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# Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

# SEPTEMBER EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

**CHINA 2016-2017**

**WEST COAST SEPTEMBER**

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China.**

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

[Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China. 2](#_Toc459042066)

[SEPTEMBER EVIDENCE FILE INTRO 3](#_Toc459042067)

[TABLE OF CONTENTS 4](#_Toc459042068)

[AFFIRMATIVE ORIENTED ARGS 21](#_Toc459042069)

[Impact China Climate Change Problem 22](#_Toc459042070)

[China Key to Warming 23](#_Toc459042071)

[No China Warming Reduction 25](#_Toc459042072)

[No Renewables 30](#_Toc459042073)

[Not Too Late 33](#_Toc459042074)

[Warming I/L Disease 34](#_Toc459042075)

[Impact China Economy Failing 35](#_Toc459042076)

[Chinese Economy Headed for Crash 36](#_Toc459042077)

[No Government Solutions to Chinese Economy 37](#_Toc459042078)

[Debt Kills Chinese Economy 38](#_Toc459042079)

[Investment and Housing Won’t Solve Chinese Economy 39](#_Toc459042080)

[Chinese Economic Collapse Bad 40](#_Toc459042081)

[Chinese Downturn Spreads Globally 41](#_Toc459042082)

[Chinese Downturn Spreads Globally 42](#_Toc459042083)

[Chinese Economic Downturn Threatens U.S. Economy 43](#_Toc459042084)

[Chinese Economic Downturn Spurs Hardliners and Risks International Conflict 44](#_Toc459042085)

[Impact Human Rights Credibility Good 45](#_Toc459042086)

[Human rights are worth protecting (general impacts) 46](#_Toc459042087)

[The U.S. has a moral obligation 48](#_Toc459042088)

[Terrorism Scenario 49](#_Toc459042089)

[Terrorism Extension 51](#_Toc459042090)

[Human rights credibility is key to global leaderhsip 52](#_Toc459042091)

[Human rights credibility is key to survival 53](#_Toc459042092)

[Human rights credibility is key to democracy 55](#_Toc459042093)

[The U.S. is a strong human rights leader 56](#_Toc459042094)

[Engagement with China is key 57](#_Toc459042095)

[Engagement with China is key 59](#_Toc459042096)

[Pressure on human rights is counterproductive 60](#_Toc459042097)

[Impact US-China War Likely and Bad 61](#_Toc459042098)

[Yes US-China War – 1AC/1NC 62](#_Toc459042099)

[Yes US-China War – Goes Nuclear – General 63](#_Toc459042100)

[Yes US-China War – Goes Nuclear – General 64](#_Toc459042101)

[Yes US-China War – Impact Magnifier 65](#_Toc459042102)

[Yes US-China War – ECS MPX 66](#_Toc459042103)

[Yes US-China War – SCS/Spratlys MPX 67](#_Toc459042104)

[Yes US-China War – Taiwan MPX 68](#_Toc459042105)

[Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates 69](#_Toc459042106)

[Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates 70](#_Toc459042107)

[Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates 71](#_Toc459042108)

[Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Yes US Draw In + Econ MPX 72](#_Toc459042109)

[Yes US-China War – Taiwan – Escalates 73](#_Toc459042110)

[Yes US-China War – Cyber Module 74](#_Toc459042111)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Chinese NFU Policy 75](#_Toc459042112)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Chinese Statements 76](#_Toc459042113)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Confucian Pacifism 77](#_Toc459042114)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Hotlines 78](#_Toc459042115)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Interdependence 79](#_Toc459042116)

[Yes US-China War – AT: Interdependence – AT: Trade 80](#_Toc459042117)

[Aff CFIUS 81](#_Toc459042118)

[Top-Level 82](#_Toc459042119)

[UQ: CFIUS Hurting China FDI 83](#_Toc459042120)

[UQ: CFIUS Hurting China FDI – Perception 85](#_Toc459042121)

[Solvency: CFIUS Key – BIT 86](#_Toc459042122)

[Solvency: CFIUS Key – Investment 88](#_Toc459042123)

[Solvency: Say Yes – FDI – Both 89](#_Toc459042124)

[Solvency: Say Yes – BIT – China 90](#_Toc459042125)

[Advantage-Specific 91](#_Toc459042126)

[Economy IL: Chinese FDI Key 92](#_Toc459042127)

[Economy IL: BIT Key 93](#_Toc459042128)

[Energy Sector IL: CFIUS Key 94](#_Toc459042129)

[Free Trade IL: CFIUS Key 96](#_Toc459042130)

[Leadership IL: CFIUS Key 97](#_Toc459042131)

[Relations IL: Chinese FDI Key 98](#_Toc459042132)

[Relations IL: BIT Key 99](#_Toc459042133)

[Trade War IL: Chinese FDI Key 100](#_Toc459042134)

[Aff Climate Coop 101](#_Toc459042135)

[Top-Level 102](#_Toc459042136)

[UQ: Paris Insufficient 103](#_Toc459042137)

[Solvency: Now Key 104](#_Toc459042138)

[Solvency: Say Yes – China 105](#_Toc459042139)

[Advantage-Specific 106](#_Toc459042140)

[CCP Collapse IL: Climate Action Key 107](#_Toc459042141)

[Econ/Competitiveness IL: Climate Coop Key 108](#_Toc459042142)

[Hegemony IL: Climate Action Key 110](#_Toc459042143)

[Poverty IL: Clean Energy Key 111](#_Toc459042144)

[Relations IL: Climate Coop Key 112](#_Toc459042145)

[Warming IL: Coop Key 115](#_Toc459042146)

[Warming IL: Coop Key – Paris 117](#_Toc459042147)

[Aff Space Exploration Coop 118](#_Toc459042148)

[Space Weaponization Advantage 119](#_Toc459042149)

[Solvency – Space Weaponization 120](#_Toc459042150)

[Solvency – Peaceful 121](#_Toc459042151)

[Space War Bad – Economy 122](#_Toc459042152)

[Relations Advantage 124](#_Toc459042153)

[Uniqueness – Relations Low Now 125](#_Toc459042154)

[Solvency – Space is Key 126](#_Toc459042155)

[Solvency – Economic Growth 127](#_Toc459042156)

[Solvency – International Benefits 128](#_Toc459042157)

[Solvency 129](#_Toc459042158)

[China Wants Plan 130](#_Toc459042159)

[China Wants Plan 131](#_Toc459042160)

[China Says Yes – Exploration 132](#_Toc459042161)

[China Space Tech Growing – Wants Cooperation 133](#_Toc459042162)

[China Space Tech Growing – US Involvement Key 134](#_Toc459042163)

[US Wants Plan – Transparency 135](#_Toc459042164)

[Cooperation Solves – Feasible 136](#_Toc459042165)

[Space Collaboration Solves – Dialogue Effective 137](#_Toc459042166)

[Solvency – Cooperation Key to US Space National Interest 138](#_Toc459042167)

[Solvency – Empirical Evidence 139](#_Toc459042168)

[Solvency – Leadership 140](#_Toc459042169)

[Solvency – A2 Unsafe 141](#_Toc459042170)

[Now is Key 142](#_Toc459042171)

[Aff Steel Agreement 143](#_Toc459042172)

[Solvency—Industry Innovation 144](#_Toc459042173)

[Solvency—Industry Innovation 145](#_Toc459042174)

[Solvency—Good Will 146](#_Toc459042175)

[Solvency—Economy 147](#_Toc459042176)

[Solvency—Relations 148](#_Toc459042177)

[Solvency—Economy 149](#_Toc459042178)

[Solvency—Economy 150](#_Toc459042179)

[Solvency—Economy—Manufacturing Sector 151](#_Toc459042180)

[Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices 152](#_Toc459042181)

[Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices 153](#_Toc459042182)

[Solvency—Economy—Protectionist Backlash 154](#_Toc459042183)

[Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices 155](#_Toc459042184)

[Solvency—Economy—Less Competitive 156](#_Toc459042185)

[Solvency—China Economy 158](#_Toc459042186)

[Steel Protectionism Bad 159](#_Toc459042187)

[A/T “Tariff Good for Economy” 160](#_Toc459042188)

[A/T “Tariffs Effective/ Necessary” 161](#_Toc459042189)

[A/T “Steel Tariffs Key” 162](#_Toc459042190)

[A/T “China Unfair Export Practice” 163](#_Toc459042191)

[Uniqueness—Steel Producers 164](#_Toc459042192)

[Aff Taiwan Grand Bargain 165](#_Toc459042193)

[Solvency—China Says “Yes” 166](#_Toc459042194)

[Solvency—China Says “Yes” 167](#_Toc459042195)

[Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions 168](#_Toc459042196)

[Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions 169](#_Toc459042197)

[Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions 170](#_Toc459042198)

[Solvency—Econ/ Chinese Sanctions 171](#_Toc459042199)

[Solvency—Starting Point 172](#_Toc459042200)

[Solvency—Chinese Aggression 173](#_Toc459042201)

[Solvency—US/ China War 174](#_Toc459042202)

[Solvency—US/ China War 175](#_Toc459042203)

[Solvency—US/ China War 176](#_Toc459042204)

[Solvency—Concessions 177](#_Toc459042205)

[Solvency—Concessions 178](#_Toc459042206)

[Solvency—Laundry List 179](#_Toc459042207)

[Solvency—Chinese Nationalism 180](#_Toc459042208)

[Solvency—US/ China Relations 181](#_Toc459042209)

[Solvency—US/ China Relations 182](#_Toc459042210)

[A/T “US Security Commitment Key” 183](#_Toc459042211)

[A/T “US Security Commitment Key” 184](#_Toc459042212)

[A/T “US Security Commitment Key” 185](#_Toc459042213)

[DA Answers China Politics 186](#_Toc459042214)

[Economic reform bad 187](#_Toc459042215)

[Economic reform impossible 189](#_Toc459042216)

[Xi leadership bad 192](#_Toc459042217)

[Rebuttal to Western cooperation link 199](#_Toc459042218)

[Rebuttal to Economic collapse 200](#_Toc459042219)

[Rebuttal to Party collapse impact 204](#_Toc459042220)

[DA Answers US Elections DA 206](#_Toc459042221)

[Uniqueness 207](#_Toc459042222)

[2AC UQ Overwhelms Link 208](#_Toc459042223)

[2AC Non Unique 209](#_Toc459042224)

[Non-Unique 210](#_Toc459042225)

[Non-Unique – AT: Clinton Polling Lead – Convention 211](#_Toc459042226)

[Non-Unique – AT: Clinton Polling Lead – Bradley Effect 212](#_Toc459042227)

[Links 213](#_Toc459042228)

[2AC No Link – Obama Shields 214](#_Toc459042229)

[No Link – Obama Shields 215](#_Toc459042230)

[2AC No Link – Business Lobby Shields 216](#_Toc459042231)

[Internals 217](#_Toc459042232)

[2AC Issues Not Key 218](#_Toc459042233)

[Issues Not Key – Econ OW 219](#_Toc459042234)

[Issues Not Key – AT: Single Events 220](#_Toc459042235)

[Issues Not Key – AT: Swing/Undecided Voters 221](#_Toc459042236)

[Impacts 222](#_Toc459042237)

[2AC – No Impact to Trump – General 223](#_Toc459042238)

[2AC – No Impact to Trump – Structural Barriers – Warming 224](#_Toc459042239)

[2AC AT: Warming – No Impact 225](#_Toc459042240)

[AT: Warming – No Impact 226](#_Toc459042241)

[AT: Warming – No Impact – AT: Climate Wars 227](#_Toc459042242)

[AT: Warming – No Warming 228](#_Toc459042243)

[AT: Warming – Too Late 229](#_Toc459042244)

[AT: Warming – Clinton Fails – Courts 230](#_Toc459042245)

[AT: Warming – Paris Deal Doesn’t Solve 231](#_Toc459042246)

[2AC AT: Econ – No Impact – No Wars 232](#_Toc459042247)

[AT: Econ – No Impact – Resilient 233](#_Toc459042248)

[AT: Trade – No Impact 234](#_Toc459042249)

[AT: Econ – Turn – Trump Boosts the Economy 235](#_Toc459042250)

[AT: Liberal Order – Resilient 236](#_Toc459042251)

[AT: DA Turns Case – Relations Adv 237](#_Toc459042252)

[CP Answers to Advantage CPs 238](#_Toc459042253)

[Answers to Military Spending CP 239](#_Toc459042254)

[Answers to Ocean Fertilization CP 243](#_Toc459042255)

[Answers to Sulfate Aerosols CP 246](#_Toc459042256)

[Answers to Currency Swap CP 250](#_Toc459042257)

[Answers to China A2/AD CP 253](#_Toc459042258)

[Answers to Lawfare CP 254](#_Toc459042259)

[Kritik Answers Realism K 255](#_Toc459042260)

[Plan Focus Good 256](#_Toc459042261)

[Plan Focus Good – 1AR 257](#_Toc459042262)

[Permutation—Both Theories Key 258](#_Toc459042263)

[Permutation—Engagement Compatible With Realism 259](#_Toc459042264)

[Mearsheimer Wrong—China 260](#_Toc459042265)

[Liberalism True—China 261](#_Toc459042266)

[Liberalism Good 262](#_Toc459042267)

[Realism Bad 263](#_Toc459042268)

[Engagement Solves Conflict 264](#_Toc459042269)

[Arms Control 265](#_Toc459042270)

[China Not Realist 266](#_Toc459042271)

[Realism Bad—Extinction 267](#_Toc459042272)

[Realism Bad—Norms 268](#_Toc459042273)

[Realism Bad—Exclusion 269](#_Toc459042274)

[Realism Bad—Epistemic Failure 270](#_Toc459042275)

[Epistemic Failure—1AR 271](#_Toc459042276)

[Realism Bad—Explanatory Power 272](#_Toc459042277)

[Explanatory Power—1AR 273](#_Toc459042278)

[Realism Bad—Cultural Evolution 274](#_Toc459042279)

[Cultural Evolution Solves Extinction 275](#_Toc459042280)

[Morality Is Human Nature 276](#_Toc459042281)

[Cultural Evolution Disproves Self-interest 277](#_Toc459042282)

[Cultural Evolution Denies Realism 278](#_Toc459042283)

[AT: Human Nature 279](#_Toc459042284)

[AT: Inevitable—Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 280](#_Toc459042285)

[AT: Inevitable—Not Objective 281](#_Toc459042286)

[AT: Inevitable—Humans Malleable 282](#_Toc459042287)

[AT: Mearsheimer—Theory Flawed 283](#_Toc459042288)

[AT: Mearsheimer—Bias 284](#_Toc459042289)

[AT: Mearsheimer—Bias 285](#_Toc459042290)

[AT: Mearsheimer—WoT 286](#_Toc459042291)

[AT: Waltz 287](#_Toc459042292)

[AT: Murray 288](#_Toc459042293)

[AT: Guzzini 289](#_Toc459042294)

[AT: Guzzini – Empirics 290](#_Toc459042295)

[NEGATIVE ORIENTED ARGS 291](#_Toc459042296)

[Impact China Climate Change Solving 292](#_Toc459042297)

[Yes Renewables 293](#_Toc459042298)

[Yes China Warming Reduction 296](#_Toc459042299)

[China Not Key 299](#_Toc459042300)

[Paris Summit Solves 301](#_Toc459042301)

[Too Late 303](#_Toc459042302)

[Impact China Economy Stable 305](#_Toc459042303)

[Chinese Economy Generally Strong 306](#_Toc459042304)

[Chinese Economy Generally Strong 307](#_Toc459042305)

[Savings Rates Prove Chinese Economy Strong Now 308](#_Toc459042306)

[Reforms Improving Economy Now 309](#_Toc459042307)

[Chinese Economic Collapse Not Bad 311](#_Toc459042308)

[Downturn Good: Southeast Asian Growth 312](#_Toc459042309)

[Downturn Good: Sino-U.S. Relations 313](#_Toc459042310)

[Downturn Good: Democratization 314](#_Toc459042311)

[Chinese Economic Downturn Not Bad--General 315](#_Toc459042312)

[Chinese Economic Downturn Not Bad--General 316](#_Toc459042313)

[Impact Human Rights Credibility Bad 317](#_Toc459042314)

[Human rights norms are Eurocentric 318](#_Toc459042315)

[U.S. is hypocritical on human rights 319](#_Toc459042316)

[U.S. is hypocritical on human rights 321](#_Toc459042317)

[Hypocrisy undermines credibility 323](#_Toc459042318)

[Reversing hypocrisy key to credibility 324](#_Toc459042319)

[Reversing hypocrisy key to credibility 326](#_Toc459042320)

[Engaging China fails 327](#_Toc459042321)

[Engaging China fails 329](#_Toc459042322)

[Engagement Bad – Credibility Turn 330](#_Toc459042323)

[A2: Terrorism Scenario (ISIS) 331](#_Toc459042324)

[Impact US-China War Not Likely and Not Bad 332](#_Toc459042325)

[No US-China War – 1NC/2AC 333](#_Toc459042326)

[No US-China War – General – Laundry List 334](#_Toc459042327)

[No US-China War – General – Laundry List 335](#_Toc459042328)

[No US-China War – General – Laundry List 336](#_Toc459042329)

[No US-China War – General – Deterrence 337](#_Toc459042330)

[No US-China War – General – Interdependence 338](#_Toc459042331)

[No US-China War – General – Interdependence 339](#_Toc459042332)

[No US-China War – General – Prodict 340](#_Toc459042333)

[No US-China War – ECS 341](#_Toc459042334)

[No US-China War – ECS 342](#_Toc459042335)

[No US-China War – SCS 343](#_Toc459042336)

[No US-China War – SCS 344](#_Toc459042337)

[No US-China War – Taiwan 345](#_Toc459042338)

[No US-China War – Taiwan 346](#_Toc459042339)

[No US-China War – Taiwan – AT: China Wins 347](#_Toc459042340)

[No US-China War – AT: Cyberattacks – China 348](#_Toc459042341)

[No US-China War – AT: Cyberattacks – General 349](#_Toc459042342)

[No US-China War – AT: Miscalc 350](#_Toc459042343)

[No US-China War – AT: Nuclear Escalation 351](#_Toc459042344)

[No US-China War – AT: Nuclear Escalation – AT: No China NFU 352](#_Toc459042345)

[Neg CFIUS 353](#_Toc459042346)

[Case 354](#_Toc459042347)

[Inherency – BIT Now 355](#_Toc459042348)

[Inherency – No CFIUS Concerns 356](#_Toc459042349)

[Protectionism Adv – Alt Cause 357](#_Toc459042350)

[Protectionism Adv – CFIUS Not Protectionist 358](#_Toc459042351)

[Protectionism Adv – Not High 359](#_Toc459042352)

[Relations Adv – Appeasement Doesn’t Solve 360](#_Toc459042353)

[Relations Adv – Talks Solve 361](#_Toc459042354)

[Relations Adv – Can’t Solve/Doesn’t Matter 362](#_Toc459042355)

[Solvency – CFIUS Good 363](#_Toc459042356)

[Solvency – BIT Impossible – Congress 364](#_Toc459042357)

[Solvency – A2: China Retaliatory Measures 365](#_Toc459042358)

[China Aggression DA Link 366](#_Toc459042359)

[Politics Links – Plan Unpopular 367](#_Toc459042360)

[Neg Climate Coop 368](#_Toc459042361)

[Case 369](#_Toc459042362)

[Inherency – Global Climate Action Now 370](#_Toc459042363)

[Inherency – US-China Climate Coop Now 371](#_Toc459042364)

[Inherency – A2: Paris Bad b/c Not Binding 372](#_Toc459042365)

[Warming Adv – China Climate Action Now 373](#_Toc459042366)

[Warming Adv – Alt Cause – Brexit 375](#_Toc459042367)

[Warming Adv – Alt Cause – China Enforcement 376](#_Toc459042368)

[Relations Adv – Squo Coop Solves 377](#_Toc459042369)

[Relations Adv – Climate Coop Doesn’t Solve 378](#_Toc459042370)

[Solvency – US/China Not Key 379](#_Toc459042371)

[Carbon Pricing – China Doing Now 380](#_Toc459042372)

[Green Tech – Squo Solves 381](#_Toc459042373)

[Green Tech – Alt Cause 382](#_Toc459042374)

[Green Tech – Doesn’t Solve Competitiveness 383](#_Toc459042375)

[Politics Links – General Climate Change – Plan Unpopular 384](#_Toc459042376)

[Politics Links – Carbon Pricing – Plan Unpopular 385](#_Toc459042377)

[Neg Space Cooperation 386](#_Toc459042378)

[Counterplans 387](#_Toc459042379)

[CP Solvency – U.S. space advancement 388](#_Toc459042380)

[Status Quo solves 389](#_Toc459042381)

[Cooperation now 390](#_Toc459042382)

[Cooperation Bad 391](#_Toc459042383)

[China won’t be an honest broker 392](#_Toc459042384)

[Cooperation leads to militarization 394](#_Toc459042385)

[Answers to “Space Race” 396](#_Toc459042386)

[China won’t engage in a space race 397](#_Toc459042387)

[Non-unique: Space race now 398](#_Toc459042388)

[Non-unique: Space race now 399](#_Toc459042389)

[Answers to militarization/weaponization 400](#_Toc459042390)

[Militarization/weaponization happening now 401](#_Toc459042391)

[Answers to ASATs 403](#_Toc459042392)

[Answers to ASATs 404](#_Toc459042393)

[Neg Taiwan “Grand Bargain” 405](#_Toc459042394)

[Grand bargain will fail - General 406](#_Toc459042395)

[Grand bargain will fail - General 408](#_Toc459042396)

[Grand bargain will fail – Not an honest broker 409](#_Toc459042397)

[Grand bargain will fail to resolve conflict 410](#_Toc459042398)

[Grand bargain makes war more likely 412](#_Toc459042399)

[Grand bargain undermines U.S. leadership 414](#_Toc459042400)

[Grand bargain undermines U.S. leadership 416](#_Toc459042401)

[Grand bargain collapses alliances / Japanese rearm 418](#_Toc459042402)

[Grand bargain collapses alliances / Japanese rearm 419](#_Toc459042403)

[\*\*\*Protectionism Disad\*\*\* 421](#_Toc459042404)

[Disad Overview 422](#_Toc459042405)

[1NC 423](#_Toc459042406)

[1NC Uniqueness 424](#_Toc459042407)

[1NC Link 425](#_Toc459042408)

[1NC Internal Link 426](#_Toc459042409)

[1NC Internal Link 427](#_Toc459042410)

[1NC Impact 428](#_Toc459042411)

[Uniqueness 429](#_Toc459042412)

[No Trade War Now 430](#_Toc459042413)

[No Trade War Now 431](#_Toc459042414)

[No Trade War Now—Brink 432](#_Toc459042415)

[No Trade War Now 433](#_Toc459042416)

[Protectionism Low Now (US) 434](#_Toc459042417)

[Protectionism Low Now (US) 435](#_Toc459042418)

[Protectionism Low Now (Global) 436](#_Toc459042419)

[Protectionism Low Now (Global) 437](#_Toc459042420)

[Protectionism Low Now (China) 438](#_Toc459042421)

[Protectionism Low Now (China) 439](#_Toc459042422)

[Links 440](#_Toc459042423)

[Link—US/ China Relations 441](#_Toc459042424)

[Link—US/ China Engagement 442](#_Toc459042425)

[Link Magnifier—Relations 443](#_Toc459042426)

[Link Magnifier—Economic Engagement 444](#_Toc459042427)

[Link Magnifier – American Labor Movement 445](#_Toc459042428)

[Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism 446](#_Toc459042429)

[Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism 447](#_Toc459042430)

[Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism 448](#_Toc459042431)

[Int. Link—Companies Fear Chinese Competition 449](#_Toc459042432)

[Int. Link—Companies Fear Chinese Competition 450](#_Toc459042433)

[Int. Link—Companies Influence Congress 451](#_Toc459042434)

[Int. Link—Companies Influence Congress 452](#_Toc459042435)

[Impacts 453](#_Toc459042436)

[Free Trade Good—Data 454](#_Toc459042437)

[Free Trade Good—Long Term Economics 455](#_Toc459042438)

[Trade War—Key to Global Stability / Poverty 456](#_Toc459042439)

[Trade War—Kills Jobs 457](#_Toc459042440)

[Trade War— Causes Shooting War 458](#_Toc459042441)

[Trade War— Causes Shooting War 459](#_Toc459042442)

[Free Trade Good—Key to Global Stability 460](#_Toc459042443)

[Free Trade Good—Key to Hegemony 461](#_Toc459042444)

[Protectionism Hurts Economy—Prices 462](#_Toc459042445)

[Protectionism Hurts Economy—Global Econ 463](#_Toc459042446)

[Protectionism Causes Retaliation 464](#_Toc459042447)

[Protectionism Causes Retaliation 465](#_Toc459042448)

[Impact Magnifier – Geopolitical Tensions 466](#_Toc459042449)

[Answers to 2AC Args 467](#_Toc459042450)

[A/T “Job Loss Worse Than Trade War for Econ” 468](#_Toc459042451)

[A/T “Manufacturing Not Key to Economy” 469](#_Toc459042452)

[A/T “China Won’t Retaliate” 470](#_Toc459042453)

[A/T “China Won’t Retaliate” 471](#_Toc459042454)

[A/T “Global Economy Resilient” 472](#_Toc459042455)

[A/T “Global Economy Resilient” 474](#_Toc459042456)

[A/T “Job Loss Worse Than Trade War for Econ” 475](#_Toc459042457)

[A/T Free Trade Kills Jobs 476](#_Toc459042458)

[A/T “Free Trade Bad” 477](#_Toc459042459)

[\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\* 478](#_Toc459042460)

[Non-Unique—Trade War Now 479](#_Toc459042461)

[Non-Unique – Trade War Now 480](#_Toc459042462)

[Non-Unique – Trade War Now 481](#_Toc459042463)

[Non-Unique – Trade War Now 482](#_Toc459042464)

[Non Unique—Protectionism Inevitable 483](#_Toc459042465)

[Non-Unique—Protectionism Inevitable 484](#_Toc459042466)

[Non-Unique – Protectionism Inevitable 485](#_Toc459042467)

[Non-Unique – Protectionism Inevitable 486](#_Toc459042468)

[Non-Unique – Trade War Inevitable 487](#_Toc459042469)

[No Link—No Influence 488](#_Toc459042470)

[No Link—Congress Won’t Act 489](#_Toc459042471)

[No Link—Companies Like the Plan 490](#_Toc459042472)

[No Link—No Spillover 491](#_Toc459042473)

[Link Inevitable – China Buying US Companies 492](#_Toc459042474)

[Internal Link Turn 493](#_Toc459042475)

[Internal Link Turn 494](#_Toc459042476)

[No Internal Link – Overcapacity 495](#_Toc459042477)

[No Internal Link – Diverse Customers 496](#_Toc459042478)

[Free Trade Bad – War 497](#_Toc459042479)

[Free Trade Bad—Economy 498](#_Toc459042480)

[Free Trade Bad—Economy 499](#_Toc459042481)

[Free Trade Bad – Workers 500](#_Toc459042482)

[Free Trade Bad— Trade Deficits 501](#_Toc459042483)

[Free Trade Bad – Democracy 502](#_Toc459042484)

[Free Trade Bad – Environment 503](#_Toc459042485)

[Free Trade Bad – Exploitation/Mistreatment 504](#_Toc459042486)

[Free Trade Bad – Exploitation/Mistreatment 505](#_Toc459042487)

[Free Trade Bad – Poverty 506](#_Toc459042488)

[A/T Increased Trade with China Good 507](#_Toc459042489)

[A/T Free Trade Opens Markets 508](#_Toc459042490)

[DA China Politics DA 509](#_Toc459042491)

[1NC 510](#_Toc459042492)

[Economic reform now 515](#_Toc459042493)

[Political capital is key 517](#_Toc459042494)

[Economy reform impacts 520](#_Toc459042495)

[Rebuttal to Economic slowdown stops reform 524](#_Toc459042496)

[Rebuttal to Xi is perceived as pro-western now 528](#_Toc459042497)

[Rebuttal to US cooperation is popular 531](#_Toc459042498)

[Rebuttal to Xi/CCP is weak 537](#_Toc459042499)

[Rebuttal to Politics will prevent privatization 539](#_Toc459042500)

[Rebuttal to Market reforms are slow 542](#_Toc459042501)

[Rebuttal to China is already privatized/economy resilient 543](#_Toc459042502)

[DA US Elections DA 544](#_Toc459042503)

[Shells 545](#_Toc459042504)

[1NC Shell 546](#_Toc459042505)

[Uniqueness 551](#_Toc459042506)

[1NC Uniqueness 552](#_Toc459042507)

[2NC Uniqueness Wall 553](#_Toc459042508)

[2NC – AT: UQ Overwhelms Link 554](#_Toc459042509)

[2NC – AT: UQ Overwhelms Link – AT: Voters Locked In 555](#_Toc459042510)

[Links 556](#_Toc459042511)

[1NC Link – General 557](#_Toc459042512)

[2NC Link Wall – General 558](#_Toc459042513)

[Link – Economic Engagement 560](#_Toc459042514)

[Link – North Korea 561](#_Toc459042515)

[Link – Taiwan / Grand Bargain 562](#_Toc459042516)

[Link – AT: Big Business Shields Clinton 563](#_Toc459042517)

[Link – AT: Obama Shields Clinton 565](#_Toc459042518)

[AT: Link Turns – General – Negative Voter Theory 566](#_Toc459042519)

[AT: Link Turns – General – Spin 567](#_Toc459042520)

[2NC – Link Turns the Aff – Relations Advs 568](#_Toc459042521)

[Internals 569](#_Toc459042522)

[1NC FoPo Key 570](#_Toc459042523)

[2NC FoPo Key 571](#_Toc459042524)

[2NC FoPo Key – China Key 573](#_Toc459042525)

[2NC FoPo Key – AT: Economy 575](#_Toc459042526)

[2NC Issues Key – General 576](#_Toc459042527)

[Issues Key – AT: Demographics 577](#_Toc459042528)

[Issues Key – AT: Economy 578](#_Toc459042529)

[Issues Key – AT: Ideology 579](#_Toc459042530)

[Impacts 580](#_Toc459042531)

[1NC MPX – Clinton Good – Warming 581](#_Toc459042532)

[2NC Clinton Good – Warming 583](#_Toc459042533)

[Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Structural Barriers Check Trump 586](#_Toc459042534)

[Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Courts Roll Back CPP 587](#_Toc459042535)

[Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Paris Deal Fails 588](#_Toc459042536)

[2NC Warming MPX 590](#_Toc459042537)

[2NC Warming MPX – Climate Wars 592](#_Toc459042538)

[2NC Warming MPX – K MPX – Structural Violence 593](#_Toc459042539)

[2NC Warming MPX – AT: Too Late 594](#_Toc459042540)

[2NC Warming MPX – AT: Warming Not Real / Anthropogenic 595](#_Toc459042541)

[2NC Clinton Good – Economy / Trade 596](#_Toc459042542)

[Clinton Good – Economy 599](#_Toc459042543)

[2NC MPX – Clinton Good – Liberal Order 600](#_Toc459042544)

[CP Advantages CPs 601](#_Toc459042545)

[Military Spending CP 602](#_Toc459042546)

[1NC 603](#_Toc459042547)

[2NC 605](#_Toc459042548)

[A2 Military is overfunded now 607](#_Toc459042549)

[Ocean Fertilization CP 610](#_Toc459042550)

[1NC 611](#_Toc459042551)

[2NC 613](#_Toc459042552)

[Sulfate Aerosols CP 616](#_Toc459042553)

[1NC 617](#_Toc459042554)

[2NC 619](#_Toc459042555)

[Geoengineering links to politics 620](#_Toc459042556)

[Geoengineering does not link to politics 621](#_Toc459042557)

[Currency Swap CP 623](#_Toc459042558)

[1NC 624](#_Toc459042559)

[2NC 626](#_Toc459042560)

[China A2/AD CP 628](#_Toc459042561)

[1NC 629](#_Toc459042562)

[2NC 630](#_Toc459042563)

[Lawfare CP 631](#_Toc459042564)

[1NC 632](#_Toc459042565)

[2NC 634](#_Toc459042566)

[Kritik Realism K 635](#_Toc459042567)

[Argument Summary 636](#_Toc459042568)

[1NC 639](#_Toc459042569)

[1NC 640](#_Toc459042570)

[1NC 641](#_Toc459042571)

[1NC 642](#_Toc459042572)

[Links 643](#_Toc459042573)

[Engagement 644](#_Toc459042574)

[Economic Engagement 645](#_Toc459042575)

[Diplomatic Engagement 646](#_Toc459042576)

[IR Theory 647](#_Toc459042577)

[AT: China Is Only Responding 648](#_Toc459042578)

[AT: China Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 649](#_Toc459042579)

[Hegemony 650](#_Toc459042580)

[Military 651](#_Toc459042581)

[Democracy 652](#_Toc459042582)

[Terrorism 653](#_Toc459042583)

[Cyberwar 654](#_Toc459042584)

[Isolating Iran 655](#_Toc459042585)

[AT: Mearsheimer is talking about Syria and Egypt 656](#_Toc459042586)

[Impact 657](#_Toc459042587)

[Impact – 2NC 658](#_Toc459042588)

[Democracy 659](#_Toc459042589)

[Turns Case – Military Interventionism 660](#_Toc459042590)

[AT: Great Power War 661](#_Toc459042591)

[Alt 662](#_Toc459042592)

[Thesis 663](#_Toc459042593)

[Thesis – Inevitable 664](#_Toc459042594)

[Thesis – China 665](#_Toc459042595)

[Offshore Balancing 666](#_Toc459042596)

[Offshore Balancing Solves Heg 667](#_Toc459042597)

[Framing 668](#_Toc459042598)

[Theory First – 2NC 669](#_Toc459042599)

[Conflict 670](#_Toc459042600)

[Policy Relevance Good 671](#_Toc459042601)

[Academic Theory > Think Tanks 672](#_Toc459042602)

[Scholarship Key To Politics – 2NC 673](#_Toc459042603)

[Scholarship Key To Politics – 2NR 674](#_Toc459042604)

[Uniqueness 675](#_Toc459042605)

[AT: Perm 676](#_Toc459042606)

[AT: Perm – Heg Link 677](#_Toc459042607)

[AT: Perm – Moralism Link 678](#_Toc459042608)

[AT: Heg Inev – Public 679](#_Toc459042609)

[AT: Alt 🡪 Isolationism 680](#_Toc459042610)

[AT: Risk Not Objective/Bad 681](#_Toc459042611)

[AT: Constructivism/Reps Matter 682](#_Toc459042612)

[AT: State Focus Bad 683](#_Toc459042613)

# AFFIRMATIVE ORIENTED ARGS

# Impact China Climate Change Problem

### China Key to Warming

#### Global warming can’t be stopped without Chinese cooperation

Emily Atkin Staff Writer 5-12-14 Stopping Climate Change ‘Almost Impossible’ If China Can’t Quit Coal, Report Says <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/05/12/3436673/coal-dependent-china/> (Accessed 5-13-16)

If China doesn’t begin to limit its coal consumption by 2030, it will be “almost impossible” for the world avoid a situation where global warming stays below 2°C, a new study released Monday found.¶ The study, led by the U.K.’s Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, recommends China put a cap on greenhouse gas emissions from coal by 2020, and then swiftly reduce its dependency on the fossil fuel. The reductions would not only increase public health and wellness and decrease climate change, but could also “have a major positive effect on the global dynamics of climate cooperation,” the report said.¶ “The actions China takes in the next decade will be critical for the future of China and the world,” the study said. “Whether China moves onto an innovative, sustainable and low-carbon growth path this decade will more or less determine both China’s longer-term economic prospects in a natural resource-constrained world, … and the world’s prospects of cutting greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to manage the grave risks of climate change.”

#### China warming policies shift international attitude towards cooperation

Robinson Meyer Associate Editor 9-25-15 China, the World's Biggest Polluter, Commits to Cap-and-Trade Carbon Emissions <http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/09/the-worlds-largest-cap-and-trade-program/407371/> (Accessed 5-15-16)

China’s program will benefit Chinese citizens first and foremost, who will have longer, healthier lives due to the reduction in smog; and to the degree that it slows anthropogenic climate change, it will benefit people all over the world. But it could potentially change some of the U.S. climate debate—or, at least, change the Republican talking-point response to any proposed climate policy.¶ At the GOP presidential debate earlier this month, many candidates did not so much reject mainstream climate science as say that America was powerless to do anything about it.

#### China’s lion share of emissions are necessary cut to be made to reduce 2 degrees Celsius

Barbara Finamore staff writer 1-27-16 Good News: China's Dropping Coal Consumption Is Putting the Brakes on Global Carbon Emissions <https://www.nrdc.org/experts/barbara-finamore/good-news-chinas-dropping-coal-consumption-putting-brakes-global-carbon> (Accessed 5-13-16)

New analysis finds that China holds the key to achieving the 2 degree Celsius global climate goal reaffirmed by 195 countries last month in Paris. According to research by Barclays Bank, China accounts for 33-40 percent of the carbon emissions gap between current trends and a 2 degree Celsius pathway. This is not surprising, since China was responsible for over one-quarter of the world's carbon emissions in 2014, more than the U.S. and the European Union combined.¶ The good news is that China is moving forward much faster than anyone expected to cut its coal use and CO2 emissions, with enormous implications for public health, the environment, and climate. These trends are expected to continue. In fact, China is now on a path to achieving its Paris climate commitments well before its 2030 target date.

#### China key to stop warming—international sway and tech innovations make them uniquely key

Guan Chao Editor 4-22-16 China Takes Lead in Fight against Climate Change <http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/04/22/4202s925197.htm> (Accessed 5-13-16)

"Going forward, China will continue to participate in and promote international efforts against climate change," he said.¶ "Meanwhile, China will work to bring about an early entry into force as well as a full implementation of the Paris Agreement and actively conduct south-south cooperation on climate change," he added.¶ The Paris climate deal needs 55 nations that together account for 55 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions to ratify the agreement before it enters into force.¶ More than 160 countries, including China, are expected to sign the pact on Friday, the first day when the landmark deal is open for government signatures.¶ As a major developing country, China considers the fight against climate change both an international responsibility and a domestic need, said Zhang.¶ China, he says, will continue to pursue innovative green growth, such as creating more low-carbon pilot cities, developing near zero carbon emission areas and launching a national emissions trading system, the vice premiere said.¶ The UN, Zhang said, plays an irreplaceable role in global affairs and China will further support UN's role in resolving international hot issues, addressing global challenges and pushing forward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.¶ China is ready to further strengthen its cooperation with the UN, he added.¶ For his part, Ban welcomes Zhang as Chinese President Xi Jinping's special envoy to attend the signature ceremony for the Paris Agreement.¶ Noting that China has played an important role in the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the UN chief said China has vigorously pushed for energy conservation and emissions reduction, as well as south-south cooperation, demonstrating great leadership in this regard.¶ The UN is ready to work closely with China to implement the climate deal, and also expects China to continue its staunch support regarding UN climate change efforts, Ban said.¶ At Ban's invitation, Zhang will attend the high-level signing ceremony to be held at UN headquarters in New York on Friday.

### No China Warming Reduction

#### China not complying with self-imposed emissions standards—policy is mere lipservice

Emily Atkin Staff Writer 5-12-14 Stopping Climate Change ‘Almost Impossible’ If China Can’t Quit Coal, Report Says <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/05/12/3436673/coal-dependent-china/> (Accessed 5-13-16)

But despite increasing calls for China to reduce its coal-burning — not only because of climate impacts but because of infamous, choking air pollution — it has been unclear whether the country has made enough effort to actually make a dent in its consumption. The country has taken steps to replace thousands of small-scale coal mines with large ones, and its largest cities have pledged to make drastic reductions in emissions.¶ However, a Chinese government report recently found that only a tiny fraction of Chinese cities fully complied with pollution standards in 2013, while approving the construction of more than 100 million tonnes of new coal production capacity in 2013, according to a Reuters report.¶ “Coal, in absolute terms, is growing in China,” Fergus Green, one of the authors of the study, told ThinkProgress. “But its share of electricity is declining as other sources of electricity take up additional shares of capacity. So we see absolute growth, but signs of serious moderation.”¶

#### China’s emissions rising now—legal inability to assess historic liability

Alyster Doyle Environmental Correspondent 4-13-15 China Poised To Top U.S. As Biggest Cause Of Modern Global Warming <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/13/china-global-warming_n_7053496.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

OSLO, April 13 (Reuters) - China is poised to overtake the United States as the main cause of man-made global warming since 1990, the benchmark year for U.N.-led action, in a historic shift that may raise pressure on Beijing to act.¶ China’s cumulative greenhouse gas emissions since 1990, when governments were becoming aware of climate change, will outstrip those of the United States in 2015 or 2016, according to separate estimates by experts in Norway and the United States.¶ The shift, reflecting China’s stellar economic growth, raises questions about historical blame for rising temperatures and more floods, desertification, heatwaves and sea level rise.¶ Almost 200 nations will meet in Paris in December to work out a global deal to fight climate actions beyond 2020.¶ “A few years ago China’s per capita emissions were low, its historical responsibility was low. That’s changing fast,” said Glen Peters of the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo (CICERO), who says China will overtake the United States this year.¶ Using slightly different data, the U.S.-based World Resources Institute think-tank estimated that China’s cumulative carbon dioxide emissions will total 151 billion tonnes for 1990-2016, overtaking the U.S. total of 147 billion next year.¶

#### China war on pollution overhyped—still expected to increase both energy imports and per capita emissions in the next 20 years

World Nuclear Association responsible for virtually all of world uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; all reactor vendors; major nuclear engineering, construction, and waste management companies; and most of the world's nuclear generation. Other members provide international services in nuclear transport, law, insurance, brokerage, industry analysis and finance. 4-16 World Nuclear Association Members <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx> (Accessed 5-13-16)

In November 2014 the Premier announced that China intended about 20% of its primary energy consumption to be from non-fossil fuels by 2030, at which time it intended its peak of CO2 emissions to occur. This 20% target was reiterated by the President at the Paris climate change conference in December 2015, along with reducing CO2 emissions by 60 to 65% from 2005 levels by 2030. This means that China’s energy growth has entered a ‘new normal’ phase including environmental protection, and to address this, vigorous development of nuclear power is required. By 2030 nuclear capacity will be 120 to 150 GWe, and nuclear will provide 8% to 10% of electricity. The February 2015 edition of the BP Energy Outlook 2035 projects that by 2035 China becomes the world’s largest energy importer, overtaking Europe, as import dependence rises from 15% to 23%. China’s energy production rises by 47% while consumption grows by 60%. China’s fossil fuel output continues to rise with increases in natural gas (+200%) and coal (+19%) more than offsetting declines in oil (-3%). China’s CO2 emissions increase by 37% and by 2035 will account for 30% of world total with per capita emissions surpassing the OECD by 2035.The distribution of energy resources relative to demand poses some challenges, notably for north-south coal transport and east-west power transmission.

#### China will refuse to eliminate fossil fuels to a sufficient level to solve global warming—economic advancement and stability always to policy precedent over anti-warming initiatives

Patricia Adams an economist and the executive director of Probe International, a Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement since its nascency in the mid-1980s 2015 The Truth About China <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-about-China.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China’s Communist Party faces intense domestic pressure to develop its economy in order to raise its standard of living. Under normal circumstances, China could accomplish this goal by increasing its use of fossil fuels. It also faces intense domestic pressure to eliminate air pollution, which in many cities has become a major public health threat. Ordinarily, it could accomplish this goal by burning those same fossil fuels efficiently and cleanly, as does the West. But China’s goals are complicated by intense international pressure to curb its use of fossil fuels in order to lower its carbon dioxide emissions. Curtailing its use of fossil fuels would slow economic growth and, contrary to popular belief, compromise China’s desire to reduce air pollution. The goals of economic growth and blue skies reinforce each other but conflict with the goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The economic advance of developed countries has been marked by increases in fossil-fuel use. The developed world – chiefly the United States and European countries – now insists that China adopt a different, unproven path to economic development by curtailing fossil-fuel use. Not only has no country since the Industrial Revolution ever become developed by eschewing fossil fuels, but even those developed countries that have set explicit carbon dioxide reduction targets for themselves have generally been unable to meet these while growing their economies. While the West’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions changed little in the decades preceding the great recession of 2007–2009,1 its per-capita emissions of NOx and SOx pollutants declined markedly (see Figure 1). The developed countries tackled their air-pollution problems without cutting fossil fuels. Using abatement technologies, the developed world found economic growth and improved air quality compatible objectives. But despite decades of effort, no technology has been found that decouples fossil-fuel use and carbon dioxide emissions on anything other than a small scale, at very high cost. The West is now asking China to accomplish something no Western economy has been able to do – to maintain high rates of economic growth while simultaneously cutting carbon dioxide emissions.

#### China coal consumption not on the decline—more reliable sources indicate slowed growth but continual growth

Patricia Adams an economist and the executive director of Probe International, a Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement since its nascency in the mid-1980s 2015 The Truth About China <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-about-China.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

In percentage terms, the State Council calls for coal to fall to 62% of all energy by 2020, oil to fall to 13%, and gas to rise to more than 10%. The balance would be taken up largely by renewables and nuclear, which combined would make up 15% of all energy by 2020 and, should the US–China announcement be realised, 20% by 2030.13 The dominant renewable energy technology would remain hydroelectric, accounting for over 7% of supply in 2020 and over 8% in 2030.14 Notwithstanding the proportional shift away from coal and oil, the stated plan indicates that coal will remain by far the dominant energy source for China in the decades ahead. And that assumes the plan encounters no practical roadblocks to implementation. Although China’s coal consumption and production last year declined (BP’s Statistical Review estimates growth at 0.1%, while the Chinese government claims it shrank by almost 3%),15 the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects China’s coal consumption to continue to grow beyond 2020, but more slowly than in the past, unless economic growth is much lower than assumed.16 ‘Economic growth in China needs more energy than nuclear, gas, oil and renewables can supply’, says the IEA, so China will be ‘the coal giant for many years in the future’.17 Zhang Yuzhuo, chairman of Shenhua Group, the country’s largest coal mining company, offered another reason for coal’s importance: China’s coal-dominated energy mix will not change for the next two decades because increased reliance on imported oil poses a threat to the country’s energy security.18

#### China won’t be able to meet climate change promises—necessary infrastructure infeasible to produce

Patricia Adams an economist and the executive director of Probe International, a Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement since its nascency in the mid-1980s 2015 The Truth About China <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-about-China.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China has made grand promises about ‘rebalancing’ its economy to be energy-lite, en route to reaching its stated goals of capping carbon dioxide emissions and meeting 20% of its energy needs with non-fossil fuels by 2030. Many not only believe that these goals are achievable, they believe that in China, a dictatorship ruled by fiat, the goals are more easily achievable than in a messy democracy that must pander to different interest groups. This belief is mistaken. China’s Communist Party dictatorship and top-down economy would be a hindrance rather than a help in meeting these goals, even assuming China ever expected to meet them. China’s stated goals are nothing but daunting. According to Scientific American: China will have to build as much wind, solar, nuclear and hydropower in the next 10 years as it has built coal-fired power plants in the last 10 years – as much as 1,000 gigawatts worth of alternatives to coal, also including natural gas, whether pipelined from Russia or fracked out of the country’s own shale deposits. And even if that dream is realized, an International Energy Agency analysis76 suggests such a build out, though possible, is not sufficient to slow rising coal consumption unless China’s economic or electricity use growth also slow significantly.77 According to the US-based Breakthrough Institute, a think tank focused on development and the environment, because its economy will continue to grow ‘a deep transformation of the present fossil energy economy is not on the horizon in China’.78 Breakthrough agrees with others that China’s target of meeting 20% of its energy needs from non-fossil sources merely represents a continuation of current trends and policies and ‘reflects the naturally slow pace of energy transitions’.79

#### China’s agreement in Paris talks non-binding—China won’t commit to curbing emissions

Bill Powell Journalist 12-11-15 AIRPOCALYPSE NOW: CHINA AND CLIMATE CHANGE <http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/11/airpocalypse-now-400422.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

As the Paris conference drew nearer, the U.S. publicly heaped praise on China for the targets it has set to reduce CO 2 emissions—reducing their growth and then moving to outright cuts around 2030. “This is the political breakthrough we've been waiting for,” cheered Timothy Wirth, a former U.S. undersecretary of state for global affairs and now vice chairman of the United Nations Foundation, when Xi first made his promise to Obama to limit emissions. In private, there is far more skepticism—and for good reason. In truth, the commitment Beijing made was far less dramatic than it seemed. The peak date for emissions was in line with forecasts already made by several state-backed think tanks: The China Academy of Social Sciences said in a 2014 study that slowing rates of urbanization would likely mean industrial CO 2 emissions would peak around 2025 to 2030 and start to fall by 2040.Furthermore, China has made it clear that it won’t be legally bound by whatever comes out of the Paris summit. “The time line China has committed to is not a binding target,” says Li Junfeng, an influential Chinese climate policy adviser linked to the NDRC. In mid-November, Kerry confirmed that the so-called COP21 agreement in Paris will not be a treaty and thus not legally binding on the signatories.¶ There are several reasons for that. For years now, ever since the West—the United States in particular—began to obsess about “climate change,” suspicions were rampant in China. At a climate conference I attended nearly a decade ago, one Chinese delegate took to the floor to rant about “outside forces” trying to keep China down by changing the global energy rules overnight: “You got to build your economies on cheap energy—coal and oil—but now that we’re growing fast, you’re not supposed to use coal and oil anymore.” This, he said, was “ladder-up economics.” Just as China began to rapidly climb up the ladder, economically speaking, the West was trying to yank it up.

#### Expert consensus—china cannot adopt renewables fast enough to offset emissions increases

Alan Neuhauser Staff Writer 5-11-16 Made in China: 60 Percent of Growth in Power Sector Emissions to Come From Asia <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-05-11/made-in-china-60-percent-of-growth-in-power-sector-co2-emissions-to-come-from-asia> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Despite high-profile efforts to slash their air pollution and slow global warming, China, India and other developing nations in Asia will account for nearly 60 percent of the growth in global carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector through 2040, the U.S. Energy Information Administration says.¶ Beset by booming populations, growing middle classes and little infrastructure like long gas pipelines, the countries are facing huge demand for electricity. And that makes coal plants – relatively cheap to build – a near-irresistible option for meeting that demand, despite the huge amount of pollution they generate.¶ Electricity generation is the world's largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for 25 percent of the global total in 2014, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.¶ Electricity generation is the world's largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for 25 percent of the global total in 2014, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Courtesy U.S. Energy Information Administration¶ India's energy-related CO2 emissions will rise 2.7 percent a year through 2040 from a base year of 2012, according to the International Energy Outlook released by the EIA on Wednesday. China, which set out to build dozens of low-emitting nuclear power plants to reduce haze and smog from coal, will see its emissions climb 1 percent a year.¶ Overall, emissions from developing nations will rise nearly 50 percent from 1990 to 2040, according to the scenario, compared with an increase of about 8 percent for members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, a global group made up of developed nations.

### No Renewables

#### China not exploring wind power as alternative energy

The Climate Group International Energy Consortium 4-2015 China’s fast-track to a Renewable Future <http://www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/RE100-China-analysis.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Currently, the majority of wind projects in China are large-scale utility developments, so this technology option is generally not being explored by the corporate sector. A national subsidy for distributed wind has been under development for several years, but has not yet been officially released. Without a defined price, distributed wind projects are not as economically attractive for corporations as solar options. But it should be noted that distributed wind is benefiting indirectly from a number of distributed PV support policies including free grid interconnection – although projects under 6 MW are exempt from applying for a generation license.1

#### China attempting to stimulate economic growth by increasing oil imports

Jenny Hsu Staff Writer 4-13-16 China crude imports rise 13% in March <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-crude-imports-rise-13-in-march-2016-04-13> (Accessed 5-13-16)

HONG KONG--China imported 32.61 million metric tons of crude oil in March, equivalent to 7.71 million barrels a day, preliminary data from the General Administration of Customs showed Wednesday. Imports of crude rose 13% on-year in March, in line with the market's expectation that despite China's slowing economic growth, the country's thirst for crude remains strong thanks to the government's aggressive efforts to stock up on strategic reserves and growing appetite from independently-operated refineries known as teapots. China's overall exports in dollar term in March increased 11.5% compared with a year earlier, after falling for eight straight months. Imports declined 7.6% from a year earlier, compared with a 13.8% drop in February. As part of its efforts to stimulate competition and improve the efficiency of the local energy sector, the Chinese government in July last year began to grant import licenses and quotas to teapot refineries, which in the past could only source crude from state-owned companies. So far, about a dozen of the more than 100 teapots have been allowed to purchase crude directly from foreign sources with a collective quota of about 1 million barrels a day, equivalent to 15% of China's total imports in 2015.

#### China demand for crude oil increasing—multiple reasons

Gordon Kristopher Staff Writer 4-18-16 China Crude Imports Hit Record: How Will It Affect Global Market? <http://marketrealist.com/2016/04/china-crude-imports-hit-record-will-affect-global-market/> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China is the second-largest crude oil consumer in the world after the US. It’s also one of the largest crude oil importers along with the US. China’s General Administration of Customs reported that China imported 7.3 MMbpd (million barrels per day) of crude oil in 1Q16, which is 6% more than 4Q15 and 13% more than 1Q15. However, crude oil imports fell by 4% in March 2016 compared to February 2016 to 7.7 MMbpd. The key drivers for China’s crude oil imports are as follows: The rise in demand from Chinese teapot refineries led to the rise in China’s crude oil imports in 2015. Demand is expected to rise in 2016 due to frozen retail fuel prices despite lower crude oil prices. Building strategic reserves in China also led to the rise in crude oil imports. China increased its strategic reserves by 100 MMbbls (million barrels) in 2015, which is expected to increase its strategic crude oil reserves by 60 MMbbls in 2016. China’s exports in March hit their highest level so far in 2016, which suggests a stabilizing economy. Multiyear low crude oil prices motivated refiners to import more crude oil.

#### China shift to nuclear power not feasible—insufficient supply

Patricia Adams an economist and the executive director of Probe International, a Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement since its nascency in the mid-1980s 2015 The Truth About China <http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/12/Truth-about-China.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

To displace some fossil-fuel-generated power, the State Council wants to more than triple nuclear power by 2020, from the current installed capacity of almost 18 GW to 58 GW.23 By 2030, says Zhou Dadi, vice-president of the China Energy Research Society, China could boost nuclear capacity to 200 GW, and by 2050 to 400–500 GW.24 To feed these reactors just until 2020, China will somehow need to secure about 16% 5 of global uranium supply. China’s domestic uranium production capacity would have to triple in size, and even then would only cover approximately 25% of the country’s needs.25

#### China lacks the grid capacity to integrate renewable energy

Coco Liu Staff Writer 3-28-16 Facing Grid Constraints, China Puts a Chill on New Wind Energy Projects <http://insideclimatenews.org/news/28032016/china-wind-energy-projects-suspends-clean-energy-climate-change> (Accessed 5-13-16)

HONG KONG—The Chinese government has halted the expansion of wind power in its northern provinces where a large number of turbines are churning out power that's being wasted. The move underscores the challenges facing China as it works to fulfill its clean energy ambitions. Chinese regulators said the windswept regions of Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang will suspend the approval of new wind projects in 2016, according to a March 17 statement published on the website of China's National Energy Administration. The six regions have installed nearly 71 gigawatts of turbines, more than the rest of China combined. It's at least the fourth time in five years that Beijing has ordered wind operators there to slow down growth. The decision highlights a growing concern among energy analysts that China's spectacular growth in renewable energy is bumping up against the reality of grid constraints and shrinking electricity demand. Solar panels and wind turbines were virtually nonexistent in China a decade ago, and now the country leads the world in installing both. Wind power installations, in particular, have exploded over the last five years as part of the country's ambitious push to combat climate change and bring down dangerous levels of air pollution from its massive coal consumption. Already the world's wind energy giant, China installed an additional 33 gigawatts of wind turbines in 2015, more than half of new installations worldwide, as developers rushed to build as many projects as possible to meet a year-end deadline for subsidies. But too much of that energy is being squandered. In 2015 alone, 33.9 billion kilowatt-hours of wind-powered electricity was wasted, government statistics show—equivalent to the electricity consumed by 3 million American households a year. That was about 15 percent of China's total wind power generation, up from 8 percent a year earlier.

#### China oil and gas demand rising faster than experts anticipated

CNBC 1-26-16 China oil demand to grow 4.3 percent in 2016: CNPC research <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/26/china-oil-demand-to-grow-43-percent-in-2016-cnpc-research.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China's oil demand will grow 4.3 percent this year to surpass 11 million barrels per day, compared to 4.8 percent growth last year, the country's top energy group forecast on Tuesday.¶ State-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) sees the country's oil demand rising to 566 million tonnes, or 11.32 million bpd in 2016, some 460,000 bpd higher than last year.¶ The forecast, in an annual report released by CNPC's research institute, also put the country's net crude imports up 7.3 percent this year to 7.14 million bpd..¶ China, the world's second-largest oil consumer, raised crude imports by nearly 9 percent last year, or an additional 540,000 bpd, largely to boost government and commercial reserves as oil companies took advantage of the nearly 70 percent fall in global benchmark prices from mid-2014 to end-2015.¶ The CNPC demand forecast was higher than a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that put growth in China's demand for oil products in 2016 at 3.1 percent, down from the 5.6 percent growth it estimated for last year.¶ Reuters' own calculations show implied oil demand was up 3.1 percent to 10.63 million bpd in 2015. CNPC also forecast that apparent natural gas consumption would rise 7.3 percent to 205 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2016, compared with growth of 5.7 percent in 2015 as reported by China's top central planning commission.

### Not Too Late

#### Expert consensus indicates we aren’t passed tipping point for global warming yet

Suzanne Goldberg Staff Writer 5-11-16 UN climate science chief: it's not too late to avoid dangerous temperature rise <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/11/un-climate-change-hoesung-lee-global-warming-interview> (Accessed 5-13-16)

The head of the United Nations climate science panel has declared it is still possible to avoid a dangerous 2C increase in global warming – despite more than a dozen record hot years since 2000. But the costs could be “phenomenal”, he said.¶ In an interview with the Guardian, Hoesung Lee, the leader of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), defied the bleak outlook of climate scientists who warn the world is hurtling to a 2C rise far faster than anticipated.¶ Governments set 2C as the danger limit for global warming at the Paris climate conference last year – and agreed to work to limit warming to 1.5C.¶ Global average temperatures have already risen about 1C since the pre-industrial era because of warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions. February’s hot temperatures stunned scientists, even after a string of record-breaking years.¶ But Lee insisted the 2C goal remained technically feasible, although it could become prohibitively expensive. “2C is achievable, and if we fail to act according to what the IPCC has been advising, the cost will rise phenomenally,” Lee said. “The sooner we act, we will be able to achieve 2C stabilisation cost-effectively,” he went on. “The longer we wait to take action, the cost will be a lot higher.”¶ See Earth’s temperature spiral toward 2C rise - graphic¶ Read more¶ An economist who began his career at ExxonMobil, Lee took over the UN climate panel last year after Rajendra Pachauri was forced to step down amid charges of sexual harassment.¶

### Warming I/L Disease

#### Global warming facilitates disease spread

Sonila Cook and Oren Ahoobim Partner and associate partner at Dalberg 5-15-16 The planet's health is essential to prevent infectious disease <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/may/15/the-planets-health-is-essential-to-prevent-infectious-disease> (Accessed 5-13-16)

These trends raise questions: Why are infectious diseases occurring with such frequency? Why are pandemics the new normal? The increased rate of outbreak is typically framed as a failure of the health system. Indeed, that is a critical component. But the conditions that allow for outbreak in the first place are rooted in environmental change.¶ The environmental degradation of natural ecosystems has resulted in many negative outcomes, one of which is the outbreak of infectious disease. The vast majority of human infectious diseases, such as malaria, Zika, and HIV/Aids, originate in animals. When we disrupt the natural environment and habitat of animals, we are poking the beast, so to speak.¶ Infectious disease is a systems problem – and systems problems require systems solutions¶ Take deforestation. Destroying the delicate balance of ecological conditions in forests increases contact between humans and potential reservoirs of disease in the animal population. Evidence shows that Ebola may have been spread to humans who came into contact with infected wildlife, enabled by widespread deforestation. The environment plays a critical role in serving as a buffer against infectious disease. A failure to recognise the value of this service that forests provide means that deforestation and infectious disease outbreaks are likely to continue at alarming rates.¶ Jambi province, Sumatra. A logged-over area in the vast track of pulp wood concessions.¶ Jambi province, Sumatra. A logged-over area in the vast track of pulp wood concessions.

#### Extreme weather changes precipitate disease spread

Molly M. Ginty Staff Writer 12-31-15 Climate Change Bites <https://www.nrdc.org/stories/climate-change-bites> (Accessed 5-15-16)

“A longer warm-weather season and changing rainfall patterns are allowing the creatures that can transmit disease to humans to thrive for longer periods each year—and to simultaneously move into broader areas,” explains Kim Knowlton, senior scientist and deputy director of NRDC's Science Center.¶ Knowlton and other experts say climate change means Americans need to learn more about diseases that are vector-borne, or transmitted by agents such as insects. Among the biggest threats—because we have neither effective vaccines nor guaranteed cures for them—are West Nile virus and dengue fever, both spread by mosquitoes, and Lyme disease, transmitted by deer ticks.

# Impact China Economy Failing

### Chinese Economy Headed for Crash

#### Lack of demand, overcapacity and huge debt have tanked Chinese economy

Himanshu Goenka, reporter at International Business Times, May 14, 2016

"China's April Economic Indicators Point to Sustained Weakness," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-april-economic-indicators-point-sustained-weakness-2368964 (accessed 5/15/2016)

China’s economy is growing at its slowest pace in over 20 years, driven down by global and domestic demand, overcapacity in its factories and increasing amounts of debt. The country has been trying to make supply-side reforms to cut excess industrial capacity, and is also encouraging banks to increase lending to private firms.

#### Downward slide and contraction are inevitable and economic crash is likely

Gordon C. Chang, author of "The Coming Collapse of China," May 10, 2016

"China's Economy Past the Point of No Return," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-economy-past-the-point-no-return-16139 (accessed 5/15/2016)

Even before the first dreadful numbers for last month were released, Anne Stevenson-Yang of J Capital Research termed the uptick the “Dead Panda Bounce.” The economy is essentially moribund as there is not much that can stop the ongoing slide. A contraction is certain, and a severe adjustment downward—in common parlance, a crash—looks likely.

#### Contraction is inevitable and crash is likely

F. McGuire, staffwriter for Newsmax, May 15, 2016

"Author Gordon Chang: China's Economy Is 'Past the Point of No Return'," Newsmax Finance, http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/StreetTalk/China-Gordon-Chang-Economy-asia/2016/05/15/id/728922/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

The Chinese economy has been teetering on the brink of disaster seemingly forever and now respected author Gordon Chang warns it has drifted past “the point of no return” in its journey to disaster. “The economy is essentially moribund as there is not much that can stop the ongoing slide. A contraction is certain, and a severe adjustment downward — in common parlance, a crash — looks likely,” Chang wrote for The National Interest.

### No Government Solutions to Chinese Economy

#### Chinese policymakers have lost control of the economy and no relief will happen in the status quo

Gordon C. Chang, author of "The Coming Collapse of China," May 10, 2016

"China's Economy Past the Point of No Return," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-economy-past-the-point-no-return-16139 (accessed 5/15/2016)

That has grave implications for Beijing, as Chinese technocrats have evidently lost control of the economy. For one thing, they are no longer helped by strong external demand, and there is little prospect of relief in coming months. As Zhou Hao of Commerzbank told the Wall Street Journal, “China is on its own.”

#### Stimulus won’t solve economy—business sector is moribund

Bloomberg News, May 15, 2016

"China Slowdown Shows Debt Addiction Will Be Tough to Shake," Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-15/china-april-slowdown-shows-debt-addiction-will-be-tough-to-shake (accessed 5/15/2016)

"Even with substantial stimulus at work, the accumulated problems of high debt and industrial overcapacity mean that the pass-through to stronger activity remains decidedly muted," Bloomberg Intelligence economists Tom Orlik and Fielding Chen wrote in a note. "The fact that only policy-driven sectors (infrastructure and real estate) are doing well is a reminder that stimulus has yet to revive the animal spirits of China’s entrepreneurs." That leaves the world’s second-largest economy increasingly reliant on the debt-dependent drivers of property and government-backed building programs.

### Debt Kills Chinese Economy

#### Debt-fueled economy puts China in same place U.S. was in 2007-2008

Bonnie Cao, Emerging Markets/China Correspondent, and Ye Xie, Emerging Market Reporter at Bloomberg News, April 21, 2016

"Soros Says China's Economy Looks Like the U.S. Before the Crisis," Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/soros-says-china-s-debt-fueled-economy-resembles-u-s-in-2007-08 (accessed 5/15/2016)

Billionaire investor George Soros said China’s debt-fueled economy resembles the U.S. in 2007-08, before credit markets seized up and spurred a global recession. China’s March credit-growth figures should be viewed as a warning sign, Soros said at an Asia Society event in New York on Wednesday.

#### Rising debt levels and lack of demand kill economy

Mark Magnier, reporter at Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau, May 14, 2016

"Chinese Indicators Lag Behind Expectations, Show Economy Struggles," Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-industrial-output-growth-moderates-in-april-1463205031 (accessed 5/15/2016)

China’s economy continues to battle significant headwinds, including rising debt levels and the economic drag of too many factories pumping out more products than there is demand for. Coal consumption, steel production and exports were weaker in April, while the official and Caixin purchasing managers’ indexes came in weaker than expected last month.

#### Bad debt levels are killing Chinese banking sector

The Financial Express, May 13, 2016

"China's Economy in Doldrums: Eight Factors Driving the Turmoil," The Financial Express, http://www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/chinas-economy-in-doldrums-8-factors-driving-the-turmoil/254295/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

For Chinese lenders, the build-up of bad debts, which have increased for 18 consecutive quarters, followed the state-driven credit boom of 2009 and has shown no sign of slowing. This is making policymakers mull unconventional measures to prevent a potential debt crisis. Many bank analysts believe the NPL situation in China’s banking sector is far more severe than official data suggests, as some banks adopt untimely loan recognition and turn to off-balance sheet lending to hide bad debts.

### Investment and Housing Won’t Solve Chinese Economy

#### Private investment is dead in China

The Star, May 16, 2016

"China’s economy grinds down a gear as heavy industry drags," The Star, http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2016/05/16/chinas-economy-grinds-down-a-gear-as-heavy-industry-drags/ (accessed 5/16/2016)

Private investment in fixed assets decelerated to the slowest pace since at least 2012. “Due to weak market demand, companies’ reluctance to invest and market entrance barriers, China’s private fixed-asset investment has been decelerating since the start of this year,” the statistics bureau said in a statement. “This will hurt the steady growth of investment and it deserves a lot of attention.”

#### Housing sector won’t solve economy

Esther Fung, Shanghai bureau reporter specializing in Chinese real estate for the Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2016

"China Housing Revival Buffers Economy," Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-housing-revival-buffers-economy-1463288631 (accessed 5/16/2016)

Many economists say higher housing prices and sales buoyed China’s first-quarter gross domestic product, which rose 6.7%, a slightly slower pace of expansion than the previous quarter. Some of these people say the market will continue to grow in the coming months, spurred both by rising housing prices and activity in the sector and by a related increase in consumer confidence. But that period will be followed, these people predict, by a housing downturn as the market is weighed down both by excess capacity and restrictions by local governments intended to cool prices. What’s more, the housing market’s contribution to the Chinese economy has been falling in recent years. The construction, sale and outfitting of homes contributed to 22% of China’s GDP in 2013, 19.8% in 2014 and 15.1% in 2015, according to Moody’s Analytics. “Housing will not be a durable source of growth for the Chinese economy, at least not for the foreseeable future,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody’s Analytics.

## Chinese Economic Collapse Bad

### Chinese Downturn Spreads Globally

#### Chinese downturn causes world-wide recession

Kedar Grandhi, financial journalist for International Business Times, April 5, 2016

"IMF Warns that an Economic Crisis in China Could Cause Global Recession Again," International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/imf-warns-that-economic-crisis-china-could-make-world-go-back-into-recession-1553150 (accessed 5/16/2016)

An economic crisis in China could result in a world-wide recession, warned the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was because China's financial links with the rest of the global economy was set to increase, the organisation said ahead of its spring conference in Washington next week. "It is likely that China's spillovers to global financial markets will increase considerably in the next few years", the IMF said.

#### Slow Chinese growth causes anxiety in global financial markets

The Hindu, April 18, 2016

"World worried over China’s economic slowdown," The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/world-worried-over-chinas-economic-slowdown/article8486893.ece (accessed 5/15/2016)

Signs of weaker-than-expected Chinese growth, volatility of the Chinese renminbi and persistent capital outflows have led to growing anxiety in the financial markets-despite plenty and strong buffers that emerging market and developing countries (EMDC) have accumulated in recent years, said Alexandre Tombini, Governor, Central Bank of Brazil.

#### Loss of confidence in Chinese economy shocks global markets

Chris Giles, economics editor of Financial Times, January 7, 2016

"World economy feels the impact when China takes a knock," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/30441208-b548-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51.html (accessed 5/16/2016)

While all the other effects of China on the global economy are reasonably predictable and potentially have offsetting benefits, the pernicious effect of weaker confidence has the greatest potential to shock. Whether it is through global financial market turmoil, the willingness of companies to invest or the desire of households to tighten their belts, confidence in the security of the global economy is both vital for prosperity and almost entirely unpredictable.

### Chinese Downturn Spreads Globally

#### Chinese downturn causes global economic downturn

George B. Leong, senior editor at Lombardi Financial, April 8, 2016

"China Economic Collapse: A Dire Warning for China’s Stock Market," Profit Confidential, http://www.profitconfidential.com/economy/china-economic-collapse-a-dire-warning-for-chinas-stock-market/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

The concern is that the inability to rely on the actual growth metrics for the Chinese economy is dangerous not only for China but also for the global economy, including the U.S. What happens if the real growth in the Chinese economy is way lower at below six percent? This would drive massive distrust towards Chinese economic data and anything out of Beijing. The impact on the global economies and stock markets would be disastrous.

#### Empirically perception of Chinese economic downturn causes global stock meltdown

Lana Clements, freelance financial journalist, May 15, 2016

"Economy misses vital trading targets at critical time," The Express, http://www.express.co.uk/finance/city/669661/CHINA-ON-BRINK-Economy-misses-vital-trading-targets-at-critical-time (accessed 5/15/2016)

Worries over the fallout from the Asian country's slowing economy triggered a meltdown in stock markets across the world at the start of the year. Intervention by Chinese policymakers stabilised the situation and positive readings from economic indicators in March further calmed nerves.

#### Chinese decline destabilizes region

Deutsche Welle News, January 12, 2016

"The winners and losers of China's downturn," D.W. Asia, http://www.dw.com/en/the-winners-and-losers-of-chinas-downturn/a-18973627 (accessed 5/15/2016)

The slowdown in China could also act as a destabilizing force for the region as a whole, said Carlos Casanova, an economist and Asia expert at BBVA Research in Hong Kong. "Slowing growth momentum together with fears concerning the sustainability of China's corporate sector debt, have put significant downward pressures on the Chinese currency renminbi," he told DW.

### Chinese Economic Downturn Threatens U.S. Economy

#### Chinese downturn severely threatens U.S. economic recovery

Jonathan R. Laing, Senior Special Writer at Barron's, April 30, 2016

"Why China’s Economy Won’t Land Softly," Barron's, http://www.barrons.com/articles/why-chinas-economy-wont-land-softly-1461990759 (accessed 5/15/2016)

By all accounts, the economic slowdown in China was the major cause of the nasty U.S. stock market corrections in both August of last year and during the first six weeks of this year. The fear, of course, was that trouble in the Middle Kingdom would drag down global growth and stunt the U.S.’s muddling recovery.

#### Chinese collapse sparks U.S. economic downturn

China Economic Collapse, December 31, 2015

"How the Financial Crisis in China Impacts You," chinaeconomiccollapse.com, http://chinaeconomiccollapse.com/how-the-financial-crisis-in-china-impacts-you/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

China has an economy that can be easily be compared to that of the US and there are many U.S. companies that invest deeply in China. Thus, any economic meltdown in China will mean a lot of trouble for you. If the markets is to rumble because of China’s meltdown, the global banks will shiver, there will be loss in earnings that can lead to job losses and the U.S. will take much longer to recover from the loss that they have been tried to do in recent years.

### Chinese Economic Downturn Spurs Hardliners and Risks International Conflict

#### Collapse leads to risk of coups, hardline foreign policy and reckless Chinese military adventurism

Willis L. Krumholz, financial analyst with J.D. from University of St. Thomas, September 28, 2015

"China's Coming Great Depression," The Federalist, http://thefederalist.com/2015/09/28/chinas-coming-great-depression/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

The most immediate threat China poses will be geopolitical. As strains on Xi Jinping’s leadership increase due to economic turmoil, factions already annoyed by Xi’s consolidation of power and crackdown on corruption could attempt a coup. These factions might be more nationalistic or Maoist than is current leadership, which should surely worry policymakers in America. To guard against this, Xi will further solidify power at home, and seek to distract from the economic turmoil by flexing China’s military muscle abroad. The recent Chinese naval foray off the coast of Alaska is only the beginning, and the West should worry about the brewing conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands. American leadership must to be prepared with a measured response, operate from a position of strength, and be committed to maintaining pax Americana in Asia.

#### Collapse leads to increased military aggression

Andrew O'Willeke, attorney and former editor of Michigan Journal of International Law, September 27, 2012

"China's Great Depression Will Start Post-2014 And Pre-2024," Wash Park Prophet, http://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2012/09/chinas-great-depression-will-start-post.html (accessed 5/15/2016)

The obvious moment for China's fragile but intense pent up political frustrations, including those that fall on its intense urban-rural divide would be in the wake of China's first modern Great Depression, which I have predicted will most likely begin sometime in the time frame from 2015 to 2023. So, look to that time frame, not just for Chinese domestic economic malaise, but also for major Chinese political upheaval of some sort and for Chinese aggression in foreign policy and military affairs in a probably vain attempt to divert public attention from the domestic crisis.

# Impact Human Rights Credibility Good

### Human rights are worth protecting (general impacts)

#### Human rights are endemic to all people who deserve dignity and respect

Shashi Motilal, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, July 12, 2013, Delivered Lecture on “Human Rights, Human Moral Obligations and Moral Cosmopolitanism” at Institute of Philosophy, Freie University, Berlin, Germany, July 12, 2013, <http://www.geisteswissenschaften.fu-berlin.de/v/dagg/termine/shashi-motilal_human-rights1.pdf> (Accessed 5-30-16)

Every human being thus, has a human moral obligation to himself/herself, as well as to other beings (both human and sub-human) to treat each with dignity and respect, as every being is an integral part of the cosmic whole. This is his basic moral obligation or what is termed as sadharan dharma in the Hindu context. These basic human moral obligations are present in every human being from birth and ought to be fulfilled, although the fact is that because a human being is a slave of his passions and because he is free, at times he is misled and does what he ought not to do and/or fails to do what he ought to do. This results in what are called ‘human rights violations’ in the language of human rights.

#### Human rights are the universal foundation of freedom and dignity

The Advocates for Human Rights, Staff Writer, 2015, “Human Rights Basics,” <http://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/human_rights_basics> (Accessed 5-30-16)

Human rights are standards that allow all people to live with dignity, freedom, equality, justice, and peace. Every person has these rights simply because they are human beings. They are guaranteed to everyone without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Human rights are essential to the full development of individuals and communities. Many people view human rights as a set of moral principles that apply to everyone. Human rights are also part of international law, contained in treaties and declarations that spell out specific rights that countries are required to uphold. Countries often incorporate human rights in their own national, state, and local laws.

#### The collapse of human rights norms causes WMD conflicts

William W. Burke-White Spring 2004, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation,” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, [https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/wburkewh/workingpapers/17HarvHumRtsJ249(2004).pdf](https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/wburkewh/workingpapers/17HarvHumRtsJ249%282004%29.pdf) (Accessed 5-24-16)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. [2](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=62d5bddd50e555db7dfb40b14668cef6&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAW&_md5=a81b07a0a90d95be59f9b7bb9d939181#n2) If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

### The U.S. has a moral obligation

#### The U.S. has a moral obligation to affirm human rights

Human Rights First, Staff Writer, 2015, “American ideals. Universal values,” Human Rights First!, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about> (Accessed 5-30-16)

On human rights, the United States must be a beacon. Activists fighting for freedom around the globe continue to look to our country for inspiration and count on us for support. Upholding human rights is not only a moral obligation; it’s a vital national interest: America is strongest when our policies and actions match our values. Human Rights First is an independent advocacy and action organization that challenges America to live up to its ideals. We believe American leadership is essential in the global struggle for human rights, so we press the U.S. government and private companies to respect human rights and the rule of law. When they fail, we step in to demand reform, accountability and justice. Around the world, we work where we can best harness American influence to secure core freedoms.

### Terrorism Scenario

#### Lack of human rights credibility is a primary cause of terrorist recruitment

Jeremy Ravinsky, policy associate at the Open Society Foundations April 1, 2016, “Crossing Red Lines and US Credibility: What About Our Human Rights Rules?,” Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-red-lines-and-us-credibility-what-about-our-human-rights-rules> (Accessed 5-26-2016)

This cycle goes to the heart of why the flagrant neglect of human rights conditions weakens US credibility and our ability to protect ourselves. [Studies](http://www.jstor.org/stable/25699342) [have shown](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.537.6828&rep=rep1&type=pdf) that human rights abuses are a primary cause of terrorist recruitment. It is in the US national security interest to curb such abuses by governments and their security forces. But, after years of failing to enforce conditions on aid, the United States lacks sufficient credibility to demand that its partners respect human rights. The legal conditions on receiving aid represent small red lines, which are crossed repeatedly without any consequence. They are perhaps less dramatic than chemical weapons red lines, but the consequences are nonetheless erosive to US global standing.

#### The threat of nuclear catastrophe is much higher than the Cold War

William J. Perry, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies December 8, 2015, “William J. Perry on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/william-j-perry-nuclear-war-and-nuclear-terrorism8961> (Accessed 5-30-16)

Indeed, throughout my career I always perceived a dark nuclear cloud hanging over my head, threatening no less than the extinction of civilization. During the Cold War we had a half dozen nuclear crises, of which the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous, and I was close enough to these crises that they made a deep personal impression on me. I believed then, and I believe to this day, that we got through these crises and avoided a nuclear catastrophe as much by good luck as by good management. Thirty years later, when the Cold War ended, I breathed a huge sigh of relief—we had dodged the nuclear bullet that would have ended our civilization. Surely we would never be so foolish as to allow that existential threat to reemerge. But for the last two years I have come to believe that I was too optimistic; indeed, that we are facing nuclear dangers today that are in fact more likely to erupt into a nuclear conflict than during the Cold War.

#### Our scenario is ISIS

William J. Perry, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies December 8, 2015, “William J. Perry on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/william-j-perry-nuclear-war-and-nuclear-terrorism8961> (Accessed 5-30-16)

Finally, today we are witnessing ISIS undertaking terror on a grand scale, not only in the Mideast but in Europe. No one should doubt that ISIS would expand their terrorism with nuclear attacks if they had access to these weapons. Given the huge store of fissile material in the world, some of it still not well secured, making an improvised nuclear bomb could be within their reach. So a nuclear terror attack is my fifth nuclear nightmare. These five nuclear nightmares add up to a danger to our people that is greater in some ways than the nuclear dangers we faced during the Cold War. But most Americans—especially our youth—are blissfully unaware of those dangers.

### Terrorism Extension

#### Weak human rights credibility spreads terrorism

Jeremy Ravinsky, policy associate at the Open Society Foundations April 1, 2016, “Crossing Red Lines and US Credibility: What About Our Human Rights Rules?,” Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/crossing-red-lines-and-us-credibility-what-about-our-human-rights-rules> (Accessed 5-26-2016)

Most importantly, the Pentagon—which administers most of these military assistance programs—must make rights protection a priority. Conditions on US aid will not serve their purpose if officials willfully neglect them. Human rights abuses lead to more insecurity and terrorism. The government must do a better job of institutionalizing mechanisms to counter that. Otherwise, terrorism will continue to spread as US credibility on human rights crumbles.

### Human rights credibility is key to global leaderhsip

#### Taking a strong human rights stance is essential to U.S. national security objectives and global leadership

[Vanessa Walker](https://www.amherst.edu/people/facstaff/vwalker), the Joseph W. and Diane Zerbib Assistant Professor of History at Amherst College and Ph.D. in History from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, February 11, 2016, “Human rights as an essential element for national security,” Miller Center, University of Virginia, <http://firstyear2017.org/blog/human-rights-are-essential-elements-for-national-security> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

Any U.S. national security policy today must systematically incorporate the nation’s democratic values and mission, humanitarian concerns, and human rights if it hopes to garner public support and reflect Americans’ understanding of themselves. Promotion of human rights is not necessarily a trade-off between morality and concrete objectives such as national security. Like all interests, however, there are hard choices and moments when one issue will surpass another. To stave off disappointment and disillusionment resulting from the necessarily slow and often private work of implementing U.S. foreign policy and advancing humanitarian interests, the incoming administration must explain to the public how and why human rights considerations are central to the new national security priorities. It must also illuminate the inherent complexities and apparent inconsistencies of viable policies. A strong national security agenda will not only lay out viable policies to address key strategic problems, it will do so in a way that is responsive to domestic values and constituencies. Developing a strategic vision that both acknowledges and transcends case-by-case particularities of reconciling values and interests is as difficult as it is necessary to finding success in Syria, the Middle East, and globally.

### Human rights credibility is key to survival

#### Human rights protection is a survival issue

George Annas, Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health and Professor of SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science at Boston U. School of Medicine, et al 2002 , “Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”, American Journal of Law & Medicine, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151, <http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=fac_schol> (Accessed 5-30-16)

The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the ﬁrst time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival: [L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries.

#### Human rights credibility is essential to avoid extinction

Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Law and Director of the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York School of Law, 1998, “The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights,” New York City Law Review, 1998/99, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev. 59 pp. 71-72

The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.

### Human rights credibility is key to democracy

#### Taking a leadership role in human rights allows the U.S. to shape decisions and advance democracy

Brian Griffey, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA and as an investigative journalist, March 18, 2011, “U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” (<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad> (Accessed 5-30-16)

The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade. As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights violations in Libya, joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights shortcomings. By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting principles we identify with our democracy.

#### Greater U.S. involvement in human rights leadership is essential to spreading democracy

Brian Griffey, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA and as an investigative journalist, March 18, 2011, “U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” (<http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad> (Accessed 5-30-16)

Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld, especially in times of crisis. Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society.

### The U.S. is a strong human rights leader

#### The U.S. has been a strong leader on the Human Rights Council

Mark P. Lagon, President, Freedom House, May 17, 2016, Written Testimony for the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing, “A Glass half full: Why the U.S. needs to be on the UN human rights council,” <https://freedomhouse.org/article/glass-half-full-why-us-needs-be-un-human-rights-council> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

The implications of these assessments of the Council’s performance over a decade, and the impact of U.S. leadership on the Council, are evident. First, with the United States on the body, the Human Rights Council has improved and indeed offered some real value, in country-specific resolutions, thematic work, and the UPR giving “lift” to civil society voices in their own countries.  Its work has been helpful, even vis-à-vis the Security Council where the U.S. has a veto – performing better than the latter on Syria and getting North Korea’s atrocious human rights situation onto the latter’s agenda.  These benefits should not be breathlessly overstated, but the fear of those in the Administration in which I served that the Council was no better or was even worse than the Commission have proven too fatalistic.

#### The Human Rights Dialogue involves the U.S. and China with direct engagement over human rights

Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary of State, August 14, 2015, “On-the-Record Briefing on the 19th U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue,” US Dept. of State Press Release, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246092.htm> (Accessed 5-30-2=16)

So let me first emphasize that the Human Rights Dialogue is one forum among many where we discuss these issues. Secretary Kerry and others raise them prominently at the Strategic & Economic Dialogue and the Consultation on People-to-People Exchange. Today’s meetings also help set the stage – and this is very, very important – for the upcoming state visit in September of Chinese President Xi Jinping, where human rights will be very prominently addressed. The dialogue gave us a chance to convey in advance of that visit the growing sense of alarm in the United States about human rights developments in China and to stress the importance of making specific improvements in keeping with China’s own laws and international commitments. Let me reiterate what some of my predecessors have also stressed. The Human Rights Dialogue is a chance for us to engage directly with the Chinese Government on human rights in an in-depth manner, focusing on specific issues and specific cases. This is not a venue where we simply agree to disagree, rather it is forum where we need to engage frankly and candidly and to chart a way forward on these important issues if and where possible.

### Engagement with China is key

#### The U.S. should mainstream human rights issues across engagement policies. It should be the rubric of diplomacy

Nicholas Bequelin, East Asia Director at Amnesty International, based in Hong Kong. A former Visiting Scholar at The China Center, Yale Law School, and previously at Human Rights Watch, he obtained his Ph.D. in History from the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS), Paris, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

Third, the U.S. must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police.

#### Engaging China to adopt universal human rights promotes peace and stability

Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and a member of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch, Asia, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

We should remind our politicians that promoting China's adherence to universal human rights norms is not just a matter of moral idealism, but also a matter of sound strategy. First, everyone will feel safer as businesspeople, scholars, and tourists when China has rule of law, and this includes not only Americans but other foreigners and Chinese as well. Second, China's strategic intentions will be more transparent if they are shaped in an open political process, and this will reduce suspicion of China by all of China's neighbors and the U.S., which also will be good for China itself. Third, China will be more stable politically once the regime is grounded in the consent of the people, and a stable and prosperous China is in the interests of the rest of the world. Finally, a world with a robust set of international norms and institutions that regulate fields such as trade, investment, the environment, arms control, and human rights will be a more predictable and peaceful world, where conflicts of interest can be sorted out and common interests advanced in reliable ways. Such a world cannot be built without the full participation of a rising great power like China.

#### We cannot sideline human rights. We need direct engagement with China

Chris Smith, U.S Congressperson (NJ-04), March 29, 2016, “Sidelining Human Rights a Strategic Mistake the U.S. Cannot Afford to Make,” Press Release, http://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398805 (Accessed 5-30-2=16)

 “If human rights are sidelined again this week in the Obama-Xi meeting—it will not only be an unconscionable abandonment of China’s best and brightest who today suffer jail, torture, and death for freedom, but it will be a colossal strategic mistake, as well,” Smith said at a Capitol Hill press conference. “The U.S. cannot meekly ‘raise’ human rights concerns when it is increasingly clear that our security and economic interests with China will not be ensured without dramatic human rights improvements and advances in the rule of law.

### Engagement with China is key

#### U.S. engagement on human rights should not fear empty Chinese confrontations

Joshua Rosenzweig, an independent researcher and translator based in Hong Kong and Ph.D. in Chinese Studies from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

We all agree that China's progress toward a society that truly respects and protects human rights depends primarily on the efforts of the Chinese people, many of whom already are working actively to build civil society institutions, demanding government accountability and limits on state power, and struggling to protect the rights of others as well as themselves. Human rights engagement by any country, including the United States, must recognize these efforts and work to support and further develop them. I believe that human rights engagement only can be really worthwhile if it is critical engagement that understands that progress blooms from argument and debate. The United States cannot avoid addressing the most serious human rights violations in China out of fear that, by appearing too confrontational, it risks damaging other aspects of the relationship. For its part, Beijing must stop responding with angry rhetoric every time it hears something it doesn't like. In this same vein, the United States also should expect to listen more to Chinese critiques of American human rights problems.

#### Engaging China over human rights is essential to long-term relations

Chris Smith, U.S Congressperson (NJ-04), March 29, 2016, “Sidelining Human Rights a Strategic Mistake the U.S. Cannot Afford to Make,” Press Release, http://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398805 (Accessed 5-30-2=16)

 “A government that does not respect the rights and basic dignity of its own people cannot be assumed to be a responsible actor in the global arena,” Smith said. “A government that brutally crushes the yearning of its citizens for fundamental freedoms cannot be a trusted partner able to work on a number of pressing bilateral and global issues.”  Smith said that under Xi’s leadership, the Chinese government has pushed through new laws and draft legislation that would legitimize political, religious, and ethnic repression, further curtail civil liberties and civil society, and expand censorship of the Internet. Draconian population control policies remain in place and gendercide—the extermination of the girl-child through sex-selection abortion— is a massive, festering problem that has catastrophic social and economic consequences. Civil rights lawyers and labor organizers are jailed, Hong Kong booksellers disappear; journalists and religious leaders are harassed and detained and family members of overseas journalists who print information critical of President Xi—are targeted, Smith said. “The Obama Administration cannot continue to engage in the fantasy that avoiding human rights will somehow bring about a change of heart in Beijing.  It will not,” Smith said. “The U.S. must raise human rights because U.S. interests and better U.S.-China relations depend on it. President Xi’s shift toward a hard authoritarianism is a disturbing development.  More than any time in recent memory, China is becoming a garrison state, with security forces empowered by new laws to silence dissent and drive a wedge between the Chinese people and the international community.”

### Pressure on human rights is counterproductive

#### US human rights pressure on China fosters a confrontational relationship that fundamentally undermines relations

Jinghan Zeng, Vice-Chancellor's 2020 Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Policy at De Montfort University and an Associate Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, et al, March 27, 2015, “Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of the Debate in China,” International Affairs, 91:2, p. 262

By far the biggest problem for China in respect of protecting its core interests is the United States. Taiwan is not only important in itself for China; it is also considered to be the biggest problem in Sino-US relations. Moreover, the US is blamed for trying to sabotage this most important core interest. For example, one article argues that, ‘regarding the issue of the most central and important interest [Taiwan], the US has always been interfering, challenging, and damaging China's core interests’. In total, 14.81 per cent of papers refer to US policy towards China on a range of other issues (especially Xinjiang, Tibet and human rights policies) as threatening China's core interests. It is argued that the US has never ‘cared’ about China's core interests. For example, one article argues: ‘The US has never had any scruples respecting China's core interests … the more important the issues are concerned with China's national core interests, the more likely that the US will “challenge” them.’ In two articles, Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University, goes a step further and argues that the core interests of the US and China cannot be resolved because they are ‘oppositional’. It is argued that the core interests of the US and China are ‘opposite and confrontational … this fundamentally determines that Sino-US relations cannot be friendly—it may even be an opposing and confrontational relationship’. This view echoes the prediction of Great Power conflict theory that the core interests of the rising power and the existing hegemon will eventually clash—though without directly engaging with the extant (western) literature on the theme. There is, then, a tendency to treat tensions in US–Chinese relations as an unfortunate but natural fact of life in a changing world order. As one article puts it: ‘It is not easy to ask the US to give up its hegemonic attitude and actions; and it is impossible to ask China to continue to tolerate the US actions that damaged China's core interests. So a struggle is inevitable.’

# Impact US-China War Likely and Bad

### Yes US-China War – 1AC/1NC

#### US-China war goes nuclear – causes extinction

Lawrence Wittner, Professor Emeritus of History at SUNY Albany, 11-28-2011, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?” [www.huntingtonnews.net/14446](http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446) (accessed 6/1/16)

But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

### Yes US-China War – Goes Nuclear – General

#### Tensions in Asia lead to miscalc and nuclear escalation

Max Fisher, MA in Security Studies from Johns Hopkins University and foreign affairs writer and editor for the Atlantic, 10-31-2011, “5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-and-china-could-spark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616> (accessed 6/1/16)

Neither the U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absolute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary because both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a preventative strike, just to be safe. This is especially true because you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The U.S. and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee one of them spiraling out of control. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war.

### Yes US-China War – Goes Nuclear – General

#### Escalation is likely – China will use nuclear weapons if they are losing conventionally – best polisci

Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth University, 3-1-2014, “Conventional War and Escalation,” <https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/Lieber_Press_Article_Esc_030114.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

To explore whether weak states actually employ this logic, we first identify below the conditions under which states would be most likely to build defense plans around doctrines of coercive nuclear escalation. Second, we sort nuclear-armed countries according to those conditions. Finally, we determine whether those states that (according to our argument) should have adopted coercive nuclear doctrines have actually done so. Two factors should have a powerful effect on whether nuclear-armed states develop coercive nuclear doctrines. First, countries are more likely to view nuclear weapons in this manner if they expect to lose conventional wars. In other words, coercive nuclear doctrines should be far more appealing to the weak than to the strong. Second, these doctrines will be more attractive to states for which the consequences of conventional military defeat are dire. When the United States loses conventional wars – e.g., in Vietnam, perhaps in Afghanistan – it may damage presidential approval, but the republic does not fall, and leaders are not hung. For other states and leaders, defeat often brings terrible consequences. Many Israelis believe that the consequences of a military defeat to the Syrians or Egyptians would mean the end of sovereignty at best – and genocide at worst. Even countries that do not fear military conquest might worry that a humiliating conventional defeat might trigger uprisings or coups, and the overthrow of the existing regime (often including the death of the leaders themselves). If the United States dealt an overwhelming defeat to the Iranian military during a conflict over the Strait of Hormuz, it is not clear that the Islamic Republic would survive the political turmoil that could follow. Observers of China have noted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) no longer bases its legitimacy on communism, but rather on nationalism and evidence that the CCP has made China strong and globally respected. If during a military clash in the Pacific, the United States inflicted a crushing defeat against the Chinese air force and navy, the leaders of the CCP may reasonably question whether their government could survive the humiliation and anger from the people or military. Leaders of nuclear-armed states who fear that conventional military defeat could lead to terrible consequences for themselves or their country would be expected, if the arguments in this article are correct, to be more likely to develop coercive nuclear doctrines than those who do not share this fear.

### Yes US-China War – Impact Magnifier

#### Asian escalation is highly likely – multiple warrants

Bruce Jones et al, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, (Thomas Wright, Fellow in Foreign Policy and member of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, Jeremy Shapiro, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings , and Robert Keane, Research Assistant at the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings), February 2014, “The State of the International Order,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/02/state%20of%20the%20international%20order/intlorder_report.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

Why are we seeing the revival of geopolitical competition and why is it most prevalent in Asia? First, unresolved historical tensions are preventing a deepening of cooperation between the affected states and provide fertile ground for populist nationalism. In East Asia, differences over how Japan has handled its World War II past have increased anti-Japanese sentiment in China and South Korea while also prompting a backlash in Japan. Second, the presence of territorial disputes, which have a zero sum quality to them, provides a focal point for security rivalry and a venue for a crisis that could inadvertently spiral out of control. East Asia is replete with such disputes, particularly at sea. Fortunately, there are fewer elsewhere. Third, states are competing for access to scarce resources, particularly energy. As Asian economies become more dependent upon far away sources of energy, especially in the Middle East, they have an incentive to build the naval capabilities to secure these resources. Finally, this all occurs against the backdrop of a perceived power transition whereby China is rising at the perceived expense of its neighbors. This dynamic empowers nationalists in China who want to claim what they see as rightfully theirs and nationalists in the rest of Asia who want to stand up to China before it is too late.

### Yes US-China War – ECS MPX

#### East China Sea war escalates – goes nuclear – their defense is too optimistic

Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth University, 3-1-2014, “Conventional War and Escalation,” <https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/Lieber_Press_Article_Esc_030114.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

Second, a conventional conflict in maritime East Asia between the United States and China may entail far greater nuclear escalation risks than is commonly recognized. Because the conquest of China is not plausible, many analysts assume that the escalation risks in a U.S.-China clash are substantially muted. But that optimistic assumption overlooks two critical facts, which are highlighted in Table 1. Namely, China’s leadership may not be able to survive the political repercussion of suffering a humiliating conventional military defeat at the hands of the United States, and that the U.S. style of conventional operations – including large numbers of strikes on the Chinese mainland to blind Chinese sensors and degrade military command and control – may exacerbate these escalatory risks.

### Yes US-China War – SCS/Spratlys MPX

#### Conflict over the Spratlys causes nuclear war – independently tanks the global economy by cutting off critical trade routes

UK Defence Forum, 1-20-2003, “Regional Studies 8: “Conflict In The South China Sea,” <http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/rs8.htm> (accessed 6/1/16)

The oil rich and strategically important Spratly Islands archipelago is one of the world's most important flash points. There is a strong risk that the states of South-east Asia could be drawn into a war with China, destabilising the whole region and upsetting economic growth in one of Britain's most important markets. The shipping lanes passing close to the Spratlys carry 25% of the world's oil trade to Japan and America, the South China Sea is one of the most important trade routes in the world. Because of the importance of the sea lanes and oil associated with the Spratlys and the fact that Britain is a signatory to a defence pact that includes Malaysia, one of the disputing states, British naval forces could be called in to the South China Sea. The end of the cold war altered the balance of power in the South China Sea. The United States has withdrawn from Subic Bay in the Philippines and the former Soviet Union has withdrawn from Camranh Bay, Vietnam. China is in the best position to take advantage of the resulting power vacuum. It claims most of the area, and argues that the South China Sea, an area of approximately 800,000 square kilometres, has been encroached upon by other regional powers. The focus of this conflict are the Spratly Islands; claimed by China, Taiwan and, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines. The conflict indirectly involves all the states of South-east Asia. The UK is party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements which also involve Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. This defence pact is not an alliance, but should hostilities break out in the South China Sea, Britain would be obliged to help Malaysia and has an interest in keeping the sea lanes free for trade. The Spratly Islands dispute has the potential to become a major international conflict. The profound changes brought on the region by the withdrawal of the US and USSR have created a climate of instability. In this climate there is a risk that China may attempt to impose her will on the region by attacking her opponents forces on the Spratlys and non-Chinese merchant vessels on the high seas. It is unlikely that China would attempt to take all the islands in one bite. It would be much easier to get away with a slow period of limited aggression. Britain, along with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand is a signatory of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). This defence pact is not an alliance, however if Malaysian ships or troops were attacked then Britain would be under an obligation to assist. In addition Britain has strong trade links with ASEAN and a profound interest in keeping sea lanes open. Britain does not have to capability to intervene on her own. However she might send a naval force in collaboration with Australia and the USA. The most likely form of intervention would be similar to the Armilla patrol that operated in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. Neutral ships would be protected by warships and the sea lanes kept open without a formal declaration of war against China. For the first time, Britain, and the US, risk becoming involved in military hostilities with another nuclear power. Despite the very small chance that nuclear weapons would be used such a prospect has frightening prospects for our security in the next century. The international community will have to find a better way of relating to China if we are to avoid a conflict in the near future. One first step might be to stop turning a blind eye to human rights abuses. While this policy would cause a souring of relationships in the short term, China would be given the message that some actions are unacceptable. It could not interpret silence as a weakness and reluctance to become involved in Asian politics that could be exploited. The West should learn the lesson of Iraq, that if reasons of expediency allow the international community to give a free hand to a despotic leadership, those leaders will attack their neighbours because they think they can get away with it.

### Yes US-China War – Taiwan MPX

#### US-China war over Taiwan escalates – goes nuclear

William Lowther, writer at the Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211> (accessed 6/1/16)

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

### Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates

#### Asia is a powder keg – multiple warrants – escalates to great-power wars

Shawn Brimley, vice president of the Technology and National Security Program for a New American Security, Ben FitzGerald, Director of Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Ely Ratner, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security, 9-17-2013, “The Drone War Comes to Asia,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/17/the_drone_war_comes_to_asia?page=full> (accessed 6/1/16)

But there's a much bigger and more pernicious cycle in motion. The introduction of indigenous drones into Asia's strategic environment -- now made official by China's maiden unmanned provocation -- will bring with it additional sources of instability and escalation to the fiercely contested South and East China Seas. Even though no government in the region wants to participate in major power war, there is widespread and growing concern that military conflict could result from a minor incident that spirals out of control. Unmanned systems could be just this trigger. They are less costly to produce and operate than their manned counterparts, meaning that we're likely to see more crowded skies and seas in the years ahead. UAVs also tend to encourage greater risk-taking, given that a pilot's life is not at risk. But being unmanned has its dangers: any number of software or communications failures could lead a mission awry. Combine all that with inexperienced operators and you have a perfect recipe for a mistake or miscalculation in an already tense strategic environment. The underlying problem is not just the drones themselves. Asia is in the midst of transitioning to a new warfighting regime with serious escalatory potential. China's military modernization is designed to deny adversaries freedom of maneuver over, on, and under the East and South China Seas. Although China argues that its strategy is primarily defensive, the capabilities it is choosing to acquire to create a "defensive" perimeter -- long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft carriers, submarines -- are acutely offensive in nature. During a serious crisis when tensions are high, China would have powerful incentives to use these capabilities, particularly missiles, before they were targeted by the United States or another adversary. The problem is that U.S. military plans and posture have the potential to be equally escalatory, as they would reportedly aim to "blind" an adversary -- disrupting or destroying command and control nodes at the beginning of a conflict. At the same time, the increasingly unstable balance of military power in the Pacific is exacerbated by the (re)emergence of other regional actors with their own advanced military capabilities. Countries that have the ability and resources to embark on rapid modernization campaigns (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Indonesia) are well on the way. This means that in addition to two great powers vying for military advantage, the region features an increasingly complex set of overlapping military-technical competitions that are accelerating tensions, adding to uncertainty and undermining stability. This dangerous military dynamic will only get worse as more disruptive military technologies appear, including the rapid diffusion of unmanned and increasingly autonomous aerial and submersible vehicles coupled with increasingly effective offensive cyberspace capabilities. Of particular concern is not only the novelty of these new technologies, but the lack of well-established norms for their use in conflict.

### Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates

#### Asian territory wars escalate – draw in great powers

Bruce Jones et al, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, (Thomas Wright, Fellow in Foreign Policy and member of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, Jeremy Shapiro, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings , and Robert Keane, Research Assistant at the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings), February 2014, “The State of the International Order,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/02/state%20of%20the%20international%20order/intlorder_report.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

In the East China Sea and South China Sea, countries are scrambling to assert their claims to long ignored reefs, rocks and islets in an effort to secure expanded control over major shipping lanes and access to potentially enormous resource wealth. The competing claims also reflect a desire by countries in the region to reclaim historaical territory and affirm their influence. The disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the Dokdo/Takeshima rocks, and the Spratly and Paracel islands and other contested areas have ratcheted up tensions as fishing trawlers, scientific vessels, coast guard cutters, and naval ships increasingly clash and spar in the waters around the disputed territory. Rising nationalism – particularly in China, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines – has added a domestic dimension to the various disputes, while China’s increasingly assertive tactics in support of its claims have driven many Asia-Pacific countries toward greater defense cooperation with one another as well as with the United States, the traditional security guarantor in the region. This raises the specter that a minor stand-off over some uninhabited rocks could spiral out of control, leading to a major great-power conflict – perhaps the most serious since the Second World War.

### Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Escalates

#### Maritime accidents have unique escalation risks

Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2012, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> (accessed 6/1/16)

The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

### Yes US-China War – ECS/SCS – Yes US Draw In + Econ MPX

#### East and South China Sea wars draw in the US – treaty obligations – also collapses the global economy

Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, 1-22-2013, “Will America’s Next War Be in the Pacific?” <http://www.alternet.org/world/will-americas-next-war-be-pacific> (accessed 6/1/16)

The possibility of an Iranian crisis remains in the spotlight because of the obvious risk of disorder in the Greater Middle East and its threat to global oil production and shipping. A crisis in the East or South China Seas (essentially, western extensions of the Pacific Ocean) would, however, pose a greater peril because of the possibility of a U.S.-China military confrontation and the threat to Asian economic stability. The United States is bound by treaty to come to the assistance of Japan or the Philippines if either country is attacked by a third party, so any armed clash between Chinese and Japanese or Filipino forces could trigger American military intervention. With so much of the world's trade focused on Asia, and the American, Chinese, and Japanese economies tied so closely together in ways too essential to ignore, a clash of almost any sort in these vital waterways might paralyze international commerce and trigger a global recession (or worse).

### Yes US-China War – Taiwan – Escalates

#### High risk of Taiwan escalation – prefer polisci

Eric Stephen Gons, PhD Candidate in Public Policy at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2011, “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific,” <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

We may look to Chinese military trends that reveal China’s perception of cross-strait relations. Chinese military modernization is focused on a conflict over Taiwan. The direction of PLA efforts provides clues: “Since the end of the 1990s, PLA reform, modernization, procurement, and training have been heavily – almost singularly – focused on preparing for a conflict over Taiwan.”87 A read of PLA modernization doctrine will reveal recurring themes: preparing for “high-tech regional wars,”88 and preparing to “defeat the superior with the inferior.”89 A high-tech war under modern conditions refers to Chinese planning for a violent, quick conflict where information and escalation dominance play a large part. A conquest of, or armed diplomacy against, Taiwan would certainly be a limited, regional war (as opposed to the massive people’s land wars against an enemy like the Soviet Union for which the PLA was optimized for decades). And defeating the superior with the inferior can really have only one meaning, since China faces only one superior military power, the United States. The confluence (or triangulation) of these themes points clearly to preparations for the possibility of some kind of violent That the PLA is preparing for a war over Taiwan is one reason to take the Taiwan situation seriously. Another reason is that conflict over Taiwan is congruent with many of the factors empirically shown to make war more likely. At the state-level, we have seen that China is at a critical point in the power cycle. Also, if China begins democratizing, that would also constitute another structural precursor to conflict. At the dyad-level, Taiwan and China are proximate (or contiguous across a 100-mile strait). Secondly, there is an outstanding territorial dispute between the two powers – the entire ROC itself (the ROC used to claim to be the legitimate representative of all of the PRC’s territory as well, in which case each state had a territorial claim to the entirety of the other state). This outstanding territorial dispute combined with the long militarization of the Straits constitutes an enduring rivalry, raising the risks of war.90 The reunification of Taiwan with the mainland is a key national goal for China: “The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence’ and their activities remains a hard one… posing a grave threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.”91 Now that the mainland government no longer relies on communist ideology as a source of legitimacy, it tends to emphasize two other sources: delivering continued economic growth, and reversing China’s “century of humiliation:” restoring China to its former territorial integrity and central position in Asia. Taiwan is perhaps the only outstanding territory yet to be retaken by China, and as such is a key piece of the PRC’s claims to legitimacy.

