In this case, it might be said that by bracketing the discrimination of blacks in Othello, Baldwin came to see Shakespeare's tragedy as art. But the real problematic originates less in Baldwin's stance than in that of white, English-speaking audiences, who see Othello merely as art. It is not that they attempt to bracket the discrimination that enraged Baldwin but that they omit this from the beginning. They would maintain that those who degrade Shakespeare for such a minor flaw do not understand art. Ultimately, this is the same position that allows the belief that works exhibited in museums and galleries are art. My point is that they should unbracket the race issue in Shakespeare, at least once.

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### AT: Diplomacy is Boring

#### Whether the practice of diplomacy is itself sublime is irrelevant—the task at which it is directed is the mediation of the globe, and that evokes the sublime.

Iver B. Neumann, Associate Professor of Russian Studies at Oslo University and Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, August, 2006

“Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 865-888, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/865.abstract> (accessed 5/18/16)

There is evidence from other services which suggests that this finding is valid not only for Norwegian diplomacy, but for contemporary diplomacy as such. A study of the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff concluded that If the conditions of parochialism, rigidity, and territoriality are indeed rooted in the basic structure of large bureaucracies, it may be doubtful whether administrative remodelling could ever do much more than modify outward appearances. The conditions themselves may persist in basic form, and persist in thwarting coherent efforts to plan.5 6 A study of German foreign policy planning concluded more specifically that ‘Planning which focuses on uncommon and perhaps unpopular ideas … is conspicuous by its absence.’57 A n e c d o t a l l y, I have had Australian, Russian and Swedish diplomat interlocutors who have o ff e red parallel experiences from their own respective services once I have told them about mine. However, all this concerns the diplomat at work in his or her home country. Perhaps we may still call unexpected improvisations by the field-working diplomat that succeed in creating a fait accompli sublime. But these are rare, and hardly characteristic of contemporary diplomacy. Must we conclude, then, that whereas Byzantine diplomacy and old diplomacy were sublime by the lights of their day, contemporary diplomacy is not? I do not think so. There remains a weak sense in which Lyotard’s analysis may lead us to conclude that diplomacy is sublime. The globe is in constant need of mediation. The demand for the good offices of diplomats never stops, and it is infinite. There is always more diplomatic energy to spend. If diplomatic practice cannot be said to be sublime, the task at which it is directed can.

### AT: Engagement Is Peaceful

#### Engagement only appears peaceful because they have bracketed off the international tension that underlies the harmony of empire.

Russ Castronovo, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2007, “Geo-aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris,” Beautiful Democracy, p. 185

Early twentieth-century histories of Manifest Destiny shoulder much of the burden in allowing aesthetic formalism to go global. As William Griffi s asserted in The Romance of Conquest: The Story of American Expansion through Arms and Diplomacy (1899), “The United States of America have become, in the full sense of the word, a World Power, and in a double sense, ‘the great Pacific Power.’” Aesthetics run deeper than formatting historiography in the fictive mode of “romance” and “story,” however. What makes U.S. incursions in the Pacific so peaceful is an overall harmony of empire that resolves contradiction by treating differences as isolated, particularistic content that achieves greater unity at the structural remove of form. International tension, even hemispheric conflict, seems mere content that can be bracketed off in the realization of a larger isomorphism of form: “The Far East has become the Near West.” 10 This formula of complete and total identity had been expressed a generation earlier in Hunt’s Merchant Magazine of 1845 as a purely geometric precept: “For the last three centuries, the civilized world has been rolling westward; and Americans of the present age will complete the circle.” 11 As ideal form, the circle provides a figure for the imagination both to comprehend the world as a globe and to manage international commerce as globalization.

### AT: Aesthetics Don’t Matter Anymore

#### The transgressive seduction of the sublime has only increased in the last 150 years.

Erik Ringmar, Professor at the Center for Cultural and Social Studies at the National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan, August, 2006

“Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime: The European Destruction of the Emperor’s Summer Palace,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp 917-933, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/34/3/917.abstract> (accessed 5/12/16)

During the 150 years since the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan, the victory of the commonsensical has become next to complete. We are today living in a world where the pragmatic, the scientific and the economically efficient have come to dominate our lives completely. All superstitions and all naked emperors have been exposed; the ‘awe-full’ is considered truly awful and commonsensical arguments trump all others. Reason has won the day. Everyone everywhere is a European liberal or at least a European liberal in the making. Yet the yearning for transgression has not gone away. Beyond the brightly lit and the clearly elucidated there are still fleeting shadows in sylvan groves and small vessels on stormy seas. We know this is the case because we see it in our dreams and in our nightmares. In fact, the more sense we make of the world, the more the sublime will come to attract us. In an era when everything is rational and tangibly real, we need the sublime more than ever in order to rescue us from our reason and our reality. This is why the cultures of contemporary societies are filled with portrayals of transgressive acts – in computer games, films, music, drug culture, religious prophecies and internet porn. Although officially we may be loath to admit it, vicarious experiences of this kind are what we spend most of our time and our money on. Never properly admitting this tension in our lives, we are still hypocrites. Overt imperialism is of course a thing of the past. Europeans no longer directly control other parts of the world. Today we are firm believers in democracy, self-determination and free trade. Today Europeans – and their North American counterparts – use development experts and consultants to advise countries in what used to be known as the ‘Third World’, and they use international agreements on trade, finance and intellectual property in order to impose reason, order and accountability. They speak to poor and underdeveloped countries with authority and knowledge, sure of themselves and their own superiority. The poor and underdeveloped may initially resist such impositions but eventually they will always give in. Yet the desire for transgression remains as powerful as ever, The countries which once used to be European colonies are still our Oriental others, the ‘exotic’ locations which we visit on vacation or where Hollywood blockbusters are set. They are also the places where acts of liberal barbarism continue to be performed. Going off to a war in a foreign land is today one of the few ways in which an average Euro p e a n or American kid legally can get their transgressive kicks. As soldiers they are expected to kill and as prison guards they are expected to treat their captives harshly.5 4 All their training is geared towards overcoming their natural aversion to killing and their prior socialisation and h u m a n i t y. Here the boys finally get to transgress for real and they can become their own action heroes. And their leaders – like once Lord Elgin and General Montauban – can spread their liberal values thro u g h acts of barbarism.