### Yes US-China War – Cyber Module

#### US-China conflict escalates to a cyber-war

Max Hastings, writer at the Daily Mail, 11-25-2011, “Will World War III be between the U.S. and China?” <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2066380/Will-World-War-III-U-S-China.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

This sort of violent language was familiar in the era of Mao Tse-tung, but jars painfully on Western susceptibilities in the 21st century. China’s official press has urged the government to boycott American companies that sell arms to Taiwan. The Global Times, again, demands retaliation against the United States: ‘Let the Chinese people have the last word.’ Beyond mere sabre-rattling, China is conducting increasingly sophisticated cyber-warfare penetration of American corporate, military and government computer systems. For now, their purpose seems exploratory rather than destructive. But the next time China and the United States find themselves in confrontation, a cyber-conflict seems highly likely. The potential impact of such action is devastating, in an era when computers control almost everything. It would be extravagant to suggest that the United States and China are about to pick up a shooting war where they left off in November 1950, when Private Carl Simon suffered the shock of his young life on a North Korean hillside.

**US retaliates – goes nuclear**
Robert Tilford, Graduate of the US Army Airborne School in Ft. Benning, Georgia, 7-27-2012, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast,” http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa (accessed 6/1/16)

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.” “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said. Which means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely. “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure. A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response. That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.

\* modified for ableist language

### Yes US-China War – AT: Chinese NFU Policy

#### China goes nuclear – won’t abide by NFU – newest white paper proves

James M. Acton, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4-18-2013, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

INTERPRETING any country’s pronouncements about its nuclear weapons can be a study in fine distinctions, but occasionally a state says — or fails to say — something in a clear break from the past. A Chinese white paper on defense, released on Tuesday, falls into this category and now demands our attention, because it omits a promise that China will never use nuclear weapons first. That explicit pledge had been the cornerstone of Beijing’s stated nuclear policy for the last half-century. The white paper, however, introduces ambiguity. It endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. With North Korea making overt nuclear threats, the job of deciphering Beijing’s cryptic and mild-sounding statement may not seem a priority. Indeed, it is because the likelihood of nuclear escalation with China is low that most defense experts are likely to focus instead on what the white paper has to say about China’s rapidly expanding conventional military capabilities. But all of those developments may be closely connected. In 1964, immediately after testing its first nuclear weapon, China promised to “never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” This “no-first-use pledge” was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers, from the first, in 1998, through the sixth and most recent, in 2011. It was among the strongest assurances in the world of no-first-use, a stance that the United States has never taken. The change this year is almost certainly not the result of bureaucratic error. No-first-use has been such an intrinsic part of the Chinese nuclear liturgy that the authors of the white paper would have been extremely unlikely to have forgotten it. Besides, other evidence indicates that a broader rethinking of Chinese nuclear strategy may be under way.

### Yes US-China War – AT: Chinese Statements

#### Discount Chinese rhetoric – Chinese policies prove they’re revisionist

John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 3-16-2015, “US, China heading toward face-off, says Mearsheimer,” asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/US-China-heading-toward-face-off-says-Mearsheimer?page=2 (accessed 6/1/16)

Q: China says it can rise peacefully, and that it will cooperate with other countries and respect their core interests. Do you believe that? A: China sends mixed signals when it talks -- it says very different things. China talks about rising peacefully and it tries to assure its neighbors, countries like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, that as it grows more powerful, those neighbors have nothing to worry about. However, at the same time the Chinese have made it clear that: No. 1, they want the Senkaku Islands back or they want to make them part of China; No. 2, they intend to make Taiwan part of China once again and, No. 3, they plan to turn the South China Sea into a giant Chinese lake. What the Chinese are saying is that as we get more powerful we're going to try to change the status quo. This is going to frighten all of China's neighbors, and it's sending the opposite message from the one that says China can rise peacefully and that China is a benign power in the region. I think in the end ... that message -- that China is a benign power -- will be drowned out by China's behavior, which will be much more oriented towards altering the status quo, and by military force, if necessary.

### Yes US-China War – AT: Confucian Pacifism

#### No evidence for Confucian pacifism and it doesn’t restrain warfighting anyway

John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 4-8-2014, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204> (accessed 6/1/16)

There are two problems with this theory of Confucianism. First, it does not reflect how Chinese elites have actually talked and thought about international politics over their long history. In other words, it is not an accurate description of China’s strategic culture over the centuries. More important, there is little historical evidence that China has acted in accordance with the dictates of Confucianism. On the contrary, China has behaved just like other great powers, which is to say it has a rich history of acting aggressively and brutally toward its neighbors. There is doubtless a prominent Confucian strand in Chinese culture going back more than 2,000 years. But as Alastair Iain Johnston points out, a second and more powerful strand is at play in Chinese thinking about international politics. He calls it the “parabellum paradigm” and notes that it places “a high degree of value on the use of pure violence to resolve security conflicts.” This paradigm, he emphasizes, “does not make significantly different predictions about behavior from that of a simple structural realpolitik model.” That is why he uses the term “parabellum paradigm” interchangeably with “cultural realism,” which is the title of his book. Very important is Johnston’s contention that Confucianism and cultural realism “cannot claim separate but equal status in traditional Chinese strategic thought. Rather, the parabellum paradigm is, for the most part, dominant.” The discussion up to now has assumed that Confucianism is essentially peaceful and does not advocate initiating war for any reason. But that assumption is not true. As Yan Xuetong makes clear, the high premium Confucianism places on morality does not rule out employing war as an instrument of statecraft. Indeed, it mandates that China be willing to wage just wars when another country is behaving in ways that China’s leaders deem immoral. Yan writes, “Some claim that Confucius and Mencius advocate ‘no war’ and are opposed to all war. In fact, they are not opposed to all war, only to unjust wars. They support just wars.” He further says, “Confucius thinks that reliance on preaching to uphold the norms of benevolence and justice is inadequate. Hence he thinks the way of war should be employed to punish the princes who go against benevolence and justice.” Of course, this justification for war is remarkably pliable. As almost every student of international politics knows, political leaders and policymakers of all persuasions are skilled in figuring out clever ways of defining a rival country’s behavior as unjust or morally depraved. Hence, with the right spinmeister, Confucian rhetoric can be used to justify aggressive as well as defensive behavior. Like liberalism in the United States, Confucianism makes it easy for Chinese leaders to speak like idealists and act like realists. And there is abundant evidence that China has behaved aggressively toward its neighbors whenever it could over the course of its long history. In his survey of Chinese foreign policy since the second millennium BCE, the historian Warren Cohen writes, “In the creation of their empire, the Chinese were no less arrogant, no less ruthless, than the Europeans, Japanese, or Americans in the creation of theirs.” He adds, “Historically, a strong China has brutalized the weak—and there is no reason to expect it to act differently in the future, to behave any better than other great powers have in the past.” The political scientist Victoria Tin-bor Hui observes that when we look at Chinese foreign policy over time, what we see is “the primacy of brute force rather than ‘humane authority.’” She notes, “It is difficult to understand such prevalence of military conflicts throughout Chinese history from only the perspective of Confucian thought.”

### Yes US-China War – AT: Hotlines

#### Hotlines don’t prevent escalation – China won’t share information with the US

Michael Pillsburry, Director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at the Hudson Institute, 11-13-2014, “China and the United States Are Preparing for War,” foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/13/china-and-the-united-states-are-preparing-for-war/ (accessed 6/1/16)

Washington is willing to share a substantial amount of military information with China, in order to "reduce the chances of miscommunication, misunderstanding or miscalculation," as then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a January 2011 trip to Beijing. But the Chinese leadership, which benefits from obfuscation and asymmetric tactics, refuses to communicate its military’s intentions. Despite repeated entreaties from American officials, Beijing is unwilling to talk about many key military issues — like the scope and intentions of its rapid force buildup, development of technologies that could ~~cripple~~ [destroy] American naval forces in the region, and its military’s involvement in cyberattacks against the United States — that would lower friction between the two sides. And sometimes, as in 2010 after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing breaks off military-to-military contacts altogether — leading to an especially troubling silence.

### Yes US-China War – AT: Interdependence

#### Yes China war – interdependence theory is wrong

John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 4-8-2014, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204> (accessed 6/1/16)

It would be wrong to argue that economic interdependence does not matter at all for the fostering of peace. Leaders do care greatly about their country’s prosperity, and in certain circumstances that concern will help dampen any enthusiasm they might have for war. The key question, however, is whether such calculations are likely to decisively influence policymakers in a wide variety of circumstances. In other words, will the impact of economic interdependence be weighty enough to serve as a firm basis for peace between China and its potential rivals over a long period of time? I believe there are good reasons to doubt that concerns about mutual prosperity will keep Asia peaceful as China grows more powerful. At the most basic level, political calculations often trump economic ones when they come into conflict. This is certainly true regarding matters of national security, because concerns about survival are invariably at stake in the security realm, and they are more important than worries about prosperity. As emphasized, if you do not survive, you cannot prosper. It is worth noting in this regard that there was substantial economic interdependence and prosperity among the European great powers before 1914. Nevertheless, World War I happened. Germany, which was principally responsible for causing that conflict, was bent on preventing Russia from growing more powerful while at the same time trying to become a hegemon in Europe. Politics overwhelmed economics in this important case. Politics also tends to win out over concerns about prosperity when nationalism affects the issue at stake. Consider Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Chinese leaders have stressed that they will go to war if Taiwan declares its independence, even though they believe the ensuing conflict would damage China’s economy. Of course, nationalism is at the core of Chinese thinking on Taiwan; that island is considered sacred territory. One might also note that history is littered with civil wars, and in almost every case there was substantial economic interdependence between the combatants before the fighting broke out. But political calculations proved to be more influential in the end. There are three other reasons to doubt the claim that economic interdependence can sustain peace in Asia in the face of an increasingly powerful China. The theory depends on permanent prosperity to work, but there is no guarantee there will not be a trade war or a major economic crisis that undermines that assumption. Consider, for example, how the ongoing euro crisis is doing serious damage to the economies of many European countries. But even in the absence of a severe global economic downturn, a particular state might be having significant economic problems, which could put it in a position where it had little to lose economically, and maybe even something to gain, by starting a war. For instance, a key reason Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990—despite their close economic ties—is that Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC oil production quotas and driving down Iraq’s oil profits, which its economy could ill afford. Another reason to question economic-interdependence theory is that states sometimes start wars in the expectation that victory will bring them substantial economic and strategic benefits and that those prospective benefits will be greater than the prosperity lost from damaged inter-dependence. For example, it is widely believed there are abundant natural resources on the floor of the South China Sea. However, China and its neighbors disagree significantly over who controls that large body of water. Although it is unlikely, one can imagine a more powerful China using military force to gain control over the South China Sea so that it can exploit its seabed and fuel Chinese economic growth.

### Yes US-China War – AT: Interdependence – AT: Trade

#### Trade doesn’t solve war – deterrent signals fails and China can always find other trade markets

P.R. Goldstone, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, 9-25-2007, “Pax Mercatoria: Does Economic Interdependence Bring Peace?” <http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_08_07_Goldstone.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

Many hope trade will constrain or perhaps pacify a rising China, resurgent Russia, and proliferation-minded Iran, as it well may. Nonetheless, any prudent analysis must incorporate caveats drawn from states' particular political economy of security policy. In non-democratic states, however important global markets may be to the economy in aggregate, elites will be most sensitive to sectoral interests of their specific power base. This mismatch can cause systematic distortions in their ability to interpret other states' strategic signals correctly when genuine conflicts of interest emerge with a nation more domestically constrained. Leadership elites drawn from domestic-oriented, uncompetitive, or non-tradable constituencies will tend to discount deterrent signals sent by trading partners whose own domestic institutions favor those commerce-oriented interests, believing such interests make partners less likely to fulfill their threats. For example, one reason the BJP government of India decided to achieve an open nuclear weapons capability was that its small-business, domestic-oriented heart constituency was both less vulnerable to trade sanctions and less willing to believe that the US would either impose or long sustain such sanctions, given its own increased economic interests in India. Sometimes, deterrent signals may not be sent at all, since one nation's governing coalition may include commerce-dependent groups whose interests prevent state leaders from actually undertaking necessary balancing responses or issuing potent signals of resolve in the first place; the result can be fatally muddled strategy and even war -- as witness the series of weak attempts before the First World War by finance-dominated Britain to deter "Iron and Rye"-dominated Germany. The emergence of truly global markets makes it all the less plausible under most circumstances that a revisionist state will be unable to find some alternative source of resources or outlet for its goods. Ironically, the more the international economy resembles a true global marketplace rather than an oligopolistic economic forum, the less likely it would appear that aggressors must inevitably suffer lasting retaliatory cut-offs in trade. There will always be someone else with the capability to buy and sell.

# Aff CFIUS

## Top-Level

### UQ: CFIUS Hurting China FDI

#### CFIUS is the biggest reason Chinese FDI is low now

Beijing Review, April 14, 2016

“Say No to Unwritten Investment Restrictions” <http://www.bjreview.com/Opinion/201604/t20160411_800054153.html>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Recently, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) stopped two Chinese investments. In January, CFIUS blocked the $3.3-billion sale of Philips' lighting unit to a Chinese consortium. In February, China's Unisplendour Corp. Ltd. terminated a deal to acquire a 15-percent stake for $3.8 billion in Western Digital Corp. following a decision by CFIUS to conduct an investigation into the purchase. It is safe to say that CFIUS is the "No.1 killer" of Chinese investments in the United States.

#### CFIUS blocks Chinese investment

David Dollar, Senior Fellow at Brookings on Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development in the John L. Thornton China Center, February 26, 2015

“Why so little investment between the United States and China?” <https://www.brookings.edu/2015/02/26/why-so-little-investment-between-the-united-states-and-china/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Concerning the relatively small amount of Chinese direct investment in the United States: the initial impetus for China’s outward investment was to secure natural resources. There were more opportunities for this in developing countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, than in the United States. In recent years, however, Chinese outward investment has diversified and a larger share is coming to the United States in sectors such as real estate, food, and banking. While Chinese investment to the United States is increasing fairly rapidly, the national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) have soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market. While CFIUS only reviews a small number of transactions each year, it has turned down a number of high-profile Chinese acquisitions on national security grounds.

#### It’s causing Chinese companies to go for smaller, less important deals

Ben Marlow, Deputy Business Editor at The Telegraph, March 5, 2016

“China's huge shopping spree hits a bar in land of the free” <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/03/05/chinas-huge-shopping-spree-hits-a-bar-in-land-of-the-free/>, (accessed 8/9/16)
Bankers say CFIUS is particularly nervous about Chinese interest in American technology. While some of the concerns can be softened by adding certain clauses into deals and inserting break fees, there is little that Chinese officials can do to curb the backlash.

Washington’s stance must be hugely frustrating for the Chinese government but the clampdown shows no sign of abating.  CFIUS is also reviewing Western Digital Corporation’s sale of a 15pc stake to Tsinghua Unisplendour, the planned sale of the Chicago Stock Exchange to a Chinese buyer, and ChemChina’s mega buyout of Syngenta.

As a result, bankers say, Chinese companies are already scaling back their ambitions in the US, seeking joint ventures instead of straight takeovers, attempting smaller deals, and focusing on less sensitive sectors. For China, the land of the free is proving to be more elusive than it had perhaps anticipated.

#### CFIUS kills the US-Sino bilateral investment relationship

Xinhua News, February 10, 2015

“U.S. needs to reform CFIUS reviews on foreign investment: experts” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-02/11/c_133986476.htm>, (accessed 8/9/16)

CFIUS has been a thorny issue in bilateral investment relationship between China and the United States. Many Chinese companies had undergone CFIUS reviews for national security reasons, and the number of companies put under such reviews is disproportionally high considering China's relatively small investment scale in the United States.

In regard to CFIUS reviews, a broad and ambiguous definition of national security and non-transparent decision making processes are the major targets of complaint by foreign investors.

### UQ: CFIUS Hurting China FDI – Perception

#### Even if CFIUS isn’t bad in reality, the perception that it blocks investment is sufficient to cause our impacts

Destiny Duron Deas, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Duke University Graduate School, M.A. expected 2008 and Bachelor’s from Southern Methodist University, 2008

“THE COSTS OF PERCEIVED HYPOCRISY: THE¶ IMPACT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN¶ ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=dlj>, (accessed 8/9/13)

This Note is not intended to condemn the policies or rules of either China or the United States concerning the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign entities. Rather, it shows that even perceptions of hypocrisy can have serious consequences. When choosing to act, even in the interests of national security, the United States should be careful to consider the detrimental effect its policies may have on other countries.

### Solvency: CFIUS Key – BIT

#### Refusal to resolve China’s concerns about CFIUS are blocking a BIT now – the plan is key

Theodore H. Moran, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute¶ for International Economics and from 2007 to 2013 served as associate to¶ the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) dealing with CFIUS issues and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair¶ of International Business and Finance at Georgetown University and is a¶ member of the International Advisory Council of Huawei, September 2015

“Chinese Investment and¶ CFIUS: Time for an Updated¶ (and Revised) Perspective” <https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-17.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

For more than a decade, China has complained about what it¶ maintains has been a pattern of erratic and politicized treatment¶ of Chinese investors when they attempt to acquire US¶ companies. Chinese authorities remain stung in particular by¶ the political backlash in Washington provoked in 2005 when¶ the China National Off shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)¶ attempted unsuccessfully to acquire the American oil company¶ Unocal. Although the deal was aborted by politics, and not any¶ offi cial fi nding of security concerns, the Chinese have targeted¶ the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States¶ (CFIUS) as a focus of their criticism. Th e Chinese want the¶ committee, an interagency group that reviews foreign acquisitions¶ of US companies for possible threats to the national security¶ of the United States, to be more open and transparent in¶ its rulings and to not discriminate against Chinese fi rms but¶ instead treat Chinese acquisitions on an equal basis in comparison¶ with acquisitions by fi rms of other nationalities.

The United States is not likely to accede to the Chinese¶ demands in any formal or legal manner. In a world of geopolitical¶ tensions, acquisitions by fi rms from potential adversary¶ countries will inevitably receive disproportionately intense scrutiny.¶ Assessments by US intelligence agencies will remain secret¶ so as not to reveal “sources and methods.”

Discussions with the Chinese about addressing their demands¶ have been a major part of negotiations on a bilateral¶ investment treaty (BIT), but as of September 2015, progress¶ on the issue has stalled despite efforts to complete agreement¶ at the time of the visit of President Xi Jinping to Washington¶ and Seattle. It has become increasingly apparent that the United¶ States is not prepared to change CFIUS’s substantive procedures¶ as China wants.

#### Biggest roadblock to BIT is addressing China’s CFIUS concerns

Nicholas Jenny, Global Risks Insights writer, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The main aim of a Sino-US BIT is to help encourage bilateral investment by guaranteeing companies non-discriminatory market access and protection from arbitrary treatment. In that respect, a BIT makes strong economic sense in the current climate by providing a level playing field for both US and Chinese companies to invest in one another’s markets.

Several [roadblocks](http://www.piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf) must first be addressed by both sides: US legislators are concerned about the favourable terms given to Chinese SOEs & domestic firms and the application of China’s anti-monopoly law; the Chinese are concerned about the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which has the power to block foreign investment should it be deemed a threat to national security.

### Solvency: CFIUS Key – Investment

#### CFIUS reform is key to solve Chinese investor uncertainty and encourage FDI

Xinhua News, February 10, 2015

“U.S. needs to reform CFIUS reviews on foreign investment: experts” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-02/11/c_133986476.htm>, (accessed 8/9/16)

For instance, as the definition of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by CFIUS is ambiguous, many Chinese mixed-ownership companies have been subject to CFIUS national security reviews, Fang Jin, deputy secretary general of the CDRF, said at the forum.

As a result, Chinese companies are facing rising uncertainties and restraints when investing in the United States, said Fang.

In order to lift ambiguity and promote transparency, Posen called for reforming the CFIUS process. He argued if the process is more transparent, foreign investors would have less reasons to complain when reviews are initiated, as they spell less uncertainty.

### Solvency: Say Yes – FDI – Both

#### Both sides say yes – there’s momentum to promote FDI

Nicholas Jenny, Global Risks Insights writer, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

However, there is a strong impetus for both countries to overcome these issues.

The US and China have already made [narrowing down](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/15/us-usa-china-investment-idUSKCN0RF2KN20150915) the list of sectors which will be restricted to foreign investment a key priority. The time is therefore ripe for producing results – political momentum on both sides of the Pacific is strong.

### Solvency: Say Yes – BIT – China

#### China says yes – sees it as crucial to boost its economy

Minxin Pei, Fortune writer, September 28, 2015

“US-China summit: It's time for some cautious optimism” <http://fortune.com/2015/09/28/china-us-obama-xi-jinping-meeting/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

With its focus almost exclusively on commercial cyber espionage, the media may have overlooked the most significant economic deal for which Xi’s visit has injected new momentum —a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The two countries have been negotiating a BIT for years but an agreement proved elusive. With its struggling economy, Beijing now regards a U.S.-China deal on BIT as a top priority. Chinese leaders think a BIT will signal American confidence in their economy, and American supporters argue that it will make the Chinese market more accessible to U.S. firms. But there are serious obstacles ahead. Most importantly, both sides have yet to agree on sectors in which investments will not be allowed. Even though Chinese and U.S. negotiators have recently exchanged the so-called “negative lists” naming these off-limits industries, the two sides are far apart. At the summit, Obama and Xi reiterated that a “high-quality” BIT will be the most important item on the bilateral economic agenda. But with only 15 months left in office, time is fast running out for Obama to close such a deal.

## Advantage-Specific

### Economy IL: Chinese FDI Key

#### Increased Chinese FDI is key to the US economy and doesn’t hurt national security

David M. Marchick, managing director at the Carlyle Group, where he is global head of external affairs, and Daniel R. Bowles, associate at the Carlyle Group, February 2012

“Fostering Greater Chinese Investment in the United States” Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 13, <http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/02/10/attracting-chinese-investment-heres-where-to-start/>, (accessed 8/8/16)

Openness to foreign investment generally benefits the United States, generating high-paying jobs, facilitating investment in research and development (R&D), and strengthening the country's manufacturing base. President Obama recently stepped up efforts to attract foreign investment, expanding the Commerce Department's investment promotion arm and proposing other measures to encourage "insourcing."

Given the slow pace of the economic recovery, the United States would benefit hugely from additional FDI. Critics argue that Chinese investment could compromise U.S. security interests and lead to job offshoring. While Chinese acquisition of certain U.S. companies in the defense or technology sectors would create national security concerns, the preponderance of potential Chinese investments in the United States would raise no such issues.

### Economy IL: BIT Key

#### BIT stabilizes the world economy and the individual US and Chinese economies

C. Fred Bergsten et al, senior fellow and director emeritus and the founding director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2014

“Toward Free Trade and Investment between China and the United States “, Ch. 1, <http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/6918.html>, (accessed 8/9/16)

China and the United States are the world’s two largest economies and together account for about one-third of world output. They are the two largest trading nations and the two largest recipients of FDI. China is the world’s largest exporter and largest or second-largest (to Germany) surplus country. The United States is the world’s largest importer and deficit country. A trade agreement between them would be a very big deal for the world economy, with profound effects on both countries. It would open new export opportunities that would accelerate each country’s economic growth. It would create new sources of import competition that would strengthen the productivity and competitiveness of each. Like any dynamic economic change, it would require internal adjustment among companies and especially workers. It would rein- force the rebalancing that both the US and Chinese economies need and have been pursuing. However, it would likely require substantial policy changes in both China and the United States, especially coming on top of the other major trade compacts that both China and the United States have been negotiating.

### Energy Sector IL: CFIUS Key

#### CFIUS is killing the US energy sector, which needs FDI to succeed

Joshua C. Zive[,](http://www.hblr.org/2013/04/unreasonable-delays-cfius-reviews-of-energy-transactions/#_ftn1)  Senior Counsel at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, April 18, 2013

“Unreasonable Delays: CFIUS Reviews of Energy Transactions” <http://www.hblr.org/2013/04/unreasonable-delays-cfius-reviews-of-energy-transactions/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The role of foreign investment in the U.S. energy sector has changed significantly in recent years. The development of domestic oil and gas resources has resulted in a significant increase in foreign interest in the U.S. as a target for investment in the wide range of industries connected to domestic oil and gas production, transportation, and use.[[1]](http://www.hblr.org/2013/04/unreasonable-delays-cfius-reviews-of-energy-transactions/#_ftn2) Such investment is important to the continued growth and success of the U.S. energy sector and, in order to facilitate these ventures, the regulatory process surrounding energy transaction investment should not impose unreasonable delays. Unfortunately, delays and burdens associated with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the Unites States (CFIUS) are playing an increasingly significant and frustrating role in energy transactions.

#### CFIUS causes delays that deter key foreign investment in the energy sector now – CFIUS reforms that speed up the process are key to restoring investor confidence

Joshua C. Zive[,](http://www.hblr.org/2013/04/unreasonable-delays-cfius-reviews-of-energy-transactions/#_ftn1)  Senior Counsel at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, April 18, 2013

“Unreasonable Delays: CFIUS Reviews of Energy Transactions” <http://www.hblr.org/2013/04/unreasonable-delays-cfius-reviews-of-energy-transactions/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The unnecessary delays faced by energy transactions can discourage important foreign investment and create unexpected problems that result in aborted transactions as result of events that occur during the long CFIUS review period. As such, there is risk going forward that an increasing number of parties might consider choosing to avoid these delays by not filing a voluntary notice, which leaves a lingering risk of a transaction being reviewed and potentially unwound by CFIUS after it has closed.

Decisions regarding whether to file a voluntary notice with CFIUS should be motivated by reasonable evaluations of national security issues and risks and not by the costs associated with delays. If parties choose not to file notices due to concerns about delays, it is likely that some transactions that may raise real or perceived national security issues will be not be reviewed by CFIUS before closing. When the media later reports on either the actual or alleged risks of these transactions, the risk of more controversies like DP World becomes more pronounced. Such controversies undermine the confidence that foreign investors have in the U.S., harming the economy and the energy sector. Furthermore, it is possible that some of the transactions that seek to avoid CFIUS review, in order to avoid delays, may pose actual national security risks if those transactions result in substantive—and not merely hypothetical—security vulnerabilities.

U.S. national security, the U.S. energy sector, and the larger U.S. economy would be well served if CFIUS would treat energy transactions in a more rational manner. CFIUS should promulgate guidance regarding the types of energy assets that are likely to be considered critical infrastructure and should be willing to terminate reviews after the initial 30-day review for assets that are outside of the defined scope of critical infrastructure. Additionally, the pre-notice process should be more clearly defined and should not include requests for information outside of what is required by CFIUS regulations. If these changes were made, it would allow CFIUS to focus their resources on transactions that raise legitimate national security risks and would allow parties involved in most energy transactions to submit a notice to CFIUS with confidence that the review could be completed in a reasonable timeframe.

### Free Trade IL: CFIUS Key

#### Our CFIUS-based rules and restrictions on FDI have caused reciprocal Chiense measures, all of which is killing free trade globally

Destiny Duron Deas, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Duke University Graduate School, M.A. expected 2008 and Bachelor’s from Southern Methodist University, 2008

“THE COSTS OF PERCEIVED HYPOCRISY: THE¶ IMPACT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN¶ ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=dlj>, (accessed 8/14/16)

As discussed in Part I, U.S. policies resisting foreign investment¶ in domestic enterprises have already provoked China to similarly¶ restrict foreign trade.108 The costs of U.S. and Chinese protectionism¶ may extend beyond the borders of either nation. Because both the¶ United States and China are members of the GATS,109 the U.S. and¶ Chinese M&A Rules implicate international law. The rules also affect¶ the central policy concern driving the GATS: promoting free trade in¶ the global economy.

Section A evaluates the compatibility of both countries’ foreign investment policies with the GATS provisions. Despite the differences between the U.S. and Chinese M&A Rules, this Section concludes that both countries’ rules violate the GATS. Section B explores the costs associated with violating the GATS. It argues that the rules harm the credibility of two nations that claim a commitment to the principles of free trade and economic development—and the WTO’s efforts to encourage free trade in the global economy

#### Free trade being hurt globally due to US and Sino protectionism like CFIUS

Destiny Duron Deas, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Duke University Graduate School, M.A. expected 2008 and Bachelor’s from Southern Methodist University, 2008

“THE COSTS OF PERCEIVED HYPOCRISY: THE¶ IMPACT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN¶ ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=dlj>, (accessed 8/14/16)

The People’s Republic of China’s revised rules governing foreign¶ acquisitions of domestic enterprises, promulgated in the fall of 2006,¶ disappointed many observers who had hoped for a more open and¶ transparent approach to Chinese foreign investment. On closer¶ inspection, however, the United States’ own laws and policies¶ restricting foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises influenced the¶ Chinese rules’ protectionism. The costs of U.S. trade policy have¶ extended beyond Chinese law. Both the U.S. and Chinese rules¶ limiting foreign investment likely violate each country’s respective¶ GATS commitments. These violations bring consequences beyond the¶ borders of these two nations, undermining free trade in the global¶ economy.

### Leadership IL: CFIUS Key

#### Perceived US hypocrisy based on CFIUS standards contradicting our own push for more open trade kills our leadership and influence in the world

Destiny Duron Deas, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Duke University Graduate School, M.A. expected 2008 and Bachelor’s from Southern Methodist University, 2008

“THE COSTS OF PERCEIVED HYPOCRISY: THE¶ IMPACT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF FOREIGN¶ ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES” <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=dlj>, (accessed 8/14/16)

The United States, however, may have actually¶ contributed to the content of the new rules. Although the U.S.¶ Congress did not pen the words of Article 12, U.S. policies resisting¶ acquisitions of domestic American companies by foreign entities had¶ a discernible impact on the content of the revised rules. After the¶ United States prevented a Chinese company from acquiring a¶ California corporation, China responded with revised rules that¶ heightened Chinese protectionism.10

Both the Chinese and U.S. acquisition rules may also run afoul of¶ World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. The United States¶ has argued that its own acquisition11 rules are no more restrictive than¶ necessary to maintain national security.12 Even if this argument is¶ accepted, the perceived hypocrisy of the United States blocking¶ politically unpopular acquisitions of U.S. entities by Chinese¶ companies while simultaneously urging more openness in the global¶ market undermines American influence and credibility. The costs of this perceived hypocrisy are not always clearly defined or restricted to¶ national borders.

### Relations IL: Chinese FDI Key

#### Increased Chinese FDI in the US solves relations and prevents war by increasing economic interdependence

Zachary Karabell, head of global strategy at Envestnet a financial services firm, April 1, 2016

“The Chinese want to buy more American companies — and we should let them” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-chinese-want-to-buy-more-american-companies--and-we-should-let-them/2016/04/01/ce4f811c-ef72-11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a_story.html?utm_term=.bdab2baa775a>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Instead of raising the battlements, the United States should adopt a policy that follows the old adage “keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” The best way to preserve American security and prosperity and to keep China’s aggression in check is not to resist China’s desire to invest but to encourage it.

The more money Chinese companies pour into the United States, the more motivation China has to maintain good relations and the more it has to lose if relations turn sour. If you are Chinese President Xi Jinping, the scale of these investments and capital flows becomes a serious consideration every time you contemplate an overture to Russia, or policy toward North Korea, or whether to menace that trawler in the seas around Vietnam. It is a factor when assessing how to value the yuan, and how much to confront or accommodate the United States on issues ranging from tariffs to trade agreements.

### Relations IL: BIT Key

#### BIT promotes interdependence and solves US-Sino conflict

Nicholas Jenny, Global Risks Insights writer, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The biggest benefits of a far-reaching and comprehensive BIT would exceed simple investment and trade. Rather, the treaty will provide the opportunity to significantly increase cooperation between both countries and in doing so will greatly reduce tensions in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Since Kant’s principle of perpetual peace, the notion that trade decreases the chance of interstate conflict has become widely accepted. The logic is simple: by increasing bilateral investment, the cost of conflict becomes too high for both countries to consider it a viable option. The European Community (EC) was built on this foundation by making the cost of another war between France and Germany too high to fathom

#### Just negotiating the BIT promotes cooperation and solves tensions

Nicholas Jenny, Global Risks Insights writer, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The process of negotiating towards a BIT is as important as the end result. BITs are difficult to achieve because they require negotiating through [political and economic security challenges](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-china-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-next-week/) which are sensitive topics in both countries. However, the fact that both sides are willing to sit down and talk about these traditionally taboo areas is a success in itself and will help both sides become increasingly open in their dealings and achieve trust between one another.

While many believe the recent success of the TPP will be Obama’s greatest foreign policy achievement, that treaty does little for the Sino-US relationship. A comprehensive BIT between the US and China would be a significant achievement in Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” A BIT will, first and foremost, promote bilateral investment. However, the intangible benefits it has the potential to produce should remind both leaders that there is more at stake should they fail to agree to a comprehensive BIT.

### Trade War IL: Chinese FDI Key

#### Sending a signal that the US welcomes increased Chinese FDI is key to dampen trade tensions that exist now

Edward Alden, the Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness and is the director of the CFR Renewing America publication series and co-author of the recent CFR Working Paper Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States and the former Washington bureau chief of the Financial Times and was the project co-director of the 2011 Independent Task Force on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy and holds a master's degree in international relations from the University of California, Berkeley, and pursued doctoral studies before returning to a journalism career and also has a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of British Columbia, February 10, 2012

“Attracting Chinese Investment: Here’s Where to Start” <http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/02/10/attracting-chinese-investment-heres-where-to-start/>, (Accessed 8/9/16)

But the paper argues that the United States needs to start by making it clear that this country actively wants and will encourage Chinese investment, and by working with China to eliminate misperceptions and clear away unnecessary obstacles where they exist. Both countries need to move beyond the bad feelings that were generated in 2005 when the Chinese oil company CNOOC faced a political firestorm over its effort to purchase Unocal.

The timing for such an initiative could not be better. The Obama administration has already[announced a strong policy](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/20/statement-president-united-states-commitment-open-investment-policy) of encouraging foreign investment. The visit to Washington of Chinese vice-president Xi Jinping is the perfect opportunity to tailor that message for a Chinese audience, and to deliver it at the highest levels. Xi, who will become the next president of China, is already [more familiar with the United States than any previous Chinese leader](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204573704577186992329708730.html), having spent time here as an agricultural official, and having sent his daughter to Harvard.

Such an initiative would also help to counter-balance some of the increasingly tough rhetoric and action on trade out of the Obama administration. The White House recently launched a new [trade enforcement task force](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203436904577151273759279432.html) that is largely aimed at China, and a number of high profile disputes, including one involving solar panels, are set to raise trade tensions. An investment initiative would help make clear that the administration wants to see economic gains for both sides.

# Aff Climate Coop

## Top-Level

### UQ: Paris Insufficient

#### Paris agreement not enough – sustained ambition is key to following through

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, November 11, 2015

“4 wins we need to make the Paris climate talks a success”, , (accessed 8/9/16)

But we also know that the Paris talks alone won’t deliver emission reductions needed to meet the long-term goal of keeping global temperatures from rising beyond 2 degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit – a widely agreed-upon objective, and a level that scientists believe would avert the most severe [impacts](https://www.edf.org/climate/climate-change-impacts) of climate change.

Meeting that goal will require sustained ambition over time, well beyond the 2025 or 2030 horizon of the Paris commitments.

### Solvency: Now Key

#### Further action now is key – will have huge long-term effects that determine effectiveness of policy

Fei Teng, bachelors degree in Mechanical Engineering and Applied Mathematics from Tsinghua University and MSc and Ph.D in Management Science in the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University and is now an associate professor in the Institute of Energy, Environment, and Economy at Tsinghua University and a lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report, Working Group III, and Jim Williams, Director of the [Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project](http://deepdecarbonization.org/) for the [U.N. Sustainable Development Solutions Network](http://unsdsn.org/) and has been Chief Scientist at the San Francisco consulting firm [E3](https://www.ethree.com/) and has a B.S. in Physics from Washington and Lee University and M.S. and Ph.D. in Energy and Resources from the University of California, Berkeley, September 23, 2015

“What Would New Breakthroughs on Climate Change Mean for the U.S.-China Relationship?” <https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-new-breakthroughs-climate-change-mean-us-china-relationship>, (accessed 8/9/16)

China and the U.S. last November injected new momentum into global efforts to avoid dangerous climate change. It recognized that the two countries have a common interest in protecting the climate, and that their leadership is needed. The forthcoming meeting between President Xi and President Obama should build on last fall’s announcement and translate political willingness into a practical action plan.

A vital step going forward is a commitment by both countries to develop detailed long-term low-carbon transition plans. Deep emissions reductions require changes in the physical infrastructure and equipment that produce and use energy. Because the economic lifetimes of many key elements in the energy system—power plants, buildings, industrial boilers, freight trucks—are decades long, decisions made today have emissions consequences far into the future. A long-term plan that takes infrastructure inertia into account is an essential point of reference for all aspects of an effective climate strategy, from short-term policy to R&D priorities to sending the right signals to businesses and investors.

### Solvency: Say Yes – China

#### China sees climate coop as an opportunity – would say yes to the plan

Julie Makinen, reporter in the Los Angeles Times' Beijing bureau, December 13, 2015

“China, U.S. relationship key in climate agreement” <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-u-s-climate-20151213-story.html>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Now, instead of regarding any multilateral environmental pact as a hindrance to unbridled economic growth, China sees an opportunity to seize agreements such as the Paris deal to showcase itself as a progressive superpower and responsible international stakeholder — while doing things it needs to do at home anyway.

The Obama administration, said Kerry, recognized this coming convergence in 2013 and sought to capitalize on it “to change the paradigm of what happened in Copenhagen.”

“We saw they had environmental challenges in China and had [a self-] interest, therefore, and we tried to tap into that.”

#### China says yes – recognizes the need to act to solve threats to its development

Julie Makinen, reporter in the Los Angeles Times' Beijing bureau, December 13, 2015

“China, U.S. relationship key in climate agreement” <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-u-s-climate-20151213-story.html>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Sam Geall, a University of Sussex research fellow, said in a recent report that diplomacy certainly has helped push China along. “But far more important is the growing awareness that climate impacts and air pollution pose major threats to [China’s] development,” he said.

“In short, China’s new approach rests on the fact that its leaders see combating climate change as being in the national interest,” he added. “And underpinning that perception is not only a vision of how China might position itself in [the] future, but also a real transformation already underway in China’s economy.”

## Advantage-Specific

### CCP Collapse IL: Climate Action Key

#### Climate action key to prevent CCP collapse from unrest about rising pollution rates in China

Julie Makinen, reporter in the Los Angeles Times' Beijing bureau, December 13, 2015

“China, U.S. relationship key in climate agreement” <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-u-s-climate-20151213-story.html>, (accessed 8/9/16)

What explains China’s shift? It’s not necessarily pangs of guilt nor a newfound sense of global munificence. Instead, after years of downplaying its environmental crisis, Chinese leaders appear to have recognized that cleaning up China’s toxic skies and pushing the country toward renewable energy are crucial to maintaining the Communist Party’s grip on power amid rising public discontent.

### Econ/Competitiveness IL: Climate Coop Key

#### US-Sino cooperation on climate change spurs the green tech industry through combining our strengths – this is key to US competitiveness and the economy

Wang Ke, assistant professor at the Renmin University School of Environment and Natural Resources and research fellow at the Renmin University National Academy of Development and Strategy, November 10, 2014

“Building a New Type of Major Power Relationship Through Climate Cooperation Will Require New Thinking from the United States”, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ChinaReport-Energy-FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

China and the United States share many common interests in the climate space.¶ Both countries are bearing the adverse effects of climate change. As the world’s¶ two biggest energy consumers, both nations face very similar challenges on¶ improving energy efficiency, expanding renewable energy development, and¶ upgrading critical infrastructure to improve climate resiliency. When it comes¶ to finding solutions to these challenges, the two nations possess complementary¶ strengths: the United States generally excels at technological innovation, and¶ China generally excels at deployment of these technologies in the production process.¶ By working together, both countries can combine strengths in order to excel¶ across the value chain. China’s economy is shifting toward a cleaner and more¶ efficient development model, and that is creating an enormous domestic Chinese¶ market for clean energy technologies and products—a market that will generate¶ large-scale demand for advanced U.S. systems, technologies, standards, and management¶ expertise. China-U.S. collaboration on low-carbon technology brings¶ together U.S. research, development, and business models with China’s worldleading¶ manufacturing strength and enormous market size. When both nations¶ combine forces, it allows U.S. businesses to shape the global supply chain and¶ global division of labor, to drive down the cost of low-carbon technology more¶ quickly, and to expand the global market of low-carbon technology and products.

In turn, these market developments will help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,¶ promote economic prosperity, and create jobs. Low-carbon solutions will¶ also help the United States upgrade its infrastructure at home and make its own¶ low-carbon economic transition easier. As illustrated in a Pew report, the United¶ States and China have already become very complementary in terms of renewable ¶

#### Chinese transition to clean energy is key to the US green tech industry

Melanie Hart, Director for China Policy at the Center for American Progress, November 10, 2014

“Exploring the Frontiers of U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation: Energy and Climate Change”, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ChinaReport-Energy-FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

To be sure, the United States benefits from these initiatives as well. By helping¶ China clean up its environment, the United States is also cleaning its own because¶ pollution is mobile. When the United States helps China expand its energy economy,¶ new market opportunities are created for U.S. businesses. From an American¶ perspective, this arrangement allows the United States to make the most of its¶ strengths and to help China move in a direction that benefits both nations.

#### Key to our economy by opening up markets

Nat Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, November 23, 2015

“To know what the United States is really doing on climate change, look past the political theater” <http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2015/11/23/to-know-what-the-united-states-is-really-doing-on-climate-change-look-past-the-political-theater/#more-4736>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The United States will choose its own best path to contribute. But global action is good for our economy (as we create markets for clean technologies) and it is essential for doing all we can to address climate change with the urgency that is needed. Some in Congress will try to stop the U.S. from helping the world’s poorest countries fight climate change, but cooler heads know that’s short-sighted: the fact is, [when other countries cut carbon pollution, it helps our economy and our climate too.](http://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/foreign-action-domestic-windfall)

### Hegemony IL: Climate Action Key

#### Failure to follow through on our Paris commitments kills US hegemony

Aspen Institute, June 2, 2016

“Session 2: Climate Diplomacy, Cooperation, and Broader Issues of International Relations” Track II Briefing Paper, <https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/ee/2.%20U.S.%20Climate%20Diplomacy.FINAL__0.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

We have not addressed here what parties should do in the face of outlying climate actors who in the future may wish to completely abrogate the Paris Agreement or in other ways make themselves international pariahs on this issue. Todd Stern, former U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, thinks that the answer is obvious. Speculating about a possible future U.S. president who may want to take us out of the Paris Agreement, Stern speculates that the outcome would be that “U.S. standing in the world would plummet amid almost universal condemnation” leaving “U.S. credibility and leverage in tatters.” We full well expect that whether this claim is true will be debated in the upcoming election. The fact that this is an issue under public discussion now in the U.S. is a sign that climate diplomacy is now of far greater interest in the U.S. than it has ever been before.

### Poverty IL: Clean Energy Key

#### Clean energy is key to solve poverty

Fred Krupp, Environmental Defense Fund President, September 10, 2015

“4 undeniable signs we're making progress on climate change” <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/09/10/4-undeniable-signs-were-making-progress-climate-change>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Clean energy is lifting people out of poverty One billion people worldwide still have no energy, and more than 1 billion live in extreme poverty. Turning the corner on climate cannot mean that economies can’t develop.

But just as some developing economies adopted cellular technology without ever having land lines, some will leap-frog the dirty energy phase of economic development and go straight to clean.

In fiscal 2014, the World Bank more than doubled lending for renewable energy projects to nearly $3.6 billion – or 38 percent of its total energy lending.  As Rachel Kyte, the bank’s vice president and special envoy for climate change, recently said, what poverty-stricken people of the world need now is a “a low-carbon revolution.”

### Relations IL: Climate Coop Key

#### Absolutely key to relations

Michelle FlorCruz, Content Producer at Asia Society News, December 21, 2015

“Solving Climate Change Problem Rests on U.S.-China Cooperation” <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/solving-climate-change-problem-rests-us-china-cooperation>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Though cooperation between the two countries may not be easy when it comes to other topics, Schell says that climate change is one topic that the two economic giants can see eye-to-eye on.

“We’re not going to find common interest in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Tibet, human rights, probably in trade, a thousand things where we’re going to disagree,” Schell said, adding that “climate change may end up being the kind of the great savior of the U.S.-China relationship.”

“What has brought these two massive emitters together is I think, an American recognition that you can’t just walk away from this problem, despite the problems of the U.S. Senate,” Rudd said. “Secondly, Chinese self-interest at home because of carbon pollution and air pollution within cities — having a huge impact on mortality by the way — and then in addition to that, China’s international reputational stakes.”

#### Climate change is the only area with enough agreement to spillover and solve broader tensions

Wang Ke, assistant professor at the Renmin University School of Environment and Natural Resources and research fellow at the Renmin University National Academy of Development and Strategy, November 10, 2014

“Building a New Type of Major Power Relationship Through Climate Cooperation Will Require New Thinking from the United States”, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ChinaReport-Energy-FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Given the long-term strategic significance of climate change and the complementary nature of China and the United States on this issue—including their shared interests—the room and potential for cooperation is fairly large. Since the issue is less sensitive than security issues and less likely to fall victim to short-term political dynamics, it is more stable and ready for cooperation and thus could become “a pillar of the bilateral relationship.”10 This pillar could help build mutual trust and respect, pave the way for further bilateral cooperation in the areas of international politics, economics, and finance and security, and promote a new type of major power relations between China and the United States.

#### US-Sino collaboration on climate change sends a positive signal that spillsover to the broader relationship

Junjie Zhang, Associate Professor of Environmental Economics in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at University of California, San Diego and a Senior Adviser of Asia Society and holds a Ph.D. in Environmental and Resource Economics from Duke University and an M.S. and a B.S. in environmental engineering from Tsinghua University and a B.A. in environmental economics and management from Renmin University of China, September 16, 2015

“What Would New Breakthroughs on Climate Change Mean for the U.S.-China Relationship?” <https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-new-breakthroughs-climate-change-mean-us-china-relationship>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Climate change is one of the few areas that the U.S. and China can achieve successful collaboration. As the rivalry between two countries has intensified in recent years, mutually beneficial climate collaboration can be an important step stone to improve bilateral relationship. By working together to reduce climate pollutants, both countries not only contribute to the protection of global climate but also send a positive signal to build a healthy U.S.-China relationship.

#### Climate change engagement requires a level of cooperation that builds trust in our broader relations

Aspen Institute, June 2, 2016

“Session 2: Climate Diplomacy, Cooperation, and Broader Issues of International Relations” Track II Briefing Paper, <https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/ee/2.%20U.S.%20Climate%20Diplomacy.FINAL__0.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

Explore the soft and hard co-benefits of cooperative climate action. The broader USChina diplomatic relationship is mired by divergent diplomatic and economic interests, often leading both actors to approach disclosure of key metrics with caution. Yet the disclosure required to address the common threat of climate change, and fully realize the potential of the Paris agreement, can be the focal point from which trust is earned through an iterative process and thereby benefiting the broader diplomatic relationship. There are numerous well known hard and measurable co-benefits of climate action. These include the clean air and health benefits of GHG reduction, the technology and development benefits of innovation in low carbon technology, the development of capacity in development and use of data sets, including MRV standards, and others. The U.S. and China could commit to a series of workshops on such topics to build peer learning groups that span areas that have been previously separate but which have potentially common or overlapping research agendas.1 As these workshops develop their analysis, it may be possible to envision how diplomacy could make progress through action achieving co-benefits that would be less likely if the issues and benefits are not considered together.

#### Concrete action on climate cooperation is key to relations

Melanie Hart, Director for China Policy at the Center for American Progress, November 10, 2014

“Exploring the Frontiers of U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation: Energy and Climate Change”, <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ChinaReport-Energy-FINAL.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

The United States and China have a unique window of opportunity to achieve measurable progress on energy and climate change and to upgrade the U.S.-China relationship across the board. The two nations currently share more interests in this space than in any other. On military issues, for example, dialogue has improved tremendously in recent years. But at a strategic level, the United States and China are still primarily just trying to avoid destabilizing incidents in the Asia-Pacific. On cyber security, the government-to-government working group under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, has been unable to even schedule meetings, much less think about actual policy deliverables. On economic issues, commercial complaints are growing on both sides of the Pacific and making it increasingly difficult to agree on anything new and concrete that would deepen market integration in the near-to-medium term.

If U.S. and Chinese leaders want their meetings to produce something new and concrete, there is a growing consensus in both capitols that energy and climate cooperation is the only track that can reliably deliver. The range of energy and climate deliverables rolled out thus far is truly breathtaking. Current bilateral projects include cooperation on advanced vehicle technology, clean coal, building efficiency, greenhouse gas-emission monitoring, smart grid technology, shale gas development, and many others. There is virtually no area of this domain where the two nations are not cooperating in some way. Most importantly, this cooperation is in the form of real projects that involve people from both sides getting together to actually do something. By any measure, this area of the relationship has become a true action track, not an empty-talk track.

At the same time, however, it is important to make sure that this growing array of action-oriented projects eventually adds up to something more than a steady stream of deliverables for high-level meetings. On climate change, in particular, bilateral cooperation will not be considered a true win unless those activities have an impact that goes far beyond the bilateral relationship. Most importantly, other nations around the world are looking to the United States and China to breakdown the current impasse between developed and developing countries and serve as the poles around which the rest of the world could rally to form a new global climate agreement in 2015.

### Warming IL: Coop Key

#### Joint US-Sino action on warming is crucial to global emissions reductions

Joseph Aldy et al, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, February 2016

“Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy”, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/13)

Climate change has added a new dimension to a bilateral relationship that is already one of the most important of the twenty-first century. While China and the United States have different national interests in many areas, climate change represents an important area where their interests, and those of every other country interested in the wellbeing of its citizens and future generations, converge. But the success of the China–U.S. relationship in this arena will be determined less by the ability to find common ground than by the ability to find solutions that properly address the real socioeconomic and political differences that exist between these two nations. If an effective response to climate change eventually requires the participation of all countries, despite their different cultures, states of economic development, and political systems, successful China–U.S. cooperation under the hybrid Paris climate policy architecture may well prove crucial in paving the way for broader international cooperation to reduce the risk of global climate change.

#### Can’t solve warming without joint US-Sino action

Michelle FlorCruz, Content Producer at Asia Society News, December 21, 2015

“Solving Climate Change Problem Rests on U.S.-China Cooperation” <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/solving-climate-change-problem-rests-us-china-cooperation>, (accessed 8/9/16)

On the heels of the UN Climate Summit in Paris, Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), and Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross Director of Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, discuss the pivotal role American and Chinese cooperation will play in addressing global climate change.

“The climate change problem will not be solved if the U.S. and China don’t get together,” Schell said during [the panel event](http://asiasociety.org/northern-california/events/un-climate-summit-and-future-us-china-collaboration) at Asia Society Northern California on December 18, 2015, which was moderated by Bruce Pickering, vice president of Global Programs at Asia Society. “Doesn’t matter what the Europeans do, the Japanese … what matters is the U.S. and China.”

#### Being the two largest emitters makes US-China action on warming key to solve

Joseph Aldy et al, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, February 2016

“Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy”, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/13)

China and the United States, the two largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in the world, together accounted for 35%2 of global GHG emissions in 2012. While there are major socioeconomic and political differences between the two countries, it is widely acknowledged that action by China and the United States is necessary for the world to effectively address global climate change.

### Warming IL: Coop Key – Paris

#### Continued US-China cooperation on climate change is key to effective implementation and enforcement of the Paris deal

Aspen Institute, June 2, 2016

“Session 2: Climate Diplomacy, Cooperation, and Broader Issues of International Relations” Track II Briefing Paper, <https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/ee/2.%20U.S.%20Climate%20Diplomacy.FINAL__0.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/16)

U.S.-China cooperation was critical in achieving the Paris Agreement. The dynamics of Paris were complex, and the completion of the agreement will require further cooperation from state and nonstate actors. Implementation of the global climate regime emerging after Paris will be even more complex. U.S.-China cooperation in the run up to and through the Paris COP was also critical for the ambition expressed in the agreement. Continued U.S.-China cooperation is essential for implementing the agreement, strengthening it over time, and increasing ambition over successive rounds of pledges.

#### US-China cooperation on Paris implementation is key to the deal’s effectiveness and multilateral cooperation on climate change

Joseph Aldy et al, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, February 2016

“Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy”, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf>, (accessed 8/9/13)

Given that China and the United States are the world’s two largest GHG emitters; the

momentum that already exists with respect to bilateral cooperation on climate change and

clean energy technologies;11 and the completion of the Paris Agreement at COP-21—it is important to explore opportunities for and challenges to furthering this cooperation. Among other reasons, much work remains to be done to elaborate the Paris Agreement over the next five years—to specify rules, procedures, and guidelines for the various elements of the accord. China-U.S. collaboration will continue to be very important during this preparatory phase. More generally—beyond the UNFCCC process—it is important to explore how China–U.S. cooperation can facilitate multilateral cooperation in global efforts to address climate change.

# Aff Space Exploration Coop

## Space Weaponization Advantage

### Solvency – Space Weaponization

#### International cooperation and dialogue key to prevent space weaponization

Scott Pace, Director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs, May 2016, “Space Cooperation Among Order-Building Powers” <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964616300091> (Accessed 8/1/2016)

In 2007, Estonia was subject to a wide-ranging series of cyber-attacks against government ministries, the parliament, banks, newspapers, and broadcasters. Widely attributed to be of Russian origin due to their sophistication and persistence, the cyber-attacks prompted new attention to international law in the cyber domain. In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence convened an international group of legal scholars and practitioners to draft a manual on how to interpret international law in the context of cyber operations and cyber warfare. This effort resulted in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare or simply the Tallinn Manual.4 As might be expected, no such manual or study exists for armed conflict in space. Debates on the use of force in space in international forums quickly reveal a divergence of views and a lack of expert discussions on the interlinked concepts 5of security, sustainability, and the potential for conflict in space. Some see outer space as a sanctuary, where the use and exploration of outer space is the province of all humankind, and where space activities can only be conducted for peaceful purposes. Others are concerned that the growing use of space for national security purposes could lead to attacks on space systems as part of future conflicts on Earth. To explore these issues, the Secure World Foundation, in collaboration with my home institution, the Space Policy Institute (SPI), convened a workshop on September 9, 2015, in Washington, D.C., to discuss three hypothetical yet plausible scenarios exploring issues of self-defense and conflict in outer space. The workshop included experts from academia, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the public sector in non-official capacities. Some had extensive experiences with space systems while for others space operations were an unfamiliar subject. As part of the scenarios, participants considered questions such as: Does uplink jamming that prevents command and control of a satellite and degrades military capability constitute an armed attack? What is the legal standard for a pre-emptive attack on satellites in self-defense? What is the burden of proof for one country to demonstrate that another country is responsible for damage to its satellites? Can destroying a ground facility be a proportional response to attacks on a nation's satellites? Under what circumstances could the creation of a debris cloud in orbit be considered an armed attack on another country?5 Participants all felt that they had barely scratched the surface of what was needed to truly understand all the legal, political, and operational nuances of armed conflict in space. They pointed to the lack of clarity and consensus on the meaning of existing principles in international space law, and a lack of legal and political mechanisms for resolving situations without use of force. The national security space community overall lacks experience in dealing with jus ad bellum and jus in Bello questions and an even greater lack of expertise and capacity with these issues within the international community. Some experts felt that the experience highlighted the importance of international discussions on norms of behavior and perhaps even new legal agreements, although most cautioned that much more work would be required to increase understanding and build consensus before meaningful discussions were possible. While recognizing the uncertainty and somewhat speculative nature of discussions of self-defense in space, the use of force, and armed conflict in space, several participants felt that the merely continuing status quo for space activities was dangerous. The increasing and somewhat unappreciated reliance on space systems by advanced and developing states could create unpredictable pressures for escalation and crisis instability should those space systems be threatened or lost.

### Solvency – Peaceful

#### Cooperation with China would make space exploration peaceful

Charles Poladian, IBTimes Staff Writer, November 16, 2015, “The Future of Space Policy is Built on International Cooperation: NASA Administrator Charles Bolden,” <http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasa-administrator-charles-bolden-2186627> (Accessed 8/12/2016)

Conspicuously absent from NASA's international partners is China. Politics have stymied this relationship following a ban included in the 2011 U.S. Federal budget. There are some loopholes that have allowed Bolden to collaborate with the Chinese Academy of Science on Earth science research. NASA also provided China with lunar imagery that helped the Chang'e 3 mission select a landing site. Air traffic management is another area of cooperation. "It’s critical to partner with China," Bolden said. Space exploration is peaceful, but the area above Earth could become a source of contention as more countries send satellites into orbit. More partnerships would lead to a safer orbit. "If we’re partnered with the Chinese, as we are with other nations, I think they would be much less prone to do something that puts low-Earth orbit in jeopardy, like, you know, anti-satellite stuff. Now, that may be a naïve thought, but I think that's what gives me hope, that the more we can have many nations working toward a common goal, the better off we’ll be," Bolden said.

### Space War Bad – Economy

#### Lack of cooperation escalates risk of space war

Omar Lamrani, studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, May 18, 2016, “What the US Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248?page=show> (Accessed 8/6/2016)

Space is becoming more congested, contested and competitive. Since the Soviet Union put the first satellite, Sputnik I, into space in 1957, no nation has deliberately destroyed another's satellite in orbit. But there is a growing possibility that battles may soon be waged in space. Although the militarization of space started long ago, a number of technological developments and tests over the past decade show that the race toward its weaponization is accelerating. Driven by Washington's dominance of and strategic dependence on space, U.S. rivals are working to develop and deploy anti-satellite weapons (widely known as ASATs). The technology, which began to be developed during the Cold War, has become an area of intense competition for the world's most capable militaries over the past decade. For the United States, being the leader in military space technologies provides immense advantages. At the same time, its outsized reliance on those technologies entails risks. The current unequal dependence on space, the United States fears, could give adversaries incentive to attack its infrastructure in orbit. Washington is therefore pushing to bolster its capabilities and is preparing for the possibility that a future conflict could escalate into space. As the militarized space race continues, the United States will stay focused on deterrence. A war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal. An Unequal Dependence: Washington's dependence on space infrastructure reflects the United States' dominance in space. The tyranny of time and distance inherently hinders the United States' ability to deploy its military across the globe. But the space domain effectively helps the country to overcome the limitations, allowing for enhanced force projection. As a result, the U.S. military relies heavily on its orbital assets for navigation, intelligence collection, precision targeting, communication, early warning and several other crucial activities. The great advantages that space assets afford the United States have not gone unnoticed by its potential rivals. Though China and Russia, for instance, also rely on space, they are less dependent on their space assets than the United States is. First, neither nation has as much in orbit. In addition, because both put greater focus on their immediate geographic regions, they can use more conventional tools to achieve their objectives. For instance, Beijing, by virtue of geographic proximity, could rely on its ground-based radars and sensors in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, on the other hand, would have to lean on its satellites to support a response in the same area. Despite the United States' superior ability to strike at enemy space constellations — groups of similar kinds of satellites — competitors may determine that the resulting loss of space access would be worthwhile if they could severely degrade U.S. space access. And while the United States is the most proficient nation in space-based warfare, there are limits to its abilities. Satellites in orbit follow predictable movements, have restricted maneuverability and are difficult to defend from an attack. There is little doubt that a full kinetic strike on U.S. satellites, which would inflict physical damage, would invite a devastating response. But tactics designed to degrade the satellites' abilities, rather than to destroy their hardware, could be deemed less escalatory and therefore perhaps worth the risk. These include jamming signals, hacking operational software and dazzling (temporarily blinding) or permanently disabling sensors. Calculating the risk of nonkinetic strikes, which would create little physical damage and could even be reversed, a potential foe would take into account the United States' hesitance to escalate a conflict in space, given its heavy dependence on orbital technology. Reinforcing Deterrence: If the United States wants to preserve its primacy in the face of increasing threats to its strength in space, Washington will need to invest in strategies to deter attacks on its orbital assets. The first step in strengthening space deterrence is to ensure proper attribution: The United States cannot hold its enemies accountable for attacks if it does not know who initiated them. But the vastness of space, along with the difficulty of obtaining physical evidence from attacked satellites, can make responsibility hard to prove. To that end, the United States is investing in a second-generation surveillance system, known as Space Fence, to track satellites and orbital debris. Slated to begin operating in 2018, Space Fence uses ground-based radars that give it 10 times the detection capability of its predecessor, the Air Force Space Surveillance System. In addition, the United States has been working with a classified satellite defense technology called the Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness system, which reportedly will be able to pinpoint the source of a laser fired at a satellite. Redundancy and shielding can also deter limited attacks against satellites. The innate redundancy of large satellite constellations could make attacking them too risky; such an assault would fail to significantly impair U.S. space control while still inviting retaliation. Meanwhile, more widespread use of resistant antenna designs, filters, surge arresters and fiber-optic components, which are less vulnerable to attack, is already being explored to further shield satellites from jamming, dazzling and blinding. Finally, the United States can work alongside its global partners and allies to convey the idea that a full-blown battle that would destroy orbiting satellites would be bad for all of humanity. Reinforcing this message and openly tying it to a powerful U.S. response could further bolster deterrence. Preventing a War in Space: While the United States works to discourage hostilities in space, in no small part to ensure its enduring advantage there, Washington is also taking more steps to plan for the contingency of a war in space. The Department of Defense has nominated the secretary of the U.S. Air Force as the initiative's principal adviser, tasked with coordinating space-related efforts across the military. Late last year, the United States also established the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center at Colorado's Schriever Air Force Base. The center facilitates information sharing across the national security space enterprise and has already run a number of wargame scenarios to simulate conflict in orbit. Furthermore, the Pentagon has added $5 billion to its space programs budget in 2016, pushing the total to about $27 billion. The budget provides for spending on technologies and tactics that can help the United States mitigate and recover from a space attack. One effort, spearheaded by the Operationally Responsive Space Office, aims to develop small satellites and associated launch systems that can be built and deployed quickly and cheaply. (For the most part, the current U.S. fleet consists of large, sophisticated and expensive satellites, some of which cost billions of dollars and take years to construct.) As part of this endeavor, the office has directed the development of a standardized but modular satellite chassis that allows for multiple payload variations. The result is increased flexibility, as well as lower costs and quicker turnaround in production. Developing a less expensive and more efficient way to launch replacements for destroyed or disabled systems is the next step. With that in mind, the Operationally Responsive Space Office is funding the development of the Spaceborne Payload Assist Rocket-Kauai (SPARK) launch system, designed to send miniaturized satellites into low-Earth and sun-synchronous orbits. In its efforts to rapidly launch swarms of miniaturized satellites on the cheap, the U.S. military is also looking to leverage the private sector. Companies such as Virgin Galactic (with the LauncherOne) and the Rocket Lab (with the Electron Vehicle) have expressed keen interest in the initiative. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack — theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet, however; key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems, such as the large but critically important nuclear-hardened command-and-control mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas and considerable power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative ways to perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer the most advanced alternative. But considering the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best. Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in place. In the race between shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial war. The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration.

## Relations Advantage

### Uniqueness – Relations Low Now

#### US-China relations low now – Cooperation is key

Yin Chenge, research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies, March 07, 2016 “China-U.S. Relations: Cooperation or Confrontation?” <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-relations-cooperation-or-confrontation/> (Accessed 8/11/2016)

For many years, United States military airplanes and ships have conducted close-in surveillance operations on China. Recently, with a more ostentatious move, a U.S. Navy vessel sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Zhongjian Island in China’s Xisha Archipelago in violation of Chinese sovereignty. The U.S. claimed that they will continue the practice in the future. The U.S. has created two excuses for its challenge against Chinese sovereignty. The first is “freedom of navigation”, which is a pseudo proposition. There has been no trouble regarding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Each year more than 100,000 vessels of various types from various countries sailed through the South China Sea without any trouble. Not a single accident has occurred there because of China. Freedom of navigation refers to the free passage of vessels of all countries through international waters not the freedom for a country’s military vessels to conduct close-contact surveillance; much less in the territorial waters of another country. The U.S. moves have nothing to do with freedom of navigation. These actions are in contempt of and a challenge against the sovereignty of another country. They are the replica of the gunboat policy of days past. The other is China’s “excessive maritime claims.” A spokesperson of the U.S. Department of Defense employed such a pretext to justify its challenge against Chinese sovereignty, indicating China is expanding the scope of its own sovereignty in the South China Sea, taking islands and maritime rights and interests of other countries as its own. This pretext aims to deny China’s sovereignty, turning Chinese territorial waters into international waters, and finding “reasonable” ground for its military vessels’ is a willful disregard of Chinese sovereignty in Chinese waters. This reflects ignorance and distortion of history. The islands and adjacent waters in the South China Sea have always been China’s. This is both historical truth and commonsense. Even U.S. President Barack Obama once acknowledged it. The essence of the South China Sea issue is most Chinese islands and reefs have been illegally occupied by a number of countries. China is the victim in the South China Sea issue. By portraying China the victim and constructive stakeholder as a “provocateur” and challenging China with such an excuse, the U.S. has disregarded facts and exposed its own obsession with power politics. U.S. challenges against China are an integral part of its offensive strategy against China in the Asia-Pacific, which embodies the conspicuous escalation of its attempt to contain China. The background is China’s persistent, forceful rise, as well as the abrupt rise of its impacts on regional and global stages thanks to the implementation of its “one belt, one road” initiative. The U.S. has been bedeviled by the strategic anxiety that China will challenge or supplant its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific—and globally. That is undoubtedly a groundless supposition. China has demonstrated that no matter how strong it becomes it won’t change its initial goal of peaceful development, it will always be faithful to its promise of never pursuing hegemony. China-U.S. gaming in the South China Sea will be a long-term phenomenon.

### Solvency – Space is Key

#### Cooperation in space boosts overall relations

Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation, September 9, 2015, “An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship,” <http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602> (Accessed 8/4/2016)

The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding the “Thucydides trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict. The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States’ ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic congestion and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASA’s successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of China’s new capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the United States and other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and China’s growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities.

### Solvency – Economic Growth

#### US-China cooperation in space is key to US-China relations and overall economic growth

Brian Weeden, Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation, and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, April 26, 2016, “Use Outer Space to Strengthen US-China Ties,” <http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/> (Accessed 8/4/2016)

The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.

### Solvency – International Benefits

#### US-China cooperation would benefit developing countries

RT, Staff Writer, June 22, 2016, “China Future Space Station up for Sharing with Other Countries,” <https://www.rt.com/news/347750-china-space-station-share/> (Accessed 8/11/16)

Calling space exploration the “common dream and wish of mankind,” Wu said the agreement will “promote international cooperation on space exploration, and create opportunities for United Nations member states, particularly developing countries, to take part in, and benefit from, the utilization of China’s space station.” Those thoughts were echoed by UNOOSA director Simonetta Di Pippo, who called the agreement an “exciting opportunity to further build the space capacity of developing countries and increase understanding of the benefits space can bring to humankind...” Beijing is excluded from using the ISS due to a US government ban on its participation. In addition, NASA is explicitly forbidden from working with China, with a 2011 Congress spending bill citing a high risk of espionage.

## Solvency

### China Wants Plan

#### China open to cooperation with the US – ban prevents SQ cooperation

XNA, Xinhua News Agency Staff Writers, April 26, 2016, “China open to Sino-US Space Cooperation” http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China\_open\_to\_Sino\_US\_space\_cooperation\_999.html (Accessed 8/11/2016)

China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the United States, the heavyweights of China's space program said on Sunday, the anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago. "China will not rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States," said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut. Payload has been reserved in the Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and foreign astronauts, said Yang on the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government. Upon request, China will also train astronauts for other countries, and jointly train astronauts with the European space station, Yang said. "The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It's true for us, and for the United States too," according to the senior astronaut. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China's manned space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development." "Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou added. Citing security reasons, the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities and working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise. Ban remains in effect The U.S.-dominated International Space Station, which unsurprisingly blocks China, is scheduled to end its service in 2024. China's space station could be the only operational one in outer space, at least for a while.

### China Wants Plan

#### China wants to cooperate with the US

Doug Messier, Managing Editor, May 10, 2016, “Chinese Space Program Increases International Cooperation” <http://www.parabolicarc.com/2016/05/10/chinese-space-program-increases-international-cooperation/> (Accessed 8/12/2016)

U.S. Cooperation Remains Difficult Chinese officials say they would like to cooperate with United States in space. “China will not rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States,” said Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut. ”The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It’s true for us, and for the United States, too.” Cooperation is strictly limited, however. Under U.S. law prohibits NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending any money on cooperating with China in space. The prohibition does not apply to the State Department. American and Chinese diplomats held discussions on civil space cooperation during the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue last June. The three-day meeting led to the establishment of a plan to hold regular talks on civil space cooperation in areas such as satellite-collision avoidance, weather monitoring and climate research. Meanwhile, some cooperation is taking place. A commercial Chinese experiment will be flown to the International Space Station later this year under a private agreement between NanoRacks and the Beijing Institute of Technology. The experiment will test the effect of the space environment on DNA. An earlier experiment flew to China’s Tiangong-1 space station in 2011.

### China Says Yes – Exploration

#### China wants space exploration cooperation with US

Arthur Dominic Villasanta, ChinaTopix Staff Writer, June 27, 2016, “Heads of China and US Space Agencies Appeal for Cooperation in Space Exploration” <http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/93677/20160627/heads-china-space-agencies-appeal-cooperation-exploration.htm> (Accessed 8/12/2016)

China plans to land its first robot rover on Mars by 2021 and is currently developing a heavy rocket that can reach the Red Planet. Over the next 15 years, China will develop and launch a heavy lift rocket nearly 10 meters in diameter and with five times the carrying capacity of current rockets for voyages to Mars. Last April, CNSA head Prof. Wu Weiren affirmed China is ready to again work with the U.S. despite the legal ban on cooperation imposed by the U.S. and the perception among influential members of the U.S. Congress that CNSA remains a military-led organization whose priority is to ensure China's military dominance of space beneath the guise of a civilian space program. CNSA is an agency of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), a pseudo-civilian organization apparently led by military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). SASTIND and its predecessor have played a key role in developing China's space program since 1956 when China began its ballistic missile program. Today, SASTIND is China's comprehensive administrative office for national defense science; military technology and military industries. "We would like to cooperate with the US, especially for space and moon exploration. We would welcome this very much," said Wu. "We have urged the US many times to get rid of restrictions, so scientists from both countries can work together on future exploration.'" And this May, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden suggested the United States resume cooperation with China in space by having Congress revise U.S. Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 that bans any cooperative effort among the space programs of both the U.S. and China.

### China Space Tech Growing – Wants Cooperation

#### China’s space program is growing – wants to cooperate

Ray Kwong, strategist and marketing consultant, April 26, 2016, “Space: China seeks cooperation with the US,” http://www.ejinsight.com/20160426-space-china-seeks-cooperation-with-the-us/ (Accessed 8/11/2016)

“Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind,” Zhou added. Chinese President Xi Jinping asked scientists to help realize China’s dream of becoming a global space giant as the Communist nation marked its first Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government, according to NDTV. “In establishing Space Day, we are commemorating history, passing on the spirit, and galvanizing popular enthusiasm for science, exploration of the unknown and innovation, particularly among young people,” Xi said. He asked space scientists and engineers to make China a space power. “Becoming an aerospace power has always been a dream we’ve been striving for,” Xi added. With or without some sort of collaborative effort with the US, China is nothing but committed. Xu Dazhe, director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), at a press conference on April 22 in Beijing, described China’s Mars mission, slated for 2020, as one which includes an orbiter, lander, and rover which will “walk on Mars”, according to a press release. China is also building its own space station with the core module to be lofted in 2018, followed by another in 2020; the station is expected to be operational by 2022. In 2013, three Chinese astronauts spent 15 days in orbit aboard an experimental space lab, the Tiangong 1, before returning to Earth. Later that year, the Chang’e 3 probe made the first soft landing on the moon since 1976 when it deployed the Jade Rabbit moon rover. The US may have to watch China from the sidelines as NASA scientists are currently forbidden from working with the Chinese space program thanks to a 2011 bill passed by US Congress, citing security concerns. Be that as it may, China still hopes for an American assist, with Xu the CNSA director offering “proof” that NASA is on board.

### China Space Tech Growing – US Involvement Key

#### US involvement key to prevent China from militarized space program

Mark Whittington, World Politics Writer and author of Why Is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon?, October 6, 2015, “Let’s Invite China to Become a Partner in Space – but with Conditions” http://www.capitalistreview.com/lets-invite-china-to-become-a-partner-in-space-but-with-conditions/ (Accessed 8/12/2016)

Should the United States reach out to China and form a space partnership, just as it has with other countries, such as Russia and the European Union? China has certainly become a major space power in its own right, having flown a number of crewed missions of increasing scope and complexity. China has sent robotic probes that have not only orbited the moon but have landed on its surface. Future space plans include a large space station and possibly landing humans on the moon. China is barred from participating in the International Space Station because of a law passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in 2011. The reason the law was passed and why many resist space cooperation with China stems from that country’s human rights record and its aggressive push for imperial hegemony. It is engaged in a military buildup to lay claim to resource-rich areas in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, both of which are claimed by China’s neighbors. It is building weapons systems that seem designed to supplant the United States as a Pacific power and, in the fullness of time, the world’s sole superpower.

### US Wants Plan – Transparency

#### The Martian proves US wants plan – China open to transparency

Michael Martina, Beijing Reuters Staff Writer, April 22, 2016, “China official says film 'The Martian' shows Americans want space cooperation” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space-idUSKCN0XJ1C2> (Accessed 8/11/2016)

A senior Chinese space official said the Hollywood blockbuster "The Martian" is proof that Americans want to see the United States and China cooperate in space, but lamented Washington's ban on collaboration between the two countries. Advancing China's space program is a priority for Beijing, with President Xi Jinping calling for the country to establish itself as a space power. China insists its program is for peaceful purposes, but the U.S. Defense Department has highlighted its increasing space capabilities, saying it was pursuing activities aimed to prevent adversaries from using space-based assets in a crisis. Apart from its civilian ambitions, Beijing has tested anti-satellite missiles, and the U.S. Congress has banned NASA from engaging in cooperation with its Chinese counterpart due to security concerns. Xu Dazhe, the chief of the China National Space Administration, promised China's space plans would become "increasingly transparent". "When I saw the U.S. film 'The Martian', which envisages China-U.S. cooperation on a Mars rescue mission under emergency circumstances, it shows that our U.S. counterparts very much hope to cooperate with us," Xu told reporters at a briefing.

### Cooperation Solves – Feasible

#### Cooperation with China could begin straightforward – feasible

Irene Klotz, Reuters Staff Writer, October 12, 2015, “NASA Chief Says Ban on Chinese Partnerships is Temporary” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-usa-china-idUSKCN0S61SU20151012> (Accessed 8/12/2016)

China is the only other country besides the United States and Russia that have flown people in orbit. In addition to developing its own space station - so far at the prototype stage - , China has flown a series of robotic spacecraft to the moon. The last probe included a lander that touched down in December 2013. Xu later told reporters China planned to launch a lunar sample return mission in 2017 and was looking for partners for a 2019 robotic excursion to the far side of the moon. NASA is working on a heavy-lift rocket and capsule that can carry astronauts to the moon and eventually to Mars. Collaborations with China could begin with very straightforward projects, such as deciding on a common system for docking spaceships, European Space Agency Director General Johann-Dietrich Woerner told reporters. "What we have to do is to try not to be competitive. We should work together to tackle all different types of challenges in a common project," Woerner said.

### Space Collaboration Solves – Dialogue Effective

#### US-China dialogue builds collaboration over space policies – boosts economy

Vid Beldavs, FOTONIKA-LV photonics research center, December 7, 2015, “Prospects for US-China space cooperation” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1>

The US-China Civil Space Dialogue can be seen as part of a process of building international collaboration in which the ISEF conference is a point of focus. Japan has agreed to host the next ISEF Conference in 2016 or possibly 2017. No doubt much will depend on continued progress with the US-China Civil Space Dialogue, with the next meeting planned for 2016 in Washington, DC. The ISEF process indicates that the Obama Administration has a major commitment to space, with the US playing a leadership role in broadening collaboration beyond the established players, notably through engagement with developing countries and China. ISEF points to a major role for international collaboration to advance space exploration and to the application of space technologies to address critical problems on Earth and to accelerate economic advancement.

### Solvency – Cooperation Key to US Space National Interest

#### Cooperation with China on space is key to US overall national interest in space policy

Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor of National Security Affairs at US Naval War College, and China US Focus Staff Writer, June 28, 2016, “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Benefiting from Entanglement with China” <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-benefiting-from-entanglement-with-china/> (Accessed 8/2/2016)

With a new U.S. administration entering in 2017, all policy bets are on the table. While “space” is increasingly recognized as a vital U.S. national interest, rarely does consideration of space policy stating national goals (ends) or appropriate strategies for achieving those goals (means) get discussed beyond a small cadre of individuals within the security community. We have recently argued in an Atlantic Council strategy paper that such a situation can and has led to misalignment of strategy ends and means, and we urge a “rebalancing” of means – diplomatic and military – in the new administration. Specifically, if stability, sustainability of the space environment, and access to space are enduring space goals, which we think they are, then diplomacy and deterrence by denial must be integral and equal parts of the means used toward achievement, along with traditional military means and deterrence by punishment. Regarding China, entanglement, as a method of deterrence by denial intended to create conditions whereby the real or perceived costs of an antagonistic or nefarious action exceeds the benefits, appears an underutilized approach that could provide useful to both countries.

### Solvency – Empirical Evidence

#### Empirically US and China can boost space exploration with cooperative framework

Cameron Hunter, research fellow at the Kluge Center, July 4, 2016, “When US-China Space Cooperation Wasn’t Just Hollywood Fantasy,” <http://www.spacenewsmag.com/commentary/when-u-s-china-space-cooperation-wasnt-just-hollywood-fantasy/> (Accessed 8/11/2016)

However, cooperation with China in space was once a persistent part of U.S. space policy. During my time at the Kluge Centre in the Library of Congress, I have tracked the development of U.S.-China space relations back to the late 1950s. I have found that during the latter half of the 20th Century, China has been perceived by U.S. policymakers as both a partner and a threat to the U.S. in space, often simultaneously. U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, and the subsequent signing of the Shanghai Communique, was built in part on the shared experience of a Soviet threat. Deng Xiao Ping, then vice premier, built on this by continuing to communicate Chinese fears about the Soviets both before and during the Carter administration. U.S. policy makers seem to have taken this on board, and by the late 1970s (in the run up to the start of normalization efforts) the State Department reminded Carter of the 44 Soviet divisions which were stationed on the Sino-Soviet border. China and the U.S. therefore found a shared interest in limiting Soviet influence — and in U.S. policy terms this meant the possibility of strengthening China in order to achieve this goal. High-level talks between then-U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the post-Mao Chinese leadership began in 1977. As part of the plan to normalize the relationship, Carter decided to send a science and technology delegation to China, telling his science adviser: “I do not want you to go as Santa Claus. Be sure exchanges are equitable.” A National Security Council memo early in the process frames the proposal as building on the 1972 Shanghai Communique, saying that “this cooperation would be an important building block for the wide-ranging cooperation which we believe is as inevitable as it is highly desirable.” However, Carter did not intend to proceed without a consensus among more than a dozen agencies and departments, including the State Department, the Department of Defense (DoD), the CIA and NASA. By Oct. 13, 1978 a consensus had been forged, and the plan went into motion. It is worth noting that the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) were still in place, and the first iteration of ITAR had been introduced in 1976. Any cooperation with China in space had to take place within this framework. The cooperation that followed relied on giving China exemptions to these regulations. Space was a high-profile component of the exchange package, most notably Chinese participation in Landsat, but also the agreement in principal for more general cooperation in remote sensing, hosting of Chinese science on American systems and U.S. provision of launch services to China. Landsat’s moderate-resolution imagery had some limited military applications for China, but it dovetailed well with American attempts to aid China in agricultural matters.

### Solvency – Leadership

#### Not cooperating with China threatens US leadership in space

Rebecca D. Costa, American Sociobiologist and former CEO, February 8, 2016, “The Price of China-phobia May Be America’s Leadership in Space,” <http://www.rebeccacosta.com/blog/the-price-of-china-phobia-may-be-americas-leadership-in-space-298.htm> (Accessed 8/10/2016)

Regrettably, the Congressman's sentiment and 2011 bill had an anti-Chinese ripple effect. In 2012, The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission prepared an extensive report warning against China's view of international space travel. And in 2015, a report by UCSD's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, argued that "China's efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests." Sounds eerily similar to opponents who vigorously fought Eisenhower's efforts to partner with the Soviet Union. And what do the Chinese think of the U.S reaction? According to Wang Jin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense there is no rational reason for fear, "The Chinese government has always advocated the peaceful use of outer space - it opposes space weaponization and an arms race in outer space." To prove their intentions, the Chinese government invited former International Space Station Commander, Chiao, to visit their Astronaut Center and speak openly with Chinese astronauts – who – according to Chiao – were conducting scientific work very similar to astronauts in the U.S. He saw no evidence to support Wolf and other leader's accusations. If there's no real evidence that working with China would be any less advantageous than collaborating with the Soviet Union, then we are left with only one possibility: irrational fear. China-phobia. And the regrettable possibility that China-phobia may continue to drive public policy, costing America their leadership in space.

### Solvency – A2 Unsafe

#### China and US cooperation focuses on outer space safety

COC, China.org.cn, authorized government portal site to China, May 12, 2016, “China, US Hold First Dialogue on Outer Space Safety,” <http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-05/12/content_38439736.htm> (Accessed 8/8/2016)

China and the United States have held their first dialogue on outer space safety. During the dialogue on Tuesday the two sides exchanged views on issues such as outer space policy, bilateral cooperation on space safety and multilateral space initiatives. The discussions were "pragmatic, in-depth and fruitful," according to the Chinese delegation. The two sides agreed to hold the next dialogue before the end of the year. The discussion was co-hosted by Wang Qun, director-general of the Department of Arms Control at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose. Plans for such a meeting between both countries sprang up at the seventh China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue held last June in Washington.

### Now is Key

#### Now is key – US must protect equities in space and balance with other major powers

Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, January 2016, “From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for a US Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space,” <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Space%20Report_16107.pdf> (Accessed 8/12/2016)

For the determinant reality is that the era of unchallenged U.S. dominance of space is over. Thus it is probable that some potential U.S. adversaries will, whatever corrective actions the United States is likely to pursue, be able to strike at U.S. space assets, and strike with possibly significant consequences for U.S. military power. Of course the scale and intensity of this threat will vary considerably based on the potential opponent – China and Russia will be more menacing in this respect than North Korea or Iran. But the fact remains that the United States is likely to face – and indeed is already facing – adversaries that can do serious damage to what is a vital component of U.S. military posture. The era of unchallenged U.S. dominance of space is over. Thus, because some degree of vulnerability in space appears to be inevitable and because the United States is near certain to need to continue relying on space, the United States must find ways to protect its equities in space at least in part by persuading its adversaries not to exploit those vulnerabilities. More precisely, the United States needs to find ways to induce, convince, coerce, deter, dissuade, coax, incentivize, or otherwise persuade potential adversaries that can threaten U.S. space assets not to act on that ability or to limit the extent to which they do. Unfortunately, there seems to have been little effort to develop a serious defense and deterrent posture for space until recently, and it is not clear that even commendable recent efforts to strengthen the U.S. space posture are guided by a clear strategic logic, despite the worsening problem.51 Indeed, Congress was sufficiently concerned by the absence of such a coherent approach and the apparent lack of movement within the executive branch towards developing one that it felt compelled to mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that the U.S. government develop such a strategy.52 This arrested development has stemmed in part from the sense held until recently that U.S. space assets were largely safe, in part from concern in some quarters that developing a deterrent posture for space would contribute to or spur arms racing and the further militarization of the space domain, and in part from the vestigial sense that adversaries would be deterred from space attacks by the prospect of uncontrolled escalation. This last factor derived in part from the sense during the Cold War that the deterrent to attacks against space assets lay largely in the threat that such a step would likely be construed as a prelude to a general attack, and therefore greatly risk general nuclear war. Thus this legacy U.S. approach to deterrence of attacks against space assets relied, explicitly or latently, on the threat of a potentially overwhelming retaliation against even limited space attacks.

# Aff Steel Agreement

### Solvency—Industry Innovation

#### The squo is robbing steel makers of their incentive to innovate, the plan provides it so the industry can survive long term

Pater Tenebrarum, Economic writer, May 30 2016, “The Stunning Idiocy of Steel Tariffs,” Acting-Man, <http://www.acting-man.com/?p=45102> (Accessed August 8, 2016)

If Western steelmakers are not able to compete with Asian ones at current steel prices, then jacking import prices up by 200% may temporarily help to keep them in business, but they will no longer have an incentive to become more efficient. In the long run, they will simply be set up for an even bigger fall. They may enjoy an advantage for a brief time, but it isn’t going to last. Since the amount of capital is finite, tying up capital and labor in an inefficient sector of the economy perforce deprives other sectors of these resources. Here one can interweave our example of the consumer who considers whether or not to buy a car, and finds to his delight that it is offered at a 30% discount one day. The money he saves will now be available for other uses. In other words, not only is our hypothetical consumer’s living standard raised immediately, but the funds he saves will also benefit others. Whether he saves the money or spends it on other consumer goods, more economic opportunity will ensue. The important thing is that it is the consumer making the allocation decision. Ultimately the economy’s production structure is supposed to serve consumers after all – not government bureaucrats and cronies.

### Solvency—Industry Innovation

#### Only innovation will save the steel industry—tariffs are insufficient

[Mark J. Perry](https://www.aei.org/scholar/mark-j-perry/), Scholar at AEI and a professor of economics and finance at the University of Michigan's Flint campus. At AEI, Perry writes about economic and financial issues for American.com and the AEIdeas blog, June 2, 2016, “US steel tariffs: A case study in protectionism, economic losses on net, and ‘legal plunder’,” <https://www.aei.org/publication/us-steel-tariffs-a-case-study-in-protectionism-economic-losses-on-net-and-legal-plunder/> (August 8, 2016)

Yesterday’s WSJ article highlights some of the negative effects of the steel tariffs and the 60% increase in steel prices: Steel tariffs, which come during an election season rife with promises to protect American workers, have given U.S. steel mills more pricing power and have curtailed imports of some steel products that are made more cheaply abroad. That is helping American producers. But it is creating problems for some steel buyers. Brookville Equipment Corp., which makes mining equipment, requires 10 tons of steel to make one mining locomotive, says Marion Van Fasson, president of the Brookville, Pa.-based company. The price increases reduced profit margin on one of those machines by a few thousand dollars. “… I’d love to have lower-priced steel,” said Mr. Van Fasson. “There’s grumbling that the U.S. mills are taking advantage of a tight market, and the price hikes are too much, too fast,” says Lisa Goldenberg, president of Delaware Steel Co., a steel trading and processing company. Some manufacturers are pushing back. In a letter to the Department of Commerce requesting an exemption, Steelcase Inc. Chief Executive James Keane said a tariff on a special kind of Japanese steel could cost one of his subsidiaries $4 million to $5 million a year. The subsidiary, Polyvision, makes whiteboards for schools at a plant in Oklahoma, where it employs about 50 people. “If nothing changes, we would have to close our Oklahoma plant,” he wrote. “Schools can’t afford to pay more for these whiteboards, so if we raise prices to our customers they will use lower quality substitutes that are likely not made in the U.S.” Car companies have been lobbying against steel tariffs. In a May 17 brief filed to the International Trade Commission, lawyers for Ford Motor Co. expressed concern about tariffs. “Innovation and product quality are best served by a cutting-edge, competitive U.S. steel industry; not one walled off from competition,” they wrote. “Availability of fairly-traded imports is important even for industrial consumers such as Ford, which has a long-demonstrated history of de facto preference for U.S.-produced” steel.

### Solvency—Good Will

#### The plan is a gesture of goodwill that facilitates Chinese behavior changes

[Daniel J. Ikenson](http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-ikenson), Director of [Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](http://www.freetrade.org/), March 5, 2012, “Trade Policy Priority One: Averting a U.S.-China “Trade War”,” Cato Institute, <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war> (Accessed August 7, 2016)

There is no question that some Chinese policies have been discriminatory and provocative, and that the U.S. government has been right to challenge those policies, both formally and informally. But the U.S. government has also indulged in protectionism and made some poor choices that have and will continue to fuel bilateral disputes. There is plenty of blame to go around for the heightened bilateral tensions. The most significant determinant of the quality and direction of the U.S.-China relationship is American self-confidence. In other words, U.S.-China relations will be driven more by actions in Washington than by actions in Beijing. If the U.S. economy starts to grow at a stronger pace and businesses begin to invest and hire more rigorously, the temptation of politicians and the media to scapegoat China for self-induced, domestic woes will diminish. Even though China-bashing polls well, responsible policymakers should be looking beyond the politics to find bridges, olive branches, and solutions that remind people in both countries of the importance and mutual benefits of the relationship. Gestures of goodwill could go a long way toward stopping and reversing the recent deterioration of relations.

### Solvency—Economy

#### US import tariffs on Chinese steel will crush the US economy

Daniel R. Pearson, Former member of the U.S. International Trade Commission, is senior fellow in trade policy studies at the Cato Institute, May 23, 2016, “The U.S. And China Are Both Wrong On Steel,” Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/05/23/us-china-steel-war/#613834edb9a2> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

Since steel is a globally-traded commodity, China’s excesses are bedeviling steel producers around the world. The United States is no exception. In the face of rising imports, American production declined 11% over the past four years, dropping from 89 MMT in 2012 to 79 MMT in 2015. Some firms are losing money. U.S. steel producers are justifiably unhappy with the circumstances. Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers seem determined to follow a protectionist path that won’t provide much (if any) help to the U.S. steel industry, but definitely will hurt the broader U.S. economy. Steel producers hope that imposing a few more anti-dumping or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) restrictions might help to raise prices by further limiting imports of steel. However, the 149 AD/CVD measures currently in place obviously haven’t returned the steel industry to health, so it’s folly to think that a handful more would make any difference.

### Solvency—Relations

#### The plan is a key step to reduce US/ China tensions over trade

Shawn Donnan, Staff writer for Financial Times, May 10, 2016, "US and China skirmish as trade clash looms", Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4bd8c6ec-16c5-11e6-b8d5-4c1fcdbe169f.html#axzz4AjqYBaLt> (Accessed August 8, 2016)

The US is also applying pressure on China elsewhere in the trade sphere. It has been quietly leading a campaign to block China securing “market economy” status under the WTO, something Beijing prizes and argues it should be granted automatically come December and the 15th anniversary of its accession to the global trade body. Even as it pushes to make progress on a bilateral investment treaty with China the Obama administration is keeping Beijing out of separate talks in Geneva on the global trade in services. Washington is pressing it to loosen restrictions on green products such as solar cells in yet another set of negotiations. Chad Bown, a former member of Mr Obama’s council of economic advisers, said there was a fundamental difference between the administration’s tactics against China and what Mr Trump is proposing. The current moves are all being conducted within “the rules of the game” while Mr Trump’s proposed unilateral tariffs would likely put the US in violation of WTO rules. But other advocates of free trade bemoan what they see developing. Dan Ikenson, who directs trade research at the libertarian Cato Institute, said the administration’s pushing of the TPP as a geopolitical response to the rise of China highlighted just how weak Mr Obama’s position now was with Congress. “The elements are all there for the administration to cast China as this real international scofflaw and this danger. And the best way to hit back is to bring these trade cases,” he said. There is also a risk that an “extremely hostile period” in US-China trade relations could have consequences for the future of the relationship between the world’s two largest economies, said Gary Hufbauer, a US trade policy expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “I see years of acrimony ahead on this current path.”

### Solvency—Economy

#### Protectionism on Chinese steel sets off a cascade of economic downfalls for the US

[Mark J. Perry](https://www.aei.org/scholar/mark-j-perry/), Scholar at AEI and a professor of economics and finance at the University of Michigan's Flint campus. At AEI, Perry writes about economic and financial issues for American.com and the AEIdeas blog, June 2, 2016, “US steel tariffs: A case study in protectionism, economic losses on net, and ‘legal plunder’,” <https://www.aei.org/publication/us-steel-tariffs-a-case-study-in-protectionism-economic-losses-on-net-and-legal-plunder/> (August 8, 2016)

Calls for Protectionism: What was the response of US steel producers to record world steel supply, falling steel prices and near-record US steel imports? As might be expected, those market conditions sparked the highest number of trade complaints filed by American steelmakers in more than a decade (38 in 2013) and ignited calls for new tariffs on imported steel, as the [Wall Street Journal reported in May 2014](http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579559871796406720). The domestic steel producers were successful in their lobby rent-seeking efforts and earlier this year were able to persuade their government enablers to grant them protection against more efficient, lower-cost foreign steel producers. According to this [March 1, 2016 Wall Street Journal article](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imposes-266-duty-on-some-chinese-steel-imports-1456878180?cb=logged0.33136839916326966), the “Department of Commerce imposed duties on imports of cold-rolled steel, used to make auto parts, appliances and shipping containers, from seven countries including China, whose steelmakers were slapped with a massive 266% tariff.” Well, actually, as [I pointed out here on CD](https://www.aei.org/publication/imposing-266-tariffs-on-chinese-steel-imports-will-punish-us-manufacturers-and-consumers-not-china/), it was American steel-using manufacturers, not Chinese steelmakers, who were slapped with the massive tariff. And even if they avoid buying Chinese steel, US manufacturers will still face much higher steel prices as American steelmakers, protected from foreign competition and lower-priced foreign steel, gain US market share with their higher-priced steel. Not too surprisingly, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday in a front-page article titled “[U.S. Steel Tariffs Create a Double-Edged Sword](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-steel-tariffs-create-a-double-edged-sword-1464740256)” that “the duties on steel products from China, Brazil, India, Japan and other countries have contributed to the U.S. benchmark hot-rolled coil index rising more than 60% this year to $615 per ton [from less than $385].” What can we expect from steel tariffs and higher steel prices? The WSJ article’s sub-title summarizes the situation very well: “American producers [will ] capitalize on tighter supplies and higher prices, but costs [will] rise for manufacturers.” In greater detail, let’s summarize the outcomes from protectionist trade policy in the form of steel tariffs: 1) Domestic steelmakers will win with higher steel prices, higher profits and share prices (U.S. Steel’s stock has nearly doubled since January 1), and greater market share, but 2) Domestic steel-using manufacturers will lose because of higher input prices, lower profits, and possibly reduced sales and market share) and 3) Millions of American consumers and businesses will lose when they now pay higher prices for everything that contains steel, including cars, appliances, tractors, tools, construction materials, wind turbines, forklifts, pipelines, and airplanes.

### Solvency—Economy

#### US tariffs on Chinese steel hurts the economy—makes various sectors and consumers poorer

Tim Worstall, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, June 1, 2016, “US Steel Tariffs Against China Are Working: Americans Losing Jobs, Becoming Poorer As A Result,” Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/06/01/us-steel-tariffs-against-china-are-working-americans-losing-jobs-becoming-poorer-as-a-result/#1c349d3b27d5> (Accessed August 10,. 2016)

Before the US imposed tariffs against certain imports of certain Chinese steels I stated that the reason we didn’t want to do this is because such trade restrictions make Americans poorer. The reason being that imports are the whole point of our having trade in the first place, they are what make us richer: so, why are we trying to make ourselves poorer by making the very things that we want more expensive? We now have the results of those tariffs being imposed: the results being that as predicted Americans are becoming poorer as a result of those China steel tariffs. This is a pretty good recommendation for economic forecasting and also and extremely good indication of how truly public policy about matters economic can be. From the WSJ [today](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-steel-tariffs-create-a-double-edged-sword-1464740256): “New tariffs on imports are boosting steel prices in the U.S., offering a lifeline to beleaguered American steelmakers but raising costs for manufacturers of goods ranging from oil pipes to factory equipment to cars. U.S. steel producers who lost billions of dollars last year amid a flood of cheap imports are looking to capitalize on tighter supplies and higher pricing. That is shifting the dynamics of a supply chain that had come to rely on inexpensive foreign steel.”

### Solvency—Economy—Manufacturing Sector

#### The plan is big win for the manufacturing sector—cheap steel prevents metal shortages and grows jobs

[Katie Benchina Olsen](https://agmetalminer.com/author/kbenchinaolsen/), Staff writer for Metal Miner news, May 19, 2016, “Are Manufacturers and Consumers Hurt by Steel’s Anti-Dumping/CVD Lawsuits?,” Metal Miner, <https://agmetalminer.com/2016/05/19/are-manufacturers-and-consumers-hurt-by-steels-anti-dumpingcvd-lawsuits/> (accessed August 10, 2016)

The steel industry directly employs 142,000 people which is part of the 12 million U.S. manufacturing jobs according to the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). The newly elected chairman of American Iron and Steel Institute — John Ferriola, chairman, president and CEO of Nucor Corp. — said at a recent AISI CEO press briefing that steel jobs declined by 13,000 in 2015. Although steel jobs declined last year, manufacturing jobs in other subsectors have picked up the slack. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a total of 13,000 manufacturing jobs were created in 2015. Steel prices have been rising in the U.S. as domestic mills are now shielded from imports China and other countries named in the trade cases. According to numerous sources, the domestic lead times have extended which is leaving some companies scrambling for metal.

### Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices

#### US steel tariffs kill jobs and raise steel prices

Knowledge @ Wharton, Business journal at University of Pennsylvania, February 12, 2003, “U.S. Steel Users Claim Tariffs “Protect a Few at the Expense of the Majority”,” Knowledge @ Wharton, <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/u-s-steel-users-claim-tariffs-protect-a-few-at-the-expense-of-the-majority/> (Accessed August 8, 2016)

U.S. steel users are paying about a third more for their raw material than they did a year ago, forcing thousands of job losses and leading some to seek cheaper steel from overseas suppliers. Others are threatening to move their own businesses offshore to escape what they say is the prohibitive cost of doing business in the U.S. It’s a prospect that may result in a permanent loss of business for U.S. steel makers at a time when the industry is striving to consolidate and become more efficient. The main reason for the surge in steel prices is the tariff program imposed by the Bush administration in March 2002. The government set duties as high as 30% on 14 types of foreign steel for three years in a bid to protect the domestic industry from imports that in some cases were being “dumped” or sold at below the cost of production. The action followed a finding by the International Trade Commission, a federal government body, that the domestic industry had been hurt by the imports. Steel users are now urging President Bush to make a detailed study of the effect of the tariffs on their businesses when his administration conducts its “mid-term review” of the duties in September 2003. Bush should scrap the tariffs, they argue, and allow global market forces to prevail in the steel industry. Some 200,000 jobs have been lost in the steel-consuming industries since prices jumped by around 40% in early 2002, according to the Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), which represents steel users such as makers of automotive parts.

### Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices

#### US steel imports raise prices and crush domestic jobs—protectionism always makes consumers worse off

Derek M. Scissors, Resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies Asian economic issues and trends. Scissors is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University, where he teaches a course on the Chinese economy, July 4, 2016, “[Anticipating Protectionist U.S. Policy: IP Theft and SOEs “Trump” Currency and the Trade Deficit](http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/anticipating-protectionist-u-s-policy-ip-theft-and-soes-trump-currency-and-the-trade-deficit/),” China Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/anticipating-protectionist-u-s-policy-ip-theft-and-soes-trump-currency-and-the-trade-deficit/> (accessed August 9, 2016)

It is not a good time for American supporters of trade and investment with China. For political reasons, protectionist steps by the U.S. may be [unavoidable in 2017](http://thehill.com/policy/finance/285011-clinton-vows-to-appoint-trade-prosecutor). In the name of “making China play fair,” trade barriers risk hurting ordinary Americans and offering little in the way of gains. It is important to recognize that some policies are more justified and less dangerous than others. At its core, protectionism is interference with competition for the sole reason that the competition is foreign. For example, the Chinese government often treats foreign patents [as anti-competitive](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/22/c_133354154.htm), even while it encourages domestic patents [at every opportunity](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/14/c_135010140.htm). This is simple bias at the expense of its economic partners. Protectionism stereotypically involves tariffs, such as recent and pending American decisions to apply [new tariffs to certain steel product](http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/18/news/us-steel-china-trade/) imports from China. Interfering with competition, foreign or domestic, always has a cost. In this case, domestic cars and buildings are made more expensive if the foreign steel is made more expensive. While cost is unavoidable, protectionist policies can be designed to discourage or change predatory behavior while limiting damage to the home economy. However, the standard protectionist argument takes no note of this. Instead, it is merely that “we” should make the products instead of buying from “them,” so we would have the jobs involved. This entirely ignores the reasons for importing – availability, price, and quality. People and companies purchase imports because they are the best choices available. Taking away those choices can only make the home country buyers worse off. The result of that would be [jobs disappearing](https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/China-US.pdf). This is perhaps most obvious in the case of energy, but it applies to all imports.

### Solvency—Economy—Protectionist Backlash

#### US steel tariffs risk international protectionist backlash

The Irish Times, Irish based news organization, March 6, 2002, “US feel backlash over protectionist steel policy,” Irish Times, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/us-feel-backlash-over-protectionist-steel-policy-1.415786> (accessed August 9, 2016)

The world's major steel producers have threatened the US with lawsuits and trade reprisals after President Bush announced tariffs of up to 30 per cent on steel imports. The EU swiftly condemned the decision, which is aimed at protecting the ailing US steel industry, and said it would file a complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Other major producers, including Japan, Russia, South Korea and Brazil have also vowed to fight the new tariffs. "The US decision to go down the route of protectionism is a major setback for the world trading system," EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said in a statement. "The EU will of course launch an immediate complaint in Geneva [at the WTO] against this clear violation of WTO rules and we will take whatever measures are necessary to safeguard our own market," Mr Lamy said. Last night President Bush announced tariffs of up to 30 per cent on a range of steel imports. They will take effect on March 20th and will stay in place for three years.

### Solvency—Economy—Jobs/ Prices

#### History shows protectionism fails—tariffs on Chinese steel jack prices, destroy jobs, and cost the economy billions

Business Review Board, Libertarian think tank and news outlet, May 20, 2016, “Obama's Steel Tariffs Will Hurt U.S. Economy,” The Patriot Post, <https://patriotpost.us/posts/42727> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

This week, the Obama administration slapped a whopping 522% tariff on cold-rolled steel produced in China — a move that smacks of cronyism and will damage U.S. manufacturing. For context, George W. Bush set a tariff against Chinese-made steel in 2002. While the threshold stood at 30%, it’s estimated that relatively modest tariff cost this nation 200,000 jobs and $4 billion in lost wages. A complaint from U.S. Steel Corp. might have something to do with Barack Obama’s tariff. In April, the company [complained](http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/29/476070445/u-s-steel-says-china-is-using-cyber-stealth-to-steal-its-secrets) to U.S. International Trade Commission alleging a laundry list of Chinese steel companies were dumping cheap steel on the United States — good for American manufacturing, bad for the steel companies. The complaint came as the steel producers of the world met in Brussels and agreed to cut back on their steel production but China refused. Sound familiar? A year ago Saudi Arabia refused to cut back on its oil production as the price per barrel bottomed out. As part of his campaign, Donald Trump [promised](https://patriotpost.us/posts/42565) a battery of tariffs against places like Mexico and China in order to protect U.S. manufacturing jobs. If his plan worked, it would cost America an estimated $6,000 per household. As the Wall Street Journal editorial board pointed out, Obama is merely [employing some of Trump’s policies](http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-front-runs-trump-on-china-1463677249). Protectionism might be an alluring idea at the populist level, but [the policy rarely works](https://patriotpost.us/articles/41217). History has demonstrated its shortfalls. Rather, free trade brings out the most prosperity.

### Solvency—Economy—Less Competitive

#### US import tariffs on Chinese steel create a “death by a thousand pricks” scenario for the economy—makes domestic steel manufacturing less competitive long term

[Timothy D. Terrell](http://sites.wofford.edu/terrelltd), Associate Professor in the Department of Economics @ Wofford College, December 30, 2009, “Is Chinese Steel Hurting the US Economy?,” Wofford College, <http://sites.wofford.edu/terrelltd/home/is-chinese-steel-hurting-the-us-economy/> (accessed August 12, 2016)

Today the United States International Trade Commission [imposed tariffs](https://web.archive.org/web/20120316210100/http%3A/online.wsj.com/article/SB126219101972610403.html?mod=WSJ_newsreel_business) on Chinese steel pipe, largely used in the oil and gas industry. Urged on by the US steel industry and an associated labor union, the tariff follows an earlier duty imposed on Chinese tires. Clearly, the US steel industry and its workers will enjoy a short-term benefit from this policy. Long-term, it could make the industry less competitive. This would not be the first time. In the early 1800s, British iron producers used an advanced manufacturing process that made British iron superior to American-made iron. Rather than improve their techniques to compete, American iron producers reacted by appealing to Congress for protective tariffs against British iron producers. In 1842, Congress did as they asked, but British iron continued to be imported. In fact, as economic historian Larry Schweikart noted in his book, The Entrepreneurial Adventure, “When tariffs ended and protection was greatly reduced, iron production in America increased. …[B]y 1860 American mills had become fully competitive with the British, in part because the end of protection eliminated the old charcoal smelters and obsolete mills, leaving the newer anthracite smelters in a position to meet the demand for the newer nonrail products.” It’s also clear that the consumers of steel pipe will suffer from this policy, including the oil and gas industry and all those who use their products (i.e. every consumer in the US). Each job saved in the steel industry could cost far more than the employee earned. However, in the well-rehearsed story of protectionism, even if the total losses to the victims greatly exceed the total gains to the winners–which is likely–the diffuse nature of those losses means that the victims are politically weak. The concentrated gains to a few provide the political impetus for tariffs. By itself, this tariff won’t spell the end of the US economy. But it is another small injury which, when matched by similar efforts by other protectionists, regulators, and interventionists of various stripes, can produce “a death by a thousand pricks.”

#### The plan solves Chinese overproduction of steel—absent the plan China is stuck with tons of unsellable steel which crushes their economy

[Shuaihua Wallace Cheng](http://www.scmp.com/author/shuaihua-wallace-cheng), Staff writer for the South China Morning Post, September 28, 2015, “Overcapacity a time bomb for China’s economy,” South China Morning Post, <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1862024/overcapacity-time-bomb-chinas-economy> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

China has narrowly escaped major financial crises for over two decades. But the good times may soon be over - and not because of the recent stock market crash which has spawned debates about whether the country faces a serious economic crisis. Some analysts compare China’s equity bubbles to the situation that led to the 1929 Great Depression, but other believe those are merely false alarms, and fears about China are overblown. In the short term, the latter argument is more convincing: China’s equity crisis has affected fewer than 15 per cent of Chinese households. And the majority of these middle class investors have only lost money gained a few months earlier, when stock prices spiked. Even after the recent crash, the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s Composite Index still stands 1,000 points higher than it did in July 2014. In any case, stock values are just 1.5 per cent of total assets in the Chinese banking system, and most Chinese companies are not financed by the stock market. The consumer confidence index shows that the trend of growing consumption by both urban and rural Chinese remains stable. And Chinese authorities still have the power and flexibility to mobilise economic growth, for example, by loosening monetary policy to allow high liquidity of credit, or by expanding fiscal measures to stimulate household consumption. But while the Chinese economy is unlikely to crash anytime soon, China nonetheless faces a high probability of being the next major power to face an economic collapse and is now at a tipping point. One major reason is industrial overcapacity. Overcapacity is not new in China, but in sectors such as iron and steel, glass, cement, aluminium, solar panel, and power generation equipment, the overcapacity rate has recently surpassed 30 per cent, the threshold at which overproduction may trigger loan defaults by companies that have borrowed and then watched their profits fall. Production has run rampant because of vicious competition between local governments. In order to achieve high GDP growth, local governments attract new manufacturing facilities by offering all kinds of financial subsidies such as tax holidays and rent-free use of government land.

### Solvency—China Economy

#### The plan relieves pressure on China’s economy preventing violent collapse

David Stockman, Former Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, December 23, 2015, “The Trade Wars Begin: U.S. Imposes 256% Tariff On Chinese Steel Imports,” David Stockman’s Corner, <http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/the-trade-wars-begin-u-s-imposes-256-tarriff-on-chinese-steel-imports/> (Accessed August 11, 2016)

This means that suddenly China’s steel exporters will have to scramble to find a comparably large market in which to sell their wares as now exporting to the US is prohibitively expensive and would result in massive losses to domestic producers. According to Bloomberg calls to the spokesman’s office at China’s Ministry of Commerce in Beijing weren’t answered. An official who answered a call to the China Iron & Steel Association couldn’t immediately comment. Not like they would have much to say. The problem for China is that as we have explained previously, unless local commodity producers can keep generating some cash flow, even if it is negligible, China will be swept in a default wave that will sweep away all the overlevered producers of steel and other commodities, leading to social unrest or worse. We already know that at current prices [more than half of China’s commodity producers can’t even make one coupon payment](http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-10-01/chinese-cash-flow-shocker-more-half-commodity-companies-cant-pay-interest-their-debt). What happens now when the rush to the bottom enters the final laps and the bottom falls out of prices?

### Steel Protectionism Bad

#### Steel protectionism is a band aid solution—only the plan allows free enterprise

Aaron Walayat, Staff writer for US-China Perception Monitor, June 2, 2016, “Much Ado About Steel Dumping,” US-China Perception Monitor, <http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2016/06/02/much-ado-about-steel-dumping/> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

In reality, everything from quality to consumer preference will play a role in the success of products in the US market. Regardless, boosting up tariffs for the sake of protecting US steel jobs will be to the detriment of the US economy as a whole, hurting industries that require steel as an input factor. A 2003 article published on the Wharton school website even went so far as to argue that steel tariffs [“protect a few at the expense of the majority.”](http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/u-s-steel-users-claim-tariffs-protect-a-few-at-the-expense-of-the-majority/) The answer much ado about steel dumping isn’t an easy one. While China’s overcapacity has been to the detriment of China’s economy, the cheaply priced steel has hurt American steel producers as well. Pearson suggests that the United States should thank the Chinese for the overcapacity of steel, which has led to competitive American products that use the commodity as an input. Such a move would be a wake-up call to China’s central economic planning apparatus who would, in Pearson’s view, respond by closing some steel mills. As the world globalizes, trade is, whether we like it or not, an international enterprise. Each day, the situation is changing, and each day, David Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage becomes shifts among countries. While the US may not be advantageous in certain sectors anymore, new opportunities open up every day thanks to technological innovation. With economic growth, there will naturally be growing pains. Protectionism, however, will serve only as a short term painkiller, the only solution is for the United States to get competitive, find its advantages, and adjust. We cannot put too much attention to bringing back lost jobs, for as Fletcher School professor Daniel Drezner reminds us, some of the jobs we are trying to get back [just don’t exist anymore](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/29/opinion/where-did-all-the-jobs-go-nowhere.html?_r=0).

### A/T “Tariff Good for Economy”

#### The tariff can’t help the economy—any benefits are offset by losses elsewhere

John W. Miller, Wall Street Journal Reporter, May 31, 2016, “U.S. Steel Tariffs Create a Double-Edged Sword,” Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-steel-tariffs-create-a-double-edged-sword-1464740256> (Accessed August 7, 2016)

New tariffs on imports are boosting steel prices in the U.S., offering a lifeline to beleaguered American steelmakers but raising costs for manufacturers of goods ranging from oil pipes to factory equipment to cars. U.S. steel producers who lost billions of dollars last year amid a flood of cheap imports are looking to capitalize on tighter supplies and higher pricing. That is shifting the dynamics of a supply chain that had come to rely on inexpensive foreign steel. “Our government has done a pretty good job of boxing out the guys who were importing the most-cheap steel,” says Stuart Barnett,owner of Chicago-based Barsteel Corp., a steel processor and distributor that sells to a range of manufacturers. “But now the greatest fear we have is that China keeps the cheap steel for itself and makes products that undercut other industries.”

### A/T “Tariffs Effective/ Necessary”

#### Tariffs aren’t effective at addressing the Chinese overproduction problem

[Edward Alden](http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/author/ealden), Staff writer for Council on Foreign Relations, April 19, 2016, “How to Solve the Global Steel Glut,” CFR, <http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2016/04/19/how-to-solve-the-global-steel-glut/> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

Today, China is by far the worst offender. In 2000, the United States and China produced about the same amount of steel—135 million metric tons (MMT) in the United States, and 165 MMT in China. Since then, China has added an extraordinary 990 MMT of steelmaking capacity—more steel than the entire world was consuming in 2000. This was not driven by market opportunities but rather by government subsidies aimed at pumping up the economy through investment and job creation; China’s major steel firms reportedly lost nearly $10 billion last year and are groaning under their debt load. Other countries, including Korea, Turkey and India, have also boosted production. U.S. steel capacity fell over the same period, as did Europe’s. If the United States, Japan, the European Union, India, Turkey, Russia, Korea and Brazil all stopped making steel tomorrow, there would still be enough to supply the global market. One of the reasons free trade is under such attack in the United States and some other countries is that the classic free trade argument—that the market will sort this mess out to everyone’s benefit — simply does not hold true in such a distorted sector. If nothing is done, some of the most efficient steel plants in the world will go under and the heavily subsidized, unprofitable ones in China and elsewhere will survive. But the classic U.S. and European response—to throw up trade barriers in the form of anti-dumping tariffs—is not terribly helpful either. Temporary tariffs can give some breathing room to their steel industries. But they come too late, often when the companies are teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. And breathing room for what? If there is no big reduction in steel capacity worldwide, the problem will either be shuffled off to other countries or will re-emerge when the tariffs expire. In the meantime, big steel-using industries like automobiles and shipbuilders will face higher costs than their competitors in countries where steel markets are less protected.

### A/T “Steel Tariffs Key”

#### There’s lots of other steps outside of tariffs to protect domestic steel production

Thomas J. Gibson, President and CEO of the American Iron and Steel Institute, and Chuck Schmitt, President of SSAB Americas and chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute's board of directors, March 23, 2016, “The crisis facing the U.S. steel industry,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/opinions/american-steel-industry-gibson-schmitt/> (accessed August 8, 2016)

If America's steel industry is to survive, the United States must take action to reduce global overcapacity by working to remove subsidized production from the world supply so basic market forces can once again determine outcomes. We must begin this effort by ensuring that our trade laws are aggressively enforced. Congress [recently passed legislation](https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/644) to improve enforcement at our borders to try to catch those who evade tariffs by deliberately mislabeling where the steel comes from, in addition to other clever tricks that are undermining the American steel industry. Worse still, some of our trading partners manipulate their currency to make their exports to the United States even cheaper. American companies that play by the rules can't win at this rigged game. Domestic steel producers are already seeking some relief by filing trade cases with the Commerce Department and the [International Trade Commission](https://www.usitc.gov/investigations/701731/2015/hot_rolled_steel_flat_products_australia_brazil/preliminary.htm) on all the major flat-rolled steel products, including corrosion-resistant steel, hot-rolled steel and cold-rolled steel. Congress gave the Commerce Department new tools last summer when it enacted legislation that made improvements to the trade remedy laws, and now it is critical that the department aggressively use them.

### A/T “China Unfair Export Practice”

#### China isn’t manipulating the market, they’re just more efficient

[Ruby Lian](http://www.reuters.com/journalists/ruby-lian) and [David Lawder](http://www.reuters.com/journalists/david-lawder), Staff writers for Reuters, May 19, 2016, “China to support steel exports as U.S. imposes hefty tariffs,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-steel-idUSKCN0Y82ER> (Accessed August 8, 2016)

While a flood of cheap Chinese steel has been blamed for putting some overseas producers out of business, China denies its mills have been dumping their products on foreign markets, stressing that local steelmakers are more efficient and enjoy far lower costs than their international counterparts. China has also denied there are any inducements in place that encourage steelmakers to sell their products overseas, saying trade flows are determined by the market. "Global demand is increasing, and Chinese steel products are very competitive, so exports are increasing a little, but the steel sector is mainly used to satisfy domestic demand and there has never been any policy support for large volumes of exports," China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) chairman Ma Guoqiang said at a conference this week.

### Uniqueness—Steel Producers

#### Conditions are improving for steel producers now

Zacks Equity Research, Research firm, May 27, 2016, “U.S. Thumps China with Heavy Tariffs on Steel Imports,” Zack’s Equity Research, <https://www.zacks.com/stock/news/218800/us-thumps-china-with-heavy-tariffs-on-steel-imports> (August 10, 2016)

The U.S. steel producers are still struggling to cope with falling steel prices as a result of the combined impact of imports and overcapacity in the industry. Low costs of production have allowed overseas producers (especially China) to sell their products at cheaper rates, leading to an industry-wide price decline. China, which accounts for around 50% of global steel output, continues to pose a threat to the U.S. steel industry. The Chinese steel industry continues to reel under massive excess steel capacity and sluggish domestic demand amid a cooling economy. China’s economy rose at an annual rate of 6.7% in the first quarter of 2016, its slowest in seven years. Beijing has been repeatedly criticized by the U.S. and the European Union for dumping its excess steel capacity in the overseas markets at unfairly low prices. China's steel exports jumped 7.6% year over year in the first four months of 2016 (per customs data), indicating sustained demand weakness at home. The USITC, yesterday, launched a probe into the allegations contained in U.S. Steel’s complaint against Chinese steel producers. U.S. Steel, in April, lodged a complaint with the USITC, asking the regulator to start an investigation against biggest Chinese steel producers and their distributors. The complaint alleges three clauses of action – illegal conspiracy to fix prices, theft of trade secrets and circumvention of trade duties by false labeling. U.S. Steel is seeking the exclusion of all unfairly traded Chinese steel products from the U.S. market. Steel market conditions in the U.S. have somewhat improved of late, thanks to favorable rulings on steel trade cases in the recent past. Domestic steel makers continue to actively press the U.S. regulators to stop unfair trade practices and enforce new trade laws to rescue the crisis-hit U.S. steel industry.

# Aff Taiwan Grand Bargain

### Solvency—China Says “Yes”

#### China says yes—Grand bargain is in their best interest

Wu Xinbo, Professor and Executive Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Director at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Spring 2014, “Agenda for a New Great Power Relationship,” The Washington Quarterly, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24674/uploads(accessed August 10, 2016)

The next several years are crucial for China–U.S. relations. Beijing is now¶ under a new leadership that is more self-confident and more attentive to its¶ public opinion. The further narrowing of the power gap between China and the¶ United States will inevitably generate more anxiety in Washington. The¶ competition between the two countries in the Asia–Pacific may pick up¶ momentum. At the same time, the world’s two largest economies will need to¶ coordinate to promote global governance in an era when regional and global¶ challenges are only getting more complicated. It is indeed high time to reset¶ China–U.S. relations—for the long-term interests of both countries as well as¶ the entire world.¶ There are definite opportunities as the Obama administration’s second term¶ proceeds. China’s new leader Xi Jinping feels comfortable in dealing with Washington, striving for “a new type of major¶ power relationship” with the United States. Xi¶ first put forward this idea when he visited the¶ United States in February 2012 as the Chinese¶ Vice President. In May 2012 during the Fourth¶ Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) held in¶ Beijing, the Chinese side further elaborated on¶ this concept to the U.S. interlocutors. Finally, in¶ June 2013, President Xi fully expounded his¶ optimism for building such a relationship to President Obama during their¶ informal meeting in California—both sides have the political will to construct a¶ new type of relationship between great powers; cooperation between the two¶ countries over more than 40 years constitutes a solid foundation for the further¶ cooperation between them; over 90 dialogue and communication mechanisms¶ set up between China and the United States provide a guarantee for the pursuit¶ of that goal; the robust exchanges and bonds forged between two societies and¶ peoples have laid a profound foundation of public opinion favorable to the¶ construction of such a relationship; and finally, there exists enormous space for¶ further cooperation between China and the United States. Xi also stressed that¶ the way to construct such a new great power relationship is to strengthen¶ dialogue, enhance mutual trust, develop cooperation, and manage differences.2¶ From the Chinese perspective, the core elements of this relationship are “no¶ conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.”3¶ Although the full policy implications have yet to be explored, the idea¶ reflects an honest desire on the part of Beijing to avoid the tragedy of major¶ power conflicts given the contemporary era’s rapid development of globalization¶ and deepening interdependence among countries. The U.S. side was initially¶ cautious and even dubious of the idea, but during the meeting in California,¶ President Obama agreed to make joint efforts along with China to advance this¶ goal. This agreement not only sends a good signal to the other side about their¶ respective intentions, but also helps set a positive tone for internal policymaking¶ on both sides.¶ It is quite common that U.S. presidents usually devote more time and energy¶ to foreign policy in their second term, trying to establish their political legacy¶ on major international issues. Without the pressure of getting reelected,¶ President Obama can pay more attention to relations with Beijing and¶ provide necessary leadership in his China policy. Fortunately, U.S. Secretary¶ of State John Kerry understands China’s growing importance to U.S. interests as¶ well as global affairs and supports the development of close and cooperative¶ relations with China. From the Chinese perspective, his team appears more credible than “the Clinton–Campbell axis” during Obama’s first term, which¶ appeared to dislike China ideologically and oppose China strategically.¶ Since 2013, both sides have made serious joint efforts to get bilateral¶ relations back on track. As mentioned, in June 2013 Xi and Obama held an¶ informal meeting in Sunnylands, California. This unprecedented summit¶ meeting, less formal but more substantive and candid, established a new type¶ of interaction between Chinese and U.S. presidents, reflecting the overlapping¶ expectation from both sides for better Sino–U.S. ties. With this positive tone¶ set, the 5th S&ED, held in Washington, D.C. one month later, allowed¶ diplomatic and economic teams from both countries to meet and make progress¶ on a wide range of issues.¶ Despite these positive developments, both Beijing and Washington have¶ room for growth as 2014 begins. As China is becoming a hub for regional¶ economic links, it should also play a central role in regional security; therefore,¶ Beijing needs to demonstrate both the willingness and capacity to work with¶ others, including the United States, to effectively deal with security challenges¶ to the region. Meanwhile, Beijing should also assure others that it can peacefully¶ manage and resolve maritime disputes with some of its neighbors, just as it did¶ over land territorial disputes with countries such as Russia and Vietnam during¶ the past two decades.¶ For its part, the United States should treat China as an important global¶ partner not just rhetorically and with diplomatic gestures, but in its actions.¶ This will require Washington to adjust some of its long-held practices such as¶ arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. president’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, and¶ frequent and intrusive air and maritime surveillance on China in its vicinity.¶ Moreover, U.S. policymakers should avoid responding to China’s rising power¶ and influence from a zero-sum perspective, where it aims to check China’s¶ growing capability and international clout, rather than fostering a mutually¶ beneficial ascent.

### Solvency—China Says “Yes”

#### China wants to safeguard US/ China relations –they’d say “yes” to the grand bargain

CNN Wire Staff, Cable News Network, September 22, 2011, “China warns U.S. against arms sales to Taiwan,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/22/world/asia/china-us-taiwan-arms-sale/> (accessed August 9, 2016)

China warned the United States Thursday that a multi-billion dollar arms sales to Taiwan will create "severe obstacles" between Beijing and Washington, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported. "The wrongdoing by the U.S. side will inevitably undermine bilateral relations as well as exchanges and cooperation in military and security areas," Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun said, according to Xinhua. Zhang summoned U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke to lodge a protest. The $5.3 billion arms package includes upgrades to Taiwan's F-16 fighter fleet, a five year extension of F-16 pilot training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona and spare parts for the upkeep of three different planes currently in use by the Taiwanese, according to State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland. The deal is part of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. "We firmly believe that our arms sales to Taiwan contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," she said. Chinese officials asked the U.S. to end military relations with Taiwan and work with the Chinese to safeguard Sino-U.S. relations, Xinhua reported.

### Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions

#### The plan is a key Confidence Building Measure—the grand bargain reduces US support for Taiwan in exchange for China easing its military posture

**Shirley Kan,** Specialist in Asian Security, August 29, 2014, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf> (accessed August 9, 2016)

There has been interest among U.S. academic circles and think tanks for Washington to pursue talks with Beijing on its military buildup and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (instead of simply enhancing security assistance to Taiwan).152 One catalyst for this debate arose out of the U.S.- PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and reported in Taiwan’s media, then-PRC ruler Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraint in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.153 President Bush reportedly did not respond directly to Jiang’s linkage. Editorials in Taiwan were divided on whether to pursue Jiang’s offer. Some argued that confidence building measures (CBMs), such as a reduction in actual deployments of the PLA’s missile and other units, would improve the chances for cross-strait political dialogue on Taiwan’s status and lead to sustained stability. They said that the United States could explore or even negotiate with the PRC how it might reduce the threat against Taiwan, such as dismantling missile brigades in a verifiable manner, since sales of U.S. systems are based on Taiwan’s defense needs. They argued that Jiang’s offer represented the first time that the PRC offered meaningfully to discuss its forces opposite Taiwan. Others said that a freeze or redeployment of missiles would not eliminate the PRC’s continuing and broader military threat against Taiwan (including mobile missiles that can be re-deployed) and that the PRC should hold direct talks with leaders in Taipei instead. They argued that Jiang did not seek to reduce the PLA’s coercive threat but to undermine the relationship between Washington and Taipei, including arms sales which take years to complete. They noted that the PLA’s missile buildup has continued.

### Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions

#### Grand bargain gets China to draw down troops and aggressive posture in the region

Bruce Gilley, Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University, January/February 2010, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs, http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gilley.FA.2010.Taiwan.pdf (August 9, 2016)

By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China s territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China detente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations—specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.

### Solvency—Chinese Troop Reductions

#### The grand bargain of the plan spills over into Chinese troop reductions

Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Assistant Dean and Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiaotong University, China, and Executive Director, the Mr. & Mrs. S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations, USA, and Simon Shen, Associate Professor and Director of Global Studies Programme in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, January 31, 2015, “Conflict and cooperation in Sino-US relations: change and continuity, causes and cures,” book pp. 102-104, (accessed August 8, 2016)

As described, some charge that the present US administration is “abandoning Taiwan” or “cozying up to Beijing with a wink and a nod.”81 But this is an exaggeration. In 2009, Hillary Clinton pledged that, despite the astonishing improvement in relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, there would be “no change in Washington’s policy on arms sales to Taiwan under the administration of US President Barack Obama.”82 The administration has kept its word. Arms sales to Taipei continue and the administration will not rule out future sales. In a similar vein, Chinese observers concede that relations between the mainland and Taiwan are the best in decades. However, China’s massive military build-up opposite Taiwan continues as if nothing has changed. The US Department of Defense’s 2012 report on China’s military confirms that over the past year, the People’s Liberation Army continued to build the capabilities and develop the doctrine it considers necessary to deter Taiwan from declaring independence; to deter, delay, or deny effective US intervention in a potential crossstrait conflict; and to defeat Taiwan forces in the event of hostilities.83 Despite the risks involved, the stakes are so high that the US and China should quietly explore ways to reduce the arms build-up in the Taiwan Strait. The two sides should explore the possibility of reaching an agreement similar to that proposed by then-President Jiang Zemin when visiting with President George W. Bush in Crawford, Texas, in 2002. Namely, Washington would agree to Beijing’s proposal that it not sell new fighters, submarines, and other advanced arms to Taipei in exchange for the removal of the missiles (and their infrastructure) that China has deployed directly opposite Taiwan. In other words, the US should revisit a proposal first raised by the PRC over a decade ago. If a US administration opted to pursue this policy, it would not need to cave in to Chinese pressure and somehow “abandon” Taiwan. Rather, the US could revert to President Carter’s original promise that the US intends only to continue with “the restrained sale of some very carefully selected defensive arms.”84 Such an initiative may yield numerous dividends for both the US and China. The redeployment of China’s missiles would increase warning time and help build confidence. It might even be considered as the first step toward a global ban on short-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, an arms agreement could pave the way for greater cooperation between Beijing and Washington on a host of pressing international problems. Perhaps most significant for China, it would also ease tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and generate good will. Indeed, President Ma claims the removal of China’s missiles is a prerequisite for the negotiation of a peace agreement.85 Moreover, public opinion polls reveal that if China withdraws the missiles deployed opposite Taiwan, 64 percent of Taiwan’s population would support a reduction in arms purchases from the US.86 In short, Beijing should remove its missiles and Washington should curb its arms sales because such an initiative would increase the prospects for peace not only in the Taiwan Strait, but in the entire western Pacific, too.

### Solvency—Econ/ Chinese Sanctions

#### The plan’s grand bargain prevents Chinese sanctions on the US

Peter Harrell, Former deputy assistant secretary of state for counter-threat finance and sanctions. He is now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, January 26, 2016, “China threatens sanctions against U.S. companies: Is this the future?”, (<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/01/26/china-threatens-sanctions-against-u-s-companies-is-this-the-future/> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

China’s recent threat to impose sanctions on U.S. defense companies that sell arms to Taiwan should come as no surprise to American officials or corporate executives: Washington has been issuing sanctions of these sorts for years. It was only a matter of time before U.S. competitors started copying its tactics. Regardless of whether China follows through on its threat, Washington needs to be ready for a new normal in which the United States must defend against sanctions as well as impose them. China is taking a page from the sanctions playbook Washington developed against Iran. Between 2010 and 2015, the United States effectively gave companies a choice: If they did prohibited business with Iran, like buying oil, they would get cut off from doing any business in the United States. Forced to choose between access to the world’s most important financial system and an Iranian market less than 1/30th the size, most companies stuck with Washington and avoided Tehran. China’s threat mirrors this approach — trying to force U.S. companies to choose between defense sales to Taiwan and access to a Chinese economy that is nearly 20 times larger. While U.S. companies do not currently sell military equipment to China, many U.S. defense contractors do sell civilian passenger aircraft, aviation parts and other civilian equipment in China and could find their ability to continue those sales cut off by Beijing. For Beijing, this is a change in official position. China has long argued that only sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council are legitimate. Yet, Beijing has not strictly adhered to this policy. In 2012, for example, it unilaterally limited imports of fruit and vegetables from the Philippines in retaliation for a dispute over claims in the South China Sea. But China’s public threat over Taiwan marks a major escalation in its apparent willingness to deploy sanctions of its own against U.S. companies engaging in business, particularly business that is expressly authorized by the Obama administration and publicly supported by many in Congress. Chinese policymakers understand that their growing economic and financial clout makes sanctions threats more credible. China is a critical market for U.S. products from cars to computer chips, and companies like Wal-Mart, Apple, MasterCard and Starbucks are among the leading American firms that generate at least 10 percent of their business in China, according to data compiled last year by Factset Research.

### Solvency—Starting Point

#### The plan’s grand bargain is a key starting point for broader forms of cooperation

Charles Glaser, Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public....I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

### Solvency—Chinese Aggression

#### The squo ensures the US is drawn into a China/ Taiwan war—the plan detangles US commitment

VOA News, American news agency, March 6, 2016, “China's President Warns Taiwan Against Moves Toward Independence,” Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com/a/china-president-warns-taiwan-against-moves-toward-independence/3221738.html> (August 10, 2016)

Chinese President Xi Jinping has issued a strong warning to Taiwan and its incoming, independence-leaning government. According to the official Xinhua news agency, Xi told delegates at the annual meeting of China's parliament Sunday that Beijing would "resolutely contain Taiwan independence secessionist activities in any form," and would never allow the "historical tragedy" of a split to occur again. China and Taiwan have been split since 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces fled the mainland after losing the civil war to Mao Zedong's communist army. Beijing considers self-ruled Taiwan a renegade province, and vows to bring the island back under its control – by force, if necessary.

### Solvency—US/ China War

#### Grand bargain de-escalates inevitable US/China war over Taiwan—cutting ties is the best option

John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, March/ April 2014, “Taiwan’s Dire Straits,” The National Interest, <http://political-science.uchicago.edu/faculty-articles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf> (accessed August 10, 2016)

How does Taiwan fit into this story? The United States has a rich history of close relations with Taiwan since the early days of the Cold War, when the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island from the Chinese mainland. However, Washington is not obliged by treaty to come to the defense of Taiwan if it is attacked by China or anyone else. Regardless, the United States will have powerful incentives to make Taiwan an important player in its anti-China balancing coalition. First, as noted, Taiwan has significant economic and military resources and it is effectively a giant aircraft carrier that can be used to help control the waters close to China’s all-important eastern coast. The United States will surely want Taiwan’s assets on its side of the strategic balance, not on China’s side. Second, America’s commitment to Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S. credibility in the region, which matters greatly to policy makers in Washington. Because the United States is located roughly six thousand miles from East Asia, it has to work hard to convince its Asian allies—especially Japan and South Korea—that it will back them up in the event they are threatened by China or North Korea. Importantly, it has to convince Seoul and Tokyo that they can rely on the American nuclear umbrella to protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended deterrence, which the United States and its allies wrestled with throughout the Cold War. If the United States were to sever its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China, that would surely send a strong signal to America’s other allies in the region that they cannot rely on the United States for protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome and instead maintain America’s reputation as a reliable partner. This means they will be inclined to back Taiwan no matter what. While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today. In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage. One might argue that there is a simple way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-too-distant future: put America’s nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however, because the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for America is to not even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. There is a second reason the United States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially dangerous flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in America’s interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of great concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it looks like the United States is preventing unification. But that is exactly what Washington will be doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people.

### Solvency—US/ China War

#### The plan is a creative grand bargain that balances Chinese threat perceptions with US interests in the region

Doug Bandow, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, and author, November 21, 2015, “[A Creative Bargain for Peace between China and Taiwan](http://manzellareport.com/index.php/politics/1061-a-creative-bargain-for-peace-between-china-and-taiwan),” Manzella Report, <http://manzellareport.com/index.php/politics/1061-a-creative-bargain-for-peace-between-china-and-taiwan> (accessed August 12, 2016)

Instead, it is worth considering creative bargains which might ensure Taiwan’s independence while satisfying Chinese interests. For instance, Washington should warn Taipei that the U.S. will not go to war on the former’s behalf. Taiwan should invest in a military sufficient to force China to pay a high price for any attempt at coercion, while maintaining its commitment to an independent existence rather than independence. The United States should warn the PRC that engaging in coercion against the island would impose a high economic price on Beijing and reduce China’s chances of taking on a greater regional and global leadership role. Washington also should encourage its Asian and European allies to communicate a similar message: while no one wants war with the PRC, no one could ignore an attack on Taiwan. Washington could propose a Taiwanese neutrality declaration along with an American promise to forswear any military commitment to or bases on the island. In return Beijing would reduce its threatening missile deployments and forswear military action against Taiwan. The United States could follow reduced tensions by reducing its force presence elsewhere in the region, and especially maneuvers challenging Chinese territorial claims. There is no easy way to square the Taiwan circle. Indeed, the Ma-Xi meeting made no attempt to do so. However, it created a better atmosphere, however limited, to explore a broader modus vivendi including America that could encourage longer-term peace and stability. The United States should take advantage of this opportunity, which might not soon recur if President Tsai takes office next year.

### Solvency—US/ China War

#### US security commitments to Taiwan ensure a disastrous war

[Ted Galen Carpenter](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/ted-galen-carpenter), a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to The National Interest, July 6, 2016, “America Should Step Back from the Taiwan Time Bomb,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/america-should-step-back-the-taiwan-time-bomb-16864> (Accessed August 12, 2016)

That period of stability has clearly come to an end, and the United States needs to reconsider the wisdom of its security commitment to Taiwan. Impatience on the part of Beijing, rash action on the part of pro-independence Taiwanese, or just a bad accident could trigger a crisis with devastating consequences for the United States. The latest incident highlights the danger. Imagine if the fishing trawler the Taiwanese missile struck had been from the mainland rather than Taiwan. Imagine if it had been a Chinese naval vessel that was struck. One suspects that Beijing’s response would have been a lot less restrained. The Taiwan Strait is a ticking time bomb. The Taiwanese people seem ever more determined to chart their own destiny distinct from the mainland. The mainland authorities are determined that reunification will take place at some point, and their patience is not inexhaustible. It’s hard to see how this turns out well, and unless the United States extricates itself from this increasingly dangerous commitment, it will be one of the casualties when the time bomb explodes.

### Solvency—Concessions

#### A Taiwan grand bargain with China reduces the risk of US/ China war and allows the US to extract concessions from China

[Charles L. Glaser](http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/experts/514/charles_l_glaser.html?back_url=%2Fpublication%2F25586%2Ftime_for_a_uschina_grand_bargain.html&back_text=Back%20to%20publication), Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1982–1985; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, January 22, 2013, "Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain," Belfer Center, <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/25586/time_for_a_uschina_grand_bargain.html> (accessed August 3, 2016)

Requiring Chinese Concessions. The United States should make accommodation on Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions: China would peacefully resolve its disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accept the United States' long-term military presence in East Asia. Reassuring U.S. Allies. If the United States and China were to reach a grand bargain, the United States could take measures to reinforce its commitment to protect its East Asian allies.  Territorial accommodation is frequently viewed as a deeply flawed strategy, but it can be a state's best option for protecting vital interests. First, accommodation can satisfy or partially satisfy an adversary that wants to change the status quo, thereby reducing the costs the adversary is willing to pay to further change the status quo, which in turn reduces the probability of war. Second, accommodation can enhance an adversary's security by shrinking the military threat the state poses or by signaling the state's benign motives, or both—which in turns increases the state's own security. Third, accommodation can reduce military competition between the state and its adversary, which under a range of conditions can improve both states' security. There are, however, costs and risks associated with territorial accommodation. First, the state loses the economic, security, political, and status value of possessing or defending the territory in question. Second, territorial accommodation could embolden the state's adversary, encouraging the adversary to pursue additional concessions. Whether this occurs depends on the adversary's motives—an adversary with limited aims could be satisfied with the initial round of concessions, whereas one with unlimited aims could be encouraged to expand further because it now doubts the state's resolve or because the concessions increased its power. Third, concessions could lead allies to question the state's willingness to come to their defense in a crisis. China's rise poses difficult challenges for the United States. If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the United States could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The United States is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the United States. Consequently, the United States should consider ending this commitment. Doing so would have both benefits and costs. Benefits. Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would have three main benefits. First, it would reduce the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. China's improved military capabilities are reducing the United States' ability to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China's expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations. Third, terminating this commitment could also greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China. Much of China's military modernization, including its growing capability to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The United States has devised a concept, widely known as AirSea Battle, to counter China's increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the United States into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition.

### Solvency—Concessions

#### Moving away from Taiwan frees up China to cooperate with and make concessions to the US

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, PhD and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and Bonnie Glaser, Senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS, Fall 2011, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?,” The Washington Quarterly, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19262/uploads> (Accessed August 12, 2016)

Would abandoning or reducing support for Taiwan secure smoother U.S.—China relations? Those in China and the United States who call for a change in Taiwan policy insist there would be significant benefits. The decision by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to trade Taiwan for normalization with Beijing facilitated a momentous improvement in U.S.—China relations, setting a powerful precedent.2 To choose China over Taiwan once again, it is asserted, could help Washington resolve differences with China over maritime rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber security, and the uses of space. This line of thinking argues that even issues not directly connected with Taiwan policy could be easier to reconcile if what China deems a core interest were satisfied. Beyond breaking the U.S.—Taiwan bond, Beijing has denied any desire to push the United States out of Asia. It has reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to ‘‘hide its light and bide its time, while getting something accomplished’’ (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei).3 It has repeatedly put development and peace first. However, China’s superior economic performance during the recession, surging global trade and investments, and developing military might led Beijing during 2010 to implement a series of assertive initiatives which caused widespread anxiety in its neighborhood and internationally. As China’s power grows, its allegiance to Deng’s maxim becomes more dated and stale.

### Solvency—Laundry List

#### Grand bargain solves US/ China warming cooperation, global economy, and proliferation

Bruce Gilley, Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University, January/February 2010, “Not So Dire Straits,” Foreign Affairs, http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Gilley.FA.2010.Taiwan.pdf (Accessed August 9, 2016)

Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s--first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.¶ Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Belling relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995-2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.¶ Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues--from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."¶ In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.¶ Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into Chinas orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.¶ Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement--in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence.

### Solvency—Chinese Nationalism

#### A grand bargain reduces Chinese threat perceptions of the US

Rana Divyank Chaudhary, Research intern with the China Research Programme at the IPCS, MA in Conflict Analysis & Peace-building, July 2015, “China-US ‘Grand Bargain’: India's Future Stakes in Great Power Peace," Ink and IR, <https://inkandire.wordpress.com/2015/10/07/china-us-grand-bargain-indias-future-stakes-in-great-power-peace/> (Accessed August 13, 2016)

Simply put, the grand bargain proponents argue that there might be certain areas, including territorial disputes and defence pacts, where both China and the US could exchange concessions without irreversibly jeopardizing their security, national interests, international commitments, and long-term economic objectives.2 A grand bargain thus reached, would simultaneously mollify the Chinese leadership’s fear that the US's primacy in East Asia and its containment of China necessitates military struggle as well as ensure America's role as the region's security provider, guaranteeing freedom of access and engagement with its regional allies for an indefinite period. A section of experts identify Taiwan and island disputes in the East and South China Seas as issues where a consequential bargain could be struck.3 Taiwan's full political integration with the mainland is a high national priority for China. At the same time, the US remains committed to the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). It has been argued that improvement in cross-Straits relations in the future along with US limiting its arms sales to Taiwan would remove a major cause of China's insecurity and pacify domestic political pressures. In return, China should either peacefully resolve all maritime disputes with neighbours in the China Seas or agree to concrete conflict prevention and joint cooperation frameworks to ultimately reach an equitable solution. There might be similar possible scenarios wherein China and the US could come to a mutual agreement to suppress major irritants in their bilateral relations. Certainly, there are significant problems which might obstruct a probable bargain. The prevailing mutual suspicions and recurrent tensions make it extremely difficult to initiate a discussion on the issue in the domestic political arena, to communicate intentions bilaterally, or to anticipate the other side’s preparedness to negotiate. Nonetheless, those who support the case note that the existing conditions in the international system and world economy do not compel the two states toward unavoidable conflict. The normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations and deepening of economic and people-to-people ties have been viewed in the US as the most successful aspect of its strategy and ‘soft power’ in East Asia. For good measure, it is only now that the Chinese leadership has felt sufficiently self-assured to announce that relations with the great powers would not be the primary focus of China’s foreign policy as it considers its ties with the US to be ‘constructive’ and ‘sustainable’ in the foreseeable future. Significant constituencies exist within both China and the US which are vocal in the favour of friendly relations and peaceful resolution of problems despite hardliners on both sides pointing toward adversarial tendencies in the counterpart. Similarly, US allies – Australia, South Korea, and Singapore – tend to balance perceptions and consider the growing acrimony in Sino-American relations a destabilizing phenomenon for the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the idea of a tentative grand bargain, though conjectural, still appears to retain a considerable degree of desirability and feasibility.4

### Solvency—US/ China Relations

#### Grand bargain solves biggest obstacle to US/China relations

Wu Zurong, Research Fellow, China Foundation For International Studies, April 2, 2013, “Is it Time to Stop Arms Sales to Taiwan?,” US-China Focus, <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/is-it-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-taiwan/> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

Since ancient times, Taiwan has been the territory of China. Oddly enough, Taiwan has always been an obstacle to the stable development of Sino-US relations since the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949. The peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Straits since 2008 is helping remove this obstacle. It is high time now for the US to seize the opportunity and make up its mind to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, stop arms sales to Taiwan and stop overt and covert official contact with Taiwan. For the last 34 years, US arms sales to Taiwan have caused considerable troubles between China and the US, making relations stagnate and suffer setbacks. Neither China nor the US strategically benefits from this unstable relationship. The Taiwan issue is a remnant of history. For the last 60 years or more, it has been the single most important and most sensitive issue at the heart of Sino-US relations. In a certain sense, the failure to seriously discuss and resolve this issue has contributed to the 22 years of estrangement and hostility experienced between China and the US. When President Nixon made his historic visit to China in 1972, Taiwan had been a central issue in the negotiations for normalization of relations between China and the United States. On January 1, 1979, China and the US established full diplomatic relations when the Carter Administration decided to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraw American troops and military installations from Taiwan, and to abrogate the treaties it had signed with Taiwan. In a word, resolution of the Taiwan issue was key to normalization. On April 10, 1979, President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act into law. The law directs the Executive Branch to promptly inform Congress of any threat to Taiwan’s security or to the social or economic system of the Taiwanese people, including any danger to the interests of the US. The act states that the US will make available defense articles and services in such a quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Chinese Government resolutely opposed the law, stating that the law contravenes the principles agreed upon by the two sides and constitutes gross interference in China’s internal affairs. Thus, the Taiwan issue remains a key issue obstructing the healthy development of Sino-US relations after normalization. Given the weight the Taiwan issue carries for Sino-US relations, China and the US should urgently act to resolve the Taiwan issue and ensure long-term stability of bilateral relations. Now, with peaceful development established in cross-Straits relations, assumed threats to Taiwan are diminishing and there is no apparent danger to US interests. Therefore, the Taiwan Relations Act is now completely out of date. The US has expressed support for the continued expansion of exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits as it is not only in the interests of the people of both sides of the Straits, but also helps maintain peace and stability in the region. With the establishment of peace prevailing across the Taiwan Straits, US arms sales to Taiwan have not only become unreasonable but also unnecessary. Taiwan’s needs for weapons are on the decline. The arms sold to Taiwan are used to protect Taiwan’s fishing boats in the Diaoyu Islands’ territorial waters. It would be ridiculous if the US insists on arms sales to Taiwan when the US officially insists on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Under the current situation, the US decision to completely terminate arms sales to Taiwan would be a wise choice. As China and the US work together to build a new type of major power relationship, based on equality and mutual benefit, continued interference in China’s internal affairs is not helpful at all. Since sustainable peace across the Taiwan Straits has overturned the very foundation of the Taiwan Relations Act, the US is losing its standing to continue arms sales to Taiwan. For the past 34 years, the US has violated the basic principles enshrined in the three joint communiqués between China and the US by selling arms to Taiwan, which has already inflicted severe damage upon Sino-US relations. It is high time for such violations to come to an end, benefitting both China and the United States. Stopping interference in China’s internal affairs by terminating US arms sales to and official contact with Taiwan does not mean the US is “giving up Taiwan.” It only means that the US has come to truly abide by the principles and the spirit of the three joint communiqués, greatly helping to enhance US credibility and strengthen mutual political trust between China and the US. At the same time, it is believed that nonofficial contact and exchanges by the US with Taiwan, whether cultural, economic or business, will continue to flourish on a solid basis in the peaceful environment across the Taiwan Straits.

### Solvency—US/ China Relations

#### The grand bargain would boost US/ China relations—China’s upset about US commitments and arms sales

China Daily Asia, Chinese news agency, December 15, 2015, “China urges US to stop arms sale to Taiwan,” China Daily Asia, <http://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2015-12/15/content_15358767.html> (Accessed August 11, 2016)

China on Tuesday urged the United States to stop arms sale to Taiwan and do something more conducive for China-US relations. "The United States should be fully aware that the arms sale to Taiwan is highly sensitive and dangerous. The US should abide by its commitment and stop arms sale to Taiwan, and do something more conducive for China-US relations and the peaceful development of the cross-Strait relations," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei. Hong made the remarks at a regular press briefing while commenting the report by Reuters that the Obama administration is expected to authorize the sale of two guided missile frigates to Taiwan as soon as this week. The sale would mark the first time in four years that the United States has shipped arms to Taiwan, the longest gap in such arms sales in nearly four decades, the report said. Hong said China's opposition to arms sale to Taiwan is "steady, clear and consistent." The arms sale severely goes against the three joint communiqués between China and the United States, especially the one signed on Aug 17, 1982. It also interferes in China's domestic affairs and harms peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and China-US relations. Under the joint communiqué, the United States promises to gradually reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan and eventually stop selling weapons to Taiwan.

### A/T “US Security Commitment Key”

#### The grand bargain would still allow the US to covertly aid Taiwan’s defense

J. Michael Cole, Editor in chief of Thinking Taiwan, a senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) in Taipei, December 22, 2014, “Arms Sales to Taiwan: Ending the ‘Brutal Interference’,” Thinking Taiwan, <http://thinking-taiwan.com/us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-ending-the-brutal-interference/> (Accessed August 10, 2016)

So what can be done to counter this? One solution would be to abandon the second axis altogether (and finding other ways to express continued political support for Taipei) while rethinking the means by which the U.S. can assist Taiwan to ensure it retains the ability to defend itself. What this probably means is an end to high-profile U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Interestingly, Taiwan has already commenced work in that direction, albeit for reasons that had little to do with the strategic reassessment along the lines proposed here. Although many of the programs were initiated under his predecessor, it really was under the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration that Taiwan committed to an indigenous defense strategy. While the decision to focus on domestic R&D and production arose out of budgetary constraints (stemming from a shift to an all-volunteer military and US$18 billion owed the U.S. for previous acquisitions), it nevertheless proposes a way out — or a way in, rather — for the U.S. Instead of selling weapons to Taiwan and risk angering Beijing, the U.S. defense sector could act more subtly by quietly [assisting Taiwan with its many indigenous programs](http://thinking-taiwan.com/from-gunboats-to-nuts-and-bolts/). Such assistance could come in the form of designs, parts, or through the secondment of engineers and technicians, who may or may not be required to “retire” before doing so. Politically, it could also mean more permissiveness on the part of the U.S. State Department when it comes to efforts by Taiwan to access certain dual-use technologies. Although this approach would likely signify lower revenues for major U.S. arms firms given that it would practically end efforts to secure future major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, this new program would nonetheless create sundry opportunities for cooperation and procurement of parts for assembly in Taiwan, as a recent [blue paper](http://english.dpp.org.tw/seventh-defense-policy-blue-paper-released/) by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party has suggested. (The case could certainly be made that major defense packages for Taiwan are highly unlikely to materialize in the near future anyway.) Furthermore, by working behind the scenes, this approach would deny Beijing the ability to exert influence on the second axis, as this axis would simply have ceased to exist.

### A/T “US Security Commitment Key”

#### The US should move away from Taiwan now while the risk of war is low—Taiwan/China reunification is inevitable

Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, February 10, 2016, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” MIT Press Journals, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00227#.V66BzvkrJhE> (accessed August 12, 2016)

The analysis in the previous section suggests that recent trends in the Taiwan Strait are reducing the likelihood of the cross-strait conflict scenario that, arguably, most worried analysts prior to 2008—a revisionist Taiwan crossing PRC redlines, thus triggering a military response. This does not imply, however, that the underlying dynamics of the scenario are becoming irrelevant as regards the prospects for cross-strait conflict. To the contrary, Beijing and Taipei continue to hold strongly divergent preferences over the issue of Taiwan's status, and it is likely that tacit bargaining on the issue will continue. Moreover, the optimistic assessment sketched out earlier hinges in part on the assumption that major trends in cross-strait relations—especially the shifting balance of power and deepening economic ties—have ambiguous effects on the location of China's redline, R. It is unclear, however, whether the net effects of economic integration and a shifting balance of power will remain ambiguous. Rather, as China's military capabilities continue to improve (and as the momentum in cross-strait economic cooperation appears to stall), it is possible that the shifting balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait could become the dominant trend in cross-strait relations. Such a development could generate renewed instability in the strait. Consider again figure 6. Recall that a shifting balance of power has the ceteris paribus effect of pushing the likely war outcome, W, to the left and reducing the size of China's war costs, cc. To the degree that these effects overwhelm the effects of other trends on these parameters, China's war utility should improve—which in the model means that China's redline, R, should begin to shift left. The shift would be most pronounced if a changing cross-strait military balance (driven, for instance, by improving PRC amphibious capabilities or a declining U.S. commitment to Taiwan) were accompanied by a decline in PRC expected costs of conflict (which might occur, for example, if cross-strait economic ties were to decay or if U.S.-China relations were to founder). Yet just as conflict could occur if a revisionist Taiwan were to redefine the status quo to a point to the right of China's redline, so too could conflict occur if a changing cross-strait environment were to push China's redline to the left of the status quo. If the redline, R, were to shift to the left of the status quo, the model suggests that the PRC would gain more from war than from a continuation of that status quo; in other words, Taiwan would now be risking military conflict if it failed to accommodate this new reality by redefining its sovereign status more to the PRC's liking. If China's redline were ever to drift to the left of the status quo, Taiwan would have incentive to be accommodating, as a war would impose tremendous costs on the island. Indeed, several scholars have suggested in recent years that China's growing power makes Taiwan accommodation on sovereignty issues virtually inevitable. Robert Sutter writes, for instance, that “China's economic, military, and diplomatic leverage over Taiwan increasingly constrains Taipei to follow a path leading to accommodation of and eventual reunification with China.”87John Mearsheimer similarly warns that “if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.”88 And, recalling Finland's strategic accommodation of Soviet interests during the Cold War, Bruce Gilley likewise suggests that “Taiwan is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.”89

### A/T “US Security Commitment Key”

#### The US is unlikely to defend Taiwan because of economic concerns of a war with China—the plan would allow the US to step away from Taiwan officially

Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University and formerly a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, May 6, 2015, “Will America defend Taiwan?,” The Australian, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/will-america-defend-taiwan/news-story/97099253fe1f490f5d67a0181c6cf25c> (Accessed August 3, 2016)

So back then a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much more to lose than America. Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered. These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China? These are the questions America's leaders would have to confront in considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very likely be that the status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or economic collapse over. And that means American leaders and policy analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The promises that America was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to keep now. What about America's allies and friends in Asia? Wouldn't they help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves about China? Many Americans seem to assume they would. But even Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if Australia is uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India, Singapore, Vietnam or even the Philippines to offer anything more than mild diplomatic support to America over Taiwan. The exception is Japan, which under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last week's visit to Washington. But does Mr Abe really speak for Japan? Will future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how exactly would that help America? How would Japan's support change the answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid? So no one should lightly assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the question is not answered simply by using the word 'appeasement' to invoke the memory of Munich. There are hard questions to be answered about how far we should be willing to go to accommodate (or, if you prefer, to appease) China's ambitions for a bigger regional leadership role as its power grows. Any substantial accommodation would mean a shift away from the US-led order of recent decades, which would be risky and unsettling. It seems much easier to evade these questions by refusing to contemplate any accommodation at all. But that would carry high costs. Those who assume that those costs must be worth paying might not have thought carefully enough about just how high the price could go. And those who assume that it will be impossible to accommodate China because it proved impossible to appease Hitler perhaps assume that there are no material differences between the situations in Europe in 1938 and in Asia now, or between Nazi Germany and today's China. They perhaps also assume that there are no alternatives to the old US-led order in Asia except Chinese hegemony. The magnitude of the issues at stake – including for the people of Taiwan – suggest that these assumptions need more careful scrutiny.

# DA Answers China Politics

## Economic reform bad

#### Fast reform kills the economy

Ian Armstrong. Found at Wikistrat. August 30, 2015. Forecasting China’s anti-corruption campaign. http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/08/forecasting-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign/

Anti-Corruption as Anti-Growth Since China’s anti-corruption campaign was launched, some have asserted that the effort has in fact hurt China, contributing to its slowing economy, due to significant drops in luxury industries, such as five-star hotels. Indeed, the declines in said industries, as well as the negative correlation between the campaign and China’s slowed growth, suggest that corruption mildly enhanced China’s short-term economic gains. This revelation in turn acts as evidence in favor of halting the initiative for the duration of the prevailing economic slowdown. However, it is Xi’s suggested institutional reforms that will impose a more significant burden on China’s already slowing economy. Reforms of any kind are costly, and a reformation of China’s established and complicated legal system and governance structure would certainly entail serious economic growing pains as the Chinese government finances the transition. In an already unstable economic environment, Beijing might seriously consider holding off on these costly reforms.

#### Supply-side reforms are the opposite of what China needs for investment

Yu Yongding. Writer at China Business Review. July 22, 2016. China’s Incomplete Growth Strategy. http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-incomplete-growth-strategy/

But not all investment is created equal. Infrastructure investment, in particular, may be the key to tackling China’s economic woes. After all, such investment, which grew at 19.6 percent in the first quarter of 2016, has already proved to be a driver of economic growth. Also, unlike real-estate investment, it has not worsened China’s resource allocation or set the stage for major imbalances.In an ideal world, domestic consumption would serve as the main engine of growth; under current circumstances, infrastructure investment is the most reliable option. In the short term, when overcapacity and deflation are the main obstacles, infrastructure investment boosts growth through the economy’s demand side. In the long run, it operates through the supply side to boost productivity and raise growth potential. Given the strong demand for government bonds, China can fund such investment with fiscal deficits. Also, with China’s major banks still state-owned, and capital controls still in place, the risk of an imminent financial crisis is very low. Of course, China’s government must uphold its commitment to implement structural reforms. But infrastructure investment is also badly needed, not just to prevent the economy from sliding further, but also to enable China to generate the sustained long-term growth that it requires to achieve developed-country status.

#### Reform will increase labor market pressure and make the economy more volatile

John Chan. Writer at Centre for Globalization Research. November 24, 2013. China’s Sweeping Free Market Reforms. Consolidating the Cheap Labor Economy, Devastating Social Impacts. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-sweeping-free-market-reforms-consolidating-the-cheap-labor-economy-devastating-social-impacts/5359207>

The proposed land reform, supposedly to give farmers the right to sell their land, is aimed at driving millions of rural poor into the cities as cheap labour. A market in urban land has existed since the 1990s. But rural land, though no longer farmed collectively since the 1980s, is still collectively owned by farmers at least nominally. In practice, it is controlled by village and township CCP bosses, whose collusion with developers and corrupt practices have often provoked violent protests and clashes. Now farmers will be allowed to sell their land. In a related decision, the household registration system will be dismantled, ending the formal ban on rural residents living in the cities. The influx of rural labour will vastly heighten the pressure on jobs and social services in the urban areas. Officially, 51 percent of China’s population now lives in the cities, up from 18 percent in 1978. In reality, 270 million “urban” residents, almost of 40 percent of total, still have their household registration in rural areas, and are not entitled to social services in the cities. The CCP regime is deeply concerned about the prospect of social unrest. Xi announced several cosmetic changes, including the abolition of the widely hated “correction through labour” system which allows police to send minor offenders to labour camps for up to four years without due procedure. In reality, Xi is strengthening the police state apparatus with the establishment of a new powerful National Security Committee that places the military, intelligence, public security and diplomatic apparatus under his direct control.

## Economic reform impossible

#### China’s economic/political system is both impossible to reform and unlikely to collapse

Brian Toohey. Writer at Asia Financial Review. August 8, 2016. Nervous Chinese government threatens policy development and growth. http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/nervous-chinese-government-threatens-policy-development-and-growth-20160807-gqmx5i

However, Jones is concerned that intra-party panels, called "Leading Groups", set up by President Xi Jinping "threaten to overtake the role of the technocratic agencies in decision making. Many Chinese are now saying this reminds them of how Mao ran the country under the Cultural Revolution. We wait for the cycle to turn." China Policy's research director, David Kelly, says the country's reform agenda confronts deep troubles blocking many policy solutions. He says: "The legacy issue of 'national unity' gives rise to a highly centralised government locked in dependency with local administrations, adept at playing by their own rules. The result is endless cycling between re- and de-centralising." Kelly says difficulties in implementing the 2013 reform program to level the playing field between private and state-owned enterprises are unresolved and solutions to the rural-urban divide face "daunting costs". However, the consultative policy process has served the leadership's core goal of building support to avoid the collapse of the existing political system. A collapse would wreck China's drive to shift its economy further up the value chain. But the strong consensus encountered during this writer's recent trip, sponsored by the Australia China Relations Institute at UTS, is that a political collapse is highly unlikely.

#### The economy is too ingrained with state control to reform

Shannon Tiezzi. Writer at the Diplomat. May 6, 2015. Will China’s Reforms Succeed? http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/will-chinas-reforms-succeed/

To many of the speakers at the conference, China’s economic reforms cannot be fully realized without accompanying political reforms. The problem of corruption and government resistance to reform, for instance, is based on structural issues and will be difficult to overcome without structural change. Cheng Xiaonong, an expert in Chinese political and economic issues based at Princeton University, said that China’s economic “new normal” is an attempt to solve “old problems” with “old models.” Since the 1980s, China’s government has felt political pressure to keep economic growth at 8 percent per year – 30 years later, China is still facing the same issue. Yet the “old model” of a hybrid state-controlled and market economy still dominates in China. “The more things change, the more they stay the same,” Cheng said. In particular, China has a long way to go if it wants to transition its economy to one based on domestic consumption. As Cheng pointed out, according to the latest World Bank figures, household consumption makes up 68 percent of the U.S. GDP. In China, it’s roughly half that – Chinese consumption has stagnated at around 35 percent of GDP since 2006. He Qinglian, another Princeton-based economist who has long pointed to the connections between political and economic reforms, described the flip side of this problem. The Chinese government has dominated the space for thought, political participation, and discussion in China based on the unspoken bargain that by doing so, Chinese people would prosper.

#### China’s economic slowdown will stop reform

Sue Lin Wong. Writer at Reuters Beijing. August 12, 2016. China's economic activity slows in July as reforms begin to bite. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-investment-idUSKCN10N0BL>

China's economic activity slowed in July, with investment growing at its slowest pace since the turn of the century, as the world's second-largest economy grappled with the painful restructuring of its older industrial sectors. The weaker-than-expected data covering investment, lending, retail spending and factory output on Friday follows a run of poor numbers this month, keeping alive hopes the government will unleash more stimulus this year to meet ambitious economic growth targets. "In light of persistent headwinds from the external sector, weak business sentiment, and a cooling property market, we believe that policymakers need to accelerate policy easing and reforms," Jing Li, an economist at HSBC, wrote in a note. The increased stimulus hopes cheered investors, with China's blue-chip CSI300 Index .CSI300 ending at it highest close since early January. China's pace of fixed-asset investment slipped to 8.1 percent in January-July, the weakest growth since December 1999, and down from 9 percent in the January-June period. Analysts had expected it to rise 8.8 percent. The retreat was led by a 22.9 percent decline in mining, suggesting the government's goal of cutting production in older industrial sectors is working. China's investment and net exports are slowing, with the government increasingly expected to boost headline growth through fiscal policies rather than interest rate cuts, analysts say. Investors remain wary about the growth outlook amid painful reforms in the state-owned enterprise sector. Private investment, which accounts for about 60 percent of overall investment, grew 2.1 percent, compared with 2.8 percent in the first half. Meanwhile, growth in investment by state firms cooled to 21.8 percent Jan-July from 23.5 percent.

#### Corrupt financial networks will syphon off the growth from economic reform

Li Modi. Writer at the Epoch Times. June 26, 2016. The Immense Challenges to Xi Jinping’s Supply-Side Economic Reform in China. <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2100969-the-immense-challenges-to-xi-jinpings-supply-side-economic-reform-in-china/>

An insider in the banking system indicated that a part of the bank loans has gone to SOEs and their subsidiaries, and many of them are zombie enterprises. Such companies readily get new loans to pay off old debts, and this accounts for a good portion of total bank loans. Henan Daily recently published a report saying a number of financial measures were available to help the coal, steel, and other traditional industries in Henan Province. However, to obtain bank loans, enterprises that are having difficulties need to reportedly change their “main business type.” This indicates that they pretend to shift business into industries other than coal, steel, or any that has been in deep mire—a policy that is equivalent to encouraging enterprises to lie. If other provinces follow the Henan example, the efforts of reducing overcapacity may end up a failure. In any case, a sense of chaos has followed orders to reduce overcapacity, with a huge amount of money moving about. Part of it has gone into the commodity futures market since April 11. Commodities from steel and cooking coal, to eggs, soybean, corn, and other agricultural products, became popular, leading to an abrupt rise in China’s futures market. At the same time, authorities injected large amounts of credit into the overall economy this year, to the tune of over 1 trillion yuan (around $150 billion) each month since the start of the year.

#### Zombie enterprise will nullify the effect of reforms

Li Modi. Writer at the Epoch Times. June 26, 2016. The Immense Challenges to Xi Jinping’s Supply-Side Economic Reform in China. <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2100969-the-immense-challenges-to-xi-jinpings-supply-side-economic-reform-in-china/>

China’s overcapacity has led to many “zombie enterprises,” in the steel, cement, coal, and other resource industries, as well as in the textile and garment industry. They are generally state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that consume public funds but don’t produce equivalent returns. Zombie enterprises are on the verge of bankruptcy, but they just don’t close down. A main reason is that local governments won’t relinquish their personal interests and benefits in connection with these enterprises. Thus, the process of reducing overcapacity has created intense conflicts between the central and local governments. While central authorities are demanding the reduction of overcapacity, local governments have their own interests. Reducing capacity has a very big impact on the local economy, finance, and employment, not even counting the benefits officials get from these enterprises. As such, chaos frequently ensues in local areas. Zhao Xizi, a former honorary chairman of China National Association of Metal Material Trade, gave the following example of how officials keep zombie enterprises looking good on paper. He said a steel company’s statements showed profits of 2 billion yuan ($305 million). But an investigation revealed that the money was obtained from selling assets, which the company then declared as profits.

#### Reforms are too slow to deal with the fundamental flaws in the economy

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. Writer at Telegraph UK. November 15, 2013. China pledges free-market blitz but necessary freedom lags. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10453614/China-pledges-free-market-blitz-but-necessary-freedom-lags.html>

The new hukuo rules will abolish curbs on rural migration to smaller towns, phase out controls gradually for medium-sized cities, but maintain a tight grip for the bigger cities. The “fine-tuning” of the one-child policy has sparked the most interest in the West, but is unlikely to have much economic impact. Fertility rates have collapsed to near 1.2 in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - far below the replacement level of 2.0 - and much the same is happening in China’s eastern cities for complex reasons. The rate in Shanghai has dropped to 1.08, the word’s lowest. Families can already have a second child if both parents are single children. The reform merely extends this to marriages where just one parent is a single child. This covers only 16m couples. The changes will have no impact on labour supply for 20 years. Yet China’s demographic crisis is already in full swing. The workforce declined by 3m last year, an inflexion point that has hit sooner than expected. The International Monetary Fund says the numbers in work will now go into “precipitous decline”, leading to a labour shortage of 140m shortly after 2030.

## Xi leadership bad

#### Xi will use his political capital to further destabilize the economy and government

Anthony J Laurence. Writer at HKFP Voices Politics & Protest. May 16, 2016. Xi Jinping’s anti-graft drive is closely linked to economic reform. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/05/16/xis-anti-graft-drive-closely-linked-to-economic-reform/

This is, in part, a facet of the anti-corruption campaign which Western academics refuse to point out, mainly because they’re in favour of neo-liberal reforms in China. Complimenting an authoritarian on a political crackdown for the purpose of policy implementation is bad form. That being said, Xi suggested neo-liberal reform is not what is at stake. This also appears not to be the case when examining the already accomplished neo-liberal reforms Xi has achieved, including de-regulation of deposit interest rates, linkages between stock exchanges and a less manipulated Remnimbi. These are all free-market capitalist agenda items business leaders and blue-blooded capitalists have been very happy with. It has been quite an accomplishment for Xi to have spent nearly all of his political capital on centralizing decision-making power into his hands through the “working small groups” in foreign affairs, security and economic policy. Furthermore, an empowered Xi results in a more aggressive China internationally, as has been seen in the strong-arming of British diplomats, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the lack of willingness to uphold the political deal in regard to Hong Kong and Xi’s unwavering resolve to recover the “lost territory” of Taiwan, which he has referred to as a “national tragedy”. All this evidence bodes ill for the stability of East Asia, as weak states in dire economic straits tend to lash out internationally in order to gin up nationalism … as can be seen with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The anti-corruption campaign has allowed Xi to act in these empowered ways and it will only continue to do so in the future.

#### Xi can’t reform the economy with his record on restricting economic freedom

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. Writer at Telegraph UK. November 15, 2013. China pledges free-market blitz but necessary freedom lags. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/10453614/China-pledges-free-market-blitz-but-necessary-freedom-lags.html>

Yet expert opinion is deeply divided. Critics say the contradiction between Xi Jinping’s free-market push and his reliance on Leninist party control is untenable, certain to be tested as the middle class grows in confidence. The new leadership may have to choose between the two. The reforms may meet stiff resistance from vested interests, especially from state behemoths that serve as patronage machines for party bosses. The text said they would have “less role in allocating resources” and would have to transfer 30pc of their profits to the general budget. Even the one-child policy has its vested interests. Richer Chinese who flout the controls have to pay a fine of £900 for each extra child. This generated £1.8bn of revenue for local authorities last year. Officials have come to rely on the income just as British local councils rely on parking fees. Yet the broad thrust of the plans seems likely to transform Chinese life over time. Land reform will allow farmers to sell, rent and inherit land that is not earmarked for agrarian use, creating a property-owning "yeoman" society in the countryside, with political views to match. Price controls on water, oil, gas and electricity will be lifted gradually, ending a subsidy system that is bleeding the budget and leading to a wasteful abuse of the country’s scarce resources. “We will provide a pricing mechanism that will be decided by the market,” it said.

#### Xi can’t manage economic reforms

The Economist. January 16, 2016. A Crisis of Faith. <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21688399-their-response-wobbly-markets-chinas-leaders-reveal-their-fears-crisis-faith/////accessed>

Jitters emanating from China’s equity and currency markets have exposed widespread fears that the way ahead will be rocky indeed—and that Mr Xi and his colleagues are ill-equipped to navigate it. Evidence from their handling of a broad range of political and economic policy suggests that the worriers may prove right. Four days after Mr Xi’s broadcast, the Shanghai stockmarket reopened after a new-year break. With 90 minutes to go before the close of business, transactions were halted for the rest of the day: the index had fallen by 7% and a newly introduced “circuit-breaker” kicked in. The sell-off has deepened since then: the index is now down by about 15% so far in 2016, its worst-ever start to a new year. At the same time, China’s once-placid currency has turned stormy. The central bank believed it could nudge the yuan down, offering a little help to weary exporters without grave repercussions. Instead, it has triggered an exodus of capital and alarmed investors around the world, who braced themselves for bigger falls. As fears of a meltdown in China rippled across global markets, the government scrapped the ill-conceived circuit-breaker, and scrambled to shore up the yuan and the markets by telling its banks and brokers to buy. Panic about China’s ability to maintain steady growth is unwarranted. True, its debt is worrisome: government and private debt was about 160% of GDP eight years ago and now stands at more than 240% (about $25 trillion). But the government still expects the economy to grow by an average of 6.5% a year for the rest of the decade. That may be difficult, and it could entail a lot more wasteful investment. But it should be achievable. The problem is thus not an economic one, per se. It is that a government once widely thought of as all-powerful—even over markets—may be losing its grip. The recent ructions, after all, are not the first mess of this sort; the markets went haywire last August (see chart 1). China’s leaders are now grappling with hugely complex reforms of their financial system, their currency policy and of their state-owned enterprises and, apparently uncertain how to proceed, they are thrashing around and making mistakes. At home and abroad, people risk losing faith in them; such a loss would be felt well beyond the markets.

#### Xi doesn’t have the power to reform the economy

Kerry Brown. Writer at the Diplomat. May 9, 2016. Modern China’s Revolutionary Dream. http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/modern-chinas-revolutionary-dream/

We do know that Xi has spent huge resources and expended political capital on internal Party matters – on trying to iron out its ill discipline through the extended anti-corruption struggle, on unifying and nailing down its current ideology (the four comprehensives, from last year) and in trying to devote effort and time to “party building.” His first words when emerging as Party leader in November were about how the Party needed to reconnect with the people, closing the gap between those ruled and those doing the ruling. It seems remarkable that he could have made such forceful and unambiguous statements so early without a large measure of support among former and current members of the elite. One possibility is that some of them mistook his words for rhetoric, rather than a declaration of real intent, but some, perhaps the majority, must have agreed with what he said. Xi Jinping’s relationship with the Party is crucial. But it is not a straightforward one. The Party is no longer the partially guerrilla fighting force led by largely rural figures with a living memory of fighting for its survival as it was under Mao. It has undergone almost four decades of its own parallel reform and transformation since 1978. Its 88 million members are more like citizens of a state within a state than ever before. They are better educated, more professional, and often sound more like executives of a major corporation than a Marxist force with roots deep in revolutionary struggle and class war. This gives the misleading impression that today’s Party members have wholly turned their back on all the things that were done and believed in by Party leaders, and membership, before 1978 and the start of the great social and economic transformation. Xi’s political personality, his ambition, and the context in which he is best understood, are all inextricably mixed up and linked with the Party, and with its own sense of mission. Seeing him outside of this framework, and not understanding his relationship with the extraordinary political organization he leads, is a mistake. Not that this is easy. The Communist Party of China is an anomaly, which sometimes looks like a thing from another era. How can it truly be in charge of perhaps the greatest single effort to forge modernity in a developing country — perhaps in any country — the world has ever seen?

#### Economic reform is a smokescreen for Xi to consolidate his power

Andrew Browne. Writer at Wall Street Journal. January 8, 2016. Xi Jinping’s Micromanaging Leaves Markets in the Lurch. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinpings-micromanaging-leaves-markets-in-the-lurch-1452241724>

Moving from a top-down command economy dominated by the CCP to a more decentralized model that allows for independent private business activity directly conflicts with Xi’s need for political control. Indeed, as the level of fear in China has grown in the two-plus years of Xi’s rule, the flow of capital flight to the West has accelerated. An estimated $700 billion flowed out of China last year, much of it flowing into the United States and other nations in the form of direct private investment. Author and China observer James Rickards believes that the promise of structural reform touted by many Western observers is illusory. “He’s working around the edges, not really accomplishing much of substance,” Rickards tells the National Interest. “Just track monthly capital outflows, including the ‘trade deficit’ with Hong Kong, which is really just capital flight disguised as transfer pricing. That’s a good measure of confidence in the leadership. The outflows have fluctuated recently, but the major trend is those who can are getting their money out as fast as they can. The cronyism is too entrenched and the debt levels are too high. They waited too long to reform.” Ultimately there is a conflict between the vision of China’s future held by most Western observers and the first priority of Xi—namely, maintaining the political dominance of the CCP with himself at the helm. Prior to Xi’s ascension to power, China’s leaders were reluctant to dismantle state-controlled industries for fear of a political reaction. Now several years into a political consolidation, Xi has established “rule by fear” such that he can make economic changes, but it remains to be seen whether change will actually occur. Meanwhile, China’s economy is increasingly moribund and the currency continues to weaken against the dollar, suggesting that the CCP may eventually return to the tried and true model of an export-led economy. Such a strategy may increase economic and political tensions between China and other industrial nations led by the United States, but it would ensure the political survival of the CCP.

#### Xi’s authoritarian leadership will make economic reform impossible

Chris Whalen. Writer at National Interest. June 19, 2016. Xi Struggles to Reform China's Politics—and Its Economy, Too. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/xi-struggles-reform-chinas-politics%E2%80%94-its-economy-too-16632>

 “His authoritarian style of leadership at home and belligerent posture abroad are ominous because they make China’s chances of being successful in reforming its own economy—on which the entire world now depends—increasingly unlikely,” writes Orville Schell of the Asia Society in New York. Part of the difficulty for Xi in managing China’s economy is that the level of corruption among CCP cadres is extreme, thus consolidation of political power truly is a necessary condition for economic change. A key element of the structural reforms promised by Xi is to inject a degree of risk into China’s economy, notes Leland Miller, president of China Beige Book. “Foreigners need to understand that China is in a constant state of stimulus,” notes Miller, who believes that Xi will eventually use his increase political control to start allowing state owned enterprises to fail and thereby force restructuring that will reduce excess capacity in many industries. “Everyone thought that the anticorruption campaign would last for six months and then things would return to the status quo,” notes Miller. “Xi has shown that he will go after anybody outside of his inner circle, including former high CCP officials, which has given him the power to make difficult changes. But his attacks on high-level cadres has also injected a level of fear into society that has a negative impact on the economy.” Miller expects Xi to continue to consolidate his political power and then turn to making significant structural changes to China’s state-dominated economy, but not necessarily changes that will magically produce a Western-style consumer economy. Western observers have for years expected a “rebalancing” of the Chinese economy away from investment led growth to a more Western-style, consumption-based model, but as we’ve noted previously in the National Interest, this may not really be possible.

#### Xi has had to purge his government to make economic reform possible

Chris Whalen. Writer at National Interest. June 19, 2016. Xi Struggles to Reform China's Politics—and Its Economy, Too. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/xi-struggles-reform-chinas-politics%E2%80%94-its-economy-too-16632>

At the same time, the government of paramount leader Xi Jinping and his trusted lieutenants has led a growing political purge that raises questions as to whether the reforms of the past several decades are now being reversed. Concepts such as collective leadership, for example, have been discarded under Xi. “[O]nce Xi acceded to top office he was widely expected to pursue political liberalization and market reform,” notes veteran sinologist Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, in the New York Review of Books. “Instead he has reinstated many of the most dangerous features of Mao’s rule: personal dictatorship, enforced ideological conformity, and arbitrary persecution.” Other observers believe that Xi and his allies are in a struggle with vested interests resistant to economic reform. As the economic situation in China slows, the struggle among different factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is also intensifying. Several observers point to the failure of former Premier Wen Jiabao, in particular, which has led to some urgency in economic reforms, hence the need for Xi to remove party officials with significant economic interests that would resist change. Another view published in Nikkei Asian Review says that Premier Li Keqiang and other senior government officials view the current state of the Chinese economy positively and want to focus on stabilizing the economy via increased government allocations of “credit” to avoid political instability. Xi, this view holds, opposes further use of debt for economic stimulus and instead wants to push structural reforms that would imply a consolidation of state-run companies and, in some regions, large-scale unemployment.

#### Investors won’t trust Xi’s reforms

Trey McAver. Senior Analyst at Trusted Sources. May 6, 2016. Xi Jinping’s failed economic policy. http://www.trustedsources.co.uk/china/macro-policy/xi-jinping-s-failed-economic-policy

Meanwhile, Mr. Xi’s problems are running away from him. The world has never witnessed such a rapid run-up of debt; credit is expanding at double the rate of economic growth. Less-drastic trends have all ended badly for other countries. Overcapacity has grown unfathomably large. By some estimates, the amount of unsold residential real estate is the equivalent of seven Manhattan islands—and the latest credit binge means another property bonanza is under way. Barry Eichengreen, a specialist on the Chinese economy at the University of California, Berkeley, writes that financial authorities face a series of unpalatable options to head off mounting threats to the banking system. The least bad is probably to issue bonds to recapitalize the banks, essentially placing the burden on future taxpayers. There are no assurances this will happen, but if it doesn’t, Mr. Eichengreen says, “the consequences could be dire.” The smart money isn’t waiting to find out: Much of it has already fled, and more will follow if U.S. interest rates head higher later this year, adding further pressure on the yuan to weaken. Perhaps the most worrying sign of wavering confidence is that private investment is falling sharply even as state investment soars. Companies putting their own money at risk are waiting for evidence that the leadership is committed to Mr. Xi’s version of “supply-side” overhauls, which if executed decisively—and flawlessly—might lead to sustainable growth. For now, what they see is an administration still stuck on the semantics.

#### Xi is an ineffective reformer

Andrew Browne. Writer at Wall Street Journal. May 17, 2016. Xi Jinping’s Economy Gets Stuck in Theory Stage. http://www.wsj.com/articles/xis-economy-gets-stuck-in-theory-stage-1463467219

His record to date on implementing his own radical reform agenda suggests weakness rather than strength. He hasn’t been nearly as effective in driving change as the formidable former Premier Zhu Rongji, who closed thousands of inefficient state enterprises in the late 1990s. Despite plenty of talk of industrial restructuring, we have yet to see bankruptcies on any scale, even in industries linked to the real-estate sector that are in colossal oversupply. In fact, one after another, new steel and cement plants are going up. Mr. Xi seems to have underestimated both the complexity of the challenge and the forces of resistance. Some argue that state enterprises today have better defenses; they’ve bulked up and found protective godfathers within local governments that need their tax revenues. Others say the delay in implementing industrial reforms stems from the fact that Mr. Xi doesn’t have his own people in key positions. According to this theory, changes should start flowing after a key party meeting next year—the 19th congress—that will see a sweeping personnel reshuffle. Speculation is swirling about the future of Premier Li Keqiang, who’s had a hapless tenure, shouldering much of the blame for a stock-market meltdown last year and a badly managed shift in China’s currency regime that triggered massive capital flight and global panic about the country’s economic prospects.

#### Xi’s reforms won’t be legitimately free market

Andrew Browne. Writer at Wall Street Journal. May 17, 2016. Xi Jinping’s Economy Gets Stuck in Theory Stage. http://www.wsj.com/articles/xis-economy-gets-stuck-in-theory-stage-1463467219

Financial authorities kicked off the year by flooding the economy with credit, which has sluiced into the massively overbuilt real-estate sector. Corporate debt—already at worryingly high levels after previous rounds of economic stimulus—is mounting. And the biggest beneficiaries of the credit binge are state-owned industrial enterprises, which are hopelessly inefficient users of capital compared with private companies. Mr. Xi’s lecture on economic terminology points to a state of confusion at the highest levels of economic decision-making, at a time when confidence among investors is fragile both at home and abroad. In settling the question of how to interpret “supply side” in the Chinese context, Mr. Xi has raised a much more fundamental one: Who is running the Chinese economy? It’s supposed to be Mr. Xi himself. Since assuming office more than three years ago, he has reversed several decades of bureaucratic practice and taken direct control, shoving the premier aside. He governs not through the State Council—the Chinese cabinet—but through committees within the Communist Party. The chief vehicle for his economic stewardship is the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, which he chairs. Many call him the most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping and maybe even Mao. But given the glaring discrepancy between economic theory and practice, perhaps it’s time to revise that view.

## Rebuttal to Western cooperation link

#### If Xi’s reforms are achieved with anti-western ideology, they will fail

Simon Denyer. Writer at the Guardian. March 6, 2015. How Xi Jinping’s presidency was shaped by traumas of Mao and Gorbachev. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/xi-jinping-china-reform-gorbachev-mao

Gorbachev and Mao both struggled against opposition and factionalism within their own parties, although they pursued far different remedies. Xi is determined to consolidate power and eliminate rivals. He has experienced firsthand the chaos that ensues when the party disintegrates, and that helps explain his desire to reinvigorate the Chinese Communist party and reassert its primacy. One of his major themes is a war on “western values”, including a free press, democracy and the constitutional separation of powers, all of which he believes pose an insidious threat to one-party rule. In this and in the growing ideological controls on sectors ranging from the news media to the military, Xi is resisting forces that he thinks brought the Soviet regime to its knees. Paradoxically, though, he also has seen the dangers of international isolation and an inward focus, factors that helped weaken Mao’s China and the Soviet Union. That paradox, between “reform and opening” on the one hand and excluding western values on the other, has created an unresolved tension in his presidency. Cheng Enfu, the director of the Institute of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, predicted that the president’s efforts to combat this “infiltration” of western values could become as intense as his anti-corruption campaign.

#### Economic reforms will have nothing to do with popular politics

Barry Naughton. Research Fellow at Hoover Institute. 2015. Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014. http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf

Of the three areas discussed here, two have been discreetly underplayed by policymakers. They don’t make much of an appearance on the Third Plenum’s declaration, and they haven’t made much of a splash in the domestic or international media. Since these policies can be implemented top-down by technocrats, there is no need for the administration to mobilize popular support for them, and it may be easier to sidestep controversy and undercut opposition. Naughton, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 11 5. Economic opening will play an important role in the emerging program of reforms. Xi’s great power ambitions are clearly a major driver of his policy preferences, and this is true with respect to economic reforms as well. Thus, to a certain extent, the reform agenda is hostage to a reasonably open international economic environment, and cooperation as well as competition among rivals. There is a deep contradiction between the consistent nationalism of Xi’s policy approach and a genuine opening. This contradiction is manifest in ideological and commercial arenas, but is currently most acute with respect to technology policy. Nobody can predict the ultimate outcome of these deep tensions and contradictions, which might persist for decades. An “external” economic or security event, or a sudden break by China from its recent more cooperative foreign policy positions, may push China policy-makers (that is, Xi) away from the reform agenda. Conversely, an improvement in global conditions will increase the attractiveness of a reform agenda that accepts greater integration with the world economy.

## Rebuttal to Economic collapse

#### Reforms are slow and not enough to stop economic collapse

Yu Yongding. Writer at China Business Review. July 22, 2016. China’s Incomplete Growth Strategy. http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-incomplete-growth-strategy/

Although Chinese officials should be applauded for their commitment to implementing painful – and badly needed – structural reforms, the supply-side focus ignores the present. China faces two challenges: the long-term issue of a declining potential growth rate and the immediate problem of below-potential actual growth. Among the long-term factors undermining potential growth are diminishing returns to scale, a widening income gap, and a narrowing scope for technological catch-up through imitation. Moreover, even as the country’s demographic dividend dissolves, its carrying capacity (the size of the population the environment can sustain) is being exhausted. Finally, and most important, the country is suffering from inadequate progress on market-orientated reform. While some of these factors are irreversible, others can be addressed effectively. Indeed, the government’s supply-side reform strategy is a good first step. In the long run, the supply-side reforms will stabilize and raise China’s growth potential. But, contrary to popular belief, current reforms will not boost China’s growth rate today. Why are so many economists convinced that a long-term reform strategy is all China needs? One reason is the widely held notion that today’s overcapacity reflects supply-side problems, not insufficient demand. According to this view, China should implement tax cuts to encourage companies to produce products for which there is genuine demand. That way, the government would not inadvertently sustain “zombie enterprises” that cannot survive without bank loans and support from local governments.

#### China’s economy is resilient

Kevin Rudd. Professor at Harvard University. April 2015. The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf

On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese national power, on balance we should assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the period under review. This takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent slowing of the rate. It also takes into account lower levels of global demand for Chinese exports, high levels of domestic debt, the beginning of a demographically driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high levels of domestic savings, at best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding private sector still constrained by state-owned monoliths, and a growing environmental crisis. But it also takes into account the vast battery of Chinese policy responses to each of these and does not assume that these are by definition destined to fail. Furthermore, if China’s growth rate begins to falter, China has sufficient fiscal and monetary policy capacity to intervene to ensure the growth rate remains above 6 percent, which is broadly the number policy makers deem to be necessary to maintain social stability.

#### Catastrophic collapse is impossible

Kevin Rudd. Professor at Harvard University. April 2015. The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf

It is equally unconvincing to argue that China’s transformation from an old economic growth model (based on a combination of high levels of state infrastructure investment and low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing for export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the services sector and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to failure. This is a sophisticated policy blueprint developed over many years and is necessary to secure China’s future growth trajectory through different drivers of demand to those that have powered Chinese growth rates in the past. There is also a high level of political backing to drive implementation. The process and progress of implementation has so far been reasonable. Moreover, to assume that China’s seasoned policy elites will somehow prove to be less capable in meeting China’s next set of economic policy challenges than they have been with previous sets of major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain wrong. China does face a bewildering array of policy challenges and it is possible that any one of these could significantly de-rail the Government’s economic program. But it is equally true that Chinese policy elites are more sophisticated now than at any time since the current period of reform began back in 1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy responses when necessary. For these reasons, and others concerning the structure of Chinese politics, the report explicitly rejects the “China collapse” thesis recently advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the extreme for America’s China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy assumption that China will either economically stagnate or politically implode because of underlying contradictions in its overall political economy. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis.

#### China’s economy won’t go through catastrophic collapse

Arthur Kroeber et al. Writers at Foreign Policy. January 28, 2016. Without Reform from Beijing, ‘The World Will Endure More China Scares.’ http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/28/china-scare-economy-management-failures-currency-renminbi-stocks/

No hard landing in China. Time and again, momentum driven investors draw erroneous economic conclusions on the basis of pyrotechnics in financial markets. It’s happening again in early 2016. But the real side of the Chinese economy — the ultimate arbiter of a hard or a soft landing in any nation — is holding up much better than most believe. Yes, economic growth is slowing in China. The real story is not in the aggregate GDP but in important shifts in the mix of the Chinese economy. In 2015, an 8.3 percent expansion in the services sector outstripped that of the once-dominant manufacturing and construction sectors, which together grew by just 6 percent in 2015. The so-called tertiary sector rose to 50.5 percent of Chinese GDP in 2015, well in excess of the 47 percent share targeted in 2011, when the 12th Five-Year Plan was adopted, and fully ten percentage points larger than the 40.5 percent share of secondary-sector activities (manufacturing and construction). This significant shift in China’s economic structure is vitally important to the nation’s consumer-led rebalancing strategy. Services development underpins urban employment opportunities, a key building block of personal income generation. With Chinese services requiring about 30 percent more jobs per unit of output than manufacturing and construction, combined, the tertiary sector’s relative strength has played an important role in limiting unemployment and preventing social instability — long China’s greatest fear and the most likely candidate for a smoking gun on the hard landing watch. Yet even in the face of decelerating GDP growth, urban job creation hit 11 million in 2015, above the government’s target of 10 million and a slight increase from 10.7 million in 2014.

#### China has survived severe shocks

Arthur Kroeber et al. Writers at Foreign Policy. January 28, 2016. Without Reform from Beijing, ‘The World Will Endure More China Scares.’ http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/28/china-scare-economy-management-failures-currency-renminbi-stocks/

To be sure, China’s reserves have fallen enormously — by $700 billion — in the last 19 months. Given China’s recent build-up of dollar-denominated liabilities, which the Bank for International Settlements currently places at around $1 trillion, external vulnerability can hardly be ignored. But, at $3.3 trillion in December 2015, China’s reserves are still enough to cover more than four times its short-term external debt — well in excess of the widely accepted rule of thumb that a country should still be able to fund all of its short-term foreign liabilities in the event that it is unable to borrow in international markets. Of course, this cushion could all but vanish in a few years if foreign reserves were to continue falling at the same $500 billion recorded in 2015. This was precisely the greatest fear during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, when China was widely expected to follow other so-called East Asian miracle economies that had run out of reserves in the midst of a contagious attack on their currencies. But if it didn’t happen then, it certainly won’t happen now: China’s foreign-exchange reserves today are 23 times higher than the $140 billion held around 1997 and 1998. Moreover, China continues to run a large current-account surplus, in contrast to the outsize external deficits that proved so problematic for other Asian economies in the late 1990s. Still, fear persists that if capital flight were to intensify, China would ultimately be powerless to stop it. Nothing could be further from the truth. While Chinese authorities have no desire to close the capital account after having taken several important steps to open it in recent years, they would most certainly rethink this position if capital flight were to become a more serious threat.

#### China’s economy is doomed regardless of reforms

Rowan Callick. Writer at the Weekend Australian. July 23, 2016. Great fall of China on cards say economists. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/great-fall-of-china-on-cards-say-economists/news-story/da18f3cd6034fddb65e141e8b9925fa8

The mismanagement of the stockmarket plunge last year, and of the currency rate change, have underlined concerns about whether China’s increasingly large and complex economy has grown beyond the ability of a tiny group, or a single “core” figure, to direct. The international ratings agencies led by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have since the global ­financial crisis been criticised for pulling their own punches due to a desire to ingratiate themselves with sovereigns. Both have, however, felt forced to brave the criticisms inflicted from Beijing as in the past few months they have downgraded their China outlook ratings from stable to negative. Moody’s gives three chief ­reasons: “The ongoing and prospective weakening of fiscal metrics, as reflected in rising government debt and in large and rising contingent liabilities on the government balance sheet. “A continuing fall in reserve buffers due to capital outflows, which highlight policy, currency and growth risks. “(And) uncertainty about the authorities’ capacity to implement reforms — given the scale of reform challenges — to address imbalances in the economy.” It says: “The very rapid increase in investment by state-owned enterprises was maintained, at 23.5 per cent year-on-year, in the first half of the year — with such intensified leverage complemented by falling profits.”

## Rebuttal to Party collapse impact

#### Xi’s reforms will cause political infighting and party collapse

Lingling Wei and Jeremy Page. Writers at Wall Street Journal. July 22, 2016. Discord Between China’s Top Two Leaders Spills Into the Open. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/discord-between-chinas-top-two-leaders-spills-into-the-open-1469134110>

The longer-term concern is any political impact of a split. Conflict within the leadership has been a feature of modern China’s most tumultuous periods, from the Cultural Revolution to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The party’s legitimacy rests in large part on being able to project an image of uniform and levelheaded decision-making at the top. Mr. Xi, like China’s last two top leaders, is president, party chief and head of the military. The premier heads the cabinet and for most of the last four decades has managed the economy, with other duties divided among other senior party figures. Mr. Xi has reversed that collective leadership model and centralized decision-making within a number of small committees he heads, including over the economy. His supporters say the party leadership had become weak and corrupt in the previous administration and now needs a strong central figure to maintain public support while overhauling the economy. Detractors say Mr. Xi has taken on too much to govern effectively, while stripping authority away from Mr. Li and other more qualified economic stewards. Mr. Li has acquiesced to that treatment for the last two to three years, but in recent months, supporters say, he has been actively undermined. Rumors now abound within the party about whether he will be replaced as premier in next year’s reshuffling of key party posts. Messrs. Xi and Li are the only two members of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee—the top leadership body—not due to retire.

#### Xi’s economic reforms will be highly divisive and destabilizing

Lingling Wei and Jeremy Page. Writers at Wall Street Journal. July 22, 2016. Discord Between China’s Top Two Leaders Spills Into the Open. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/discord-between-chinas-top-two-leaders-spills-into-the-open-1469134110>

People sympathizing with the premier say he was simply trying to meet the growth target set by the leadership, and to ensure sufficiently high growth for economic reforms to succeed. Mr. Xi has advocated overhauls while also insisting growth stays on target, and he has backpedaled on his 2012 pledge to embrace market forces. His decrees on the state sector in the past year, for example, have centered on strengthening the party’s control. “Li Keqiang has been placed in an impossible position,” wrote Barry Naughton, an expert on China’s economy at the University of California, San Diego, in a paper published this week. ”Economic policy has moved in a fundamental way into Xi Jinping’s shop, and out of Li Keqiang’s shop. Li cannot be happy with this, and it is hard to see how the Xi-Li relationship can be maintained under these conditions.” A big risk from the policy uncertainty, said Arthur Kroeber, co-founder of China-focused research firm GaveKal Dragonomics, is that needed changes, such as the closing of money-losing factories, stall. “It’s increasingly clear to me that China’s economic program is not very coherent,” he said. The report last week of second-quarter growth of 6.7%— the same pace as in the first quarter, despite multiple headwinds—was seen as a sign that leaders continue to use an old stimulus playbook of credit expansion and state spending rather than tackling inefficiencies. Some state-company executives are confused.

#### The CCP’s resilience depends on state controlled economics

Shannon Tiezzi. Writer at the Diplomat. May 6, 2015. Will China’s Reforms Succeed? http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/will-chinas-reforms-succeed/

Mao Yushi, a prominent Chinese economist, has long been a leading critic of China’s state-controlled economy. In 2012, the U.S. Cato Institute awarded Mao the 2012 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, calling him “one of China’s most outspoken and influential activists for individual rights and free markets.” Speaking in Vancouver on May 3, Mao traced a history of constant chaos in China from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the violent political movements under Mao Zedong, including the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). While Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rhetoric identifies 1949, the year the People’s Republic was established, as the beginning of modern China, Mao puts the advent of true peace and stability much later: 1978, when Deng Xiaoping began the “reform and opening up” movement. Mao noted China’s progress since then, but said the larger question still facing China is how to continue its development. On this point, China is divided – “leftists” emphasize stability and equality above all else, while “rightists” advocate for a marketized society and economy. Meanwhile, Mao pointed to the corruption and greed of certain officials (such as Xu Caihou, who previously served as China’s top military leader) as a major obstacle to continued reform. The corrupt will resist reform, and there’s little China’s leaders can do to solve this issue.

# DA Answers US Elections DA

## Uniqueness

### 2AC UQ Overwhelms Link

#### Clinton is winning in a landslide – the effect of the plan can’t make up a massive polling deficit

Nate Silver, Founder and Editor in Chief of FiveThirtyEight, 8-5-2016, “Election Update: Trump’s Slump Deepens In The Polls,” http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/election-update-trumps-slump-deepens-in-polls/

There’s no longer any doubt that the party conventions have shifted the presidential election substantially toward Hillary Clinton. She received a larger bounce from her convention than Donald Trump got from his, but Trump has continued to poll so poorly in state and national surveys over the past two days that his problems may be getting worse. The recent Fox News, Marist College and NBC News/Wall Street Journal national polls show Trump trailing Clinton by 9 to 14 percentage points, margins that would make for the largest general election blowout since 1984 if they held. Clinton’s numbers in those polls are on the high end of what we’ve seen lately — Marist, for instance, has generally had a Clinton-leaning house effect in its polls this year. By contrast, a series of polls released earlier in the week generally put Clinton’s advantage at 5 to 8 percentage points.

### 2AC Non Unique

#### Trump is winning in unbiased polls now – pro-Clinton polling is skewed towards Democratic respondents

Brett Gifford, political analyst at Inquir.io, 8-4-2016, “Donald Trump Leading New Poll Averages +0.9%,” https://inquir.io/2016/08/05/donald-trump-leading-new-polls/#.V6ThwJMrKu4

In a summary by LongRoom Unbiased polls it shows Donald J. Trump leading his rival Hillary Clinton by 0.9% as of 8/01. After the rocky week that Trump was having with the entire Khan family controversy it seems that of the 6 polls conducted this week by LongRoom, USC-Daybreak, YouGov, CBS, CNN, and Morning Consult Trump holds a lead in 4 of them. For clarification, LongRoom conducts their polls a bit differently than traditional polling places, they compensate for the over sampling of Democrats and Republicans and use accurate representations of area demographics to skew the results in a more unbiased manner. LongRoom has a long history of being fairly accurate with polls from past elections, you can read up on their full methodology including sources for the demographics here. It is obviously best to take these new poll results with a grain of salt. LongRoom is also giving the average polling bias to Hillary Clinton with 4.2% being biased in favor of Clinton. It is easy to see how the polls are skewed in favor of the Democrats given the number of Democrats sampled in a majority of these polls is much larger than the number of Republicans.

### Non-Unique

#### Trump will win – Clinton is unpopular, the race is unpredictable, and Trump’s style fits the electorate – former GOP candidate Romney agrees

Andrew Kaczynski, political reporter at Buzzfeed, 7-29-2016, “Mitt Romney Thinks Donald Trump Could Win The Election,” https://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/mitt-romney-thinks-donald-trump-could-win-the-election?utm\_term=.pfK08g9RM7#.dq51ogYGJr

Former Republican nominee Mitt Romney said earlier this month he thought Donald Trump could win the presidency, citing Hillary Clinton’s high unfavorable numbers and the unpredictability of the race. Romney was speaking with Republican consultant Mike Murphy’s Radio Free GOP podcast, released two weeks ago, when he made the comments. “You have to give Donald Trump credit. He was able to bring a rhetoric and a style that he had perfected over his career to the political sphere and connect with people and become the nominee,” Romney said. “Despite the fact that I and a lot of other people thought he would not be an ideal nominee, he is. At this stage, it’s rougher going, but I can’t predict what’s gonna happen.” “To be honest, it’s very possible in my view that Trump wins,” continued Romney. “I wouldn’t think it’d be by a landslide, but I think he could win. I think he could lose, I think he could lose by a landslide. But, I don’t know which it’s going to be and a lot of that depends on what happens to Hillary Clinton. Is there a meltdown moment, or some implosion of some kind?”

### Non-Unique – AT: Clinton Polling Lead – Convention

#### Current polling is misleading – Clinton’s post-convention bounce is not representative of the national race

Andrew Prokop, political analyst at Vox, 8-4-2016, “The newest polls are devastating for Donald Trump,” http://www.vox.com/2016/8/4/12374000/trump-clinton-polls-today

A very important caveat here is that we are still in the immediate post-convention period — a period where the polls have often been very volatile, historically. And as Vox's Jeff Stein has written, part of what’s going on here may be that Democrats are more likely to even answer polls in the wake of good feelings from their party’s convention. So it really isn’t clear yet if Clinton’s new lead will prove durable or temporary. (Polling averages currently have her ahead by 5 to 7 points nationally.)

### Non-Unique – AT: Clinton Polling Lead – Bradley Effect

#### Trump is under-polling his true electoral strength – Bradley Effect

Steven Shepard, political analyst at Politico, 6-28-2016, “Are the Polls Skewed Against Trump?” http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-polls-bias-224903

Is there a pool of voters who are too embarrassed to admit to pollsters they’re voting for Donald Trump? As Trump consistently lags Hillary Clinton in general-election polls, his campaign is counting on it. The notion of the “shy Trump voter” refers to the theory that there’s a group of voters who won’t admit their support for Trump in phone surveys, but will actually choose the controversial, presumptive GOP presidential nominee this fall. Earlier this month, the New York real estate mogul said at an event that he does “much better” in elections than in pre-election surveys, making a passing reference to the phenomenon known as the Bradley Effect — coined after the African-American mayor of Los Angeles who led in polls but lost unexpectedly in the 1982 California gubernatorial race. The idea that Trump might be under-polling was echoed again last week, after the United Kingdom voted narrowly to leave the European Union, despite polls showing the referendum to be a tossup — a campaign that centered on many of the same issues that Trump is touting in the U.S. presidential race.

## Links

### 2AC No Link – Obama Shields

#### Clinton isn’t tied to the plan and being a hawk means that the GOP can’t spin the plan against her

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

As a recent Washington Post op-ed bluntly pointed out, “If Hillary Clinton wants the nomination — and there’s no indication to the contrary — she can have it” (Robinson, 2015, n.p.). Hillary’s nomination will make it very difficult for the Republican Party to attack the Democrats for going soft on China by spinning the rethink of the military bases to seem that way. The former First Lady’s reputation in foreign policy circles is difficult to challenge. She recently distanced herself from Obama’s foreign policy generally, from Asia policy specifically, and is perceived as a foreign policy hawk. In the New York Times review of her book Hard Choices, Michiko Kakutani (2014) stated that “Mrs. Clinton’s views are perceived as often more hawkish than Mr. Obama’s” (n.p.). Another book review in The Guardian also articulated opinions attuned with the New York Times article and public perception, stating “she comes across as consistently hawkish, pushing Obama to take stronger action” (Runicman, 2014, n.p.). Many in the defense establishment including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have praised Clinton for her diplomatic skills. Her experience in foreign relations and her perception as a foreign policy hawk will challenge Republicans as they look ahead towards the upcoming presidential elections. Accusations of a foreign policy rethink favoring soft policies on the PRC and the DPRK will most likely fall flat for the Republican Party against this seasoned diplomat.

### No Link – Obama Shields

#### GOP can’t cast Clinton as soft on China

David Sanger, staff writer at the New York Times, 8-28-2015, "China’s Vulnerability Is a Test for U.S. Presidential Candidates," http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/politics/chinas-vulnerability-is-a-test-for-us-presidential-candidates.html

Rightly or wrongly, Mrs. Clinton is considered to be more confrontational with the Chinese than Mr. Obama, after a famous flare-up with her Chinese counterpart over the country’s territorial claims. As a result, the Republicans know that if Mrs. Clinton emerges as the Democratic nominee, it will be difficult to cast her as soft on China. A bigger problem may be in their own party. The American opening to China was a Republican president’s project. It is considered one of the greatest accomplishments of Richard M. Nixon’s checkered presidency, and today’s mainline Republican foreign policy establishment takes a very nuanced view of balancing Chinese power. Whoever emerges from the scrum of 17 Republican candidates will seek the wisdom — and the endorsement — of Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of state, and at 92 still the party’s greatest foreign policy mind. The architect of the American relationship with Beijing, who four years ago published a book on America’s dealings with China, is not one to call for cutting off relationships with Beijing.

### 2AC No Link – Business Lobby Shields

#### Business lobby solves the link – counteracts ‘soft on China’ charges

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Although the business community is not directly involved in security matters, majority American business leaders favor pragmatic relations with the PRC. The US ability to maintain stability in the region and increase cooperation with China is likely to improve trade conditions. As Sutter points out, in the American business community [The] prevailing sentiment is to sustain stability in the Chinese business environments which has proven advantageous for many American companies that invest, manufacture, and trade in China. The drive for stability often causes American business interests to place differences and disputes with China in second place as they lobby American officials in Washington. (Shambaugh, p.118) The role the business community plays in US-Sino relations could be seen during Clinton’s presidency when “US business pressures pushed Clinton to intervene in May 1994 to reverse existing policy and allow for unimpeded US renewal of MFN status for China”(Shambaugh, 2013, 120). It is true that on the edges of the political spectrum in the US, hardline liberals and conservatives prefer tougher acts towards the PRC, but these lines of thought are a minority in comparison to those favoring policy that maintains good trade relations between the world’s two largest economies. Rethinks of the military bases promise to improve trade relations in the region, and such economic perks are a source of massive mainstream support. The powerful lobbying of the business community can supply a counterweight to those, especially in Republican circles, arguing for less friendly ties with the PRC.

## Internals

### 2AC Issues Not Key

#### Persuasion doesn’t matter – structural factors outweigh

Mark S. Mellman, President and CEO of the Mellman Group, 5-27-2014, “A winning combination,” http://mellmangroup.com/winning-combination/

For the last several weeks I’ve been trying to correct a meme that has been abroad in the land among journalists, academics, donors and even campaign strategists. In only slightly oversimplified form, progenitors argue that, in this hyperpartisan world, political persuasion doesn’t happen and that the only way for Democrats to win is to change the electorate through get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. Part of the misunderstanding arises from an uncomfortable fact that few in our business are willing to confront: Much of what we do is not ultimately dispositive. Both GOTV and persuasion strategies have limited impact. Circumstances beyond anyone’s direct control — incumbency, partisanship, the economy and candidate quality, among others — usually do far more to determine electoral outcomes than anything campaigns and their consultants do.

### Issues Not Key – Econ OW

#### People will vote their pocketbooks

Jeffrey M. Jones, poll analyst at Gallup, 6-16-2014, “Key Midterm Election Indicators at or Near Historical Lows,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/171671/key-midterm-election-indicators-near-historical-lows.aspx

Poor economic conditions are often a major reason why Americans are dissatisfied with the state of the nation and disapprove of government leaders. Earlier this year, Gallup found the economy ranking ahead of other issues when voters were asked which will be most important to their vote. Although Americans' confidence in the economy is improving slightly, the public still shows greater concern over it than in prior midterm election years. Specifically, 44% mention an economic issue when asked to name the most important problem facing the country. That is significantly higher than in the 1998, 2002, and 2006 elections, but is down sharply from 2010, reflecting improvements in the economy since then. The major aspects of the economy most troubling to Americans are the state of the economy in general and unemployment, mentioned by 20% and 16%, respectively, as the most important problem.

#### The economy is the most important issue

Pew Research Center, 5-5-2014, “Chapter 1: The 2014 Midterm: Congressional Vote, Top Issues,” http://www.people-press.org/2014/05/05/the-2014-midterm-congressional-vote-top-issues/

Amid a sluggish economic recovery, the job situation is the top midterm issue for voters, with health care and the budget deficit following closely behind. Nearly half (48%) of voters say the job situation is the most important or second most important issue to their vote, 42% say health care is a top voting issue, 38% name the budget deficit and 31% name education. Security and anti-terrorism policy (19%) and immigration (14%) are seen as less important midterm issues, out of the six tested in the survey. Jobs are the top issue for voters who plan to vote Democratic. More than half of Democratic voters (55%) cite jobs as their most important issue or second leading issue. Republican voters give about equal importance to three leading issues: the budget deficit (46%), health care (44%) and the job situation (42%). Republican voters who agree with the Tea Party are more likely than those who do not to cite the budget deficit as a top voting issue (54% vs. 44%).

### Issues Not Key – AT: Single Events

#### Single events don’t swing elections

Linda Feldmann, writer at the Christian Science Monitor, 10-3-2012, “Why Mitt Romney trails in polls, as presidential debates begin,” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2012/1003/Why-Mitt-Romney-trails-in-polls-as-presidential-debates-begin-video

Fully two-thirds of voters know that it was Romney who made the statement, and among those voters, 55 percent reacted negatively, versus 23 percent who saw it positively, according to Pew. Most damaging to Romney is the reaction of independent voters. Some 55 percent of independents who are aware of Romney’s comment say they had a negative reaction to it, while only 18 percent viewed it positively. But Gallup asked voters if the 47 percent comment has made them more or less likely to vote for Romney, and a plurality said it made no difference. Indeed, analysts say it’s nearly impossible to isolate an individual event or comment as being decisive in turning a race. “Voters are confronting a big wide Mississippi River of information flowing at them, and as a consequence it’s difficult to isolate the effect of any one thing,” says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University in Washington. “That said, there’s no question it’s been several weeks of relatively bad news for the Romney campaign. It hasn’t enabled him to close the post-convention gap. If anything, that gap has grown.”

### Issues Not Key – AT: Swing/Undecided Voters

#### Issues don’t matter to swing voters – best polisci

Michelle Cottle, writer at the Daily Beast, 9-23-2012, “Undecided Voters Are a Menace,” www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/23/undecided-voters-are-a-menace.html

Ask the political scientists, pollsters, and other professional analyzers of the electorate who parse these sorts of things. They will tell you—as they have told me repeatedly over the years—that undecideds or swing voters or whatever you want to call them tend to be low-information folks who cast their ballots based on whichever candidate gives them the last-minute warm-and-fuzzies. (Did you see that guy’s smile in the last debate? Sign me up!) Way back during the 2000 Bush-Gore smackdown, I dug around in the data, interviewed undecideds, and called up a passel of experts. My findings were perhaps best (and certainly most entertainingly) summed up by Michael Haselswerdt, then the head of Canisius College’s political science department, who told me: “When it comes to politics, undecided voters don’t know anything. And they’re not going to pay attention long enough to learn anything.” Twelve years on, the situation has not changed much. As The New York Times noted recently, “Swing voters often form their opinions about candidates based on emotional intangibles and a few events, like the debates.” As for these oh-so-thoughtful folks’ carefully weighing their options, the Times observed, “Of likely swing voters, white non-college voters are ‘particularly low-information voters who don’t pay attention to the daily political back-and-forth, so their opinions are driven by their economic situation,’” said Jefrey Pollock, the president of Global Strategy Group, a polling firm for Priorities USA Action, a pro-Obama super PAC. Or as NBC’s First Read put it last week after postconvention analyses of undecideds in the battleground states of Florida, Ohio, and Virginia: “These are voters who simply aren’t paying attention.” Ya think? Another enduring and annoying characteristic of undecideds: many of them aren’t really undecided at all. (The Times put the number of self-styled independents who reliably vote for one party or the other at around half.) Why would people pretend to be something they’re not? Oh, I don’t know, maybe because political types blather on and on about how “thoughtful” it makes them.

#### Swing voters are a myth

Lynn Vavreck, Associate Professor of Political Science and Communication Studies at UCLA, 4-22-2014, “The Myth of Swing Voters in Midterm Elections”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/the-myth-of-swing-voters-in-midterm-elections.html?\_r=0
If you want to understand the 2014 midterm elections, remember this simple fact about American politics: There just aren’t that many swing voters. Many people change their minds over the course of a campaign about whether to vote and even which candidate they’re leaning toward. Ultimately, though, voters tend to come home to their favored party. There are relatively few voters who cross back and forth between the parties during a campaign or even between elections.

## Impacts

### 2AC – No Impact to Trump – General

#### Can’t accurately predict how candidates will behave in office – tons of empirics – their pessimism is overstated

Matthew Cooper, staff writer at Newsweek, 3-16-2016, "What the World Will Look Like Under President Trump," http://www.newsweek.com/2016/03/25/world-under-president-donald-trump-437158.html

Ouija Bored The history of predicting how presidencies will play out isn’t pretty. Many worried Reagan would be a warmonger. Instead, he signed the biggest arms reduction deals with the Soviets ever and responded to the slaughter of U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983 by pulling out instead of digging in. In Texas, George W. Bush was a popular governor known for bipartisanship. In Washington, less so. Forecasting the Trump years seems equally perilous. Critics should allow that he could be like Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger—a political novice and ideologically flexible Republican whom some California voters feared, yet who turned out to be way more tepid than the Terminator.

### 2AC – No Impact to Trump – Structural Barriers – Warming

#### Trump can’t reverse Obama-led environmental actions

Bill Murray, energy policy contributor at RealClearPolitics, 5-17-2016, "Would Trump Undo Obama's Environmental Legacy?," http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/05/17/would\_trump\_undo\_obamas\_environmental\_legacy\_130583.html

Other analysts express doubt about Trump’s ability or desire to upend current environmental trends, believing the long-standing administrative rules regarding public comment and judicial review may make any rollback of Obama’s actions not worth Trump’s time or energy. “He can’t undo it all. He can reinterpret a lot, but reinterpreting doesn’t necessarily make it gone forever, or even reverse the trend,” said Kevin Book, a principal at ClearView Energy Partners. If elected, “he has the administrative power, but if you’re going to reverse findings, after all that has happened, you’re going to need a lot of ink, a lot of time and a lot of lawyers.” A Trump administration would need support from Congress, and given the possibility that Democrats may regain control of the Senate, Trump’s deal-making tendencies scare any number of Republican energy purists. Trump’s complete lack of ideological obligations considering environmental policy, and his desire to negotiate big changes in U.S. policy, mean it is possible he could offer Democrats a national tax on carbon in return for comprehensive tax reform or immigration reform, according to some analysts.