### AT: Realism Good/True

#### If we win a link this argument goes away—realism is an imposed superstructure that creates meaning, not an objective description of IR.

Prem Kumar Rajaram, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Central European University, July-September, 2002

“Theodor Adorno's aesthetic understanding: an ethical method for IR?” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 351, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645053> (accessed 5/15/16)

To summarize Adorno's account of Enlightenment understanding, we may note that it is primarily concerned with the identification of a functional or instrumental meaning of material things. The extraction of the meaning of these things is influenced by a superstructure into which these things are contrived to fit. If Adorno is correct and this sort of thinking continues to beset contemporary thought, then the structuralism of neorealism and the pessimistic angst of traditional realism can be understood in these terms. As recent critical theories of international relations have shown, a characteristic of these realisms has been obfuscation of the role of "subaltern" groups in international relations in favor of isolating factors and agents of overriding importance in the conduct of international relations.

#### Realism and liberalism themselves presuppose a Western intellectualist aesthetic.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

Before examining attempts to challenge mimetic representation it is necessary to draw attention to some of the blurred boundaries between the aesthetic and the mimetic. First, one must note that existing social scientific approaches to ir already have an aesthetic. Notwithstanding their mimetic objectives, dominant Realist and Liberal views of the international rely on a particular set of representations. The exact nature of this aesthetic is debatable, and its form varies from author to author, but it undoubtedly contains elements of the Western intellectual heritage, particularly the Enlightenment and Romanticism. What has been retained from the romantic ideal is the autonomy of the Self, the quest for independence and selfdetermination, the belief that people can shape history.30 In the world of ir scholarship this translates into a masculine preoccupation with big and heroic events: wars, revolutions, diplomatic summits and other state actions that are imbued with international significance. This very selective romantic aesthetic is supplemented with the scientific heritage of the Enlightenment, with the desire to systematise, to search for rational foundations and certainty in a world of turmoil and constant flux. Ensuing attempts to ‘extract the eternal out of the transient’ are manifest in the strong social scientific dominance of ir scholarship.31

### AT: Reps Don’t Shape Reality

#### It’s impossible to separate international political reality from its representation.

Roland Bleiker, Co-Director of the University of Queensland’s Rotary Centre for International Studies a Humboldt Fellow at the Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001

“The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 509-533, <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/30/3/509.extract> (accessed 5/4/16)

Mimetic approaches do not pay enough attention to the relationship between the represented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation.11 They are theories against representation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into being only through the process of representation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen. Our effort to make sense of this event can, thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation ‘always raises the question of what set of true statements we might prefer to other sets of true statements’.12 It is a process through which we organise our understanding of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis—a perfect resemblance between signifier and signified—was possible, it could offer us little political insight. It would merely replicate what is, and thus be as useless as ‘as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to our question of how to interpret that text’.

### AT: Alt. Doesn’t Spill Over

#### That assumes a deeply flawed model of efficient causality, transforming spaces where imperialist representation resonates is only way to create change.

Luiza Bialasiewicz et al, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London; David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alison J. Williams, International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University; Alex Jeffrey, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, May 2007

“Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” Political Geography, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 405-422, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096262980600151X> (accessed 4/9/16)

Methodologically this approach requires an alternative model of explanation, one best explicated by the argument of William Connolly (2005: 869) that classical models of explanation based on “efficient causality” – whereby “you first separate factors and then show how one is the basic cause, or they cause each other, or how they together reflect a more basic cause” – need to give way to the idea of “emergent causality”. In this conception, politics is understood as a resonant process in which diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving complex – causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation ( Connolly, 2005: 870. See also Connolly, 2004). In this context, it is important to understand what an individually named subject signifies, and how we can understand the place of agency within performativity once pre-given subjectivity is contested. In his account of the contemporary American political condition, William Connolly argues that, in contradistinction to any idea of a conspiratorial cabal exercising command, the US is run by a “theo-econopolitical [resonance] machine” in which the Republican party, evangelical Christians, elements of the electronic media and “cowboy capitalists” come together in emergent and resonant, rather than efficient, relationships (Connolly, 2005: 878). This means the major public figures – like the President and prominent media commentators – need to be understood in particular ways. As Connolly (2005: 877) argues: It is pertinent to see how figures such as Bush and O'Reilly dramatize the resonance machine. But while doing so, it is critical to remember that they would merely be oddball characters unless they triggered, expressed and amplified a resonance machine larger than them. They are catalyzing agents and shimmering points in the machine; their departure will weaken it only if it does not spawn new persona to replace them.