### 2AC AT: Warming – No Impact

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – its gradual, humans adapt, and technology solves problems before they occur

Matt Ridley, British scientist, 8-17-2012, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” Wired, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff\_apocalypsenot/all/

So, should we worry or not about the warming climate? It is far too binary a question. The lesson of failed past predictions of ecological apocalypse is not that nothing was happening but that the middle-ground possibilities were too frequently excluded from consideration. In the climate debate, we hear a lot from those who think disaster is inexorable if not inevitable, and a lot from those who think it is all a hoax. We hardly ever allow the moderate “lukewarmers” a voice: those who suspect that the net positive feedbacks from water vapor in the atmosphere are low, so that we face only 1 to 2 degrees Celsius of warming this century; that the Greenland ice sheet may melt but no faster than its current rate of less than 1 percent per century; that net increases in rainfall (and carbon dioxide concentration) may improve agricultural productivity; that ecosystems have survived sudden temperature lurches before; and that adaptation to gradual change may be both cheaper and less ecologically damaging than a rapid and brutal decision to give up fossil fuels cold turkey.¶ We’ve already seen some evidence that humans can forestall warming-related catastrophes. A good example is malaria, which was once widely predicted to get worse as a result of climate change. Yet in the 20th century, malaria retreated from large parts of the world, including North America and Russia, even as the world warmed. Malaria-specific mortality plummeted in the first decade of the current century by an astonishing 25 percent. The weather may well have grown more hospitable to mosquitoes during that time. But any effects of warming were more than counteracted by pesticides, new antimalarial drugs, better drainage, and economic development. Experts such as Peter Gething at Oxford argue that these trends will continue, whatever the weather.¶ Just as policy can make the climate crisis worse—mandating biofuels has not only encouraged rain forest destruction, releasing carbon, but driven millions into poverty and hunger—technology can make it better. If plant breeders boost rice yields, then people may get richer and afford better protection against extreme weather. If nuclear engineers make fusion (or thorium fission) cost-effective, then carbon emissions may suddenly fall. If gas replaces coal because of horizontal drilling, then carbon emissions may rise more slowly. Humanity is a fast-moving target. We will combat our ecological threats in the future by innovating to meet them as they arise, not through the mass fear stoked by worst-case scenarios.

### AT: Warming – No Impact

#### No impact to warming – adaptation solves and their impacts are exaggerated and decades away

Richard Tol, Professor of Economics at the University of Sussex, Professor of the Economics of Climate Change at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and has been a member of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change since 1994, 3-31-2014, “Bogus Prophecies of Doom Will Not Fix the Climate,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e8d011fa-b8b5-11e3-835e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3KEMPgPPi

Humans are a tough and adaptable species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic, in the desert and in the rainforest. We survived the ice ages with primitive technologies. The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to humankind is laughable. Climate change will have consequences, of course. Since different plants and animals thrive in different climates, it will affect natural ecosystems and agriculture. Warmer and wetter weather will advance the spread of tropical diseases. Seas will rise, putting pressure on all that lives on the coast. These impacts sound alarming but they need to be put in perspective before we draw conclusions about policy. According to Monday’s report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a further warming of 2C could cause losses equivalent to 0.2-2 per cent of world gross domestic product. On current trends, that level of warming would happen some time in the second half of the 21st century. In other words, half a century of climate change is about as bad as losing one year of economic growth. Since the start of the crisis in the eurozone, the income of the average Greek has fallen more than 20 per cent. Climate change is not, then, the biggest problem facing humankind. It is not even its biggest environmental problem. The World Health Organisation estimates that about 7m[illion] people are now dying each year as a result of air pollution. Even on the most pessimistic estimates, climate change is not expected to cause loss of life on that scale for another 100 years.

### AT: Warming – No Impact – AT: Climate Wars

#### Climate change has a minimal effect on conflict escalation, at best

Alex Berezow, staff writer at Real Clear Science, 10-26-2012, “Will Climate Change Cause Violent Conflict?” Real Clear Science, http://www.realclearscience.com/journal\_club/2012/10/26/will\_climate\_change\_cause\_violent\_conflict\_106391.html

It is widely believed that climate change will lead to violent conflict, for instance, over dwindling water and food supplies. However, a recent paper in PNAS casts some doubt on this. Using a complicated statistical analysis, researchers analyzed the impact of precipitation and temperature on conflict in east Africa. (See below.) The above panels measure conflict as a function of precipitation (Panel A) or temperature (Panel B). The dashed line represents long-term average (mean) precipitation or temperature, and the X-axis shows changes in these variables (as reported by standard deviations from the mean). The Y-axis represents conflict. Panel A, therefore, shows that as precipitation increases, conflict decreases. The authors note that when rainfall is 2 standard deviations above average, conflict is reduced by about 30%. However, drier conditions did not result in a statistically significant change in conflict. Panel B shows even more mixed results. When temperature is 1 standard deviation above average, conflict drops by about 12%, but increases by about 30% when the temperature is 2 standard deviations above average. There was no change in conflict for cooler weather. Though the authors found a statistically significant connection between rainfall/temperature and conflict, they warned that other factors (e.g., politics, economics, current events) are usually more important and better at predicting conflict. Thus, while climate change is likely to have real effects on human behavior, its contribution to global conflict should not be exaggerated.

### AT: Warming – No Warming

#### No warming – experts and empirics

Investor’s Business Daily, 2-15-2013, “Global Warming Consensus Looking More Like A Myth,” IBD, http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/021513-644725-geoscientists-engineers-dont-believe-in-climate-change.htm?p=full

Environment: The global warming alarmists repeat the line endlessly. They claim that there is a consensus among scientists that [hu]man is causing climate change. Fact is, they're not even close. Yes, many climate scientists believe that emissions of greenhouse gases are heating the earth. Of course there are some who don't. But when confining the question to geoscientists and engineers, it turns out that only 36% believe that human activities are causing Earth's climate to warm. This is the finding of the peer-reviewed paper "Science or Science Fiction? Professionals' Discursive Construction of Climate Change" and this group is categorized as the "Comply with Kyoto" cohort. Members of this group, not unexpectedly, "express the strong belief that climate change is happening, that it is not a normal cycle of nature, and humans are the main or central cause." Academics Lianne M. Lefsrud of the University of Alberta and Renate E. Meyer of Vienna University of Economics and Business, and the Copenhagen Business School, came upon that number through a survey of 1,077 professional engineers and geoscientists. Their work also revealed that 24% "believe that changes to the climate are natural, normal cycles of the earth" while another 10% consider the "'real' cause of climate change" to be "unknown" and acknowledge that "nature is forever changing and uncontrollable." The 10% group, known as the "Economic Responsibility" cohort, expresses "much stronger and more negative emotions than any other group, especially that climate science is a fraud and hoax and that regulation is futile, useless, and impossible." The 24% group, tagged as the "Nature is Overwhelming" faction, is the "most likely to speak against climate science as being science fiction, 'manipulated and fraudulent'" and is "least likely to believe that the scientific debate is settled, that IPCC modeling is accurate." The researchers also found a group they call the "Fatalists" — the 17% who "diagnose climate change as both human- and naturally caused," "consider climate change to be a smaller public risk with little impact on their personal life" and "are skeptical that the scientific debate is settled regarding the IPCC modeling." Lefsrud and Meyer also note that "skepticism regarding anthropogenic climate change remains" among climate scientists. They mention, as well, that "the proportion of papers found in the ISI Web of Science database that explicitly endorsed anthropogenic climate change has fallen from 75% (for the period between 1993 and 2003) as of 2004 to 45% from 2004 to 2008, while outright disagreement has risen from 0% to 6%." If the alarmists are getting only limited cooperation from man, they are getting even less from nature itself. Arctic sea ice, which sent the green shirts into a lather when it hit a record low in the summer of 2012, has "with a few weeks of growth still to occur ... blown away the previous record for ice gain this winter." "This is only the third winter in history," when more than 10 million square kilometers of new ice has formed in the Arctic, Real Science reported on Tuesday, using data from Arctic Climate Research at the University of Illinois. At the same time, the Antarctic "is now approaching 450 days of uninterrupted above normal ice area," says the skeptical website Watts Up With That, which, also using University of Illinois Arctic Climate Research data, notes that "the last time the Antarctic sea ice was below normal" was Nov. 22, 2011. This is all illuminating information. But it won't get the same media attention given to Al Gore and the usual assortment of eco-radicals, because it violates the narrative that our selfish activities are warming this planet. It is consistent, however, with what most people call common sense.

### AT: Warming – Too Late

#### Can’t dodge the 2 degree limit – dangerous warming is inevitable

Brad Plumer, Senior Editor at Vox, 4-22-2014, “Two Degrees,” http://www.vox.com/2014/4/22/5551004/two-degrees

By 2009, nearly every government in the world had endorsed the 2°C limit — global warming beyond that level was deemed "dangerous." And so, every year, the world’s leaders meet at UN climate conferences to discuss policies and emissions cuts that they hope will keep us below 2°C. Climate experts churn out endless papers on how we can adapt to 2°C of warming (or less). Two decades later, there’s just one major problem with this picture. The idea that the world can stay below 2°C looks increasingly delusional. Consider: the Earth’s average temperature has already risen 0.8°C since the 19th century. And if you look at the current rapid rise in global greenhouse-gas emissions, we’ll likely put enough carbon in the atmosphere by mid-century to surpass the 2°C limit — and go past the 4°C limit by century's end. That’s well above anything once deemed "dangerous." Getting back on track for 2°C would, at this point, entail the sort of drastic emissions cuts usually associated with economic calamities, like the collapse of the Soviet Union or the 2008 financial crisis. And we’d have to repeat those cuts for decades. The climate community has been slow to concede defeat. Back in 2007, the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a report noting that the world could stay below 2°C — but only if we started cutting emissions immediately. The years passed, countries did little, and emissions kept rising. So, just this month, the IPCC put out a new report saying, OK, not great, but we can still stay under 2°C. We just need to act more drastically and figure out some way to pull carbon dioxide back out of the atmosphere. (Never mind that we still don’t have the technology to do the latter.)

### AT: Warming – Clinton Fails – Courts

#### Recent Court rulings thump – blocking the CPP undermines Paris talks and guts US climate leadership

Coral Davenport, energy correspondent at the New York Times, 2-10-2016, "Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord," http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html

The Supreme Court’s surprise decision Tuesday to halt the carrying out of President Obama’s climate change regulation could weaken or even imperil the international global warming accord reached with great ceremony in Paris less than two months ago, climate diplomats say. The Paris Agreement, the first accord to commit every country to combat climate change, had as a cornerstone Mr. Obama’s assurance that the United States would enact strong, legally sound policies to significantly cut carbon emissions. The United States is the largest historical greenhouse gas polluter, although its annual emissions have been overtaken by China’s. But in the capitals of India and China, the other two largest polluters, climate change policy experts said the court’s decision threw the United States’ commitment into question, and possibly New Delhi’s and Beijing’s. “If the U.S. Supreme Court actually declares the coal power plant rules stillborn, the chances of nurturing trust between countries would all but vanish,” said Navroz K. Dubash, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “This could be the proverbial string which causes Paris to unravel.” The court did not block the rule permanently, but halted it from being carried out in the states until legal challenges against it have been decided, a process that could take a year or more. Legal experts said the justices’ decision to stop work on the rule before any court had decided against it was unprecedented and signaled that the regulation might ultimately be overturned. That could set back the United States’ climate efforts for years, although there would still be a chance for Washington to meet its commitments by 2025.

### AT: Warming – Paris Deal Doesn’t Solve

#### The deal won’t solve – cuts are too small

Brad Plumer, Senior Editor at Vox, 9-23-2014, “Past UN Climate Talks Have Failed. Will This Next Round Be Any Different?” http://www.vox.com/2014/8/28/6075433/global-climate-talks-paris-2015

The case for pessimism: There are plenty of pessimists about a new deal. One recent analysis by MIT researchers looked at what was realistic to expect from countries in terms of emissions pledges. (This was based on "national communications, discussions with observers of conditions in various countries, and — by necessity — a good deal of guesswork.") Their conclusion? The 2015 pledges would fall short of the cuts needed to stay below 2°C of global warming. What's more, there are still deep-seated disagreements among different countries on how to best to tackle global warming. Poorer countries argue that the US, Europe, and other rich nations are responsible for most of the extra carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere today, so they should bear most of the burden for addressing global warming. Richer countries, by contrast, say that you also have to look at future emissions when allocating blame — so fast-growing nations like China and India need to do more.

#### Paris talks won’t solve warming – empirics

Brad Plumer, Senior Editor at Vox, 9-23-2014, “Past UN Climate Talks Have Failed. Will This Next Round Be Any Different?” http://www.vox.com/2014/8/28/6075433/global-climate-talks-paris-2015

On Tuesday, the UN is holding a big climate summit in New York City as a prelude to talks on a new agreement to tackle global warming. Negotiations will go for over a year, with a meeting in Lima this December and a final meeting in Paris at the end of 2015. Does that sound drearily familiar? It should. The world's leaders have been hammering out various climate agreements for decades now. There was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord. But despite all these talks, global greenhouse-gas emissions have kept rising, putting the world on track for more warming in the years ahead. So why should this newest round of climate diplomacy be any different? It's a fair question. Some analysts are skeptical that countries will achieve their goal of limiting global warming to no more than 2°C (or 3.6°F) above pre-industrial levels.

### 2AC AT: Econ – No Impact – No Wars

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/p29101

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21

### AT: Econ – No Impact – Resilient

#### No global downturn – multilateral institutions increase coordination to prevent total collapse

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/p29101

It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy coordination. As scholar G. John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”75 The post-2008 economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be closing anytime soon.

### AT: Trade – No Impact

#### Trade and interdependence don’t solve war

Katherine Barbieri, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, 2013, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict?” Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research, pg. 243-245

How does interdependence affect war, the most intense form of conflict? Table 2 gives the empirical results. The rarity of wars makes any analysis of their causes quite difficult, for variations in interdependence will seldom result in the occurrence of war. As in the case of MIDs, the log-likelihood ratio tests for each model suggest that the inclusion of the various measures of interdependence and the control variables improves our understanding of the factors affecting the occurrence of war over that obtained from the null model. However, the individual interdependence variables, alone, are not statistically significant. This is not the case with contiguity and relative capabilities, which are both statistically significant. Again, we see that contiguous dyads are more conflict-prone and that dyads composed of states with unequal power are more pacific than those with highly equal power. Surprisingly, no evidence is provided to support the commonly held proposition that democratic states are less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states. The evidence from the pre-WWII period provides support for those arguing that economic factors have little, if any, influence on affecting leaders’ decisions to engage in war, but many of the control variables are also statistically insignificant. These results should be interpreted with caution, since the sample does not contain a sufficient number wars to allow us to capture great variations across different types of relationships. Many observations of war are excluded from the sample by virtue of not having the corresponding explanatory measures. A variable would have to have an extremely strong influence on conflict—as does contiguity—to find significant results. 7. Conclusions This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of contiguity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in most instances trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; however, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war. The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade.

### AT: Econ – Turn – Trump Boosts the Economy

#### Turn – Trump is key to US growth – lower corporate tax rates, ends job-killing regulations, greater business confidence

Betsy McCaughey, Senior Fellow at the London Center for Policy Research, 5-4-2016, "Donald Trump’s policy plans are real, detailed — and great," <http://nypost.com/2016/05/04/donald-trumps-policy-plans-are-real-detailed-and-great/>

Check out Trump’s economic plan, for starters. Unlike Hillary Clinton’s anti-business agenda, Trump’s plan would actually help unemployed Americans get back to work. Trump slashes the corporate tax rate to 15 percent, down from the current 40 percent, the highest rate in the industrialized world. Not all American companies pay that staggering rate, but even after deductions and accounting maneuvers, companies in the United States end up clobbered by taxes nearly twice the global average (24 percent). In Ireland, a magnet for tax-weary companies, the rate is only 12.5 percent and their economy is growing about three times as fast as ours. Conversely, Japan and Argentina are stuck in the doldrums along with America, partly because of their high rates. Trump also proposes a one-time 10 percent repatriation tax on profits US companies made overseas and kept there to avoid the 40 percent rate. That bargain could lure back as much as $2.5 trillion in capital urgently needed here. To promote investing in plants and equipment, Trump would allow companies to write off the purchases the year they’re made, rather than over several years, as current law requires. Economist Larry Kudlow predicts that if Trump’s corporate tax plan becomes law, you’ll see “a tremendous movement of capital and labor back to the United States.” Trump’s lower 15 percent business rate would also apply to small businesses that usually get taxed at individual income tax rates. That would give a break to mom-and-pop operations, startups and other small businesses that are the source of most jobs. Compare Trump’s blueprint with Clinton’s nightmare scenario: Higher taxes, more tax complexity and an avalanche of new regulations. Over-regulation has depressed economic growth for the last 15 years. The Obama administration suffocated business with 81,000 pages of new regulations in 2015 alone. Hillary is pushing for even more — with controls on hiring, pay, bonuses and overtime to promote “fairer growth.” Translation: gender and racial preferences, plus meddling in how much you get paid. Remember Obama’s statement, “You didn’t build that.” Hillary assumes “You don’t own that.” Government will run your business. Hillary wants companies to stop maximizing quarterly earnings for shareholders — what she derides as “quarterly capitalism.” She wants “farsighted investments” (whatever that means). Companies that can get out of the United States will rush for the exits.

### AT: Liberal Order – Resilient

#### The liberal order is doing great and is resilient

Dhruva Jaishankar, a Transatlantic Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 5-30-2012, “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive in a Post-Western World,” Global Trends 2030, http://gt2030.com/2012/05/30/why-the-liberal-order-will-survive-in-a-post-western-world/

And yet the first drafts of history are often destined for the rubbish bin. Predicting the decline of the liberal order (often inextricably linked to narratives about the future of democracy, liberalism, free markets, peace, and global institutions) is an age-old pastime. Whether Sputnik, the 1973 oil shock, major terrorist attacks, or post-colonial wars, a wealth of supporting evidence has been used to prophesize the end of the free world. In fact, the picture is far rosier than one might infer from the torrent of pessimism currently emanating from the Western commentariat. Consider the following: - Democracy is advancing. 65% of countries evaluated by Freedom House can be counted as electoral democracies, a slight increase since 1995 and a significant increase since 1990. However, a higher proportion of people (53%) are living in electoral democracies today than at any other time in history. And of those 3.75 billion people, 70% now reside in the developing world. - Liberal values are spreading gradually. 76% of independent countries today are considered free or partly free by Freedom House, an improvement over 72% in 1995 and 63% in 1990. The standards of acceptable behavior concerning the treatment of marginalized groups – whether ethnic or religious minorities, women, or the economically disadvantaged – have also risen across the board. - Market liberalization is progressing, if fitfully. Although the overall quality of world economic freedom, as measured by the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, has declined slightly since 2008, the figures have improved for every region outside the United States and Europe. - Trade is booming. After a slump in 2009, global trade rebounded strongly with 14.5% growth in 2010 followed by 6.5% growth in 2011 according to figures compiled by the World Trade Organization. - Liberal democracies are delivering. According to the UNDP, every country for which data is available – both democratic and non-democratic – has experienced improvements in human development (health, education, and income) since 2000. Developing non-democracies marginally outperformed developing democracies over this period (1.28% as compared to 0.91% per annum), but the apparent ‘democracy tax’ is chimerical given non-democracies’ lower bases, their resource exports, and – in some especially egregious cases such as North Korea and Somalia – inadequate data. It should also be noted that in terms of human development the likes of Ghana, India, Bangladesh, and Mongolia have outperformed China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Iran over the past decade. - The world is becoming more stable and peaceful. Violence – whether interstate wars, civil wars, political disturbances, or organized crime – has dropped steadily since 1991. Deaths resulting from war-related violence have fallen 45% since the 1990s, and 70% since the Cold War, according to figures compiled by the Peace Research Institute-Oslo. Crime-related fatalities have also declined in roughly three-quarters of all countries over the last decade. Taken together, these trends augur well for the future of the liberal order as the West declines and the ‘rest’ rise. And anecdotal evidence suggests things might only get better. Burma and Egypt are experiencing historical elections. Political intrigue and infighting in China, coupled with decelerating growth, have led to serious questions the world over about the viability of the Beijing model. Vladimir Putin faces popular protests in Russia, while Bashar al-Assad might not be leading Syria by the end of the year. The leaders of major countries meet more regularly and discuss a wider range of issues than ever before. And while details and implementation remain problematic, all the world’s major powers are in agreement about the challenges the global order faces, from economic protectionism and weapons of mass destruction to climate change.

### AT: DA Turns Case – Relations Adv

#### DA doesn’t turn case – plan shields from election backlash and Trump’s hardline stance on China is all talk

He Yafei, former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1-25-2016, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016. What can be done to counteract the negative spillover from the US election this year? On the one hand, there need to be more cooperative actions from both sides to reinforce the relationship. Climate change is one, cooperation in the Middle East is another. To quicken the pace of negotiation on BIT is definitely useful with emphasis on shortening the “negative list”. The US-China relationship is simply too important for both nations not to make extra efforts in election years to make it stronger in the face of increased headwind. On the other hand, we ought to stay calm and ready to meet any possible frictions and challenges in close coordination and consultation to minimize damage to the bilateral relations. We have to understand that “China-bashing” is more words than actions. Any new administration once in the White House will be more realistic and down-to-earth in its China policy as determined by shared interests of both nations worldwide.

# CP Answers to Advantage CPs

## Answers to Military Spending CP

#### The need for more military spending is a self-fulfilling prophecy

Daniel Larison. Writer at the American Conservative. November 12, 2015. No, the U.S. Doesn’t Need Higher Military Spending <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/no-the-u-s-doesnt-need-higher-military-spending/> (accessed 5-15-16)

That is true only if one refuses to scrutinize the military’s missions, and accepts as a given that the United States must address all threats, in all places, and at all times. It only makes sense if the object is to discourage others, including our wealthy allies, from playing a larger role in their respective regions, or globally. If we want fewer free-riding and “cheap-riding” allies than we have, the U.S. has to scale back on its own military spending and deployments to give them the incentive to do more. Otherwise, we will continue subsidizing the defense of the top industrialized nations of the world indefinitely. Increased military spending makes that outcome even more certain. That will place a large and ever-increasing burden on the U.S. while our allies do as little as they think they can get away with. Besides being absurd, that is also politically unsustainable. Good luck explaining to Americans in the decades to come that they have to accept cuts at home so that Japan and Germany can skimp on their own defense long after they became thriving postwar economies. This arrangement makes the U.S. “indispensable” only in the sense that we have encouraged our allies to be utterly dependent and incapable of defending themselves on their own, which makes them fairly useless allies and increasingly turns them into nothing more than liabilities that the U.S. doesn’t need.

#### Comparing current military spending to past budgets and by GDP doesn’t tell us anything—our military is still huge

Henry Blodget. Writer at Business Insider. February 10, 2013. Yes, Of Course We Should Cut Military Spending! http://www.businessinsider.com/we-should-cut-military-spending-gradually-2013-2 (accessed 5-15-16)

U.S. military spending has soared over the past decade, and we now spend $700+ billion a year on our military (see chart at top). This dwarfs the military spending of any other country on the planet. The No. 2 military spender in the world, China, spends about $140 billion a year on its military--less than a quarter as much. (See chart at right). Our military spending is so huge, in fact, that it accounts for a staggering 41% of all the military spending in the world. That's more than the next 15 biggest military spenders put together. (See chart below,) The only military spending category in which the U.S. isn't absurdly dominant is military spending as a percent of GDP. Our economy is so huge that our level of military spending as a percent of the economy--~5%--is behind that of several other countries. Importantly, however, these other countries are small countries with small economies. No other developed or big country comes close to us in military spending, even as a percent of GDP. So suggesting that we can't cut military spending without rendering ourselves a weakling relative to the competition is absurd.

#### Global conflicts are most likely when US military spending is high

Daniel Larison. Writer at the American Conservative. November 12, 2015. No, the U.S. Doesn’t Need Higher Military Spending <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/no-the-u-s-doesnt-need-higher-military-spending/> (accessed 5-15-16)

It is wrong to assume that the world becomes more or less dangerous depending on how much money we throw at the Pentagon. This is not only a fairly silly and American-centric way of thinking about international security, but it is demonstrably untrue. The world was much more dangerous and full of armed conflicts during the Cold War when our military budget took up a much larger share of our GDP, but that had a lot to do with the existence of the Soviet Union and its allies and proxies. When the U.S. started cutting back its military spending after the Cold War, the world didn’t become more dangerous than it had been during the Cold War, but was actually becoming much more peaceful and less violent overall. The most recent spike in instability and violence in the world in the last fifteen years has come at the same time that the U.S. military budget has been steadily rising and the U.S. has been using its military in one intervention after another. Given that experience, why would we assume that the world would be more dangerous as a result of not increasing military spending? Why wouldn’t we assume the reverse?

#### Investment in the latest military tech is high now

Louis Jacobson and Amy Sherman. Writers at PolitiFact. December 14, 2015. PolitiFact Sheet: Military spending under Obama and Congress http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/dec/14/politifact-sheet-our-guide-to-military-spending-/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Rubio made a less accurate attack when he said the United States "is not building the aircraft, the long-range bombers, the additional aircraft carriers, (or) the nuclear submarines." We rated that claim False. The United States is, in fact, building various military equipment, though there is debate among experts as to whether it is happening fast enough. Here is an updated summary of some of what we found: The Navy is building 12 ballistic missile submarines to replace the current force of 14 beginning with the first hull in 2021. The Navy budgeted $1.4 billion for research and development in fiscal year 2016, but the challenge is funding the total of about $103 billion. The Defense Department is in the middle of the largest aircraft procurement ever for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In recent years, around 30 have been built a year, and that will ramp up to 100 a year around 2017. Plans call for acquiring 2,443 joint strike fighters over about 20 years at a cost of nearly $400 billion. In October, the Air Force awarded a contract for the new bomber program, known as a long-range strike bomber. However, the bid is currently under protest by Boeing. The cost estimate is $21.4 billion for the engineering and manufacturing development phase and then $550 million per aircraft for the first 21 of 100. The 100 planes are expected to be done by the 2020s.

#### The US Navy is not at all weak

Louis Jacobson and Amy Sherman. Writers at PolitiFact. December 14, 2015. PolitiFact Sheet: Military spending under Obama and Congress http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/dec/14/politifact-sheet-our-guide-to-military-spending-/ (accessed 5-15-16)

A popular talking point about the United States having the "smallest Navy" in almost a century emerged in the 2012 presidential campaign and has seen new life this cycle. The literal accuracy of the claim has changed recently and from year to year. In 1916, the U.S. Navy had 245 active ships. The number peaked at a massive 6,768 ships during World War II. Then the number drifted down during most of the 20th century, with slight upticks during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. However, the ships of 1917 were most definitely not the ships of today. The types of ships active in 1917 that are also active today -- such as cruisers and destroyers -- are now outfitted with far more advanced technology than they were during World War I. And today, the U.S. Navy has 11 aircraft carriers (plus the jets to launch from them), 31 amphibious ships, 14 submarines capable of launching nuclear ballistic missiles and four specialized submarines for launching cruise missiles — all categories of vessels that didn't even exist in 1916. And all are more effective at projecting seapower than their forebears. The comparison "doesn’t pass ‘the giggle test,’ " William W. Stueck, a historian at the University of Georgia, told us in 2012. In March 2015, the Navy, after a formal process completed in 2014 to consider its future military needs, set a goal for a fleet of 308 ships. Given the current shipbuilding schedule, that goal would not be met until 2022 at the earliest. And that depends on repealing sequestration.

#### The Navy has enough funding

US Navy. 2015**.** Department of the Navy Releases Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Proposal <http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=79466> (accessed 5-15-16)

The Department of the Navy released its proposed $148 billion budget for fiscal year 2015 (FY15), March 4. The budget is part of the $495.6 billion defense budget President Barack Obama submitted to Congress the same day. Rear Adm. William Lescher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget, briefed media at the Department of Defense budget press conference about the Navy and Marine Corps portion of the budget . "Our budget comes during a period of increased fiscal austerity and uncertainty, and at a time when the Combatant Commanders' demand for naval forces continues at very high levels," said Lescher, "There were tough choices made in developing this budget, but it provides the resources that allow us to preserve our warfighting advantage in a thoughtful, responsible way." This year's budget submission prioritizes funding for forward presence and continues to make critical investments in people and future capabilities.

#### The Navy has a big enough budget and is building new ships

Grace Jean. Writer at Janes. March, 2015. Pentagon budget 2015: US Navy prioritises shipbuilding at expense of aviation procurement <http://www.janes.com/article/34843/pentagon-budget-2015-us-navy-prioritises-shipbuilding-at-expense-of-aviation-procurement> (accessed 5-15-16)

The navy is requesting a USD148 billion baseline budget, down from its FY 2014 budget request of USD155.8 billion, which did not reflect the spending caps imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act. The base budget breaks down into five spending accounts: USD38.4 billion for procurement; USD46.8 billion for operations and maintenance; USD45 billion for military personnel; USD16.3 billion for research and development; and USD1.5 billion for infrastructure. "The department has put together a budget at a time of continued very high [combatant commander] demand for naval forces that balances investment in presence, in capability, and in readiness that's laser-focused on ensuring force wholeness and sustaining our war-fighting edge, in alignment with the strategy," Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget Rear Admiral Bill Lescher told reporters during budget briefings at the Pentagon on 4 March. The navy's procurement request of USD38.4 billion comprises USD14.4 billion for ships, USD13.1 billion for aircraft, USD3.2 billion for weapons, USD1 billion for the US Marine Corps, USD800 million for ammunition, and USD6 billion for other naval acquisition efforts, which includes support equipment and communications for the above. In its FY 2015 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which spans FY 2015-19, the navy intends to acquire 44 ships - an uptick of three ships compared with the FY 2014 plan. In FY 2015 the service plans to procure seven new construction ships: two Virginia-class attack submarines; three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS); and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

## Answers to Ocean Fertilization CP

#### The ocean is too big

Becky Oskin. Writer at Huffington Post. March 21, 2014. Iron Fertilization Might Be Ineffective Against Global Warming, Fossil Study Shows <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/21/iron-fertilization-global-warming-fossils_n_5006300.html> (accessed 5-15-16)

The dust level in the drill core suggests that about four to fives times more sediment fell across the Southern Ocean between South America and Africa during the ice age than the amount that falls there today, Martínez-García said. “The magnitude of the area we are talking about is equivalent to three times the areas of the entire United States, and is maintained for several thousand years,” he told Live Science. “This helps put into perspective what we can do in terms of the modern ocean.” The new study supported the argument that the amount of iron needed for geoengineering is untenable in the long term, said Gabriel Filippelli, a biogeochemist at Indiana University-Purdue University in Indianapolis. “It is difficult to imagine even a decade-long international effort of iron fertilization, sustained by continual ship runs dumping iron in a weather-hostile and isolated region of the world, let alone an effort that lasts a millennium,” Filippelli said. But Filippelli also said he thinks the ice-age iron story is more complicated than just dust blowing in the wind. “The authors note only one source of iron — from above,” he said. There is also evidence that the oceans were richer in iron because of more river input during the ice ages, he said. Thus, the ice-age ocean had extra iron from above and from below.

#### Iron fertilization will end up killing the algae it’s supposed to bloom

Mat McDermott. Writer at Motherboard. June 13, 2013. Yet Another Reason Ocean Iron Fertilization Isn't Such a Great Idea http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/yet-another-reason-ocean-iron-fertilization-isnt-such-a-great-idea (accessed 5-15-16)

In the short term this isn't a big deal, but over time, the analysis speculates, the growth in diatoms could starve out other plankton, spurring on the growth of microbes that don't need as much iron, thereby reducing the amount of algal blooms that can absorb carbon dioxide—exactly contrary to the whole point of ocean iron fertilization. Last October, entrepreneur Russ George (the former CEO of Planktos, a for-profit company trying to commercialize ocean iron fertilization) conducted what has been described as a rogue science experiment in the waters off British Columbia. George dumped 100 tons of iron dust into the waters just south of the Alaskan Gulf. He managed to produce a 3,861 square mile plankton bloom—as he hoped to. Controversially, George got the approval of a local indigenous council for the experiment, though they said afterwards they thought he was conducting a "salmon enhancement project" not an experiment in geoengineering. How risky is ocean iron fertilization? Back in 2009, the Royal Society made a comprehensive assessment of different climate modification techniques. They found that while it is not as risky as some other techniques, such as pumping sulfate particles into the atmosphere to reflect the incoming solar radiation, ocean iron fertilization has a "high potential for unintended and undesirable ecological side effects" and has not been proven effective.

#### Iron isn’t enough to make the oceans sink atmospheric carbon

Shannon Kelleher. Writer at Eos. February 5, 2016. Iron Fertilization Might Not Make Oceans Better Carbon Sinks <https://eos.org/articles/iron-fertilization-might-not-make-oceans-better-carbon-sinks> (accessed 5-15-16)

Data from the sediment cores led the researchers to infer that although 2 to 3 times as much iron-rich dust peppered the equatorial Pacific during the last ice age than today, levels of the nutrients nitrogen, phosphorus, and silica fell—and algae production lagged. The evidence suggests that the boom in algae production in the Southern Ocean during the same time period used up vital nutrients in southern waters, resulting in less to go around by the time currents reached the equatorial Pacific, the researchers report. “The equatorial Pacific didn’t really help reduce the CO2 during the last ice age,” said Costa. “It wasn’t an active participant in the carbon dioxide drawdown.” The study raises questions about whether sprinkling modern oceans with iron would actually be a viable way to sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in the effort to mitigate climate change. This study shows that “you can’t just go out anywhere in the ocean and dump some iron in and expect to have an effect on climate,” said Phoebe Lam, an assistant professor of ocean sciences at the University of California, Santa Cruz. She said this and previous studies suggest iron fertilization may increase algae production in some regions, but the combined findings seem to suggest that nutrient circulation between the world’s oceans would prevent an overall increase in algae production and any total increase in the ocean’s ability to store carbon.

#### Iron fertilization would end up hurting the algae it’s supposed to help

Yahoo News. June 20, 2013. Why Ocean Fertilization Could Actually Hurt Marine Health https://www.yahoo.com/news/why-ocean-fertilization-could-actually-hurt-marine-health-154849777.html?ref=gs (accessed 5-15-16)

Putting iron into ocean waters to stimulate the uptake of carbon dioxide—a geoengineering scheme that’s been investigated for its potential to help combat global warming—may have unintended consequences that could limit its effectiveness, if not render it counterproductive. A recent study published this month in the journal, Nature Communications, found that the outer shells of diatoms, a widespread type of algae, contain much higher levels of iron than previously documented. They could act to "hog" iron in sea water, leaving less of it for other types of algae, according to Julia Diaz, a study co-author and researcher at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. But it's a bit more complicated than that, according to Diaz. The study looked at the levels of iron in diatoms collected from the Southern Ocean, finding significant and surprising levels of the metal. Diatoms have been found to be more plentiful after ocean fertilization experiments, meaning they could be taking up this excess iron. "If that's the case, that makes that iron unavailable to other organisms," Diaz tells TakePart. "And those other organisms may be more capable of drawing down carbon dioxide from the atmosphere."

#### Ocean fertilization is untested and dangerous

Craig McClain. Director of Science at National Evolutionary Synthesis Center. October 15, 2012. Here We Go Again With Dumping Iron Into the Ocean. http://www.deepseanews.com/2012/10/here-we-go-again-with-dumping-iron-into-the-ocean/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Shortly thereafter, a follow-up post by Dr. M on Deep Sea News pressed Planktos for a response to his own questions regarding their methodology. Dr. M leveled his skepticism at the out-of-sight, yet problematic, seafloor impacts following the dumping of iron filings into the ocean – including the lack of ability to quantify any long-term and downstream effects, potential oxygen depleted conditions of the seafloor below fertilization, enhanced release of nitrous oxide with two hundred times the greenhouse gas potential of carbon dioxide during the decomposition of organisms, and lack of predictability of the amount of carbon dioxide that will actually sink to the seafloor and how long it will be sequestered. Following this post, Miriam on The Oyster’s Garter leveled a comprehensive dismantling of the science behind the company’s responses to criticism from the scientific community. “I’m appalled Planktos has even gotten off the ground with such poor, nonsensical science,” wrote Miriam back in October of 2007. You should head back to Miriam’s original post as it still stands as a beautiful point-by-point rebuttal of junk science. With little to no apparent regard for a precautionary approach, Planktos was essentially proposing geoengineering on a massive scale with little to no understanding of the effect of iron fertilization on ocean ecosystems. Shortly after our blog posts raised the level of scrutiny on Planktos’ plans, several international conservation NGOs as well as a few Galapagos-based conservation groups expressed their own concerns over plans to dump iron filings into Galapagos’ waters.

## Answers to Sulfate Aerosols CP

#### Sulfate aerosols would be prone to miscalculation

Rachel Kaufman. Writer at Live Science. August 16, 2012. Could Pumping Aerosols into the Atmosphere Stop Global Warming? <http://www.livescience.com/22417-aerosols-stop-global-warming.html> (accessed 5-15-16)

Skeptics of the idea, however, say it's one thing when a volcano erupts; imitating nature would be another thing entirely. While Pinatubo-like amounts of sulfur (roughly 20 million tons) pumped into the atmosphere could linger three to four years, cooling the planet within the first months, reversing sea ice melt, and possibly even promoting tree growth, the side effects are uncertain. A 2009 paper found that stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) could lead to drought in Africa and Asia and deplete the ozone layer, and it would not stop ocean acidification. A miscalculation in the injections could be a costly mistake, ushering in a new ice age. And if scientists were to stop regular injections without cleaning up the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the rebound effect could be worse for crops, animals and ecosystems than if they had done nothing. Beyond that, critics say, regular aerosol injections would change the sky's color, ruin astronomy for optical telescopes on Earth, and remove the incentive for nations to clean up their own acts. And in a final act of irony, with less sunlight reaching the Earth's surface, solar panels would produce less power.

#### Sulfate aerosols can’t be dispersed properly and won’t solve

Max Planck Institute. May 14, 2013. Sulfate aerosols cool climate less than assumed <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130514085309.htm> (accessed 5-15-16)

The life span of cloud-forming sulfate particles in the air is shorter than had been assumed due to a sulfur dioxide oxidation pathway which has been neglected in climate models so far. Sulfur dioxide is as antagonist of greenhouse gases less effective than previously assumed. It forms sulfate aerosol particles in the air, which reflect sunlight, and as so-called cloud condensation nuclei influence the chemical processes within clouds. Therefore, sulfate aerosol particles help to cool Earth, making them an important factor in climate models. However, a team around researchers from the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry found out that it is likely most models overestimate the cooling effect of these particles. The reason is a largely disregarded reaction pathway catalysed by mineral dust within clouds, which has a strong influence on the life span of sulfate aerosol particles and their ability to reflect sunlight. In their role as condensation nuclei, aerosol particles are an important trigger for the formation of clouds. As humidity accumulates on the particles droplets are formed, which later develop into clouds. Within the clouds, however, the chemical composition of these aerosol particles changes.

#### Sulfates could cause dangerous regional climate anomalies

Alan Robock. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. May 2008. 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be A Bad Idea <http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/20ReasonsBASinpress.pdf> (accessed 5-15-16)

However, researchers at the National Center for Atmospheric Research showed in 2007 that the Pinatubo eruption caused large hydrological responses, including reduced precipitation, soil moisture, and river flow in many regions.5 Simulations of the climate response to volcanic eruptions have also shown large impacts on regional climate, but whether these are good analogs for the geoengineering response requires further investigation. Scientists have also seen volcanic eruptions in the tropics produce changes in atmospheric circulation, causing winter warming over continents in the Northern Hemisphere, as well as eruptions at high-latitudes weaken the Asian and African monsoons, causing reduced precipitation.6 In fact, the eight-month-long eruption of the Laki fissure in Iceland in 1783-1784 contributed to famine in Africa, India, and Japan. If scientists and engineers were able to inject smaller amounts of stratospheric aerosols than result from volcanic eruptions, how would they affect summer wind and precipitation patterns? Could attempts to geoengineer isolated regions (say, the Arctic) be confined there? Scientists need to investigate these scenarios. At the fall 2007 American Geophysical Union meeting, researchers presented preliminary findings from several different climate models that simulated geoengineering schemes and found that they reduced precipitation over wide regions, condemning hundreds of millions of people to drought.

#### Sulfates cause the oceans and rain to acidify

Zeke Hausfather. Writer at Yale Climate Connections. June 6, 2010. Why Reducing Sulfate Aerosol Emissions Complicates Efforts to Moderate Climate Change http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2010/06/common-climate-misconceptions-why-reducing-sulfate-aerosol-emissions-complicates-efforts-to-moderate-climate-change/ (accessed 5-15-16)

If humans adopted geoengineering as a solution to global warming, with no restriction on continued carbon emissions, the ocean would continue to become more acidic, because about half of all excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is removed by ocean uptake. The ocean is already 30 percent more acidic than it was before the industrial revolution, and continued acidification threatens the entire oceanic biological chain, from coral reefs right up to humans. If sulfate is injected regularly into the atmosphere, no matter where, acid deposition will increase. In 1977, the Russian climatologist Mikhail Budyko calculated that the additional acidity caused by sulfate injections would be negligibly greater than levels that resulted from air pollution. But the most relevant quantity is the total acid deposition, including both wet (acid rain, snow, and fog) and dry (acidic gases and particles), that passes through the troposphere—the atmospheric layer closest to Earth’s surface—as the material falls from the stratosphere. Any additional acid deposition would harm the ecosystem, and it will be important to understand the consequences of exceeding different biological thresholds. Furthermore, more particles in the troposphere would affect public health. The effect may not be large compared to the impact of pollution in urban areas, but in pristine areas it could be significant.

#### Sulfate aerosols kill the ozone and accelerates deforestation

Alan Robock. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. May 2008. 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be A Bad Idea <http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/20ReasonsBASinpress.pdf> (accessed 5-15-16)

Aerosol particles in the stratosphere serve as surfaces for chemical reactions that destroy ozone in the same way that water and nitric acid aerosols in polar stratospheric clouds produce the seasonal Antarctic ozone hole. For the next four decades or so, when the concentration of anthropogenic ozone-depleting substances will still be large enough in the stratosphere to produce this effect, additional aerosols from geoengineering would destroy even more ozone and increase damaging ultraviolet flux to Earth’s surface. Sunlight scatters as it passes through stratospheric aerosols, reducing direct solar radiation and increasing diffuse radiation, with important biological consequences. Some studies, including one that measured this effect in trees following the Mount Pinatubo eruption, suggest that diffuse radiation allows plant canopies to photosynthesize more efficiently, thus increasing their capacity as a carbon sink. At the same time, inserting aerosols or reflective disks into the atmosphere would reduce the total sunlight to reach Earth’s surface. Scientists need to assess the impacts on crops and natural vegetation of reductions in total, diffuse, and direct solar radiation.

#### Geoengineering won’t make enough of a difference

Shi-Ling Hsu. Professor Florida State University. September 2011. The case for a carbon tax: Getting past our hang-up to effective climate policy http://www.springer.com/us/book/9781610911788 (accessed 5-15-16)

Finally, excluded from consideration in this book are adaptation and geo-engineering measures. Adaptation is the general term for a wide range of things that can be done by a country to prepare for and adjust to life in a climate-changed world, at least as it can best be foreseen. Adaptation could include, for example, relocation of populations away from areas vulnerable to tropical storms, or the genetic modification of seeds to yield more drought-resistant crops, or the construction of sea walls to protect a city from the intruding sea. Geo-engineering measures aim to directly reduce the heat-increasing effects of greenhouse gases, by either reducing atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases or by reducing the amount of solar radiation that is absorbed. Like adaptation, geo-engineering consciously does not address the sources of the greenhouse gases. Proposed geo-engineering measures have included the promotion of ocean algal growth (which would in theory capture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere), the launching of tiny particlesized mirrors into the upper stratosphere so as to reflect sunlight and prevent it from reaching the Earth, and simply painting roofs white so as to reflect sunlight more effectively and increase the amount of heat that is radiated back out into space.

#### **Only emissions reductions can make a lasting impact**

Shi-Ling Hsu. Professor Florida State University. September 2011. The case for a carbon tax: Getting past our hang-up to effective climate policy http://www.springer.com/us/book/9781610911788 (accessed 5-15-16)

The problem of international coordination among countries (which I argue in this book is best addressed by a carbon tax) currently seems challenging enough to warrant some diversification of approaches to climate change. While the international legal community balks at the unilateralism inherent in adaptation and geo-engineering as a climate strategy, options that do not require global and crosscultural politicking begin to look attractive. Moreover, the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change are such that a portfolio of policies is likely required. 3 All that said, it is most sensible from the perspective of greenhouse gas mitigation to cabin off these kinds of strategies from the question of how to reduce emissions. It is complicated enough to consider what mitigation policies should be pursued, without complicating the question by adding in analysis of adaptation and geo-engineering measures.

## Answers to Currency Swap CP

#### Chinese companies have terrible lending records

Jacky Wong. Writer at Wall Street Journal. March 11, 2016. China Banks: Careful What You Swap Into <http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/03/11/china-banks-careful-what-you-swap-into/> (accessed 5-15-16)

The hope is that by giving the troubled companies breathing space on their debt, the lenders could eventually enjoy the upside from their revival. This is especially true for companies that are only unlucky to be caught in a cyclical downturn. But what happens if the luck doesn’t turn soon? Just look at China Huarong Energy. Creditors of the shipbuilder-turned-oil-explorer this week agreed to swap their loans to the company into equity. But given the relentless oversupply in the shipping industry, its shipbuilding business may not turn around in near future, if at all. As for oil, China Huarong ventured into an oilfield in Kyrgyzstan in 2014 right when prices began falling. Even if oil prices recover this year, chances are they won’t go back to 2014’s triple-digit levels. For Huarong’s creditors, then, swapping into its shares is just prolonging the pain.

#### Currency swaps create more instability

Izabella Kaminska. Writer at Financial Times. September 4, 2013. Beware the EM central bank FX swap trend http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/09/04/1623262/beware-the-em-central-bank-fx-swap-trend/ (accessed 5-15-16)

If you’re a central bank in emerging markets, struggling to keep your economy stimulated/protected from hot money flows, using swaps or FX sales is a tempting and viable alternative to interest rate hikes, they note. And generally speaking, the BNP EM strategists argue, swaps provide for a richer toolset for most central banks. Just ask one of the trend-setters Brazil: Following the sharp depreciation of emerging market (EM) currencies on the back of the prospects of Fed tapering and the halt of excess liquidity flows into EM economies, some central banks started intervening in the FX market to curb depreciation pressure on their currencies1. However, what has attracted attention this time is that most of the CBs intervening in the FX market are relying on a different tool rather than the usual sale of their international reserves, namely the offer of USD via FX swaps. In Brazil, this has been a recurrent choice of FX intervention over the past couple of years when it seemed the BCB has reached its optimal level of international reserves. Whenever they want to prevent sharp movements on the USDBRL, they opt to sell USD via currency swaps or to buy USD via reverse currency swaps. Now, this sort of FX intervention has been spreading out among other EM countries with India and Indonesia following the BCB’s steps, although with some differences. We think this can be feasible for Turkey as well.

#### Currency swaps will be short sold on the market—that will counteract any inflation

Marcio Garcia. Professor at University of California Berkley. September 25, 2013. Should Brazil’s central bank be selling foreign reserves? http://voxeu.org/article/should-brazil-s-central-bank-be-selling-foreign-reserves (accessed 5-15-16)

A notable and recent copycat has been India, which on August 28 decided to engage in USDINR FX swaps for fixed tenors with oil companies, in a bid to shore up the rupee. As BNP Paribas’ team explains, while the swap tactic can make your reserves go further — in almost shadow banking style — its success is dependent on whether the sought after intervention actually works, or else there could be basis risk exposure as well as real world counterpart risk: Effectively, RBI is lending USD to the oil companies, not selling USD spot. The immediate impact on the market was positive as the market took this to mean that RBI had taken oil import USD demand out of the market. Another (unexpected) consequence of the swap facility was to widen the cross currency basis as the RBI started doing buy/sell FX swaps with the market, presumably to prevent a decline in its spot reserve numbers. One consequence not yet priced in by the market is potential losses for oil importing companies in the event of INR depreciation. If this measure works and the INR appreciates, the USD loan against RBI could be repaid at a profit. But if the INR depreciates, then oil companies would incur losses. In that event RBI would need to keep rolling these swaps or the government would have to take a fiscal hit. India was the most reluctant among these CBs to hike rates and these FX interventions do not seem to be enough to cope with the depreciation pressure, as INR has remained the weakest performing among EM currencies (Chart 1).

#### Currency swaps can only provide short term liquidity

Judit Pales. Professor at University of Budapest. September 2011. The role of currency swaps in the domestic banking system and the functioning of the swap market during the crisis. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/op-90.pdf (accessed 5-15-16)

In India’s case there is no naked shorting at the moment. What India is lending, it is currently reborrowing on a forward basis from the market. If the exchange rate moves in favour of the domestic currency the strategy can pay off considerably for the EM central bank. If it doesn’t, the outstanding dollar-denominated funding mismatch must eventually be plugged with real reserves – or in the event that these are drained entirely, by tapping the Fed’s own FX swap window to plug the dollar shortage. Either way, it is a move that temporarily prints dollars into the system. The fact that these moves come after Fed tapering panic, meanwhile, arguably tell us a lot about global appetite for dollar liquidity. It’s almost an indirect message to the Fed saying that if you stop dollar easing, we’ll turn to more innovative ways to plug the shortfall ourselves. But as BNP Paribas themselves conclude, it might be a risky strategy. If the exchange rate fails to move, or the Fed’s resolve proves stronger than that of EM central banks, somewhere basis risk losses will have to be worn. At best, swaps might only delay inevitable depreciation: Overall, EM CBs are opting to intervene via FX swaps, given that the level of international reserves is not affected. Although their intervention might calm down the FX market in the very short term, they will not solve the underlying problems – evidenced by a large current account deficit – behind this depreciation pressure on their currencies. And they will probably end up with other unintended consequences: a deterioration of fiscal accounts to cover losses from FX swaps and dreaded sovereign ratings downgrades, which would attract even lower capital flows to cover the deficit on the current account.

#### Swapped currencies are avoided in the international market

Izabella Kaminska. Writer at Financial Times. September 4, 2013. Beware the EM central bank FX swap trend http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/09/04/1623262/beware-the-em-central-bank-fx-swap-trend/ (accessed 5-15-16)

In other words, such FX interventions would be feasible in smoothing the moves due to short-term speculative positioning and buy time to address the fundamental issues. For the longer term, we will hear more about the external vulnerabilities, as tightening in global liquidity conditions is a question of “when” rather than “if”. Consequently, countries resorting to measures that simply delay the potential adjustment run the risk of a significant hit on fiscal balances, if they are eventually forced to let the currencies depreciate. In this case, instead of reaping the rewards of depreciation (see our piece “Embrace devaluation”), those countries will struggle with the effects of lower credit quality. While this comparison might be far-fetched at the moment, it is precisely what led to a decline in growth rates in CEE economies after the 2008/2009 crisis – because of the inability to let the currency weaken when it necessary. It is too early to make a prediction, but judging by the recent behaviour of their central banks, Brazil, Turkey, India and Indonesia might already be declining.

## Answers to China A2/AD CP

#### A martime denial strategy would be coastly and have limited effectiveness

J Michael Cole. Writer at the Diplomat. November 12, 2013. How A2/AD Can Defeat China http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/how-a2ad-can-defeat-china/ (accessed 5-15-16)

However, creating a multinational ASM strategy would not be without its challenges, nor can its formation be taken for granted. Although a number of ASM systems are currently available and their acquisition within the financial means of even the weakest of the partners involved, their effectiveness would depend on the ability of member states to also receive cueing and targeting data from U.S. sensors, which creates challenges (by no means insurmountable) in terms of ensuring that all the platforms involved can communicate. Moreover, to avoid fostering the impression in Beijing that the U.S. and regional countries are seeking to keep it bottled in, ASM units probably could not be deployed permanently, and instead should be pre-positioned (presumably on U.S. territory) for rapid deployment amid rising tensions resulting from Chinese aggression or threat thereof. Access to heavy lift capabilities and operational airfields in partner countries would therefore be crucial elements for the success of this strategy. For obvious reasons, proposing such an alliance would be controversial. Nor can it be assumed, as the report notes, that countries in China’s periphery would be willing to risk Beijing’s ire by joining the effort, unless conditions in the region deteriorate dramatically and the PLA’s posture becomes more aggressive than it is currently. Moreover, an ASM component alone would be insufficient to ensure the ability of a member country to counter a Chinese attack.

#### Escalation fails—we’ll blink before China does

Sydney J Freedberg. Writer at Breaking Defense. September 26, 2013. China’s Dangerous Weakness, Part 1: Beijing’s Aggressive ‘Self-Defense’ http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/chinas-dangerous-weakness-part-1-beijings-aggressive-idea-of-self-defense/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Two centuries of insecurity have conditioned Chinese leaders to be a little light on the trigger finger. So while Chinese strategy documents consistently speak of self-defense – the current official term is “active defense” – “I think you have to not be very literal when you read this stuff,” Wortzel said. “It’s a fairly prickly and aggressive military doctrine inside a defensive structure.” “A lot of what they do is very heavily built on preemption,” Wortzel explained. “When you read the diplomatic literature out of China, all their attacks are ‘preemptive counterattacks.’ When they went into Korea [in 1950], it was a preemptive counterattack. When they went into Vietnam [in 1974 and 1979], it was a preemptive counterattack. When they went into India in 1962, it was a preemptive counterattack.” It’s not that China was entirely unprovoked in these cases. In 1950, they saw US forces steamrolling over their North Korean ally and surging towards the Chinese with no guarantee the Americans would stop at the Yalu. (Indeed, Gen. Douglas MacArthur wanted a wider war with China, which is why Harry Truman finally fired him). In both 1962 and 1979, there had been skirmishes along the disputed borders for years. But in each case, the Chinese response was to escalate – massively, bloodily, and unexpectedly. These examples aren’t just ancient history. The principle of preemption is a big part of China’s “active defense” doctrine today, said retired Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, speaking on a panel at the Wilson Center earlier on Wednesday.

## Answers to Lawfare CP

#### Lawfare will not deter China

Julian Ku. Writer at Opinio Juris. July 13, 2014. Why “Lawfare” Won’t Deter China in the South China Sea http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/13/lawfare-wont-deter-china-south-china-sea/ (accessed 5-15-16)

China has opted out of any “compulsory” system of international dispute resolution that would rule on its territorial claims in the South China Sea (or anywhere, for that matter). This “opt-out” is perfectly legal and may very well prevent the Philippines from even making their full case to the UNCLOS arbitration tribunal. There are no other legal institutions that have jurisdiction. So the only way “lawfare” can work here is if China consents to arbitration. But if Kazianis is right that this is a strategy by China’s neighbors to block its expansion, then why would China ever agree to arbitration? 2) Even if compulsory jurisdiction were somehow found in one of these international bodies, there is very little chance that China would feel compelled to comply with any negative ruling. This is not a China-specific problem, but rather a problem almost every country faces when considering arbitration over territorial disputes. The effectiveness of tribunals in these contexts is highly limited since they depend for enforcement on the individual state-parties. This is why voluntary arbitration tends to work better than compulsory arbitration in these kinds of territorial disputes. The U.S. and Canada, for example, have managed to settle (most of) their often contentious land and maritime borders through a combination of non-arbitral commissions, and then special bilateral arbitrations.

# Kritik Answers Realism K

### Plan Focus Good

#### Debates over IR should not be framed over ontological issues—it’s infinitely regressive and irrelevant to the plan

James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Senior Fellow at FSI, Ralph D. Mershon Professor of International Security at the Mershon Center – The University of Ohio, 2002. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” Handbook on International Relations by Walter Carlsnaes & Thomas Risse, SAGE Publications, p. 53.

It is important to understand these ontological issues, since failure to do so can lead to analytical tools or frameworks becomes tacit ontologies (Ruggie, 1983: 285), foreclosing potentially interesting lines of argument without justification. However, we do not believe this framing of the rationalist-constructivist debate is the most useful, for three reasons. First, the issues are by definition philosophical, and as such not likely to be settled soon, if ever, and almost certainly not by IR scholars. Second, although some rationalists and constructivists may in fact have strong ontological commitments, others may not, since there is no inherent need to commit to an ontology to work in these traditions. Just as quantum physicists can do their work without any idea how to interpret its ontological implications, social scientists too can proceed pragmatically, remaining agnostic about what society is ‘really’ made of. Finally, it seems doubtful that as a discipline we know so much about international life that we should rule out certain arguments a priori on purely philosophical grounds. Thus, while recognizing the role that ontological issues play in structuring the rationalist-constructivist debate, in this chapter will largely avoid them, adopting a stance of ontological pluralism instead.

### Plan Focus Good – 1AR

#### Reject ontology—prefer plan focus—extend Wendt

#### It’s arbitrary—ontological truth can’t be resolved because it’s impossible to articulate ontological claims in non-subjective terms

#### It’s impractical—we can act without resolving ontological commitments—the aff’s pluralism entails a critical reflexiveness solved by the perm

#### Theoretical purity of the alternative is impossible – no explanation fits perfectly and never will, instead endorse the Aff’s mediation of competing theories to produce specific analysis and a plan of action

#### It’s most productive to proceed with weak ontology—commitments aren’t necessary, solves paralysis, is most pragmatic, and avoids damaging dogmas

#### -Ontology doesn’t deny accuracy of observations, prefer specificity of 1ac impacts

#### -Ontological commitments are presumptuous and hastily preclude potentially valuable insights and observations

### Permutation—Both Theories Key

#### **Perm: do plan and non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative**

#### **No single paradigm perfectly captures US-China relations—policymakers should use both theories to produce specific analysis that is more comprehensive and accurate to avoid miscalculations**

Hudda ’15 (Nabil Hudda, Instructor of Politics at the University of Hong Kong, Master of Science, China and Globalisation from Kings College, London, “Interpreting the Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives,” E-International Relations Students. April 3, 2015. [http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/] accessed: 5/5/16)

Overall, Realism and Liberalism offer us valuable theoretical insight into interpreting the rise of China. This research paper does not conclude that these theories are redundant, but does assert that simple analysis and interpretation of the rise of China through Realism and Liberalism in isolation is inadequate and provides an incomplete perspective. Realist theory offers interpretations of China’s rise that focus on its pursuit of power and security in an international anarchic system. In this system, self-interested states such as China compete in a zero-sum game environment. Several empirical examples in this paper support this narrow Realist interpretation, but not to a full extent. Competing empirical evidence based on Liberal theory contradicts the narrow realist interpretation. A Liberal scenario is one where the anarchic element of an international system can be diluted. In contrast to a Realist view, cooperation means that a win–win situation for all is a possibility and conflict is not inevitable–in fact, it can be prevented.¶ The implication is that in the interpretation of China’s rise, these two theories must be analysed in combination with each other—not in opposition to each other. Indeed, “the complex correlations between power and interest defy analytic capture by any one paradigm”.[50] However, this is not enough. Using both theories in combination will lead to a more comprehensive and more accurate interpretation of China’s rise, but since all proponents of these theories use history to characterise and interpret present or future discourse, speculations tend to be too simplistic. Although debatable and undefined in this paper, perhaps the theories evaluated could be combined with ‘Chinese characteristics’ in order to get a better interpretation of China’s rise.¶ This combination could include taking into account China’s own unique culture, civilisation and historical backdrop, in addition to being more inclusive when it comes to interpretations. That is, current interpretations of China’s rise need to include a more diverse range of literature that includes significant Chinese sources.¶ In relation to current policy regarding interpretations of China’s rise, I would hope for increased cooperation where there is common ground to avoid miscalculations and misperceptions. More importantly, issues of dispute need to be handled with more care, and within designated frameworks. This is important in order to avoid the extremes of Realism, but also address the failings of Liberalism.¶ Finally, I would like to extend Martin Jacques’ comment that there needs to be more humility by the West when addressing China.[51] Perhaps more humility on the part of all nations—including China itself—needs to be present before a multiplicity of theories, lenses and insights can be as effective as they need to be. This will then enable a more accurate interpretation of China’s rise.

### Permutation—Engagement Compatible With Realism

#### Liberalist engagement strategies do not trade-off with security focus—they offer superior options at best and enhance military power at worst

Goldsmith ’14 (Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, “A Liberal Defense of Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy,” E-International Relations Students. October 6, 2014. [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/06/a-liberal-defense-of-barack-obamas-foreign-policy/] accessed: 5/4/16)

The Realist path is always open, but better options should be pursued, and this includes a willingness for the U.S. to make important compromises, recognize others interests, and build trust. “Regional aggression that goes unchecked — whether in southern Ukraine or the South China Sea, or anywhere else in the world — will ultimately impact our allies and could draw in our military.” While he takes a multilateral approach to checking Chinese expansion, he also recognizes that the U.S. should be able to compromise and lead by example. “We can’t try to resolve problems in the South China Sea when we have refused to make sure that the Law of the Sea Convention is ratified by our United States Senate, despite the fact that our top military leaders say the treaty advances our national security. That’s not leadership.” This sense of responsibility and capacity for self-criticism shows a maturity that other states can respect.¶ What is perhaps most distinct about Obama’s Liberalism is the strong emphasis on how the U.S. is perceived abroad, and the belief that that matters. This is clearly related to the importance of democracy, and the ability of the U.S. to cooperate with other democracies, instead of losing the support of key allies like France and Germany as happened under George W. Bush. It is also related to recent Liberal emphasis on “soft power” (Nye 2004). Obama refers to the importance of “international support and legitimacy” for the success of U.S. military efforts. Similar statements are frequent in the West Point speech. “International opinion matters.” “We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield.” “[W]hen we cannot explain our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, we erode legitimacy with our partners.” After Russia invaded Ukraine, “our ability to shape world opinion helped isolate Russia right away… And this mobilization of world opinion and international institutions served as a counterweight to Russian propaganda and Russian troops.” While the concept of soft power might be criticized for some lack of theoretical rigor, my research with Yusaku Horiuchi (2012) develops some rigorous hypotheses regarding soft power and provides strong empirical evidence that international public opinion has “hard power” consequences for the success of U.S. foreign policy. Obama’s emphasis on international opinion about the U.S. speaks to repairing and maintaining the North Atlantic security community, and for traditional Liberal concerns for a wider community of international legitimacy and trust.¶ Obama is clearly aware of the potential for good outcomes based on mutual interests, democracy, and constructive human endeavors, but he is fully capable of taking the hard decisions and making the trade-offs that foreign policy requires when these gains are not accessible. He presents his choices regarding relations with Egypt in this light:

### Mearsheimer Wrong—China

#### Realist dogma is wrong and dangerous in regards to China—contradicts state interests and empirics, causing power conflicts and preventing cooperation on global issues

Etzioni ’15 [Amitai Etzioni, professor of international relations at The George Washington University, “Mearsheimer’s War With China: The provocative political scientist foresees tense relations between the U.S. and China.” March 29, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/mearsheimers-war-with-china/ accessed: 5/5/16]

Mearsheimer believes that containment is the United States’ only way to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. (He dismisses preventative war because China possesses a nuclear deterrent, nixes policies to inhibit China’s economic growth on the grounds that they would hurt the United States’ own economy, and notes that attempting to topple China-friendly regimes and fomenting rebellion within China is likely to fail.) Containment would entail forming “a balancing coalition” with China’s neighbors, which would require the United States’ active coordination and military backing. To many it seems that the United States has indeed begun to form such a coalition. However, Mearsheimer does not expect that containment will prevent current tensions between the United States and China from eventually escalating into a direct conflict. One reason for his claim is that China’s weak neighbors have a strong incentive to provoke crises now, before China becomes even stronger. Mearsheimer points out this makes the United States potentially vulnerable to becoming embroiled in conflicts that its weak allies might well instigate with China, forcing the U.S. to engage in war to protect them. (The United States’ treatment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of Japan covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is one telling example.) Mearsheimer notes that European countries had no such perverse incentives when the United States contained the USSR during the Cold War. Both countries’ strong nationalism, Mearsheimer believes, heightens the likelihood that the United States and China view each other as threatening. The often-provocative Mearsheimer dismisses the thesis that “Confucian pacifism” or economic interdependence will reduce the “chance that these two countries will shoot at each other.” In short, Mearsheimer asks whether war is likely and concludes that he expects, in the longer term, that the United States and China will engage in “an intense security competition with considerable potential for war” and, more flatly, that China’s rise “will not be peaceful.” In the process, Mearsheimer ignores that if one does not follow the kind of real politik analysis for which he is famous – that is, an analysis that looks at security rather than at sentiments, beliefs, and loyalties – a rather different conclusion emerges. First, the United States and China both have enormously pressing domestic problems. China’s slowing economic growth and the United States’ slow economic growth make it impossible for either country to – without neglecting these domestic demands – invest many taxpayer dollars in their military. Second, a military confrontation is very likely to be exceedingly costly for both sides. China cannot reasonably expect to war with the United States without suffering serious, lasting damage – at best. Third, the United States did not fare particularly well in four of its last five wars, as Henry Kissinger delicately pointed out, and it has a hard time dealing even with ISIS, which has at most 35,000 fighters and lacks a navy, air force, nuclear weapons, or significant cyber capabilities. Fourth and most importantly, the United States and China share many important shared and complementary interests. These include slowing nuclear proliferation, curbing Islamic extremism, protecting the environment, preventing climate change, and fostering economic growth and stability. Moreover, the two countries have very little “real” reason to confront each other. China can secure access to the energy and raw materials essential to its economic well-being, without any harm coming to the United States – unless the two countries turn every change to the status quo into a crisis of prestige. And China has shown, so far largely through land disputes, that it can settle differences with its neighbors peacefully. The main value of Mearsheimer’s provocative thesis is that it alerts those of us on both sides of the power divide to redouble our efforts to prevent his dire predictions from coming true.

### Liberalism True—China

#### **Realism oversimplifies U.S.-China relations—states are not the only political actors and empirics prove Chinese liberalism—the alt dooms cooperation**

1. Numerous non-government entities influence states. 2. Consequences of military power outweigh benefits. 3. China’s expanding economic interdependence and participation in multilateral institutions proves liberalism. 4. Realist lens sacrifices opportunities for cooperation on critical global issues

Hudda ’15 (Nabil Hudda, Instructor of Politics at the University of Hong Kong, Master of Science, China and Globalisation from Kings College, London, “Interpreting the Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives,” E-International Relations Students. April 3, 2015. [http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/03/interpreting-the-rise-of-china-realist-and-liberalist-perspectives/ accessed: 5/5/16]

Liberalism is made up of several interrelated concepts and strands, including the ‘Kantian Triangle’,[38] ‘international institutions’, ‘interdependence’, and the ‘Democratic Peace Theory’,[39] as explored by scholars such as Michael Boyle and Andrew Moravcsik.¶ In contrast to realist assumptions, Liberalist ones are optimistic in that they assume human nature is fundamentally good and that conflict can be avoided. Realism and Liberalism both concur on the existence of an anarchic international system, but for Liberalists, this can be mitigated. For Liberalists, sovereign states are not the only central actors in world politics. Individuals, interest groups, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations all have an influence on states. While Realism virtually denies the possibility of cooperation, this notion underpins Liberalism. Since the consequences of using military power often outweigh the benefits, states have a vested interest in engaging in cooperation. Cooperation can lead to absolute gains: a win–win situation for all. The next section will focus on interdependence (in particular, economic interdependence) when assessing Liberalist perspectives on the rise of China because it seems to be one of the strongest strands (if not the strongest strand) in the Liberalist armament.¶ Richard N. Cooper defines economic interdependence as the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in relation to “economic developments within those nations”.[40] Economic activity tends to refer to international transactions such as trade (imports and exports) and foreign direct investment (FDI).[41] Intense economic activity results in an increased number of ties and greater influence among the nations that engage in such economic activity. Consequently, economic interdependence lessens the likelihood of conflict as one economy becomes more bound to another. As David Starr Jordan puts it when referring to the likelihood of European conflict, it is a beacon for economic interdependence: “What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible.”[42]¶ As the graph shows, China’s overseas direct investment or FDI has risen significantly. The darker line—Chinese FDI flow into the world, including Asia—shows an increase of nearly $75 billion. Using the economic interdependence notions above, this increase in FDI should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of conflict and can, in fact, foster greater cooperation amongst states.¶ In addition, China’s trade interaction with the rest of the world accounts for nearly 50 per cent of its GDP.[43] This shows an intertwined economic relationship between the nation’s economy and the global economy. Conflict would undermine this economic relationship and result in universal losses and repercussions. Furthermore, China is now an active member in a range of regional and international organisations, institutions and frameworks. Xi Jinping correctly points out that China contributes to, and is a proactive member of, the G20, The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The United Nations Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization and The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) mechanism.[44] He adds that there is a further need to “seek common ground on issues of common interests in pursuit of win–win progress”,[45] which not only denigrates the Realist interpretation of China’s rise, but wholly supports the Liberalist interpretation. Through China’s participation in such organisations, the encouragement of cooperation ensues, ensuring all participants are awarded a share of winnings, meaning that they are less likely to engage in conflict with one another.

### Liberalism Good

#### **The international liberal order creates conditions that ameliorate the security dilemma—democracy, interdependence, and institutions better explain peace**

Goldsmith ’14 (Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, “A Liberal Defense of Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy,” E-International Relations Students. October 6, 2014. [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/06/a-liberal-defense-of-barack-obamas-foreign-policy/] accessed: 5/5/16)

Realists like John Mearsheimer (2001) and Charles Glaser (2011) see a world of usually unavoidable security threats, which can be managed through the age-old method of balancing military power. The “security dilemma” means that absent world government, one state’s efforts to make itself more secure necessarily reduce the security of other states. While some “optimist” Realists like Glaser argue for conditions under which some states might cooperate with each other, these are not likely to regularly exist among the world’s biggest powers (e.g., their motives are clear to each other and they are certain none is “greedy”). There is usually no escape from this situation because ultimately states, especially great powers, cannot trust each other enough to abandon their preference for self-reliance to ensure survival. With no supra-national power possible among sovereign states, there can be no guarantee other than one’s own “self-help.”¶ Liberals recognize the possibility and frequent reality of such a world, but argue for several types of conditions under which the security dilemma can be ameliorated and even made irrelevant. Authors such as Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) have resurrected a “Kantian tripod” of democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions on which such peaceful relations might rest. Ideas of “security community” based on common experiences and identity, as in the European Union (Deutsch et al. 1969 [1957]), or of “capitalist” or “contractual” peace (Gartzke 2007; Mousseau 2009), tell similar stories, but focus on some different variables. Within the realm of Liberal IR theory there is wide debate, but that some factors can allow states to safely shift concerns from survival via self-help to welfare via mutually beneficial cooperation is a common denominator.¶ Often, Liberal authors point to virtuous circles of mutual reinforcement among the key variables. For example, democracy gives leaders incentives to improve economic welfare, which can lead to expanded trade. This creates mutual interests in maintaining economic cooperation, which can be reinforced by international institutions to prevent cheating and build confidence through transparent rules. The transparency of democratic governance further reduces suspicion of hidden motives, while also providing norms of peaceful domestic conflict resolution through compromise that can serve as focal points for dealing with potential conflict between democratic states. Importantly, the empirical support for Liberal propositions has turned out to be considerable. Jack Levy’s (1989) oft-quoted characterization of the idea that democracies very rarely go to war with each other – the “democratic peace” – as “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations” is still relevant. As Helen Milner (2009) has written of institutional Liberal theory, “in this increasingly globalized world, it may be the most useful international relations paradigm we have.”¶ As a guide to foreign policy, Liberal theory points decision makers to distinguish between situations in which the great benefits of international cooperation can be reaped, and those in which realpolitik and self-help must be applied. In his West Point speech, Obama specifically rejects both the realist and idealist labels. His approach is recognizably Liberal. [2] He clearly acknowledges the existence of major threats to U.S. security, and the need to take unilateral military action when self-help is the only option: “The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it… America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life.” But he identifies this as a last resort, and the least preferred tool for ensuring security and pursuing interests.

### Realism Bad

#### Realism foreign policy is disastrous—creates enmity conflicts, forecloses cooperation, and sacrifices the most powerful tool we have to promote security interests

Goldsmith ’14 (Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, “A Liberal Defense of Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy,” E-International Relations Students. October 6, 2014. [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/06/a-liberal-defense-of-barack-obamas-foreign-policy/] accessed: 5/5/16)

Obama recognizes the negative consequences for the U.S. of a purely Realist foreign policy: not only in foregone gains from cooperation, but also in creating enmity and conflict spirals unnecessarily. Rather, he notes the main powerful and pragmatic tools that the U.S. has to promote its interests and security in other ways. And these are quintessentially Liberal. He points to international institutions, democracy, economic interdependence, and the need to build international trust. His speech is an argument for U.S. leadership in multilateral efforts, always with a preference for working with allies and others with common interests where possible. He provides examples of working through international institutions ranging from NATO allies imposing military and economic costs on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, to OECD monitors and the limited but real positive impacts of post-World War II institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and IMF. He directly references the democratic peace and its potential for improving global stability, but also lauds democracies as the best alliance partners for the U.S. He emphasizes the role of economic interdependence engendered by free trade and investment, leading to prosperity through capitalist competition and entrepreneurial innovation.¶ But he also notes the utility of economic sanctions – something of considerable importance in imposing costs on Russia where military force, even via proxy, is almost certainly not an option for success. Economic “opportunity costs” to aggressors is a key aspect of Liberal theory. It is important to make the costs of aggression as high as possible, relative to the benefits that otherwise would have been enjoyed. The implications of this for managing present and future relations with China are important, and he also notes the role of international law: “we’re supporting Southeast Asian nations as they negotiate a code of conduct with China on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. And we’re working to resolve these disputes through international law.” While international law is usually not enforceable, especially against a great power like China, it can provide a focal point for settlement, and a face-saving path to resolving territorial and other disagreements. But the military aspect of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia makes clear that tools for dealing with China’s territorial ambitions include force.

### Engagement Solves Conflict

#### Empirics show liberalism works—engagement with China has produced positive reform while lowering military threats. Prefer positive long-term trends over knee-jerk threat projections

Lubman ‘4 (Stanley, Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California-Berkeley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill" (March 4, 2004). Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers. Paper 18. [http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/18], accessed: 5/3/16)

After Tiananmen, as Lampton and others have most usefully recalled, American policy was thrown into indecision over whether to engage or punish China. The conflict between these orientations was nowhere more apparent than in the annual Congressional debates over the renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment of Chinese imports into the US. The annual ritual was required by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which required Congressional agreement to approve or reject a Presidential decision to extend MFN to “non-market” economies. The debates, as Lampton says, “created an annual opportunity…for politicians and interest groups to demonstrate their commitment to American values and to promote their concerns.”15 The debates were further complicated by the vacillation of President Clinton, who early in his first term linked extension of MFN to China with progress on specific human rights issues, and then, less than a year later, delinked trading status and human rights.16 The institutional changes and policy debates during the 1990s that have been briefly noted here provide essential background to the PNTR debates of 1999-2000. Well before PNTR became an issue, debate in Congress and among both policy-makers and academics had produced sharply opposed views of China. The issues are fundamental: Will China’s economic growth lead to political reform domestically, and will China, with its enormous potential economic and military power, be a constructive member of the international community or a threat to the security of other nations, including the United States? Those who urge continued US-China engagement emphasize that China has undergone extensive economic and social change since economic reforms began in 1979 that have improved the material lives of many Chinese and considerably increased their personal freedoms. Supporters of engagement urge that a long-term view must be taken of the possibilities for change in China’s political institutions. They recognize that China remains an authoritarian state dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that the Chinese party-state continues to maintain institutions and practices that violate principles of human rights that have been given expression in United Nations conventions. They argue, however, that the conditions necessary for the rise of civil society and democratic government can only develop slowly, if at all. Russia and Eastern Europe are examples of the difficulties that attend transitions from Communist totalitarianism and planned economies toward democratization and freer economies. They also urge that China's involvement in international institutions will promote China’s positive participation in the international community; that membership in the WTO will make China increasingly subject to international trade rules; and that expanded foreign trade and investment will aid China’s economic development and, therefore, eventual political reform.

### Arms Control

#### China shot down their own weather satellite to prompt dialogue about space cooperation. Neocons look for any excuse to start arms racing—causing accidental war

Broad ‘7 (William J., Foreign Policy Editor for the New York Times, “The World: Look Up! Is It a Threat? Or a Plea for a Ban?” Published: January 21, 2007, NYT http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/weekinreview/21broad.html] , accessed: 5/3/16)

THE nation’s star warriors, frustrated that their plans to arm the heavens went nowhere for two decades despite more than $100 billion in blue-sky research, felt a shiver of hope last week with news that China had conducted its first successful test of an antisatellite weapon. Having long warned of the Chinese threat, they now said their fears were vindicated and expressed optimism for their own projects, which range from new kinds of defensive satellites to flotillas of space weapons and orbital battle stations able to shatter all kinds of enemy arms. China, a group of 26 “Star Wars” supporters warned in a recent report, has “begun to erode American space dominance” and will accelerate that slide with “both lasers and missiles capable of destroying satellites.” H. Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative research group in Washington, said in an interview that the cost to the United States of new arms and defensive measures would most likely run to “billions or tens of billions of dollars a year, pretty much year in and year out,” and added, “I don’t think that’s excessive.” But the prospect of a new arms race in space is also energizing an opposition, including arms control supporters and fiscal conservatives alarmed at the rising costs of the Iraq war. Treaties could short-circuit the costly game of measure-countermeasure on the high frontier before it expands any further, they say. Currently, no international treaty or domestic law forbids such developments. An unfettered arms race could hurt the United States more than any other nation, arms control advocates argue. The United States owns or operates 443 of the 845 active satellites that now orbit the planet, or 53 percent. By contrast, China owns just 4 percent. “We not only have the most satellites but they are more integrated into our economy and our way of making war than any other country,” said Laura Grego, a staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group in Cambridge, Mass., that takes liberal positions on arms issues and environmental issues. “We have the most to lose in an unrestrained arms race.” But that logic has not persuaded the Star Wars advocates, who say the United States needs to protect its huge investment in space satellites by being ahead of anyone else in shooting such devices out of the sky. Diplomats from around the globe have gathered in Geneva for many years to hammer out a treaty on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” which would ban space weapons. Arms control supporters say China and Russia have backed the process, while the United States has dragged its feet. Last year, John Mohanco, a State Department official, told the diplomats in Geneva that as long as attacks on satellites remained a threat, “our government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets.” A Heritage Foundation analysis of such diplomacy says China is charging ahead to build space arms while “seeking to block the United States from developing its own anti-satellite weapons and space-based ballistic missile defense systems.” China’s strategy, the analysis says, is clear: “Work on public opinion in the United States to make moral arguments against weapons in space, develop international coalitions to limit the way that the United States can use space, and develop China’s own weapons systems and tactics to destroy American satellites and space-based weapons.” But Theresa Hitchens, a critic of the administration’s space arms research who is director of the Center for Defense Information, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs, said that China’s antisatellite test might be “a shot across the bow” meant to prod the Bush administration into serious negotiations. In the test, a Chinese missile pulverized an aging Chinese weather satellite more than 500 miles above Earth on Jan. 11. Ms. Hitchens warned that an arms race in space could easily spin out of control, noting that India has been “rattling its sword” and some experts in that country are openly calling for antisatellite arms. A global competition that produced armadas of space weapons, she added, could raise the risk of accidental nuclear war if, for instance, a whirling piece of space junk knocked out a spy satellite.

### China Not Realist

#### Their realism inevitable argument does not apply to China—our relationship and the ways in which we choose to construct them are fluid

Yaqing 10 (Qin, Assistant President of the Foreign Affairs College at Bejing and Professor of English and International Studies, "International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise", The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2010, July 21st 2010, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 21-22.)

Identity in process means that an actor’s identity is constructed and re-constructed by processual forces which come from relations in motion. If we follow Buzan’s categorization, any state could be called a revisionist, including the United States, the UK, or France, for in their identity revisionist elements can be easily detected. This is essentially the concept of ‘identity in fixity’, static and non-transformable. The reality is that any identity is identity in process. In the past three decades, China’s success in peaceful rise has been mainly due to its own change, which comes from interaction with and practices in international society. We did not have another cold war because, to a large extent, China changed and brought the change as well as itself into international society. It is often argued over the question that such change is tactical or fundamental, or as a result of calculation or of ideational reshaping.46 It is a false question, for the two again are inseparable.47 Change includes behavior change and identity change, which are inter- and correlated. Action starting from interest calculation leads an actor into a process and once inside the process mere interest calculation will not work, for the process has its own dynamics and the complex relations may entangle the actor in endless intersubjective practices. The intensive interaction among the actor and other actors and between the actor and the process is powerfully transformative.48 Bian thus is the key to understanding such processes. Continuity through change and change through intersubjective practices is the key to the process-oriented interpretation of society as well as of identity. Buzan argues that it will be extremely difficult for China to accept the primary institutions of international society. We may use one example to illustrate the opposite. Even if we take a brief look at the case of the market institution, we may see how the process approach works. The story tells us how China has accepted the institution of market economy and together with it how China has gradually changed its identity from a most rigidly planned economy to largely a market economy. The process is a difficult, gradual, and through all the ups and downs, but it is not necessarily violent. Market economy has been long a primary institution of the Western international society. China’s acceptance of the institution of market economy was extremely difficult and painful at the beginning. For thirty years since 1949, China adopted the planned economy model and practiced it to the extreme during the Cultural Revolution. Market was not a mere economic issue. Rather it was related to China’s identity as a socialist state and to the Chinese Communist Party’s identity as a revolutionary party. The first serious test for China’s reform and opening up was therefore whether China would accept the market institution. Using the three steps in the process approach we argue that the key to this test was how to look at the two opposites: market and planning.

### Realism Bad—Extinction

**Realism can’t account for complex catastrophes – causes escalation**James **Der Derian**, Professor of International Studies – Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, **2009** “An Accident Waiting to Happen”, Harvard International Review, 27(3), Fall, http://hir.harvard.edu/ predicting-the-present/national-security, accessed: 5/3/16

However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to **the dominant worldview** of national security, **realism.** And **if language is**, as Nietzsche claimed, **a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear** notions of **causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and** the **materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task**. Worse, **what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our** national and homeland **security systems**? **What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did?** **What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises**—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—**not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers**—what organizational theorists identify as **“negative synergy”** and “cascading effects” —**that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters?** Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—**we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters**.” What, then, is to be done? **A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event**. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that **the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity**. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events.

### Realism Bad—Norms

#### Realism denies the ability of ethical norms to factor in international behavior—this creates a system that only works to maintain the oppression—sacrificing and dehumanizing whole populations in the name of realism

Berdayes ‘04 (Vicente, Professor of Communication Studies at Saint Mary’s College, “What is Globalization?: Ambiguities of the Contemporary World Scene.” In Choi, Jung Min, John W. Murphy, and Manuel J. Caro. 2004. Globalization With A Human Face. Westport, Conn: Praeger, pp. 47 - 64. p. 31-32.)

Not so with neoliberal or realist conceptions of social order. Political realism is explicitly distrustful of the ability to lay down ethical norms to guide the formation of an international order. To the contrary, for authors such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, the theory of *Realpolitik* was needed to temper the universalistic claims of reason, which might be used to justify unrestrained interventions into the affairs of other states. Political realists, by contrast, forward a conception of international rela­tions based on power politics. According to this reductionistic view of statecraft, the international order is essentially Hobbesian in character— a field in which states vie for power without an overarching political entity to enforce order. Because the creation of an overarching power capable of subjecting states to its authority is considered foothardy, Hobbes’s own answer to this dilemma is closed off, and the lone way to ameliorate the constant insecurity among states is by pursuing an international “balance of power” as the only viable deterrent to war. Furthermore, according to this school, the nature of the political order within states is irrelevant to international statecraft. As Francis Fukuyama explains, it makes no difference whether countries are “theocracies, slave holding aristocracies, fascist police states, communist dictatorships or lib­eral democracies,” because the “striving for power is not affected by the internal characteristics of states. As has been demonstrated in the latter half of the twentieth century, this reductionistic rendition of political order disengages foreign policy from any concern with civil rights and social justice. As these themes suggest, Realpolitik dovetails with sociological re­alism in presenting nation-states as autonomous agents, and as a consequence human beings disappear as objects of concern within foreign policy. Examining the conceptual framework articulated by this dominant school of political thought, one can see that realist foreign policy is not concerned with mirages such as democracy or justice. Consequently, the pursuit of global order lacks an overarching telos or goal rooted in ethical imperatives. Key phrases such as “balance of power,” “regime change,” “power politics,” and even the term “realism” indicate the extent to which this school of thought is disengaged from the ideal of social progress that took hold in the modern era.Rather than the pursuit of democratization guided by the ideal of universal civil society, such phrases show the extent to which political decisions at the international level are calculated only to perpetually reproduce the status quo. The result of such cynicism is a continually shifting array of alliances between states without regard for the hirsute characteristics of the regimes involved. For human beings caught in the web of such decisions, the result is international indifference toward or outright support of political repression for the sake of the bal­ance of power. The rise of *Realpolitik* as the dominant framework for con­ceptualizing foreign policy in the postwar period indicates how weakly globalization has been linked to the *emancipatory* ideals of the modern age.

### Realism Bad—Exclusion

#### Realism is wrong – the state isn’t everything. Realist theory ensures continued subordination and exclusion.

Jayan Nayar , associate professor at the School of Law at University of Warwick, “Peoples’ Law: Decolonising Legal Imagination,” Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal, 6 December 2007, accessed 11/21/08 http://go.warwick.ac.uk/lgd/2007\_1/nayar, , accessed: 5/3/16

If nothing else, the appreciation of the novelty of ‘globalisation’ in the context of the realities of ‘ global governance’, and now in the face of US-defined ‘war against terror’- mode of interventions, puts paid first, to the Westphalian idealism of a universalist state system and secondly, to the UN Charter myth of an international system based on closed units existing as ‘sovereign, independent and equal’ states.[24](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/%22%20%5Cl%20%22sdendnote24sym%22%20%5Co%20%22sdendnote24anc) That the ‘ billiard-ball’ notion of ‘inter-national’ relations has died a death should be clear. Instead, we have, I would venture, what could more accurately be labelled the ‘Mercury Blob’ reality of transnational relations. Just like the blobs of mercury upon a surface, we have the transitory conditions of ‘independent’ units, which lose their deception of solidity and ‘independence’ upon contact or pressure. The scene, it would seem, is ever changing depending upon the forces of ‘nature’ and ‘action’. The hitherto considered formidable state-system, under conditions of ‘ globalisation’, reveals similar tendencies and weaknesses. The so-called ‘Realist’ perspective which is based on a world of dualisms - for example, the ‘national’ and the ‘ international’, the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ – disguises this crucial historical truth of international relations, namely, that the evolution of the State as presently constituted has followed from the intimate mutuality of interests between domestic political forces and transnational economic interests. Being socially located in the international arena, the State is defined by the constant action and reaction of forces which form the networks of transnational social relations.[25](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/%22%20%5Cl%20%22sdendnote25sym%22%20%5Co%20%22sdendnote25anc) In contrast to the ‘Realist’ precept that the ‘State’ is the original constitutive unit of international relations, and therefore, that it is governed by some ‘internal’ logic of state-centred imperatives, studies on the political-economy of international relations have pointed to the conclusion that the state is a historically specific (re)construction that is the result of the interplay of ‘multiple logics’; the international State system, transnational class structures, the capitalist world economy and the social and cultural conditions prevailing at any given time, these are all factors which directly impinge on the actual functionings of the state.[26](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/%22%20%5Cl%20%22sdendnote26sym%22%20%5Co%20%22sdendnote26anc) Thus we obtain a view which reveals that the state has throughout been constructed and reconstructed to reflect the minority interests and motivations of ‘globalising elites’.[27](http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/%22%20%5Cl%20%22sdendnote27sym%22%20%5Co%20%22sdendnote27anc)

### Realism Bad—Epistemic Failure

#### Commitment to realism causes epistemic failure—they lock us in a cycle of false predictions like WW1, Soviet Collapse, and the Berlin Wall

Kissane ‘6 (Dylan, PhD candidate School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, May, Presented at Central European University. Budapest, Hungary. “The Illusion of Anarchy: Chaos, Complexity, and the Origins of World War One,” Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Working Paper No. 16. [http://www.caei.com.ar/working-paper/illusion-anarchy-chaos-complexity-and-origins-world-war-one], accessed: 5/3/16)

Imagining the pre-World War I system as chaotic not only allows the analyst to see the impact that small events have on a wider system, it also instructs us in the failures of those who attempted to analyse the happenings of the time. With a concentration on events at the national or international level, few analysts or foreign policy advisors would have had cause to warn the Archduke not to travel to a region that, officially and legally, was part of his domain. With a concentration on the alliances of the continent, people of the time ignored local uprisings and terrorist groups – perhaps in much the same way that, during the Cold War, the great powers ignored an emerging terrorist problem of their own. In a chaotic system the analyst is forced to look beyond the great problems and powers else he or she is likely to miss the ‘little things’ that eventually shape the world and, in this case study, the greatest conflict humankind had known to that point in global history. The origin of World War One remains one of the most contested questions in international political and military history. Some continue to point to the inevitability of the conflict, resorting to theoretical support from realists and neorealists who maintain that, under anarchy, war is likely and often just a matter of poor balancing by states. But a focus on the large matters in international relations has not helped to explain the modern international system, nor predict major events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the falling of the Berlin Wall. Unit or individual level analysis would have helped to predict and explain these events, but only when the individual level interactions are considered important enough to affect the entire system. Thus, the same seemingly insignificant matters – a small group of terrorists in a Soviet occupied Afghanistan, for example – arise time and again. And, time and again, we are surprised that such small matters can have such a significant impact on the entire system. As Richard Lebow argues, “what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of its alleged causes but the pattern of interaction between them” – assuming a chaotic system allows the analyst to focus on the effects of such interactions, an option not open to those who base their analysis on an anarchic model.63 It is the argument of this paper that this is unlikely to change while international relations persists with the notion that the international system is anarchic when, it would seem, there is at least a chance that it may be something else. The example of the beginning of World War One is simply a pertinent case study where a series of small matters – the date of arrival in a hostile Serbian area and the woman the heir to the throne fell in love with, for example – combine to brig about an event so massive that it became known as ‘The War to End All Wars’. Without a new paradigm, international relations will continue to misdiagnose the past, hampering its ability to explain the present and, one day, predict the storms which sweep the system as we know it today.

### Epistemic Failure—1AR

#### Extend Kissane—anarchy assumes there’s so little structure in IR that we can predict events from states outward, since they’re isolated agents without laws binding them they’ll be strategic. But chaos is more apt, there are lots and lots of interconnected parts with complicated relationships and excluding them from your theories doesn’t make them go away, which explains why realist prediction fails so often.

#### Vote aff on any risk of an impact—their K becomes indeterminate without any ability to predict the future

Kissane ‘6 (Dylan, PhD candidate School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, May, Presented at Central European University. Budapest, Hungary. “The Illusion of Anarchy: Chaos, Complexity, and the Origins of World War One,” Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Working Paper No. 16. [http://www.caei.com.ar/working-paper/illusion-anarchy-chaos-complexity-and-origins-world-war-one] , accessed: 5/3/16)

If we imagine the international system as chaotic and not anarchic, we must also admit that this will have significant implications for our analysis and base assumptions. Indeed, as has been seen in meteorology, a revised understanding of the system mean that all assumptions based on the nature of the previously assumed system will need to be reviewed and, perhaps, overhauled.39 It is the purpose of this section to identify some of the expectations and implications of assuming a chaotic system, particularly those that differ from those arising from the ‘normal’ anarchic system. Though the differences are many, there are three that will be highlighted here: the complex, time sensitive dependence of the system, and the importance of seemingly minor permutations within the system and the impossibility of long-term prediction. Dealing with each in turn, it will be shown that a chaotic international relations system is not only conceptually and intellectually different to the system as it is imagined today, but also fundamentally and essentially different with regards to what is expected of an anarchic one. The first of the differences to be highlighted concerns the notion of complex time-sensitivity to events occurring within the system. In a chaotic system the precise time and nature of events makes a significant difference to the result within the wider system. For example, a difference of only a few thousandths of a degree in a temperature reading can have significant impacts on the behaviour of a weather system some weeks or months in the future.41 Though the system is deterministic – that is, it follows simple rules – it is so sensitive to changes in conditions that prediction becomes almost impossible.

### Realism Bad—Explanatory Power

#### Realism fails to explain emerging international phenomena- like imperial aggression

Nuruzzaman ‘6 (Mohammed, Univ. of Alberta, “Beyond the Realist Theories: ‘‘Neo-Conservative Realism’’ and the American Invasion of Iraq,” International Studies Perspectives 7, 239–253.)

Stephen M. Walt, a noted American realist, writing some 3 years ago, identified two basic criteria to judge any theory: (a) the explanatory powers of a theory to account for any developments within its field and (b) the theory’s internal fertility (Walt 2002:201–202). While the first criterion is about the powers of a theory to explain events happening in the real world, the second criterion is concerned with the ability of the theory to refine and expand itself to cover the range of phenomena that fall within its theoretical grip. Put together, the two theoretical criteria are all about how powerfully a theory can provide explanations to anomalies or critical objections that might arise from time to time and whether a theory would be in a position to repair itself to address the anomalies and critical objections. Judged against these two criteria, realist theories, Walt opines, remain important and quite powerful to cover most developments in international politics. Walt was, of course, responding to the fierce critiques labeled against realist theories after the disintegration of the Cold War and the resultant transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world. A group of scholars (e.g., Kegley 1993, 1995; Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Lebow 1994; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Vasquez 1997), at the end of the long persisting Cold War by the early 1990s and in the absence of a strong rival to America, questioned the basic premises of the realist theories and found them irrelevant to explain developments in the post–Cold War world. The academic obituaries to realist theories were soon rejected by many realist theorists. Walt, for example, persuasively argues that despite the collapse of the Cold War structures in East–West relations, realist theories still remain valid to explain the feelings of insecurity of states and their responses to changes in the distribution of powers in the international system. This is exactly because states assess their positions vis-a`-vis their rivals and attempt at enhancing power at the cost of actual or potential rivals. The inability of states to engage in extensive collaboration to produce mutual gains brings home the point that military force remains a fact of international political life. The struggle for survival through the enhancement of power positions vis-a`-vis rivals is a well-calculated rational game and would continue indefinitely (Walt 2002:197–198). Admittedly, the range of explanatory powers of the realist theories remains quite strong to account for issues in power politics involving great and major powers. But anomalies might arise when issues outside the regular pattern come to the center stage of international politics and dominate political and military decisions of the most powerful state in the international system. One such anomaly has been the American ‘‘war on terror’’ launched against Al-Qaeda in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack and its subsequent extension to Iraq. Indeed, the American war on terror and the occupation of Iraq in March 2003 is a spectacular development in world history as well as international relations. Three significant features make this war one of the most remarkable events in international relations. First, this is perhaps history’s most unequal war fought between the world’s militarily most powerful state and a weak, militarily easily vulnerable and economically collapsing Arab state. Second, the George W. Bush Jr. administration justified the war on the ground of a new specter of threats originating from Iraq’s alleged programs of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which subsequently proved wrong. Third is the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s alleged links to terrorist organizations, most notably Al-Qaeda, which is seen as a major threat to American values and interests worldwide. The September 11, 2001, attack on America and the American harsh military response to Al-Qaeda and Iraq have resulted in a new security environment in which the world’s lone superpower is deeply engaged in a war against a nonstate shadowy organizationFAl-Qaeda. The serious questions are: do realist theories capture the dynamics of America’s war against Al-Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq on grounds that subsequently proved wrong? If not, what theoretical framework can explain the decision of the Bush administration to fight Al-Qaeda and invade Iraq? The basic objective of this paper is to examine the explanatory powers of the realist theories of international relations to account for America’s war against Al-Qaeda, a nonstate actor, and Iraq, a nonthreatening state. It argues that existing academic realist theories are largely deficient frameworks to provide a satisfactory explanation of America’s decision to invade Iraq and its war against a concept, the nonstate transnational network of Islamic fundamentalists known as Al-Qaeda. The changed nature of threats posed by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations has created real dilemmas for the realist theorists.

### Explanatory Power—1AR

#### If realism can’t explain war they lose because their claim to an accurate model of the world is false—it’s a criteria for a theory

#### This proves our aggression impact turns, they’re the precise phenomenon they can’t explain

#### Iraq is the perfect example—realists opposed invasion and their theory can’t explain it

Nuruzzaman ‘6 (Mohammed, Univ. of Alberta, “Beyond the Realist Theories: ‘‘Neo-Conservative Realism’’ and the American Invasion of Iraq,” International Studies Perspectives 7, 239–253.)

The way in which the invasion of Iraq was undertaken and executed based on ungrounded threats and in an unprovoked environment makes it difficult to apply the realist framework to explain America’s war decisions against Al-Qaeda and Iraq. Most importantly, realists of all stocks vehemently opposed the planned invasion of Iraq. In the weeks preceding the diplomatic forays and military build-up to the Iraq war, a group of international relations scholars published a full-page advertisement in the New York Times on September 26, 2002. The signatories to the advertisement included some well-known realist thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt. The advertisement questioned the very rationale on which President Bush tried to justify the war, expressed doubts about the connection between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and interpreted the WMD threats posed by the Saddam regime as unrealistic and fabricated (Group of Authors 2002). George F. Kennan, one of the few surviving classical realists of our time and the architect of the theory of containment of Soviet communism, found President Bush’s quick run to the Iraq war unjustified and unpalatable. He expressed serious concern about the postinvasion consequences and criticized the Democratic Party for its failure to scrutinize the war aims of the Republican president (Kaufman 2002). The gulf differences over the invasion of Iraq between the realist theorists and the neoconservative realists notwithstanding, their fear about Al-Qaeda was identical. They agreed that Al-Qaeda could not be deterred if it acquired nuclear or biological weapons. To put it in simple terms, both sides admitted the failure of deterrence against nonstate shadowy organizations that operate secretly. The realist opposition to the Iraq war, a careful analysis would suggest, was based on two specific grounds. First, small states have little influence on the balance of power. In other words, maintaining balance of power between great and major powers is more important, and fights between great and weak powers should be avoided. Second, occupation is a hugely costly game not only in economic and military terms but also in terms of serious resistance to the occupation forces. Nationalism remains a mighty powerful force specifically in the Third World, and it leads to deadly insurgencies or struggles for freedom when countries like Vietnam or Iraq are occupied. This theoretical realist opposition is, however, more a prescription for restraint than an actual explanation of the Iraq war. The growing unease of the realists with the invasion and occupation of Iraq lends some degree of credence to the point that the existing realist theories or academic realism fall short of explaining this historic event satisfactorily. Perhaps, the concept of ‘‘neo-conservative realism,’’ which is related to the realist theories but uses a much wider concept of national interest involving security and the promotion of American ideology and values, can better explain how the Bush administration planned and executed the invasion of Iraq, unilaterally defying the opposition of the allies and the wider international community. As developed and elaborated in the next section, ‘‘neo-conservative realism,’’ like the academic realist theories, accepts the concept of national interest as a foundation stone but not in the strict sense of security or prosperity traditionally invoked by realists of all stripes. National interest, the neo-conservative realists would define, stands for an unchallenged American global leadership and the expansion of the American empire of liberty, democracy, and free market backed by a mighty military machine. The purpose of military power is to prop up the empire of liberty and freedom by challenging and eliminating anti-American regimes, organizations, and values.

### Realism Bad—Cultural Evolution

#### Realism is not inevitable but it IS harmful—it denies evolutionary benefits

Masters ’94 (Roger D., Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, Emeritus at Dartmouth University, “Human Nature, Biology, and Justice,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, (Oct., 1994), pp. 323-326. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601548], accessed: 5/1/16)

I suggested above that the harsher aspects of group morality-the virtues of force and fraud-are often glossed over (perhaps because it is hard for moral reasons, in the mode of standard morality, t ~ - ~ r o c l a itmhe m. But there is no corresponding need to whitewash the second set of features of group morality-loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice-as these feel morally comfortable anyway. They tie in with other , , precepts of standard morality. For instance, they accord well with the everyday virtue of generosity or caring for others; almost everyone admires people who put others before themselves. In the context of group interaction, though, the reason for putting one's fellows before oneself is to make one's whole group stronger vis-&-,is the other group. As Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) commented, it is a little-noted paradox that the call to patriotism transmutes individual selflessness into group selfishness. How did group morality come into being? It is even easier to hypothesize the genesis of psychological characteristics related to group morality then the threepronged evolution of standard morality described above. Darwin saw that group morality must depend on a certain kind of group selection. He stated: "A tribe, including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage and sympathy, were always ready to aideach other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most tribes" (1871: 203). I should mention here that group selection is considered highly controversial among biologists, but when limited to the human species it is less so. Humans, or hominids, can *deliberately* plot to kill an adjacent group. With language they can pool their knowledge, say, to invent new weapons. Even in humans, however, group selection is a form of natural selection: it is the group with the *genes* for smart, cooperative behavior that prevails. Interestingly, Bigelow (1963, 1972) points out that we should not always expect the most warlike group to be victorious in natural selection. The group that is best at negotiating with a warlike neighbor may in fact survive as fittest. In any case, for Bigelow, it is the group whose members can best work together, either to outwit or out-hit the enemy, that prevails in evolution.

### Cultural Evolution Solves Extinction

#### The impact is nuclear extinction by silencing all opposition and foreclosing IR change

Masters ’94 (Roger D., Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, Emeritus at Dartmouth University, “Human Nature, Biology, and Justice,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, (Oct., 1994), pp. 323-326. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601548], accessed: 5/1/16)

Although the above answers, and a few others, were provided to me as an IR student in the event that I insisted on carin"g about international ethics, the message I received more strongly was that to "care" is rather unprofessional. "Please leave your ethical mind-set at the door, because, once you enter IR, there is much for you to learn about the workings of the real world, especially about power politics." Indeed, that is good advice, I believe, in that the student needs to be exposed to the full impact of international amorality (or immorality). In the larger context of political science, however, it is peculiar advice. Political science, which incorporates political theory and philosophy, has long been interested in the *just$- cation* of political power, not merely in recording the fascinating manifestations of raw power, and has been interested in seeing how government can bring about the good life. It is not clear, of course, that IR scholars consider themselves to be working in the context of political theory. The discipline of IR is often dated to 1919 when the first chair was-endowed in ~berystw~thW,a les (by a Welsh family interested in peace after World War I). In the 1920s and 1930s IR'S subject matter consisted largely of international law and organization. The major change to realism and power politics occurred only in the 1940s starting with, say, the publication of E.H. Carr's *Twenp Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* (1948). Actual events in the world since 1950 have clearly called for a discipline that *does* concentrate on power politics, on war and security matters, on international economics, and so forth. International Relations and its Realist school have filled the bill, largely by taking the *state* as its research animal and looking almost exclusively at the motives, agendas and needs of states, and the structure of the states syitem and how it dictates certain strategies. Whereas political science endlessly criticizes the state, questions its legitimacy, and so forth, IR simply accepts the state. And thereby hangs a tale. By choosing the state as its only unit for analysis, IR has, in my opinion, given the needs of the state an intellectual priority, and along with it a moral priority, over the needs of other entities, such as the human species or the human individual. I have yet to see a Realist publication which says that in the case of a conflict between the state and the individual, or the state and humanity, it is the state that must bend. The state, it is thought, "cannot" bend because it is an implacable force and has limited scope for action thanks to the constraints of the state system (and, I would say, thanks to the constraints of the IR academic mind-set). An obvious example is the nuclear threat (pleasantly in abeyance at the moment). The possibility of global extinction, owing to interstate behavior in a nuclear war, certainly constitutes an infringement on humanity. Yet most of the studies of nuclear armament and -deterrence have concentrated on the unchanging nature of state behavior. That is, IR studies do not call for any change in the present state system, even for the sake of avoiding global extinction.

### Morality Is Human Nature

#### Realism is just a prejudice, our moral impulses are a fact of evolutionary biology

Masters ’94 (Roger D., Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, Emeritus at Dartmouth University, “Human Nature, Biology, and Justice,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, (Oct., 1994), pp. 323-326. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601548], accessed: 5/1/16)

For a long time, the dominant school of IR, namely Realism, has gotten away with claiming that it is value-free, that it reports "just the facts" about international power-politics. Below I shall contend, instead, that the discipline's concentration on power and national interest (reflecting, largely, the second half of the dual code of morality) is itself a value choice. I recommend that IR teachers be encouraged to acknowledge their value choices concerning the behavior of nations, rather than to pretend they do not have any. The human species is the only one to have evolved psychological predispositions for moral behavior. Granted, many animal species practice altruism, that is, cooperative or aid-giving behavior, which is certainly one element within the human scheme of morality. But animals lack a perception of right and wrong, punishment of deviants by society as a whole, and the ability to construct rules. (Some primatologists may disagree with me on the first item; see Ellis 1990.) Humans have very strong moral sensibilities; morality is pervasive in their social life. In the following section I shall briefly describe "standard morality," that is, everyday ethics as practiced by individuals, and in the subsequent section, "group morality," the special code of ethics that governs intergroup and even international behavior.

### Cultural Evolution Disproves Self-interest

#### Cultural evolution disproves the inevitability of self-interest

Masters ’94 (Roger D., Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, Emeritus at Dartmouth University, “Human Nature, Biology, and Justice,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, (Oct., 1994), pp. 323-326. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601548], accessed: 5/1/16)

Finally, the remaining element of evolved morality is the human penchant for law and order. Children respond so readily to teachings about right and wrong (even arbitrary rules such as, "Don't cross the blue line") that one has to postulate an innate predisposition for order, separate from the sense of fairness described above. The evolutionary background to this, I believe, has nothing to do with biological altruism. Rather, it has to do with another phenomenon that is pervasive in the animal kingdom, namely dominance hierarchies. Thanks to the need to compete for scarce resources, many species evolve aggressive behavior among individuals, and these often result in a pecking order, or an order of access to resources. Apparently as an adaptive alternative to "fighting to the death," certain behaviors of submission have evolved, including obedience to superiors. As mammals, and especially as primates, we are likely to have psychological traits related to participation in dominance systems. These traits include both a penchant for domination and-where, alas, domination is not possible-for submission. In sum, standard morality as practiced by human individuals in their societies includes welfare provision, moral judgment, and law and order. Kindness, fairness (or complaining about unfairness), and obedience are everyday phenomena.

### Cultural Evolution Denies Realism

#### Inevitability claims of realism are based on A-Historical models used to justify envy for State Power

Masters ’94 (Roger D., Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government, Emeritus at Dartmouth University, “Human Nature, Biology, and Justice,” International Political Science Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, (Oct., 1994), pp. 323-326. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601548], accessed: 5/1/16)

A third reason for scholarly devotion to the state is the fact, as Justin Rosenberg (1990) has pointed out, that IR specialists are impressed by the constancy of the state and the state system, over a period of several hundred years, but in fact their models are doggedly ahistorical. They are missing the whole picture of social change, including technological change. Think, for example, of how scenes of suffering refugees have forced change in recent foreign policy just because they are televised. A fourth reason for the respectful attention given to the state has to do, I suppose, with prestige. People hold more prominent jobs as representatives of states than as representatives of individuals or of humanity. The world of diplomats is the world IR is interested in, and so it would seem churlish for IR scholars to be too critical of the role of the diplomat. The diplomats themselves are, of course, bound by their jobs to uphold the prestige of the state. Leo Kuper has compellingly described, in *The Prevention of Genocide* (1985), the ways in which the United Nations acts as a gentlemen's club, whose members happen to be states. To name just one reason why we give honor to the state: the status quo is favorable to our advanced and affluent nations. Who knows what wild ideas of international justice may be called forth if we try to envision some future other than the status quo? To get back to my sociobiological theme of the dual code of morality, I have argued elsewhere (Maxwell, 1990) that the realist school of IR largely articulates group morality. It agrees that force and fraud are "virtues" in international relations. Realism claims merely to be observing the behavior of states, but I think it is reasonable to say that realism endorses "state morality." In fact, the reason why realist scholars may feel no need to apologize for international violence is that such violence is "moral" in the scheme of group morality. All of us-not just IR scholars-accept implicitly the tenets of group morality. When students are taught realism, they are taught even-handedly that *all* states have the right to protect their own interests. Yet in being taught this universal rule they are, of course, reassured that if they practice group morality for *their* group, they are behaving normally.

### AT: Human Nature

#### Humans aren’t violent – scientific consensus

Oliver P. Richmond, lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, Peace in International Relations, 2008, p. 2

Many hoped that science would, as Hobbes wrote, open the way for peace. Hobbes wrote, in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, Leviathan (often held up to be the epitome of tragic realism in IR) to illustrate that peace was plausible in spite of hatred, scarcity, and violence. Of course, he also developed the notion of the Leviathan as a way to moderate the 'natural state' of war. IR has instead focused on the latter (war as a natural state) rather than the former (peace as a natural state), despite the fact that so much of the ground work has been done in peace and conflict studies, anthropology, sociology, in the arts, in branches of several other disciplines, such as economics or psychology, and via the more critical approaches to the discipline. The supposed Freudian death instinct has seemed to resonate more powerfully through the discipline than notions of peace. Yet, as Fry has argued a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence shows that peace, conflict avoidance and accommodation are the stronger impulses of human culture. War is significant part of Western culture as well as others, but not of all cultures. 1O Indeed, it is notable that in Western settings war memorials are frequent, particularly for the First and Second World War, but peace is rarely represented in civic space unless as a memorial of sacrifice during war. Similarly in art, aspirations for peace are often represented through depictions of war and violence, such as in Picasso's Guernica (1937) or Goya's The Third of May, 1808: The Execution of the Defenders of Madrid (1814). Lorenzetti's The Allegory of Good Government (1338-40) and Rubens' Minerva Protects Pax from Mars (1629-30) are notable exceptions. Further afield one could point to the Ottoman Topkapi Palace's Gate ofPeace in Istanbul, and the Gate of Heavenly Peace leading into the Imperial City in Beijing (though these were, of course, associated with both diplomacy and imperial wars).

### AT: Inevitable—Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Realism is a self-fulfilling construct of IR

Smith ‘4 (Steve, Vice Chancellor of the University of Exeter and Professor of International Studies, “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 3, pages 499–515, September 2004. [DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.t01-1-00312.x], accessed: 5/1/16)

But this does not have to be so. We construct, and reconstruct, our disciplines just as much as we construct, and reconstruct, our world, and thus the question becomes one of why does the discipline of International Relations "see" only this part of the world of international violence? There are three aspects to the answer. The first is that the discipline has developed out of a focus on the "Great Powers," and on the structural consequences of the interactions of states as actors. The forms of violence that this "sees" are essentially related to the balance of power and war, traditionally defined. Violence is what happens, or is threatened to happen, between national states. Second, International Relations as a discipline has developed in what can be called the leading powers, first the U.K., then the U.S., and has therefore not surprisingly adopted the policy concerns of those countries as if they were the policy concerns of the world. Given that these states did not exhibit the forms of violence outlined in the UNDP data discussed above, then International Relations did not see them as core components of the emerging discipline. Thirdly, the discipline has long been based on a definition of what constitutes knowledge that works most effectively when explaining the interactions between measurable variables in a tight deductive framework. Now, while such a method could easily be utilized in the study of the wider forms of violence just discussed, once it was set up and focused on questions of interstate conflict, systems structure, and the utility maximizing behavior of states, then this became the self-fulfilling definition of the subject matter of the discipline.

### AT: Inevitable—Not Objective

#### Realism assumes there is an objective truth about how actors operate and ignores specific viewpoints

Smith ‘4 (Steve, Vice Chancellor of the University of Exeter and Professor of International Studies, “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 48, Issue 3, pages 499–515, September 2004. [DOI: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.t01-1-00312.x], accessed: 5/1/16)

This search for cover-all explanations carries with it a number of assumptions about social action, the most important of which is the notion of finding a generally applicable explanation, one that applies to all actors regardless of identity, and regardless of their subjectivities. Positivist International Relations explains the behavior of predefined actors, with predefined interests, in a predefined structure. It does not take "their" agenda or "their" perception of their interests as the subject matter for the discipline. Instead of this focus, the discipline needs to pay much more attention to questions of subjectivity and to try and examine these in terms of understanding them rather than by imposing one narrow view of social science to explain them. There is no Archimedean point to pronounce on the "truths" of international relations, no firm foundation on which to build a legitimate social science that eschews normative considerations in the search for the ultimate truth. Above all, truth is not "out there," waiting to be discovered. The puzzles and conflicts of international relations cannot be "solved" in the manner of a logical puzzle; instead they have to be unwrapped and understood from the viewpoints of the actors involved. Finally, the discipline should step back from the notion that its accounts and theories can determine and demarcate the truth about the world, if by truth is meant one truth, imposed by epistemological fiat.

### AT: Inevitable—Humans Malleable

#### Inevitability claims disguise their ideological grounding—we can push past them

Ish-Shalom ‘6 (Piki, Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism,” International Studies Review 8, p. 441–468)

This conclusion brings the problem of the incommensurability of theories to the fore. The discussion offered here supports the argument that a broad and common consensus over the validity of theories cannot, indeed, be achieved because the theoretical world is as ruptured as the political world. It might have been possible to achieve broad agreement if all that was involved were questions of the accuracy of measurements, definitional weaknesses, methodological blunders, and faulty logical inferences. If this were the case, it would have been reasonable to expect, as one expects from positivism, a clarification of ambiguities and a correction of mistakes, followed by the discovery of an objective truth. However, more is at stake in theoretical disagreements. In its most essential sense, the dispute involves divergences over a priori assumptions regarding human nature and humans’ rational faculties as well as over ideological convictions concerning the warranted and realistic way to organize a society and a polity. Moreover, given that these assumptions and convictions are unresolved philosophically or in political life, it would be unreasonable to expect their resolution in the theoretical world. This, then, is the ideological framework in which we should understand the interparadigmatic debates that have dogged international relations from its earliest days. The ideological and political worlds do have a second lesson to teach us, however. As politics can demonstrate, different parties and different ideologies do understand each other. Moreover, most of them have enough in common to be able to construct political systems together, to cooperate with each other, and to form crossover coalitions. Ideologies can be commensurable, and so also theories. For this claim of theories’ commensurability, though, to really make sense, we have to define the ‘‘system’’ that the various theories construct and participate in, that is, what is it that we mean by social science. What we need is to reformulate the social sciences according to our findings of what, in fact, constitute theories, that is, the ideological reasoning behind theorizing. Consequently, we should be trying to replace positivism with a normative philosophy of the social sciences, which takes the constitutive relations of value and fact seriously as well as the ideological engagement of theoreticians with their theorized subject matter, the social world. A normative philosophy of the social sciences would supplant the ethic of scientific objectivity with a normative ethic and introduce moral reasoning, argumentation, and evaluation into the process of explanatory theorizing. Instead of having positivist objectivity as its shaky foundation, morality would provide a sound and pluralistic foundation for the social sciences. Under the terms of a normative philosophy of the social sciences, a genuine sensitivity to the ideological foundation of theoretical reasoning could be realized that would clear the way to an effective commensurability (although not agreement) among theories by facilitating a genuine process of understanding and by evaluating the normative foundations of the various social science theories. The result would be a more effective and essentialist, give-and-take critique that clears the way for theoretical improvement and moral, political, and social progress.

### AT: Mearsheimer—Theory Flawed

#### Mearsheimer’s theory is historically myopic and methodologically flawed

David C. Hendrickson, professor of political science at Colorado College, World Policy Institute, Spring 2003, Vol. 20 Issue 1, EBSCO

In methodology, the book has the positivist imprimatur characteristic of most work in the American science of international politics, an approach shared by many of the liberals with whom Mearsheimer does battle. That is to say, Mearsheimer aims at the identification of a simple law or law-like statement (states are power-maximizers), offers a parsimonious theory (they are this way because of the structure of the system), and then tries to show that 200 years of history bear out his thesis. In this world, states never learn lessons from their past misdeeds and catastrophes, or rather the lesson they learn (unless they decide to give up the great power game) is that they must supersize their power. Such positivist methods, deeply rooted in academia though they are, unfortunately have severe limitations. Greatly lauded in theory, parsimony in practice invariably yields a simplified view of the past, and passing all these materials through a single meat grinder makes, organizationally and stylistically, for much repetition. To show that the economic base matters (chapter 3), that land power is more important than seapower or airpower (chapter 4), that conquest pays (chapter 5), or that the international system is populated by revisionist powers (chapter 6), Mearsheimer trudges through the same material (the great power competition of the last two centuries), but with the unpleasing result that no single event is ever given a thorough or satisfying explanation.(n13) Mearsheimer's proclivity to make timeless assertions about the relative value of competing strategic arms (land, naval, air) is also dubious, for the resolution of that question depends on the political objectives they are meant to serve in any particular instance (which Mearsheimer typically leaves unspecified). Because Mearsheimer confines his focus to interactions among the "great powers," of whom there remain precious few, his treatment is curiously circumscribed. In considering naval power, for instance, he doesn't examine its political utility in circumstances short of war or its military significance in wars against states of inferior rank. Even committed continentalists and perceptive critics of "the British way of warfare" such as Sir Michael Howard and Paul Kennedy should certainly wince at Mearsheimer's systemic denigration of naval power and his cavalier dismissal of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Enthusiasts of airpower and of the "revolution in military affairs" will write him off as an old tank man feverishly re-gaming distant and now irrelevant wars.(n14) The most serious lacuna in this book is the absence of reflection on the nature and character of the legal, ethical, and institutional restraints that the leaders of states are obliged to observe. For Mearsheimer, there is no international society, or at least none that is relevant to the scientific study of international politics. He mentions such restraints only for the purpose of dismissing their significance, and he displays little knowledge of the role they have played in shaping international history. Exchange, reciprocity, good faith--as instruments both of securing interest and of soothing the asperities of interstate conflict--are given no recognition in Mearsheimer's conceptual world. International institutions, he affirms, are just "arenas for acting out power relationships"; that they have anything to do with legitimacy--or indeed that legitimacy itself is of any conceivable importance--is not a thought that occurs to the author. Though ostensibly "realistic," such an approach stands in direct opposition to our daily experience of political life, in which political actors are continually in competition for the moral high ground and battle fiercely for the mantle of legitimacy.(n15) A realism that shunts those factors aside is psychologically naïve as well as morally obtuse, for such factors are significant even if they are only observed hypocritically (as, admittedly, they often are). The failure to grapple with normative issues is also quite contrary to the richest vein in classical realism. The greatest of the realists, Thucydides, placed in continual dialectical antagonism the claims of power and justice, and his History is "above all an investigation and a testing of the Athenian thesis on justice and on the place of justice in the world of international politics."(n16) Indeed, Mearsheimer's dismissal of the normative dimension of international politics makes it difficult to understand why he describes international politics as tragic in character, for tragedy requires elevation of character and the choice between irreconcilable but otherwise commanding values. If a state dedicated to power maximization, and that alone, meets adversity in its inexorable advance toward domination, it is difficult to limn the tragic dimension of its misfortune. Is it tragic when the bad go bad? Related to Mearsheimer's ethical void is another shortcoming: in emphasizing power-maximization as the rational objective of the state, Mearsheimer is seemingly oblivious to the consideration that the people in constitutional democracies might fear not only threats from abroad but also overly centralized power at home. In the long history of reflection on the security predicaments of free states, as Daniel Deudney has shown, domestic hierarchy or tyranny is as significant a problem as international anarchy or conquest. That crucial theme, though missing from Mearsheimer, has long been at the core of the republican security theory to which Montesquieu and America's Founding Fathers made such distinguished contributions. That theory is far more sophisticated and relevant than Mearsheimer's offensive realism because it places the preservation of free institutions and the control of power at the core of its concern.(n17) Mearsheimer's apparent unawareness of this heritage is in keeping with his lack of interest in the history of international thought prior to the twentieth century, which lends to his work a parochial air. This unconsciousness of his predecessors is probably just as well, for if Mearsheimer belongs anywhere in the history of international and strategic thought, it is with the schools of Wilhelmine Machtpolitik and Geopolitik.

### AT: Mearsheimer—Bias

#### Mearsheimer’s account of IR ignores most progress made in alternate theories and carries a self-fulfilling bias towards militancy

Bruce Cumings, Norman and Edna Freehling Professor of History at the University of Chicago, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58 Issue 3, May/June 2002, EBSCO

If you thought the twentieth century was cruel, with upwards of 100 million people killed in warfare, wait until the twenty-first: "This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium," writes John J. Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Hopes for peace will probably not be realized" because great power competition is the natural state of affairs--making for a world of sharp conflict that is nasty, brutish, and eternal. Mearsheimer offers his theory of "offensive realism" in "a handful of simple propositions" that come at the reader like staccato machine-gun fire. Great powers are those that can field a conventional army capable of conducting all-out war, and that have a survivable nuclear deterrent; they perpetually seek to maximize their share of world power in a zero-sum struggle with other powers doing the same thing; and their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon--"the only great power in the system." This state of affairs is tragic, according to Mearsheimer, precisely because it is unavoidable and ineluctable; it is neither designed nor intended by human beings, yet we are all caught up in it, inescapably and forever. This book does not have a tragic tone, however, because Mearsheimer is having too much fun explaining why we're all going to hell in a hand basket of our own (unconscious) design. This treatise is a milestone in the literature of realpolitik for its simplicity and directness, its unswerving commitment to a single handful of pithy, tried-and-true realist propositions, and its unalloyed, straightforward shoot'em-up style. Bullets seem to whiz by as Mearsheimer tells us that anarchy reigns in the international system; that the guy with the biggest gun wins ("the strongest power is the state with the strongest army"); it's a dog-eat-dog world and when you get into trouble there's no 911 to call; going democratic won't help either because regime type makes no difference (democracies fight each other, too); and a cruel fate awaits us all because for every human neck, "there are two hands to choke it." If this sounds like the Clint Eastwood theory of international affairs, Mearsheimer would only take that as a compliment. His fervid and often funny style will make the book standard reading in the classroom; indeed, generations of students will enjoy throwing brickbats at his arguments. The big powers, being big powers, are always on the march. If they aren't, well, they're just biding their time and building up their armies, looking for a chance to strike. The French will delight in Mearsheimer's account of modern German history, with Germans on the aggressive onslaught every day of the week from Bismarck through Hitler, just as Koreans will love his depiction of Japan's single-minded expansionist bent from 1868 to 1945. History is the place where Mearsheimer "tests" his propositions, and it's hard to fail the test: Even pasta and wine-loving modern Italy was constantly seeking "opportunities to expand"; its "hostile aims were ever-present." If Italy nonetheless wasn't going anywhere, it was because "its army was ill-equipped for expansion." You would think that the spectacle of the world's second-ranking superpower closing up shop and turning itself into 15 squabbling nations in 1991 would be a bit of a stretch for the tenets of "offensive realism," but no--the Soviet Union's self-liquidation was another instance of realism in action. Now the theory tells us that the great clash of the new century will be between the United States and China. But we don't need to worry about Japan and Germany: They may be the second and third largest economies in the world, but they haven't been great powers since 1945. Why? Because the United States keeps its troops on their soil. And if the troops should leave? Then they're great powers after all and all bets are off. It's nice to have a parsimonious theory that explains everything. The book is a bit too simple, however, in its confrontation with a narrow literature of international relations unique to the American experience and the American academic scene. There are only two theories, realism and liberalism (or idealism), as Mearsheimer tells us today, and as George Kennan told us half a century ago in his classic little book, American Diplomacy. The liberals are irremediably deluded, of course, but the only realists that capture Mearsheimer's attentions are his contemporaries in American political science like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, and Stephen Walt, or renowned predecessors like E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Completely absent is the important literature in international relations that goes far beyond the simple dichotomies of realism and idealism, like the world economy theories of Karl Polanyi or Immanuel Wallerstein, important work on hegemony by Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, the realist political economy done by Susan Strange, or the application of critical theory to international relations by James Der Derian, Robert Latham, and others. The growing body of feminist work on international relations would be even more remote from Mearsheimer's concerns, but perhaps by now there is something refreshing in an author who never seems to have heard of the race-class-gender triptych.

### AT: Mearsheimer—Bias

#### Mearsheimer is driven by a self-fulfilling militaristic bias

David C. Hendrickson, professor of political science at Colorado College, World Policy Institute, Spring 2003, Vol. 20 Issue 1, EBSCO

"Offensive realism," nevertheless, holds forth only the flimsiest of barriers to the abuse of power. Taken in the abstract, it supports the general principle that we should expand our power into every nook and cranny of the world. Noting that "the historical record shows that offense sometimes succeeds and sometimes does not," Mearsheimer insists that "the trick for a sophisticated power maximizer is to figure out when to raise and when to fold." Mearsheimer, certainly, is not obligated by his theory to counsel conquest and occupation, especially given his acute appreciation of the logic of deterrence, but it is easy to see why a powerful state that lives by his maxim would acquire a fondness for military methods and be tempted by the kind of deed he now detests. The appropriate verdict for Mearsheimer recalls an old New Yorker cartoon, in which a stern judge lectures a hapless defendant: "You're not guilty, but you're very, very close." Mearsheimer's "realism" needs (as, indeed, does Mandelbaum's "liberalism") the steadiness and the ruling-out of wild ventures that are provided by traditional standards of international law, such as the norm against preventive war, just as it needs recognition that international institutions and the consensual methods they encourage are a potentially salutary check upon large and threatening concentrations of power. Above all, Mearsheimer's realism needs an Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, an understanding that power, like other valued things in life, is also subject to the laws of excess and defect, and that always wanting more is a vice no less fatal than not having enough. On such terms, come to think of it, might realism and liberalism--the lion and the lamb--lie down together in peace.

### AT: Mearsheimer—WoT

#### Mearsheimer’s theories are outdated and overgeneralizing – current events like the War on Terror prove offensive realism is irrelevant

Richard M. Swain, US Military Academy at West Point, The European Legacy, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2003

Mearsheimer’s timing was unfortunate. The book was published in 2001, just before terrorists armed with box-cutters flew two airplanes into the World Trade Center and attention shifted from the search for peer competitors within the traditional nation state anarchy, to dealing with non-state actors, resident in areas of regional lawlessness, capable of reaching out and inflicting pain on even the world’s nearest approximation to a hegemon (an unfortunate term in my view) with no particular hope of achieving any kind of realistic political goal. The events of 11 September did not necessarily invalidate Mearsheimer’s theory for great power interaction, but they changed the terms of public debate dramatically. The attempt to base a predictive theory of international conflict on the experience of the European Westphalian European state model by extrapolating from the wars of the late eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was promethean in any event. There are very few human activities as context and contingency-driven as wars. Gross generalizations, largely ignoring contextual issues of purpose, technologies and circumstances, are bound to appear tendentious for readers like the reviewer who are skeptical of predictive general theories to begin with. In spite of displaying a great deal of erudition in multiple fields, Dr Mearsheimer is not convincing, not least because he fails to account for the ability of human intelligences, in many, even most cases, to construct their own future, not least by recognizing that absolute security for the aspiring hegemon inevitably becomes destabilizing because it means absolute servitude for everyone else, a recognition that can lead to mutual restraint between great powers as much as leading necessarily to war. This is not to disagree with the proposition that states can be directed by evil men, willing to risk death and total destruction to gain unlimited power, but that is a contextual issue not a systemic factor.

### AT: Waltz

#### Waltz’s structural theories lack an explanatory mechanism for what states consider security interests – their argument is useless in a discussion of IR theories

Peter J. Katzenstein, Ph.D from Harvard and Walter S. Carpenter Jr. Professor of International Studies at Cornell University, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 1996, CIAO

Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share a similar, underlying analytical framework, susceptible to the same weakness. Kenneth Waltz privileges systemic effects on national policy and sidesteps the motivations that inform policy. He argues that "neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit level explanations of traditional realism. . . . The range of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which they act." Since causes operate at different levels and interact with one another, explanations operating at either level alone are bound to be misleading. Robert Keohane concurs when he writes that "institutional theory takes states' conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory. . . . Nor does realism predict interests. This weakness of systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their relative predictive power." The consequences of this shortcoming for both neorealism and neoliberalism are in Keohane's view far-reaching. "Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. . . . Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. . . . More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system."

#### Waltz oversimplifies international relations

Crawford 2000 (Robert M. A. Crawford, Lecturer of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of British Columbia, 2000. Idealism and Realism in International Relations, P. 64-65)

The primary villain in this process, according to most of the increasingly vocal critics of the discipline, is Kenneth Waltz, whose self- proclaimed scientific overall of political realism is said to reduce international politics "to a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist, and structuralist commitments" (Ashley 1986, 258; Waltz 1979). Ironically, however, Waltz, more than any of his followers and critics, consistently acknowledges the explicitly analytical, abstracted nature of his neorealist theory of international politics (Waltz 1990, 31; see chapter four for further discussion). There are many legitimate criticisms that can be leveled against Waltz, but subsequent debate has largely missed the point of his neorealist theory, focusing on whether and how to flesh out its allegedly sparse interpretation of political structure while failing to recognize that its parsimony is precisely what Waltz intends, and is the essence of his contribution. Clearly it is not realistic to reduce the exotically complex reality of international politics to a handful of variables, and to understand state behavior purely in terms of the competitive dynamics created by the anarchical structure of the international system. But being thoroughly unrealistic is exactly what Waltz intends, and exactly what deductive theory requires (Waltz 1990). Post-1979, however, the alpha and omega of mainstream IR theory has involved a quest to make neorealism describe and explain everything, in blithe disregard of its intended function and the intrinsic complexity of international politics. Remarkably, the stunning arrogance of Waltz's theoretical claims is all but eclipsed by the rush to adopt and adapt them. Conspicuously absent in these debates is any serious attempt to question Waltz's claim to provide not a theory of international politics, but the theory of international politics. In one stroke neorealism slams the disciplinary door on all other conceptions of theory, all other conceptions of realism included. Again, the sheer audacity of Waltz's position is mitigated by his frank acknowledgment of its deliberate abstraction from "the rich variety and wondrous complexity of international life" (Waltz 1990, 32). But, as the debates occasioned by Waltz so richly attest, the realities of international politics can be difficult to distinguish from the assumptions used to investigate or model them.

### AT: Murray

#### Claims of reconstructing realism fail – they give you no specific way that realism and the critique can be reconciled

Michael Joseph Smith, Thomas C. Sorenson Professor of Political and Social Thought and Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, “Review: Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics,” International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, October 1999, JSTOR

If Trollope had written this thoughtful book, it would be called Realism redux, for not only does it seek to vindicate its protagonist – in this case the whole realist school of thought – in the face of unfair attacks, it also insists upon the hero’s continuing importance, relevance, and wisdom. The author succeeds more fully in the first task than in the second. Realism may yet suffer from misinterpretation and oversimplification, but it remains difficult to see how it can provide a compass to guide us through the dilemmas of ethics and foreign policy. Murray’s summary on the latter issue aptly restates the realist fondness for paradox, without really going beyond it: ‘Realism teaches us that politics is, in the final analysis, a process of dealing with unending moral dilemmas; we must simply cope with them as best we can’ (p. 155). Realism invokes prudence, restraint, and is rightly skeptical of self-righteous crusades; at the same time it contains a ‘unversalist’ element that Murray describes ‘as existing in its own space, detached from both rationalism and reflectivism, beholden to neither’. But what defines this space? In the close readings of realist texts that comprise the most convincing parts of this book, Murray adopts an Augustinian reading of these texts that might provide a clue. And indeed there is much in the rich, interpretive chapters of this book that will repay careful reading. Students of realist thought, qua political theory, will now regard Murray as an essential addition to the literature. As a sometime foil for his views, I appreciate his careful and respectful readings – yet I think he is too credulous of the realist invocation to synthesis without defining its specific content. Of course Weber says we should combine the ethic of conviction with the ethic of responsibility (p. 111) – but how, precisely? Neither Weber nor Murray has much to say here. One had hoped that the Augustine deployed so skillfully in the interpretive bulk of the book would be brought to bear in the chapters that seek to show realism’s relevance, indeed superiority, to other contemporary approaches. But Augustine is largely abandoned after chapter two; he appears only as a kind of spokesman for a ‘middle path’ (p. 166) between Kant and Hegel. Realism reconstructed in this way amounts to a kind of erudite ‘protest against a dilemma’s two horns’ (to quote the title of a 1950 Niebuhr article). Murray deepens our understanding of the realist worldview and persuades us that it is still engaging. But the task of defining the way between amoral power politics and naïve idealism remains as daunting as ever – and I continue to doubt that the realists offer us much real help.

### AT: Guzzini

#### Guzzini’s theories are based on historically shaky grounds that overemphasize realism in its predictive capacity

Samuel M. Makinda, School of Politics and International Studies at Murdoch University, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53 Issue 3, November 1999

Guzzini observes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics. He argues that attempts 'to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory' have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism. Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will distort the realist tradition. Guzzini concludes that 'despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action'. Guzzini presents a powerful and illuminating argument, but his analysis raises some questions. First, Guzzini's argument is basically another distortion of the evolution of IR. While Guzzini claims that IR dates back to the 1940s and attributes its establishment to Morgenthau, there is evidence that the discipline is much older and emerged as part of political science long before the US became a superpower. Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of IR. Even Morgenthau, the so-called 'founding father' of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam. Third, Guzzini has overemphasised the identification of IR with realism. His attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider the works of theorists like Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett on the 'democratic peace' thesis. Indeed, what Guzzini has done is provide a reconstructed and partially distorted history of IR, which can be denigrated and maligned much more easily by post-structuralists, post-modernists, feminists and critical theorists.

### AT: Guzzini – Empirics

#### Realism is far more unstable than Guzzini gives it credit for – his works are historically inaccurate

Mitchell Rologas, University of St. Andrews, International Affairs, Vol. 76 Issue 1, January 2000, p. 141

This is a stimulating work which, for all the excellence of some of its individual components, nevertheless does not add up to a convincing whole. Guzzini's interpretation of realism as `the attempt to translate the rules of the diplomatic practice of the nineteenth century into scientific rules of social science which developed mainly in the US' (p. 11) is plausible enough but his treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired old myth that there was an interwar `debate' between idealism and realism (p. 32). Not only do scholars investigating the period find little evidence for such a debate, but they also have considerable difficulty in separating the idealists from the realists (see for example the essays in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinker of the twenty-year crisis: inter-war realism reassessed, 1995). Was Chamberlain an idealist or a realist? E. H. Carr, as Guzzini is aware, gave different answers to this question in consecutive editions of his Twenty-year crisis. Certainly, if we accept Guzzini's summary that `in short, idealism holds that through reason alone mankind can overcome the state of nature in inter-state relations' (p. 17) we will be hard pressed to identify very many idealists at all. This is important because Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of `paradigms' in suggesting that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism as the dominant paradigm after the Second World War. I doubt whether realism has ever enjoyed quite the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it, certainly nothing that would approach the Kuhnian state of `normal science.' Hans Morgenthau--whose Politics among nations is described by Guzzini as `the paradigmatic text of the emerging US social science' (p. 16)--had numerous detrators both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks. Guzzini sees the academic community as the `binding link' between `the internal conceptual debates and the external context of realist thought', describing this approach as `a historical sociology of a fairly limited kind' (p. 2). It is, indeed, so limited as to hardly warrant the description at all. Guzzini has very little to tell us about the links between academe and government. Chapter two introduces Morgenthau and E. H. Carr as `the fouding fathers of the new descipline' (p. 16) but in chapter four where Guzzini explores the formation of US foreign policy it is George Kennan who emerges as the most significant figure. To say merely that `realist thought developed in parallel with US foreign policy formulations' (p. 49) is to side-step too many important questions. Guzzini acknowledges that the growth of hegemonic stability theory `epitomized again the close link between US foreign policy concerns and the research interests of the academia in international relations' (p. 142) but if this `close link' amounts to little more than trailing in the wake of the twists and turns of US foreign policy the discipline can hardly be worthy of its grandiose title. The absence of any attempt to explore these linakages helps to explain the self-contained feel of the individual chapters.

# NEGATIVE ORIENTED ARGS

# Impact China Climate Change Solving

### Yes Renewables

#### China taking steps towards curbing emissions now—increasing renewable spending as well as investing in energy efficiency initiatives

Gabriella Russo Lopes Staff Writer 5-5-16 A changing China for a changing climate <https://www.greenbiz.com/article/changing-china-changing-climate> (Accessed 5-13-16)

The Chinese government seeks to build a low-carbon energy system by reducing coal consumption, enhancing the clean use of coal, scaling up renewable energy and investing in hydropower while ensuring the resettlement of inhabitants who may be displaced by hydropower development. China plans to amplify its carbon sinks through reforestation and to enhance overall climate resilience through conservation and water management.¶ China also will foster energy efficiency and low carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP) in both the industrial and transportation sectors, adopting emission standards and promoting low-carbon urbanization, services and businesses.¶ The country will invest in innovation toward a low-carbon development pattern and strengthen science and technology support. China intends to enhance regional strategies by identifying provincial differences in carbon intensity, limiting large-scale industrialization and urbanization, and favoring medium and low population concentrations.¶ China also has committed to establishing a Fund for South-South Cooperation on Climate Change to help other developing countries that are seeking to reduce their emissions and to address the impacts of climate change.

#### Energy security, international scrutiny and domestic industry pushing China to renewable energy now

Kevin Lo Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne Januray 2014 A critical review of China's rapidly developing renewable energy and energy efficiency policies <http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/science/article/pii/S1364032113006655> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Renewable energy and energy efficiency (REEE) policies relate to five significant issues in China. First among these is energy security, defined as “unimpeded access or no planned interruptions to sources of energy” [1]. China's sustained economic development over the past three decades has accompanied a rapid rise in energy demand, which, at times, has contributed to widespread electricity shortages [2]. China's increasing dependence on oil imports is also a concern. China has changed from an oil exporting country in the early 1990s to one of the largest oil importing countries in the world, with an oil import dependency rate of more than 50% [3]. Oil imports are perceived as susceptible to interruption because most oil imported to China must pass through the Malacca Strait, a chokepoint wedged between Indonesia and Malaysia that is vulnerable to maritime blockage [4].¶ Climate change is the second issue affecting China's commitment to REEE policies. Despite its status as a developing country and its historically low emissions, China faces international pressure to control its carbon emissions, which has intensified since China surpassed the United States as the world's largest carbon polluter [5]. Domestic concerns about the impact of climate change also contribute to the urgency of climate mitigation [6]. Third, REEE policies affect economic competitiveness. The manufacturing of renewable energy products (e.g., wind turbines and photovoltaic cells) has been designated as a pillar industry by the government, which hopes that China will become a global leader and exporter of green technologies [7] and [8]. Therefore, REEE policies can be understood as both economic and environmental policies. Pollution is the fourth issue. The burning of fossil fuels is associated with air, water, and soil pollution, which have serious implications for health, water security, and food security. Finally, human livelihood is the fifth issue affecting China's adoption of REEE policies. Despite rapid development, many Chinese rural households still depend heavily on traditional biomass energy for heating and cooking [9]. Renewable energy, such as photovoltaic and solar water heating, can significantly improve the livelihood of people from underdeveloped areas in China.

#### China leading the world in renewable energy production

The Climate Group International Energy Consortium April 2015 China’s fast-track to a Renewable Future <http://www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/RE100-China-analysis.pdf> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China’s Fast Track to a Renewable Future China has wasted no time in directing billions of dollars into its clean energy sector. Currently, the country is the world’s leading investor in renewables. In 2014, China increased its investment to US$89.5 billion, up 32% from the previous year. This was nearly 73% more than the US, the next largest investor.1 In the same year, China also led the world in new wind and solar installations, with 19.81 gigawatts (GW) and 10.60 GW respectively.2 By 2020, the world’s largest energy user plans to have 100 GW of solar and 200 GW of wind installed. China’s ambitious push for renewables is supported by a host of policies and regulations that encourage energy efficiency and domestic renewable energy deployment. To kick-start the expansion of its renewable energy capacity, the Renewable Energy Law passed in 2005 (amended in 2009) provided an umbrella framework for regulating renewables in China.4 Now, under China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (12th FYP: 2011-2015), the country aims to source 11.4% of its primary energy from renewable sources by 2015, and 15% by 2020. The renewable energy target is further reinforced by the 12th FYP’s goal to reduce energy intensity by 16% and carbon intensity by 17%.

#### Changing global energy infrastructure makes China’s shift to renewable energy faster than experts anticipated

Joshua Hill Staff Writer 3-6-16 China Renewable Energy Growth Soars & Coal Use Declines <http://cleantechnica.com/2016/03/06/china-renewable-growth-soars-fossil-fuel-use-declines/> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China’s solar and wind energy capacity increased by 74% and 34%, respectively, in 2015, while coal consumption dropped by 3.7%. Image of wind farm in China's Xinjiang province China’s National Bureau of Statistics released figures for 2015 this week, and officials believe that the country’s current growth path will allow them to soon surpass their carbon emissions targets. Specifically, China broke two new records in 2015, installing a record 32.5 GW of wind in 2015, and a record 18.3 GW of solar in 2015 — both of which were higher than initial estimates. “The latest figures confirm China’s record-breaking shift toward renewable power and away from coal,” said Tim Buckley, Director of Energy Finance Studies at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). “Solar and wind continue to be the big winners, as illustrated by a 73.7% increase in grid-connected solar generation capacity. Declining consumption coupled with an over-abundance of domestic supply, meaning coal imports into China were particularly badly hit, dropping 30.4% yoy.”

### Yes China Warming Reduction

#### Slow economic growth and Chinese efficiency initiatives both reduce coal pollution and increase investment in renewable energy

Dylan Brown Staff Writer 4-26-16 COAL: Export ambitions down, but not out <http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060036277> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Slowing global economic growth upended conventional wisdom that Powder River Basin coal would fill a global coal void created by Asian demand. China, once the linchpin of hopes for U.S. coal exports, is driving the slowdown like it did growth for decades.¶ "Chinese thermal coal imports are unlikely to grow for a decade," Roberts said, as the world's largest coal producer and consumer works "to modernize and rationalize its coal industry."¶ China recently instituted a moratorium on new coal plants and plans to shutter more than 1,000 coal mines to address a chronic overcapacity of between 500 million to 1 billion metric tons, Roberts said (ClimateWire, March 1).¶ To drain the supply glut, Roberts said China could boost exports, and Australia and Indonesia were ready to step in if not. "Slower growth will allow Asian regional suppliers to meet the bulk and maybe all Asian demand," Roberts said.¶ To make matter worse for U.S. exports, power plants are increasingly efficient. And key Asian countries are poised to cut energy intensity, the ratio of energy to gross domestic product, in half within decades, said Roberts.¶ As environmental awareness grows, Roberts sees investment fleeing to renewables as those technologies advance faster than efforts to trap and store coal plant emissions.¶ All factors combined, Roberts said delaying planned Pacific Northwest terminals was the "more prudent option at this time."

#### Chinese climate change initiative responsible for first drop in C02 concentration in the 21st century—energy efficiency alternative energy production and consumer habits

Liu Yuanyuan Director of Operations 11-25-15 China’s Investment in Renewable Energy Surpasses Europe, U.S. Combined <http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2015/11/china-s-investment-in-renewable-energy-surpasses-europe-u-s-combined.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

“To reduce emissions, it’s not enough to reduce subsidies for fossil fuel production,” Jiahua said. “It is also necessary to change the consumer consumption habits.”¶ As an example, China has implemented the multi-step electricity pricing mechanism, which is proving more effective than eliminating the subsidies for fossil fuel production.¶ The Chinese government is launching major initiatives to control carbon emissions, in a move to reduce smog and the effects of climate change. President Xi announced in Washington in September that China would launch a national carbon emissions trading market in 2017, where Chinese companies whose actual carbon emissions exceed their government-granted allotments would be fined, while those whose actual carbon emissions are below their government-granted allotments can sell the surplus carbon emission quota.¶ China is also investing heavily in the development of renewable energies. Last year alone, the country invested $90 billion, more than any other country. China is developing its solar power industry at a staggering speed, and has built a large number of solar farms in the Gobi Desert.¶ The country has become the world’s largest wind power producer, deploying thousands of turbines in western China, with plans to increase the number by more than 100 percent over the next five years. China is also the world’s largest hydropower producer, with its hydropower dams accounting for half of the world’s total. The number continues to increase.

#### Five Year Plan focused on reducing warming—will significantly cut coal consumption

Reuters News Outlet 3-6-15 UPDATE 1-China to reduce coal consumption, lessen pollution – ministry <http://www.reuters.com/article/china-coal-cut-idUSL4N0W834Q20150306> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China will reduce coal consumption and boost energy efficiency as part of efforts to lessen air pollution, according to an action plan released by the government on Friday.¶ The world's top consumer will cut coal consumption by over 80 million tonnes by 2017 and more than 160 million tonnes by 2020 through efficiency measures, under the 2015-2020 plan from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.¶ China's annual coal consumption, at about 3.7 billion tonnes, accounts for roughly 66 percent of the country's energy demand.¶ The coal-dominated energy mix in China has been identified as a major cause of the hazardous smog that frequently shrouds cities such as Beijing and Shanghai as well as a significant source of climate-warming greenhouse gases.¶ China aims for a reduction of dust emissions by 500,000 tonnes and sulfur dioxide by 600,000 tonnes by 2017, according to the plan.

#### China shifting to renewables—geographic location and efficiency

Maria Gallucci Staff Writer 4-26-16 China Bans Some New Coal Power Plants, Spelling More Bad News For A Troubled Industry <http://www.ibtimes.com/china-bans-some-new-coal-power-plants-spelling-more-bad-news-troubled-industry-2359636> (Accessed 5-15-16)

The commission also said that in regions that face a shortage of electricity supplies, the government will prioritize renewable energy projects such as solar and wind farms, and develop energy transmission networks across provincial borders. Chinese officials last week vowed to lead the world on green energy development during a signing ceremony for the Paris climate change agreement in New York.

#### China reducing coal usage now—upward revisions are outdated and do not represent current trends

Barbara Finamore staff writer 1-27-16 Good News: China's Dropping Coal Consumption Is Putting the Brakes on Global Carbon Emissions <https://www.nrdc.org/experts/barbara-finamore/good-news-chinas-dropping-coal-consumption-putting-brakes-global-carbon> (Accessed 5-13-16)

The drop in China's coal consumption is not just a statistical error. Many other measures confirm that China's coal industry has been on a downward spiral for the past two or three years. China's coal mining industry has about 1.5 billion tons of surplus production capacity, with over 80 percent of China's coal mining companies operating at a loss. Job losses are mounting in the coal industry, and coal exporting countries like Australia have been hit hard as Chinese imports of foreign coal fell.¶ The news that China's coal consumption is dropping may be somewhat confusing, given the fact that China recently revised its historical coal consumption statistics upward. Yet this revision only applied to the 2000-2013 time period, and should not overshadow the fact that the Chinese coal industry has experienced a dramatic downturn since then, and actually may have peaked in 2013-2014. Moreover, as the PBL Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency noted, all national emission inventories are subject to uncertainty, and the considerable effort China put into revising its energy statistics has "definitely resulted" in better estimates of real fossil fuel consumption - which should also help to make future estimates more reliable.

#### China increasing energy grid capacity now to keep pace with transition to renewables

Reuters 5-13-16 China to boost energy storage 10-fold to cut power waste: industry <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-power-idUSKCN0Y414C> (Accessed 5-13-16)

China is expected to raise its power storage capacity by ten-fold to 14.5 gigawatts by 2020, as the world's second-biggest economy tries to cut massive waste from renewable energy projects, an industry association said.¶ China is the world largest wind and solar power producer, but some regions are estimated to be losing more than 40 percent of their power because of technical restraints and bottlenecks in the grid, alongside weak power demand growth.¶ Storage technologies, such as pumped storage hydropower or lithium ion batteries, are expected to play a critical role in improving the China's capacity to make better use of renewables.¶ International companies involved in providing storage technology to China include ABB and TUV Rheinland, while domestic players include Soaring Electric, Sifang Automation and joint ventures such as Sungrow-Samsung SDI Energy Storage Power Supply company.¶ China currently has 105 megawatts of storage capacity after a 110 percent increase over the previous five years, but that represented just 1.7 percent of total generation capacity by 2015, according to a report released this week by the China Energy Storage Alliance, an industry body.¶ "We didn't count pumped hydropower, and we project growth to rise to 14.5 GW by 2020 based on manufacturers' orders," said Tina Zhang, managing director of the alliance.¶ The government said in its latest 2016-2020 "five-year plan" that it would seek breakthroughs in the commercialization of energy storage, but it did not set a target.¶ "China is heading an energy revolution led by the transformation to low-carbon energy and the opening up of its wholesale power market, and storage will be important to bolster the changes," said Jiang Liping, vice president of the State Grid Energy Research Institute.

### China Not Key

#### U.S action needed to stop climate change—international modeling

Mark Reynolds Staff Writer 12-23-15 U.S. leadership needed to create a market solution for climate change <http://www.syracuse.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/12/us_leadership_needed_to_create_a_market_solution_for_climate_change_commentary.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

As organizers of the Paris conference will be the first to admit, the commitments made by nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be insufficient to prevent global warming from exceeding the 2 C warming threshold, let alone 1.5 C. For that reason, the agreement calls for nations to revisit their commitments every five years, with the expectation that national goals will be made increasingly ambitious.¶ Leadership from the United States is needed to marshal global efforts against carbon pollution. Right now, unfortunately, that leadership is less than inspiring.¶ Forced by a recalcitrant Congress to take matters into his own hands, President Obama initiated the Clean Power Plan, which uses Environmental Protection Agency regulations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions at power plants. The EPA rules have met with stiff opposition from congressional Republicans, and both the House and the Senate have passed resolutions of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act.¶ But instead of just saying "no" to the Clean Power Plan, Republicans could offer a market-based alternative that would eliminate the need for EPA regulations. By placing a fee on carbon and returning the revenue to American households, we can incentivize a clean-energy economy without increasing the size of government. Meanwhile, applying border tariffs to imports from nations that lack an equivalent price on carbon will protect American businesses and provide the incentive for all nations to establish a price on carbon — the single biggest step a country can take to meet its climate goals.

#### Independent climate action unnecessary—china shift facilitated by Paris Agreement

Helen Briggs Staff Writer 6-30-15 China climate change plan unveiled <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33317451> (Accessed 5-13-16)

All countries involved in UN climate talks must submit national plans for cutting emissions ahead of the key Paris talks.¶ China joins several other countries, including the EU, US and Mexico, that have already committed their plans for tackling climate change, formally known by the UN as INDCs (intended nationally determined contribution).¶ With China's announcement, the world's biggest polluters - China, the US and the EU - have now all detailed their climate plans ahead of the global climate conference.¶ Commenting on the statement, Li Shuo, climate analyst for Greenpeace China, said for success in Paris, all players - including China and the EU - needed to up their game.¶ "Today's pledge must be seen as only the starting point for much more ambitious actions.¶ "It does not fully reflect the significant energy transition that is already taking place in China.¶ "Given the dramatic fall in coal consumption, robust renewable energy uptake, and the urgent need to address air pollution, we believe the country can go well beyond what it has proposed today."

#### Paris Agreement fails without US leadership

Ryan Cooper Writer 12-15-15 The global fight against climate change needs a leader. Step up, America. <http://theweek.com/articles/594157/global-fight-against-climate-change-needs-leader-step-america> (Accessed 5-13-16)

But a word of caution: Despite this historic agreement, actual policy success is not remotely guaranteed. Each nation is now going to have to follow through on its own. And for the deal to work, the United States must get out in front of the pack.¶ Doing so would be relatively easy for the U.S. Though we have made much progress over the last decade or so, we've got a long ways to go to catch up to countries like Denmark and Germany — and because the U.S. is so big, decarbonization would mean a far larger absolute volume of reduced emissions anyway. And being richer than almost all European nations, we can also more easily afford aggressive policy.¶ Second, such a policy would have many ancillary benefits. Aside from causing climate change, oil and especially coal are dirty energy sources that kill thousands of Americans every year and sicken orders of magnitude more. Climate policy means fewer respiratory disorders and cancers, and longer, healthier lives for American citizens.

#### America’s status as global hegemon puts the U.S in unique position to enforce international climate agreements

Terron Sims is a fellow with the Truman National Security Project and a graduate of West Point 12-15-15 Terron Sims: America should lead on climate change <http://pilotonline.com/opinion/columnist/guest/terron-sims-america-should-lead-on-climate-change/article_edf30c64-3704-58c4-a04f-439c8b4faa4f.html> (Accessed 5-15-16)

Most Americans believe that we are still the indispensable nation for leading on world problems, and that includes climate change.¶ Now that the Paris talks have produced an agreement in which every government has to keep emissions down and report their progress to the world, let us press our local, state, and national elected officials to keep their eyes on the ball. America is the hegemon; let’s keep it that way.

### Paris Summit Solves

#### Paris Summit enough to solve global warming

Bianca Jagger founder of human rights organization 4-28-16 Will the Paris Climate Agreement Deliver? <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bianca-jagger/will-the-paris-climate-ag_b_9793130.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

I was at COP21 in Paris when negotiators finally agreed the Paris Agreement, the first legally binding global climate deal: the culmination of 21 years of international negotiation and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process: a massive global political mobilization in response to the looming threat of catastrophic climate change. It scales up ambition from the previous international instrument, the Kyoto Protocol, by placing mitigation and adaptation obligations on all Parties. The Agreement includes elements of previous international agreements and follows on from the Kyoto Protocol and the shameful failure of the Copenhagen Accord. The Paris Agreement is an unprecedented evolution in both international law and climate change law. We all hope that it will be enough to save the planet.

#### Paris Summit insufficient to solve global warming

Bianca Jagger founder of human rights organization 4-28-16 Will the Paris Climate Agreement Deliver? <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bianca-jagger/will-the-paris-climate-ag_b_9793130.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Some critics have been skeptical about the Paris Agreement, and expressed doubts that governments have either the intention or the ability to live up to their promises — I share their doubts. NASA climate scientist Professor James Hansen, one of the world’s foremost authorities on climate change, said of the agreement, “It’s a fraud really, a fake... It’s just bullshit for them to say: ‘We’ll have a 2C warming target and then try to do a little better every five years.’ It’s just worthless words. There is no action, just promises.’”George Monbiot writes of the Paris Agreement, “By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it should have been, it’s a disaster.” Scientists at MIT say that under the current Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) the global average temperature will soar by as much as 3.7 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100. This is far above the 1.5 degree Celsius target, which, as President Hollande memorably stated at the opening of COP21 in Paris, is the ‘absolute ceiling’ for global temperature rise if we are to prevent climate catastrophe. Anything above 1.5 degrees C is a death sentence for us and for the planet.

#### Paris summit solves global warming—international cooperation

Suzanne Goldberg Staff Writer 12-12-15 Paris climate deal: nearly 200 nations sign in end of fossil fuel era <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/paris-climate-deal-200-nations-sign-finish-fossil-fuel-era> (Accessed 5-13-16)

Governments have signaled an end to the fossil fuel era, committing for the first time to a universal agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions and to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate change.¶ After 20 years of fraught meetings, including the past two weeks spent in an exhibition hall on the outskirts of Paris, negotiators from nearly 200 countries signed on to a legal agreement on Saturday evening that set ambitious goals to limit temperature rises and to hold governments to account for reaching those targets.¶ Government and business leaders said the agreement, which set a new goal to reach net zero emissions in the second half of the century, sent a powerful signal to global markets, hastening the transition away from fossil fuels and to a clean energy economy.¶ The deal was carefully constructed to carry legal force but without requiring approval by the US Congress - which would have almost certainly rejected it.

### Too Late

#### Climate change tipping point has been passed—Australia permanently beyond 400ppm

Peter Hannam Environmental Editor 5-10-16 Global warming milestone about to be passed and there's no going back <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/global-warming-milestone-about-to-be-passed-and-theres-no-going-back-20160509-goqcm0.html> (Accessed 5-13-16)

"Our atmosphere cannot take any new coal mines – both the old parties must stop approving them and revoke their approval of the Adani coal mine [in Queensland] at both the state and federal level," Senator Waters said.¶ A spokesman for Environment Minister Greg Hunt defended the government's climate policies."There is now absolutely no doubt that we will beat our 2020 target" of cutting 2000-level emissions by 5 per cent by then, the spokesman said. "We are playing our part to tackle climate change and our 2030 target [of cutting 2000-level emissions about 19 per cent] is ambitious and significant," he said. "Labor has nothing more than a plan to bring back the carbon tax and hike electricity prices."¶ Rising 'pretty much all of the time'¶ Cape Grim's readings are significant because they capture the most accurate reading of the atmospheric conditions in the southern hemisphere and have records going back 40 years.¶ With less land in the south, there is also a much smaller fluctuation according to the seasonal cycle than in northern hemisphere sites. That's because the north has more trees and other vegetation, which take up carbon from the atmosphere in the spring and give it back in the autumn.¶ So while 400 ppm has been temporarily exceeded at the other two main global stations since 2013 - in Hawaii and Alaska - they have dropped back below that level once spring has arrived because of that greater seasonal variation.¶ David Etheridge, a CSIRO principal research scientist, said atmospheric CO2 levels had fluctuated around 280 ppm until humans' burning of fossil fuels and clearing of forests set in process rising levels of greenhouse gases almost without pause since about 1800.¶ "It's been upwards pretty much all of the time," Dr Etheridge told Fairfax Media. "This is a significant change, and it's the primary greenhouse gas which is leading to the warming of the atmosphere."

#### Latest records Indicate we are locked in to warming—cant decrease C02 concentration in atmosphere

Michael Slezak Staff Writer 5-11-16 World's carbon dioxide concentration teetering on the point of no return <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/11/worlds-carbon-dioxide-concentration-teetering-on-the-point-of-no-return> (Accessed 5-13-16)

“No matter what the world’s emissions are now, we can decrease growth but we can’t decrease the concentration.¶ “Even if we stopped emitting now, we’re committed to a lot of warming.”¶ Over in Hawaii, the Mauna Loa station, which is the longest-running in the world, is sitting above 400 ppm, and for the first time, might never dip below it again.¶ “It’s hard to predict,” Butler told the Guardian. “It’s getting real close.”¶ Meanwhile, the global average, after controlling for the seasonal cycle, popped above 400ppm late last year. Within a couple of years, the seasonal dips will never drop below 400ppm in the global average too.¶ Air samples collected at Cape Grim, Tasmania, Australia, under clean air (baseline) conditions¶ Air samples collected at Cape Grim, Tasmania, Australia, under clean air (baseline) conditions. Photograph: CSIRO¶ All together, the world is on the verge of no measurements ever showing a reading under 400ppm.¶ CSIRO climate scientists earmarked for redundancy to finally learn their fate¶ Read more¶ “There’s an answer to dealing with this and that’s to stop burning fossil fuels,” Butler said.¶ Butler also emphasised that this CO2 is locking in future warming. “It’s like lying in bed with your electric blanket set to three. You jack it up to seven – you don’t get hot right away but you do get hot. And that’s what we’re doing.”¶ The CO2 concentrations are driving what appears to be runaway climate change around the world.¶ This year has seen record hot global ocean temperatures, which have caused coral reefs all around the world to bleach and devastated Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.¶ Air surface temperatures have also been shocking climate scientists. Yearly and monthly temperature records have been breaking regularly, with many of the records being broken by the biggest margins ever seen.

# Impact China Economy Stable

### Chinese Economy Generally Strong

#### Private sector job creation outstrips state industry job loss

The Economist, April 30, 2016

"Still Kicking," The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21697597-free-spending-consumers-provide-comfort-troubled-economy-consumption-china-resilient (accessed 5/15/2016)

Can consumption remain resilient given the troubles of the country’s state-dominated industrial economy, ranging from vast overcapacity to record levels of debt? One temporary source of comfort is the fact that the state sector may now itself be stabilising, thanks to a massive, debt-fuelled government stimulus. But greater reassurance comes from the fact that even a big shakeout in heavy industry would be unlikely to derail the Chinese consumer. By one estimate, if 30% of capacity is slashed across China’s most bloated state industries, perhaps 3m workers will lose their jobs over the next three years. But thanks largely to the private sector, the country created 64m jobs between 2011 and 2015, with more than 13m emerging in the past year alone.

#### Economy is resilient

Xinhua News Agency, May 14, 2016

"China's Jobs Data Offers Crystal Ball," Shanghai Daily, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/nation/Chinas-jobs-data-offer-glimpse-into-crystal-ball/shdaily.shtml (accessed 5/15/2016)

The Chinese economy has so far remained resilient despite many risks. The overall growth rate has not fallen outside the target range, which has been set at 6.5 percent to 7 percent this year. The jobs data are an equally, if not more important tool to look into the crystal ball. Top economic policymakers have attached the greatest importance to the labor market, saying that jobs underpin social stability, wealth, consumption and thus economic resiliency.

#### Economy is rebounding

Shuli Ren, professor of economics at Lake Forest College, May 3, 2016

"China’s Economy Continues To Recover Even As April PMI Misses, Analysts Say," Barron's, http://blogs.barrons.com/asiastocks/2016/05/03/chinas-economy-continues-to-recover-even-as-april-pmi-misses-analysts-say/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

One can pretty much ignore today’s data: China continues on the path of cyclical rebound in the second-quarter, according to both UBS and HSBC. According to UBS economist Ning Zhang, China still has some momentum in investments from March: "High frequency data showed property sales in the 30 major cities moderating slightly in April from March’s strength, likely due to the recent modest tightening of property policies in Shanghai, Shenzhen and some tier-2 cities."

### Chinese Economy Generally Strong

#### All economic indicators are up now

Bloomberg News, April 24, 2016

"China's Economy Seems to Be Recovering Faster," Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-24/earliest-china-economic-data-show-recovery-gathers-pace-in-april (accessed 5/15/2016)

China’s property-led economic rebound gathered pace in April, according to the earliest batch of private indicators for the month. Gauges from four providers all increased in April from March, while sub-indexes for employment showed stronger demand for workers.

#### Auto industry dominance indicates Chinese manufacturing success—low labor and production costs key

Mike Patton, economic analyst at Forbes, April 29, 2016

“China will surpass the U.S. in 2018,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/04/29/global-economic-news-china-will-surpass-the-u-s-in-2018/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

How has China become such a dominant economic power? Part of the reason is its booming auto industry. To illustrate, the total number of autos sold last year in China was 24.6 million. This dwarfs total auto sales in the U.S. last year, which hit a record 17.5 million cars and trucks. In addition, SUV sales in China increased a whopping 52% in 2015. China’s auto industry is thriving and should provide stiff competition for U.S. auto manufacturers in the years ahead. Unless the U.S. government levies high tariffs on imports to equalize prices between Chinese autos and those made in America. It is important to remember that the cost of production (labor included) is much lower in China.

### Savings Rates Prove Chinese Economy Strong Now

#### Savings statistics prove Chinese economy is far more stable than U.S.

Oliver Rui, professor of finance and accounting at China Europe International Business School, April 27, 2016

"What Billionaire George Soros Gets Wrong About the Chinese Economy," Fortune, http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/george-soros-wrong-chinese-economy/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

Today, China remains the country with the world’s highest saving rate at 50%, compared to 16% in the U.S. The country has accumulated more than 120 trillion renminbi of financial assets. Of that amount, 55 trillion renminbi is in bank deposits, which is relatively easy to convert into cash. So the average Chinese household’s balance sheet is much healthier than that in the U.S. It provides enough reserves and confidence to weather an economic storm.

#### Savings rates demonstrate availability of cash for investment capital

Michael Ivanovich, former senior economist at the OECD in Paris, international economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 15, 2016

"Why you should take a broader view of China’s economy," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/16/why-you-should-take-a-broader-view-of-chinas-economy.html (accessed 5/15/2016)

The Chinese certainly have the money. With a savings rate of 49 percent of GDP, China has plenty of readily available internal sources of finance to support growing investments in its stock of physical capital.

### Reforms Improving Economy Now

#### Chinese reforms are improving human capital and tech innovation

Michael Ivanovich, former senior economist at the OECD in Paris, international economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 15, 2016

"Why you should take a broader view of China’s economy," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/16/why-you-should-take-a-broader-view-of-chinas-economy.html (accessed 5/15/2016)

But quite apart from that, I believe that Beijing is fully aware of what they are up against. All of China's current structural changes (reforms) are aimed at enhancing the efficiency of its human capital (through education and vocational training) and at fostering technological innovation to raise the quality of its (physical) capital stock.

#### China reforming bank industry, will solve bank failures

Eswar Prasad, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics, April 27, 2016

"China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks," Testimony before U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2016/04/27-china-economy-financial-markets-prasad (accessed 5/15/2016)

China’s financial system remains bank-dominated, with the state directly controlling most of the banking system. Recognizing the importance of a better financial system for an improved allocation of resources within the economy, the Chinese government has instituted a number of reforms in recent years. Bank deposit and lending rates have now been fully liberalized. Commercial banks can now set these rates freely, although the PBC still sets reference rates to guide banks. An explicit bank deposit insurance program has been in operation since May 2015. This program is intended to expose banks to some degree of market discipline by replacing the implicit full insurance of all deposits by the government. The system also allows for early intervention by the banking regulator and has an improved resolution mechanism for failing banks.

#### Reforms solve financial markets and check against depreciation during global downturns

Eswar Prasad, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, New Century Chair in International Trade and Economics, April 27, 2016

"China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks," Testimony before U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2016/04/27-china-economy-financial-markets-prasad (accessed 5/15/2016)

These reforms are important steps in the right direction. Future reforms and development of the banking system will have significant implications for the development of China’s more nascent financial markets, including the corporate bond market and also for economic development more broadly. In particular, China’s aspirations to make the RMB a global reserve currency rest in large part on the pace of development of its fixed-income markets. Reserve currency economies are expected to issue high-quality and creditworthy government debt or government-backed debt instruments that can serve to hedge against foreign investors’ domestic currency depreciation during a global downturn.

## Chinese Economic Collapse Not Bad

### Downturn Good: Southeast Asian Growth

#### Chinese downturn opens space for Southeast Asian growth

Deutsche Welle News, January 12, 2016

"The winners and losers of China's downturn," D.W. Asia, http://www.dw.com/en/the-winners-and-losers-of-chinas-downturn/a-18973627 (accessed 5/15/2016)

Some economists suggest that China's restructuring and growth downturn also presents opportunities for several economies in the region, especially as China continues to exit many labor-intensive sectors. For instance, Casanova says that countries could try to increase their global market share in sectors where China is retreating, particularly in lower-value-added manufacturing, such as the processing of minerals and metals, textiles and apparel. In this context, Southeast Asian economies could capture some of the overcapacity that China is trying to outsource, say experts.

#### Southeast Asian growth is critical to global economic growth

International Strategic Analysis, November 9, 2015

"Southeast Asia as a Driver of Global Economic Growth," International Strategic Analysis, http://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=153&cHash=3f4d79a5c5b5a728d1a8bb90cb8e541c (accessed 5/15/2016)

While many of the world’s leading emerging markets have struggled to record significant economic growth in recent years, one important region, Southeast Asia, has defied that trend. In recent years, Southeast Asia has recorded strong economic growth rates that have allowed the region to become an important driver of global economic, trade and investment growth. Amid the slowdown in growth in China and many of the world’s most important emerging markets, and the continued sluggish growth in most of the world’s developed economies, this strong performance by Southeast Asia has proven to be welcome news. In fact, in the years ahead, Southeast Asia’s role as a key driver of global economic growth will be enhanced.

### Downturn Good: Sino-U.S. Relations

#### Chinese economic crisis improves Sino-U.S. relations since both nations need each other for fiscal bailout support

Eswar S. Prasad, Professor of Trade Policy at Cornell University, Spring/Summer 2009

"Effects of the Financial Crisis on The U.S.-China Economic Relationship," Cato Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/14858/uploads (accessed 5/15/2016)

Paradoxically, the crisis is likely to intensify the embrace between the two economies. In the short run, China needs export growth in order to maintain job growth and preserve social stability. As China continues to run current account surpluses by exporting to the United States and other advanced country markets, it has little alternative to buying U.S. Treasuries with the reserves it accumulates while managing its exchange rate. The United States needs willing buyers for the Treasuries issued to finance its budget deficit, which is certain to increase due to bailout and fiscal stimulus operations.

#### Chinese crisis increases Beijing's reliance on U.S. Treasury bonds

Eswar S. Prasad, Professor of Trade Policy at Cornell University, Spring/Summer 2009

"Effects of the Financial Crisis on The U.S.-China Economic Relationship," Cato Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/14858/uploads (accessed 5/15/2016)

Ironically, given the turmoil in world financial markets and the dearth of safe and liquid financial instruments, China’s reliance on U.S. Treasuries to park its accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is likely to intensify. Even during September to November 2008, when U.S. financial markets were in deep turmoil, Chinese purchases of U.S. Treasury bills and bonds amounted to nearly $123 billion. The continued flow of Chinese money into U.S. Treasuries is of course rather convenient for the United States at a time when it faces the prospect of having to finance a massive budget deficit.

### Downturn Good: Democratization

#### Collapse de-legitimizes Maoist communism

Will Hutton, principal of Hertford College, Oxford, and chair of the Big Innovation Centre, October 10, 2016

"The world economic order is collapsing and this time there seems no way out," The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/11/world-order-collapse-refugees-emerging-economies-china-slowdown-recession (accessed 5/16/2016)

China’s banks are, in effect, bust: few of the vast loans they have made can ever be repaid, so they cannot now lend at the rate needed to sustain China’s once super-high but illusory growth rates. China’s real growth is now below that of the Mao years: the economic crisis will spawn a crisis of legitimacy for the deeply corrupt communist party.

#### Chinese democratization increases stability

Arthur Waldron, visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, September 11, 2000

"China after Communism," American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/publication/china-after-communism/ (accessed 5/15/2016)

Taiwan has been having real elections for more than a dozen years now, but the most recent one was a watershed because what had been the opposition party won the presidency. But isn’t Taiwan unstable? Zhu Rongji recently expressed concern over Chen’s ability to govern. This took some cheek, given China’s creaky system. But the fact is that Taiwan’s system is based on legitimate and popularly approved constitutional structures, including checks and balances. Democratic government often appears weaker than autocratic, but in fact it is stronger. In Taiwan, an opposition that had been excluded for half a century, most of the time by force, has now taken power. Under such conditions no transition can be completely smooth. But democracy has in fact made Taiwan much more stable and much stronger than it was. After all, we don’t know what the political future of China is, but who will deny that the institution of elected president in Taiwan is here to stay? The effects of genuine democracy on China would be similar, I think.

### Chinese Economic Downturn Not Bad--General

#### Economic crash just part of Chinese economic evolution

David Olive, Toronto Star Business Columnist, February 12, 2016

"We Should All Be So Lucky To Have China's Crash," Toronto Star, https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/02/12/we-should-be-so-lucky-as-to-have-chinas-crash-olive.html (accessed 5/15/2016)

Upheaval is a condition of industrial revolutions. History will show that China’s transition from peasant society to upper-middle-income country, as defined by the World Bank, has inflicted less collateral damage than its precursors elsewhere, while bringing more rapid social progress to more people.

#### Backstopping will solve the effects of the collapse

Sputnik News, January 27, 2016

"China's Impending Collapse? Don't Bet on It," Sputnik News, http://sputniknews.com/asia/20160127/1033787299/china-no-economic-collapse.html (accessed 5/16/2016)

It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate these problems, he acknowledges. Westerners tend to draw parallels with their own real estate crisis of 2007-09, but the central government in Beijing has much less debt than Washington did during this country’s troubles and so is better able to backstop the financial system should the need arise.

### Chinese Economic Downturn Not Bad--General

#### Collapse decreases Chinese hegemony

Gordon G. Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, December 29, 2015

"Will 2016 Bring the Collapse of China’s Economy?" The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-2016-bring-the-collapse-chinas-economy-14753? (accessed 5/16/2016)

China, most analysts think, will dominate the international system for the rest of this century. Yet whether the economy’s downturn is a crash or a long period of decline, Beijing’s diplomats soon will not be able to afford to make promised investments abroad, fulfill aid commitments or write-off debts, all things that buy geopolitical influence for a regime that cannot export its ideals. Chinese generals and admirals will not have the cash to build or buy the aircraft carriers, submarines, satellites, and moon bases they now contemplate. Civilian officials will not be in the position to provide needed services at home. China’s rise, in short, will be cut off, and Chinese dominance of the region and the international system, something analysts say is inevitable, will have to wait at least decades.

#### Chinese collapse won't hurt U.S.

Trevir Nath, New York-based financial accountant with Masters in Economics from the New School, September 15, 2015

"Is China's Economic Collapse Good For the U.S.?" Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091515/chinas-economic-collapse-good-us.asp (accessed 5/14/2016)

Given that the China's current turmoil has been followed by a downturn in U.S. and global stock markets, a pessimistic reader might wonder if much more chaos should be expected if China's economy continues to deteriorate. With China holding a great deal of Treasury debt, one worst-case scenario would be for China to dump their Treasury holdings, which could have fearsome implications for the U.S. dollar. That said, while this makes for an intriguing doomsday scenario, there's little actual evidence of any such forthcoming catastrophe. After all China, who's no longer the largest holder of U.S. debt, has already been selling Treasuries, in a bid to prevent the yuan from weakening beyond the level that the Chinese government wants. At China's current rate of Treasury selling, we haven’t seen any pressure being exerted on the U.S. economy. In fact, even if China really wanted to dump all of its U.S. debt, the move could easily backfire: they would find it extremely difficult to find any alternative asset as stable or liquid as Treasuries.

# Impact Human Rights Credibility Bad

### Human rights norms are Eurocentric

#### Human rights are premised on a universalizing extension of Eurocentric domination

Makau Mutua, Professor of Law and Director at Human Rights Center, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2001, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, Harvard International Law Journal, Winter, 42 Harv. Int'l L.J. 201, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525547> (Accessed 5-26-16)

Any valid critique must first acknowledge that the human rights movement, like earlier crusades, is a bundle of contradictions. It does not have, therefore, a monopoly on virtue that its most vociferous advocates claim. This Article argues that human rights, and the relentless campaign to universalize them, present a historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural dominance over the past several centuries. At the heart of this continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and "othering" that which is different and non-European. By this argument, the Article does not mean to suggest that human rights are bad per se or that the human rights corpus is irredeemable. Rather, it suggests that the globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world.

### U.S. is hypocritical on human rights

#### U.S. hypocrisy on human rights is clear in the criminal justice and immigration systems

Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, co-director of the U.S. program at Human Rights Watch, May 11, 2015, “Hold the US accountable on human rights,” Aljazeera America, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/5/holding-the-us-accountable-on-human-rights.html> (Accessed 5-26-2016)

Serious and longstanding human rights problems also plague the U.S. criminal justice system, including poor prison conditions, disproportionately harsh sentencing, the death penalty and abusive police practices. As the protests in many U.S. cities over the deaths of African-Americans Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray and others show, there is strong and understandable public concern over police brutality and [racial discrimination](http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/03/02/decades-disparity-0) in the U.S. criminal justice system. Other governments should press the U.S. to clean up these blots on its record. Countries should also call the U.S. out on abuses in its immigration system, notably its recent decision to detain immigrant families with children who are apprehended crossing the border. The administration admits the detentions are aimed at [deterring](http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/11/immigration-detention-centers-illegal-immigrants-obama-column/25358695/) other migrants, many of whom are fleeing persecution at home. But international law bars all detention of children for immigration purposes, which is profoundly harmful to their development. The large-scale U.S. surveillance programs revealed by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden raise further concerns. Nearly two years since his first disclosures, neither the White House nor Congress has yet to impose meaningful limits on these programs, which affect potentially millions of people inside and outside the U.S. Even a very modest bill to impose [some constraints](http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/30/us-pass-usa-freedom-act) on domestic surveillance, the USA Freedom Act, faces strong opposition from legislators who [support](http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/23/us-reject-mass-privacy-violations) the programs. In this context, it is ever more critical that concerned governments join others, like those of Brazil and Germany, that have been pressing the U.S. to reform.

#### The U.S. is no human rights “leader”. As long as we point to isolate events and ignore domestic abuses we will never be perceived as a credible human rights broker

Aaron X. Fellmeth, Professor and Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Summer 2015, “Leading from (a Bit) Behind: The United States and International Human Rights Law,” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 40 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 977, <https://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume40/> issue-4-summer-2015/leading-from-a-bit-behind-the-united-states-amp-intl-human-rights-law/ (Accessed 5-29-16)

One thing is certain: The boosters of U.S. moral leadership in human rights cannot be referring to a public commitment to human rights institutions. The United States has ratified fewer international human rights treaties than any other liberal democracy, and even fewer than many autocracies. When it has ratified a treaty, it has frequently included reservations and declarations that undermine or nullify some or all of the treaty's protections. Nor do the boosters seem to be referring to exceptional generosity toward the needy. The United States does devote significant funds to foreign development assistance in absolute terms, but the amount is lower relative to national income than the assistance most developed countries provide. Instead, the boosters seem to be referring to a long history and tradition of U.S. respect for (some aspects of) human dignity and advocacy that other countries should respect human rights. As the first country to cast off monarchy and assume democracy based on selective liberal values, the United States clearly holds a special place in the history of human rights generally. Moreover, the individualistic political philosophies of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and other intellectual leaders of the American Revolution inspired demands for human rights in other countries, most notably in revolutionary France. The United States also participated actively in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the core U.N. human rights treaties, and in designing the machinery of the United Nations that would ultimately help to make many of those rights a reality for millions of individuals. It has condemned many foreign human rights abuses and punished them with trade and economic sanctions, both unilaterally and by exerting influence at the United Nations, sometimes at great cost to itself. It has in a few cases deployed military forces to intervene directly in large-scale foreign human rights atrocities, and until very recently, has also provided a judicial forum for the relief of foreign victims of human rights abuses through the Alien Tort Claims Act. These are all properly counted as acts of leadership, and perhaps this is the leadership to which the boosters refer. As long as we stay at that level of vagueness--more or less high school political science--the United States does come across as a paragon of respect for and promotion of human rights. Lost in this self-congratulatory litany, however, is a balanced accounting of U.S. opposition to international human rights and global enforcement regimes, as well as a long and varied domestic record of serious human rights abuses. An extended history of the United States would be required to do justice to its human rights record, but some major events in U.S. history that cast doubt on its historical claim to moral leadership should be discussed before moving to a discussion of current practice.

### U.S. is hypocritical on human rights

#### The U.S. is not the beacon of freedom but hypocrisy on human rights

Lauren Carasik, a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western New England University School of Law, March 12, 2014, “Human rights for thee but not for me,” Aljazeera America, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/the-us-lacks-moralauthorityonhumanrights.html> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

Although the U.S. was instrumental in creating this international framework, it has resisted conforming to many of the norms for which there is an emerging international consensus. The U.S. holds sacred its commitment to civil and political rights, such as those protected by its robust and revered Bill of Rights and proclaims itself a beacon of freedom and justice in the world. Critics argue that the rhetoric exceeds the reality on the ground. Economic and social rights are far more contested, in part because they require affirmative duties that affect resource allocation: States must take progressive action toward providing housing, food, education, health care and a host of other rights. The U.S. purports to be evenhanded. But geopolitical interests influence the tenor and content of its assessments, leading some critics to accuse the U.S. of sacrificing human rights at the altar of political expediency. For example, the U.S. has been accused of blunting its appraisal of allies such as [Saudi Arabia](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Backchannels/2014/0128/US-support-for-human-rights-abroad-The-case-of-Saudi-Arabia), [Bahrain, Mexico, Uzbekistan](http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/02/barack-obama-dump-these-8-unsavory-allies), Honduras and Israel. Economic interests also factor in. Critics decry the [sale of arms to countries](http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/06/22/9174/us-points-finger-and-arms-exports-human-rights-abusers) that by Washington’s own assessment are complicit in human rights abuses. While politically and economically self-interested maneuvering is inevitable, not all countries issue an ostensibly definitive and unvarnished report on the state of global human rights.

#### The U.S. is the opposite of a human rights leader for five reasons

Aaron X. Fellmeth, Professor and Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Summer 2015, “Leading from (a Bit) Behind: The United States and International Human Rights Law,” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 40 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 977, <https://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume40/> issue-4-summer-2015/leading-from-a-bit-behind-the-united-states-amp-intl-human-rights-law/ (Accessed 5-29-16)

In practice, U.S. disengagement from international human rights law has five important aspects. First, as is well known, the United States refuses to sign or ratify important and widely accepted international human rights treaties.  Second, in the relatively few treaties the United States has ratified, it has included reservations and declarations designed to weaken or nullify important human rights in the United States. Third, the United States continues to commit serious human rights violations in its domestic and foreign measures, through both commission and omission.  The United States has also frequently ignored or rejected sound guidance and recommendations relating to its own human rights abuses from treaty-monitoring bodies. Fourth, the United States offers no municipal remedy for the great majority of human rights violations committed by the government or with its toleration. And fifth, in condemning foreign human rights abuses, U.S. policy suffers from troubling inconsistencies: it defends its abusive allies or ignores their bad records while condemning other states with similar records.  I will briefly summarize each of these aspects.

#### Police brutality is a dominant cause of the international perception of U.S. hypocrisy on human rights

[John Paul Brammer](https://bluenationreview.com/author/jp-brammer/), Staff Writer, May 14, 2015, “UN Human Rights Review Slams US For Police Violence And Racism,” Blue Nation Review, <https://bluenationreview.com/un-human-rights-review-slams-us-for-police-violence-and-racism/> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

At the Human Rights Council on Monday, member nations of the United Nations called out the United States for, among other things, its [police brutality](http://bluenationreview.com/native-americans-are-the-group-most-likely-to-be-killed-by-police/), [virulent racism](http://bluenationreview.com/ferguson-police-chief-still-job/), the [death penalty](http://bluenationreview.com/fbi-exaggerated-evidence-for-years-including-in-death-penalty-cases/), and [Guantanamo Bay](http://bluenationreview.com/obama-wishes-closed-gitmo-day-one/), Al Jazeera reports. Al Jazeera also reports that senior counselor to the U.S. assistant attorney general James Cadogan told delegates that these criticisms come as a “challenge” to “do better:” “The tragic deaths of Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Michael Brown in Missouri, Eric Garner in New York, Tamir Rice in Ohio and Walter Scott in South Carolina have renewed a long-standing and critical national debate about the even-handed administration of justice. These events challenge us to do better and to work harder for progress — through both dialogue and action.” I think a few member nations, like Russia, for example, relished the opportunity to tell the United States that their human rights record isn’t exactly sterling. Particularly because of the U.S.’s perceived role as the “world’s policeman.”

### Hypocrisy undermines credibility

#### The perception of U.S. hypocrisy undermines human rights credibility and leadership globally

Lauren Carasik, a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western New England University School of Law, March 12, 2014, “Human rights for thee but not for me,” Aljazeera America, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/the-us-lacks-moralauthorityonhumanrights.html> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

Last month U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry [unveiled](http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/us-syria-leads-humanrightsviolationsin2013.html) the State Department’s comprehensive annual assessment of human rights around the globe. It painted a grim picture of pervasive violations. Notably absent from the report, however, was any discussion of Washington’s own record on human rights. The report elicited sharp rebukes from some of the countries singled out for criticism. Many of them questioned the United States’ legitimacy as self-appointed global champion of human rights. China issued its own report, 154 pages long, excoriating the U.S. record on human rights and presenting a list of Washington’s violations. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry called the report “unbalanced and nonobjective” and censured the U.S. for appointing itself the world’s watchdog. Ecuador, Russia and Iran also criticized the report. By signaling that the world cares about human rights violations, the report provides a useful tool for advocates. While the omission of any internal critique is unsurprising, that stance ultimately undermines the [State Department’s](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/index.htm) goals of promoting human rights abroad. Abuses unfolding around the world demand and deserve condemnation. But it is difficult for the U.S. to don the unimpeachable mantle, behave hypocritically and still maintain credibility.

#### Failing to fulfill our obligations undermines the credibility of U.S. human rights leadership

Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, co-director of the U.S. program at Human Rights Watch, May 11, 2015, “Hold the US accountable on human rights,” Aljazeera America, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/5/holding-the-us-accountable-on-human-rights.html> (Accessed 5-26-2016)

The U.S. has put a lot of effort into strengthening the U.N. Human Rights Council and making the UPR a useful process when it comes to dealing with other countries. It has also made a point of setting a good example, by engaging in extensive consultation with nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders in the run-up to its review. But the U.S. will risk undermining these efforts if it fails to fulfill its own human rights commitments.

### Reversing hypocrisy key to credibility

#### Only backtracking on our own failings can restore human rights credibility

Lauren Carasik, a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western New England University School of Law, March 12, 2014, “Human rights for thee but not for me,” Aljazeera America, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/the-us-lacks-moralauthorityonhumanrights.html> (Accessed 5-27-2016)

U.S. intransigence is often cloaked behind lofty conception of American exceptionalism — the idea that the U.S. embodies the standards of liberty and democracy to which other countries should aspire. Claiming to stand at the apex of democracy and human rights, the U.S. exempts itself from surrendering its sovereignty to any global rights framework. Resistance to the adoption of international norms is not monolithic within the country, however. In a sign of retreat from these principles at a local level, some states and municipalities are embracing international human rights standards. The “[Bringing Human Rights Home](http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/Bringing%20Human%20Rights%20Home.pdf)” report by the Human Rights Institute at Columbia School of Law evinces the willingness of some local governments to incorporate universal human rights standards, including economic and social rights that the U.S. has so far declined to validate. In 2012 former U.S. President Jimmy Carter [urged the U.S.](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-human-rights-record.html) to reclaim its moral high ground, lamenting that “America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends.” Upholding universal, inalienable and enforceable human rights standards in a pluralistic and increasingly entangled world is no easy task. But the domestic and international human rights movements are driven by the urgent goal of protecting the dignity of all human beings — including those at the margins who are powerless, poor, invisible and persecuted. The U.S. would have more credibility in promoting those principles if it reflected on its own transgressions. Naming and shaming by international actors is an essential tool for advancing human rights. But it assumes both the moral authority to sit in judgment and the humility to be self-critical.

Human rights abuses within the criminal justice and immigration systems illustrates

#### We’d have to correct several human rights issues to restore credibility

John Shattuck, CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and a lecturer on U.S. foreign policy at Tufts University and former Ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2000, Fall 2008, “Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights,” Human Rights Magazine, Vol. 35, <http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol35_2008/human_rights_fall2008/> hr\_fall08\_shattuck.html (Accessed 5-26-2016)

The gap between America’s values and actions revealed by this polling data has severely eroded U.S. global influence. How can you and your administration gain it back? First, you should make it clear that one of our country’s bedrock principles is the international rule of law. Human rights are de-fined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratified and incorporated into our domestic law. In flaunting basic rules—such as habeas corpus, the Convention against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions—the previous administration created a series of “law-free zones.” Within these zones, detainees were abused, thousands were held indefinitely without charges, and human rights were trampled. Second, you should bring U.S. values and practices back into alignment. The United States in recent years has lost credibility by charging others with the types of human rights violations that it has committed itself. In recent annual country reports on human rights practices, the State Department has criticized other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, warrantless electronic surveillance, and other abuses, even though the U.S. record in these areas also has been abysmal. Fortunately, history shows that U.S. credibility on human rights can be restored when our government’s policies reflect our nation’s values. A series of bipartisan initiatives during five recent presidencies––three Republican and two Democratic––illustrates the point.

### Reversing hypocrisy key to credibility

#### Only backtracking on our own failings can restore human rights credibility

#### Consistency is key! The most effective way to promote human rights in China is to set a clear example

Nicholas Bequelin, East Asia Director at Amnesty International, based in Hong Kong. A former Visiting Scholar at The China Center, Yale Law School, and previously at Human Rights Watch, he obtained his Ph.D. in History from the School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS), Paris, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

The keys to effective promotion of the human rights agenda in the U.S.-China relationship are relatively straightforward: First, what is most important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect, with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the [C.I.A. renditions](http://www.salon.com/2013/05/19/how_guantanamo_affects_china_our_human_rights_hypocrisies/singleton/). Second, the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights.

#### U.S. credibility on human rights is directly tied to it commitment in practice. Everything we do to abuse human rights undermines credibility

Aaron X. Fellmeth, Professor and Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Summer 2015, “Leading from (a Bit) Behind: The United States and International Human Rights Law,” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 40 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 977, <https://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume40/> issue-4-summer-2015/leading-from-a-bit-behind-the-united-states-amp-intl-human-rights-law/ (Accessed 5-29-16)

The claim that the United States is worthy of trust is only as credible as its commitment to human rights and willingness to expend the resources necessary to be certain that the individuals it is killing, without trial or public airing of evidence, do indeed pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. A public commitment to IHRL enhances that credibility, and a refusal to commit obviously does the opposite. That commitment must be to international human rights law and not municipal rights for what should be an obvious reason: all, or almost all, of these killings are taking place in foreign countries outside of U.S. jurisdiction, where non-U.S. citizens have few if any rights under U.S. municipal or constitutional law.

### Engaging China fails

#### China is improving its human rights record and the U.S. is in no position to criticize China. Engagement will be ineffective

Yu Ning, Staff Writer, March 31, 2016, “US must renew understanding of China’s human rights,” Global Times,

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976750.shtml> (Accessed 5-28-16)

China has made remarkable progress in the field of human rights over the past decades. The country has lifted more than 630 million people out of poverty, one-tenth of the entire world population. It has endeavored to improve the social security net, eliminate inequality and enhance the rule of law. However, the recognition of China's human rights by Western activists has been largely affected by a slim number of China's dissidents. It's biased and radical. It's risky if the US President attempts to grasp a country's situation through a small number of dissidents. Look at what happened in Iraq. Iraqi dissidents assured then US President George W. Bush that US troops would be greeted with "sweets and flowers" when they had boots on Iraqi soil. But what they actually met in Iraq was bullets and shells. No country has a perfect human rights record and the US is no exception. Its racial discrimination and global surveillance program both severely violate human rights. The US should understand that it does not have the ability to exert any direct influence on China's political development, nor can it stop China punishing dissidents who violated its laws. The Xi-Obama meeting is an opportunity to deepen mutual understanding and cooperation.

#### U.S. human rights leadership is counterproductive unless engagement happens through multilateralism

Joshua Rosenzweig, an independent researcher and translator based in Hong Kong and Ph.D. in Chinese Studies from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

While there's much work that the United States can and should do to undo the damage done to its human rights reputation in recent years, it is counterproductive for any particular nation to take responsibility for being a model of moral behavior and rectitude in the area of human rights. At many times in its history the United States has not been willing enough to see itself as an equal and active participant in a global process of protecting and promoting universal human rights standards. This is not to deny that the United States still has an important leadership role to play, but this leadership must be understood in the context of multilateral processes aimed at realizing the full set of internationally recognized human rights in all countries, including China and the United States. The human rights project should be the responsibility of all of us, in every country, not a source of political finger-pointing between global competitors.

#### China uses economic clout to counter human rights criticism

Aryeh Neier, president emeritus of the Open Society Foundations, June 13, 2013, “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advance-human-rights-in-china/276841/> (Accessed 5-28-16)

One of the reasons that the United States and some of its Western allies succeeded a quarter of a century ago in promoting human rights in Soviet bloc countries is that they persuaded many in those countries that human rights and economic success went hand in hand. In recent years, however, China's economic success during a period of economic trouble in the West has conveyed an opposite message. The difficulty of promoting human rights globally in these circumstances is exacerbated by the way that China uses its economic clout in its relations with other countries. Western pressures to promote rights often are defeated by China's assertiveness in making clear that its trade and aid are not subject to human rights conditions. This has become an important factor in countering pressures for human rights in Africa, in Central Asia and in other parts of the world.

### Engaging China fails

#### Engagement over China’s human rights fails. Over a decade of constructive engagement proves

Wesley K. Clark, A retired United States Army general, a former NATO supreme allied commander in Europe and a consultant, October 12, 2014, “Getting Real About China,” The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/sunday/getting-real-about-china.html?_r=0> (Accessed 5-29-16)

China’s harsh suppression of political dissent, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, and its close ties to Russia, Iran and North Korea, have finally laid to rest the dream many Western leaders have had since the 1990s: that ''constructive engagement'' would eventually, inevitably lead to more openness and democracy. Instead, the opposite has occurred: China is more confident, more assertive, and also more closed. Thirty-five years after Deng Xiaoping freed up the economy, the Communist Party is using material prosperity and nationalist ideology to maintain its legitimacy in the face of wrenching social tensions. It has rejected both the move toward democracy and the acceptance of human and civil rights that Americans had hoped would emerge from China's astonishing economic rise. Even more worrisome, China's foreign policy relies on keenly calculated self-interest, at the expense of the international institutions, standards, and obligations the United States has sought to champion. It increasingly views us as a rival and potential adversary.

#### 26 years of engagement over human rights is a proven failure

Marco Rubio, former U.S. Senator from Florida, June 3, 2015, “[On Human Rights, No More Free Passes for China](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419247/human-rights-no-more-free-passes-china-marco-rubio),” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419247/human-rights-no-more-free-passes-china-marco-rubio (Accessed 5-29-16)

Despite the fact that China's rulers revealed the true nature of their regime that day, too many of our political and business elite have been content with the status quo in China, especially with regard to basic human rights and liberties, which China has long repressed. In fact, U.S. policy has aimed at engaging with the Chinese Communist Party, surrendering American influence and principles. Twenty-six years later, repression continues to be the order of the day, and the aspirations of the Tiananmen generation remain unfulfilled. President Xi Jinping's presidency has been marked by what experts describe as the most intense crackdown in years. The organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported in March that the government's persecution of rights defenders was as severe as it has been since the mid 1990s. The list of those arrested and harassed is extensive, including Uighur economist Ilham Tohti, Tibetan Buddhist leader Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, Tie Liu, Pu Zhiqiang, and Chen Kegui. Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo remains in jail, and his wife Liu Xia suffers under house arrest, as does human-rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng.

### Engagement Bad – Credibility Turn

#### Soft power bolsters the convergence of human rights and democracy promotion to enforce universal norms and undermines credibility

Bastiaan Bouwman, doctoral candidate in the international history of human rights, at the London School of Economics, 2015, “Uncomfortable Bedfellows: Why Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Are Better Off Separate,” Humanity in Action,

 http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/579-uncomfortable-bedfellows-why-human-rights-and-democracy-promotion-are-better-off-separate (Accessed 5-27-16)

The specter that the convergence of human rights and democracy promotion raises is that Western states have established a universal blueprint for what societies should look like, and that they now aim to reform the world in their image – through soft power and international law as much as possible, but even through hard power if necessary. While this suspicion may be exaggerated, the stated universality of human rights and democracy leaves no doubt that their spread is, in principle, an objective of Western governments, even though it is bounded by other, competing interests. It is hard to imagine this objective ever being achieved, but as stated above, the notion that Western actors are pursuing it certainly vexes authoritarian regimes. It also disturbs many, especially in the non-West, who doubt the sincerity of the stated intentions for rights and democracy assistance, and who feel that interference in their national polities diminishes their ability to determine their own future.

### A2: Terrorism Scenario (ISIS)

#### ISIS is no existential threat

Louis Jacobson, Staff Writer, November 16, 2015, “Is ISIS an 'existential threat' to the United States?,” PolitiFact, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/nov/16/isis-existential-threat-united-states/> (Accessed 5-30-16)

We found general agreement that ISIS aspires to become an existential threat to the United States. But that’s not the same thing as actually being one. Even an attack as devastating and deadly as 9/11 -- which ISIS hasn’t come close to duplicating on American soil -- didn’t topple the U.S. government or threaten its historical status as a constitutional democracy. ISIS, like other terrorist groups, has "a limited ability to kill civilians in dramatic and destabilizing ways, which in turn forces us to spend inordinate amounts of money and effort on security," said Lance Janda, a military historian at Cameron University. "But they cannot destroy us, or invade, or wreck our economy, or threaten our fleets or armies or air forces in the same way that conventional enemy forces might." Rubin agreed. "ISIS may or may not be focused on mounting terrorist attacks against the U.S. as it has done in France, but these attacks, while serious, would not be existential threats," he said.

# Impact US-China War Not Likely and Not Bad

### No US-China War – 1NC/2AC

#### No China war – Asia can de-escalate tensions

Nick Bisley, Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, Australia, 3-10-2014, “It’s Not 1914 All Over Again: Asia is Preparing to Avoid War,” <http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-over-again-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875> (accessed 6/1/16)

Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle époque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however, the historical parallel is deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But there are very good reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why Asia is not about to tumble into a great power war. China is America’s second most important trading partner. Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with which China trades. Trade and investment’s “golden straitjacket” is a basic reason to be optimistic. Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because Beijing and Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely aware of how much they have at stake. Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The two powers have established a wide range of institutional links to manage their relations. These are designed to improve the level and quality of their communication, to lower the risks of misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has demonstrably improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes. Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914, today’s two would-be combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation. Just as the extensive array of common interests has led Beijing and Washington to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and mechanisms intended to improve trust, generate a sense of common cause and promote regional prosperity. Some organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders’ meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But there are more than 15 separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what might be described as an infrastructure for peace in the region. While these mechanisms are not flawless, and many have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they have been crucial in managing specific crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.

### No US-China War – General – Laundry List

#### No US-China war – US alliances, deterrence, interdependence check

Robert J. Art, Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Fellow at MIT Center for International Studies, Fall 2010, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” <http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Art%20Rise%20of%20China.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

China does not present the type of security threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany. Americaʼs nuclear forces make it secure from any Chinese attack on the homeland. Moreover, China clearly presents a potentially different type of threat to the United States than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, because the geopolitics of the two situations are different. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to the nuclear) threat was two-fold: to conquer and dominate the economic–industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Persian Gulf constituted two of the five power centers of the world during the Cold War—Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States being the other three. If the Soviets had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political–military intimidation, then it would have controlled three of the five power centers of the world. That would have been a significant power transition. Chinaʼs rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, Chinaʼs domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.–China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction. The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat.

### No US-China War – General – Laundry List

#### No Chinese motive for war – economic ties, military is outmatched – won’t challenge the US

Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University, 8-15-2011, “Think Again: War,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war> (accessed 6/1/16)

What about China, the most ballyhooed rising military threat of the current era? Beijing is indeed modernizing its armed forces, racking up double-digit rates of growth in military spending, now about $100 billion a year. That is second only to the United States, but it is a distant second: The Pentagon spends nearly $700 billion. Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the United States; it's not clear why it would want to. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China's global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. Since Chairman Mao's death, China has been hands down the most peaceful great power of its time. For all the recent concern about a newly assertive Chinese navy in disputed international waters, China's military hasn't fired a single shot in battle in 25 years.

### No US-China War – General – Laundry List

#### No US-China war – not expansionist, economics, values

Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, and Richard Rosecrance, Adjunct Professor in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Winter 2010, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict” <http://globalasia.org/V4N4_Winter_2010/Jia_Qingguo_Richard_Rosecrance.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice.

### No US-China War – General – Deterrence

#### No China war – deterrence checks

Joseph S. Nye, University Professor at Harvard University, former US assistant secretary of defense, and former chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, 1-13-2014, “1914 Revisited?” <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s--nye-asks-whether-war-between-china-and-the-us-is-as-inevitable-as-many-believe-world-war-i-to-have-been> (accessed 6/1/16)

Today’s world is different from the world of 1914 in several important ways. One is that nuclear weapons give political leaders the equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser, and the Czar had had a crystal ball showing their empires destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they would have been more prudent in 1914. Certainly, the crystal-ball effect had a strong influence on US and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis. It would likely have a similar influence on US and Chinese leaders today.

### No US-China War – General – Interdependence

#### Economic ties prevent China war – comparative evidence

Noah Feldman, Bemis Professor of Law at Harvard University and Senior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, 5-16-2013, “The Unstoppable Force vs. the Immovable Object” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/china_united_states_cool_war_power?page=full> (accessed 6/1/16)

The argument that the United States and China will not find themselves in a struggle for global power depends on one historical fact: Never before has the dominant world power been so economically interdependent with the rising challenger it must confront. Under these conditions, trade and debt provide overwhelming economic incentives to avoid conflict that would be costly to all. Over time, the two countries' mutual interests will outweigh any tensions that arise between them.

### No US-China War – General – Interdependence

#### Chinese leaders will choose growth over war – prefer our evidence – best analysis of Chinese political decisionmaking

J Michael Cole, former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9-27-2012, “The Limits of Chinese Hard Power” [http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/limits+Chinese+hard+power/7310477/story.html](http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/op-ed/limits%2BChinese%2Bhard%2Bpower/7310477/story.html) (last accessed October 2012)

Furthermore, assuming that rational voices prevail within the Chinese Communist Party — and there is every reason to believe that this will be the case — Beijing’s principal consideration remains domestic stability, which in turn remains contingent on continued economic growth. Nothing would risk disrupting that delicate balance as a war with a regional power, let alone the U.S., and the probable economic sanctions that would ensue. The need to keep the economy running therefore serves as a brake against reckless militarization of Chinese foreign policy.

### No US-China War – General – Prodict

#### Low risk of US-China war – expert consensus goes our way

Ali Wyne, researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2-23-2012, “The future of the US-China relationship” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/23/the-future-of-the-u-s-china-relationship/> (accessed 6/1/16)

The good news is that while strategic tension between them is inevitable, a military conflict is not. The RAND Corporation recently explored six flashpoints that could trigger one, but concluded that war was not “probable in any of the cases” over the next 30 years. Meanwhile, a new survey of 1,600 U.S. international-relations scholars assigns U.S.-China war a 23% probability over that same window—appreciable, but low.

### No US-China War – ECS

#### No risk of war in the East China Sea

Trefor Moss, Hong Kong journalist and former Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2-10-2013, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true> (accessed 6/1/16)

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).

### No US-China War – ECS

#### China won’t fight wars for territory – they’ll find a diplomatic solution – growth, US power checks conflicts

Graham Allison, Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Robert Blackwill, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1-28-2013, “Beijing still prefers diplomacy over force” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2bda1e4c-694c-11e2-9246-00144feab49a.html#axzz2N5pXaSjg (accessed 6/1/16)

As tensions mount over competing claims for contested territories, should we expect Beijing to use military force to advance its claims? From the perspective of the grand strategist, the answer is no – unless it is provoked by others. “China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, and that it needs open sea lanes. They are determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan,” Mr Lee says. In his view, it is highly unlikely that China would choose to confront the US military at this point, since it is still at a clear technological and military disadvantage. This means that, in the near term, it will be more concerned with using diplomacy, not force, in foreign policy.

### No US-China War – SCS

#### No SCS war – costs outweigh benefits – China won’t use force

Allen Carlson, Associate Professor in the Government Department at Cornell University, 2-21-2013, “China Keeps the Peace at Sea” published in Foreign Affairs, <http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2013/02/china-keeps-peace-at-sea_27.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan.

### No US-China War – SCS

#### No SCS war – no benefits, costs too high – expert consensus

VOA News, 9-4-2012, “Will South China Sea Disputes Lead to War?” <http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-war-unlikely/1501780.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

“A minor military clash in the South China Sea is, rather worryingly, a distinct and growing possibility,” according to Ian Storey from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. Storey, an expert on Asia Pacific maritime security, goes even further. He envisions the possibility of differences over fishing rights or energy exploration turning into a military clash. “Caused by miscalculation, misperception or miscommunication, it’s just a question of time before one these skirmishes results in loss of life,” Storey said. A South China Sea War is Unlikely But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown conflict is unlikely. “It is in no country’s interests to spill blood or treasure over this issue – the costs far outweigh the benefits,” Storey said. Other experts agree. James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College says admires how China has been able to get its way in spreading it claims of sovereignty without becoming a bully. “[China] gradually consolidated the nation's maritime claims while staying well under the threshold for triggering outside -most likely American -intervention,” said Holmes. “Is war about to break out over bare rocks? I don't think so.” writes Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Political Strategist for the geopolitical analysis group Stratfor. Kaplan, however, doesn’t give much hope for negotiations. “The issues involved are too complex, and the power imbalance between China and its individual neighbors is too great,” he said. For that reason, Kaplan says China holds all the cards. Kaplan doesn’t look for Chinese military aggression against other claimants. That, he says, would be counterproductive for its goals in the region. “It would completely undermine its carefully crafted ‘peaceful rise’ thesis and push Southeast Asian countries into closer strategic alignment with the US,” said Kaplan.

### No US-China War – Taiwan

#### No impact – China would get destroyed if they tried to invade

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, former Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, and former China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, 1-31-2014, “China’s Deceptively Weak (and Dangerous) Military,” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-deceptively-weak-and-dangerous-military/?allpages=yes> (accessed 6/1/16)

The PLA simply does not have enough transport ships to make the crossing, and those it does have are remarkably vulnerable to Taiwanese anti-ship cruise missiles, guided rockets, smart cluster munitions, mobile artillery and advanced sea mines – not to mention its elite corps of American-trained fighter and helicopter pilots. Even if some lucky PLA units could survive the trip (not at all a safe assumption), they would be rapidly overwhelmed by a small but professional Taiwan military that has been thinking about and preparing for this fight for decades.

### No US-China War – Taiwan

#### No Taiwan war – economic integration, peaceful resolution is more likely

Stimson Center, November 2012, “A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era: Military Superiority, Agility, and Efficiency” <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/A_New_US_Defense_Strategy_for_a_New_Era.pdf> (accessed 6/1/16)

In addition, as China’s economic and military power grows, a continuing US military presence in Japan and rotational deployments of naval, marine, and/ or air units to the Western Pacific may be important to reassure neighboring states, and to encourage the peaceful resolution of China’s differences with some of its neighbors. These disputes, which sometimes have threatened to escalate into military conflict, stem from disagreements over which nation owns certain islands in the South and East China seas, and the extent of each country’s maritime economic zone and resultant control of undersea resources, especially oil and gas reserves. One also could imagine circumstances leading to an effort by China to seize Taiwan by force, which would likely escalate to involve US military forces. This scenario increasingly appears unlikely given the island’s tightening economic integration with the mainland. China remains committed to the reunification of Taiwan, but a peaceful resolution of the issue seems more likely now than reunification by force.

### No US-China War – Taiwan – AT: China Wins

#### China won’t use military force – war is net-worse for China even if they win

Zachary Keck, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, 12-24-2013, “Why China Won't Attack Taiwan,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/> (accessed 6/1/16)

Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan’s formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han Chinese on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere. The entire situation would be a nightmare for Chinese leaders. Consequently, they are nearly certain to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.

### No US-China War – AT: Cyberattacks – China

#### China isn’t a military cyber-threat – insufficient expertise

Jon R. Lindsay, Assistant Research Scientist at the University of California, San Diego, May 2015, “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat,” <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cyber_threat.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

Despite high levels of Chinese political harassment and espionage, there is little evidence of skill or subtlety in China's military cyber operations. Although Chinese strategists describe cyberspace as a highly asymmetric and decisive domain of warfare, China's military cyber capacity does not live up to its doctrinal aspirations. A disruptive attack on physical infrastructure requires careful testing, painstaking planning, and sophisticated intelligence. Even experienced U.S. cyber operators struggle with these challenges. By contrast, the Chinese military is rigidly hierarchical and has no wartime experience with complex information systems. Further, China's pursuit of military "informatization" (i.e., emulation of the U.S. network-centric style of operations) increases its dependence on vulnerable networks and exposure to foreign cyberattack. To be sure, China engages in aggressive cyber campaigns, especially against nongovernmental organizations and firms less equipped to defend themselves than government entities. These activities, however, do not constitute major military threats against the United States, and they do nothing to defend China from the considerable intelligence and military advantages of the United States.

### No US-China War – AT: Cyberattacks – General

#### No cyberwar – states are cautious, deterrence checks, norms solve

Brandon Valeriano, Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, and Ryan Maness, PhD Candidate at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 11-21-2012, “The Fog of Cyberwar” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138443/brandon-valeriano-and-ryan-maness/the-fog-of-cyberwar?page=show (accessed 6/1/16)

Cyberattacks are rare, and when they do occur, states are cautious in their use of force. As with conventional and nuclear conflict, some of the principles of deterrence and mutually assured destruction apply. Any aggressor in cyberspace faces the acute threat of blowback: having techniques replicated and repeated against the initiator. Once developed, a cyberweapon can easily be copied and used by a tech-savvy operative with access to a critical system such as the Defense Department’s network, which foreign-government hackers have had success infiltrating. Far from making interstate cyberwarfare more common, the ease of launching an attack actually keeps the tactic in check. Most countries’ cyberdefenses are weak, and a state trying to exploit an adversary’s weakness may be similarly vulnerable, inviting easy retaliation. An unspoken but powerful international norm against civilian targets further limits the terms of cyberwarfare.

### No US-China War – AT: Miscalc

#### Low risk of miscalculation

Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, and Richard Rosecrance, Adjunct Professor in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Winter 2010, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict” <http://globalasia.org/V4N4_Winter_2010/Jia_Qingguo_Richard_Rosecrance.html> (accessed 6/1/16)

Finally, leaders of the two countries have learned how to cooperate after years of interaction. With the scope and depth of contacts increasing, China and the US find themselves with greater understanding and appreciation of each other’s legitimate interests and political sensitivities than ever before. Policy makers in the two countries not only know each other as counterparts, but also increasingly as personal friends. Many become acquainted long before they become important in their respective policy making institutions. Previous misunderstandings at the policy level are no longer serious. This has made miscalculation between the two countries less likely and facilitated cooperation.

### No US-China War – AT: Nuclear Escalation

#### No nuclear escalation – Chinese defense posture proves

Elbridge Colby, principal analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, focuses on strategic and deterrence; previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense working on nuclear-weapons policy and arms control, 7-31-2013, “Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=show> (accessed 6/1/16)

Moreover, the Chinese themselves act like they expect to wage a war with the United States that includes at least some attacks on the Chinese mainland without escalating to the nuclear level. Why else would they be spending huge quantities of money, time and effort on building up such a formidable air-defense system to defend against air and missile attacks against mainland China? As the Pentagon’s 2013 China military report puts it: China has developed a national integrated air defense system (IADS) to defend key strategic cities and borders, territorial claims, and forces against threats from the air. Overall, China’s IADS represents a multilayered defense consisting of weapons systems, radars and C4ISR platforms working together to counter multiple types of air threats at various ranges and altitudes. One of China’s primary goals is to defend against precision strike munitions such as cruise and ballistic missiles, especially those launched from long distances. These investments would be totally nonsensical if China were expecting to rely on its nuclear forces to respond to U.S. conventional attacks on the mainland. China’s leaders are many things, but foolish and irrational don’t seem to be among of them. Rather, China appears to be planning to look primarily to its growing conventional air-defense network—not nuclear strikes—to deal with the threat of air and missile attacks against the mainland.

### No US-China War – AT: Nuclear Escalation – AT: No China NFU

#### China still operates under the NFU doctrine – won’t use nukes first

M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4-22-2013, “China has not (yet) changed its position on nuclear weapons” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/22/china-has-not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/?all=true> (accessed 6/1/16)

Second, the absence of the no first-use policy in the 2012 white paper does not support Acton’s contention that China is changing its nuclear doctrine. Here, Acton overlooks that this edition of China’s bi-annual defense white papers is different from past volumes in one important respect. According to Major General Chen Zhou, one of the white paper’s drafters and a researcher at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, the 2012 white paper uses a thematic model (zhuanti xing) and not a comprehensive one. In the past, the comprehensively-oriented white papers all had the same title, such China’s National Defense in 2010. The title of the 2012 edition, however, reflects the new thematic focus: Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces. By discussing in more detail the structure and missions of China’s armed forces, the 2012 white paper dropped a chapter found in all previous ones entitled “National Defense Policy.” In the past editions, this chapter contained the references to China’s no first-use policy (as well as many other defense policies). Applying Occam’s razor, the lack of a chapter on China’s national defense policies can account for the absence of a reference to the no first-use policy. In addition, the white paper’s discussion of the use of nuclear weapons is consistent with the no first-use policy. The white paper refers to “the principle of building a lean and effective force,” repeating language from the 2006 white paper that officially detailed China’s nuclear strategy for the first time. Second, it states that China’s nuclear weapons will only be used under one condition: “If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the [Second Artillery] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack (jianjue fanji).” Here, the 2012 white paper uses the exact same sentence as the 2008 white paper, which did contain a reference to the no first-use policy. More generally, a nuclear counterattack is the only campaign for China’s nuclear forces that has been described in authoritative Chinese doctrinal texts, starting with the 1987 edition of the Science of Strategy (Zhanlue Xue). Acton also cites a speech that Xi Jinping gave to party delegates from the Second Artillery in December 2012. In public reporting of his speech, Xi stated that the Second Artillery provides “strategic support for our great power status.” Xi also did not mention the no first-use policy. But Xi did not mention any other elements of China’s nuclear policy, either, or anything related to when and how China’s nuclear forces would be used. Instead, the absence of the no-first use policy in this speech was likely another “false negative” regarding a change in China’s nuclear doctrine. Furthermore, Xi in his remarks praised the Second Artillery for “resolutely carrying out the policies and instructions of the party center and Central Military Commission.” Given that Hu Jintao re-affirmed no first use at the April 2012 nuclear summit in Seoul, these “policies and instructions” would have included the no first-use policy. To be clear, Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering its no first-use policy. The debate was especially intense during the mid to late 2000s. Some participants in the debate suggested that no first use might not apply in certain situations that would be seen as equivalent of a “first use,” including conventional strikes on China’s nuclear forces or facilities as well as strikes on strategic targets like the Three Gorges Dam or the top Chinese leadership. In the end, however, a high-level decision was made to maintain the no first-use policy and the internal debate concluded without any change to China’s position.

# Neg CFIUS

CFIUS is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States reviews security issues with economic trade with countries including China.

## Case

### Inherency – BIT Now

#### BIT will already happen now, and the aff doesn’t resolve the biggest stumbling block

Robert Held, financial consultant currently living in Geneva, June 29, 2016

“China: Why reciprocity in market access is pivotal” <http://atimes.com/2016/06/china-why-reciprocity-in-market-access-is-pivotal/> (accessed 7/8/16)

Although the high-level eighth [Strategic and Economic Dialogue](https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0484.aspx) between the US and China yielded only[few results](http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/few-bright-spots-in-china-us-dialogue), such as China agreeing to extend a rather symbolic RMB 250 billion Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor quota to the US, officials from both countries [emphasized](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/07/c_135420058.htm) their desire for concluding the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which had been stalled for years, raising hopes China is officially ready to allow more foreign investment to flow in.

Indeed, the biggest stepping-stone in concluding the BIT between the two countries so far has been China’s lack of [reciprocity](http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/05/18-china-global-investment-dollar), namely its barring of foreign investors from entering a number of protected economic sectors. Hence, bringing China to downsize the “negative list” of off-limits sectors is pivotal in reaching an agreement – which is precisely what Beijing [promised](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-trade-idUSKCN0YS024) would do on June 6.

#### Strong motivation for getting it done already – plan isn’t needed

Nicolas Jenny, specialist in European and Asian political risk who currently works for a private urban development firm in Hanoi, Vietnam and has amaster's at Sciences Po Paris and Fudan University and holds a bachelor's from the University of Bristol, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

However, there is a strong impetus for both countries to overcome these issues.

The US and China have already made [narrowing down](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/15/us-usa-china-investment-idUSKCN0RF2KN20150915) the list of sectors which will be restricted to foreign investment a key priority. The time is therefore ripe for producing results – political momentum on both sides of the Pacific is strong.

### Inherency – No CFIUS Concerns

#### CFIUS doesn’t block Chinese investment and a rise in applications proves China knows that

Anne Salladin, attorney with Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, March 30, 2016

“How the US reviews China deals for national security” <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/30/how-the-us-reviews-china-deals-for-national-security-commentary.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

But it's not all bad news – and it's not time for a panic or retreat for Chinese investors. While there are an increasing number of reviews by CFIUS of Chinese investment, it's because there is more investment by the Chinese in the U.S., not because there is greater scrutiny. Chinese acquirers are filing more transactions with CFIUS and, like transactions from all other countries, a vast majority of them pass muster. Chinese investors' willingness to initiate the process means that there is confidence that the process can be managed – and that deals will be successful.

Despite the rhetoric from the U.S., the reality is that the United States is open to foreign investment, and CFIUS is to be consulted – not feared.

#### CFIUS doesn’t block FDI

Tatman Savio, Hong Kong-based partner in the international trade group of [Akin Gump](http://akingump.com/), and William Leahy, Washington, D.C.-based associate with [Harris, Wiltshire, and Grannis](http://www.hwglaw.com/), and Alex Conway, associate in [Akin Gump](http://akingump.com/)’s D.C. office, July 6, 2016

“Chinese Investment in the U.S. – Lessons and Opportunities” <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinese-investment-in-the-u-s-lessons-and-opportunities/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Chinese investors and their potential acquisition targets should take note of these developments, which could imperil Chinese attempts at large-scale acquisitions. However, these dynamics should not obscure recent successes involving Chinese investments in the United States. Despite political and economic hurdles, several large-scale Chinese investments have cleared the CFIUS process and stand as proof that opportunities exist for prudently structured and strategically focused deals.

### Protectionism Adv – Alt Cause

#### Populist anger is an alt cause – makes protectionism inevitable

Brian Padden, VOA News, July 1, 2016

“Asia Braces for Rising Protectionism From US, Europe”, <http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-braces-for-rising-protectionism-from-us-europe/3399971.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Export dependent countries in Asia are growing increasingly concerned that the growing populist anger in the U.S. and Europe against perceived unfair trade policies could lead to a global economic slowdown.

#### Brexist proves protectionism will happen

Korea Times, July 5, 2016

“Free trade will continue to ensure prosperity” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/07/202_208671.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

The aftermath of Brexit in international trade appears enormous. As a member of the EU, Britain is currently enjoying free trade with 27 other EU countries without worrying about tariffs and other trade restrictions. With the United Kingdom's divorce from the bloc, however, the EU will become protective about British exports and vice versa. Such protectionist moves might spread rapidly across the world amid the prolonged global economic slump.

### Protectionism Adv – CFIUS Not Protectionist

#### CFIUS isn’t protectionist – deals are barely ever blocked

Brandt Pasco, CFIUS and Export Control Lawyer, September 24, 2012

“What you need to know about CFIUS” <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=82a9d103-4eff-4eac-9fbd-42fb5c8cd83>, (accessed 7/8/16)

A. Whenever a transaction is withdrawn during or after CFIUS review, or when CFIUS imposes a risk mitigation agreement on an investor, it always raises these concerns. It is easy to imagine that national security review of investments is just a cover for protectionist policies. But it simply isn’t true. Only in the rarest of instances does CFIUS close the door on foreign investment, and the bar for such a decision is high, involving lengthy debate at the highest levels of government, including the President.

#### Even if they are right that it sometimes blocks Chinese FDI, it’s not protectionism, just reciprocity.

Eliza King, works for an independent Brisbane-based NGO specialising in human rights and development throughout the Asian region, March 16, 2016

“Foreign Investment: Why Does the U.S. Mistrust China?” <http://intpolicydigest.org/2016/03/16/foreign-investment-why-does-the-u-s-mistrust-china/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

That assessment is hard to square, though, with foreign leaders exasperated by China’s state-controlled business practices, [currency manipulations](http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/251534-time-to-take-action-against-chinese-currency-manipulation), and hacking and intellectual property theft that have made Americans, especially, far more shrewd about the way China has been “biding its time.”

The West fully appreciates China’s strategic investment in [innovation](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2016/0131/Why-China-hacks-the-world), and its transformative power for the Chinese people, but the position of Western – and many ASEAN nations dealing with China – isn’t based in a protective isolationism, so much as it is on expectations of a level playing field.

### Protectionism Adv – Not High

#### No rise in protectionism happening now – any increase in specific measures are normal considering the economy

Financial Times, June 23, 2016

“Protectionism may bark but it still has no bite” <https://next.ft.com/content/b163ce90-3942-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7>, (accessed 7/8/16)

However, a closer look at the numbers suggests that the rise in protectionist measures is concentrated in well-established mechanisms such as duties against dumped and state-subsidised imports. Their increase is well inside normal boundaries given the state of the world economy. Governments should use what discretion they have to limit the use of such measures, but must also prevent more insidious and covert forms of protectionism from distorting world commerce.

#### China isn’t trying to be more protectionist

Brian Padden, VOA News, July 1, 2016

“Asia Braces for Rising Protectionism From US, Europe”, <http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-braces-for-rising-protectionism-from-us-europe/3399971.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Economists say Asian countries can take further measures to open up their economies and increase investment in industrialized countries to mitigate protectionist fervor in the West. Drysdale said that is already happening to some degree.

### Relations Adv – Appeasement Doesn’t Solve

#### Appeasing China only emboldens them – staying strong on Chinese investments is key to prevent conflict

Minxin Pei, the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, February 23, 2016

“Washington Is Giving the Cold Shoulder to Chinese Investment” <http://fortune.com/2016/02/23/chinese-company-acquisitions-us-companies/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

The growing opposition to Chinese investments in the U.S. reflects a sea change in Washington. In the last few years, a consensus is emerging that America’s engagement policy with China—pursued by both Republican and Democratic administrations since Richard Nixon went to Beijing—has not delivered the expected dividends. As China has grown stronger and more influential, it has shown a greater willingness to challenge U.S. interests and values. Militarily, China has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in acquiring advanced weapon systems that pose a serious threat to American naval forces in the Western Pacific. Most troubling is China’s latest escalation in the South China Sea, where it has built large artificial islands in disputed areas.

### Relations Adv – Talks Solve

#### Current BIT talks alone solve relations – don’t need there to be an actual treaty

Nicolas Jenny, specialist in European and Asian political risk who currently works for a private urban development firm in Hanoi, Vietnam and has amaster's at Sciences Po Paris and Fudan University and holds a bachelor's from the University of Bristol, October 6, 2015

“Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

The process of negotiating towards a BIT is as important as the end result. BITs are difficult to achieve because they require negotiating through [political and economic security challenges](http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-china-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-next-week/) which are sensitive topics in both countries. However, the fact that both sides are willing to sit down and talk about these traditionally taboo areas is a success in itself and will help both sides become increasingly open in their dealings and achieve trust between one another.

### Relations Adv – Can’t Solve/Doesn’t Matter

#### Either US-China relations are compartmentalized and the aff doesn’t spillover or status quo cooperation solves the impact – but either way conflict isn’t a problem.

Dingding Chen, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany and is also the Founding Director of 海国图智研究院 （Intellisia Institute）, a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China, June 10, 2016

“Reality Check: The South China Sea Does Not Define the US-China Relationship” <http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/reality-check-the-south-china-sea-does-not-define-the-us-china-relationship/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

For example, at the recently concluded [Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/09/c_135424649.htm) in Beijing, a number of important agreements were moved along by both countries. Among them, the Bilateral Investment Treaty is a major one. Both sides agreed to speed up the process and exchange so-called negative lists soon. Renminbi trading will also soon head to the U.S. market, further deepening the economic interdependence between China and the United States.

And, of course, there are major global and regional issues that have seen positive cooperation between China and the United States during the last few years, including climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue, and, most recently, UN sanctions on North Korea. All this just shows how global the Sino-U.S. relationship really is, reminding us of the relative lack of importance of the South China Sea issue.

### Solvency – CFIUS Good

#### CFIUS key to Chinese investment – allays public concerns

PIIE, Peterson Institute of International Economics, February 2015,

“TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY”, Chapter 4, <https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf>, (accessed 7/8/16)

US sentiment toward growing Chinese investment is becoming more positive, especially at the state level, where governors vie to attract job-creating fi rms to their economies. However, convincing Americans that Chinese investment does not pose an economic or security threat can be diffi cult. As a side advantage, the CFIUS process provides reassurance to the public at least with respect to security concerns.

#### That’s key to successful Chinese FDI

PIIE, Peterson Institute of International Economics, February 2015,

“TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY”, Chapter 4, <https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Missing from CFIUS’s evaluation—a feature that characterizes investment review in many other countries—is¶ that it does not take into account economic interests when deciding whether to recommend disapproval to¶ the president. The United States would like the BIT to make sure that China’s investment review does not take¶ economic interests into account for US investments into China. One of the core tenets of the US government¶ is to facilitate an environment of free enterprise, where markets determine prices and fi rms compete freely¶ against one another. A US-China BIT is not likely to make the process any easier, but any government is going¶ to reserve that right to block potentially threatening investments. Chinese fi rms should feel confi dent that, if¶ they do not pose a national security threat, their transactions will not be blocked by CFIUS. To be sure, Chinese¶ fi rms face other potential pitfalls. As with Japanese investors in the 1980s and 1990s, some members of¶ the American public are wary of Chinese takeovers. Therefore Chinese investors must have a strategy to deal¶ with public opinion. Getting an early feel for how the transaction will be perceived is critical, and Chinese fi rms¶ should not expect that they can fl y under the radar of US media attention. Early opinion surveys may save time¶ and money down the line.

### Solvency – BIT Impossible – Congress

#### Even if the plan gets China on board with a BIT – no way it gets through Congress

PIIE, Peterson Institute of International Economics, February 2015,

“TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY”, <https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Only two of the United States’ 41 BITs—the US-Rwanda BIT and the US-Uruguay BIT—have entered into force in the past decade. This limited harvest refl ects both the challenge that partner countries face in meeting the terms of the US model BIT and the diffi culty that US offi cials face in securing congressional approval of an investment treaty. The US ratifi cation process—requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate—is prolonged and uncertain. Indeed, many US trading partners prefer to negotiate comprehensive investment chapters in their free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, which are similar in content to BITs but differ in the process in which the United States ratifi es and implements the pact.

#### Congress won’t approve a BIT

David Dollar, senior fellow with the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy) and [Global Economy and Development](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/global) programs at Brookings and is a leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations and previously was the U.S. Treasury Department's economic and financial emissary to China and formely worked at the World Bank for more than 20 years, serving as country director for China and Mongolia from 2004 to 2009, May 18, 2016

“What do China’s global investments mean for China, the U.S., and the world?” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/05/18-china-global-investment-dollar, (accessed 7/8/16)

This issue of getting China to open up its protected markets is high on the policy agenda of the United States and other major economies. The United States has been negotiating with China over a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would be based on a small negative list; that is, there would be a small number of agreed sectors that remain closed on each side, but otherwise investment would be open in both directions. So far, however, negotiations on the BIT have been slow. It is difficult for China to come up with an offer that includes only a small number of protected sectors. And there are questions as to whether the U.S. Congress would approve an investment treaty with China in the current political environment, even if a good one were negotiated.

### Solvency – A2: China Retaliatory Measures

#### China’s review process isn’t about retaliation – it’s logical and inevitable progression in its own trade policies

Souvik Saha, JD from Northwestern and MA from Columbia, Fall 2012

“CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization”, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 33, Issue 1, <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=njilb>, (accessed 7/8/16)

While the United States’ approach to reviewing foreign investments for national security concerns has evolved for nearly four decades, China’s framework is in its nascent stages. Given that China’s new model came into existence in the wake of several failed acquisitions of U.S. companies in the United States, some fear that the model is reactionary in motive. However, China’s national security review process can also be seen as the next logical step in the continued liberalization of its economy. This portion of the Comment analyzes the historical buildup to China’s adoption of a formal national security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions, as well as key features of the model.

### China Aggression DA Link

#### Plan causes China aggression – bolsters its economy and helps expand their global influence

[Robert Caskey](http://www.americanthinker.com/author/robert_caskey/), American Thinker staffwriter, April 7, 2016

“It’s Time for a Moratorium on Chinese Investment”, <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/04/its_time_for_a_moratorium_on_chinese_investment_.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

Succeeding on the Chinese market is therefore tremendously difficult for U.S. companies. On the flipside, Chinese investors face almost no barriers on doing business on American soil, a fact that is currently helping Beijing prop up its ailing economy and advance its global influence. What should be obvious, even to the Obama administration and certainly to its successor, is that these plays are just another expression of China’s unquenchable thirst for expansion. These strategies may seem new to targets in the West, but not to a Chinese government accustomed to deploying the same trade and financial weapons across the African continent and Asia.

Western analysts recognize China’s compelling need for agricultural resources to feed its ever-growing population and natural resources to supply its voracious industries. What they miss, with a naïveté that leads to peril, is that China’s longstanding commitment to expansion through trade, as the true endgame of a foreign policy that pays lip service to its “peaceful rise,” really means Chinese hegemony – and that’s a threat the U.S. must put to rest.

### Politics Links – Plan Unpopular

#### Politicians are increasingly turning against Chinese investment in the US

Tatman Savio, Hong Kong-based partner in the international trade group of [Akin Gump](http://akingump.com/), and William Leahy, Washington, D.C.-based associate with [Harris, Wiltshire, and Grannis](http://www.hwglaw.com/), and Alex Conway, associate in [Akin Gump](http://akingump.com/)’s D.C. office, July 6, 2016

“Chinese Investment in the U.S. – Lessons and Opportunities” <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinese-investment-in-the-u-s-lessons-and-opportunities/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

At the same time, the political climate in the United States threatens to become increasingly hostile toward Chinese investment. Earlier this year, a member of Congress indicated she would reintroduce a bill to expand the mandate of CFIUS. Furthermore, the presumptive presidential nominees are focusing significant time and energy discussing perceived inequities in the trading relationship with China.

#### Plan is very unpopular with Congress

Anne Salladin, attorney with Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, March 30, 2016

“How the US reviews China deals for national security” <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/30/how-the-us-reviews-china-deals-for-national-security-commentary.html>, (accessed 7/8/16)

U.S. lawmakers have also sounded the alarm on Chinese investment, threatening new legislation to expand the scope of CFIUS's reviews, while other lawmakers demanded "a full and rigorous investigation" of the Chicago Stock Exchange deal and raised concerns about other deals. At the same time, CFIUS issued its annual report showing that, in 2014, it had reviewed more transactions from China than from any other country – for the third year in a row.

# Neg Climate Coop

## Case

### Inherency – Global Climate Action Now

#### Status quo solves – the momentum to act on climate change is too strong for current efforts to be insufficient

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, July 8, 2016

“A bright spot amid Brexit? Growing momentum for global climate action.” <http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2016/07/08/a-bright-spot-amid-brexit-growing-momentum-for-global-climate-action/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

In short, leaders around the world have come to the realization that the path to shared global prosperity is a low-carbon path.

That makes the politics of climate action more resilient now than they ever have been before. And that is good news to keep in mind in these uncertain days.

### Inherency – US-China Climate Coop Now

#### US-China climate cooperation is resilient and booming now

[Jackson Ewing](http://theconversation.com/profiles/jackson-ewing-198402), adjunct research fellow in international relations at [Nanyang Technological University](http://theconversation.com/institutions/nanyang-technological-university), December 10, 2015

“Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate Change” <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate problem, and view it as a refreshingly non-zero sum game. They recently formed and now cofund the [U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center](http://www.us-china-cerc.org/), with a mandate extending through 2020, and are pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon capture and sequestration to sustainable urban infrastructure.

These connections feed into growing business ties, manifested most publicly through the annual [U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum](http://www.cleanenergyforum.org/). Such ties create incentives that are likely to keep climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan.

#### Many examples of US-China climate cooperation being high now and solving leadership needs

Melanie Hart et al, Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Pete Ogden, Senior Fellow at the Center, and Kelly Sims Gallagher, professor of energy and environmental policy at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, June 13, 2016

“Green Finance: The Next Frontier for U.S.-China Climate Cooperation” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/06/13/139276/green-finance-the-next-frontier-for-u-s-china-climate-cooperation/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

All told, the United States and China are making significant efforts to reduce domestic emissions. Both countries are demonstrating strong leadership on domestic climate policy, and that has opened up new opportunities for mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The United States and China are already collaborating through the Climate Change Working Group, which has launched multiple collaborative projects under the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED; the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, which brings U.S. and Chinese experts together for joint clean energy technology development; and the Mission Innovation initiative, which aims to raise research and development funding across multiple sectors, including clean energy sectors in the United States and China. U.S. and Chinese officials also are engaged in a Domestic Policy Dialogue, formally established at the 2015 S&ED, which is a bilateral forum for sharing lessons learned from each nation’s climate policy experiences to date. Going forward, there is room to expand these initiatives. Possible areas for enhanced cooperation on domestic policy include reducing non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, improving measurement capabilities for land-use and forestry-sector climate impacts and for policies for the power sector, technological innovation, and resilience policy.

### Inherency – A2: Paris Bad b/c Not Binding

#### Non-binding is better

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, November 11, 2015

“4 wins we need to make the Paris climate talks a success”, <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/11/11/4-wins-we-need-make-paris-climate-talks-success>, (accessed 7/9/16)

The silver lining here is that non-binding commitments can actually encourage greater ambition and participation, both of which are essential to an effective international response to climate change.

### Warming Adv – China Climate Action Now

#### China is committed to climate change measures – status quo solves

[Jackson Ewing](http://theconversation.com/profiles/jackson-ewing-198402), adjunct research fellow in international relations at [Nanyang Technological University](http://theconversation.com/institutions/nanyang-technological-university), December 10, 2015

“Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate Change” <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

In China, conventional pollution has moved environmental issues up the list of development priorities and made them part of the country’s core national strategic calculations.

The [scale and scope of protests](http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesasia/2015/06/22/environmental-protests-expose-weakness-in-chinas-leadership/) against air pollution and environmental decline – which[by some measurements lead to 1.6 million deaths per year](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/asia/study-links-polluted-air-in-china-to-1-6-million-deaths-a-year.html?_r=0) – are on the rise, and Chinese leadership is responding through rhetoric and practice.

#### China is serious about taking climate change measures now – meat guidelines prove

Oliver Milman, environmental reporter for The Guardian, and Stuart Leavenworth, freelance journalist, June 20, 2016

“China's plan to cut meat consumption by 50% cheered by climate campaigners” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/20/chinas-meat-consumption-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

The Chinese government has outlined a plan to reduce its citizens’ meat consumption by 50%, in a move that climate campaigners hope will provide major heft in the effort to avoid runaway global warming.

New [dietary guidelines](http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/04/8a2389fd54b964c80154c1d781d90197.html) drawn up by China’s health ministry recommend that the nation’s 1.3 billion population should consume between 40g to 75g of meat per person each day. The measures, released once every 10 years, are designed to improve public health but could also provide a significant cut to greenhouse gas emissions.

#### China’s meat consumption cuts solve the aff

Oliver Milman, environmental reporter for The Guardian, and Stuart Leavenworth, freelance journalist, June 20, 2016

“China's plan to cut meat consumption by 50% cheered by climate campaigners” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/20/chinas-meat-consumption-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

“China’s move to cut meat consumption in half would not only have a huge impact on public health, it is a massive leadership step towards drastically reducing carbon emissions and reaching the goals set out in the Paris agreement,” said James Cameron.

#### China solving now – huge investments in clean energy and establishment of carbon pricing prove

Fred Krupp, Environmental Defense Fund President and is a widely recognized leader of the international environmental community, September 10, 2015

“4 undeniable signs we're making progress on climate change” <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/09/10/4-undeniable-signs-were-making-progress-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

2. China is building momentum for global action

In September 2015, China announced it will roll out a national carbon trading program in 2017, the world’s largest. China also submitted its climate plan to the United Nations in June, confirming it will let emissions peak by 2030 – and possibly sooner.

I know from my colleague Dan Dudek in China that “sooner” is possible because this is a country that’s [serious about climate action](https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/02/24/how-i-know-china-serious-about-climate-action).

### Warming Adv – Alt Cause – Brexit

#### Brexit destabilizes the UK’s commitment – killing the global climate change regime

Sara Stefanini, Politico writer, June 24, 2016

“5 ways Brexit will transform energy and climate” <http://www.politico.eu/article/5-ways-brexit-will-transform-energy-and-climate/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

A post-Cameron leadership could also change the country’s approach to the Paris climate agreement. “It could potentially submit a highly ambitious [nationally determined contribution] to the U.N., it could ramp down its ambition, or it could ignore it, which would be a blow to the whole process,” said Will Nichols, a senior environment and climate change analyst at the risk advisory firm Verisk Maplecroft.

#### European nations are key

Nat Keohane, an economist and EDF's Vice President for Global Climate, November 25, 2015

“A stage and a spotlight for action: Why the Paris climate talks are different” <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/11/25/stage-and-spotlight-action-why-paris-climate-talks-are-different?_ga=1.61433964.1949651119.146804851>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Of course, the United States and the E.U., where emissions are already trending down, must do more. They also have a responsibility to help developing countries transition to robust low-carbon growth and adapt to climate change – as well as a strong self-interest in doing so.

### Warming Adv – Alt Cause – China Enforcement

#### Local government duplicity means China can never credibly lead on climate change

Wang Dan, a former leader of the 1989 pro-democracy movement at Tiananmen Square and lectures on the history of the People's Republic of China at Taiwan's National Tsing Hua University, July 7, 2016

“How Credible Are China's Environmental Promises?” <http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/promises-07072016112523.html>, (accessed 7/9/16)

China has been focusing on environmental issues for a very long time, and yet the problems seem to get worse and worse.
There are many reasons for this, not least of which is the duplicitous attitudes of local governments.
What credibility do China's promises to the rest of the world have, if Beijing can't even rein in its local governments?

#### Structural issues mean China will never be an effective leader on climate change

Wang Dan, a former leader of the 1989 pro-democracy movement at Tiananmen Square and lectures on the history of the People's Republic of China at Taiwan's National Tsing Hua University, July 7, 2016

“How Credible Are China's Environmental Promises?” <http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/promises-07072016112523.html>, (accessed 7/9/16)

So local governments will always find a way to subtly resist central government directives about stricter observation of environmental regulations, while nodding along with them in public.
Until these structural problems in China's political system are resolved, there can be no confidence in any of China's environmental commitments.

### Relations Adv – Squo Coop Solves

#### Status quo coop already solves US-China conflict

Timothy R. Heath, senior defense and international analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, June 27, 2016

“South China Sea Spat a Symptom of U.S.-China Jockeying for Advantage” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19174/south-china-sea-spat-a-symptom-of-u-s-china-jockeying-for-advantage>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Despite the intensifying competition, powerful negative and positive inducements constrain the two countries from pursuing a destructive, hostile confrontation. Neither country is well-positioned politically or economically to engage in a long-term, highly antagonistic relationship, let alone a major conflict. In China, Xi continues to grapple with a fragile political situation as [elites feud and economic reforms stall](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-over-economic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state). In the U.S., the astonishing rise of presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and the unexpected appeal of Bernie Sanders’ failed candidacy for the Democratic nomination reflect an underlying popular ambivalence about U.S. international engagement. And it is not clear what benefit either country might gain by fighting a devastating conflict over issues related to the South China Sea.
In addition to the clear downsides of antagonistic relations, Beijing and Washington face strong positive incentives to stabilize ties. Both the United States and China recognize that progress on various global and regional problems will depend, in large part, on bilateral cooperation. The IMF’s latest projections [anticipate sluggish growth at best](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2016/NEW041216A.htm) for the global economy, underscoring the importance of coordination between the world’s two largest economies. The annual high-level bilateral forum known as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, held June 6-7, [highlighted other areas](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258146.htm) in which the two countries have worked together. Among these issues, leaders at that event highlighted [modest progress on climate change](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change)and [efforts to coordinate policy on North Korea](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-congress-idUSKCN0WJ2MS).

#### US-China conflict unlikely because current cooperation is enough for good relations

Fu Ying, the Chairperson of Foreign Affairs Committee in the National People's Congress, June 13, 2016

“The U.S. and China Are Neither Allies Nor Enemies — But They Must Get Along” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-ying/us-china-relationship\_b\_10439886.html , (accessed 7/9/16)

Perceptions in both China and the United States on China-U.S. relations are now highly diverse. In particular, [recent media reports](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/world/asia/us-south-china-sea-talks.html?_r=0) have painted the South China Sea as a new geopolitical wrestling ground for the two countries. However, if you look at what is happening in real life, you see a different picture.

Over the past three years, President Xi Jinping and President Obama have had [six](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint)lengthy meetings that cover wide-ranging subjects, giving a strong push to the relationship by initiating important programs of cooperation.

### Relations Adv – Climate Coop Doesn’t Solve

#### Empirics prove climate coop doesn’t spillover to resolve tensions in other areas

Zhang Hongzhou, Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, October 13, 2015

“China-US Climate Change Cooperation: Beyond Energy” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-us-climate-change-cooperation-beyond-energy/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Thankfully, unlike most aspects of Sino-U.S. relations where tensions are rising, bilateral cooperation on climate change has made remarkable progress, highlighted by the historic climate change agreement signed by the two countries in November 2014. During Xi Jinping’s first state visit to the United States last month, the two sides announced a new set of policies to combat climate change, including a national cap-and-trade program in China and a $3 billion fund from China to help developing countries curb global warming.

### Solvency – US/China Not Key

#### No one country or set of countries is key

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, July 8, 2016

“A bright spot amid Brexit? Growing momentum for global climate action.” <http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2016/07/08/a-bright-spot-amid-brexit-growing-momentum-for-global-climate-action/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

That is not to say that leadership on climate from both the U.K. and the EU is not vital; it is, and will continue to be. Taken as a whole, Europe is still the world’s third-largest emitter. It remains a powerful and valuable voice for ambition.

Fortunately, political support for climate action in the region remains high, with [60 percent](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/18/what-the-world-thinks-about-climate-change-in-7-charts/) of Europeans saying global warming is already harming people around the world.

But we are long past the days when climate progress depended on one bloc of countries. Just consider this:

### Carbon Pricing – China Doing Now

#### China has already committed to carbon pricing

Valerie Karplus, Assistant Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, December 14, 2015

“COMMENT: For carbon pricing in China, the question is not “if” but “how” – with lessons for the United States” <http://carbon-pulse.com/13359/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

One way to do this is to introduce economically-efficient climate policies, such as a price on CO2. On his September visit to the United States, President Xi announced that China would do exactly that, by developing a national emissions trading system (ETS) by 2017. The new system has great potential to deliver emissions reductions at a lower cost compared to existing command-and-control approaches, especially if authorities allow it to do most of the heavy lifting.

#### That solves the aff

NYT, New York Times, January 19, 2016

“Proof That a Price on Carbon Works” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/proof-that-a-price-on-carbon-works.html>, (accessed 7/9/16)

These actions deserve applause. But their real value may lie in providing a template for the rest of the world. Broad participation is essential to keeping warming below a point of no return; as a practical matter, it is also essential to keep companies from moving their operations to nations that do not impose a cost on carbon emissions.

In that context, China’s [announcement last year](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-president-obama-summit.html) that it would set up a national cap-and-trade system was hugely encouraging — the world’s largest emitter agreeing to tax itself to help solve a problem that, only a few years ago, it barely acknowledged. Yet Congress has refused to act even as it becomes clear that putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions is the most direct and cost-effective way to address climate change.

### Green Tech – Squo Solves

#### Green tech revolution happening now – status quo solves

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, July 8, 2016

“A bright spot amid Brexit? Growing momentum for global climate action.” <http://blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2016/07/08/a-bright-spot-amid-brexit-growing-momentum-for-global-climate-action/>, (accessed 7/8/16)

A clean energy revolution is underway: Wind power is competitive with coal in much of the world even without subsidies, the cost of solar panels has dropped 75 percent in less than a decade and new technologies for how we use and store energy more efficiently are transforming markets.

### Green Tech – Alt Cause

#### Brexit kills clean tech hopes

Sara Stefanini, Politico writer, June 24, 2016

“5 ways Brexit will transform energy and climate” <http://www.politico.eu/article/5-ways-brexit-will-transform-energy-and-climate/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Investors like long-term predictability, so the U.K.’s exit will likely cause upheaval for businesses planning to build renewable energy plants or drill for shale gas in the U.K., at least for a couple of years.

The chiefs of oil and gas majors BP, Shell and Centrica were among the 200 business leaders who signed a letter in February warning that a vote to leave “[put the economy at risk](http://www.politico.eu/article/top-uk-ceos-brexit-puts-jobs-at-risk/).”

Ambiguity about the new U.K.-EU relationship will raise uncertainty about changes in energy and climate policies, leaving investors in limbo. “And investor uncertainty often comes with a risk premium,” said Antony Froggatt, a senior research fellow at the London-based think tank Chatham House.

### Green Tech – Doesn’t Solve Competitiveness

#### The plan’s tradeoff with gas and oil production would hurt US competitiveness and leadership

Richard Kauzlarich, Real Clear Energy staffwriter, June 16, 2016

“U.S. Offshore Leasing Legacy: A Chance to Secure U.S. Energy Security” <http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2016/06/16/us_offshore_leasing_legacy_a_chance_to_secure_us_energy_security_109171.html>, (accessed 7/9/16)

Likewise, gas and oil production has transformed the United States from a position of reliance on foreign suppliers into a leader helping to meet global demand. Today, the United States is the largest producer of oil and natural gas, outperforming juggernauts like Russia and Saudi Arabia. Domestic supplies have alleviated fluctuations in the international markets, protecting consumers against price volatility and increased the [competitiveness of American industries](http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/4284/Gas-propelled_competitiveness.html)(like Chemicals) that rely on hydrocarbon based inputs.

### Politics Links – General Climate Change – Plan Unpopular

#### Congress strongly opposes climate change agreements

Nathaniel Keohane, Vice President at Environmental Defense Fund, where he leads EDF’s Global Climate program and helps to shape the organization’s advocacy for environmentally effective and economically sound climate policy, November 11, 2015

“4 wins we need to make the Paris climate talks a success”, <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/11/11/4-wins-we-need-make-paris-climate-talks-success>, (accessed 7/9/16)

For one, the targets that countries take on will not be binding under international law – something that would likely require approval by the U.S. Senate. In the current political climate, that appears unattainable for any treaty that needs implementing legislation, let alone one on climate change.

#### Climate change is hugely partisan

Keith Gaby, explores the intersection of politics and climate change for EDF, August 11, 2015
“A tipping point in the politics of climate change” <https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/08/11/tipping-point-politics-climate-change>, (accessed 7/9/16)

None of this means the fight is over. Climate change, which should be a scientific matter, is still wrapped around the axle of partisan politics – and unwinding it will take time.

### Politics Links – Carbon Pricing – Plan Unpopular

#### Carbon pricing empirically faces a ton of backlash from Congress

Valerie Karplus, Assistant Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, December 14, 2015

“COMMENT: For carbon pricing in China, the question is not “if” but “how” – with lessons for the United States” <http://carbon-pulse.com/13359/>, (accessed 7/9/16)

China, which is [responsible for about 28 percent](http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/05/history-carbon-dioxide-emissions) of worldwide CO2 emissions, has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon market in the next five to 10 years. However, in the United States (which produces about 16 percent of global CO2 emissions) the issue has become highly politicized, as seen by the failure of the 2009 Markey/Waxman Bill that would have established emissions trading. While the U.S. pledge at the Paris climate talks was quite ambitious (to reduce CO2 emissions by 26-28% by 2025, relative to 2005), discussions of how a CO2 price could help by lowering the cost of reaching this goal have all but stalled.

# Neg Space Cooperation

## Counterplans

### CP Solvency – U.S. space advancement

#### Experts agree: U.S. space leadership decline is inevitable without multiple internal reforms

Jesse Emspak, Staff Writer, March 8, 2016, “Space Race Losers? US Leadership in Danger, Report Warns,” Space.com, http://www.space.com/32185-united-states-space-exploration-leadership.html (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The United States could lose its long-held leadership position in space science, technology and exploration if the country doesn't renew its commitment to those fields soon, a coalition of space-industry organizations has warned. Such a commitment should include the completion of a crewed launch system, stable NASA budgets and continued partnerships with other nations on projects such as the [International Space Station](http://www.space.com/3-international-space-station.html), said the 12-group coalition, which jointly presented a white paper at the National Press Club on Friday (March 4). "What we have is a rather unprecedented consensus of the space community in the United States," said Elliot Pulham, CEO of the nonprofit Space Foundation and one of three experts who shared their thoughts with reporters at the document's unveiling.

#### Space conflicts with China are inevitable unless we improve our overall space-based capabilities

Allyson Versprille, Staff Writer, October 2015, “Analysts: U.S. Must Ramp Up Space Program,” National Defense Magazine, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/October/pages/AnalystsUSMustRampUpSpaceProgram.aspx (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The United States needs to put more emphasis on advancing space-based capabilities if it hopes to maintain its strategic advantage over China, analysts said. “In parallel with its space program, China continues to develop a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict,” said the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.” The report listed several incidents where China demonstrated these types of capabilities including: a 2007 anti-satellite missile test that resulted in the deliberate destruction of a defunct weather satellite and generated hundreds of pieces of debris; a 2013 launch that propelled an object moving on a trajectory toward geosynchronous orbit where many nations maintain communications and remote-sensing satellites; and an assumed 2014 follow-up test to the 2007 launch, though no satellites were destroyed.
“Many officials … believe that they are developing a capability to reach even higher orbits, which would allow them to target nearly all of our space assets,” said Henry Obering III, executive vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton and former director of the Missile Defense Agency. “Even though we rely heavily on space-based capabilities, we historically have chosen not to view space in the same way that we do air, land and sea when it comes to protecting our critical lines of communication.” Failure to understand that future battles are going to be fought in space could hurt the United States in the long run, he said, and tomorrow’s threats will be more severe than today’s as China specifically targets U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and power projection capabilities.

## Status Quo solves

### Cooperation now

#### We already have a cooperative dialogue with China on space. Either coop solves now or the plan would fail

Marcia S. Smith, President of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC (SpaceTech) and former Director of the Space Studies Board and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board at the U.S. National Research Council, June 26, 2015, “U.S., China Agree to Bilateral Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue,” Space Policy Online, http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/u-s-china-agree-to-bilateral-civil-space-cooperation-dialogue (Accessed 7-6-2016)

During recent meetings with Chinese officials, Secretary of State John Kerry agreed to establish a "U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue."  A State Department spokesman says the first meeting will be held before the end of October, but could not provide any other details. The lengthy [list](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm)of "outcomes" from the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) held in Washington, DC June 22-24, 2015, includes a section on cooperation in science, technology and agriculture.   Under that heading, the two countries agreed as follows: "101. Space: The United States and China decided to establish regular bilateral government-to-government consultations on civil space cooperation. The first U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue is to take place in China before the end of October Separate from the Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue, the two sides also decided to have exchanges on space security matters under the framework of the U.S.-China Security Dialogue before the next meeting of the Security Dialogue."

#### US-China Space Dialogue means we already engage in space coop

Vidvuds Beldavs, Staff Writer, December 7, 2015, “Prospects for US-China space cooperation,” Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The US-China Civil Space Dialogue can be seen as part of a process of building international collaboration in which the ISEF conference is a point of focus. Japan has agreed to host the next ISEF Conference in 2016 or possibly 2017. No doubt much will depend on continued progress with the US-China Civil Space Dialogue, with the next meeting planned for 2016 in Washington, DC. The ISEF process indicates that the Obama Administration has a major commitment to space, with the US playing a leadership role in broadening collaboration beyond the established players, notably through engagement with developing countries and China. ISEF points to a major role for international collaboration to advance space exploration and to the application of space technologies to address critical problems on Earth and to accelerate economic advancement.

## Cooperation Bad

### China won’t be an honest broker

#### China plays lip service to cooperation. It will always retain flexibility for a 1st strike

Kevin Pollpeter, Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. University of California-San Diego, et al. March 2, 2015, “China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States” A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/>default/files/ Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream\_Report.pdf (Accessed 7-6-2016)

With this formulation, the Chinese stance on space weapons neither prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of terrestrially-based counterspace weapons, such as direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles and directed energy weapons nor the development of any type of counterspace weapon or their storage, including space-based weapons, as long as they are not deployed in space. Moreover, China’s stance does not prohibit “use of force” or the “threat of force” against objects in space during armed conflict. According to a Chinese and Russian draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” nothing in the proposed treaty “may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” This last condition renders the treaty useless considering the emphasis of China’s military strategy on striking first and since most countries claim the right of self-defense before going to war.

#### China doesn’t want cooperation but an accumulation of power to wait out the U.S.

D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 18, 2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” Testimony of before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf> (Accessed 7-7-2016)

China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on Earth, or in space, China’s basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans. They are relying on China’s accumulation of space power to convince enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military realms.

#### Exclusion from the ISS has already put China in a position to capture international prestige with their own space station

Joan Johnson-Freese, PhD. and Professor at the Naval War College, February 18, 2015, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission: China’s Space & Counterspace Programs,” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

China is not a partner in the International Space Station (ISS), although for a long time it eagerly sought inclusion. Arguments against Chinese inclusion initially focused on China having little to contribute, in terms of financial support, hardware or knowhow. When that situation began to change, considerations of ideology and technology transfer issues were raised. Opponents considered the U.S. working with an authoritarian communist government as inappropriate, although the U.S. has pragmatically worked with unsavory governments in other areas of the world when it serves U.S. realist interests. When all else failed, potential technology transfer issues were raised to block Chinese inclusion. Not being included has supported arguments within China to build their own space station. China’s planned space station will de facto replace the ISS when ISS reaches the end of its operational lifetime, conferring both technonationalist and leadership connotations to China. China is already courting other countries along those lines.

### Cooperation leads to militarization

#### Space cooperation will do nothing to affect territorial disputes. It will be used against us for its militarization advancement

D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 18, 2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” Testimony of before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf> (Accessed 7-7-2016)

For the United States, cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but it likely will have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts which will dominate relations with China. One can see the value of meeting with Chinese space officials, especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But at this juncture, before China has achieved levels of “space dominance”, it is crucial to link any real cooperation with China to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S. security. Furthermore, allowing China increasing access to U.S. space technology, space corporations, or government institutions at this time presents two risks. First it could encourage China to advance an illusion of cooperation with the U.S. and the West while differences on Earth become sharper. This could become useful for Beijing to deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain leverage over U.S. options and actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any new access for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military sectors.

#### Cooperation without moves to counter China’s space militarization plays into China’s hands to expand military ambitions

D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 18, 2015, “China’s Military Ambitions in Space and America’s Response,” Testimony of before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf> (Accessed 7-7-2016)

A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in space with China cannot be separated from China’s ambitions on Earth or out into space. Likewise, for the United States to “wall off” space cooperation with China and to treat it as a “special” realm only plays into China’s game. As long as it is ruled by the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan, militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like Pakistan, become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It is imperative for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering China’s expanding military ambitions in space -- are more important to U.S. security than is space cooperation with China.

#### China does not separate civilian and military advances. They want to displace the U.S.

Clay Dillow, Staff Writer, February 20, 2016, “Is China's race to space a military ploy?,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/18/chinas-space-missions-in-2016-tied-to-military-ambitions.html (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The strategy is working: Over the last 15 years, it's been able to start closing the gap with U.S. and Russian rivals — likely helped along by funding from the Chinese military. The accelerating tempo of China's civilian space activities now presents a further threat to U.S. space dominance. The fear is that at some point in the foreseeable future, the Chinese could overtake — and even rocket past — the U.S. industry. "You've got this combination of civilian projects for prestige and military projects for power," said James Andrew Lewis, a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). "It shows that the Chinese are moving to be a leader in space — if not the leader."

## Answers to “Space Race”

### China won’t engage in a space race

#### China’s space program is bent of, economic development, technology, tradition and prestige, not a space race

Joan Johnson-Freese, PhD. and Professor at the Naval War College, February 18, 2015, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission: China’s Space & Counterspace Programs,” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson%20Freese_Testimony.pdf> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

Domestic pride and international prestige, economic development (including skilled jobs and expanded science and engineering educational programs), and dual-use technology development are all proven reasons for pursuing human spaceflight programs, as demonstrated in the United States with the Apollo Program. China is well aware that the United States enjoyed multiple benefits in all of these areas through the Apollo Program, and all today motivate China’s commitment to long-term space exploration programs, including human spaceflight. An ambitious, multi-faceted space program continues China’s traditional heritage of undertaking big projects, like the Great Wall and the Three Gorges Dam, to demonstrate national prowess. Space activity continues that tradition, now with a techno-nationalist bent.

#### China clearly wants to be the leader in space, but even if success is 100%, they’d be 3 decades behind the U.S.

Clay Dillow, Staff Writer, February 20, 2016, “Is China's race to space a military ploy?,” CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/18/chinas-space-missions-in-2016-tied-to-military-ambitions.html (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The Shenzhou XI mission will allow Chinese scientists to research technologies and identify potential engineering flaws or other issues before launching the core module of its permanent space station sometime later this decade. If the schedule holds, China hopes to have its very own space station online by 2022 — a space station that some security analysts worry could be used for military applications. Those missions will join an already lengthy Chinese mission portfolio as several ongoing science and technology programs launched in previous years continue to progress. Those missions include a lunar orbiter that is presently scouting locations for a future robotic landing on the lunar surface (likely in 2017) that will pave the way for Chinese astronauts to land on the moon by the mid-2020s — a feat that would make China the only nation capable of putting astronauts on the moon a full five decades after Americans terminated the Apollo program. "The significance of all this is that China clearly intends to have a competitive space capability," said Dr. John Logsdon, a space policy expert and professor emeritus at George Washington University. If the Chinese hit all the milestones they've set for themselves, they'll still be where the U.S. and Soviets were three decades ago, but they'll also have ticked many of the boxes on the modern space-power checklist. "These are steps in the logical development of a highly capable space program," Logsdon noted. "They're not successes or milestones to get worried about as long as our own program moves forward."

### Non-unique: Space race now

#### There’s already a space race in Asia. It’s driven by regional rivalries, not against the U.S.

James Clay Moltz, associate director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, January 17, 2015, “It’s On: Asia’s New Space Race,” The Daily Beast, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/17/> why-china-will-win-the-next-space-race.html (Accessed 7-6-2016)

Since China’s first human spaceflight in 2003 and its threatening anti-satellite test in 2007, Asia has seen a surge in space activity, with budgets increasing rapidly across the region. While few officials admit to the term, [a “space race” is emerging in Asia](http://www.amazon.com/Asias-Space-Race-International-Contemporary/dp/023115688X/ref%3Das_at?tag=thedailybeast-autotag-20&linkCode=as2&). The surge of Asian countries joining the ranks of major space powers mirrors the rise of Asian economies and their militaries more generally since the end of the Cold War. But following the political drivers of these trends leads most often to regional rivalries, not a desire to compete with the United States or Russia. Being first in Asia to do anything in space brings prestige, lends credibility to governments in power, and helps stimulate Asia’s young population to study science and technology, which has other benefits for their national economies. The responses to China’s rise have included the sudden development of military space programs by two countries that previously shunned such activities—Japan and India—and dynamic new activities in countries ranging from Australia to Singapore to Vietnam. On the Korean Peninsula, both North and South have orbited satellites in the past three years and both have pledged to develop much larger rockets. Many of these countries realize that they can’t “win” Asia’s space race, but they also know that they cannot afford to lose.

#### China is serious about space regardless. The race is already on!

Vikram Mansharamani, a Lecturer at Yale University in the Program on Ethics, Politics, & Economics, March 31, 2016, “China Is Winning the 21st Century Space Race,” Fortune, http://fortune.com/2016/03/31/china-space-race-moon/ (Accessed 7-6-2016)

At a [cost of more than $150 billion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station), the International Space Station (ISS) is the most expensive object ever built. This price tag is more than double the combined costs of China’s [Three Gorges Dam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Gorges_Dam), Boston’s [Big Dig](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Dig), and the [Chunnel](http://www.therichest.com/luxury/most-expensive/the-10-most-expensive-construction-projects-ever-completed/?view=all). But as noted by [CNN](http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2015/05/world/china-space/), funding for the ISS may run out in the early 2020s. That happens to be around the same time that the Chinese are expected to complete their own space station, potentially leaving the Asian power with the sole operating lab in the heavens. And given that [Congress banned NASA](http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/05/07/congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks/#bbeca652b860) from working bilaterally with anyone from the Chinese space program, it’s unclear if American astronauts will be welcome. The Chinese space station is merely one part of the Middle Kingdom’s extraterrestrial ambitions. Tinkering in the heavens has emerged as an important plank of its geopolitical strategy. And if recent history is any guide, the Chinese are serious about their plans in space. To begin, their program has already accomplished a great deal over the past few years. In 2013, China became the third nation—after the United States and the Soviet Union—to soft-land a spacecraft on the moon. In 2014, the country also sent a [probe](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/nov/02/chinese-probe-flies-around-the-moon-and-back-first-such-trip-since-1970s) around the moon and back, the first such mission since the 1970s. But China has even grander plans. These include a 2018 mission to send the first probe in history to land on the “[dark side](http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/15/10774508/china-dark-side-of-the-moon-2018)” of the moon, whose [extraordinary geology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Pole%E2%80%93Aitken_basin) is largely unexplored. Other plans aim to [bring back](http://www.bbc.com/news/25141597) lunar samples as well as to land humans on the surface of the moon. The country has [Martian ambitions](http://techcrunch.com/2016/03/25/2020-is-set-to-be-the-biggest-year-yet-for-mars-exploration/) as well.

### Non-unique: Space race now

#### We are already in a space race with China and must develop pre-emptive self-defense now to counter ASATs in development. Any delay is a gamer-changer for China

Brian Chow, retired in 2015 after serving as a senior physical scientist specialized in space and other national security issues for over three decades, January 18, 2016, “China’s new space threat and the justification of US pre-emptive self-defense,” The Space Review, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2903/1> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The US has long been avoiding the sensitive issue of pre-emptive self-defense in space, which is exercised before a space attack has actually started. However, facing a new game-changing threat under development in China and Russia, the US must address the issue and let the world know its position now. Bringing the issue up on the eve of pre-emption would be too late and could lead to a war both sides would want to avoid. In November 2015, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its 2015 Annual Report to the Congress. It stated that “since 2008, China has tested increasingly complex space proximity capabilities.” It confirmed what it and the Department of Defense have been suggesting, that “China’s recent space activities indicate that it is developing co-orbital antisatellite systems to target U.S. space assets. These systems consist of a satellite armed with a weapon such as an explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.” It also confirmed that, in July 2013, “once all three were in orbit, the satellite with the robotic arm grappled one of the other satellites, which was acting as a target satellite.” A robotic arm could be used to disable a satellite while producing little space debris. Space objects capable of close proximity operations and particularly equipped with a robotic arm could pose a game-changing threat. These space objects could be placed in orbit during peacetime. During a crisis, such as China seizing Taiwan or territorial disputes in the South China Sea, these space objects could be maneuvered to tailgate US satellites. China could deter US intervention by demonstrating that its space stalkers could almost simultaneously attack several critical satellites from such a close proximity that the US would not have time to save them—if it waited until the attacks had actually started.

#### China will already beat us back to the moon

[Bruce Dorminey](http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/), Staff Writer, March 24, 2016, “China Likely To Beat NASA Back To The Moon,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2016/03/24/china-likely-to-beat-nasa-back-to-the-moon/#6ab165e3604c (Accessed 7-6-2016)

Chinese taikonauts will likely beat [NASA](http://www.forbes.com/companies/nasa) astronauts back to the lunar surface in as little as five to ten years, longtime lunar scientist and geologist Paul Spudis now tells me. If so, that will happen primarily by default, as the lunar surface continues to drop off NASA’s crewed destination radar. Of course, that doesn’t preclude Russia, the European Space Agency (ESA), or numerous commercial space ventures — who have all expressed a desire to return astronauts to the lunar surface — from getting there sooner. But for now, Spudis thinks the Chinese are most likely to next make it happen.

## Answers to militarization/weaponization

### Militarization/weaponization happening now

#### China already has the capability of weaponizing space

Minnine Chan, Staff Writer, October 6, 2015, “Nuclear space race picks up pace: China unveils rocket capable of firing 20 nukes to defeat US missile shield,” South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1864406/long-march-challenging-us-space-power-chinas-most (Accessed 7-6-2016)

China showed the world how far it had come in developing space weapons as it unveiled its new family of space launch vehicles. The first Long March 6 rocket was successfully launched from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre late last month with a multipayload of 20 small satellites, according to state broadcaster CCTV and the People’s Liberation Army’s mouthpiece, the PLA Daily. The September 20 launch marked China as the third country with such technology, after Russia and the United States. About a week later, on September 29, the official Science and Technology Daily reported that a Second Artillery Corps battalion had launched a midnight full-flight test of a strategic missile. The test proved that the strategic missile force could now operate the entire chain of the C4ISR – computerised command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – systems that the US military uses. “The launch of the Long March 6 will definitely help President Xi Jinping increase his bargaining power on security issues when dealing with US President Barack Obama,” said defence policy specialist He Qisong of the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. “The launch will send a message to the US that the PLA now is capable of breaking its ballistic missile defence system in Asia, because … the multipayload technology can also be used on the DF-41 [long-range nuclear missile].” Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Dong said the Long March 6 technology could also be used on the JL-3, China’s third-generation nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile. The DF-41, which the Pentagon has described as China’s most powerful weapon, has an estimated 12,000km range and can carry up to 10 warheads. The DF-41 and JL-3 combined could carry up to 20 warheads, hitting as many different targets.

#### China already thinks conflicts in space are inevitable as a natural military progression from air power

Kevin Pollpeter, Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. University of California-San Diego, et al. March 2, 2015, “China Dream, Space Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States” A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/>default/files/ Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream\_Report.pdf (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The increasing reliance on space by the U.S. military has resulted in an increasing interest by Chinese analysts in counterspace technologies to deny potential adversaries the use of space. Counterspace technologies include kinetic- kill vehicles that destroy their targets by ramming them at high speeds, directed energy weapons such as lasers that can degrade or disable satellites, and co-orbital technologies that can orbit to a satellite and ram it or grab it for nefarious purposes. The most recent well-known example of an anti-satellite test was the 2007 Chinese test of a direct ascent kinetic-kill vehicle that destroyed a defunct weather satellite. Because of this, Chinese sources conclude that space warfare will follow the evolution of air warfare. Initially air power was used for reconnaissance over the European trenches of World War I. To deny access to this intelligence, airplanes were equipped with weapons to shoot down other aircraft. Other aircraft were assigned to bomb and strafe ground forces. During World War II, air power became more decisive and strategic, with air power playing a key role in naval operations and in the invasion of northern Europe. In recent conflicts, air power has played a critical role in achieving victory for the U.S. military. According to Chinese sources, space warfare is now at the equivalent stage of the state of air power in World War I in which intelligence gathering was the main mission of air forces. But just as with air power, space power will become so vital to military operations that militaries will seek to control space, resulting in a contest over its supremacy. As a result, Chinese analysts conclude that space war is inevitable and that the Chinese military must not only develop space-based C4ISR assets, but also develop the means to protect those assets and to deny an enemy access to its space-based C4ISR assets. In this regard, Chinese writers on space advocate the PLA to prepare to achieve space supremacy, defined as the ability to use space and to deny the use of space to its adversaries.

### Answers to ASATs

#### Even China’s best ICBMs can’t come close to U.S. military/GPS satellites

Jaganath Sankaran, a postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Winter 2014, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly: An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum on National and International Security, 8:4, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_14/SSQ_2014-4.pdf> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The substantial range of orbital altitudes—1,000 km to 36,000 km— across which satellites operate poses a challenge to China’s ability to attack US military satellites. Of the three sets of orbiters discussed above, ISR imagery satellites operating at altitudes less than 1,000 km are most vulnerable to ASAT attack by China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). This was demonstrated by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. On 11 January 2007, China launched a two-stage, solid-fuel, medium-range Dong Feng (DF)-21 ballistic missile using a mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) from the Xichang Space Center which slammed into one of its polar-orbiting LEO weather satellites (Feng Yun 1C) orbiting at an altitude of approximately 850 km. Caution should be exercised, however, in linearly scaling this Chinese ASAT capability to satellites operating at higher altitudes. The DF-21 ballistic missile used in the 2007 test cannot reach either GPS or communications satellites. In fact, even China’s most powerful solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are unable to reach an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate. These limitations of Chinese missiles are due to fundamental constraints of physics.

#### China ASAT scenarios are based on multiple untested assumptions

Jaganath Sankaran, a postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Winter 2014, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly: An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum on National and International Security, 8:4, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_14/SSQ_2014-4.pdf> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The launch reignited the perceived threat of Chinese ASAT missile attacks on US military satellites. The growing US concern about Chinese ASAT capability goes back to 2007 when Beijing shot down one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). China has also conducted “missile defense” tests viewed as proxies for ASAT missions. These Chinese activities are seen by many analysts as a threat to US space capabilities. The persistent refrain has been that the US military exploits space surveillance capabilities better than any other nation, resulting in an asymmetric advantage to its armed forces on a global scale. Given this US advantage, analysts posit China will find it prudent to directly attack US satellites—executing a space “pearl harbor” that would cripple US military capabilities for years. Without its eyes and ears in space to provide early warning and real-time intelligence, it is argued, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should China put direct military pressure on Taiwan. However, the argument that US armed forces are critically dependent on satellites and therefore extremely vulnerable to disruption from Chinese ASAT attacks is not rooted in evidence. Instead, it rests on untested assumptions—primarily, that China would find attacking US military satellites operationally feasible and desirable.

### Answers to ASATs

#### GPS redundancy means an ASAT attack would not affect the military and China would suffer the same effects

Jaganath Sankaran, a postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Winter 2014, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly: An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum on National and International Security, 8:4, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_14/SSQ_2014-4.pdf> (Accessed 7-6-2016)

The GPS constellation of around 30 satellites orbits Earth at an altitude of 20,000 km in six orbital planes with four satellites in each plane plus some spares. This unique orbital arrangement guarantees that the signal of at least four satellites can be received at any time all over the world. In reality, more than four satellites are accessible from any location, giving high-resolution positioning and timing information to the US military user. If China decided to launch an ASAT attack against GPS satellites, what might it expect to gain militarily from such an operation? How might the attack affect US operational capability during a naval conflict in the Taiwan Straits? To answer these questions, a calculation was performed by modeling a hypothetical conflict region for a period of 72 hours—the “China-Taiwan region” (shown in fig. 1) where it is expected conflict between the United States and China is most likely. The region also includes the Chinese East Fleet located in Dinghai and the Chinese South Fleet located in Zhan Jiang. The simulation focused on calculating the effort required by China to degrade GPS accuracy—measured in geometric dilution of precision (GDOP)—in the modeled region. GDOP is a dimensionless measure of GPS 3D positioning accuracy calculated from the geometric relationship between the receiver position and the position of the satellites the receiver is using for navigation. The current GPS satellite constellation is designed to provide a worldwide GDOP value of less than six with at least four satellites visible over any spot. When the GDOP rises above six, GPS satellite constellation coverage over the region is not very good, resulting in positioning errors. Even mildly unfavorable GDOP values can lead to position errors of 100 to 150 meters. As the GDOP continues to rise above six, it is possible that no determination of position can occur. The average GDOP value for deployed US forces in the entire modeled region before an ASAT attack is consistently below 3 for the duration of the simulation (as seen in top graph in fig. 2). To meaningfully impact US performance—for example, force US ships to operate without access to accurate GPS signals—China would have to decrease accuracy to a GDOP value greater than six. To do that, it would have to successfully attack and disable at least five GPS satellites passing over the region. However, with five GPS satellites removed, the GDOP rises above six for a meager five minutes before the redundancy in the GPS constellation compensates for the degraded signal (see middle graph in fig. 2). Similarly, when six GPS satellites are destroyed, the degradation lasts for a period of only 95 minutes centered around the chosen time of attack (see bottom graph in fig. 2). It should be noted that Chinese users of GPS signals would suffer the same degradation as US armed forces. Other countries around the world would also eventually suffer from varying degrees of loss in GPS accuracy due to this attack.

# Neg Taiwan “Grand Bargain”

### Grand bargain will fail - General

#### The focus on improving relations undermines our bargaining power. Grand bargain supporters have never offered a viable policy

Ian Easton, research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he studies defense and security issues in Asia and formerly a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), March 2016, “Strategic Standoff: The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan,” Project 2049 Institute,

<http://www.project2049.net/documents/Strategic%20Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf> (Accessed 7-12-2016)

America has suffered from a lack of strategic clarity, unsure of what is needed to compete effectively against China or even whether there is a real competition underway. Ever since the early 1970s many American foreign policy elites have taken it for granted that the PRC was of supreme importance and that Washington needed Beijing's cooperation, first as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, then for market access, and more recently as a partner on global issues ranging from North Korea to the Taliban and from piracy to climate change. This view is especially pronounced among those who embrace the notion that America is in decline and that China is going to prevail over the long run. From their perspective, the best the U.S. can do is make a "grand bargain" that would limit China's ascendency to its own sphere of interest. American policymakers, influenced by these defeatist views, have sometimes gone to great lengths to accommodate China's communist leadership. The tendency to overvalue the strategic importance of US-PRC relations is something which unnecessarily weakens Washington's bargaining power with Beijing, and undermines efforts to formulate long-term strategy. America's relatively sanguine approach to China's emergence as a strategic competitor is increasingly difficult to reconcile with events. Over the past decade the PRC has offered Washington several indicators that trouble is lurking ahead, each of which has been minimized or ignored in the name of positive Sino-U.S. relations. One of the first wake-up calls came on January 11, 2007, when China shot a ballistic missile into a target satellite in low earth orbit. This missile test was followed by several others, all that clearly demonstrate Beijing's intention to weaponize space and neutralize the eyes and ears of U.S. military power in a conflict. Another warning came in 2010, when China deployed the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile, a weapon apparently capable of targeting ships at sea including aircraft carriers, the queens of America's fleet. Many other unsettling developments, both diplomatic and military, followed over the course of the next several years (see Table 1 on the following page). Some analysts have turned a blind eye to these developments, and instead have clung to the false hope that mutual economic interdependence, military-to-military exchanges, and favorable diplomatic treatment will build trust and socialize China, enticing it into becoming a responsible stakeholder. These analysts often emphasize the risks of inadvertent conflict and rapid escalation if their policy prescriptions are not followed. Yet none of their recommendations, which arguably have been tested to the limit of prudence in recent years, have dulled the CCP's ruthless competitive instincts. If anything, examples of American appeasement and risk aversion have only emboldened Beijing to push farther and harder.

#### A grand bargain would fail and undermine stabilizing economic cooperation. We do not need the plan

Noah Lingwall, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, August 8, 2015, “The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/ (Accessed 7-11-2016)

The concept of a U.S.-China grand bargain offers a creative attempt at a strategy to resolve some of the most intractable issues hindering improved cooperation between the two countries. Even if implemented, this proposed strategy would not serve as a panacea to all the issues facing the United States and China. Any bargain would face serious pitfalls that would cast doubt over the longevity of its provisions. In light of the [contentious land disputes in the South China Sea](http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/regaining-the-initiative-in-the-south-china-sea/) and continuing tension over the unresolved question of Taiwan, an idealistic resolution might seem a productive step forward. The Taiwan problem is deeply entrenched within China and Taiwan’s political culture and it cannot be solved in one fell swoop. A grand bargain is an encouraging, yet illusive notion. The framework of a grand bargain might serve as a useful blueprint for future cooperation, but the current status quo already acts as a positive foundation for future China-Taiwan relations and should remain in place. As Taiwan’s March 2016 [presidential election rapidly approaches](http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/taiwan-will-have-a-female-president-in-2016/), the concept of a grand bargain appears particularly ill-conceived. In all likelihood, neither party’s candidate will risk alienating public support by pushing a radical plan for unification or separation. Increased economic cooperation will continue to maintain the equilibrium between the two nations and could even mitigate the most contentious issues that bedevil U.S.-China and China-Taiwan relations. While it is possible that these issues may pose a future threat, the current Taiwan problem is not broken, and there is no need to fix it.

### Grand bargain will fail - General

#### The grand bargain will not work and merely sustain China’s expansionism

Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, August 6, 2015, “The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/> (Accessed 7-11-2016)

But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

#### Chinese concessions are meaningless. They will coerce competing claimants

Noah Lingwall, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, August 8, 2015, “The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/ (Accessed 7-11-2016)

The second condition of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” appears equally insurmountable. Charles Glaser asserts that China would promise to resolve regional land disputes through more peaceful means if the United States were to cede control of Taiwan. As is the case with acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony, this provision of the grand bargain would be difficult to enforce. China currently finds itself besieged by a litany of competing land claims from Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. Based on China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping’s “assertive diplomacy” manifesto, one can hardly expect that China will capitulate to its smaller, weaker neighbors. Doing so would both undermine its growing reputation as a maritime power and undercut its goal to become an established world power. As China looks to enhance its international prestige, it is hard to believe that its leaders would tolerate the land claims of competing Asian nations. Also, it takes two parties to come to an agreement, so it is not up to China alone to guarantee the peaceful resolution of land disputes. The other disputants involved would have to make the same pledge to avoid territorial conflicts. Moreover, China’s rising national power may induce its leaders to initiate unpredictable, aggressive strategies in the future. The United States cannot orchestrate a grand bargain based on promised concessions.

### Grand bargain will fail – Not an honest broker

#### China will default on the bargain and won’t accept U.S. regional influence

Noah Lingwall, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, August 8, 2015, “The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/ (Accessed 7-11-2016)

Even if China is willing to accept (in its view) an “invasive” U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific in the present, there is no mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in the future. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan.

#### China won’t abide by the grand bargain. Best course is to maintain U.S. support

David An, was formerly a tenured US diplomat who covered China, Taiwan and East Asia in the State Department, Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014. He helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the US Embassy in Beijing and throughout East Asia, July 21, 2015, “Don’t Bargain Taiwan Away, America,” Ketagalan Media, http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/21/dont-bargain-taiwan-away-america/ (Accessed 7-7-2016)

The United Nations, International Criminal Court and other institutions cannot effectively punish states or sitting heads of state as effectively as domestic institutions could with their full sovereignty to rule. A world government does not exist with jurisdiction to resolve disagreements or enforce rule of law; therefore China could promise one thing and do another. Glaser’s theory simply assumes a grand bargain with China will, somehow, be kept by China. Neither does Glaser’s theory address the reverberating effects of the US abandoning Taiwan for US partners and allies in the region. The safest course of action for Taiwan is to maintain its freedom to choose its own political, social, and economic future for the longest extent possible. The so-called 1992 Consensus has allowed both sides of the Taiwan Strait their respective interpretations of the cross-Strait status quo under the rubric of “One China”—with China saying One China is under the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan saying the two sides are unified under its Republic of China. This kind of ambiguous policy constructs have allowed the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang to sidestep the issue of sovereignty, while Taiwan has so far grasped onto enough leeway to choose its own direction. Taiwan’s political choices have allowed it to blossom into a mature democracy, which is something that is typically not allowed in China. Taiwan’s future is its own to decide only if it continues to enjoy the US’s support and commitment. Though I highly respect and admire much of Glaser’s academic work, I cannot support his provocative conclusions. A more humanistic and historical theoretical framework would show the value of continued US support for a loyal partner, more than a rational theory that embodies much thinking but little heart.

### Grand bargain will fail to resolve conflict

#### Appeasing China in a grand bargain fails to prevent future conflicts

Leif-Eric Easley, Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government and a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Spring 2016, “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security, 40:4, p. 179

Glaser argues that an established power can enhance its security by pursuing territorial accommodation toward a rising power. He cites international relations theorists who lament that concessions-granting strategies suffer a stigma in foreign policy circles. The literature suggests, however, that appeasement usually fails, and even in the handful of historical circumstances in which it may have succeeded, its benefits tended not to last. Efforts to model strategies of accommodation suggest that a declining power may instead have incentives to hold the line early against a rising challenger to preempt its use of salami tactics and avoid engaging in a future conflict under less favorable conditions. Glaser offers almost no coverage of the most studied case of failed territorial accommodation vis-à-vis Germany, nor does he provide historical examples where accommodation succeeded. Applications of bargaining theory are generally unsupportive of appeasement, stressing incentives that governments have to misrepresent their intentions. An accommodation strategy might make sense for a weak power with reliable intelligence that its adversary has limited aims or for a relatively matched power that seeks to buy time for rearmament. These conditions do not apply to the U.S.-China case, however. The United States lacks reliable intelligence on China’s limited aims, but it is not a weak power and it has no need to abandon Taiwan for the sake of improving its military capabilities.

#### No bargain is guaranteed. The plan would help China expel the U.S. from E. Asia and lead to massive naval power expansion

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center and former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, June 24, 2015, “The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show (Accessed 7-10-2016)

On the subject of Taiwan’s strategic value, Glaser spends most of his effort arguing against his own thesis.  He points out that Taiwan acts as a huge barrier, creating choke points for the deployment of PLA naval forces, while possession of Taiwan would give the PLAN direct access to the deeper waters of the Pacific, would increase [the Chinese A2/AD capability](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/countering-china%E2%80%99s-a2-ad-challenge-9099), would extend the range of air cover for the Chinese navy, and particularly would make it easy for Chinese submarines to enter the Philippine Sea and threaten US carrier battle groups there.  Having made these points, Glaser unconvincingly concludes that controlling Taiwan would not “significantly increase” Chinese military leverage. The “grand bargain” idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington.  From Beijing’s point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it believes it already owns for something else it believes it already owns.  If they did agree, how the “bargain” would be operationalized is unclear.  What would it mean for China to “officially accept” U.S. alliances and military bases in the Asia-Pacific?  This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly “principled” opposition to any country having “Cold War era” alliances and foreign bases.  At the same time, it is easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup, maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea, etc.) while claiming these were not attempts to drive U.S. influence out of the region. Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their U.S. rival.  He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan.  If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can tolerate continued U.S. regional hegemony.  If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States.  If we now recognize that expelling U.S. strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role.  The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own. Even if the current regime in Beijing does not plan to dismantle U.S. regional leadership, the United States cannot be sure the leaders of a future, stronger China will think the same way.  China could renege on Glaser’s proposed deal more easily than the US could.  China is a local power with relatively short supply lines to the East and South China Seas.  In the case of the South China Sea, China enjoys a huge and growing military force projection disparity in its favor relative to the other claimants.  But to cancel its part of the deal, the United States would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to invade and capture a Taiwan defended by ensconced PLA forces only 100 miles from China’s mainland.

### Grand bargain makes war more likely

#### Selling out Taiwan dooms peaceful resolution

Elizabeth Economy, Staff Writer, April 25, 2016, “Beijing's Squeeze Play On Taiwan,” Forbes Asia, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabetheconomy/2016/04/25/beijings-squeeze-play-on-taiwan/#4a3bc2bb4476> (Accessed 7-9-2016)

Beijing may think that it is firing a warning shot across the bow to Tsai by demonstrating just how much Beijing can take away if the president-elect doesn’t toe the line. Instead, however, Beijing’s actions are undermining its best partner in the Taiwanese government, President Ma, making it nearly impossible for him and his team to claim that under KMT rule Taiwan made real and sustainable progress in its relationship with the mainland. After all, if the presumed gains of the past eight years can be wiped out in the space of three months, it only reinforces the sense among many in Taiwan that Beijing cannot be trusted. Finally, after falling off the American radar screen over the past eight years, Taiwan is quickly edging its way back on. The next administration needs to keep its eye on the final objective—“that cross-Strait differences be [resolved peacefully](http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/07/144363.htm) and according to the wishes of the people on both sides of the Strait.” This means we don’t help stir the pot on Taiwan and we don’t sell-out Taiwan for some ephemeral [grand bargain](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00199#.Vx48WvkrK70) with Beijing. Taiwan may be small but it is not a small matter. At stake is not only our relationship with Beijing but also American values and principles, which are exemplified by Taiwan’s vibrant and determined democracy.

#### China won’t stop with Taiwan. Absorption causes expansionism and war with the U.S.

J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, May 7, 2015, “If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825 (Accessed 7-10-2016)

Lastly, as I pointed out in my previous piece, there is absolutely no guarantee that after acquiring Taiwan (on a silver platter or at the end of a rifle), China’s appetite would be sated. In fact, much like imperialism, territorial expansionism has its own internal dynamics: the more territory one controls, the greater the incentive to push outwards to protect newly acquired real estate. Should Taiwan become part of Chinese territory, Beijing would likely seek to protect the island from neighboring countries (Japan, the Philippines) and U.S. forces in Guam, all of whom would likely have adjusted their military postures due to the proximity of an expanded China to their territories. The vicious circle that this would risk engendering isn’t too difficult to imagine. All of this shows us that it would be nearly impossible to isolate the absorption of Taiwan from the region in which that transfer of power would occur. A neutral Taiwan is therefore the surest way to ensure stability in that corner of Northeast Asia all the way to the South China Sea.

#### The plan will not reduce E. Asian tensions but *causes* war

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center and former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, December 6, 2012, “Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” Time, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/ (Accessed 7-8-2016)

Advocates of abandoning Taiwan may erroneously believe that halting U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taipei would reduce tensions in East Asia. This is certainly what Beijing would have us believe. According to Chinese officials and commentators, U.S. assistance to Taipei is all that stands in the way of peaceful unification, and without it the people of Taiwan would stop resisting and accept Beijing’s terms for unification.  This premise, however, ignores an important reality: the main obstacle to unification is not [U.S. arms sales](http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/01/29/taiwan.arms/index.html?iref=allsearch), but rather Taiwanese nationalism and the wish of nearly all Taiwan’s people not to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, withdrawal of U.S. support would not necessarily lead to a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait imbroglio. The opposite outcome is at least as likely. Deterrence against an attack by the People’s Liberation Army would be weakened, while Taiwan’s people may well choose to fight rather than capitulate.

### Grand bargain undermines U.S. leadership

#### A grand bargain would motivate China to dislodge U.S. leadership and expand control over East and South China Seas

Leif-Eric Easley, Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government and a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Spring 2016, “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security, 40:4, pp. 180-181

Rather than alleviate frictions, a grand bargain would likely motivate beliefs that China could eventually dismantle the U.S. security architecture in Asia, emboldening actors on the Chinese side to pursue their interests more assertively. U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would entail repealing the Taiwan Relations Act, ending the legal basis for defense cooperation and arms sales, immediately undermining deterrence, and steadily degrading Taiwan’s defense capabilities in ways difficult to reverse. Meanwhile, China’s salami tactics, in combination with its ability to quickly redeploy military assets it might agree to pull back and its demonstrated long-term approach to the East China and South China Seas, make any such deal as Glaser suggests not credible. Chinese official documents give no reason to believe that Beijing would be conciliatory on other claims if the United States accommodated China on Taiwan. Taipei also claims sovereignty over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Beijing’s legal claim to these islands, which it calls the Diaoyu Islands, heavily relies on the history of the Republic of China and the status of “Taiwan Province.” Meanwhile, Taiwan maintains troops and recently upgraded its facilities on Taiping/Itu Aba, the largest naturally occurring feature of the disputed Spratly Islands, where China has been engaged in land reclamation and construction on features it controls. U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would likely make Chinese decision makers believe they could strengthen their claims in the East China and South China Seas by coercing Taipei to consolidate its positions with those of Beijing. Beijing’s assertive policies contrast to the responsible, measured, and cooperative approach Taipei has taken to managing disputed claims in the East China and South China Seas. Far from being the dangerous source of entrapment Glaser describes, Taiwan is a valuable strategic and economic partner. In June 2015, the United States and Taiwan signed the Global Cooperation and Training Framework agreement to jointly offer capacity building in areas such as public health, women’s empowerment, environmental protection, and maritime safety. Leaders across Taiwan’s political spectrum have internalized lessons from the provocative Chen Shui-bian years and are not about to risk the lives and treasure of their people for the sake of forcing Washington’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing. Moreover, the United States has historically managed to deter challengers and restrain partners, preventing both sides from initiating or escalating conflicts.

#### Sino-Taiwan unification gives China unprecedented naval power to challenge the U.S.

Noriya Nakazawa, Staff Writer, November 7, 2015, “On Taiwan: An Option between Total War and Withdrawal for the U.S.,” InPEC Magazine, https://inpecmagazine.com/2015/11/07/nakazawa/ (Accessed 7-9-2016)

If China reunified Taiwan, US deterrence by both denial and punishment would reduce its effectiveness because the PLA Navy (PLAN) would acquire easy access to deep seas in the western Pacific. As to this issue, Bosco points out that China’s submarines would be able to dive into the deep sea without passing shallow waters from the east coast of Taiwan – although PLAN submarines likely have to keep their snorkels above the sea surface from PLAN bases at China’s east coast up to around Okinawa islands’ line. Actually, in the sea below lat. 24°30’ N along the east coast of Taiwan, the sea depth becomes more than 1000m within 12 nautical miles from the coast, and it reaches more than 2000m at some places in that area. If China’s submarines dived into such deep level shortly after departing naval bases at Taiwan’s east coast, it would become difficult to detect those submarines and locate their area of probability. As a result, US naval assets would face much threat against sudden attacks from China’s submarines. That US vulnerability against China’s submarines will surely degrade US deterrence against China. Especially if China’s strategic submarines would achieve easy access to the deep sea, China’s deterrence by punishment will improve owing to enhanced survivability of the China’s nuclear second-strike capability.

### Grand bargain undermines U.S. leadership

#### The plan collapses U.S. international credibility and alliances, spurring a destabilizing arms race

Leif-Eric Easley, Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government and a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Spring 2016, “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security, 40:4, p. 183

Abandonment of Taiwan would be a greater shock for U.S. credibility than the 2008 financial crisis, Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, or Ukrainian conflict because it would contradict decades of U.S. policy, be a sin of commission rather than omission, and have greater direct relevance to Asia’s geopolitics. A grand bargain with China would not only degrade U.S. soft power and alliances; it could drive Asian countries to unilaterally enhance their own defenses, fueling an arms race and further diminishing security in the region. Glaser suggests that such dynamics could be avoided if U.S. leaders visit Japan and South Korea with security treaties in hand and clarify why those countries are different from Taiwan. Alliances among democracies are based not only on treaties and national interests, however, but also on shared values and popular support. Perceptions of reliability affect how people vote and can redirect democratic processes behind alliance cooperation.

#### Glaser’s “grand bargain” tanks U.S. credibility and causes a Sino-Taiwan war

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center and former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, June 24, 2015, “The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show (Accessed 7-10-2016)

The argument that Washington should abandon support for Taiwan to gain favor with Beijing faces strong counter-arguments that have prevailed in policy-making up to now.  George Washington University professor [Charles L. Glaser presents a fresh reboot of the idea in the spring 2015 issue of the journal International Security](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/isec/39/4).  Glaser says protecting Asia-Pacific allies is a vital U.S. interest, but protecting Taiwan is not.  Yet Taiwan is the main cause of Chinese opposition to U.S. strategic leadership in the region.  Meanwhile, tensions between China and rival claimants over disputed territory in the East and South China Seas threatens to spark military conflict, and foreign governments wish for more clarity in Beijing’s longer-term strategic intentions – specifically, whether it is a “greedy state” that seeks to replace the United States as regional hegemon.  Glaser proposes solving all of these problems through a Sino-U.S. “grand bargain”: the United States government “ends its commitment to defend Taiwan” in exchange for Beijing’s promise to “peacefully resolve” its maritime territorial disputes and “officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.” The case for abandoning Taiwan typically meets at least three large barriers: the betrayal of U.S. ideals, harm to America’s reputation as a reliable security partner, and Taiwan’s strategic value.  Glaser’s argumentation does not overcome these barriers. Glaser says he recognizes that a foreign friendly country’s hard-won civil liberties “are important values” that Washington “should be reluctant to jeopardize,” but in the end they are not “key national interests” for the United States and are therefore expendable.  It is debatable that the preservation of a democratic Taiwan is not a key U.S. interest.  Recent U.S. presidential administrations representing both major political parties have affirmed a U.S. strategic interest in spreading democracy because democratic countries are generally supportive of the U.S.-sponsored international system of liberal norms and institutions. Glaser focuses on the US interest in [avoiding a war with China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250).  But what about the U.S. interest in preventing [a Taiwan-China war](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-really-go-war-china-save-taiwan-12949)?  One of the main reasons for U.S. forward deployment is to help keep the region stable. The PRC argues that the Taiwan “separatist” challenge would quickly dry up if the U.S. stopped selling weapons to Taiwan, but Taipei has argued the opposite: cross-Strait stability is possible only if Taiwan feels secure, and the Republic of China (ROC) will not negotiate with China under the gun.  Beijing should not assume Taiwan would be quick to surrender even in a disadvantageous situation.

### Grand bargain collapses alliances / Japanese rearm

#### Abandoning Taiwan destroys our alliances and causes wildfire proliferation across Asia

J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, May 7, 2015, “If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825 (Accessed 7-10-2016)

White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation. Abandoning Taiwan to its inevitable fate due to China’s strength (and nuclear blackmail) would also undermine existing security alliances and discredit the agreements, legal and tacit, that have helped maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific over the decades. Such signaling would in turn encourage states in China’s neighborhood to do the necessary to protect themselves should the day come when they, too, are left to fend for themselves. It would indicate that good behavior and peaceful democratization—two qualities that apply to Taiwan—are of no intrinsic value to mankind and therefore not worth defending. And it would also prove that even medium powers (with a population of 23 million people and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy, Taiwan is not exactly a gnat) are not immune to the desires of greater powers.

#### Allowing China to absorb Taiwan collapses our alliances with Japan and S. Korea. This causes unprecedented Chinese naval expansion and control of Pacific SLOCs

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center and former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, December 6, 2012, “Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” Time, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/ (Accessed 7-8-2016)

Absorption of Taiwan by China would make Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the Chinese military. Taiwan anchors the “first island chain,” limiting the Chinese Navy’s access to the Pacific Ocean. Conversely, occupation of Taiwan would allow Chinese forces to straddle important sea lanes that are the economic lifelines of Japan and South Korea. Chinese control of Taiwan would greatly increase the pressure on Tokyo and Seoul, critically important U.S. allies, to accommodate Beijing’s strategic wishes. These alliances, and along with them the U.S. leadership role in the western Pacific, might become untenable.

### Grand bargain collapses alliances / Japanese rearm

#### Bargaining away Taiwan accelerates Chinese expansionism and causes war involving U.S. forces

J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, April 23, 2015, “Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825 (Accessed 7-10-2016)

Giving Taiwan away (as if it were the international community’s to give away to start with) would be akin to a sacrificial ceremony to appease an angry god. The problem is that doing so would likely be interpreted by Beijing as a sign of weakness, which almost certainly would fan the flames of Chinese expansionism rather than extinguish them. In fact, the annexation of Taiwan would further contribute to China’s might by adding the world’s 19th largest economy to its national power while providing Beijing with an “unsinkable carrier” facing an open Western Pacific. In this sense, it would provide China with a new front from which to confront Japan and the Philippines, not to mention U.S. forces deployed in the region. Arguing for the preservation of Taiwan isn’t simply a symptom of wishful thinking by naïve liberals who want to save a democracy against authoritarianism; the Realists’ point that it should be bargained away can be met on similar terms. Abandoning Taiwan would likely encourage Chinese expansionism while giving it more tools to do so. In other words, the tradeoff, rather than ease tensions, would risk much greater instability in future.

#### Japan would militarize in response to the grand bargain

Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center and former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, June 24, 2015, “The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=show (Accessed 7-10-2016)

Abandoning staunch, long-time friend like Taiwan would damage U.S. credibility in the eyes of other regional governments.  Glaser argues that in the case of Japan, this damage would be containable.  Tokyo realizes that compared to Taipei, its relationship with Washington is more strongly institutionalized.  Japan also has nowhere else to go, he says, other than sticking with the United States.  This is probably true, although U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would reinforce Japan’s fear regarding the long-term U.S. reliability to stand up to a strengthening China.  This would embolden Japanese advocates of accommodating China, as well as those who call for a militarily strong Japan unleashed from the alliance.  What about the damage to the reputation of the U.S. among friends in Seoul, Canberra, Manila, and elsewhere?  Glaser mentions only Tokyo, the relatively easy case.

#### Japan would rise to confront China over Taiwan

J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, April 23, 2015, “Don't Let China Swallow Taiwan,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825 (Accessed 7-10-2016)

Another problem with White’s argument is that it relies on the belief that the U.S. and its allies are a spent force. While it is true that Washington faces great challenges, this is a refrain that we have heard time and again over the past three quarters of a century, perhaps most emphatically in the months following the Vietnam War, which concluded 40 years ago this week. How often did we hear that the United States was “falling behind” the Soviet Union, or that it had no will to fight and was about to abandon its allies in Europe and Asia? If we can learn one thing from history, it is that the United States has been there before, and that it has a tendency to bounce back. In the present scenario, we should also not discount Tokyo’s ability and desire to ensure that Taiwan doesn’t fall into China’s hands. As a pillar of the U.S. security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is unlikely to sit by idly as its next-door neighbor is taken over by China.

## \*\*\*Protectionism Disad\*\*\*

## Disad Overview

#### This is an economic protectionism disadvantage. The premise is as follows. The United States is locked in various levels on conflict with China—from political, to military, to economic. One key point of contention is the amount of raw materials (particularly steel) that China produces and subsequently sells around the world. US manufacturers (and other companies/ industries) tend to fear competition from China in this area because China can afford to produce these materials for much cheaper than the United States can.

#### Uniqueness—Despite all the elevated rhetoric in the status quo, there is no trade war between the US and China. There is tension and competition, certainly, but there is no declared economic war and there is no plan to launch massive retaliatory tariffs between the two nations.

#### On the unique debate, it is important to remember that the Aff will much further ahead on uniqueness debate if you allow it to be framed merely in terms of protectionism “yes/no”. There are lots of things that count as protectionism, but this disad is mainly concerned with tariffs. Non-tariff trade barriers exist everywhere and are high all around the globe right now. I suggest narrowing this uniqueness debate to a question of tariffs instead of protectionism.

#### Link—US industries don’t want closer diplomatic and economic relations between the US and China. The plan does just that, which upsets domestic industries. They will hate the plan because it will send the signal that the US is going to prioritize relations with China over protecting domestic markets.

#### Internal Link—These domestic industries have powerful lobbies that hold sway in Congress. They will force Congress to levy massive tariffs against China in order to protect these industry’s abilities to compete.

#### Internal Link—When the US places massive tariffs on products from another nation, it risks sparking a retaliatory trade war where nations model each other’s protectionist behaviors. These trade wars risk escalating into shooting wars.

#### Impact— A war between the United States and China will escalate to nuclear extinction.

## 1NC

### 1NC Uniqueness

#### There’s no trade war between US and China now—Even China knows it’s all political saber rattling

The Guardian, British news organization, May 5, 2016, “Be rational and objective, China cautions US, after Trump trade tirades,” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/05/be-rational-and-objective-china-cautions-us-after-trump-trade-tirades> (accessed June 7, 2016)

China urged people in the United States to take a rational and objective view of the relationship between the two countries after [Donald Trump became the Republican party’s presumptive presidential nominee](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/04/republican-nomination-party-unity-trump). Trump has proposed that tariffs on imported Chinese goods be increased to up to 45% and asserted that [China](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china) had waged “economic war” against the United States, taking American jobs. China is the United States’ largest trading partner. Asked whether China was worried at the prospect of a Trump presidency, after his commanding win in Indiana and as rivals Ted Cruz and John Kasich bowed out of the race, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said the election was an internal affair he could not comment on. “What needs to be pointed out is that the essence of Sino-US trade and business cooperation is mutually beneficial and win-win, and accords with the interests of both sides,” Hong said at a daily news briefing. “We hope people in all fields can rationally and objectively view this relationship.” The official Xinhua news agency said Trump “gets them wrong, from trade balance to basic economics”, citing western media and academics dismissing his criticisms of trade with China. “Trump attacks China to woo voters,” it said.

### 1NC Link

#### Engagement with China won’t change Chinese behavior, instead causes domestic protectionist backlash

[Robert D. Atkinson](http://www.theglobalist.com/author/ratkinson/), President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, April 9, 2012, “What Should America Do About China?,” <http://www.theglobalist.com/what-should-america-do-about-china/> (accessed June 6, 2016)

As such, conflict now exists not just between American and Chinese workers, but between American companies and Chinese companies, just as it did between Japanese companies and American companies in the 1980s and early 1990s. This fundamentally changes the dynamics and the politics of U.S. trade policy toward China. If the United States is to effectively address this challenge, it is critical that policymakers and experts have an accurate view of Chinese economic policy and China-U.S. trade. Unfortunately the two prevailing views are misguided. The “free trade” view holds that efforts to press China to end its mercantilism will only backfire and limit what is largely a mutually beneficial trading relationship. The “protectionist” view, in contrast, holds that trade with China is fundamentally bad for U.S. economic interests. There is no way, the view goes, that U.S. workers can compete with Chinese workers who are paid less than 10% of American wages. Better we impose protective tariffs, “Buy American” provisions, and other protectionist measures and build our own autarkic economy. Both views miss the mark. Free traders are right that it is in the economic interests of the United States for China to be an integral part of the global trading system. But they are wrong in thinking that these benefits can accrue if China’s policies undermine that trading system and China continues its strategy of absolute advantage implemented through mercantilist policies. Protectionists are right in that it is important to ramp up the pressure on China to get it to start playing by the rules. But the notion that the United States can’t be competitive against China, even if the latter plays by the rules, is wrong. So is the notion that global integration with China can’t be in America’s and the world’s interests. The United States doesn’t need to close its borders to be a vibrant competitor. It must, however, require that other nations, especially large ones like China, play by the rules. Yet there is no evidence that China intends to voluntarily abandon its innovation mercantilism. Despite ongoing efforts by successive U.S. administrations to engage the Chinese in dialogue, there is little evidence that this process is doing anything more than helping to manage particular issues that come up.

### 1NC Internal Link

#### Domestic protectionist backlash sparks a US/ China trade war

David Lawder and Roberta Rampton, Staff writers for Reuters,March 24, 2016, “Trump's tariff plan could boomerang, spark trade wars with China, Mexico,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG> (accessed June 7, 2016)

Donald Trump's threats to slap steep tariffs on Chinese and Mexican imports may have won him votes in Republican primaries but they would likely backfire, severely disrupting U.S. manufacturers that increasingly depend on global supply chains. The Republican presidential front-runner's campaign pledges to impose 45 percent tariffs on all imports from China and 35 percent on many goods from Mexico would spark financial market turmoil and possibly even a recession, former trade negotiators, trade lawyers, economists and business executives told Reuters. "I don't mind trade wars when we're losing $58 billion a year," Trump said in a Feb. 25 debate, referring to the 2015 U.S. goods trade deficit with Mexico. Economists dispute the idea the United States is "losing" money as the trade deficit is simply the difference between what the United States imports and what it exports to a country. "Imposing tariffs or putting up trade barriers may sound good, but it will hurt our economy and credibility," said Wendy Cutler, the former acting deputy U.S. Trade Representative who helped lead U.S. negotiations in the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal last year. Among those hardest hit would be the U.S. auto industry, which has fully integrated Mexico into its production network. Some $118 billion worth of vehicles and parts flowed north and south across the border tariff-free last year, according to U.S. Commerce Department data. A 35 percent tariff would raise costs for Ford Motor Co's U.S.-assembled F-series and medium-duty pickup trucks that use Mexican-made diesel engines, one of its most profitable vehicle lines. (Graphic on U.S.-Mexico auto and parts trade: [tmsnrt.rs/1UN3wun](http://tmsnrt.rs/1UN3wun)) Ford CEO Mark Fields on Wednesday defended the company's investment strategy, which includes $9 billion for U.S. plants over the next four years, saying, "We will do what makes sense for the business." Buyers of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV's popular Ram 1500 pickup trucks assembled in Saltillo, Mexico, could see their $26,000 base price pushed up by $9,000 if the tariff is fully passed on to consumers. A Chrysler spokesman declined to comment on Trump's statements. Trump's campaign said in a statement that U.S. trade policy constitutes "unilateral economic surrender" and needs complete change because it allows foreign competitors to shut out U.S imports, devalue their currencies and unfairly target U.S. industries. "I don't think he does our issue any favors by making it so incredibly jingoistic and bombastic," said Scott Paul, president of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, a group that allies domestic steelmakers and other manufacturers with the United Steelworkers union. "But I believe there’s widespread agreement ... that there is something amiss with our economic relationship with China and it’s past time that our government pushes back a little more forcefully." It would take years for U.S. industry to rebuild supply chains devastated by sudden tariff hikes on Chinese and Mexican goods and any retaliatory measures, said Peter Petri, a Brandeis University professor who has co-authored an influential study on the effects of the TPP trade deal on national income. Even if U.S. firms were able to make such a transition, Petri said this would likely result in a permanent annual reduction in U.S. national income of more than $100 billion, or 0.8 percent. Trump's tariff plans would effectively violate NAFTA and revoke U.S. commitments to the World Trade Organization, say trade lawyers. Beijing and Mexico City "are just going to retaliate on the things that are likely to hurt us most," said Susan Schwab, the U.S. Trade Representative from 2006 to 2009 in the George W. Bush administration. Schwab negotiated major portions of free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama. In 2009, Mexico slapped duties up to 25 percent on more than 90 different U.S. farm goods, from pork to frozen potatoes due to foot-dragging by U.S. lawmakers on allowing Mexican truckers on to U.S. roads, as specified under NAFTA. The National Potato Council estimates that U.S. growers lost about $70 million in revenue over 31 months, a 50 percent cut from their third-largest export market. Mexico's economy minister, Ildefonso Guajardo said last week that big tariffs on Mexico would return the United States to "an isolationist, xenophobic and protectionist vision." And a full-scale tariff war with China would likely expose the largest U.S. export sectors to steep duties, including aircraft, semiconductors, corn and soybeans, trade lawyers said. Retaliatory tariffs would also hurt growing U.S. vehicle exports to China - at 300,000 a year now equivalent to the annual output of a large assembly plant. General Motors Co is now planning to import a Buick sport-utility vehicle from a Chinese joint venture plant.

### 1NC Internal Link

#### A US/ China trade war escalates into a shooting war—strangles economies until war is the most practical option

Barry Brownstein, PhD, professor emeritus of economics and leadership at the University of Baltimore, March 30, 2016, Why Do the Candidates Want War with China? Fee—Foundation for Economic Freedom, <https://fee.org/articles/why-do-the-candidates-want-war-with-china/> (accessed June 7, 2016)

Will a Trade War Lead to a Shooting War? In his book [The Fair Trade Fraud](http://smile.amazon.com/Fair-Trade-Fraud-Decimates-Competitiveness-ebook/dp/B019CALT8K/?tag=foundationforeco), author James Bovard observes how US textile manufacturers “inflamed public hostility towards Japan” and helped poison relations before World War II. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff [helped to create the Great Depression](http://fee.org/articles/the-smoot-hawley-tariff-and-the-great-depression/). [Financial analyst Robert Prechter](http://smile.amazon.com/Principle-Social-Behavior-Science-Socionomics-ebook/dp/B00EPGKVR2?tag=foundationforeco) points out that a common cause underlying wars and bear markets is a negative collective social mood. A negative social mood is based on fear. As fear increases, politicians seek to harness that fear for their personal advantage. They blame other countries for domestic problems. They threaten and then institute trade barriers. As trade barriers increase, the economic situation further deteriorates, both in their own country and around the world, further increasing fear. Eventually, demagogic politicians provoke wars. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, columnist [Andrew Browne explained the economic rift](http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-two-speed-economy-1457110331) growing between the old industrial part of China and its booming coast. China’s economic slow lane is choked with state-owned industrial firms in sectors linked to real estate — steel, cement, coal and construction equipment.… They are zombies in a phantom economy. Zipping along in the economic fast lane are private companies producing goods and services for a burgeoning consumer market that has taken over from manufacturing as the engine of China’s growth. The result of increasing tariffs on Chinese goods will be a declining Chinese economy. Chinese leaders will feel the pressure when “fast-lane” companies can’t absorb displaced workers from the state-owned firms. Increasing fear among Americans has already produced the Trump phenomenon. Imagine what countries with authoritarian traditions will produce if the global economy deteriorates due to trade wars. If trade wars begin, economic tensions will mount. To divert attention from the economy, Chinese politicians could escalate tensions over Taiwan or North Korea. Or, perhaps, they could direct their efforts farther abroad. Will American fears of a [cyberattack on our electrical grid](http://www.amazon.com/Lights-Out-Cyberattack-Unprepared-Surviving/dp/055341996X) prove prophetic? A prosperous world dramatically reduces the odds of such catastrophic events. Economically illiterate politicians who promote trade wars threaten human cooperation, international harmony, and general prosperity. They threaten peace. Good intentions are meaningless if your trade policies lead to war.

### 1NC Impact

#### US/ China war would escalate into nuclear extinction

Ching Cheong and Xiang Cheng, Political scientists and Chinese authors, 2001, “Will Taiwan Break Away: The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism,” Book, Google Books (accessed June 7, 2016)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking.

## Uniqueness

### No Trade War Now

#### US China bashing hasn’t stunted US exports to China—no protectionist backlash

Daniel Wagner, Staff writer for the South China Morning Post, March 22, 2016, “With its China bashing, America risks breaking a profitable partnership,” South China Morning Post, <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1928704/its-china-bashing-america-risks-breaking-profitable> (accessed June 7, 2016)

China is not above criticism, and some American politicians do raise some valid points in criticising China, such as that the government controls large parts of the Chinese economy through state-owned enterprises, which distorts the domestic market and gives some Chinese companies unfair competitive advantages. But what they then fail to say is that China must also compete in the global marketplace, and that it pays a price for supporting companies that should otherwise fail as a result of being poorly run, inefficient or bloated. If the US does not like the way China does business, it is of course free to do business elsewhere, but that would be a really bad idea for America. Exports to China totalled US$120 billion in 2014, making it the third-largest export market for US goods (behind Canada and Mexico).

### No Trade War Now

#### No trade war now—US/China trade is mutually beneficial

[Javier E. David](http://www.cnbc.com/javier-david/), Staff writer for CNBC News, April 17, 2016, “Donald Trump 'irrational' for trade war talk: China's finance minister,” CNBC News, <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/17/donald-trump-irrational-for-trade-war-talk-chinas-finance-minister.html> (accessed June 10, 2016)

China's finance chief lambasted GOP frontrunner Donald Trump as "irrational," The Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday, adding that the world's largest economy would forfeit its global leadership role if it adopted Trump's controversial trade policies. Contending that America is being treated unfairly in its trade deals, the real estate billionaire has advocated slapping tariffs of up to 45 percent on Chinese goods. The U.S.'s trade deficit with China was more than $57 billion as of February 2016, according to U.S. Census bureau data, and totaled about $366 billion in 2015. Lou's blunt remarks were an uncharacteristic departure from the usual reticence of Chinese officials to comment on U.S. election cycles. Up until now, China has sidestepped direct criticism of the U.S. presidential contenders, yet finance minister Lou Jiwei told The Journal in an interview that Trump was an "irrational type." Lou added that tariffs would be a violation of the country's obligations under the World Trade Organization. Lou also stated that the U.S. and China are "mutually dependent on each other", and that both economies would falter in the event of a trade war. For years, U.S. politicians have railed against the country's currency policies, which they feel constitute an unfair trade advantage. "Our economic cycles are intertwined," Lou told the publication. "We have a lot more in common than sets us apart."

### No Trade War Now—Brink

#### No trade war now—tensions are on the brink but no mass wave of retaliation yet

Andy Home, Reuters political and economic staff writer, April 21, 2016, “Is the world sliding toward a steel trade war?,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-steel-ahome-idUSKCN0XH19A> (accessed June 14, 2016)

TRADE WAR? The other countries taking part in that failed Brussels meeting have offered China a way back into the talks in the form of cooperation on information-sharing and policies to mitigate the social impact of restructuring the global steel industry. Whether China picks up that olive branch remains to be seen. The acrimonious language used by both sides doesn't bode well. The alternative is more trade sanctions. The U.S. statement pointedly added as a footnote that the administration last year started "an historic number of trade remedy proceedings", including $45.5 million of penalties on steel importers. Further "robust enforcement measures" will proceed in parallel with continued talks. The problem is that bilateral sanctions don't work in a commodity supply chain such as steel. Chinese exports hit not just the United States but other big Asian steel producers such as South Korea and Japan, which respond by stepping up exports. India and Japan have already clashed in the World Trade Organization over the former's move in February to set a floor price for steel imports. In Australia, where local steel maker Arrium has just gone into administration, the government has already applied 41 anti-dumping measures to imported steel products, including 13 for China and eight for South Korea. In the steel industry such a proliferation of trade sanctions is commonly known as "whack-a-mole", a reference to the popular game in which the player has to hit a mole that appears randomly from a series of holes. What it means is that one set of bilateral sanctions immediately causes a change in steel flows to affect another country, which in turn initiates its own penalties on cheap imports. This process has not only started but is gathering global momentum as every country seeks to protect its own steel sector. A global dialogue on steel restructuring is surely the right way to prevent a full-scale global trade war.

### No Trade War Now

#### US/China economic competition is exaggerated—no trade war now

Li Shengjiao, Senior Chinese diplomat, May 4, 2015, “U.S.-China Trade Rivalry in Asia Is Overhyped,” The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/li-shengjiao/uschina-trade-rivalry-in-\_b\_6801320.html (June 10, 2016)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the backbone of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Asia policy, is down to its final haggling. U.S. negotiators hope they could close out the TPP deal by the summer, despite opposition mounting from both sides of the nation’s partisan aisle. When opposition arises from within, exaggerating threats from the outside has practically become a usual practice adopted by some U.S. politicians to divert attention and win domestic support. There have been many [voices](http://www.ibtimes.com/china-gathers-support-asia-pacific-trade-pact-seen-rival-us-backed-tpp-1721789) in the U.S. that have described the TPP and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as two complete competing trade initiatives, and labeled the “competition” as a China-U.S. tug-of-war in the Asia-Pacific region. They fear that China is trying to gain dominance in Asia-Pacific trade agendas and displace the U.S.-led TPP by pushing for the FTAAP. Although the appearance of rivalry does exist, much of the hype is overblown.

### Protectionism Low Now (US)

#### Overall, US has some of the lowest tariffs in the world

Binyamin Appelbaum, Washington correspondent for The New York Times. He covers the Federal Reserve and other aspects of economic policy, May 2, 2016, “Experts Warn of Backlash in Donald Trump’s China Trade Policies,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-policy-china.html?_r=0> (accessed June 9, 2016)

Imposing sweeping tariffs would reverse a mainstay of United States foreign policy. Beginning after World War II, the United States gradually reduced its import taxes and pushed other nations to do the same, seeking not only to promote increased trade but to prevent conflict. The United States now imposes average weighted import tariffs of just 1.4 percent, [according to the World Bank](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.WM.AR.ZS), among the lowest rates in the world.

### Protectionism Low Now (US)

#### The US has low tariff rates the squo—not reliant on protectionist strategies

[Jon Greenberg](http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/staff/jon-greenberg/), Staff writer with PolitiFact. Prior to that, he was executive editor at New Hampshire Public Radio and a Washington reporter for National Public Radio, March 30, 2016, “Trump miscasts impact on trade of Chinese taxes,” PolitiFact, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/30/donald-trump/trump-miscasts-impact-trade-chinese-taxes/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

"Industrialized countries generally have lower tariffs than developing countries," Qin said. "Hence, countries such as India, Turkey, Argentina have much higher average tariffs than the United States, the EU, Canada, Japan on industrial products. China is somewhere in between the two groups." Overall, while the United States and others have had trade disputes with China, they don’t hinge on tariffs or taxes. "Generally, they are not major problems even in most cases worldwide," said Stuart Malawer, professor of law and international trade at George Mason University. Malawer served on the Virginia governor’s trade mission to China. "The real problem are non-tariff barriers. China has a significant number of them. These are primarily regulatory."

### Protectionism Low Now (Global)

#### Framing issues—tariffs are low now even if non-tariff barriers are still in place

Kithmina Hewage, Research assistant at the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka (IPS), April 07, 2016, “Has the US Turned Against Free Trade Agreements?,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/has-the-us-turned-against-free-trade-agreements/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Trade agreements have become the embodiment of international trade, with proponents and opponents rallying around and against the passage of any particular trade deal. Unlike in previous decades, however, free trade agreements are no longer exclusively focused on tariff reductions. With the expansion of the [GATT/WTO trading regime](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm) and the general acceptance of free trade, tariff rates across the world have reduced exponentially. Consequently, [non-tariff barriers](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr12-2d_e.pdf) pose the most pertinent obstacles to trade.

### Protectionism Low Now (Global)

#### Despite individual tariffs, the global trend is in favor of trade liberalization

[Sofia Lotto Persio](http://projourno.org/author/sofialottopersio/), Masters degree in Journalism, Media, and Globalisation at Aarhus University, Danish School of Media and Journalism, November 24, 2015 ,“Five trends that will shape the future of trade,” Global Trade Review, <http://www.gtreview.com/news/global/five-trends-that-will-shape-the-future-of-trade/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

The pace of trade liberalisation will continue with the extension of free trade and the continuing harmonisation of standards and regulations to reduce barriers to trade, fostering the rise of “mega-regionals”. A more stable political and currency environment is anticipated, making trading easier for companies around the world. “By 2020 we will have the new rules and terms of organisation of trade and investment that should allow countries to go back to the multilateral trading system. We will see more and more plurilateral agreements within the multilateral system – it will become a club of clubs,” says Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, co-founder, chief executives at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).

### Protectionism Low Now (China)

#### China lower import tariffs now—part of their strategy to combat black market

Kati Chitrakorn, Staff writer for the Business of Fashion, February 5, 2016, “Can China End the Illicit ‘Daigou’ Trade?,” Business of Fashion, <http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/global-currents/can-china-put-an-end-to-the-illicit-daigou-trade> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Lowering import tariffs and tightening customs controls are among strategies for curbing "selling agents” who trade in luxury goods at lower prices. Will it work? Gao, who only wishes to give her family name, has good reason to be discreet. When she tried to shop at a prominent online luxury retailer based in the UK, she ran into an unexpected burden that prompted her to use an illicit trade instead. “I ordered two products,” she tells BoF, from Beijing, where she lives. “But when DHL received the parcels last week, they called me up to say that the parcel could not pass through China’s customs. I had to return my order and get a daigou to do it for me instead, [because] the daigou would deliver the parcel to me and not report the value inside.” Due to hefty import tariffs and consumption taxes, as well as higher pricing strategies, prices for luxury goods can be 20 to 30 percent higher in China when compared to abroad. The disparity has given rise to daigou, [a grey market trade](http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/global-currents/daigou-agents-help-chinese-consumers-get-luxury-goods-less) where shopping agents purchase goods overseas and sell them back to customers in China, typically making a profit and saving the customer money at the same time, by avoiding import duties. But after years of watching the illegal trade grow, the Chinese government has recently stepped in to tackle it by lowering import tariffs and tightening customs controls. Unfortunately, what Gao’s experience highlights is that some of these new measures have inadvertently created barriers for Chinese consumers who want to use legitimate channels to buy online. “It’s ridiculous,” she says, describing how the frustration and confusion left her feeling “forced to use daigou.”

### Protectionism Low Now (China)

#### China’s tariffs are trending downward

Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Hong Kong based economic research outlet, August 27, 2015, “Trade Regulations of China,” Hong Kong Trade Development Council, <http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Small-Business-Resources/Trade-Regulations-of-China/sbr/en/1/1X000000/1X006MY8.htm> (accessed June 10, 2016)

China became a WTO Member on 11 December 2001. China has gradually liberalized its foreign trading system and has continued to reduce administrative barriers to trade. According to China’s amended Foreign Trade Law which went into effect from July 2004, all types of enterprises, including private enterprises, can register for the trading right. Individual Chinese are also allowed to conduct foreign trade under the amended Foreign Trade Law. According to WTO, China's average applied MFN tariff rate was 9.4% in 2013, progressively down from 15.3% in 2001. The average tariff was higher for agricultural products at 14.8% while the average tariff for non-agricultural products was 8.6%.

## Links

### Link—US/ China Relations

#### US/ China relations upset US businesses, previous support for relations has collapsed—laundry list of reasons

Nina Easton, Staff writer for Fortune magazine, September 9, 2015, “American businesses are growing wary of China—with good reason,” Fortune magazine, <http://fortune.com/2015/09/09/american-business-beijing/> (accessed June 9, 2016)

Last spring, five women in China were arrested for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” because they planned a sticker campaign on buses and subways to call attention to groping and other forms of sexual harassment. Lurking inside this political incident were two warning signs for foreign business—the increasing reach of Beijing’s cyber-spying (the women were caught while only in the planning stage) and the regime’s growing hostility to civil society, however benign. As the White House prepares for President Xi Jinping’s visit later this month, U.S.-China relations are being rattled by a regime that is flexing its muscle militarily, in cyberspace, and against dissenters inside its own borders. Those may be political and security issues, but they are now bleeding into the operations of Fortune 1000 companies. In the most recent episode of our CSIS iTunes podcast “Smart Women, Smart Power,” I discussed these disturbing trends—as well as Beijing’s military buildup in the South China sea—with Bonnie Glaser, CSIS’s senior adviser for Asia, and Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. You can hear the full conversation, recorded at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, [here](http://c72710c35a98c0e0a42d-2df07eb466c3361e3d607b0dca5aa8b3.r79.cf2.rackcdn.com/150826_swsp_china_02.mp3). “The American business community is very unhappy about the regulations and policies China is pursuing that favor Chinese companies and seek to give advantages to its own national champions at the expense of foreign companies,” says Glaser. Until recently, she notes, U.S. business “was the greatest supporter of closer US-China relations.” Now, a reversal of political reforms is making companies nervous. Which brings us back to the five women—and the state of civil society in China. Since that episode, Beijing has issued a draft law to police foreign nongovernmental groups. The draft provoked sharp objections from American industries ranging from technology to agriculture. While NGOs may seem tangential to business operations, industry groups cite everything from chamber of commerce exchanges to scientific gatherings as central to the foundation of $600 billion in annual U.S.-China trade.

### Link—US/ China Engagement

#### China uses unfair business practices to out compete US companies—the plan is seen as selling out US industry which causes domestic protectionism

Nick Carey and James B. Kelleher, Staff writers for the Huffington Post, April 27, 2011, “Corporate America’s Relationship With China Worries Small Business,” The Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/27/china-us-american-companies-corporations_n_854294.html> (accessed June 9, 2016)

Given the savage nature of the competition you might expect Chesebro to vent mainly against Chinese-style capitalism. But like dozens of manufacturers and others across America interviewed for this story, his anger isn’t directed at China, which he and others say is doing what it deems as necessary to boost its own people’s prosperity. Instead, their ire is aimed at the U.S. government and American multinationals for not stepping up to the plate and defending long-term U.S. interests. “I don’t blame the Chinese, they’re just pursuing their national interest,” said Patrick Mulloy, a member of the Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “I blame us for not realizing what’s happening to us and for doing nothing about it.” Prior to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization almost a decade ago, free trade proponents argued that the move would create American jobs and eliminate the country’s trade deficit. Neither prediction has proven accurate. The U.S. trade shortfall with China hit a record high $273 billion last year and government data shows some 40 percent of factories with more than 250 employees closed down from 2001 to 2010. While it can’t all be laid at China’s door, it is not a coincidence that after decades of more gradual decline, U.S. manufacturing took a nose dive after China’s entry into the WTO. Cheap labor is one huge advantage for China, of course. But numerous academics, former trade officials and labor union officials say predatory trade practices, subsidized exports and other controversial economic policies also make Chinese companies tough to compete against. And they warn that unless the U.S. works out a way to bolster and promote the sector, future prosperity and America’s superpower status will eventually be at risk. This is only underlined by the U.S. economy’s fragile state, with the jobless rate at 8.8 percent, growth tepid, and a huge government budget deficit and debt burden. Even China’s rising production costs may present an increasing threat, they argue. It means that China will be less able to rely on being the cheap maker of textiles, toys, furniture and plastics to create jobs — some of that production is increasingly going to go to places like Bangladesh and Vietnam. Instead, Beijing is increasingly focused on moving up the chain to higher valued technology-based goods — which puts it in direct competition with the remaining power base of the U.S. manufacturing sector. And the technology-transfer terms that many big American companies are agreeing to when they do deals in China, and the research centers they are opening up there, means they could in some cases be signing their own death warrants. Peter Navarro, a professor of economics and public policy at the University of California, who correctly predicted the U.S. housing bust, predicts that the crash America faces if it neglects manufacturing for too long is “going to be far worse.” “Over time the problems Americans are seeing with their economy are only going to get worse as China rises,” he said. “We’re heading for a collision and the longer that collision is delayed the harder it’s going to be.” Still, free trade proponents have warned repeatedly that any protectionist measures would result in a costly trade war that neither side can win. They also argue that the United States has only itself to blame for its economic problems.

### Link Magnifier—Relations

#### US/ China relations determine domestic protectionism

Patrick Smith, Correspondent and independent journalist—previous lecturer in journalism and media studies, April 11, 2016, “China Is Buying Up US Companies — Does Anyone Care?,” The Fiscal Times, <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2016/04/11/China-Buying-US-Companies-Does-Anyone-Care> (accessed June 9, 2016)

As it stands, CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.] rules on an ad hoc, deal-to-deal basis. Those familiar with its review process say it’s a dense, opaque bureaucracy whose wheels grind slowly and whose decisions exhibit no pattern. Something close to confusion appears to reign as a result. Two months ago Fairchild Semiconductor walked away from a $2.5 billion Chinese acquisition bid because it feared CFIUS would block it. Syngenta’s U.S. subsidiary means that deal may be blocked. So might Zoomlion’s bid for Terex, because Zoomlion’s a supplier for the People’s Liberation Army. We’re talking about a maker of cranes, don’t forget. Two weeks ago, [Anbang Insurance abruptly withdrew a $14 billion bid](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/business/dealbook/starwood-hotels-chinese-suitor-backs-out-of-bidding.html?_r=0) for Starwood Hotels. Marriott won, and will now be the world’s No. 1 hotelier. Anbang isn’t saying why it withdrew its offer. But among the uncertainties hanging over the proposed deal: Starwood has hotels near the White House and the Treasury department. Think about it: CFIUS might have blocked a hotel acquisition on national security grounds. This is not an orderly, predictable process, and it’s too prone to special-interest pressure. “The committee responds to lobbyists and strong arguments,” Dilenschneider said in an interview. “It sounds like you mean protectionism and don’t want to use the word,” I replied. “That’s exactly what I mean,” he said. There are risks here, especially given the fragility of U.S.-China relations at the moment and the anti-Chinese grandstanding now common on the presidential campaign trail. U.S. businesses could get hurt if the Chinese decide retaliatory measures are justified. So could the trade relationship, to say nothing of bilateral ties.

### Link Magnifier—Economic Engagement

#### Increased US/ China economic engagement tanks US manufacturing sector—manufacturing sector knows the plan dooms them

Matthew McMullan, Communications manager for the Alliance for American Manufacturing (AAM), January 28, 2016, “Economists Realize Trade With China Has Hurt U.S. Workers,” AAM, <http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/economists-realize-trade-with-china-has-hurt-us-workers> (accessed June 9, 2016)

There’s a new report out this week, prepared by some of the [same academics](http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-06-18/after-doubting-economists-find-china-killing-u-s-factory-jobs) who a few years ago made note of the huge drop-off in U.S. manufacturing employment that came after Washington normalized trade relations with China and helped it join the World Trade Organization (WTO). This one’s about [“China shock.”](http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906) The researchers found that for workers in industries exposed to Chinese import competition, the hits came hard and they still haven’t recovered from them. Those workers experience lots of job churn and their earnings have been reduced, meaning: They haven’t been absorbed into other industries that pay wages comparable to those they once had. They’re going from low-wage job to low-wage job, and they’re more likely to be on welfare. Trade with China, for lots of our fellow Americans, has been a bum deal. Writes Noah Smith at [Bloomberg View](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-26/free-trade-with-china-wasn-t-such-a-great-idea): So the economics profession is coming around to the reality that liberalizing trade with China has been, uh, problematic for many American workers? Whoa. So now what? What are we gonna do about this? What are we gonna do, man? We’ve got a couple of ideas. And more gifs! Crack down on currency. China has spent years keeping its currency artificially cheap in order to boost its own exports. That’s called currency manipulation. Twice a year, the Department of Treasury issues a report to Congress that looks at exchange rate shenanigans by foreign governments. But [not once](http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/press-releases/entry/treasury-again-fails-to-cite-china-as-a-currency-manipulator-aam-statement) in its 14 reports has the Obama administration’s Treasury named China a currency manipulator, which would make it sit down with its Chinese counterparts at the International Monetary Fund to negotiate over the issue. Simply naming China a currency manipulator would be a big step. But that’s not all: Congress should take up currency legislation that [passed the Senate](http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-bill-to-toughen-enforcement-of-trade-laws-1431622577) last summer. The provision would put currency manipulation on the list of illegal subsidies that could warrant imposing counter-vailing duties. Don't lock in a bad trade relationship. Back in 2000, when Washington lawmakers were normalizing trade relations with Beijing, the pro-trade crowd claimed that normalization would create a boom in American exports to China. But even back then, there were honest assessments sprinkled into the media coverage. “This deal is about investment, not exports,” [said an economist](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111703138.html) with Morgan Stanley in May of that year. We’ve had a lot of manufacturing move to China since that time, and very little growth in exports, so that assessment has proven true.

### Link Magnifier – American Labor Movement

#### The American labor movement empirically opposes free trade

Richard A. Epstein, Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, March 14, 2016, “The Rise of American Protectionism,” <http://www.hoover.org/research/rise-american-protectionism> (Accessed 6/14/16)

This point explains why the American labor movement has historically opposed free trade. The essence of unionism is, and always will be, the acquisition of monopoly power. There is no way for a union to obtain that monopoly power in the marketplace. It can only secure it through legislation. The first step in that process was the exemption of unions from the antitrust laws under Section 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The second major step was the legitimation of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which gave the union the exclusive bargaining rights against the firm once it was successful in a union election. These major statutory benefits strengthened private sector unions and imposed inefficiencies on unionized firms. This, in turn, opened the field for new firms, like the Japanese automobile companies, to organize outside the union envelope. In response, labor’s strategy went one step further. It pushed hard on trade and tariff barriers to keep out foreign imports, and exerted political influence to encourage local zoning boards to exclude new businesses that do not use union labor. Add to these issues the aggressive rise of minimum wage laws and other mandates like Obamacare and family leave statutes, and you construct a regulatory fortress that defeats the corrective forces of free trade and renders the nation less economically resilient and productive than before.

### Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism

#### US companies will lobby Congress for stiff tariffs when threatened by Chinese competition

[Kenneth Rapoza](http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/), Journalist writing about investing, business, and emerging markets, April 30, 2016, “China Threatens To Challenge U.S. Tariffs In WTO,” Forbes magazine, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/04/30/steel-wars-china-threatens-to-challenge-u-s-tariffs-in-wto/#8e3a8a937e6c> (accessed June 9, 2016)

The Ministry of Commerce of China said on Saturday that it was gearing up for a legal challenge, most likely by opening an arbitration panel in the World Trade Organization. The U.S. steel industry is reeling from cheaper Chinese imports. They say that China’s government is funding and subsidizing an industry that is faced with oversupply issues. To get rid of the steel, China is selling more of it to buyers worldwide and pricing out the competition. “China will encourage and support its steel companies to defend themselves according to law, and China will safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of its steel companies using World Trade Organization rules,” the Ministry said in a statement today, less than 24 hours after Washington announced further investigations into China’s steel industry. The U.S. hit seven countries with temporary steel tariffs in March. It’s likely they’ll be made more permanent come July, with China being the chief villain among the seven. U.S. steel manufacturers are lobbying congress to go after the Chinese. They want the tariffs to stick. On April 14, steel company executives and United Steelworkers president Leo Gerard met with members of congress’s steel caucus to deride China. They argued that cheaper Chinese imports was cutting into local steel-town economies and tried selling them on the fact that reliance on foreign steel might even be bad for national security because defense contractors rely on steel. The Department of Commerce already imposed preliminary duties on cold-rolled steel but industry leaders want even more types of steel added to the list. The duties went into effect the first week of March and were [set at 265.79%](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imposes-266-duty-on-some-chinese-steel-imports-1456878180) over the price of imported steel. They will remain temporary unless congress makes them stick in a hearing this summer. [This is what United Steelworkers are counting on.](http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/message-to-congress-its-time-for-action-on-steel-imports) [On March 1, the WSJ noted that Lakshmi Mittal](http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-imposes-266-duty-on-some-chinese-steel-imports-1456878180), the Indian CEO behind the world’s top steelmaker, Arcelormittal, said deeper tariff protection was needed to help save his U.S. steel operations in Indiana. “Tariffs will help prices. The Chinese steel industry lost $10 billion last year,” he said. “They’re dumping because of it.”

### Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism

#### US companies want stiff tariffs on Chinese imports so they can better compete

Jim Geraghty, Senior political correspondent for National Review, March 8, 2016, “The Problem with Trump’s Protectionist Tariffs,” National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/432462/donald-trump-protectionist-tariffs-hurt-working-class> (accessed June 8, 2016)

Trump’s proposals would recreate the same results on a larger scale. His across-the-board tariff on Chinese goods would bring retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports to China, the third-largest market for American companies behind Canada and Mexico. U.S. producers of soybeans, civilian aircraft, cotton, copper, corn, and recycled materials would all take a big hit. Trump is touting his tariff idea as a way of boosting U.S. economic production, instead of increasing non-U.S. imports. He’s pledging to bring back jobs lost to foreign competitors who undercut American companies. But protectionist tariffs can accomplish that only if they are uniformly applied. A tariff on Chinese products would immediately make Japanese, Mexican, and other foreign companies better able to compete in the American market, necessitating another round of tariffs on those countries. And it’s safe to assume each new tariff would bring retaliatory tariffs against U.S. exports, until there was no one left with whom we could profitably trade. Like Trump’s pledge to build a border wall, the tariffs’ intended effect sounds good, but there’s no acknowledgement of their exorbitant costs. There’s no doubt that many Trump supporters are hurting, and want desperately to gain a foothold in an economy they feel has passed them by. A unionized manufacturing job must sound nice to them. But it wouldn’t be nearly as nice if their cost of living shot through the roof overnight.

### Int. Link—Companies Favor Protectionism

#### Instead of innovating, cutting costs, or selling a better product, US companies seek tariffs on Chinese imports to compete

Jeff Jacoby, Columnist for the Boston Globe and winner of the Breindel Prize and Thomas Paine Awards, May 22, 2016, “Welcome cheap Chinese steel, dump tariffs,” The Boston Globe, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2016/05/21/welcome-cheap-chinese-steel-dump-tariffs/VAeBAyRi4ewRFwdsQbcU3N/story.html> (accessed June 8, 2016)

CHINA PRODUCES MORE than 820 million tons of steel per year, of which about 100 million tons are exported and sold at a discount overseas. Only about [3 percent of those exports](http://www.economist.com/news/finance/21696325-throwing-up-tariffs-counterproductive-response-economic-weakness-why-no) go to the United States, but American steel producers bristle at the competition. So in keeping with the time-honored practice of the US steel industry — “[the backbone of American manufacturing](https://twitter.com/envirometal/status/653568400485154816),” as it proudly calls itself — domestic producers are rising to the challenge. Are they doing so by making their operations more efficient? By improving the quality of the steel they sell? By cutting their prices to maintain market share in the face of a tough competitor? Not exactly. They’re getting the federal government to punish American consumers. “The United States on Tuesday said it would impose duties of more than 500 percent on Chinese cold-rolled flat steel, widely used for car body panels, appliances, and in construction,” [reported Reuters](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-steel-idUSKCN0Y82ER). “The Commerce Department said the new duties effectively increase more than five-fold the import prices on Chinese-made . . . steel products.” American steel producers complain that their counterparts in China are dumping cheap steel on the US market, benefiting from Chinese tax subsidies to undercut other companies’ prices. Because of these “unfairly traded imports,” [lament](http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/opinions/american-steel-industry-gibson-schmitt/) Thomas Gibson and Chuck Schmitt of the American Iron and Steel Institute, some US steel mills have had to be shuttered, and 12,000 steel-making jobs were lost during the past year. It is always painful when workers are laid off and once-thriving facilities have to be closed. But the steel industry is far from unique. The US economy creates and destroys millions of jobs every year. No industry is exempt from the upheaval, retrenchment, or losses caused by changes in technology, trade, and consumer demand. The digital revolution has decimated once-formidable companies and careers in fields as different as journalism, photography, tax accountancy, and recorded music. Would anyone argue that the government should have suppressed the Internet in order to preserve the employment and production patterns of the 1980s? Should the Commerce Department have imposed taxes of 500 percent on e-mail services and word-processing software to preserve the viability of typewriters and stenographers? For that matter, [as economist Don Boudreaux has remarked](http://cafehayek.com/2004/04/polio_vaccinati.html), should the polio vaccine have been taxed into unaffordability for the sake of all the jobs that were once linked to the care of polio victims? Sooner or later, competition and disruption challenge every industry and market. The pain they can inflict is real, but far greater and more enduring are the benefits and prosperity they generate. American steel mills are understandably chagrined that competitors from China are beating them on price. But cheaper steel also means more affordable cars, homes, and appliances for tens of millions of Americans. It means more employment at General Motors, Boeing, and John Deere. Jacking up steel prices through “antidumping” tariffs and other protectionist measures makes life more expensive for all of us and jeopardizes far more jobs than it saves. There is nothing nefarious about Chinese mills selling steel at bargain prices in the United States and other foreign countries. Companies routinely mark down the price of their merchandise — in clearance sales, as loss-leaders, for promotional purposes, or simply in response to local conditions. The Commerce Department and the US producers clamoring for punitive tariffs, claim that Beijing is subsidizing Chinese steel exports. Even if that’s true, why should Americans object? We aren’t being harmed by China’s gift — we’re being enriched. It is the federal government and its tariffs that harm us, by deliberately making steel more expensive and thereby making US consumers poorer. For years, American steel companies have bellyached about foreign competition, and for years Washington has responded with quotas, tariffs, “voluntary-restraint” agreements, and other restrictions on free trade. The Obama administration, like the [Bush 43, Bush 41, Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Johnson administrations](http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/protectionist-welfare-steel/) before it, has yielded to the industry’s unreasonable demand for more trade barriers and corporate welfare. It’s a pity. Nucor, Steel Dynamics, United States Steel, and other American producers should be told to step up and face their competition in the marketplace. They shouldn’t be rewarded for hiring lobbyists and publicists to wangle special-interest privileges that no business has a right to claim.

### Int. Link—Companies Fear Chinese Competition

#### US companies fear Chinese competition—they rely on tariffs and other protectionist strategies to compete

[David Autor](http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor), PhD—Associate Department Head, MIT Department of Economics, [David Dorn](http://www.ddorn.net/), PhD—Professor of International Trade and Labor Markets, University of Zurich Affiliated Professor, UBS International Center for Economics in Society, and [Gordon H. Hanson](http://irps.ucsd.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/gordon-hanson.htm), PhD—Professor of Economics at UC San Diego, March 12, 2015, “Why Obama’s key trade deal with Asia would actually be good for American workers,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/03/12/why-obamas-key-trade-deal-with-asia-would-actually-be-good-for-american-workers/> (accessed June 8, 2016)

[Opponents](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/03/10/afl-cio-boss-on-obamas-trade-push-we-are-going-all-out-to-oppose-it/) of giving President Obama [fast-track authority](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-new-congress-should-revive-a-bill-on-fast-track-trade-authority/2014/11/06/e2b4feae-638a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html) to negotiate [the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Partnership) — the pending trade pact between the United States and 11 countries in Asia and the Americas — cite the job-killing impacts of globalization as a prime reason for their objection. The free-trade agreement would lower tariffs and remove other barriers to imports from member countries, which opponents fear would create steep competition for U.S. industries domestically. There is indeed substantial evidence that import competition from low-wage countries has contributed to [the momentous decline in U.S. manufacturing employment](http://www.usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/documents/Pierce%20and%20Schott%20-%20The%20Surprisingly%20Swift%20Decline%20of%20U.S.%20Manufacturing%20Employment_0.pdf) in the last two decades. We even [researched and published](http://www.nber.org/papers/w20395) some of that empirical evidence. Still, we believe blocking the TPP on fears of globalization would be a mistake.

### Int. Link—Companies Fear Chinese Competition

#### Companies lobby the USFG for protections against Chinese competition

[Lee Drutman](https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/author/ldrutman/), PhD—Senior fellow at New America, and teaches in the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies at The John Hopkins University, March 3, 2014, “[How Big Pharma (and others) began lobbying on the Trans-Pacific Partnership before you ever heard of it](https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/03/13/tpp-lobby/),” Sunlight Foundation, <https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/03/13/tpp-lobby/> (accessed June 8, 2016)

But the pharmaceutical industry is not alone in lobbying to shape the trade agreement (see Figure 1below). Next on the list are auto manufacturers (101 reports), followed by clothing & accessories (89 reports), milk and dairy products (82 reports), and textiles and fabrics (82 reports). Figure 1 visualizes the top 20 most active industries, measured by lobbying reports that mention the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP by name. Looking at the top 20 organizations (Figure 2 below) tells a similar picture: PhRMA, the pharmaceutical industry’s trade association, tops the list at 44 reports mentioning the trade agreement, followed closely by drug giant Pfizer at 42. The Chamber of Commerce comes in third, with 34 reports, followed by the Dairy Farmers of America, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Yahoo!, all at 29 reports. The requisite caveat is these counts are based on voluntary disclosures, and they rely on the organization to specifically mention the trade agreement by name in its lobbying disclosure forms (as opposed to something like "trade issues"). Still, the lobbying patterns shouldn’t come as a surprise: They largely reflect the interests that are most likely to be affected by the trade agreement. Additionally, we can use [Docket Wrench](http://docketwrench.sunlightfoundation.com/) to see which organizations wrote the most public comment letters to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) regarding the TPP. Table 1 below lists these organizations, and each organization is linked to a list of its comments on Docket Wrench. For those seeking to better understand these organizations’ positions and arguments — and the ways in which they tried to shape the TPP in its early stages — these documents are an incredible source. More broadly, all this early-stage involvement demonstrates just how dedicated these industries and organizations have been to trying to shape the agreement. Our analysis of lobbying reports shows who was working on the issue back in 2009, when the number of players involved was small enough and public scrutiny was so minimal that it was easier to shape priorities and language. Figures 3 and 4below show which companies and industries were most active when. The general pattern is one of increasing involvement over time, though the charts also make clear which industries were involved right from the very start. Hollywood has been involved in shaping this agreement from the start, and the movie industry has [largely gotten what it wanted](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/15/five-key-questions-and-answers-about-the-leaked-tpp-text/) — provisions that bring back some of the pieces of [SOPA](http://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr3261-112/show)/[PIPA](http://www.opencongress.org/bill/s968-112/show) that could not pass Congress, as well as extending corporate-owned copyrights to life plus 95 years. The [International Intellectual Property Alliance](http://www.iipa.com/), a trade group that represents the film and music industry, has submitted seven different comment letters to the USTR regarding TPP. Here’s an example of one demand from [a Nov. 10, 2010 comment letter](http://docketwrench.sunlightfoundation.com/document/USTR-2010-0031-0005): [C]oncrete obligations for strengthening copyright enforcement, including: measures to address online and other infringements generally, and specifically, including criminal remedies for significant wilful (sic) infringements of copyright regardless of whether such acts are undertaken with any direct or indirect motivation of financial gain, as well as willful infringements for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Automakers (the second most active sector as measured by number of mentions in lobbying reports) are seeking [broader protections](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-02-06/ford-to-oppose-trans-pacific-trade-pact-without-currency-limits) against Japanese imports, and have major concerns about currency exchange rates. Ford Motor Company, for example, has recently stated that it will oppose the TPP unless it deals with [issues of currency manipulation](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-02-06/ford-to-oppose-trans-pacific-trade-pact-without-currency-limits). It has won some [key support in Congress](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/09/us-usa-trade-currencies-idUSBREA080TL20140109) for its position. Back in 2009, Ford listed 10 specific guiding policies for the TPP [in a comment letter](http://docketwrench.sunlightfoundation.com/document/USTR-2009-0041-0089). Here were its top three demands: Dismantle non-tariff barriers (NTBs), as well as tariffs. Promote an accelerated tariff reduction mechanism or sectoral agreement for trade for environmental goods. Require our partners to pursue market-based currency policies. The textile industry has also been extremely active. As requested by the industry, [U.S. negotiators are putting forward](http://www.textileworld.com/Issues/2013/May-June/Executive_Forum/The_TPP-High_Stakes_For_U.S._Textiles) something called [a “yarn-forward” rule](http://www.textileworld.com/Issues/2013/July-August/From_The_Editor/TPP_Effect_Hinges_On_Yarn-Forward_Rule), which would require that all important production steps take place in [a TPP country](http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/February/Statement-of-Ministers-and-Heads-of-Delegation-for-TPP-countries) — one way to prevent China from supplying cheap textile components to other Asian countries. The textile lobbying appears to have paid off in garnering [support for the industry position in Washington](http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2013/07/23/textile-protectionism-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/). Back in 2009, the American Apparel & Footwear association was laying out the case for strict Rules of Origin in [a comment letter to the USTR.](http://docketwrench.sunlightfoundation.com/document/USTR-2009-0041-0108)

### Int. Link—Companies Influence Congress

#### Corporate lobbyists control the flow of information in Washington—major influence in Congress

[Jeff Madrick](http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/jeff-madrick/), Director of the Bernard L. Schwartz Rediscovering Government Initiative at the Century Foundation and Editor of Challenge Magazine. He teaches at Lang College, the New School, April 7, 2016, “How the Lobbyists Win in Washington,” NY Review of Books, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/07/how-lobbyists-win-in-washington/> (accessed June 8, 2016)

On President Obama’s first day in office in 2009, he issued an executive order to close “the revolving door” between government and the private sector by restricting the hiring of any registered lobbyists for positions in his administration. But Obama himself eventually hired at least seventy lobbyists, many of whom then returned to lobbying after a stint in his administration. So much for Obama’s campaign pledge that he would “tell the corporate lobbyists that their days of setting the agenda in Washington are over.” The executive order has since been dropped, and the number of business lobbyists in Washington has continued rising rapidly. Taking jabs at the profession remains a popular sport, even among Republicans. Donald Trump claimed at one of the Republican debates this fall that he would not talk to lobbyists once elected. Jeb Bush said that he would not let any more into Washington’s halls of power. The question remains: How much influence on Washington’s agenda do business lobbyists have? A book titled The Business of America Is Lobbying by a highly regarded Washington watchdog, Lee Drutman, is therefore welcome, especially during a new presidential season. It takes some wading through Drutman’s disorganized prose and his sometimes ambivalent feelings about lobbying to find his main messages. But there are two crucial points that are disturbing. The first is that business spends $34 on lobbying for every dollar spent by likely opponents such as labor unions and other interest groups. The second point is, I think, Drutman’s most important. It may once have been adequate for lobbyists to provide business clients access to the right people. Today, however, they also must develop expertise on major political issues, so that they can provide policymakers with research, draft legislation, and pass on up-to-the-minute information. Lobbyists, not staffers, concludes Drutman, are now the major source of information for Congress and the executive branch on major legislative issues. In one survey, two thirds of congressional staffers said they depend on lobbyists for the information they need to make legislative decisions and pass bills. Thus lobbying grows because Congress, and often the executive branch, needs lobbyists. To sum up Drutman’s main theme, there is a large imbalance of both lobbying money and expertise that enables lobbyists to influence much of the Washington agenda today. Drutman believes this influence must be trimmed, and he proposes a number of reforms to address the asymmetry of money and expertise—including a new public lobby—that I believe may be effective and will discuss below. But none of Drutman’s proposals has been discussed in the presidential campaigns thus far.

### Int. Link—Companies Influence Congress

#### Lobbyists control the “connective tissue” between politicians and legislation in Washington

Tina Nguyen, VanityFair.com political reporter, September 15, 2015, “Donald Trump Says He Doesn’t Need Lobbyists. He’s Probably Wrong,” Vanity Fair, <http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/09/donald-trump-lobbying-super-pac> (accessed June 8, 2016)

But these days, thanks to looser restrictions on campaign-finance laws, “‘lobbying’ has become a shorthand for wealthy financial interests” trying to push their agenda through the government, says Meredith McGehee, policy director at the Campaign Legal Center, a nonprofit organization focused on combating the influence of money in politics. (The group’s founder, Trevor Potter, served as legal counsel to Stephen Colbert’s satirical super-PAC.) “Well-heeled interests can hire talented lobbyists to make their case,” McGehee noted. “But they’re not representing the consumers themselves.” Reviewing Trump’s history, he’s benefitted from just that kind of lobbying: a recent [Politico article](http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/donald-trump-lobbyists-washington-insider-213466) recapped his decades of influence in Washington, not only by donating hundreds of thousands of dollars to political candidates on both sides of the aisle, but by getting several bills passed that would benefit his large casino operations, and occasionally brushing into serious trouble with the law. (In 2000, the New York state lobbying commission imposed a $250,000 fine—the largest civil penalty in the state’s history at the time—against Trump and his associates for attempting to undercut a rival Native American gambling operation by funding a campaign against them, using secret, unregistered lobbyist money.) Although Trump has forsworn his past—mostly by saying that because he is a financial player, he cannot be played—several Washington lobbyists are sure he’ll have to rely on their industry just to get things done in Washington. That is, if he gets elected at all. “Everyone thinks it’s too early,” said lobbyist Dale Snape, vice chairman at Wexler and Walker Associates, acknowledging that Trump has definitely “tapped into the frustration of voters,” and that Washington was paying attention. But so far, no one’s been “losing sleep.” “I do not get the sense from my colleagues on either side that Donald Trump is going to carry a majority,” Snape said. “He may move the goalpost in a different way than we thought, though.” At the same time, a Republican director of government affairs at a large tech company said there was “chaos” within “traditional D.C.” over why Trump had gained appeal. “People can’t explain it,” this person, who asked to remain anonymous to speak candidly about the situation, said. (He added that initially, there was suspicion that Trump “may have been playing the political field for attention” after he announced plans to build a hotel in D.C.: "But somehow he stumbled across a serious anti-establishment mood [and] thought to himself, holy cow, this could actually work!”) But if Trump gets elected, those within the lobbying industry believe he will crash into the reality of the political system, leaving him with no other choice but to play along—even with his self-proclaimed network of successful people and experts who can advise him. “He may make attempts to reach out to friends and business associates, but it’s impossible for him to rely solely on his social circles,” the tech director said. “Many of the people he’ll have to reach out to will be the traditional voices in D.C.”—including lobbyists working on behalf of interest groups, nonprofits, think tanks, and yes, large corporations. And it won’t be as easy for the real-estate developer to exert his will in government. “In business, people make singular decisions and it will stick,” Snape observed. “In government, it’s a shared decision. There’s a limit on what you can do.” McGehee, a registered lobbyist herself, noted that the constant push to shrink the size of government has left it staffed largely by people willing to work for smaller salaries, i.e. “25-year-old staffers with no knowledge or experience” to draft legislation. Hence, government’s reliance on lobbyists, who are often political veterans with years of experience in federal agencies or Congress, and who work on behalf of the players who can finance them. And that, McGehee warned, is not something Trump has said publicly he could fix. “Trump will likely meet with people from large corporations, employers, bundlers—yes, it’s expected. But nothing ensures that the constituent side gets heard.” Some have compared Trump with another famous outsider who promised significant campaign-finance reform but, once elected, couldn’t shake the influence of lobbyists, either. “I don’t know of anyone who was more of an outsider than Barack Obama,” said Snape. “He promised he would shake up Washington. After he was sworn in, it was business as usual.”

## Impacts

### Free Trade Good—Data

#### The aff’s “free trade bad” impacts are all rhetoric—economists nearly unanimously vote Neg

[Bryan Riley](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/r/bryan-riley), Jay Van Andel Senior Analyst in Trade Policy, and [Anthony B. Kim](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/k/anthony-kim), Research Manager of the Index of Economic Freedom and Senior Policy Analyst for Economic Freedom, in the Center for Trade and Economics, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation, October 20, 2015, “Freedom to Trade: A Guide for Policymakers,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/freedom-to-trade-a-guide-for-policymakers> (accessed June 10, 2016)

What Is Better for the U.S.: Free Trade or Protection from Imports? According to data in the annual Index of Economic Freedom, countries with low trade barriers are more prosperous than those that restrict trade. What Do Economists Say About Free Trade? Polls consistently show near-unanimous support for free trade from economists. According to a panel of economic experts questioned by the University of Chicago’s Booth School of International Business, “free trade improves productive efficiency and offers consumers better choices.” (See Table 1.) What Do Americans Believe About Free Trade? According to a 2014 survey from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 65 percent of Americans believe that “globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good for the United States.”[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/freedom-to-trade-a-guide-for-policymakers%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) A 2014 Pew Research Center survey found that 68 percent of Americans believe growing trade and business ties with other countries is “a good thing.”[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/freedom-to-trade-a-guide-for-policymakers%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) A 2015 Pew survey found that 58 percent of Americans believe that trade agreements have been “a good thing” for the United States.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/freedom-to-trade-a-guide-for-policymakers%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) What Does “Fair Trade” Mean? Politicians often talk about the need to support trade that is “free but fair.” Seldom, however, does anyone explain what fair trade is, or—even more to the point—for whom trade should be fair. In the name of fairness, different special interest groups advocate different protections for their specific industries and call the comparative advantage of other countries unfair. In reality, fair trade occurs whenever there is a voluntary transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Do Imports Destroy American Jobs? No credible economic study has ever documented net U.S. job losses resulting from imports. Trade—like technology—destroys some jobs but creates others. According to Heritage Foundation research, over half a million American jobs—in fields such as transportation, wholesale, retail, construction, and finance—are supported by imports of clothes and toys from China alone. The dollars that Americans save by importing products are spent and invested elsewhere in the U.S. economy, creating new jobs; the dollars that foreign businesses earn from selling their goods to Americans are spent on U.S. exports or invested in the U.S. economy, also creating new American jobs. What About Critics Who Claim the U.S. Has Lost Millions of Jobs Due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Chinese Imports? The United States has gained millions of new jobs since NAFTA was created and since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. (See Chart 2.)

### Free Trade Good—Long Term Economics

#### Now is a key time to bolster America’s commitment to free trade—despite short term losses from trade liberalization, long term economic benefits outweigh

David Shipley, Senior editor for Bloomberg View’s economic review, March 28, 2016, “The Case for Free Trade Is as Strong as Ever,” Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-28/the-case-for-free-trade-is-as-strong-as-ever> (accessed June 11, 2016)

It wasn't so long ago that America's commitment to free trade could be taken for granted. Now it's in doubt -- even though support for open markets remains vital for the nation's future prosperity, and the world's. In this presidential election year, the mood is decidedly anti-trade. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton, under pressure from the left of her party, [refuses to back](http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/oct/08/hillary-clinton/hillary-clinton-now-opposes-trans-pacific-partners/) the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a new trade pact she once called the gold standard for such agreements. Donald Trump, her Republican counterpart, is more direct: He advocates [punitive tariffs](http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-tariffs-on-chinese-exports/) and all-out trade war. The idea that import barriers will strengthen the economy is brainless populism -- and one might expect economists to say so. If only. Many experts say, or seem to say, that [it's all very complicated](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-11/the-trouble-with-economics), that the benefits of free trade have [often been overstated](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-07/free-trade-is-no-longer-a-no-brainer-for-economists), and even that it [might not matter too much](http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/the-mitt-hawley-fallacy/) if the U.S. retreated from the global economy. Economists don't want to be thought simple-minded -- or, worse, market-fundamentalist. But the result is that some aggressively dumb economics is arousing only the most feeble pushback. The case for free trade, correctly understood, is as powerful as ever. It deserves much stronger support. The basic case is robust, and the economic record of the world's richest economies -- including that of the U.S. -- attests to it: Free trade makes economies more productive by forcing producers to innovate, specialize and compete. There are exceptions to the argument that openness promotes growth, mostly concerning the need to shelter infant industries in developing economies. It's also true that more trade involves winners and losers, and that gains for the overall economy aren't much use to the people who lose their jobs because of cheap imports. You could say the same of people who lose their jobs because of automation. Yet presidential candidates don't oppose technology because it creates losers as well as winners. Perhaps that's next. [Recent research](http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906) suggests that the short-term losses from trade liberalization are bigger and more protracted than previous work showed. This careful, detailed work underlines the need to help the workers harmed by trade. Yet these new studies don't show that short-term adjustment costs entirely outweigh the short-term gains -- much less contradict the essential point that trade, over time, gives the economy as a whole a substantial boost. Forgive the market fundamentalism, but a policy that delivers small net gains in the short term and substantial net gains in the long term still seems like a good idea.

### Trade War—Key to Global Stability / Poverty

#### A trade war crushes free trade and jeopardizes global stability and causes mass poverty

Binyamin Appelbaum, Washington correspondent for The New York Times. He covers the Federal Reserve and other aspects of economic policy, May 2, 2016, “Experts Warn of Backlash in Donald Trump’s China Trade Policies,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-policy-china.html?_r=0> (accessed June 9, 2016)

He added: “It doesn’t have to be 45; it could be less. But it has to be something because our country and our trade and our deals and most importantly our jobs are going to hell.” As president, Mr. Trump would have some latitude to reverse a course that the nation has pursued for decades. But the results could be troublesome on multiple fronts. The removal of trade barriers has played a significant role in reducing global poverty and encouraging peace between nations, achievements that could be eroded by tit-for-tat backsliding. “The basic principle is that a sovereign state enters trade agreements of its free will, and it can get back out,” said Robert Howse, the Lloyd C. Nelson professor of international law at N.Y.U. School of Law. “But that’s the easy part.”

### Trade War—Kills Jobs

#### Trade war has no winners—tariffs spark retaliatory policies killing millions of American jobs

[Jim Tankersley](http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/jim-tankersley), Journalist covering economic policy for the Washington Post, March 25, 2016, “Donald Trump’s trade war could kill millions of U.S. jobs,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/25/donald-trumps-trade-war-could-kill-millions-of-u-s-jobs/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Trade has been one of Donald Trump's [great selling points](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/21/how-republicans-helped-create-donald-trump-more-than-15-years-ago/) on the campaign trail. China and Mexico are killing us, he has told crowds on his way to the lead position for the Republican presidential nomination, and if Trump wins the White House, he will fight back. The implication is that getting tough with our trading partners -- by taxing their exports as they cross America's borders -- will bring jobs and prosperity to the United States. An economic model of Trump's proposals, prepared by Moody's Analytics at the request of The Washington Post, suggests Trump is half-right about his plans. They would, in fact, sock it to China and Mexico. Both would fall into recession, the model suggests, if Trump levied his proposed tariffs and those countries retaliated with tariffs of their own. Unfortunately, the United States would fall into recession, too. Up to 4 million American workers would lose their jobs. Another 3 million jobs would not be created that otherwise would have been, had the country not fallen into a trade-induced downturn.

### Trade War— Causes Shooting War

#### Protectionism is a recipe for war—creates conditions and a slippery slope to armed conflict

[Jeff Carter](http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/jeffcarter/), Independent market speculator, former member of the CME Board of Directors, and commentator for various cable news networks, , December 30, 2011, “Isolationism, Protectionism Lead to War,” Town Hall, <http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/jeffcarter/2011/12/30/isolationism_protectionism_lead_to_war/page/full> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Read an article I [linked to in the breakfast links](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/12/29/thursday-breakfast-links-12/) this morning that said a lot if you read between the lines a little. The sentiment is very unsettling to me with regard to growth and the future of the world economy. IMF Chair Christine Lagarde came out yesterday with guns blazing. It looks like even she has had enough of bureaucratic doublespeak for the last two years in Europe and wants something accomplished other than throwing more money at the debt crisis. She compared the current situation to the period between the two World Wars. “The period we are living in is like the 1930s in certain respects. At that time, countries turned inwards, and multilateralism declined. Today, we see some countries raising tariffs, and erecting non-tariff barriers and sometimes blocking capital flows.” According to Lagarde, rising national self-interest is the main obstacle to overcoming the current crisis. “It is difficult to put in place strategies for international cooperation against the crisis. National parliaments are reluctant to put at risk their public finances or their government guarantees to support other countries.” She added that around the world there was growing support for protectionist policies, and that the idea of “everyone for themselves” was gaining ground. The US [response](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/06/26/john-maynard-keynes-rip/) to the crisis in 2008 was not unlike the 1930's. It didn’t work in 1930, and [it didn’t work](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/06/02/beware-the-bear-hint-he-lives-at-1600-pennsylvania-avenue/) in 2008. This theme of discontent started back in 2006 in the US, and now is picking up steam across the world. It’s manifested in many different ways, but I believe there is a great disconnect between what we experience [locally](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/08/28/big-government-destroys-family-farmers/) in our daily lives and what we see in our governments. Locally, we see people being able to target services to individual [needs](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/12/10/three-24-year-olds-do-what-gao-says-is-impossible/). New tools change one size fits all to on demand, cost effective, how I want it, production. Nationally and internationally, we see big generic, big spending, over reaching government programs. It’s causing consternation. People aren’t stupid. You know when you are being snookered. In 2006, the Democrats ran on a platform of fiscal conservatism and fighting for the little guy. Once ensconsed in power, they did the [opposite](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/01/24/money-multipliers-macroeconomics-government-spending-and-obamas-sotu-proposals/). Their budgets [blew up the debt](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/11/22/more-taxes-will-not-help/) and they passed huge government [programs](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/12/05/re-doing-obamacare-2/) that only benefit the biggest guys. In 2009, the [Tea Party](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/09/22/numbers-are-stubborn-things/) formed when Obama passed the stimulus, and gained momentum after [Obamacare](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/03/21/my-sad-healthcare-story/) was passed. In 2010, they swung legislative power back to the Republicans that have pledged to follow Tea Party tenants, shrink the size and scope of government and cut spending. 2012 becomes a pivotal year for that movement because if they can get control of the Senate and White House, we might actually see some [progress](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/09/07/where-is-the-compromise/) on their goals. Worldwide though we are seeing people rise up against [central planning](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/10/17/free-markets-vs-central-planning/). It’s the millions versus the monolith. The Arab spring was something that could not have been fathomed 10 years ago. Some say its the result of social media, others the Iraq War, and some say a little of both. In China, people are becoming discontented with their government. In [Russia](http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=5893), Putin looks to be in trouble. Closer to home we have seen a secondary movement in [Occupy Wall Street](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/10/07/occupy-wall-street-is-a-fraud/) that might have started with good intentions, but was [co-opted](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/10/03/dissecting-occupy-wall-street/) by the hard left. Republican voters have tried almost every declared candidate on for size. In Iowa, we now see the rise of [Ron Paul](http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=5898). Paul’s increasing Iowa poll numbers are not because people believe in his platform. It’s a sign of how discontented voters are with the establishment. Paul would be dangerous as a President because he is an isolationist. With rising tides of isolationism world wide, this is precisely the wrong strategy to take in the US. Free trade and free capital flows among markets are some of the best tonics for an ailing economy. Home grown businesses have a chance to penetrate other markets, and can increase competition to make goods and services cheaper at home. [Immigration](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/05/03/immigration/) goes hand in hand with free trade. We want a lot of immigration to the US because it establishes all kinds of world wide networks that are impossible to establish with centrally planned negotiation. We need all kinds of high level talent in the US, and immigration is a good way of getting it here. Instead, we are setting up [barriers](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/04/19/is-the-us-a-sort-of-roach-motel/). The isolationist logic seems so simple. It’s easy to explain. However, when you hear it, gird yourself. It’s a fool’s path to prosperity. The internet is changing our economies and societies in ways that people never envisioned fifteen years ago. The internet makes the world flat. It takes vertical chains of distribution and blows them up, putting producers closer to end users. Producers can now manufacturer products [directly](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/08/31/investment-in-growth/) for your need, instead of being generic. [Central planning](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/10/26/more-on-central-planning-versus-free-markets/) for the masses doesn’t work. The world used to be this. Now it’s this, [Protectionism](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/10/05/free-trade-and-tasty-donuts/) and isolationism lead to [war](http://www.nationalww2museum.org/). All government programs treat you as if you are a random number variable in an endless chain. Bad fiscal policy, as the US has had, leads to desperation, which leads to class warfare. This is not about the have and have nots. It’s about making the pie larger. As we have seen over and over again across the entire world, big government isn’t about [making pies bigger](http://pointsandfigures.com/2011/07/25/demand-curves-slope-down-and-why-this-is-important-to-you/). It’s only about dividing pie. Because government is unproductive, reliance on it keeps giving you smaller and smaller [slices of pie](http://pointsandfigures.com/2010/06/08/why-government-jobs-dont-work/). Pretty soon we are fighting over crumbs.

### Trade War— Causes Shooting War

#### Protectionism sparks escalating trade wars that turn into shooting and nuclear wars

Michael Panzner, Teacher and faculty member at the New York Institute of Finance, 2008, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, Google Books (accessed June 10, 2016)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Free Trade Good—Key to Global Stability

#### Free trade creates and environment of peace and stability

Arthur Foulkes, Journalist and writer for various Indiana based news outlets, October 22, 2012, “The Magic of Free Trade,” FEE—Foundation of Economic Education, <https://fee.org/articles/the-magic-of-free-trade/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

What’s more, free trade among nations is a way to promote peaceful international relations. When individuals are free to trade across political boundaries, they are more likely to view “foreigners” positively. The mutual benefits of trade, in other words, can promote peace. Ricardo, one of the most influential economists of all time, was among the first to understand the great value of free trade. In his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) he summed up the benefits of free international trade nicely: Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labor to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. . . . [It] distributes labor most effectively and most economically; while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world. Free trade gets a bad rap from domestic producers and protectionists of all sorts. But nothing is more important to a growing, dynamic economy than allowing the basic human right to freely and peacefully exchange with others.

### Free Trade Good—Key to Hegemony

#### Free trade creates financial conditions key to maintain US hegemony

Mireya Solís, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies/senior fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies/ associate professor at American University, and Justin Vaïsse, Director of the policy planning staff at French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2013, “Free Trade Game Changer,” The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/free-trade-game-changer> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Free trade was not a priority in your first administration. It is, however, an indispensable component of a long-term growth strategy to rebound from the 2008-2012 recession. It is also a necessary part of the response to the significant redistribution of power in the international system. The pivot to Asia and to the emerging world in general cannot be based on political and military initiatives alone. It needs to be backed by rejuvenated American leadership in trade and investment.

### Protectionism Hurts Economy—Prices

#### Despite problems with free trade, protectionism costs Americans more money

Michael Schuman, Beijing-based journalist who writes on the global economy, April 7, 2016, “How a Tariff on Chinese Imports Would Ripple Through American Life,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/upshot/how-a-tariff-on-chinese-imports-would-ripple-through-american-life.html> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Donald Trump has proposed [a 45 percent tariff](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/fact-check.html?_r=0#/factcheck-64) on imports from China, on the theory that this would protect American jobs and promote American business. What’s more likely, though, is that the new tariffs would set off a cascade of global economic consequences, mostly negative. Trade between China and the United States — [which reached $598 billion in 2015](https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html) — has generated large economic benefits for Americans. Manufacturing many goods in China, whether sneakers or smartphones, has kept their prices lower than they would be if made here. That’s been a boon to American consumers, especially those with less money. But more and more, economists are also recognizing a downside to free trade. Competition from China and other low-wage emerging economies has severely hurt some American workers. [One study figures](http://economics.mit.edu/files/9811) that the United States lost at least two million jobs between 1999 and 2011 because of Chinese imports. To many people, Mr. Trump’s solution may seem to make sense: Restrict those imports, save jobs and support American business. But if there were a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods, at least part of that would probably be passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. Americans would end up buying fewer Chinese things, and fewer things from anywhere else. Shrinking sales of Chinese products would generally hurt American businesses and workers. A product labeled “Made in China” is not necessarily 100 percent Chinese, since many goods are assembled in China with parts from the United States and elsewhere. Sluggish purchases of these so-called Chinese products would reduce the sales of their American components, too. For this reason and others, quite a lot of the money spent on Chinese goods actually ends up in the wallets of Americans. A [study by the Federal Reserve](http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2011/august/us-made-in-china/)Bank of San Francisco figured that 55 cents of every $1 spent by an American shopper on a “Made in China” product goes to the Americans selling, transporting and marketing that product. Suppressing Chinese imports would harm shopkeepers and truck drivers.

### Protectionism Hurts Economy—Global Econ

#### Protectionism crushes the global economy—world economy is too fragile to survive a US/ China trade war

Nick Sargen, PhD and chief economist at Fort Washington Investment Advisors Inc., March 16, 2016, “Is Globalization the Enemy? Free Trade and the U.S. Election,” Nick Sargen Blog, <http://www.nicksargen.com/index.php/1683/is-globalization-the-enemy-free-trade-and-the-u-s-election/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Among the key issues to be decided in the U.S. presidential election is the future of U.S. trade policy. Free trade has been the guiding principle of both Republican and Democratic administrations throughout the post W.W.II era, but none of the contenders today has campaigned in support of it. What’s at stake is much more than the fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). More worrisome is whether the U.S. will threaten trade sanctions against China, a stance favored by Donald Trump, who has asserted China is a currency manipulator. Even if the threat of a U.S.-China trade war is mere rhetoric, it risks unsettling global markets when the global economy is fragile. Politicians instead should be focusing on policies to ensure our workers have the requisite skills to compete in a world where technological advances will render existing techniques obsolete.

### Protectionism Causes Retaliation

#### Protectionism causes other nations to model American tariffs causing global recession

[Everett Rosenfeld](http://www.cnbc.com/everett-rosenfeld/), Staff writer for CNBC.com covering international macroeconomics, politics and financial technologies, March 10, 2016, “Trump trade plans could cause global recession: Experts,” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/10/trump-trade-plans-could-cause-global-recession-experts.html> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Even if the welfare of the rest of the globe is excepted, such a tax on goods imported from China would "tremendously" hurt the poor by jacking up the prices on many of the products they most frequently use, said Caroline Freund, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. But extreme tariffs would also hurt American manufacturing — the very sector that Trump says he seeks to bolster — by raising the prices on production inputs sourced from abroad. Steel from China, for example, would become significantly more expensive for more U.S. firms, Freund said. "So many U.S. companies are deeply involved in global supply chains: I can't even imagine what that would look like with high tariffs," she said. Expanding the economic view to the global level, experts said Trump's strong measures would likely start an international trade war that cripples everyone involved. One argument economists make is that high tariffs on goods from a country like China will lead to an oversupply of products unable to be sold in the U.S., so those goods will go for even cheaper than normal in other countries, and those countries will then respond with tariffs of their own. The end result is high prices around the world, and a slowdown in international growth — or even an outright recession. Some countries might raise taxes on American goods just as a reaction to a more isolationist economic policy, experts said. "If you take (Trump's) position as real, that we would do this, then it would take the world down the road that we saw in the 1930s that we saw with the Smoot–Hawley Tariff," Freund said. "The world would definitely fall into a recession."

### Protectionism Causes Retaliation

#### Protectionism causes retaliatory tariffs that kills millions of US jobs

[Catherine Rampell](http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/catherine-rampell), Columnist for the Washington Post, May 23, 2016, “Donald Trump’s trade policies are dangerous,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-dangers-of-a-trade-war/2016/05/23/ac977b80-2120-11e6-9e7f-57890b612299_story.html> (accessed June 10, 2016)

Usually, when making reckless threats about the economic furor he’ll unleash upon China, Mexico and other major U.S. trading partners, Donald Trump claims they’ll all cower helplessly in terror in response. Such a skilled negotiator is he that no country would dare retaliate. Hence, in the battle to Make America Great Again, no trade war will ever materialize. But at his [first campaign rally](http://www.c-span.org/video/?409721-1/donald-trump-addresses-supporters-lawrenceville-new-jersey&start=1271) in almost two weeks, Trump also offered another, slightly different justification for his hot-headed comments. A hedge, if you will. As usual, he savaged our current trade deals, calling them “disgusting, the absolute worst ever negotiated by any country in the world.” As usual, he said that China and other countries are “killing us,” that we are “viewed as the stupid country.” And, as usual, he pledged to slap gigantic tariffs on products manufactured abroad. Such measures, he promised, would deter further offshoring, bring jobs back and make the rest of the world “behave” and “respect” us. But he added one additional argument. Rather than just assuming away the possibility of a trade war, he suggested it would be no big deal if one erupted. “These dummies say, ‘Oh, that’s a trade war.’ Trade war? We’re losing $500 billion in trade with China. Who the hell cares if there’s a trade war?” Let’s take his question at face value. What’s so terrible about a trade war? Plenty, for both us and our trading partners. As my Post colleague Jim Tankersley [reported in March](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/25/donald-trumps-trade-war-could-kill-millions-of-u-s-jobs/), Moody’s Analytics has modeled the consequences of the specific trade policies Trump advocates. These include a 45 percent tariff on Chinese imports and a 35 percent tariff on Mexican imports. Trump is right that China and Mexico should fear tariffs of this magnitude: They would indeed throw both countries into recession, according to the Moody’s model. Unfortunately, the resulting damage would drag us down with them, and within a year the United States would probably tumble into recession. Here’s why. If other countries choose to retaliate — or “punch back,” in the Trumpian vernacular — by introducing tariffs of their own, our own exports will get more expensive to buyers abroad. If our exports get more expensive, the employment of [millions](http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/%40tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_005500.pdf) of workers in export-supporting industries becomes endangered, too. As export ­dependent businesses shed workers, those businesses and their newly laid-off workers will have less money to spend, causing knock-on effects throughout the economy. A downward spiral would result, leading to about 7 million fewer American jobs than there would be in the absence of Trump’s machismo-driven trade policy. Even if Mexico and China for some reason chose not to levy retaliatory tariffs, mind you, Trump’s policies would still batter the U.S. economy. That’s because tariffs here — just like any other taxes — are not costless.

### Impact Magnifier – Geopolitical Tensions

#### Potential trade war would escalate – geopolitical tensions

Jill Schlesinger, Tribune Content Agency Staff Writer, March 30, 2016, “Free Trade: Good or Bad for America?” <http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-201603301700--tms--retiresmctnrs-a20160330-20160330-story.html> (Accessed 6/14/2016)

Economists and politicians may have overstated the benefits of trade deals and minimized the potential pitfalls, but one thing is clear: Even the hint of ripping up existing agreements has raised warning flags around the world. A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit listed a Donald Trump presidency as the sixth biggest risk to the global economy (tied with the rising threat of jihadi terrorism), primarily due to his "exceptionally hostile" posture toward free trade, including notably NAFTA, and his repeated accusations about China being a "currency manipulator." Economists are concerned that a potential trade war would be devastating, because it would decimate U.S. exporters, raise prices for Americans and escalate geopolitical tensions. As proof, they cite the 1930 Smoot-Hawley legislation, which contributed to making the Great Depression even worse. So what is the solution? Economists Ed Dolan says: "It would be far more reasonable to employ direct forms of aid. Retraining, adjustment assistance to workers or employers, income support or wage subsidies are some of the possible remedies." Despite the anger and rhetoric, the campaign season has raised awareness that the country needs to do more to help displaced workers.

## Answers to 2AC Args

### A/T “Job Loss Worse Than Trade War for Econ”

#### No link turn—tariffs only hurt US manufacturing and the economy

[Meagan Parrish](http://www.manufacturing.net/staff-author/meagan-parrish-0), Senior reporter for manufacturing.net, March 2016, “Could Trump’s Tariff ‘Threat’ Hurt American Manufacturing?,” Manufacturing.net, <http://www.manufacturing.net/news/2016/03/could-trumps-tariff-threat-hurt-american-manufacturing> (accessed June 15, 2016)

In recent years, many economists and policy advisers [have trumpeted](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf) the idea that the U.S. needs to take more aggressive measures to reduce its trade deficit with China — which reached a record high of $365.7 billion in 2015. Yet, GOP presidential hopeful Donald Trump’s proposed idea to impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from China and 35 percent on many goods from Mexico have many analysts worried about the implications for U.S. manufacturers. [A recent Reuters report](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) highlighted the damaging impact it could have specifically on the auto industry. The U.S. Commerce Department estimates that about $118 billion worth of cars and parts traveled tariff-free between the U.S. and Mexico last year. Imposing a high tariff would raise costs for auto companies that use Mexican-made parts in their vehicles. For example, [Reuters estimates](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) that, “Buyers of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV's popular Ram 1500 pickup trucks assembled in Saltillo, Mexico, could see their $26,000 base price pushed up by $9,000 if the tariff is fully passed on to consumers.” In [a recent interview with Business Insider](http://www.businessinsider.com/ford-ceo-mark-fields-interview-2016-3), Ford Motor Co. CEO Mark Fields commented on the idea of higher tariffs and specifically on a shot Trump took at Ford early in his campaign when he said it was unpatriotic of the company to open a new plant in Mexico. “We are a multinational company going back to our founder,” Fields [said.](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) “Our approach is to ‘build where we sell.’” Fields pointed to the income and jobs Ford has created as evidence that the current trade situation was still creating value for the American economy. “Since 2011, we've invested over $10 billion in our facilities, we've hired more than 25,000 people — 80 percent of our capital expenditures in North America are done right here in the United States, and 97 percent of engineering is done here,” he said. Although Trump’s plan would initially raise prices on goods for American consumers, the idea is that it would help level the playing field with American manufacturers so that they would relocate operations to the U.S. However, a professor who has studied the effects of the Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal [said](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) it would take years for the U.S. industry to rebuild supply chains and make that kind of transition. Meanwhile, China and Mexico are likely to retaliate and impose high tariffs on goods that would be most damaging to the U.S. economy. [Reuters pointed](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-trade-idUSKCN0WQ0WG) to 2009 when Mexico imposed duties up to 25 percent on more than 90 U.S. farm goods, while American lawmakers deliberated allowing Mexican truckers on U.S. roads. Ultimately, the row cost U.S. growers $70 million in revenue — a 50 percent cut — over 31 months, according to the National Potato Council. Trade tensions with China would expose a host of other industries to potential losses. Trade between China and the U.S. [was $591 billion](https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html) in 2014. Other industries that rely on trade with China include aircraft, corn and soybean and electronics.

### A/T “Manufacturing Not Key to Economy”

#### US manufacturing is key to the economy—key to jobs and is reverse causal to improving the economy

[Robert E. Scott](http://www.epi.org/people/robert-e-scott), Senior Economist and Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Research at EPI, January 22, 2015, “The Manufacturing Footprint and the Importance of U.S. Manufacturing Jobs,” Economic Policy Institute (EPI), <http://www.epi.org/publication/the-manufacturing-footprint-and-the-importance-of-u-s-manufacturing-jobs/> (accessed June 14, 2016)

This report examines the role manufacturing plays in employment at the national, state, and congressional district levels, including the number of jobs manufacturing supports, the wages those jobs pay, and manufacturing’s contribution to GDP. (This report updates an earlier EPI report but includes U.S. congressional district data for the first time.) The data show that manufacturing employment was stable for three decades until 1998, and has been on a largely downward trajectory since then, with traditional manufacturing states hit particularly hard. Given its size and importance, we cannot ignore the consequences of such a decline. Further, the policies that would help manufacturing the most are those that would help close the nation’s large trade deficit. Reducing this trade deficit would, in turn, provide a valuable macroeconomic boost to a U.S. economy that is still operating far below potential. The manufacturing sector has a large footprint in the U.S. economy. It employed 12.0 million workers in 2013, 8.8 percent of total U.S. employment. Manufacturing plays a particularly important role in supporting jobs in a core group of states in the upper Midwest (East North Central and selected West North Central) and South (East South Central) states. The top 10 states ranked by manufacturing’s share of total state employment in 2013 are Indiana (16.8 percent, 491,900 jobs), Wisconsin (16.3 percent, 458,400 jobs), Iowa (14.0 percent, 214,500 jobs), Michigan (13.5 percent, 555,300 jobs), Alabama (13.1 percent, 249,100 jobs), Arkansas (12.9 percent, 152,400 jobs), Ohio (12.6 percent, 662,100 jobs), Kentucky (12.4 percent, 228,600 jobs), Mississippi (12.3 percent, 136,700 jobs), and Kansas (11.9 percent, 162,900 jobs).

### A/T “China Won’t Retaliate”

#### China would certainly retaliate—they’ve done it before in response to tariffs

Keith Bradsher is the Hong Kong bureau chief of The New York Times, covering Asian business, economic, political and science news, September 13, 2009, “China Moves to Retaliate Against U.S. Tire Tariff,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/global/14trade.html?_r=0> (accessed June 14, 2016)

[China](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) unexpectedly increased pressure Sunday on the United States in a widening trade dispute, taking the first steps toward imposing tariffs on American exports of automotive products and chicken meat in retaliation for [President Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per)’s decision late Friday to levy tariffs on tires from China. The Chinese government’s strong countermove followed a weekend of nationalistic vitriol against the United States on Chinese Web sites in response to the tire tariff. “The U.S. is shameless!” said one posting, while another called on the Chinese government to sell all of its huge holdings of[Treasury bonds](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/treasury_department/treasury_securities/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier). The impact of the dispute extends well beyond tires, chickens and cars. Both governments are facing domestic pressure to take a tougher stand against the other on economic issues. But the trade battle increases political tensions between the two nations even as they try to work together to revive the global economy and combat mutual security threats, like the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. Mr. Obama’s decision to impose a tariff of up to 35 percent on Chinese tires is a signal that he plans to deliver on his promise to labor unions that he would more strictly enforce trade laws, especially against China, which has become the world’s factory while the United States has lost millions of manufacturing jobs. The trade deficit with China was a record $268 billion in 2008. China had initially issued a fairly formulaic criticism of the tire dispute Saturday. But rising nationalism in China is making it harder for Chinese officials to gloss over American criticism. “All kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, is increasingly reactive to Internet opinion,” said Victor Shih, a Northwestern University specialist in economic policy formulation. Eswar Prasad, a former China division chief at the International Monetary Fund, said that rising trade tensions between the United States and China could become hard to control. They could cloud the Group of 20 meeting of leaders of industrialized and fast-growing emerging nations in Pittsburgh on Sept. 24 and 25, and perhaps affect Mr. Obama’s visit to Beijing in November. “This spat about tires and chickens could turn ugly very quickly,” Mr. Prasad said. China exported $1.3 billion in tires to the United States in the first seven months of 2009, while the United States shipped about $800 million in automotive products and $376 million in chicken meat to China, according to data from Global Trade Information Services in Columbia, S.C. For many years, American politicians have been able to take credit domestically for standing up to China by taking largely symbolic measures against Chinese exports in narrowly defined categories. In the last five years, the Commerce Department has restricted Chinese imports of goods as diverse as bras and oil well equipment. For the most part, Chinese officials have grumbled but done little, preferring to preserve a trade relationship in which the United States buys $4.46 worth of Chinese goods for every $1 worth of American goods sold to China. Now, the delicate equilibrium is being disturbed. China’s commerce ministry announced Sunday that it would investigate “certain imported automotive products and certain imported chicken meat products originating from the United States” to determine if they were being subsidized or “dumped” below cost in the Chinese market. A finding of subsidies or dumping would allow China to impose tariffs on these imports. The ministry did not mention the tire dispute in its announcement, portraying the investigations as “based on the laws of our country and on World Trade Organization rules.” But the timing of the announcement — on a weekend and just after the tire decision in Washington — sent an unmistakable message of retaliation. The official Xinhua news agency Web site prominently linked its reports on the tire dispute and the Chinese investigations.

### A/T “China Won’t Retaliate”

#### China would certainly retaliate—they have an economic incentive to strike back

Michael Schuman, Beijing-based journalist who writes on the global economy, April 7, 2016, “How a Tariff on Chinese Imports Would Ripple Through American Life,” NY Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/upshot/how-a-tariff-on-chinese-imports-would-ripple-through-american-life.html> (accessed June 14, 2016)

And the Chinese government’s response would probably be tariffs of its own on American goods and services rather than lowering barriers for American companies doing business in China. It [moved quickly to retaliate](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/global/14trade.html?_r=0) for the tariff on Chinese tires with punitive duties on American products. Because the Chinese market has become critical for many American companies — whether Apple, Starbucks or Boeing — any steps taken by the Chinese government to curtail their ability to operate in China would be bad news for them. Mr. Trump’s tariff proposal addresses a real and legitimate concern about the effect of competition from low-wage countries on American workers. But that doesn’t mean it’s going to solve the problem — and it could create even more.

### A/T “Global Economy Resilient”

#### The global economic is becoming increasingly fragile—big disrupts like the disad impact could collapse it

[Jack Rasmus](http://www.globalresearch.ca/author/jack-rasmus), PhD and professor of economics and politics at St. Marys College in California, Global Research, February 06, 2016, “Systemic Fragility in the Global Economy,” Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/systemic-fragility-in-the-global-economy/5505941> (accessed June 14, 2016)

Half way through the second decade of the 21st century, evidence is growing that the global economy is becoming increasingly fragile. Not just in fact, but in potential as well. And not just in the financial sector but in the non-financial sector—i.e. in the ‘real’ economy. The notion that the global crash of 2008-09 is over, and that the conditions that led to that severe bout of financial instability and epic contraction of the real economy, are somehow behind us is simply incorrect. The global economic crisis that erupted in 2008-09 is not over; it is merely morphing into new forms and shifting in terms of its primary locus. Initially centered in the USA-UK economies, it shifted to the weak links in the advanced economies between 2010-2014—the Eurozone and Japan. Beginning in 2014, it shifted again, a third time, to China and emerging markets where it has continued to deepen and evolve. It is true that the main sources of instability today are not located in the real estate sector—the subprime mortgage market—or the credit and derivatives markets that were deeply integrated with that market. Nor is the real economy in a rapid economic contraction. The problem in the real economy is the drift toward economic stagnation, with global trade and real investment slowing, deflation emerging, and more economies slipping in and out of recession—from Japan to Brazil to Russia, to South Asia and Europe’s periphery, even to Canada and beyond. On the financial side, it’s the continued rise of excess liquidity and debt—corporate, government, and household—that is fueling new financial bubbles—in stocks in China, corporate junk bonds, leveraged loans, and exchange traded funds in the US, government bonds in Europe, in currency exchange and financial derivatives everywhere. Financial instability events and crashes, and the real economic devastation that is typically wrought in their wake, do not necessarily occur in repeat fashion like some pre-recorded video rerun. The particulars and details are always different from one crisis to another. At times it’s real estate and property markets (USA 1980s, Japan 1990s, global 2007). Other times stock markets (tech bust of 2000, China 2015). Or currency markets (Asian Meltdown 1997-98) or government bonds (Europe 2012). But the fundamentals are almost always the same. What then are those fundamentals? How do they originate and develop, then interact and feed back on each other, creating the fragility in the global economic system that makes that system highly predisposed to the eruption of financial crises and subsequent contraction? What are the fundamentals that ensure, when some precipitating event occurs, that the financial instability and real contraction that follows occurs faster, descends deeper, and has a longer duration than some other more ‘normal’ financial event or normal recession? What are the transmission mechanisms that enable the feedbacks, intensify the instability, and exacerbate the crisis? And how do the fundamentals negate and limit the effectiveness of fiscal-monetary counter measures attempting to restore financial stability and real recovery? Indeed, what is meant by ‘systemic fragility’, why is it important, and why do most economists not address or consider it in their forecasts and analyses? The book will argue there are 9 key fundamental trends underlying the growing fragility in the global economy include: the decades-long massive infusion of liquidity by central banks worldwide, especially the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, along with the increasing availability of ‘inside credit’ from the private banking system; the corresponding increase in private sector debt as investors leverage that massive liquidity injection and credit for purposes of investment; the relative redirection of total investment, from real investment to more profitable financial asset investment; a resultant slowing of investment into the real economy, as a shift to financial securities investment diverts and distorts normal investment flows; growing volatility in financial asset prices as excess liquidity, debt, and the shift to financial asset investing produces asset bubbles, asset inflation, and then deflation; a long run drift from inflation to disinflation of goods and services prices, and subsequently to deflation, as real investment flows are disrupted and real growth slows; a basic change in the structure of financial markets as new global financial institutions and new financial markets and securities are created, and an emerging new global finance capital elite arises, to accommodate the rising liquidity, debt, and shift to financial asset investment; parallel basic changes in labor markets resulting in stagnation and decline of wage incomes and rising household debt; growing ineffectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies as debt and incomes from financial assets rise, incomes from wages and salaries stagnate and household debt rises, and debt on government balance sheets increases while government income (taxes) slows—which together reduce the elasticities of response of investment and consumption to interest rates and multiplier effects from government fiscal policies.

### A/T “Global Economy Resilient”

#### The global economy has lost its resiliency—it’s fragile now

Jethro Mullen, Staff writer for CNN Money, April 12, 2016, “IMF warns of 'increasingly fragile' global growth,” CNN Money, <http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/12/news/economy/imf-global-economy-slowdown/> (accessed June 14, 2016)

The prospects for the world economy this year are getting gloomier. The International Monetary Fund has taken a knife to its forecasts for global growth again, warning that momentum is "ever-slowing and increasingly fragile." For this year, the fund now expects worldwide growth of 3.2%, down from the 3.4% [it forecast just three months ago](http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/19/news/economy/imf-global-growth-china/?iid=EL), and only a hair above last year's 3.1%. The past few months have seen financial market turmoil, weakening momentum in advanced economies and more difficulties for emerging and lower-income economies, the IMF said Tuesday. If global market turbulence resumes or [China's slowing economy](http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/11/news/economy/china-first-quarter-2016-gdp-preview/index.html?iid=EL) throws out any nasty surprises, the picture could darken further, it warned.

### A/T “Job Loss Worse Than Trade War for Econ”

#### No link turn—Tariffs are a small help to the manufacturing sector but the economy loses much more in a trade war

[Tim Fernholz](http://qz.com/author/tfernholz/), Journalist covering state, business and society for Quartz news, January 15, 2016, “Trump is caught lying about his China tariff proposal—and it would hurt his supporters the most,” Quartz, <http://qz.com/595618/trump-is-caught-lying-about-his-china-tariff-proposal-and-it-would-hurt-his-supporters-the-most/> (accessed June 14, 2016)

Asked if about his plan to raise a tariff on imported Chinese goods to 45%, reported by the New York Times, Trump said, “That’s wrong. They were wrong. It’s the New York Times, they are always wrong.” The New York Times, always wrong or not, is equipped with audio recorders, and the paper quickly produced [this transcript](http://nyti.ms/1JNEJU8) of Trump’s meeting with the newspaper’s editorial board: I would tax China coming in—products coming in. I would do a tariff. And they do it to us. We have to be smart. I’m a free trader. I’m a free trader. And some of the people would say, ‘Oh, it’s terrible.’ I’m a free trader. I love free trade. But it’s got to be reasonably fair. I would do a tax, and the tax—let me tell you what the tax should be. The tax should be 45 percent. Trump concluded that if China continued what he sees as unfair trade practices, “I would certainly start taxing goods that come in from China.” What would that mean to his supporters, which include many middle-class Americans frustrated by their inability to get ahead in the economy? They certainly are feeling the affects of international trade, which appears to be one of the [main causes of stagnant wages](http://qz.com/127496/dont-blame-robots-for-americas-falling-wages-blame-trade/) in the US. China’s attempts to keep its currency at artificially low levels, Trump’s bogeyman here, was once part of the picture, but [that’s old news](http://piie.com/publications/testimony/testimony.cfm?ResearchID=2902)—China has been [doing the opposite](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-defends-yuan-says-betting-against-it-is-ridiculous-2016-01-11) lately. Ultimately, imposing a massive tariff on Chinese goods would not necessarily improve the US economy. Among the consequences economists would expect: Prices rising for consumers. If you shop at Wal-Mart, you’re getting a lot of cheap goods from China. Critics of China’s trade policy argue that the company’s imports—an estimated $49 billion in 2013—[cost the US 400,000 jobs over a twelve years](http://www.epi.org/publication/the-wal-mart-effect/), though they rely on labor cost estimates from 2001 which may inflate that figure. (For perspective, the US created 2.9 million jobs in 2015). But imagine if Wal-Mart suddenly had to pay an extra 45% on its imported goods: The company would have to raise prices and look for new cheaper sources of goods. But it wouldn’t go looking in the US, where labor costs are high—it would more likely opt for low-cost labor markets like Vietnam. Not that many new jobs. We have a natural experiment about the effect of Chinese tariffs. In 2009, the US slapped China with a tariff of 35% on tires after the World Trade Organization ruled that China was overwhelming US tire manufacturers with an influx of subsidized imports. After tariffs went up, [economists looked at the results](https://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb12-9.pdf) (pdf), and found that while the US added 1,200 jobs, it cost US consumers $1.1 billion to purchase more expensive tires, for a cost per job of $900,000—little of which actually went to the workers themselves. China also retaliated by increasing duties on US chicken imports, which cost US exporters about $1 billion, and leading us to our next consequence: A trade war.

### A/T Free Trade Kills Jobs

#### Job loss is not a direct consequence of increased trade – larger shift

Gillian B. White, senior associate editor at The Atlantic, January 29, 2016, “What Economists Got Wrong About Free Trade,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/how-economists-were-wrong-about-free-trade/433818/> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

Considering how Chinese imports have affected American workers, the downsides of global exchange are much more intense and enduring than many make them out to be. As trade has become a more and more integral part of the global economy, accepted economic wisdom has asserted again and again that overall, free trade is a good thing. Because trade brings so much in the way of competitive pricing and opportunities to buy and sell goods on a more massive scale, the drawbacks that come with it—job losses and declining wages for instance—are often thought to be outweighed. Further, there’s a belief that some of these downsides aren’t even the direct consequences of trade. Proponents of free trade argue that the decline of American manufacturing jobs isn’t the result of increased trade, but of a larger shift in the nation’s economy toward higher-skilled jobs. They also point out that the growth of wage inequality hasn’t corresponded perfectly with the expansion of global trade. At any rate, whatever their cause, the drawbacks of trade are regarded as not so severe that they can’t be overcome; it’s assumed that workers who find themselves in a region whose jobs are vulnerable to foreign competition could simply move and find a job somewhere else.

### A/T “Free Trade Bad”

#### Be skeptical of their “free trade bad” turns, economic information is manipulated to distort the depiction of trade

Kithmina Hewage, Research assistant at the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka (IPS), April 07, 2016, “Has the US Turned Against Free Trade Agreements?,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/has-the-us-turned-against-free-trade-agreements/> (accessed June 10, 2016)

However, in the absence of adequate information, interest groups have sought to trump up potential losses from trade to create a sense of skepticism and fear among the general public. Therefore, governments often find it difficult to gain adequate support for trade deals regardless of the benefit to the economy and citizens. It is vital that governments ensure an inclusive process with domestic stakeholders, where adequate information regarding the direction of a deal is disseminated to the electorate. In this regard, both policymakers and economists have failed in their role as educators. Historically, advocates of trade have solely focused on the benefits without informing citizens about the potential costs. Thus, citizens feel deceived when confronted with the challenges associated with international trade, allowing greater influence for interest groups to disseminate protectionist ideals – irrespective of accuracy. Trade agreements have become the embodiment of international trade, with proponents and opponents rallying around and against the passage of any particular trade deal. Unlike in previous decades, however, free trade agreements are no longer exclusively focused on tariff reductions. With the expansion of the [GATT/WTO trading regime](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm) and the general acceptance of free trade, tariff rates across the world have reduced exponentially. Consequently, [non-tariff barriers](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr12-2d_e.pdf) pose the most pertinent obstacles to trade. Modern trading agreements, therefore, are geared toward addressing issues beyond simple tariff reductions and attempt to address bottlenecks hindering the growth potential through trade due to non-tariff barriers – many of which may have been unaddressed in previous trade deals. In essence, trading agreements now attempt to standardize and harmonize practices in order to facilitate better trade. Since developing countries suffer most from non-tariff barriers, it is vital that nations update their existing trading arrangements in order to fully benefit from trade by addressing existing obstacles. The anger, frustration, and mistrust associated with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements threatens this process. These feelings are not exclusive to the United States. Any discussion on trade liberalization, especially in South Asia, evokes a strong response from certain interest groups promoting the continuation of protectionist policies. These groups are often well organized and consequently garner prominence in public discourse on policy matters. Just as in the United States, critics in Asia showcase a growing trade deficit as evidence of the asymmetric benefits of trade deals. However, as Neil Irwin [pointed out for the New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/upshot/the-trade-deficit-isnt-a-scorecard-and-cutting-it-wont-make-america-great-again.html?_r=0), “Trade deficits are not inherently good or bad; they can be either, depending on circumstances.” And in the United States in particular, circumstances indicate the trade deficit actually has positive effects. To overcome such misconceptions, it is the responsibility of policymakers to recognize the political-economy of trade and engage with citizens by providing a comprehensive picture of the objectives of a given trade deal and its implications (both good and bad), as well as establishing a transparent and inclusive process when drafting such documents. Failure to do so will only exacerbate the trust deficit between the government and its people, hindering the growth of the country in the process.

## \*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

### Non-Unique—Trade War Now

#### US and China already fighting a trade war

Shawn Donnan, Staff writer for the Financial Times, May 10, 2016, “US and China skirmish as trade clash looms,” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4bd8c6ec-16c5-11e6-b8d5-4c1fcdbe169f.html#axzz4BDoW9ftm> (accessed June 10, 2016)

[Donald Trump](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4d4c7380-162e-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d.html#axzz489lnhlN0) may be threatening to start a trade war with China, but it is becoming clear that the US and its [geopolitical rival](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4d06d54-1672-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.html#axzz489lnhlN0) are already skirmishing ahead of what could be a combative summer. The latest sign came on Tuesday when the US brought a new challenge in the World Trade Organisation against Chinese anti-dumping tariffs on US poultry products. It was the 12th time that the Obama administration has taken China to the WTO, more than any previous US administration. “American farmers deserve a fair shot to compete and win in the global economy and this administration will continue to hold China responsible when they attempt to disadvantage our farmers, businesses and workers,” said Mike Froman, US trade representative. The latest move is part of a broader effort by the administration and American industry to get tough on China that is seeing the trade rhetoric being dialled up even far away from the campaign trail. “This is war. This is not trade. China is waging economic war. We ought to recognise that and act accordingly,” Lourenco Goncalves, chief executive of iron ore producer Cliffs Natural Resources, told reporters last week on the sidelines of a US steel industry association meeting.

### Non-Unique – Trade War Now

#### US and China in a trade war now – economic implications inevitable

Robert Romano, senior editor of Americans for Limited Government, April 10, 2016, “China and the World’s Trade War Against the US – and Why We’re Losing” <https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/04/china-and-the-worlds-trade-war-against-the-us-and-why-were-loosing> (Accessed 6/14/16)

The U.S. has been in a trade war with the rest of the world for years. We just have not been fighting back. Foreign investors and governments currently hold about $6.2 trillion of U.S. treasuries, $872 billion of so-called agency debt (mostly Fannie and Freddie mortgage securities), $3.2 trillion of corporate debt and $6.2 trillion of corporate stocks in Dec. 2015, according to data compiled by the U.S. Department of Treasury. Overall it represents a massive $16.5 trillion foreign investment in U.S. dollar-denominated assets, including debt and equities. It actually peaked in 2014 closer to $17 trillion after experiencing increases averaging $1.4 trillion from 2012 through 2014. In 2015, the number actually dropped a few hundred billion dollars as emerging markets imploded. But where did the foreigners get so much money to invest in U.S. dollar assets? A large chunk of it comes from the trade deficits the U.S. experiences annually with the rest of the world, which has averaged $539 billion a year since 2000, totaling $8.7 trillion alone, and $10.6 trillion since 1974. Consider, if that $8.7 trillion had never been shifted overseas, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be nearly $27 trillion today. Consider that. 82 percent of trade deficits has been since 2000, right at the same time permanent normal trade relations with China was granted. Those dollars were then reinvested by foreigners into U.S. dollar assets. This in turn had the effect of devaluing foreign exporter currencies against the U.S. dollar, like the Chinese yuan, making their exports cheaper, and further exacerbating ever larger trade deficits here. This is the essential currency manipulation that made it all work — which U.S. policy makers simply never responded to with any real effect.

### Non-Unique – Trade War Now

#### US already in trade battle with China – steel exports

Jon Connars, investment risk analyst and researcher with an expertise in the ASEAN region, June 7, 2016, “The Trade War with China is Already Here,” <http://atimes.com/2016/06/the-trade-war-with-china-is-already-here/> (Accessed 6/13/16)

Donald Trump’s threats to hit China with protectionist tariffs of up to 45% on the goods it ships to the US go down well with his supporters on the campaign trail, despite ruffling feathers among free marketeers within his own party. Experts and commentators are less impressed, suggesting The Donald’s proposed trade war could cost US jobs and potentially trigger a global downturn. us-china-trade-war. What Trump and his opponents fail to acknowledge, however, is that the US is already engaged in a vicious trade battle with China centered on steel exports. China’s overproduction has decimated steel producers all over the world after the country upped its output from 128 million tons in 2000 to 822 million tons in 2014. American steel makers have already lost billions of dollars as a result of China dumping its steel exports on the US economy, while their counterparts in countries from Brazil to Britain have been left facing bankruptcy. Unsurprisingly, American and European steel mills are pushing their governments to take action. In the face of growing international pressure, Beijing has repeatedly promised to slow its steel output, but the numbers tell their own story. March saw the highest level of Chinese steel production in history. The China Iron & Steel Association revealed the country churned out 70.65 million tons in just that one month alone. Despite falling back in April overall, average daily production rose from 2.279 million tons to 2.314 million tons, another record high, according to Reuters.

### Non-Unique – Trade War Now

#### Mass trade war between US and China now—it’s here and escalating absent the plan

Robert Stevens, Staff writer for the World Socialist Website, April 20, 2016, “Steel producers summit threatens stepped-up trade war against China,” <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/04/20/stee-a20.html> (accessed June 14, 2016)

A meeting Monday in Brussels was billed as a “High-Level Symposium on Excess Capacity and Structural Adjustment in the Steel Sector,” organised by the Belgian government and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Instead of resolving tensions, it marked a further stepping up of an ongoing trade war. Ministers and other high-level government officials in charge of steel-related industrial and trade policies from 34 countries attended, including the United States, China and India, which collectively produce 93 percent of global steel output. Alongside these were representatives from the European Union (EU), World Trade Organisation, the World Steel Association, and delegates from various private sector steel corporations. The meeting was called in response to the massive global overcapacity in steel production. The OECD noted that global steelmaking capacity was 2.37 billion tonnes in 2015, but declining production meant only 67.5 percent of that was being used—down from 70.9 percent in 2014. New plants were set to add another 47 million metric tonnes by 2018. China, which has gone from producing a few percent of the world’s steel a few decades ago, produced half of all steel worldwide in 2015. It now has an overcapacity of 350 million tons, according to EU estimates. This is double the amount produced in one year in the entire EU. China’s attempt to export some of its surplus has led to a collapse in steel prices of up to 40 percent. In March, China announced that 500,000 jobs would go in its steel industry, with capacity to be drastically reduced. According to World Steel Association chairman Wolfgang Eder, “The problem in Europe is that there is too much capacity” and the industry would probably have to be reduced by half in the next 15 years to survive. Given that 330,000 workers are employed at more than 500 sites throughout Europe, the scale of job losses entailed would be staggering. The “overarching focus” of the Brussels meeting was “on promoting structural adjustment in the steel industry and reducing excess capacity by removing distortionary government policies and through industry restructuring.” It aimed to “agree on steps to reduce competition-distorting policies.” Behind such phrases, the real agenda of the meeting was for the major imperialist powers to confront China, not an OECD member, with threats of escalating sanctions. Belgian Deputy Prime Minister Kris Peeter, who chaired the meeting, acknowledged that “very frank” discussions took place. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom said, “It’s now life or death for many companies” as “the massive surge in steel imports from China is hitting Europe very hard and the price of steel in Europe has dropped by 40 percent in the last years.” Singling out China again, she said a “crucial problem here is of course the involvement of states and support, and not market needs, and this has created incentives to overproduce.” Malmstrom warned that the EU has begun to impose a series of tariffs against China and was now “examining a few other Chinese issues as well and we might bring them further later this year.” Following the meeting, US Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and Trade Representative Michael Froman released a belligerent statement, warning: “Unless China starts to take timely and concrete actions to reduce its excess production and capacity in industries including steel ... the fundamental structural problems in the industry will remain and affected governments—including the United States—will have no alternatives other than trade action to avoid harm to their domestic industries and workers.” Li Xinchuang, the vice secretary general of the China Iron and Steel Association, was belligerent in his response, stating, “It is a totally pointless complaint from the US and it’s biased against China.” Speaking to Reuters, Li said, “China’s steel industry is market-based and Chinese steel products have good quality, low price and good service. The complaint on government subsidies is also crap.” Xinhua, China’s official state news agency, declared that assigning blame to the Chinese steel industry was “a lame and lazy excuse for protectionism. … Blaming other countries is always an easy, sure-fire way for politicians to whip up a storm over domestic economic woes, but finger-pointing and protectionism are counterproductive.” China's assistant commerce minister, Zhang Ji, told reporters that China had cut 90 million tonnes of capacity and would reduce it by a further 100-150 million tonnes. Asked what steps the government would take following the unsuccessful talks, Commerce Ministry spokesman Shen Danyang told reporters Tuesday, “China has already done more than enough. What more do you want us to do?” Even though any decisions reached at the meeting were to be nonbinding, nothing whatsoever could be agreed other than a “follow-up high-level discussion in September 2016.” For decades, the trade unions in every country have played a central role in dividing steel workers and sabotaging all struggles, as they facilitated the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs and attacks on wages, terms and conditions, and pension rights. Today they openly act as the nationalist cheerleaders for corporations and are the staunchest advocates of protectionism and trade war measures.

### Non Unique—Protectionism Inevitable

#### China’s economic rise makes protectionism inevitable

[Elena Holodny](http://www.businessinsider.com/author/elena-holodny), Staff writer for the Business Insider, May 14, 2016, “One of the central topics of Donald Trump's campaign is a terrible idea,” Business Insider, <http://www.businessinsider.com/protectionism-near-term-economic-problems-2016-5> (accessed June 10, 2016)

From the paper's meaty abstract (emphasis ours): China's emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. ... Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize. Just to be clear, it's way too much of an exaggeration to say that free trade is not "good." After all, it's definitely easier on consumers' wallets to not pay 45% tariffs. Plus, one could argue that 15 years isn't enough for the global and US economies to adjust to the huge China shock. But it's still interesting to think about the split between what's "good" for the global and US economies versus what's "good" for your everyday American worker — and how these kinds of issues will be addressed going forward.

### Non-Unique—Protectionism Inevitable

#### Protectionism inevitable – economic populism

Jared Bernstein, senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 14, 2016, “The Era of Free Trade Might Be Over. That’s a Good Thing.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/14/opinion/the-era-of-free-trade-might-be-over-thats-a-good-thing.html> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

FOR decades, free-trade agreements, called F.T.A.s, have been one of the most solid planks in the platform of economic elites and establishment politicians. True, the occasional political candidate like Ross Perot argued against one deal or another and even President Obama ran on “renegotiating” the North American Free Trade Agreement, but once elected, presidents of both parties sought and ratified trade deals with a wide variety of countries. Those days may well be over. What changed? For one thing, the economic populism of the presidential campaign has forced the recognition that expanded trade is a double-edged sword. The defense of globalization rests on viewing Americans primarily as consumers, not workers, based on the assumption that we care more about low prices than about low wages.

### Non-Unique – Protectionism Inevitable

#### Protectionism on the rise – global trend

Greg Ip, Chief Economics Commentator at The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2016, “Powerful Pair: Protectionism and the Presidency,” <http://www.wsj.com/articles/powerful-pair-protectionism-and-the-presidency-1457544702> (Accessed 6/15/16)

Protectionist actions are on the rise globally, according to a tally compiled by Global Trade Alert, a watchdog group, led by India and Russia. Britons will soon vote on whether to leave the European Union. In short, a protectionist president would suit the temper of the times. The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, which sharply raised import tariffs and worsened the Depression’s impact on trade, is often cited as a cautionary tale about protectionism. But in one respect the analogy is flawed. Smoot-Hawley was largely the product of horse trading between individual legislators to protect favored industries. As a result, in 1934, Congress decided to forgo “the business of tariff logrolling,” as trade historian Doug Irwin writes, and delegated most authority over tariff negotiations to the president. This division of power has insulated the world trading system from Congress’s parochial tendencies. By the same token, it puts the world more at the mercy of presidents whose latitude over trade has steadily expanded. Presidential appointees at the Commerce Department adjudicate complaints that foreign imports are being illegally sold at below cost, below home-country price or subsidized. They almost always find in favor of the domestic industry. Whether those findings actually merit penalties is up to the independent International Trade Commission, whose members are nominated by the president and confirmed by Congress.

### Non-Unique – Protectionism Inevitable

#### Increased trends show a rise in protectionism despite support for free trade

Josh Wingrove, Bloomberg Staff Writer, May 24, 2016, “Canada Concerned by Rising Global Waves of Protectionism,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-24/rising-protectionism-a-concern-to-canada-says-trade-minister> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

Rising global waves of protectionism are a concern to Canada and underscore the need not to rush ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, Trade Minister Chrystia Freeland said in an interview in Tokyo on Tuesday. Freeland’s remarks came after she joined Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in meetings with Japanese auto executives. Trudeau will join other global leaders at a Group of Seven summit in central Japan later this week. “We are a trading nation. We really understand the importance of Canada being plugged into the global economy, and we are concerned by the rising waves of protectionism we see around the world,” Freeland said, declining to specify which countries are of most concern. Canada and Japan are each TPP signatories yet neither has ratified the trade agreement. Freeland said the TPP had not come up in talks so far that day, and that Canada is concerned by a rise in anti-trade sentiment globally. Speaking to reporters later Tuesday, Trudeau said that Canada is "very much" a pro-trade nation. "I am personally extremely pro-trade and we are consulting widely on that specific deal, the TPP," he said.

### Non-Unique – Trade War Inevitable

#### New administration will increase protectionism – rise inevitable

Choi Sung-Jin, Korea Times Staff Writer, May 8, 2016, “Whoever Becomes US Leader, Trade War Seems Inevitable,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/05/123_204090.html> (Accessed 6/14/16)

As Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are all but certain to clash in the U.S. presidential election in November, attention also is on their policies' effect on the world economy. Major pledges of the two contenders are poles apart, but whoever becomes U.S. president, they will likely strengthen protectionism in trade and foreign exchange policies compared with the Obama administration, experts here said Thursday. Both candidates, for instance, oppose the U.S.-led 12-nation free trade accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), threatening its successful launch, they said. If Trump slaps import duties of 45 percent on products made by major trading partners, including China and Mexico, it will be catastrophic for global trade, touching off trade and currency wars between the United States and the rest of the world. Korea, a major exporter enjoying a sizable trade surplus with the U.S., will be one of the biggest victims. According to the International Finance Center and other sources, behind the enhanced trade protectionism found in the two otherwise contrasting politicians is the economic polarization among Americans, which sharply eroded their support for free trade.

### No Link—No Influence

#### No link: any companies upset by the plan aren’t the politically connected companies that can influence Washington

Nick Carey and James B. Kelleher, Staff writers for the Huffington Post, April 27, 2011, “Corporate America’s Relationship With China Worries Small Business,” The Huffington Post, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/27/china-us-american-companies-corporations_n_854294.html> (accessed June 9, 2016)

Big American companies with investments in China are afraid to criticize Beijing because of the controls it has over just about any access to the Chinese market. They fear too strident a stance could mean they will lose contracts or even be ostracized as Google Inc was after a dispute with China over censorship and hacking. “The Chinese government controls all the levers of the economy, from import and export licenses on up,” said Victor Shih, an assistant professor of politics at Northwestern University. “There are so many ways for the Chinese government to retaliate it is no surprise businesses are so reluctant to criticize it.” But multinationals and their CEOs have a great deal of influence on debate in Washington and more widely in the country. They have often lobbied aggressively against any measures they deem protectionist, so their relative silence is seen by many smaller manufacturers and others as weakening the U.S. in its trade relationship with China. “The issue today is that the firms hurting the most are not as politically connected as the firms that are benefiting the most,” Mesirow’s Swonk said.

### No Link—Congress Won’t Act

#### No Link—Congress would never allow mass tariffs, they fear economic backlash

[Everett Rosenfeld](http://www.cnbc.com/everett-rosenfeld/), Staff writer for CNBC.com covering international macroeconomics, politics and financial technologies, March 10, 2016, “Trump trade plans could cause global recession: Experts,” CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/10/trump-trade-plans-could-cause-global-recession-experts.html> (accessed June 10, 2016)

But many experts interviewed by CNBC dismissed Trump's calls for extreme tariffs — 35 percent [on Ford vehicles from Mexico](http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2015/06/16/trump-press-ford-cancel-mexican-plant/28816173/) and [45 percent on Chinese goods](http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-tariffs-on-chinese-exports/) — saying they strained credulity, even by campaign-promise standards. "I think in order to qualify as a coherent set of policies, the policies have to not be cartoonish and the policies have to stand some chance of being actually enacted, and I just don't think Mr. Trump's trade policies meet either of those criteria," said Michael Strain, resident scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute. A spokeswoman for Trump's campaign did not immediately return a request for comment on this article. Congress would never assent to such extreme measures, Strain said, because international trading partners and domestic businesses would immediately apply "enormous pressure." But beyond the political possibility of such a proposal, massive tariffs would also have significantly deleterious effects for the U.S. and world economy, several economists said.

### No Link—Companies Like the Plan

#### No link—US companies want strong relations with China to open up new trade and business opportunities

Bruce Kennedy, Staff writer for CBS Money Watch, September 2, 2014, “China and the U.S.: Ever-tighter economic ties,” CBS Money Watch, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-and-the-u-s-ever-tighter-economic-ties/> (accessed June 14, 2016)

Relations between the U.S. and [China](http://www.cbsnews.com/changing-china/) have never been especially warm. But over the past several decades, as China has developed into the world's second-largest economy, the two nations' financial futures have become all the more intertwined. That's why many economic experts and analysts are carefully watching as China's economy slows down. On Monday, [two surveys showed](http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-china-manufacturing-growth-slows-in-august-surveys-show-2014-9) China's manufacturing growth slowed in August, which may mean authorities will have to inject stimulus to reach their 7.5 percent annual growth target. China is in the midst of an epic transition from a manufacturing and investment-driven economy to one based on services and consumption. Experts don't expect that transition to be seamless for either the Chinese people or their leadership. "There are a number of very difficult reforms ahead of them," said Elizabeth Economy, director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She expects challenges to arise as China deals with major changes in its banking, educational and legal systems, and has to grapple with such issues as the protection of intellectual property rights. But these reforms, and China's shift toward a consumer-led economy, could also end up benefiting the U.S. Economy said the long-time dream of some American export firms, "of 1 billion Chinese consumers," may finally become a reality. "As the Chinese middle class is growing and the upper-middle class is growing, they have demonstrated themselves to be real consumers, along the lines of Americans," she noted. "They like to try new products, which creates opportunities for U.S. companies." And as the government in Beijing complies with the World Trade Organization and other international regulatory guidelines, China might start making substantial investments, as well as mergers and acquisitions, linked to U.S. companies in the near future. "There are opportunities for China, really for the first time, to contribute to actual job-making on the ground in the United States," said Economy. "And that's a big shift. The numbers are still small, but nonetheless it's potentially a very positive trend."

### No Link—No Spillover

#### No link—there’s no spillover between US/China relations and business decisions

[Mark LaPedus](http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1180416&), Staff writer for EE Times, April 10, 2001, “Companies in China worry about nationalistic policies--not spy plane incident,” EE Times, <http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1180416> (accessed June 14, 2016)

The current standoff between China and the United States over the collision of an American surveillance plane and a Chinese jetfighter is clearly harming the delicate political relations between the two countries. But will this incident impact U.S.-Sino trade relations, especially in high-technology sectors? For now, most U.S. multinationals doing business in China claim that it's "business as usual" in the country, in spite of growing tensions between Beijing and Washington. In fact, one major U.S. company in China--Motorola Inc.--claims the U.S. surveillance plane incident will have no bearing on its current or future business in China. Relations between Motorola and the Chinese government remain on solid footing, insisted Stephen Tsao, senior marketing manager for the Asia-Pacific region at Motorola Semiconductors Hong Kong Ltd. "Motorola has been friends with the Chinese government for a long time, and we don't believe that will change," said Tsao in an interview with SBN in Hong Kong last week.

### Link Inevitable – China Buying US Companies

#### China increasing takeover on US companies – dominating the market

FLF, Forbes Leadership Forum Contributor, December 10, 2015, “Chinese Investment in the US Will Grow in 2016,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2015/12/10/chinese-investment-in-the-u-s-will-grow-in-2016/#7abdb571a8ab> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

China’s domestic economy may be slowing down relative to its impressive growth over the past decade, but foreign investment by the country’s government and businesses is at an all-time high. Chinese investors looking for higher and safer returns outside China recognize the value of Western involvement as a way to build their brands and compete globally. And as I learned at a recent seminar co-hosted by the Bank of Montreal and Hill & Knowlton Strategies and attended by high-level Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, their gaze is increasingly turning toward the United States. Even though the U.S. is a favorite nation, investments here have been significantly lower than in the rest of the world: China’s $90 billion invested in the world’s largest economy is less than 10% of its total outward investment of $1.1 trillion since 2005. This underweight position results partly from China’s earlier investment strategy and partly from to the political climate in the U.S. Until recently, three quarters of Chinese foreign investment was in energy, natural resources, and related transportation infrastructure. Those kinds of investments can be made elsewhere in the world at less cost and political risk than in the U.S., where natural resources are seen as vital to the national interest. The federal Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States traditionally takes a dim view of Chinese SOEs buying up strategic national resources and screens out investors—SOEs in particular—it feels do not meet the national security test. Now, with investment returns on commodities low, China has shifted its focus onto industries with higher rates of return, such as entertainment, real estate, insurance, and technology—industries where the U.S. is the dominant market. Some recent examples of this are Alibaba’s $200 million deal with Snapchat and the purchase of the iconic Waldorf Astoria hotel by the Anbang Insurance Group (the U.S. is particularly seen as a safe haven for real estate, which is now the fastest growing part of the Chinese portfolio).

### Internal Link Turn

#### Turn: the plan facilitates better relations with China which prevents US/ China war and creates jobs in the U.S.

Zachary Karabell, Head of global strategy at Envestnet, a financial services firm, April 1, 2016, “The Chinese want to buy more American companies — and we should let them,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-chinese-want-to-buy-more-american-companies--and-we-should-let-them/2016/04/01/ce4f811c-ef72-11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a_story.html> (accessed June 14, 2015)

Consider that the last crisis in U.S.-China relations occurred in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane [crashed](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/15/that-time-u-s-soldiers-were-detained-overseas-by-a-hostile-power-and-america-said-sorry-twice/) on Hainan Island and put tensions on high. It may be purely coincidental that nothing even remotely as incendiary has occurred since China joined the World Trade Organization in December of that year and began its foreign investment push. But it’s striking how the U.S.-China relationship — which has all the seeds of a serious and adversarial rivalry — has avoided any serious bouts of angry words, let alone retaliatory action. Economic ties may not guarantee peace and prosperity, but they do increase the incentives to negotiate differences and accommodate the needs and sensitivities of economic partners. That was the original intent, for instance, behind the creation of the European Union, which for all its many failures nonetheless helped end centuries of deadly conflict between the European powers. Somewhat surprisingly, in a presidential campaign season that’s been heavy on anti-China rhetoric, one person who seems to understand the benefits of Chinese investment is Republican candidate John Kasich. Speaking with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos last month, the Ohio governor extolled how a Chinese company has created jobs by setting up an auto-glass manufacturing operation in a previously shuttered General Motors plant. “I was just in a plant in Dayton, where we have a half-a-billion-dollar investment from the Chinese, and they’ve employed over 1,000 people there,” [Kasich said](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/13/kasich_touts_chinese_foreign_direct_investment_in_ohio_employed_over_1000_people.html), adding, “I was intimately involved in bringing that to Ohio.” We need to make it easier for China to invest in America. Not only would it help invigorate domestic industries, but it would also provide a path to greater security. If instead we let our fears lead us to greater isolationism, we will surely lose.

### Internal Link Turn

#### Turn: US/ China economic engagement boosts US businesses and economy—they’d like the plan

Tim Truman, Senior Advisor and Director of Public Affairs at ITA, June 12, 2016, “Economic Engagement with China Brings Benefits to U.S. Businesses,” International Trade Administration (ITA), <http://trade.gov/press/publications/newsletters/ita_1208/jcct_1208.asp> (accessed June 14, 2016)

Economic Engagement with China Brings Benefits to U.S. Businesses. The Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic Economic Dialogue steer the crucial economic relationship between the United States and China. Since China emerged on the world economic scene 30 years ago, the country has become a major player in the global economy. In 2007, China overtook Japan as the United States’s largest export market outside of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners, and it displaced Canada as the leading source of imports. In 2007, U.S. exports to China expanded by 18 percent to $65 billion, while U.S. imports from China increased by 12 percent to $322 billion. “In both our countries, there has been a rise of economic nationalism,” said Carlos M. Gutierrez, secretary of commerce. “It threatens the progress we’ve made in increasing commercial partnerships—partnerships that benefit our citizens and our economies.” The trade relationship between China and the United States will continue to grow through bilateral initiatives that will address market barriers when they arise. Those initiatives facilitate increased trade and help resolve problems. The U.S.–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) is the primary trade dialogue between the two countries. On September 15, 2008, Gutierrez; Susan C. Schwab, U.S. trade representative; and Wang Qishan, vice premier of China, convened the 19th JCCT meeting in Yorba Linda, California. During the talks, both sides reached an agreement on steps that will promote increased trade flows. At the meeting, both sides discussed the importance of making progress on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. China reaffirmed its commitment to advance negotiations to join the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement. Chinese officials also agreed to streamline the approval process for setting up new foreign retail outlets, to lower the minimum capitalization requirements for telecommunications services (although more needs to be done), to postpone regulations that bar U.S. information technology companies from selling in China, and to accept from certain U.S. states some poultry products that had previously been banned. This year marked the JCCT’s 25th anniversary. Since its inception in 1983, the JCCT has been a useful forum for engagement and has delivered meaningful results for U.S. businesses, workers, and farmers. Perhaps most important, the JCCT has ensured that U.S. and Chinese senior economic and trade officials continue to interact regularly, and those relationships have improved both countries’ abilities to address trade-related misunderstandings and problems. The JCCT has contributed to the dramatic trade growth between China and the United States. In addition to annual senior-level meetings, the JCCT comprises more than a dozen working groups and subgroups, which meet throughout the year to discuss a range of trade and investment issues. On October 24–28, 2008, David Spooner, assistant secretary of commerce for the Import Administration, led a team of Department of Commerce officials to Beijing. The team participated in three JCCT working groups: the Structural Issues Working Group (SIWG), the Trade Remedies Working Group (TRWG), and the Steel Dialogue. The Import Administration cochairs each of the three working groups with the office of the U.S. trade representative. The SIWG provides opportunities for discussing and sharing information on China’s market reforms, as well as the remaining structural impediments that China needs to complete to transition to market economy status. The October talks highlighted China’s recent economic reforms and pinpointed areas for future focus. The discussions within the TRWG featured healthy exchanges on numerous issues related to administering trade remedy laws. The Steel Dialogue is a unique working group that involves government and industry participation from China and the United States. During the meetings, industry representatives offered detailed overviews of their respective steel market situations and developments. Although the meeting did not result in any quick fixes for the concerns raised (for example, the United States is particularly concerned about continued government involvement in China’s steel industry), the dialogue represented a valuable opportunity to increase the understanding of different points of view. In addition, the U.S. delegation stressed the importance of market mechanisms for the health of the global steel market. On October 21, 2008, Jamie Estrada, deputy assistant secretary for manufacturing, convened the first U.S.–China Environmental Industries Forum in Beijing, China. The forum allowed U.S. government and industry representatives to meet with their Chinese counterparts to help develop policies, relationships, and projects that increase the deployment of environmental technologies while addressing environmental and sustainability concerns. Both countries have much to gain from this collaboration. China will become better suited to meet its goals to reduce air emissions, waste, and water consumption, while the United States can collectively address global environmental concerns and facilitate trade in the environmental sector. The JCCT’s Environment Working Group organized the event and will develop tangible action items to address the issues discussed. The U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) is another important mechanism that guides the long-term development of the U.S.–China economic relationship. In 2006, presidents George W. Bush and Hu Jintao established the SED as a framework to address issues of mutual concern. The SED takes a long-term and strategic look at the economic relationship, while the JCCT focuses on specific trade issues. The SED has helped establish the 10-year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework and has increased transparency in publishing trade-related rules and regulations. The fifth SED took place on December 4–5, 2008, in Beijing, and it focused on balanced growth, energy and environmental protection, challenges to trade, and investment. “Through the JCCT and SED, we continue to work with our Chinese counterparts to ensure we both pursue policies of openness that have helped drive our growth,” Gutierrez said. “I believe that in such an economic environment U.S. firms would welcome the opportunity to do even more business in—and with—China, thus expanding consumer choices and driving growth and job creation. This would be to the mutual advantage of both the United States and China.”

### No Internal Link – Overcapacity

#### Overcapacity prevents internal link – Alternative remedies check

Stefan M. Selig, Undersecretary of Commerce, May 26, 2016, “Moves Against Chinese Steel are not Protectionism,” <http://www.wsj.com/articles/moves-against-chinese-steel-are-not-protectionism-1464296968> (Accessed 6/14/16)

If Chinese steel companies have received unfair subsidies and dump their goods in the U.S., we impose duties to remedy this unfair conduct. I strongly disagree with your May 20 editorial “Obama Front-Runs Trump on China.” Applying U.S. duties on unfairly traded Chinese steel is not an example of protectionism. When the evidence establishes that China and Chinese steel companies have distorted the U.S. market by providing unfair subsidies and dumping their goods in the U.S., the Commerce Department calculates the amount of duties that are necessary to remedy this unfair conduct. This is the direct opposite of protectionism. China’s “wasteful policies” leading to excess capacity is not “good news for the U.S.” Chinese steel overcapacity has contributed to more than 13,000 jobs lost in the U.S. steel industry. U.S. steel consumers should not benefit unfairly from cheap steel on the backs of U.S. steelworkers.

### No Internal Link – Diverse Customers

#### Protectionism won’t hurt China – diversity of customers

Clyde Russell, Asia Commodities & Energy Columnist at Thomson Reuters, March 4, 2016, “Protectionism Overstated as Threat to China Steel Exports: Russell,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-russell-steel-china-idUSKCN0W40Y1> (Accessed 6/14/16)

The expectation is that China's exports will follow the pattern of January for the rest of the year, declining in year-on-year terms as global protectionism starts to gather momentum. But there is also a counter argument that the measures likely to be implemented won't make too much difference, as they are being imposed by countries that don't actually buy that much steel from China. A breakdown of China's steel exports, compiled by ANZ Banking Group's senior commodity strategist Daniel Hynes, shows the EU accounts for 4 percent of shipments, the same as India, while the United States takes 3 percent and Indonesia 5 percent. By far the biggest customer for Chinese steel is South Korea, taking 12 percent, with Vietnam and the Philippines receiving 5 percent each, and Malaysia, Singapore and Africa taking 3 percent each. What the numbers show is that China's steel customers are diverse and not all are contemplating protectionist measures. CHINESE STEEL WELCOME IN PLACES In fact some, especially those with no or limited domestic steel industries, will be quite pleased to buy Chinese steel, as it means they have access to lower prices than traditional suppliers, and there is more competition in the market. The risk to China's steel exports has been overstated and producers are likely to be able to find replacement markets for volumes they may lose in countries that put taxes and duties in place, according to ANZ's Hynes.

### Free Trade Bad – War

#### Free trade facilitates war – proxy for communism/exploitation

Monica Davis, News Columnist, July 6, 2013, “Will US and Germany go to War over Free Trade Spying?” <http://beforeitsnews.com/economics-and-politics/2013/07/will-us-and-germany-go-to-war-over-free-trade-spying-2454550.html> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

The US has been at war with Third World countries for more than 60 years. Used as proxies for wars with larger communist realms, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, El Salvador and countless stood as surrogates for larger communist regimes. Now, the ideologies have turned toward free trade, market manipulation and resource acquisition. China is making inroads on the Monroe Doctrine, setting up mining operations in South America. And the US is looking to acquire African resources via manipulating military might through AFRICOM. Where once Germany and Europe carved the African continent into fiefdoms, one has to wonder if the United States is travelling the same road. The high tech American economy is not possible without African raw materials. And, for sure, the so-called Green Economy is dead in the water without them. The race for information and resources has become critical, as the US fights to remain a first world power. Newswires say the US taps more than half a billion German phone calls monthly. They tap more German phone calls, emails and texts than another other countries except China or Iraq. European “trading partners” are outraged at alleged American spying–which is virtually unlimited.

### Free Trade Bad—Economy

#### Tariff penalties with China would benefit US economic growth – increased production

Howard Richman and Raymond Richman, The Richmans co-authored the 2014 book Balanced Trade: Ending the Unbearable Costs of America's Trade Deficits, published by Lexington Books, and the 2008 book Trading Away Our Future, published by Ideal Taxes Association., March 8, 2016, “Would Trump’s Trade Policy Really Cause a Recession?” <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/03/would_trumps_trade_policy_really_cause_a_recession.html> (Accessed 6/13/16)

It is true, as Romney claims, that Trump has called for tariff-like penalties to prevent American factories from moving abroad and also to bring currency-manipulating countries (including China, Japan, and Mexico) into trade-balancing negotiations. But would Trump's tariff threats slow U.S. economic growth? No! Exactly the opposite! Trade-surplus countries have a lot more to lose from a trade war, so Trump's negotiations would likely succeed. For example, in 1981, Congress threatened trade-balancing import restrictions against trade-surplus Japan, which resulted in President Reagan negotiating "voluntary restraints" on Japanese automobile exports. As a result, Japanese automobile companies built factories in the United States that continue to employ American workers and to buy American-made auto parts, greatly increasing American incomes. Positive Effects of Tariffs Even if Trump's negotiations did not succeed, the American economy would benefit if he imposed his tariff-like penalties. First, government revenues would increase, which would reduce the budget deficit. Second, American consumers would be encouraged to switch their purchases to American producers and to the products of those countries, such as Brazil and Canada, that buy more from us when we buy more from them. America would become more attractive to foreign manufacturers and to American manufacturers who had moved their factories abroad. American factory production would increase, and so would the employment and incomes of American workers. Romney's current attacks are ironic, because during the 2012 campaign, Romney talked tough on Chinese currency manipulation and other trade violations. Romney said that the U.S. should tell China, "You can't keep on holding down the value of your currency, stealing our intellectual property, counterfeiting our products, selling them around the world, even to the United States." But Romney's attack on Trump reveals Romney's stance as the sham that many of us suspected it was at the time. Trump is right to propose imposing significant tariffs on China precisely because of the litany of trade violations 2012 Romney claimed to be exercised about. But now Romney claims that if Trump does anything about China's rampant mercantilism, it will lead to a depression. Clearly he planned to go no farther in his China trade policy than another ineffectual round of asking China to stop its mercantilism.

### Free Trade Bad—Economy

#### Free trade is bad for the US economy – jobs

Greg Ip, Chief Economics Commentator, The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2016, “The Case for Free Trade is Weaker than you Think,” <http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/11/the-case-for-free-trade-is-weaker-than-you-think/> (Accessed 6/14/2016)

If workers lose their jobs to imports and central banks can’t bolster domestic spending enough to re-employ them, a country may be worse off, Greg Ip explains. Economists disagree on plenty, but they’re pretty much unanimous that free trade is good and protectionism is bad. Elite opinion among noneconomists concurs: Editorial pages have roundly condemned Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump for threatening to tear up trade agreements and slap steep tariffs on Mexico and China. But the case for free trade and against protectionism is not absolute. If workers lose their jobs to imports and central banks can’t bolster domestic spending enough to re-employ them, a country may be worse off, and keeping those imports out can make it better off. This occurs only in certain conditions, says a new paper by Harvard University’s Larry Summers and two co-authors, but those conditions may now be present. Mr. Summers, a former Treasury secretary, is no protectionist and no fan of Mr. Trump, whose election, he warns, could lead to recession in the U.S. and financial crisis abroad. But he does worry that chronically weak demand could make protectionism both respectable and irresistible. Others, such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and Michael Pettis at Peking University have already noted how in a world with too little demand, one country’s trade surplus inflicts unemployment on the country with a deficit.

#### Jobs create economic growth—sustainability

Paul Post, Saratogian News Staff Writer, January 11, 2013, “Experts: Economy Slowly Healing, but Jobs are Key to Recovery,” <http://www.saratogian.com/general-news/20130111/experts-economy-slowly-healing-but-jobs-are-key-to-recovery> (Accessed 6/14/16)

Jobs and consumer confidence are important keys to continued recovery, a pair of economic analysts told area business leaders Friday. Gary Keith, M&T Bank regional economist, and Bouchey Financial Group Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Martin Shields addressed 150 Capital Region business people at a luncheon hosted by Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce and Saratoga Economic Development Corp. at the Holiday Inn. Saratoga County leads upstate New York in economic vitality, but local officials must remain vigilant to keep the area on its path of success, they said. “What goes in one direction for a while isn’t inevitable,” Keith said. “There are others out there that are very envious and strategizing, as we speak, how they can get a piece of this action.” Shields added, “We can’t be complacent. We have to continually reinvent ourselves.” GlobalFoundries announced plans this week for a $2 billion research and development center at Luther Forest Technology Campus that will create another 1,000 jobs by the end of 2014. “The wages that are coming here are higher wages,” Shields said. In addition to $200 million in new payroll, Saratoga County home sales jumped 17.5 percent in 2012, Keith said. Also, the region outperforms many areas in exporting goods to so-called BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China — whose economies are flourishing, Shields said. However, there is still an overall lack of consumer household spending, which he said accounts for 70 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. Partially, this is because there are 3.7 million fewer jobs in America now than before the recession started. “If we can create jobs, we can create economic growth,” Keith said.

### Free Trade Bad – Workers

#### Free trade bad for US workers – wages and job security loss

Jeff Madrick, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, October 3, 2014, “Our Misplaced Faith in Free Trade,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/opinion/sunday/our-misplaced-faith-in-free-trade.html?_r=0> (Accessed 6/14/16)

Trade is one of the few areas on which mainstream economists firmly agree: More is better. But as the Obama administration pursues two huge new trade deals — one with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the other with the European Union — Americans are skeptical. Only 17 percent believe that more trade leads to higher wages, according to a Pew Research Center survey released last month. Just 20 percent think trade creates jobs; 50 percent say it destroys them. The skeptics are on to something. Free trade creates winners and losers — and American workers have been among the losers. Free trade has been a major (but not the only) factor behind the erosion in wages and job security among American workers. It has created tremendous prosperity — but mostly for those at the top. Little wonder, then, that Americans, in another Pew survey, last winter, ranked protecting jobs as the second-most-important goal for foreign policy, barely below protecting us from terrorism. Many economists dismiss these attitudes as the griping of people on the losing end of globalization, but they would do better to look inward, at the flaws in their models and theories. Since the 1970s, economic orthodoxy has argued for low tariffs, free capital flows, elimination of industrial subsidies, deregulation of labor markets, balanced budgets and low inflation. This philosophy — later known as the Washington Consensus — was the basis of advice the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank gave to developing countries in return for financial help.

### Free Trade Bad— Trade Deficits

#### Trade deficits from surpluses harm US economy – protectionism key

Howard Richman and Raymond Richman, The Richmans co-authored the 2014 book Balanced Trade: Ending the Unbearable Costs of America's Trade Deficits, published by Lexington Books, and the 2008 book Trading Away Our Future, published by Ideal Taxes Association., March 8, 2016, “Would Trump’s Trade Policy Really Cause a Recession?” <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/03/would_trumps_trade_policy_really_cause_a_recession.html> (Accessed 6/13/16)

How Trade Deficits Have Been Hurting the U.S. When countries run trade surpluses with the United States, they give us trade deficits. Those trade deficits reduce aggregate demand for American products, American incomes, and investment in American factories. In his speeches, Trump has focused upon the three countries that have large trade surpluses with the United States: China, Japan, and Mexico. China. Despite running huge and growing trade surpluses with the United States, the Chinese government won't let its people buy American-made Boeing passenger jets, Cadillac SUVs, or Caterpillar tractors. Instead, the Chinese government forces Boeing, GM, and Caterpillar to build new factories to China in order to sell to the Chinese market. If Trump's negotiations force China to import as much from the United States as we import from them, American companies could locate new factories in the United States for shipment of their goods to China. Also, American farmers would export more meat to China. The benefit to American exporting industries and to American workers would be enormous.

### Free Trade Bad – Democracy

#### Free trade trades off with democracy – corporate dominance

Dave Johnson, contributing blogger for the Campaign for America's Future, March 14, 2016, “What’s the Problem with Free Trade,” <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/03/14/whats-problem-free-trade> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

Our country’s “free trade” agreements have followed a framework of trading away our democracy and middle-class prosperity in exchange for letting the biggest corporations dominate. There are those who say any increase in trade is good. But if you close a factory here and lay off the workers, open the factory “there” to make the same things the factory here used to make, bring those things into the country to sell in the same outlets, you have just “increased trade” because now those goods cross a border. Supporters of free trade are having a harder and harder time convincing American workers this is good for them. “Free Trade” Free trade is when goods and services are bought and sold between countries without tariffs, duties and quotas. The idea is that some countries “do things better” than other countries, which these days basically means they offer lower labor and environmental-protection costs. Allowing other countries to do things in ways that cost less “frees up resources” which can theoretically be used for investment at home.

### Free Trade Bad – Environment

#### Free trade deals threaten the environment – TTIP Proves

Hilke Fischer, Journalist and Richard Fuchs, Independent Correspondent, December 5, 2016, “TTIP: Free Trade at Expense of the Environment” <http://www.dw.com/en/ttip-free-trade-at-expense-of-the-environment/a-18773205> (Accessed 6/13/16)

Greenpeace is not the only environmental group that fears that TTIP could be bad news for the environment. Widespread resistance to TTIP in Europe. "We fear the treaty will result in more lax environmental protection standards, and will pave the way for methods that make it difficult to agree on good standards in the future," Karl Bär told DW. He works for the Munich Environmental Institute. Representatives of industry and commerce, on the other hand, argue that the treaty will lead to more economic growth and employment. "TTIP is an important element to ensure economic prosperity and Europe's leading role in a global economy," said Felix Neugart, now leading the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce Abroad. The conditions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been under negotiation between the European Union and the United States since 2013. Talks are being held behind closed doors, with proposals made on the American side remaining top secret.

### Free Trade Bad – Exploitation/Mistreatment

#### Free trade facilitates abuse of workers and poor labor standards

Everett Rosenfield, staff writer for CNBC.com, March 11, 2016, “Here’s Why Everyone is Arguing about Free Trade,” <http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/11/heres-why-everyone-is-arguing-about-free-trade.html> (Accessed 6/14/16)

Those critical of recent trade agreements also argue that labor standards are not enforced in other countries, so the U.S. is effectively rewarding those businesses abusing their workers. Those are arguments against free trade when it is practiced perfectly, with both countries firmly dedicated to maintaining low barriers to trade, but many argue these agreements are bad for the U.S. because its partners often seek to subvert the relationship. The most common charges of "cheating" on free trade involve a country's keeping its currency artificially low (so its products are cheaper, and therefore more competitive, in the U.S.), subsidizing its domestic firms so they have better margins, or even levying protective tariffs without regard for prior agreements. If the U.S. leaves its markets open to unfairly cheap foreign products while its own goods are stymied abroad, then the job-killing concerns about free trade are all the more pressing, "Trade deals are absolutely killing our country — the devaluations of their currencies by China and Japan and many, many other countries, and we don't do it because we don't play the game," GOP front-runner Donald Trump said at a Thursday night debate, reiterating his call to employ threats of retaliatory tariffs. "And the only way we're going to be able to do it is we're going to have to do taxes unless they behave."

### Free Trade Bad – Exploitation/Mistreatment

#### Free trade masks exploitation – back-channeling and hidden deals

PLP, Writer and Contributor for the Progressive Labor Party, October 3, 2012, “Free Trade Masks Intensifying Exploitation,” <http://www.plp.org/challenge/2012/10/3/free-trade-masks-intensifying-exploitation.html> (Accessed 6/12/16)

The term “free trade” is a lie, since it implies that it is only about buying and selling (trade) without hindrance (free). Actually, free trade agreements (FTAs) are a mask to cover exploitative relationships imposed by the more powerful economies on the less powerful — i.e., imperialism. Take, for example, the “United States–Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement” (CAFTA-DR). This treaty, like other FTAs, contains malignant elements that are hidden under the benign-sounding title. CAFTA-DR prohibits any Central American country from opposing an attempt by a U.S. business to set up a subsidiary within its borders, so long as the business meets certain requirements. And if a member country objects that those requirements have not, in fact, been met, that country can be sued by the U.S. business at the World Bank. In 1965 the World Bank set up its International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for just that purpose, with the participation of almost 150 countries from around the world. Thus Pacific Rim, a mining company, has staked a claim in El Salvador to extract gold. The company claims that its plan will preserve the environment, including the nearby river Rio Lempa. Rio Lempa is the source of livelihood for many Salvadorans, through farming and fishing. The workers in these industries have been fighting against Pacific Rim for some time now, knowing full well that the many poisonous chemicals used in mining will pollute and destroy their river. Indeed the workers have formed organizations and put so much pressure on the Salvadoran government that so far it has refused Pacific Rim’s permit to mine the gold. As a result of their resistance, a number of workers in these organizations have been threatened with death or actually murdered. Under capitalism the laws are designed to protect the bosses and their system. Thus, Pacific Rim and the U.S.-based Commerce Group are suing the El Salvadoran government in the ICSID for lost profit. Commerce Group has already polluted the San Sebastian River with aluminum, zinc, iron, manganese, and nickel, among other toxic metals. One study found that these toxic elements produce weakness, fatigue, rashes, and mental confusion in 60% of the local population, with women and children most affected. But Pacific Rim and Commerce Group are not in business to care about the health of the local working classes. Rather they are in business for one thing only — profit — and health problems are not their concern. Furthermore the rules of the ICSID do not even permit it to consider environmental or health problems, but rather only narrowly defined investment issues. It is likely therefore that it will grant Pacific Rim and Commerce Group the $100 million they each seek from the Salvadoran government, as compensation for their lost profits. Thus does imperialism illustrate the power of the strong over the weak, but only when the weak fight by themselves, separated from the rest of the world’s working class. When workers around the world unite in one powerful force under the leadership of PLP, such struggles can not only be won, but can be transformed into revolution by putting a complete end to capitalism and its current manifestation of imperialism. Join us.

### Free Trade Bad – Poverty

#### Free trade disproportionately impacts the poor – exploitation for “stability”

Anup Shah, Editor of Globalissues.org, March 2, 2013, “Free Trade and Globalization,” <http://www.globalissues.org/issue/38/free-trade-and-globalization> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

The world is becoming more globalized, there is no doubt about that. While that sounds promising, the current form of globalization, neoliberalism, free trade and open markets are coming under much criticism. The interests of powerful nations and corporations are shaping the terms of world trade. In democratic countries, they are shaping and affecting the ability of elected leaders to make decisions in the interests of their people. Elsewhere they are promoting narrow political discourse and even supporting dictatorships and the “stability” that it brings for their interests. This is to the detriment of most people in the world, while increasingly fewer people in proportion are prospering. The western mainstream media, hardly provides much debate, gladly allowing this economic liberalism (a largely, but not only, politically conservative stance) to be confused with the term political liberalism (to do with progressive and liberal social political issues). Margaret Thatcher's slogan of “there is no alternative” rings sharply. Perhaps there is no alternative for such prosperity for a few, but what about a more equitable and sustainable development for all?

### A/T Increased Trade with China Good

#### Increased China global trading is disruptive – lost jobs and financial crisis

Noah Smith, assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, October 7, 2015, “Free Trade is No Longer a No-Brainer,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-07/free-trade-is-no-longer-a-no-brainer-for-economists> (Accessed 6/14/16)

As for the Trans-Pacific Partnership -- the most important trade deal in years -- support from the economics profession has been muted. However, some of that might be because of the intellectual-property protections in the treaty, which many consider a trade restriction rather than a liberalization. At any rate, for the first time in many decades, there are cracks in the edifice of the free-trade consensus. The reason is easy to see -- economic theory has been overtaken by macro events. The full-fledged entry of China into the global trading system since 2000 has been hugely disruptive. The lost jobs and vanishing industries have become impossible to ignore. Meanwhile, boom-bust cycles in global financial markets -- the Asian Crisis of 1997, the global financial crisis of 2008, and others -- have left economists bewildered. The simple logic of free trade, so familiar from Econ 101, is either failing or ceasing to be relevant. Some astute economists are now claiming that the old formulation was never watertight in the first place. These whispers of dissent don’t mean that free trade is dead, or even that the consensus is a thing of the past. But it isn't considered the no-brainer it once was. Economists are beginning to question one of their most celebrated points of agreement. The future is a more uncertain profession, and perhaps, a more uncertain world.

### A/T Free Trade Opens Markets

#### Free Trade does only opens markets for predatory corporations

Dave Johnson, contributing blogger for the Campaign for America's Future, March 14, 2016, “What’s the Problem with Free Trade,” <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/03/14/whats-problem-free-trade> (Accessed 6/13/2016)

It is a fact that only 5 percent of the world’s population lives in the United States. The problem is that the line of argument that opening up trade “opens markets” brings with it certain misleading assumptions. It assumes first that non-U.S. markets are not already being served by local companies. Second, it ignores that free trade also opens our own markets to others. Third, it ignores that U.S. companies already can and do sell to most of the world’s markets and vice versa. (For example, U.S. companies were already moving production to Mexico before NAFTA, the North American Free-Trade Agreement.) Suggesting that alternative approaches to trade would “close us off from trading” or “wall our economy off from the world” are ridiculous straw-man arguments. If local companies are already meeting the needs in U.S. and non-U.S. markets, what does a trade deal really enable? Trade deals indeed “open up new markets” – for giant, predatory multinational corporations. They enable large, predatory companies that have enormous economies of scale to come in and dominate those markets, putting smaller, local companies out of business. So trade deals mean the biggest multinational companies get bigger and more multinational – at the expense of all the other companies. This includes enabling non-U.S. corporations to come to the U.S. and take over markets already served by smaller companies here. The net result of allowing goods to cross borders without protecting local businesses is a “more efficient” manufacturing/distribution system powered by the biggest and best capitalized operations. The rest go away. Economists will tell you that these increased efficiencies allow an economy to best utilize its resources. But obviously one effect of this “increased efficiency” is fewer jobs, resulting in lowered wages on all sides of trade borders.

# DA China Politics DA

This disadvantage argues that cooperation between the US and China will inflame anti-western sentiment and collapse the political capital of Xi Jinping, the Chinese President currently spearheading a massive reformation of the Chinese economy. The reforms will require a significant cultural shift and the heavy-handed methods traditionally used in Chinese politics are inaccessible to Xi because of his recent efforts to root out corruption. This makes Xi uniquely vulnerable to fluctuations in political capital because his attention is already largely wrapped up in executing these reforms and because he needs popular and political support to justify unilateral actions without resorting to corrupt practices. While this DA could generically link to any cooperation between the US and China, it is most ideal for affirmatives that specifically expand economic cooperation. Anti-western sentiment in China is most concerning with these supply-side (i.e. western capitalist) reforms because they could appear to be neoliberal efforts to make China a target for exploitation similar to the relationship China, the US and other major industrial powers have with the developing world now. It doesn’t matter if the Aff is actually leads to any exploitation—China’s feelings toward the west and the US are volatile and officials that conceded ground to the US are considered traitors to the nation. If the Aff can be tied to broader market reforms, this could mare the reputation of Xi’s regime and the reform efforts.

## 1NC

#### Xi is restructuring his government and using political capital to achieve economic reforms now

Seema Mody. Writer at CNBC. August 5, 2016. A secret meeting of leaders in a Chinese beach town could determine the future of the country. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/05/top-secret-meeting-to-take-place-with-chinas-most-powerful-people.html

“Four or five of the top seven party officials are expected to retire, and plenty of mid- and high-level positions in party, government, military, (and state-owned enterprises) will change," Wrigley said. Those shifts could have a significant effect on Chinese economic policy, as well as the way it handles defense, where it continues to take a hard-line stance in the South China Sea dispute. China has scheduled September naval exercises with Russia in the South China Sea, which it claims as its own territory despite an international court ruling against Beijing on the region last month. Probably more important in the long term, however, is economic policy, which will almost certainly be on the agenda as China suffers from a slowdown. "I think this year the public preoccupation will be management of the transforming economy, especially the slowing rate of growth and a shift to more market-driven, quality growth away from centrally driven investment that produces overcapacity," said James Keith, former deputy assistant secretary of state for China and director for China on the U.S. National Security Council. Strategists point out that China has recently shifted priorities by putting greater focus on economic stability and mapping out a longer-term approach to reform. Wall Street is watching that progress closely. "For international investors, it is quite interesting to see if this year's meeting produces any clarification of China's commitment to reform, especially in tackling the problems of excess capacity in many old-economy sectors and high levels of corporate debt," said Hung Tran, executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance. "Resolving these problems would help China rebalance its economy and put it on a more sustainable path."

#### Limited cooperation with the US has stabilized Xi’s power

Robert Sutter. Writer at the Asan Forum. October 15, 2015. Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-. http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/

These failures come from strong and enduring Sino-American differences, which are deeply rooted in both countries’ views of their history, interests, and values. Heading the list for China is opposition to US international leadership, explicitly favoring a multipolar world; Beijing opposes US support for Taiwan and others who disagree with China, and it guards against alleged US schemes to undermine the Chinese one-party political system. Beijing also works against the United States in Asia, endeavoring to weaken the alliances and strong security presence along China’s periphery, which is seen as a strategic threat to the country. The American differences with China focus on US determination to sustain global and regional leadership; China’s sovereignty and security ambitions as well as its employment of coercive means against neighbors, many of which are allies or close partners of the United States; China’s state-directed economic manipulations that result in substantial US economic losses; and China’s negative human rights record. The state-fostered Chinese elite and public view of foreign affairs highlights a particularly negative perspective of the United States. China’s strong self-righteous exceptionalism in foreign affairs will not change easily. The United States also is known for exceptionalism in international affairs. And both countries are big—the world’s most powerful; their approaches to each other will not be easily changed by smaller powers or other outside forces.2

#### Xi’s political capital is on the brink—he has to stay focused on economic reform

Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen. Writers at Brookings Institute. September 26, 2013. Can Xi Jinping’s Governing Strategy Succeed? http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/09/26-xi-jinping-china-governing-strategy-li-mcelveen

As Xi’s honeymoon has progressed, however, the initial deluge of optimism has slowed to a trickle. Many watchers of the Chinese leadership have become dispirited by a lack of substantive progress toward much-needed political reform, while Chinese public intellectuals have been dismayed by orders instructing them not to speak about seven sensitive issues: universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, past mistakes by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), crony capitalism, and judicial independence. Media censorship has tightened, and participants in human rights activities have encountered increasing political harassment and even arrest. In an attempt to consolidate his footing among party conservatives, Xi in July traveled to Xibaipo village, the People’s Liberation Army headquarters at the end of the civil war, where he quoted Mao Zedong to bolster Communist spirit. Following his trip, the leadership launched an effort to bar construction of new government buildings for the next five years. As Xi works to revitalize his image, he continues to favor superficial party controls and propaganda over substantive political and judicial reform. Cognizant that his ideas did not fully catch on initially—with officials turning to online shopping and secret dining clubs to avoid being seen consuming in public, and with citizens expressing cynicism about the government’s anti-corruption rhetoric—Xi appears to realize that his political capital is waning and his honeymoon is reaching its end. Equally important, China’s economic slowdown has prompted growing concerns about the ability of the new leadership to deliver on its promises. This climate has roused Xi’s sense of urgency to adopt more liberal economic policies, stimulate China’s weakening growth, and regain the confidence of his wary fellow leaders and the middle class at large. Xi is not the only Chinese leader in recent decades to have entered office facing high expectations in the realms of political and economic reform. His predecessors discovered that economic reforms were easier to pursue than political reforms. Xi now confronts this same reality, yet he also faces deeper and rougher political waters than any Chinese leader since Mao, with the very survival of the party-state resting in his hands. Despite these dire circumstances, the economic reforms wrought by his predecessors have nurtured in Xi and other leaders of his generation great confidence in their economic management skills, as they have helped shape China into the world’s second-biggest economy. Those same reforms have also bred a rapidly growing middle class that now holds greater consumer power and higher levels of education, and makes more political demands, than ever before.

#### Failure to reform markets will antagonize political divisions and destabilize the economy

Russell Leigh-Moses. Writer at Wall Street Journal. January 8 2015. Three Political Questions Looming Over China’s Leadership in 2016. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/01/08/three-political-questions-looming-over-chinas-leadership-in-2016/

The economy could catalyze conflict here. If slower growth turns into a tailspin, Li and his allies will surely press to have their agenda for change adopted more widely, and argue that the current strategy of “politics before economics” championed by Xi isn’t working. Xi and his comrades won’t concede the political high-ground they currently occupy without a fight. Xi and Li have been doing a fine job of sharing responsibility up to now, but the divide in their approaches is getting wider, and the challenges China faces will very likely compel one model to be adopted at the expense of the other. 3. What happens if resistance to Xi’s reforms becomes active political opposition? Xi’s efforts to centralize party control over the economy and society have been ruthless. Even the hint of organized opposition to party policies has brought out the truncheon swingers, with censorship or jail awaiting those who propose an alternative political path for China. Observers who see Xi’s main opposition as coming from the Chinese street are looking down a now-empty avenue. They should be paying attention to disquiet within the ranks of officialdom. The boldness and breadth of Xi’s reforms have led some in the party ranks to wonder privately about—and even openly question—whether his handling of China’s challenges has always been correct. For example, there are some who contend that the anticorruption campaign has placed too much power in the hands of discipline inspectors and unnecessarily disrupted the status quo (in Chinese). Some of that scrutiny concerns Xi’s efforts to reinsert the Party more fully into economic and social life, a move that risks stoking discontent in a populace that has grown used to a certain level of leeway in recent decades. There are also those within the political apparatus who see Xi’s recent restructuring of China’s military as courageous but more aimed at quelling dissent from the armed forces than rejuvenating strategy and doctrine. Even Xi himself has noted in a recently released collection of internal speeches (in Chinese) that not everything he has been doing has been met with universal acclaim within the Communist party. Murmurs of discord have reached a level in recent months where a number of officials have been punished for “improper discussion” of Party policies.

#### CCP collapse causes lash out and war

Herbert Yee. Professor at Hong Kong Baptist University. 2003. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/421

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario – nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

## Economic reform now

#### Xi is using anti-western politics to increase political capital now

China Hands Magazine. December 8, 2015. The Battlefield of Ideology. <https://chinahandsmagazine.org/2015/12/08/the-battlefield-of-ideology-2/>

While control of ideology is not necessarily new to the Chinese public, warnings against Western values have certainly surged under Xi Jinping. At an education conference in March 2011 before Xi took power, Education Minister Yuan Guiren dismissed any concerns with importing Western education materials. He argued that since Chinese abroad are not influenced in capitalist countries, they therefore would be influenced by Western ideals in their homeland. Shortly after his statement, however, the Party and the State Council issued a joint document urging universities to strengthen propaganda thought work. Minister Yuan shifted his attitude in response to the new document and warned against allowing education materials that propagate Western ideology into Chinese classrooms. On the offensive front in the battle of ideology, Xi Jinping engenders nationalism and cultural identity among the people as a mechanism to garner greater political support. Instead of simply aligning Chinese ideology with Marxist-Leninist thought, Xi uses national pride as a counterforce strategy to counter the influence of foreign ideology. It is evident in Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the idea of the “Chinese Dream” since he rose to power in 2012, a term that has spread like wildfire over Party documents. It refers to prosperity and improvement in people’s livelihood but places greater emphasis on national rejuvenation. This rhetoric has both been successful in contributing to the rising nationalist sentiments within China and helping Xi gain popularity among the Chinese people. A 2014 Harvard polling report reflects the effectiveness of this strategy: Chinese respondents rated Xi Jinping a nine out of ten on his performance, more favorable than the rating other domestic constituents gave their heads of states.

#### Xi is touring China’s rustbelt to push for economic reform

Asia Times. May 27, 2016. Xi visit to China rust belt hints squeakier view of economy than Li. http://atimes.com/2016/05/xi-visit-to-china-rust-belt-hints-squeakier-view-of-economy-than-li/

Xi’s visit to the northeast, could be a sign that he wants get behind the wheel. This area of the country includes the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, and was among the first regions in China to become industrialized with the industries of steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and petroleum refining. Against the backdrop of the Chinese economy settling into a “new normal” featuring lower growth rates, the northeast is experiencing a more acute slowdown than other areas of the country. Known as the Chinese rust belt, the area has seen economic growth slowing as its industrial base loses steam. Revitalizing this area has been a crucial part of the country’s modernization drive, reported Xinhua. Xi’s visit was an investigation to determine a way to revitalize the area, said Xin Ming from the Party School of the Communist Party of China Central Committee. Xi told a meeting of senior officials in Heilongjiang that only supply-side reform could strengthen industrial structure and productivity, said Xinhua. Since 2013, Xi has made three tours to the northeast and visited a number of technology companies, urging deeper integration of information technology and industrialization in the region. This latest inspection comes one month after the country issued a policy document on the revival of old industrial bases. China is determined to transform the northeast into the manufacturing base for advanced equipment and a strategic base for technological equipment by 2030, said the document.

#### Xi is committed to push market reform

Maggie Zhang. Writer at South China Morning Post. July 27, 2016. At Politburo meeting, Xi stresses need to push ahead with supply-side reforms. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1995181/politburo-meeting-xi-stresses-need-push-ahead-supply-side-reforms

It was reiterated the mainland would maintain a proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary mechanism as it stuck to supply-side reforms in its search for a new growth engine. The meeting seemed to endorse greater fiscal support. “Ensuring the capability and pace of fiscal expenditure” would guide private capital investment in the real economy and infrastructure, it said. Sheng Songcheng, head of statistics and analysis at the People’s Bank of China, earlier this month called for an increase in the fiscal deficit along with better policy coordination as the mainland appeared to be falling into a liquidity trap, where money-pumping failed to spur corporate investment. The meeting heard that the economy still faced strong headwinds, although it was stable in the first half, with sustained job creation in urban areas and improvements in living standards for the public. Xi also presided over a meeting with non-party experts on economic development in the second half, according to Xinhua. He said a package of policies were needed to guide expectation for development and expedite supply-side structural reforms. Economists said the half-year stocktaking signalled Xi’s firm stance on pushing forward supply-side reforms. “We have repeatedly heard about pushing ahead with supply-side reforms,” said Yu Pingkang, chief economist at Changjiang Pension Insurance. “However, the actual actions to deepen reform, which will touch on vested interest, will be gradual and can’t be made in one push.”

#### Xi has the political capital to pass reform now

Wang Xiangwei. Writer at South China Morning Post. May 16, 2016. Xi Jinping’s supply-side plan now the genuine article of economic reform for China. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article

Who is in charge of the Chinese economy? If there were still any lingering doubts over this key question among overseas investors, they should have been removed after the publication of two significant long pieces in People’s Daily last week. On Monday, the mouthpiece controlled by the Communist Party’s Central Committee carried a long question and answer “interview” with an unnamed “authoritative” source, repudiating the country’s debt-fuelled growth policies. On Tuesday, it published the text of a long speech by President Xi Jinping expounding his hallmark economic policy which focused on supply-side structural reforms – 20,000 words in all that occupied two pages in the newspaper. Xi gave the speech to top Chinese officials back in January, but the timing of the publication sent an unmistakable message. Taken together, the articles signal that Xi has decided to take the driver’s seat to steer China’s economy at a time when there are intense internal debates among officials over its overall direction – namely whether to continue to resort to the old ways of deploying massive stimulus resulting in overproduction and high debt levels, or to undertake painful restructuring to reduce overcapacity and close down “zombie” enterprises.

## Political capital is key

#### Xi specifically needs to win over anti-western conservatives to pass economic reforms

Francesco Sicsci. Writer at Asia Times. January 5, 2016. Latest China stock crash spotlights urgent need for financial reform: Sisci. http://atimes.com/2016/01/latest-china-stock-crash-spotlights-urgent-need-for-financial-reform-sisci/

The crash of the Chinese stock market on the first day of trading in 2016 is a stark reminder of the urgent need for reform in China’s financial system in particular and its economy in general. Initial reaction from commentators pointed to some incidental circumstances — China’s disappointing manufacturing data, reported earlier Monday, and the coming removal of a ban on major shareholders from selling stakes that was instituted during last summer’s stock rout. However, the size of the crash — over 7% in a few hours of trading that prompted closing the market the same day and an ensuing wave of panic it sent through world markets — hints at a different and more complex scenario. I offered an analysis last year of the factors behind the 2015 summer stock crash. These same factors were in play during the latest plunge. The reasons are threefold: State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have not been reformed; private entrepreneurs are losing confidence, and the stock exchange is still bedeviled by endemic insider trading. There’s a deeper reason: China’s old business model based on corruption and political patronage has collapsed, thanks to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. But the new business model supposed to replace it is yet to take shape because conservative forces inside China’s communist party oppose the changes.

#### The slow effect of economic reforms will require Xi to concentrate his political capital

Wang Xiangwei. Writer at South China Morning Post. May 16, 2016. Xi Jinping’s supply-side plan now the genuine article of economic reform for China. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xi-jinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article

Indeed, recent reports have suggested that since the significant increase in money supply, many of the steel and iron enterprises targeted for closure have restarted production and some have even announced expansion plans following the rebound in steel and iron ore prices. The two articles suggested that Xi appeared determined to bet on painful restructuring instead of seeking short but unsustainable growth, something that Chinese leaders have said repeatedly over the past few decades but have made little progress in achieving. As some economists have pointed out, Xi’s emphasis on supply-side reforms is part of a global trend and also reflects his political aim to put more pressure on vested interest groups, including local officials and state-owned enterprises after his harsh crackdown on rampant official corruption. The Monday interview seems to suggest Xi is not worried, as the “authoritative source” said the economy would not plunge even without stimulus as it still enjoyed huge potential, was highly resilient and had ample leeway. But it also means that he is prepared to accept lower growth in exchange for notable progress in restructuring, even if the risk of social instability rises significantly. Despite the staggering odds, Xi’s strong leadership style displayed in his unprecedented anti-corruption campaign and rapid consolidation of power means he stands a good chance of succeeding.

#### Xi’s political capital is on the brink

Minxin Pei. Senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. September 11, 2015. If Xi Stumbles. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/if-xi-stumbles/

The unfortunate truth is that the timing is a bit off. When Xi and his political advisors decided on the parade six months ago, they could not have foreseen the series of events this summer that has raised disquieting doubts about Xi’s leadership and political strength. First came the stockmarket crash. The government’s attempt to save the bubble, reportedly on Xi’s order, turned out to be an expensive flop. After spending nearly $190 billion, the main stock indices have essentially remained where they were when the market-rescue operations began in mid-July. Then there was the tragic explosion in Tianjin, which killed 160 people. Although the accident was blamed on corrupt local officials and unscrupulous businessmen who violated regulations in storing hazardous chemicals in close proximity to a densely populated area, the government’s handling of the incident, such as evasive answers to many key questions about the ownership of the company involved in the accident, the identification of the hazardous materials stored and the suppression of reporting by the media, severely damaged the notion that Xi’s reforms have made a difference in how officials behave. The Tianjin tragedy was followed by perhaps the worst real economic event of the year: A sudden devaluation of the Chinese currency after a spate of bad news indicating stagnant growth. All of a sudden, popular perceptions of the Chinese economy and of the strength of Xi’s political leadership appeared to have changed. In their totality, these events revealed a clueless government that did not seem capable of getting things done the right way, or at all. For Xi, even the slightest perception of a stumble is politically risky. In the two-and-a-half years since he came to power, his anti-corruption drive has turned many of his former comrades into bitter enemies. The bureaucracy, frozen in fear and outraged about the loss of many of its privileges, including entitlements to bribes, may well be cheering the apparent comeuppance of China’s new strongman. Xi’s rivals, cowed by his sheer display of power and momentum not too long ago, may smell blood now. Even though the horrid events of the summer may not have fatally wounded Xi, they have made him, for the first time, politically vulnerable.

#### Xi needs political capital to pass important economic reforms

Barry Naughton. Writer at Hoover Institute. August, 2015. Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014. http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf

In the space of a few months, and with little fanfare, Beijing policy-makers introduced the following three economic reform policy packages: a) A program was adopted to divorce local government finances from the corporate “local government funding vehicles” that have been piling up debt since the global financial crisis. This policy includes capping local debt and reclassifying and restructuring debt into public debt (essentially “municipal bonds”) and corporate debt (including for companies that produce public services). This is a bold and aggressive program that seeks to fundamentally shift the relationship between local governments and debt markets. At the same time, it will lead to a major short-term reduction in local government financial resources. b) A new system of property rights was introduced for agricultural land that provides protection to farmers and a clear system to support renting, leasing, and mortgaging land. c) At the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing (November 9–12, 2014), China undertook new commitments in a range of international negotiations, substantively completing freetrade agreements with Korea and Australia, and moved forward in agreements with the United States. While no individual step was a game-changer, cumulatively these moves amounted to an important shift toward a more open economic regime, particularly since complementary domestic policy steps were also taken. Each of these policy initiatives addresses fundamental aspects of the economic system. In some cases—such as land rights—the new measures address contentious political or theoretical issues that have defeated efforts at resolution for a decade or more. Each of the policy initiatives has opposition, so the top political leadership must have expended political capital, either in overwhelming the opponents, or in working out political deals that would bring them on board.

#### Xi’s economic agenda is susceptible to sidetracking—he has to remain focused

Financial Times. July 27, 2016. After the power plays, Xi must now reform. https://next.ft.com/content/52f42dc4-53e5-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef

Given his decisiveness in battling corruption and dissent, Mr Xi has been surprisingly hesitant when it comes to economic reform. In the face of slowing growth and an increasingly obsolete economic model, the government did a good job of diagnosing the problems in late 2013 when it unveiled 340 reforms to address them. Unfortunately, many of these initiatives have still not begun and a closer examination shows some were contradictory to begin with. In the early stages of his tenure, western politicians and business people were mostly willing to accept Mr Xi’s consolidation of power as a necessary precursor to economic reforms. But the chaos of last year’s bungled stock market rescue and currency devaluation and the apparent backsliding on much of the reform agenda has left investors disillusioned. The most important question in China today is what Mr Xi intends to do with the power he has amassed. His administration has already acknowledged that the mobilisation of investment and infrastructure construction that has driven decades of spectacular growth is no longer enough to keep the economy going. The authoritarian, centrally planned governments that have ruled China for millennia have always excelled at exactly this sort of mobilisation. It is how they built the Great Wall, the Grand Canal and, more recently, the shining skyscrapers of Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen.

## Economy reform impacts

#### The Chinese economy will face significant distortions if it doesn’t reform

Arthur R. Kroeber. Writer at Brookings Institute. November 17, 2013. Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber>

Over the last 20 years China has deregulated most of its product markets, and the competition in these markets has generated enormous economic gains. But the allocation of key inputs – notably capital, energy, and land – has not been fully deregulated, and government at all levels has kept a gigantic role in deciding who should get those inputs and at what price. The result is that too many of these inputs have gone to well-connected state-owned actors at too low a price. The well-known distortions of China’s economy – excessive reliance on infrastructure spending, and wasteful investment in excessive industrial capacity – stem largely from the distortions in input prices. Xi’s program essentially calls for the government to retreat from its role in allocating these basic resources. If achieved, this would be a big deal: it would substantially boost economic efficiency, but at the cost of depriving the central government of an important tool of macro-economic management, and local governments of treasured channels of patronage. As a counterpart to this retreat from direct market interference, the Decision spells out the positive roles of government that must be strengthened: macro management and regulation, public service delivery, management of social stability, and environmental protection. In short, the vision seems to be to move China much further toward an economy where the government plays a regulatory, rather than a directly interventionist role.

#### The anti-corruption effort is setting up the economy for reform

Andrew Clark. Writer at Asia Financial Review. July 30, 2016. Xi Jinping's balancing act between the old and new economy. http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/xi-jinpings-balancing-act-between-the-old-and-new-economy-20160729-gqgq00

But at the same time, this "theft" is being countered by the massive anti-corruption drive orchestrated by Chinese Communist Party boss Ji Xinping. The credit growth-corruption problem was already emerging around the time Xi Jinping took over the reins in 2012. There was a crackdown on credit growth for a couple of years, but the money tap was turned back on again last year as the country's stock-market gyrated wildly and growth began to falter. Other, less dismal, economists point that that this stark credit growth-GDP growth gap narrative fails to take adequate account of China's colossal investment activity. This is running at levels that are more than double Australia's and higher again compared with other OECD economies. Whatever the precise case, authorities will be reluctant to turn off the credit growth tap before the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. This leaves a further five years, a time when China can draw on those $US3 trillion in foreign reserves, although any sharp international run on the Chinese RMB currency, or a failure in some part of the Chinese banking system cannot be discounted as significant interim risks.

#### Failure to reform the economy means economic growth will be mismanaged

Andrew Clark. Writer at Asia Financial Review. July 30, 2016. Xi Jinping's balancing act between the old and new economy. http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/xi-jinpings-balancing-act-between-the-old-and-new-economy-20160729-gqgq00

But current growth figures obscure a growing contrast between booming, hi tech cities of the south such as Shenzhen, and grim cities in China's north-east, an area dominated by state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, involved in heavy industries such as steel-making and cement, plus coal mining. It's a place where problems of over-manning, over-production, and even producing goods that have few market prospects – making them zombie enterprises – are rife. To balance these sharply contrasting regions, with their widely divergent prospects, the ruling Chinese Communist Party is performing the job of those circus performers who straddle two horses. Let's call them Sensational South and Nowhere North. The riders thrill the crowd with their brave derring-dos. But the risk is that as they ride around the ring that is China, the horses may go their separate ways, and the riders will fall. No one is predicting that such a fall will happen soon. There are some enormous cushions to soften the fall – should it ever occur – such as China's $US3 trillion in foreign reserves, and the energy that is so apparent in this extraordinary country. Put in terms of the dismal science, the current dilemma is that there is a yawning gap between credit growth and the country's official growth rate. According to some estimates, credit growth is running at 21 per cent, meaning there is a possible GDP-credit growth gap running in the mid-teens. Much of this credit is being allocated from the central bank to vaguely named local government "financing vehicles". These party-run strongholds are in turn advancing the money to poorly performing SOEs operating in the heavy industry sector. According to one expatriate economist, this practice is akin to "opening the front door and closing the back door". In effect, the money generates little of worth, beyond a sort of make-work scheme for the Party faithful.

#### The Chinese economy is vulnerable to a severe collapse

Gordan G Chang. Writer at National Interest. December 29, 2015. Will 2016 Bring the Collapse of China’s Economy? <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-2016-bring-the-collapse-chinas-economy-14753?page=show>

The Chinese people have not been buying what their government has been saying about the economy. How do we know this? They have been taking their money out of the country as fast as they can. In Q3, there was $460.6 billion of net capital outflow, as documented by Bloomberg. Bloomberg reports the outflow in October was $62 billion. Beijing was able to slow the flood that month by imposing informal capital controls on top of its official array of barriers. Last month, however, the outflow appears to have picked up from October as foreign exchange reserves fell by an officially reported $87.2 billion—and perhaps the decline was larger as Beijing has in the second half of the year been underreporting the reductions in its reserves. No economy—not even one the size of China’s—can survive outflows of this dimension. The Chinese economy has never made sense, but confidence, both inside and outside the country, held it together. Now, the confidence is disappearing fast, and Beijing does not know how to get it back, except by repackaging solutions that have not worked. China’s technocratic leaders cannot change the downward direction of their economy. s

#### Failure to reform the Chinese economy will cause market failure in various industries

Elias Glrenn. Writer at Reuters Beijing. May 16, 2016. After shoddy China economic data, Xi says to persevere with reform. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-reform-idUSKCN0Y716A>

China will push forward supply-side reform and increase the number of middle-income earners, state television quoted President Xi Jinping as saying on Monday, after economic data for April fueled doubts about the economy's health. Xi's speech to a meeting of top government economic regulators underscores the importance, and pressure, of managing China's economic shift as growth has cooled to 25-year lows. Investment, factory output and retail sales in the world's second-largest economy all grew more slowly than expected in April. The main thrust is to reduce ineffective supply and increase effective supply, Xi said, according to the official Xinhua news agency. The government has made reducing the capacity glut one of its top priorities, and has vowed to put "zombie" companies out of business. But economists expect authorities to move slowly to avoid a sharp jump in unemployment. In some regions there had not been forceful action on government policies, Xi was quoted as saying by Xinhua. At the same time, some policies need to be further researched and drawn up. For the state and society to remain stable over the long-term, the government must realize its goal of meeting people's needs and expanding the number of middle-income earners, he said. China must push forward reform of state-owned enterprises, accelerate change in how government functions and deepen the fundamental reforms of pricing, taxation, finance and social insurance, said Xi. The government must also improve China's income distribution system and strengthen people's property protections, he said. Separately, China's State Council plans to encourage private investment, a major foundation of a stable economy, in part by removing hidden barriers, Xinhua said on Monday.

#### Brexit’s economic turbulence makes China’s reform extremely high stakes for the global economy

David Brown. Writer at South China Morning Post. June 27, 2016. Thanks to Brexit, a new global financial crash is looming. http://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/1982068/thanks-brexit-new-global-financial-crash-looming

Britain’s Brexit vote has far-reaching consequences with the potential to throw the world into even bigger economic chaos and disorder than the 2008 global financial crisis. The catastrophic collapse in the UK pound, free-falling global equities and a dramatic surge in market volatility is just the start of it. The lid has been lifted off Pandora’s Box of morbid fear. There is no end to the list of deep concerns in investors’ minds, bringing risk aversion and market panic to boiling point. Global financial confidence is a fragile house of cards at the moment. Global policymakers have worked courageously and have been extremely inventive to keep the forces of global contagion at bay over the last seven years. Zero interest rates, creative monetary engineering and lashings of QE cash have held the line, but there is precious little left in the central banks’ kitty to deal with what may come next. The next crisis could be the one that breaks the central banks. What complicates matters is that the world is already consumed with fear and loathing about unsustainable global debt levels, the parlous state of global banking, the spectre of a hard landing in China and growing geo-political concerns. Meanwhile, supranational bodies like the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD and Group of Seven seem increasingly powerless to make any difference.

#### The global economy is vulnerable to disruptions

David Brown. Writer at South China Morning Post. June 27, 2016. Thanks to Brexit, a new global financial crash is looming. http://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/1982068/thanks-brexit-new-global-financial-crash-looming

Worries about the health of the flagging global economy are genuine. Increased uncertainty will hit economic confidence hard. Consumers will hold back on spending, companies will suspend output and investment intentions and global trade will slow down even more. More vulnerable parts of the world economy will risk slipping back into recession and deflation will continue to get the upper hand. Major central banks will come under growing pressure to intervene with even more negative interest rates and extra QE provisions. Governments will be forced to end fiscal austerity and open up deficit spending again. Some governments will be tempted down the road of competitive currency devaluations. The world will be heading deeper into a bizarre world of increasingly ineffectual and more dangerous policy remedies. Increasingly alarmed investors will be looking for scapegoats, so it is no surprise the contagion spilling out from Britain is already subsuming European equity markets, peripheral bond and credit spreads and critically hitting the euro hard. Calls for similar EU referendums in France, Italy, Netherlands and Denmark have horrified the markets. Any escalation of the euro crisis could be the beginning of the end for European monetary union. The risk of other countries leaving the EU or the euro zone is the stuff of nightmares. The European Central Bank is loaded to the gunnels with “derivative” QE assets. Any risk of the ECB partnership untangling and the ensuing threat to the euro and global markets would be unimaginably toxic. A sub-parity euro/dollar fx rate is a strong possibility.

#### Chinese economic crisis will spillover globally

Luis Durani. Writer at Modern Diplomacy. May 11, 2016. The Ticking Time Bomb: The Chinese Economy. http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com\_k2&view=item&id=1407:the-ticking-time-bomb-the-chinese-economy&Itemid=490

The loans were used by people for real estate, businesses, and other means of investments. The returns from these different investment vehicles would be used to pay back the loans. These loans have grown from approximately $4 trillion (2003) to over $30 trillion dollars today. In addition, the graph depicts the banking assets as a percentage of GDP. Unfortunately, the growth in the percentage of loans has greatly outpaced the economic growth in the same time frame. The current trajectory of the banking assets represents a system that is unsustainable and on the path of crashing. It is reported that almost half of all new Chinese loans are undertaken just to pay the interest on the existing loans. While official Chinese government reports put the nonperforming or bad loans at 2-5%, in reality, it is believed to be closer to 15%. With such a large amount of toxic loans, one can safely assume the next bubble is around the corner. While the larger victim from this fallout will be China, the world will not go unscathed. Aside from being the second largest economy in the world, economic globalization has created an interconnected system that when one giant sneezes the rest of the world feels it. The crash of the Chinese banking sector can be the black swan event that will cause the entire global system into depression and in a much worse position than the 2008 crash.

## Rebuttal to Economic slowdown stops reform

#### Economic slowdown won’t stop reform

Asia News Network. July 9, 2016. China's economic growth stable, meets expectations, Xi Jinping says. <http://business.asiaone.com/news/chinas-economic-growth-stable-meets-expectations-xi-jinping-says>

China's economic growth is "basically stable and in line with expectations", President Xi Jinping said at a meeting with Chinese economists in Beijing on Friday. The country will firmly push ahead with the supply-side structural reform and continue to implement prudent monetary and proactive fiscal policies, he said. But the transition from old to new economic growth engines will take some time, although new growth engines are playing an increasingly larger role in boosting growth, he said. The sound long-term economic fundamentals remain unchanged, and the economy still has good resilience and big potentials, Xi said, providing room for coping with the current challenge of economic slowdown. The economic restructuring process remains on track, he added. Policymakers will use stable macroeconomic policies to anchor social expectations and use major reform measures to raise social confidence in the country's development, he said. The UK's recent "Leave" vote has convulsed the global financial markets and major economies have had diversified growth performances. In this global economic environment of weaker growth and higher uncertainty, China's external demand will be adversely affected, said a report by investment bank UBS. But "as the Chinese government remains committed to delivering its growth target, we expect policy support to be stepped up again, should downward economic pressures from either domestic demand or exports intensify", it said.

#### Market reforms are the only hope for fixing economic problems

Asia News Network. July 9, 2016. China's economic growth stable, meets expectations, Xi Jinping says. <http://business.asiaone.com/news/chinas-economic-growth-stable-meets-expectations-xi-jinping-says>

The UBS forecast that China's fixed-asset investment could have edged up in June, although exports may have fallen. The National Bureau of Statistics will release growth-related data for June and the overall first half of this year next week. "China faces quite heavy downward growth pressure," said Zhang Yiping, an economist at China Merchants Securities. But seen from recent data, the effect of supply-side structural reform on manufacturing has become apparent and the reduction of excessive production capacity has made headway, he said. The large number of newly begun projects in the first half of this year will help prevent economic growth from falling drastically, he added. A financial operation report released by the People's Bank of China, the central bank, on Friday said that "at the next stage, China's monetary policy tool should be used flexibly, economic restructuring and reform will be pushed, and the role of fiscal policy will be further brought out". In the second half of this year, China should continue to carry out the supply-side structural reform and take more growth-stabilizing measures, said Niu Li, director of macroeconomics at the State Information Center. "Stabilization of growth is the most important task," he said, adding that China will adopt the most appropriate policies in line with the changing situation to ensure growth remains within the targeted range.

#### China’s economy will be fine as long as they stay focused on reform

Chong Koh Ping. Writer at the Strats Times. July 23, 2016. China's economic reforms win praise. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/chinas-economic-reforms-win-praise

China's economic reforms have received a vote of confidence from heads of key international economic organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, even as they voiced concerns over sluggish global growth. In a joint statement with China, they said fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain positive in the long term, thanks to its efforts in developing new growth drivers. The statement was issued yesterday after an unprecedented "roundtable" talk with Premier Li Keqiang in Beijing, ahead of the Group of 20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank chiefs in south-western Chengdu city this weekend. The statement noted that China's economic structure has "improved" and that consumption and the services sector have become the major driving forces of the economy. China can continue to contribute to global growth if it continues to deepen reforms and strengthen structural changes such as reducing overcapacity, cutting housing stock, deleveraging and reducing cost, said the statement.

#### International creditors are investing in China

Chong Koh Ping. Writer at the Strats Times. July 23, 2016. China's economic reforms win praise. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/chinas-economic-reforms-win-praise

Praise for China came as the IMF raised its China growth forecast by 0.1 percentage point to 6.6 per cent on Tuesday, while downgrading its forecast for global growth for this year and next by the same quantum due to Britain's surprise vote last month to leave the EU. IMF managing director Christine Lagarde said yesterday that the upward revision was because the IMF has witnessed the "determined and decisive implementation of reforms" in China. The support given to encourage growth was solid and steady, she added. China's gross domestic product (GDP) numbers for the first half of this year showed signs that its slowdown has stabilised. The economy expanded 6.7 per cent in the second quarter, matching the pace of the first quarter. The heads of the international economic organisations also expressed their concerns about the sustained slow-growth environment amid weak global demand. Ms Lagarde said all policymakers should promptly implement effective monetary, fiscal and structural measures to boost growth. World Bank President Kim Jim Yong, on the other hand, noted that there is a very loud rejection of globalisation and multilateralism in the western world.

#### Economic slowdown won’t stop reform

Charles Hutzler. Writer at Wall Street Journal. September 22, 2015. Despite Slump, China’s Xi Jinping Pledges Economic Reforms. http://www.wsj.com/articles/despite-slump-chinas-xi-pledges-economic-reforms-1442894460

Chinese President Xi Jinping defended his government’s economic stewardship and said that China’s slowing growth and market fluctuations won’t deter needed reforms. In his first interview with foreign media since Chinese stocks skidded this summer, Mr. Xi told The Wall Street Journal that this summer’s government intervention to arrest the plunge was necessary to “defuse systemic risks.” The rescue was akin to acts taken by governments in “some mature foreign markets,” the president said in written responses to questions submitted by the Journal ahead of his first official state visit to the U.S. On the slowdown that has appeared sharper than both global markets and Beijing expected, Mr. Xi urged foreign investors to take the long view and compared the world’s second-largest economy to a vessel in rough seas. “Any ship, however large, may occasionally get unstable sailing on the high sea,” he said.

#### China’s economic outlook is strong

Kevin Yao. Writer at Reuters Beijing. July 26, 2016. UPDATE 1-China leaders vow to keep growth steady, push reforms. http://www.reuters.com/article/china-economy-politburo-idUSL4N1AC3P5

China's top leaders pledged on Tuesday to keep economic growth steady in the second half of the year, while creating favourable conditions for supply-side reforms, state media reported. The government will use a combination of policies to "strive to maintain stable economic development trends", the Xinhua news agency said, citing a meeting of the Politburo, a top decision-making body of the ruling Communist Party. "The downward pressure on the economy is still relatively large and we must attach great importance to some potential risks," Xinhua cited those at the meeting as saying. The world's second-largest economy grew by 6.7 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier, steady from the first quarter but still the slowest pace since the global financial crisis. China aims for annual growth of 6.5-7 percent in 2016.The government will be flexible in adjusting polices to help create a favourable environment for supply-side structural reforms, Xinhua cited the meeting, chaired by President Xi Jinping, as saying. Authorities will continue to implement a proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, Xinhua said. Reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the financial sector will be vital for cutting overcapacity and debt levels, it said, adding that the government would improve policy transparency and stabilise market expectations. China will keep the yuan exchange rate basically stable, and will also guide reasonable growth in credit and social financing, Xinhua said.

#### China’s economic struggles won’t have a long-term effect

Xinhua News. July 26, 2016. China to resolutely implement supply-side structural reform. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/26/c\_135542261.htm

China's economy held steady in H1, and supply-side structural reform has seen progress, noted the statement. "However, the downward pressure facing the economy remains, and potential risks deserving attention still exist," it noted. The statement underlined the importance of proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy, as well as the careful management of the speed and direction of macro-economic policy. China's GDP expanded 6.7 percent in Q2, the lowest growth rate since the global financial crisis in early 2009. The economy is widely expected to follow an L-shaped path as downward pressure continues and new growth momentum is yet to pick up. The statement said credit structures should be optimized to support the real economy. The yuan's exchange rate is expected to remain stable at a reasonable and balanced level. As the economy cools, falling demand has led to excess industrial capacity, which is seen as one of the most urgent issues facing the Chinese economy. The statement said cutting stockpiles and overcapacity were key tasks in the latter half of the year. To achieve this the country should deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and push forward urbanization. At a meeting of senior political advisors Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for confidence and resolution on implementing economic strategy. He asked political advisors to provide practical suggestions for the implementation of supply-side structural reform.

## Rebuttal to Xi is perceived as pro-western now

#### Xi is quietly nodding to anti-western prejudices to maintain political capital

Edward Wong. Writer at New York Times. November 11, 2014. In New China, Hostile West is Still Derided. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-turns-up-the-rhetoric-against-the-west.html?login=facebook

Even as his government was making red-carpet plans to host President Obama this week, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, praised a young blogger whose writing is best known here for its anti-American vitriol. In one widely circulated essay published by state news outlets titled “Nine Knockout Blows in America’s Cold War Against China,” the blogger, Zhou Xiaoping, argued that American culture was “eroding the moral foundation and self-confidence of the Chinese people.” He compared unfavorable American news coverage of China to Hitler’s treatment of the Jews. In another essay, he said the West had “slaughtered and robbed” China and other civilizations since the 17th century, and was now “brainwashing” it. Mr. Xi, at a forum last month aimed at tightening political control of the arts, said the blogger exhibited “positive energy.” His embrace of Mr. Zhou, who has been hailed by propaganda officials but widely mocked by scholars here, is just the latest sign of rising anti-Western sentiment, bordering on xenophobia, that has emanated from the highest levels of the Communist Party and sent a chill through Chinese civil society and academia. Using ideological language reminiscent of the Cold War, Chinese officials have voiced conspiracy theories with relish, accusing foreigners, their companies, government agencies and nongovernmental organizations of plotting to weaken or overthrow the party. Chinese institutions with ties to Western entities, no matter how benign, have also come under attack. And state-run newspapers have taken to blaming “hostile foreign forces” for any major disturbance, whether it is ethnic violence in western China or student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.

#### Xi’s has balanced cooperation with undermining to keep the US at an arm’s length

Robert Sutter. Writer at the Asan Forum. October 15, 2015. Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-. http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/

President Xi Jinping has dealt with the United States for almost three years as relations have declined. His bold and assertive actions in areas sensitive to US interests departed sharply from past restraint and put an aroused America on guard. It is hard to give these results a passing grade. As they did in Washington on September 24-25, the two leaders continue to meet and achieve agreements in limited areas of mutual interest, but rising American debate over China policy is fed by Xi’s repeated affronts and seemingly cavalier treatment of US concerns. Americans seek means to get Xi Jinping’s China to stop taking actions seen as offensive in the East and South China Seas, in cyber economic espionage, in state-backed intervention in currency and Chinese domestic markets that disadvantage US companies; in using China’s large foreign exchange reserves and other means to support self-serving Chinese-backed development institutions at odds with those backed by America; in continued rapid development of military forces aimed at Americans; and in stronger repression of Chinese peoples’ political freedom and related human rights. Xi Jinping continues to see advantage in undermining American interests in these areas. This plays well with domestic audiences in China. Approaching the end of his term and reluctant to apply American power in foreign affairs, President Barack Obama complains but seems passive and weak in dealing with Chinese challenges. Current trends forecast trouble ahead with hardening American attitudes running up against self-absorbed and self-righteous Chinese assertiveness.

#### Xi has been able to portray cooperation as US acquiescence

Robert Sutter. Writer at the Asan Forum. October 15, 2015. Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-. http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/

Unfortunately, Xi’s record shows repeated choices that place other foreign and domestic priorities above his avowed but increasingly hollow claims to seek a positive relationship with the United States. These actions make it increasingly clear that in Xi’s view, positive US ties will come on condition of America avoiding opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under him.5 By putting the United States “on notice” that it is the United States that has to give way to China’s practices at odds with US interests, the Xi government has prompted Obama and his government to be much more vocal in issuing often strident complaints. Xi has ignored them, leaving it to underlings to rebuff them. The frustration within and outside the US government grows in the face of Xi’s actions; there has been a toughening of behavior in some areas. A significant debate has emerged inside and outside the government with those favoring a tougher policy toward China in the ascendance.6 Xi Jinping began the process of changing Chinese policies with major implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and state power in late 2012. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor. Chinese policies and practices became much more assertive. Xi received enormous publicity from Chinese propaganda and media outlets; his image as a decisive leader prepared to act strongly in the face of American and other criticism was welcomed by Chinese public opinion and elite opinion. Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down; officials in China said they had conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. The string of Chinese actions and initiatives shook many out of their complacency:7 The government orchestrated the largest mass demonstration against a foreign target ever seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed islands in September 2012). It followed with intense political, economic, and security pressure on Japan unseen since World War II. China used coercive and intimidating means to extend control of disputed territory at neighbors’ expense. Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed US and other complaints that their actions upset regional stability. Despite increasing US complaints, the new Chinese government continued manipulative economic practices, cyber theft, and reluctance to contribute regional and global common goods.

## Rebuttal to US cooperation is popular

#### Anti-western sentiment is the currency of Chinese politics—reform efforts are trying to break from the US now

Edward Wong. Writer at New York Times. November 11, 2014. In New China, Hostile West is Still Derided. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-turns-up-the-rhetoric-against-the-west.html?login=facebook

The campaign has reached into academia as well. An employee of an American organization that promotes dialogue among scholars said some Chinese professors who work on international relations were no longer writing or saying anything in public that cast the United States in a positive light, for fear of being accused of spying. The employee, who spoke on the condition of anonymity so as not to antagonize Chinese partners, added that one Chinese university had barred visiting American scholars from lecturing if their research did not conform to the party line. Casting blame on the “black hand” of foreign forces has become more common in the state news media as well. The People’s Daily has published 42 articles this year blaming “Western,” “foreign” or “overseas” forces for China’s domestic problems. That total is nearly triple the number of similar pieces from the first 10 months of last year, according to a count by The Christian Science Monitor. The pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong have been a favorite target. Last Friday, Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper close to the party, ran a front-page article under a headline that said the newspaper had found “ironclad evidence” that the United States had been secretly plotting the local Occupy movement since 2006. The government has also targeted major Western companies with high-profile investigations and imposed record fines for what officials call monopolistic practices. Some foreign businesspeople and officials say the investigations are a form of protectionism. At the same time, the Chinese government has maintained restrictions on foreign investment, ownership and market access in many industries. As a result, American executives have tempered their optimism about doing business here, said John Frisbie, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, a trade group in Washington. “It should be more than a $350 billion market in China for U.S. companies,” he said. “Many sectors are still closed. There has generally been a lack of movement forward on further openings.”

#### Anti-western sentiment is deeply ingrained in China’s political culture

Elizabeth C Economy. Writer at the Diplomat. July 12, 2015. Poisoning the Well of US-China Relations. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/poisoning-the-well-of-u-s-china-relations/>

It was bound to happen. As China’s stock market continued its wild ride, dropping 30 percent by early July from a seven-year high only a month prior, rumors started swirling that Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and George Soros, among other vague forces of international capital, were to blame for the stock market plunge. No matter that foreign investors have only limited access to mainland Chinese stock exchanges, the current Chinese leadership has become addicted to the foreigner blame game. The phrase “hostile foreign forces” has become a catch-all for Chinese officials, scholars, and media commentators who cannot acknowledge the reality of China’s current political and economic situation. In the past few years, virtually no area of Chinese policy has remained untouched by the influence of “hostile foreign forces.” China’s education minister Yuan Guiren argues that “young teachers and students are key targets of infiltration by enemy forces” and condemned Western concepts such as the rule of law, civil society, and human rights. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) accused “hostile Western forces” of exaggerating the number of people who died during the Great Leap Forward in order to undermine the legitimacy of the party. CASS also worked with China’s National Defense University and the General Staff department of the People’s Liberation Army to produce a film that claims U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges offer Americans a chance for infiltration and attacks the longstanding Fulbright program as an element of “America’s cultural invasion.” Western reports of police violence in Xinjiang were attributed to hostile foreign forces in August 2014. The vice chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Li Yufu, blamed hostile foreign forces for attempting to undermine the solidarity of Chinese workers. Early in China’s clean air movement, as well, some officials argued that the activists were being used by hostile foreign forces. And, of course, hostile foreign forces were a major contributor to the protests in Hong Kong. Even President Xi Jinping has warned against outside forces intruding on Chinese religions, although virtually all major religions in China today came to the country from outside its borders, and two of the largest, Buddhism and Catholicism, are led by religious figures who reside outside China. This flurry of anti-Western rhetoric has also been accompanied by a number of legislative efforts designed to limit Western influence. A broad-reaching new National Security Law is tasked to “safeguard national security, defend the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics” as well as to realize “the great rejuvenation of the nation.” China’s national security commission is also drafting legislation to severely regulate foreign-based nonprofits for fear that Western governments will use these organizations to undermine the Communist Party. A cybersecurity law presented earlier this year, since put on hold, would have required the banking industry to use equipment deemed “secure and controllable” by Beijing, essentially closing the door for foreign information technology firms. Meanwhile, a separate proposed anti-terrorism law would require technology firms to provide encryption keys and install backdoors to allow law enforcement to access information.

#### Anti-western sentiment is the key to Xi’s power

Simon Denyer. Writer at the Guardian. March 6, 2015. How Xi Jinping’s presidency was shaped by traumas of Mao and Gorbachev. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/xi-jinping-china-reform-gorbachev-mao

Shambaugh said the Chinese Communist party used to believe that the Soviet Union’s collapse meant it had to adapt and reform, to become dynamic and responsive. But it began to abandon that strategy from 2008, as it faced another series of small traumas: riots in Tibet and Xinjiang, popular uprisings, including the “colour revolutions” and the Arab Spring, and internal dissent as the internet empowered citizens and intellectuals demanded democracy. Once again, the conservatives dug in and laid their bets not on adaptation but on repression. Xi, Shambaugh said, has intensified the repression begun under his predecessor, Hu Jintao. So when a new video series about the fall of the Soviet Union became compulsory viewing for Communist party cadres in 2013, its focus was not on the flaws in the Soviet system but – once again – on the sins of Gorbachev. “Western values played a leading role in the failure of Gorbachev’s reform effort, and the documentary aims to warn cadres not to make the same mistake as Gorbachev,” said Cheng. “Gorbachev introduced outside forces to help him to turn over the Soviet Communist party. Xi believes the Communist party can self-correct. The party is able to hunt the problem and fix it itself. Communist reform is controllable.”

#### The only way to achieve economic reform is to make clear that the US isn’t involved

Matt Sheehan. Writer at Huffington Post. September 20, 2015. What You Need To Know About China’s Strongman President. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xi-jinping\_us\_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14

Sudden drops in Chinese coal consumption also laid the groundwork for last fall’s landmark climate change agreement with the U.S. But this summer, the government fumbled on several fronts. When a politically expedient stock market bubble began to burst, the leadership pumped in money in a desperate attempt to keep the party going. That move and a sudden devaluation of the RMB fueled speculation that Xi may sacrifice deep reform in hopes of propping up short-term growth. Xi has branded his administration with the trademark phrases “the Chinese dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That branding reinforces a narrative that the Chinese Communist Party has been preaching for decades: after a “century of humiliation” characterized by foreign invasion and domestic strife, China is finally returning to its rightful place of prominence in the world. Xi is striving to take ownership of that revival narrative by pushing reforms at home and asserting Chinese preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. He has appealed to nationalism with an enormous military parade, and to hopes for clean governance by cracking down on lavish official expenditures and corrupt officials. Taken together, Xi has attempted to build a public image as a strong leader devoted to the people. While there are few reliable gauges of public opinion, surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest Xi remains immensely popular at home.

#### Xi’s popularity is tied to his push for independence from the US

Robert Sutter. Writer at the Asan Forum. October 15, 2015. Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-. http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/

China used its large foreign exchange reserves and trading capacity to develop international banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans for Asian and global investments, loans, and trade areas that excluded the United States and countered American initiatives and support for existing international economic institutions. Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically in ways grossly offensive to American representatives seeking political liberalization and better human rights conditions in China. The Chinese advances were supported by ever expanding Chinese capabilities backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of China. The Chinese military capabilities were arrayed against and focused on the American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Official Chinese media highlighted Xi’s leadership; he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful, and internationally respected China—what Xi and the Chinese publicists called the “China Dream.” Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and other powers concerned with the negative impacts of Xi’s actions were rebuked or scorned. Xi’s assertive ascendance supported the recently common view among Chinese and international commentators that China had grown in power and confidence to the extent that a tipping point had arrived in the Asian order with the United States in decline and China in greater control. The choices for America were often depicted in stark terms. The United States was called on by some to gird itself to prepare to resist in a “contest for supremacy” with China. Others saw the need for America to give way, accepting China’s leading power and influence in Asia as America pulled away.9

#### Backing down the US is a win for Jinping

Robert Sutter. Writer at the Asan Forum. October 15, 2015. Grading Xi Jinping’s America Policy: C-. http://www.theasanforum.org/grading-xi-jinpings-america-policy-c/

These actions make it increasingly clear that in Xi’s view, positive US ties will come on condition of America avoiding opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under him.5 By putting the United States “on notice” that it is the United States that has to give way to China’s practices at odds with US interests, the Xi government has prompted Obama and his government to be much more vocal in issuing often strident complaints. Xi has ignored them, leaving it to underlings to rebuff them. The frustration within and outside the US government grows in the face of Xi’s actions; there has been a toughening of behavior in some areas. A significant debate has emerged inside and outside the government with those favoring a tougher policy toward China in the ascendance.6 Xi Jinping began the process of changing Chinese policies with major implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and state power in late 2012. The caution and low profile of the previous leaders were viewed with disfavor. Chinese policies and practices became much more assertive. Xi received enormous publicity from Chinese propaganda and media outlets; his image as a decisive leader prepared to act strongly in the face of American and other criticism was welcomed by Chinese public opinion and elite opinion. Chinese reassurance and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down; officials in China said they had conveyed Chinese weakness to Asian rivals and the United States. Official Chinese media highlighted Xi’s leadership; he was depicted in glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese initiatives abroad with confidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful, and internationally respected China—what Xi and the Chinese publicists called the “China Dream.” Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and other powers concerned with the negative impacts of Xi’s actions were rebuked or scorned. Power-Shift in Asia and Future US-China Relations Xi’s assertive ascendance supported the recently common view among Chinese and international commentators that China had grown in power and confidence to the extent that a tipping point had arrived in the Asian order with the United States in decline and China in greater control. The choices for America were often depicted in stark terms. The United States was called on by some to gird itself to prepare to resist in a “contest for supremacy” with China. Others saw the need for America to give way, accepting China’s leading power and influence in Asia as America pulled away.9

#### China’s population will oppose any form of cooperation that entrenches US economic or military presence in Asia

Kevin Rudd. Professor at Harvard University. April 2015. The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf

While these conclusions sound strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese conclusion that the United States has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political legitimacy of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy. They are also based on a deeply held, deeply “realist” Chinese conclusion that the U.S. will never willingly concede its status as the pre-eminent regional and global power, and will do everything within its power to retain that position. In Beijing, this assumption permeates perceptions of nearly all aspects of U.S. policy, from campaigns on human rights, political activism in Hong Kong, arms sales to Taiwan, and America’s failure to condemn terrorist attacks by Xinjiang separatists, to support for Falungong and the Dalai Lama. As a result, senior Chinese interlocutors conclude that the U.S. is effectively engaged in a dual strategy of undermining China from within, while also containing China from without. American arguments that U.S. policy toward China bears no comparison with the Cold War-era containment of the Soviet Union are dismissed by Chinese analysts. China points to the U.S. strategic decision to “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia as unequivocal evidence of this. Beijing also points to Washington’s de facto support for Japanese territorial claims in the East China Sea, and its alleged abandonment of neutrality on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in support of the Philippines, Vietnam and other South-East Asian states at the expense of China, as further evidence of containment. Finally, China adds the most recent examples of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (which excludes China) and failed American efforts to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB. All the above, as seen from Beijing, are designed to deny international space to China in policy domains ranging from hard security, to economics and trade diplomacy. The report notes that the U.S. disputes each of the above, and instead argues that Chinese foreign policy appears geared for an attempt to push the United States strategically out of Asia.

## Rebuttal to Xi/CCP is weak

#### Xi can successfully reform the economy if he can wade through the political process

Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen. Writers at Brookings Institute. September 26, 2013. Can Xi Jinping’s Governing Strategy Succeed? http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/09/26-xi-jinping-china-governing-strategy-li-mcelveen

Although the strong presence of princelings in the top leadership likely will reinforce public perceptions of the convergence of power and wealth in the country, the four princeling leaders on the PSC—Xi, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, and Wang Qishan—all have decades of experience leading China’s major cities and provinces, and are highly competent in economic and financial affairs. Some Chinese analysts argue that, due to their princeling background, these leaders have more political capital and resources than did their predecessors Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (who came from humble family backgrounds) in terms of running the Chinese economy and coordinating various governmental agencies. Xi has long been known for his market-friendly approach to economic development for domestic and foreign businesses alike. Xi’s experience leading Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, three economically advanced regions, has prepared him well to promote the development of the private sector, foreign investment and trade, and the liberalization of China’s financial system—all of which experienced serious setbacks under the previous administration.

#### Xi is asserting the necessary political capital to pass economic reforms now

Barry Naughton. Writer at Hoover Institute. August, 2015. Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014. http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46bn.pdf

In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of the economic reform agenda. The economic reform program has now moved out of the earlier stages of preparation and the creation of specialized institutions to manage the reform process (as described in earlier CLMs). Earlier assessments, even when positive, have inevitably been cautious, because implementation has been slow, relative to the bold and broad declarations of the November 2013 Third Plenum.1 Today, however, we can start to see important areas where economic reforms have moved beyond rhetoric into important efforts of practical implementation. This does not necessarily mean that Xi has found an effective or reasonable “model” of reform, but it certainly changes the terms of the conversation we should be having about economic policy. Xi’s economic reforms are now serious and real, and deserve serious and careful attention.2 Oddly, so far the important measures discussed here have been presented in a somewhat understated way in the Chinese press, and have received very little press attention outside China. This shortcoming should be rectified as soon as possible.

#### Xi has the political strength to push through reforms

Matt Sheehan. Writer at Huffington Post. September 20, 2015. What You Need To Know About China’s Strongman President. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chinese-president-xi-jinping\_us\_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14

Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. China’s previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has instead built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. In China, Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xi’s political rivals) and the detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal Xi’s vision for China’s future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an efficient authoritarian state with a strong leader at the helm. Abroad, Xi has asserted China’s contentious territorial claims by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Over the objection of the United States and its allies, China has managed to build airstrips and outposts in waters also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Xi has also expanded Chinese influence in Southeast and Central Asia by founding new international organizations and pledging huge money for infrastructure investments abroad. Those stances have built popularity and political capital that Xi may spend on broad-ranging economic and environmental reforms. In 2013 the Chinese leadership announced its intention to kick-start sputtering economic reforms, shrinking the role of the state by giving market forces a “decisive role” in the economy. Those reforms are meant to power the Chinese economy through a tough transition: away from traditional sources of growth (cheap exports and heavy industry) and toward a new economy built on services, consumption and innovation. That’s a monumental task, and so far the record on reform is mixed. Early progress was made on thorny issues of restructuring local government debt and wrenching the Chinese economy away from high-polluting industries such as steel and cement.

## Rebuttal to Politics will prevent privatization

#### A gradual shift away from SOEs will work

Arthur R. Kroeber. Writer at Brookings Institute. November 17, 2013. Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber>

But while privatization is off the table, subjecting SOEs to much more intense competition and tighter regulation appears to be a big part of Xi’s agenda. In his interview, Yang Weimin stresses that the Plenum decision recognizes the equal importance of both state and non-state ownership – a shift from previous formulations which always gave primacy to the state sector. Moreover, other reports suggest that the mandate of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac), which oversees the 100 or so big centrally-controlled SOE groups, will shift from managing state assets to managing state capital.[5] This shift of emphasis is significant: in recent years SOEs have fortified their baronies by building up huge mountains of assets, with little regard to the financial return on those assets (which appears to be deteriorating rapidly). Forcing SOEs to pay attention to their capital rather than their assets implies a much stronger emphasis on efficiency. This approach is consistent with a long and generally successful tradition in China’s gradual march away from a planned economy. The key insight of economic reformers including Xi is that the bedrock of a successful modern economy is not private ownership, as many Western free-market economists believe, but effective competition. If the competitive environment for private enterprises is improved – by increasing their access to capital, land and energy, and by eliminating regulatory and local-protectionist barriers to investment – marginal SOEs must either improve their efficiency or disappear (often by absorption into a larger, more profitable SOE, rather than through outright bankruptcy). As a result, over time the economic role of SOEs is eroded and overall economic efficiency improves, without the need to fight epic and costly political battles over privatization.

#### Xi’s commitment to economic growth will come first

Arthur R. Kroeber. Writer at Brookings Institute. November 17, 2013. Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber>

In the last years of the Hu Jintao era, reforms were stymied by two entrenched problems: turf battles between different ministries, and interference by security forces under a powerful and conservative boss, Zhou Yongkang. Neither Hu nor his premier Wen Jiabao was strong enough to ride herd on the squabbling ministers, or to quash the suffocating might of the security faction. By establishing these two high-level groups (presumably led by himself or a close ally), Xi is making clear that he will be the arbiter of all disputes, and that security issues will be taken seriously but not allowed to obstruct crucial economic or governance reforms. The costs of crossing Xi have also been made clear by a determined anti-corruption campaign which over the last six months has felled a bevy of senior executives at the biggest SOE (China National Petroleum Corporation), the head of the SOE administrative agency, and a mayor of Nanjing infamous for his build-at-all-costs development strategy. Many of the arrested people were closely aligned with Zhou Yongkang. The message is obvious: Xi is large and in charge, and if you get on the wrong side of him or his policies you will not be saved by the patronage of another senior leader or a big state company. Xi’s promptness in dispatching his foes is impressive: both of his predecessors waited until their third full year in office to take out crucial enemies on corruption charges. In short, there is plenty of evidence that Xi has an ambitious agenda for reforming China’s economic and governance structures, and the will and political craft to achieve many of his aims. His program may not satisfy market fundamentalists, and he certainly offers no hope for those who would like to see China become more democratic. But it is likely to be effective in sustaining the nation’s economic growth, and enabling the Communist Party to keep a comfortable grip on power.

#### Xi can’t force reforms without sacrificing the anti-corruption progress he’s made

Financial Times. July 27, 2016. After the power plays, Xi must now reform. https://next.ft.com/content/52f42dc4-53e5-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef

However, the kind of growth Mr Xi says he wants now — green, innovative, focused on services and consumption — cannot be forced into existence with production targets in a command economy. Civil liberties, the freedom to challenge orthodoxies, strong rule of law, consumer protections, respect for intellectual property and a strongly engaged citizenship — as opposed to brittle nationalism — are all necessary elements for the innovative and modern economy China now needs. For Mr Xi and the Communist party all these things would require relinquishing some power and control over society. This is unlikely to appeal to a leader who has closely studied the fall of the Soviet Union and concluded that Moscow’s fatal mistake was to allow political reforms and “western” ideas to seep into the country. In the eyes of many in China, Mr Xi’s rejection of “universal values” such as democracy, freedom of speech and constitutional government has been vindicated by the apparently chaotic results of democracy elsewhere — from Brexit in the UK to the rise of Donald Trump in America. But for the sake of the economy and long-term political stability, the Communist party should now begin the process of gradual reforms to lay the groundwork for an independent judiciary and more checks and balances in politics. Mr Xi could avoid the dirty d-word (democracy) and call these reforms part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. It would be his greatest legacy.

#### Xi’s anti-corruption efforts haven’t been excessively forceful

Keyu Jin. Professor at London School of Economics. August 7, 2016. Xi Jinping is no Mao Zedong. http://opinion.inquirer.net/96300/xi-jinping-is-no-mao-zedong

These stealth political networks became virtually impenetrable, with many officials, by default, becoming the central government’s rivals, fiercely defending their economic interests by safeguarding their official posts and perquisites. Unless it reined in the municipal satraps, the central government could essentially kiss its reform plans goodbye. So Xi stopped turning a blind eye to corruption. He put some local-government powers back into the hands of the central authorities. And he launched his far-reaching anticorruption campaign. Rounding up a large number of senior officials (and military officers) who are perceived to be political rivals may look like a purge. But the fact is that all those who have been prosecuted and sentenced to prison terms were found guilty, based on hard evidence. Present-day China, even with its imperfect judiciary, can no longer imprison officials purely on political grounds, as was the case under Mao. Xi’s efforts to rein in China’s bureaucracy continues unabated. In the short term, economic activity could suffer, as local authorities delay decisions, so as to avoid attracting too much attention to themselves. But once the system is cleaned up, China will be in a much stronger position to achieve sustainable and stable economic growth. Those who fear Cultural Revolution 2.0 need to understand that China is not the country it was 50 years ago. The soil for authoritarianism and a cult of personality has been plowed under by three decades of increasing openness and economic growth. No one understands this better than Xi.

## Rebuttal to Market reforms are slow

#### China is uniquely capable of adapting to market reforms

Andrew Clark. Writer at Asia Financial Review. July 30, 2016. Xi Jinping's balancing act between the old and new economy. http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/xi-jinpings-balancing-act-between-the-old-and-new-economy-20160729-gqgq00

There are two other, significant elements missing from many political-economic scenarios for China promoted by Western, free market-oriented economists. These are the flawed, underlying assumption that even though China is run by the Communist Party, it is operating a market economy so any analysis can be validated by previous western experience. This fails to accommodate China's astonishing transformation in one generation. Further, no Western economic model can adequately factor in its ambitious, even astonishing, plans for the future, such as the global One Belt, One Road plans for deeper Chinese integration with the world economy. Missing also is an understanding that no matter how the overall figures suggest, China is running along the same railway tracks as the West that will presumably end up at the free market station, its unique mixed economy is in fact following its own railway tracks. It is being powered by the unique, ever-adaptable, Chinese mind, with its unmatched ability to focus on the task at hand. Work is deeply embedded in the Confucian culture. According to one dedicated Chinese Communist Party member: "We believe that we can get a sufficient return from God and nature as long as we are diligent enough. "It's a national spirit."

## Rebuttal to China is already privatized/economy resilient

#### China’s reforms have been limited thus far and don’t confront the biggest risks

Jams Dorn. Research Fellow at Cato Institute. December 7, 2015. China’s Challenge: Expanding the Market, Limiting the State. http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-34-updated\_1.pdf

The global financial crisis of 2007–08 expanded the role of the state and slowed the growth of the market, not only in China but around the world. President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Xiabao engineered a gigantic stimulus program designed to prop up SOEs via a rush of bank credit. Government intervention appeared to work as China’s avoided a major recession, but marketization slowed and confidence was lost in China’s reform movement. Moreover, the rush of credit going to questionable projects has led to the current rising bad debt. 6 When the leadership changed in March 2013, with the appointment of President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang, hope for reform increased. The Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress, in November 2013, announced a new blueprint for economic reform with further price liberalization and a wider role for private firms seeking to compete with SOEs, especially in the service sector. In its “Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,” the CCP’s Central Committee emphasized that “the underlying issue is how to strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the market.” The Committee advocated letting “the market play the decisive role in allocating resources” in order to “improve the socialist market economy.” Hence, the free-market bird was still confined to the cage of socialism (CCP 2013). A socialist market economy is not a free private economy. Widespread state ownership and the legacy of central planning persist, especially in the financial sector where state-owned banks dominate, investment decisions are heavily politicized, key interest rates are subject to government oversight, capital controls remain in force, and exchange-rate flexibility is closely regulated. This system of financial repression misallocates capital, discriminates against private firms, and deprives the Chinese people of a wide choice of investment alternatives. While there can be no doubt that China has made considerable progress in moving from plan to market, the visible hand of government is still thwarting the invisible hand of the market. When the power of the state, under the guise of “socialism,” substantially limits economic freedom and breeds rent seeking and corruption, 7 fundamental institutional change—not piecemeal reform—is needed to shatter special interests supporting the status quo (Cheung 1990: 28–29).

# DA US Elections DA

## Shells

### 1NC Shell

#### Clinton is winning the election now – nationally and in key swing states

Andrew Prokop, political analyst at Vox, 8-4-2016, “The newest polls are devastating for Donald Trump,” http://www.vox.com/2016/8/4/12374000/trump-clinton-polls-today

The presidential race may have reached a turning point, as a new group of polls shows Hillary Clinton clobbering Donald Trump nationally and in swing states. A national Fox News poll released Wednesday evening shows Clinton beating Trump by 10 percentage points, 49 percent to 39 percent. Then, a McClatchy-Marist poll released Thursday shows Clinton ahead by a massive 15 points — real landslide territory and easily the best recent poll she's gotten, with her at 48 percent compared to Trump's 33 percent. In Pennsylvania, a state most observers believe is a must-win for Trump considering how the electoral math is shaping up, Franklin & Marshall has a new poll showing him trailing Clinton by 11 points — 49 percent to 38 percent. In Florida, which is even more of a must-win state for Trump, a Suffolk poll found Clinton ahead of Trump in a head-to-head matchup by 6 points.

#### Soft-line policies on China alienate the public and become election-year fodder for Republicans – they’ll spin the plan at Democrats compromising on important American interests

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Senior Associate with the Center on Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, 8-25-2015, "China bashing: American campaign ritual or harbinger of tougher policy?," http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/25/China-bashing-American-campaign-ritual-or-harbinger-of-tougher-policy.aspx)

China-bashing in the 2016 presidential election has begun in earnest. In past campaigns, many of the attacks on China were forgotten as candidates dropped out of the race or were defeated. In 2012, for example, Mitt Romney pledged to declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. He never got the chance, of course, and Obama's policies were unaffected by Romney's campaign rhetoric. Sometimes, promises to 'get tough' with China during the campaign simply became irrelevant as presidents, once in power, confront the demands of real-world policy challenges. When George W Bush ran for president in 2000, he criticised his predecessor Bill Clinton for calling China a strategic partner, and instead said China should be viewed as a 'strategic competitor.' After becoming president, however, Bush dropped that label. When a Chinese jet collided with a US surveillance plane over the South China Sea, Bush worked hard to avert a US-China political crisis, and after the September 11 attacks, he welcomed Beijing's proposal to fight together against terrorism. This time may be different, however. China's repressive policies at home, combined with its transgressions in the South China Sea and massive cyber attacks on US companies and the Federal Government, make it an easy target. Moreover, criticism of China likely resonates with most Americans. Republican candidates will accuse Obama of being too soft on China and vow that if elected, they will stand up for American interests. Democrats, including Obama's former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, are more likely to find fault with than defend the current Administration's approach to managing US-China relations. Regardless of who is elected president in November 2016, he or she is likely to adopt a firmer approach to China on a litany of issues. So what are the candidates saying about China so far? GOP candidate Donald Trump condemned China's recent currency devaluation as 'the greatest theft in the history of the United States.' If elected president, Trump said, 'Oh would China be in trouble!' Carly Fiorina, another GOP contender, criticised China's cyber hacks on federal databases as an 'act of aggression' against America. She also warned against allowing the Chinese to control trade routes in the South China Sea and pledged she would be 'more aggressive in helping our allies...push back against new Chinese aggression.' In a lengthy critique of Obama Administration policies published in Foreign Affairs, GOP candidate Marco Rubio lambasted Obama's 'willingness to ignore human rights violations in the hope of appeasing the Chinese leadership.' He also accused China of pursuing 'increasingly aggressive regional expansionism.' Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has joined the fray in an effort to shield herself from the accusation that she was complicit in the implementation of a policy that accommodated China and failed to sufficiently stand up for American interests. Clinton acknowledges that as secretary of state she worked hard to build a better relationship with China and says she would continue to do so as president. But she also warns about the dangers posed by China's militarisation of the South China Sea and condemns China's 'stealing commercial secrets, blueprints from defense contractors' and 'huge amounts of government information' in its quest for an advantage over other nations. The presidential campaign is just starting to heat up. The torrent of China-bashing in the remaining 15 months before the general election is likely to have a profoundly negative effect on China's image in the US, which is already unfavourable. In a 2014 poll by the Pew Research Center, only 35% of Americans had a positive view of China, while 55% had a negative one. China's image in the US has tilted in a more negative direction in recent years – as recently as 2011 half of Americans gave China a positive rating. The negative public mood will likely align with harsher attitudes in Congress, reinforcing the proclivities of the next US president to adopt a tougher stance against Chinese trade policies, human rights violations, cyber intrusions, and assertiveness in the South China Sea. Despite a sincere desire for a positive bilateral relationship with the US, Xi Jinping is likely to prioritise the preservation of domestic stability, defence of sovereignty, and pursuit of the Chinese Dream.

#### The plan creates clear contrast between the parties on foreign policy – Clinton gets tied to Obama and the plan – swings the election

John Amble, former U.S. Army intelligence officer and PhD candidate at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London, 1-28-2016, “We Still Don’t Know if Foreign Policy Matters in the Presidential Election,” <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/we-still-dont-know-if-foreign-policy-matters-in-the-presidential-election/>

So wait, is this a foreign policy election or not? Good question, one that Elizabeth Saunders sought to answer this week in The Washington Post. One reason voters sometimes don’t support candidates based on foreign policy issues, even when they profess to be concerned with them, is because the divides between candidates’ positions can be less stark than on issues like, say, taxes and social welfare policy: “Consider Vietnam and the 1968 election … [when] most individuals’ votes were not based on Vietnam — because there was little difference between the public positions taken by Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. … That’s potentially true in 2016 as well. The most likely Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, has taken more hawkish foreign policy positions than many recent Democratic candidates, presumably bringing her positions closer to the more traditionally hawkish Republican side.” Democratic candidates avoiding foreign policy While the GOP field is happy to talk about national security and foreign policy issues, the Democrats (as we’ve noted before) are simply not interested. For Buzzfeed, Zack Beauchamp talked to Democratic foreign policy wonks who aren’t happy about that. Some of the highlights: Heather Hurlburt, New America Foundation: “The discussion of national security in the presidential debate is terrible. You sit around and say, ‘If only they would talk more about our issues in the context of the presidential campaign,’ and then they do. Just be careful what you wish for.” Matt Duss, Foundation for Middle East Peace: “Whenever there’s a crisis, Democratic leaders scramble to make statements about what we should do. But there’s a failure to constantly articulate a progressive vision for foreign policy.” Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Hillary is probably a little more interventionist than the Democratic base would like. Bernie Sanders is closer to where the Democratic base is … [but] that’s not the message he wants his campaign to be about. Although Clinton is kind of an exception To be fair, in this week’s Democratic town hall hosted by CNN, Clinton did spend a lot of time tackling foreign policy issues, especially compared to her two opponents. She addressed the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Islamic State, radicalization, and Benghazi. But as Frida Ghitis writes for CNN, “there was, however, a downside for Clinton. … The once seemingly inevitable Democratic nominee opted to tie herself ever more closely to President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Indeed, come the general election, Clinton’s full-throated defense of the controversial Iran deal and other foreign policy choices will make it that much harder to distance herself from the broader historic catastrophe of the unraveling of the Middle East that has unfolded during Obama’s watch.”

#### GOP president will undermine efforts to meet US climate targets under the Paris Deal – key to check global climate change

Ben Adler, covers environmental policy and politics for Grist, with a focus on climate change, energy, and cities, 12-16-2015, “Republicans still hope to throw a wrench in the Paris climate deal,” <http://grist.org/climate-energy/republicans-still-hope-to-throw-a-wrench-in-the-paris-climate-deal/>

Republicans didn’t even wait for a global climate change deal to be struck in Paris to start undermining it. Last month, congressional Republicans were loudly discouraging other nations from signing onto any agreement, arguing that the U.S. won’t keep up its end of the bargain if a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election. And they passed bills that would repeal the Clean Power Plan, the new set of EPA restrictions on carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants, which is the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s strategy for meeting its emissions targets under the Paris Agreement. While U.S. negotiators were hard at work in Paris trying to secure a deal, congressional Republicans kept working hard to make the U.S. look insincere. The House passed an energy bill that would expedite permitting for oil and gas projects such as pipelines and expand liquefied natural gas exports. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who is running for president, held a hearing stuffed with climate science deniers, including one who Greenpeace revealed is on the fossil fuel industry’s payroll. Republicans in Congress have also voted to end the crude oil export ban as part of the budget deal. That policy change would be a giveaway to the oil industry that would increase domestic oil production at the expense of the environment. Once a deal came out of Paris, naturally Republicans started criticizing it. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), chair of the Environment and Public Works Committee, complained — nonsensically, since he doesn’t even accept climate science in the first place — that the agreement does not hold countries such as China and India to strong enough standards. Anyway, he promises to interfere with any effort to meet our emissions targets or climate finance commitments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said President Obama “is ‘making promises he can’t keep’ and should remember that the agreement ‘is subject to being shredded in 13 months,’” according to the Associated Press. As AP explains, “McConnell noted that the presidential election is next year and the agreement could be reversed if the GOP wins the White House.” The U.S. — as the world’s largest economy, largest historic polluter, and second-largest present-day carbon polluter — is an essential player in any functioning global climate agreement. Well aware of this, President Obama made a huge and largely successful effort on climate diplomacy over the last year, crafting bilateral agreements with key nations such as China, India, and Brazil in order to lay the groundwork for an international deal. Republicans, knowing the importance of U.S. cooperation, are eager not only to kneecap any U.S. climate policy, but also to prevent global cooperation on climate change. Perhaps they fear that a future Republican president will face more pressure from allies and trading partners to address climate change now that everyone else in the world has already committed to do so. So over the next five years, until the world comes together again in 2020 to hopefully negotiate a stronger set of national targets, congressional Republicans will be working to destroy the agreement and its future potential by preventing the U.S. from keeping its word. Their game plan will be to undo the Clean Power Plan and revoke U.S. pledges of financing to assist developing nations with expanding clean energy and adapting to climate change. How this plays out will depend on the outcome of the next presidential election. All of the leading Republican presidential candidates are climate science deniers who oppose the Clean Power Plan. On the campaign trail this week, most of them have avoided any discussion of the Paris Agreement. All but one of the top nine GOP campaigns did not respond to a query on the subject from The New York Times.

#### Top experts agree – warming is real and causes extinction

Don Flournoy, PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College at Ohio University, Former Associate Dean at State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Professor of Telecommunications at the Scripps College of Communications at Ohio University, January 2012, "Solar Power Satellites," Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

## Uniqueness

### 1NC Uniqueness

#### Clinton is winning the election now – nationally and in key swing states

Andrew Prokop, political analyst at Vox, 8-4-2016, “The newest polls are devastating for Donald Trump,” http://www.vox.com/2016/8/4/12374000/trump-clinton-polls-today

The presidential race may have reached a turning point, as a new group of polls shows Hillary Clinton clobbering Donald Trump nationally and in swing states. A national Fox News poll released Wednesday evening shows Clinton beating Trump by 10 percentage points, 49 percent to 39 percent. Then, a McClatchy-Marist poll released Thursday shows Clinton ahead by a massive 15 points — real landslide territory and easily the best recent poll she's gotten, with her at 48 percent compared to Trump's 33 percent. In Pennsylvania, a state most observers believe is a must-win for Trump considering how the electoral math is shaping up, Franklin & Marshall has a new poll showing him trailing Clinton by 11 points — 49 percent to 38 percent. In Florida, which is even more of a must-win state for Trump, a Suffolk poll found Clinton ahead of Trump in a head-to-head matchup by 6 points.

### 2NC Uniqueness Wall

#### Clinton is winning nationally and in key battleground states

Nate Cohn, electoral analyst at the Upshot, 8-5-2016, “Why a Meaningful Shift in the Trump-Clinton Race May Be at Hand,” http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/upshot/why-a-meaningful-shift-in-the-trump-clinton-race-may-be-at-hand.html

Hillary Clinton has a large and perhaps growing lead in the nation and in many of the predominantly white battleground states where Donald Trump was thought to have his best shot, according to a wave of new surveys released in the last two days. Three national surveys — from Fox, NBC/WSJ and Marist/McClatchy — showed Mrs. Clinton ahead by big margins: 10, 9 and 15 percentage points. It’s the worst polling stretch for a presidential candidate at this stage since John McCain in mid-October of 2008.

#### Clinton is leading polling with key demographics

Carrie Dann, political analyst at NBC News, 8-4-2016, “NBC/WSJ Poll: Hillary Clinton Jumps to Nine Point Lead Over Donald Trump,” http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nbc-wsj-poll-clinton-jumps-nine-point-lead-over-trump-n623131

Hillary Clinton has jumped out to a nine-point lead over Donald Trump, a new NBC News/Wall Street Journal national poll shows, nearly doubling the five-point advantage she held over her Republican foe before the political conventions. In a head-to-head matchup, the Democratic ticket of Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine receives the support of 47 percent of registered voters, while the Republican ticket of Donald Trump and Mike Pence gets 38 percent, the survey shows. Last month, Clinton led Trump by a margin of 46 percent to 41 percent. In this latest poll, Clinton enjoys a significant advantage among women (51 percent to Trump's 35 percent), African Americans (91 percent to 1 percent), all non-white voters (69 percent to 17 percent), young voters (46 percent to 34 percent), and white voters with a college degree (47 percent to 40 percent).

#### Trump is underperforming recent GOP nominees – he’s on track to lose

Carrie Dann, political analyst at NBC News, 8-4-2016, “NBC/WSJ Poll: Hillary Clinton Jumps to Nine Point Lead Over Donald Trump,” http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nbc-wsj-poll-clinton-jumps-nine-point-lead-over-trump-n623131

A nine-point lead in August of a presidential election year represents a significant gap compared to the past two election cycles. In 2008, Barack Obama - who ultimately beat Republican John McCain by a 53 percent to 46 percent margin in the November election - did not show such a wide polling advantage over his Republican rival until late October, according to NBC/WSJ polls. In 2012, Obama's lead over Republican foe Mitt Romney in NBC/WSJ polls never reached nine points throughout the campaign.

### 2NC – AT: UQ Overwhelms Link

#### Clinton remains the favorite but small changes in voter support can flip the election for Trump

David Bernstein, Political Analyst at Politico, 5-27-2016, "How Hillary Loses," http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-hillary-clinton-campaign-loses-defeated-donald-trump-213924

The reassurance is that the recent polls probably don’t mean much. Trump’s current surge is likely driven by Republican voters coalescing around their nominee, and Clinton will almost certainly get a similar bump when Bernie Sanders lets go and Democratic voters return to the fold. Most pundits believe 2016 is still Clinton’s race to lose. Here’s the bad news: There is now a clear path for her to lose it. If you drill down enough, it’s clear there are at least four paths to a loss, and any one of them poses a real risk for a candidate likely to follow her usual careful, calculating playbook. The cold math of a potential Clinton defeat is not to be found in national polls, but in the Electoral College—and within each state’s unique demographics and culture. Trump won’t dramatically remake the political map, but he doesn’t need to. He just needs to squeeze a little more out of certain voters in certain states, while Clinton draws a little less. If Clinton pushes away some of her potential supporters; fails to energize others to vote; and fires up Trump’s base by pandering to her own—well, she just might be able to make the numbers work out for him. If he does pull off the election of the century, Trump’s path to 270 Electoral College votes will begin with 164 practically in the bank, from 21 solid-red states generally considered sure things for the Republican nominee. And here’s how Clinton could push more than enough additional states onto Trump’s side of the ledger—Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Iowa, Virginia, Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan—one mistake at a time.

### 2NC – AT: UQ Overwhelms Link – AT: Voters Locked In

#### Votes aren’t locked down – voter preferences are shaped early, but are not static

William Jennings, PhD, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton, 2015, “The Timeline of Elections: A Comparative Perspective,” presented at the 2015 Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Hollywood, Florida, and also at the University of Amsterdam, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, the University of Manchester, the University of Mannheim

Discussion and **Conclusion** Voter preferences evolve in a systematic way over the election timeline in a wide range of representative democracies. There is structure to preferences well in advance of elections, indeed, years before citizens actually vote. That is, very **early polls** **predict the vote**, at least to some extent. This largely reflects differences in the equilibrium support of parties and candidates. Polls do become increasingly informative over time, however, pointing to real evolution of preferences. That this pattern holds across countries is important and points towards 35 a general tendency in the formation of electoral preferences. But the pattern is not precisely the same in all countries. Political institutions structure the evolution of voters’ preferences.23 Government institutions are important. Preferences come into focus later in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones. A year out from Election Day, parliamentary elections are more predictable from the polls than are the outcomes of presidential races. This presumably reflects the greater uncertainties involved in the assessment of presidential candidates and also the time it takes for voters to directly factor in their dispositions toward the political parties (Erikson and Wlezien 2012). In parliamentary systems, by contrast, parties matter more early on. This is important because partisan dispositions, while not fixed, are more durable than those toward candidates. That preferences are in place much later in presidential systems thus comes as little surprise. That there is no real difference between legislative elections in presidential and parliamentary systems may surprise, however. It implies that parties do not matter consistently more to voters in the latter. Electoral institutions also are important. Preferences in legislative elections come into focus more quickly and completely in proportional systems. We find limited evidence of general differences across systems—that proportional representation per se is what matters. We find stronger evidence that the party-centricity of the systems matters most of all. Although closely related to proportionality, there is significant variation in party-centricity within both proportional and plurality systems, and this variation is of consequence for the formation of electoral preferences. The number of parties, meanwhile, appears to have little effect. We have only scratched the surface of the variation in context. To begin with, political institutions differ in ways that we have not considered. Perhaps more importantly, there are other differences in context that we have not even begun to explore. Some of the differences relate to countries themselves. For instance, following Converse (1969), there is reason to think that the age of democracy is important to the formation and evolution of preferences. Other differences relate not to political institutions or the countries themselves, but to characteristics of political parties. There are numerous possibilities here, most notable of which may be whether parties are in government or opposition, as is suggested by the literature on economic voting (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Duch and Stevenson 2008). Another is whether parties are catch-all or niche. The age and size of parties also could matter. Clearly, much research remains to be done, and our methodology can guide the way. That said, we have learned something about the general pattern relating preferences and the vote over the election timeline and the structuring influences of political institutions. We have shown that preferences are often in place **far in advance** of Election Day and that they evolve **slowly** over time. Indeed, the final outcome is fairly clear in the polls before the election campaign really begins. This is not to say that the campaign does not matter, as it does, particularly in 37 certain types of countries and elections where candidates are central. Even there, however, it is clear that the “long campaign” between elections matters most of all.

## Links

### 1NC Link – General

#### Soft-line policies on China alienate the public and become election-year fodder for Republicans – they’ll spin the plan at Democrats compromising on important American interests

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Senior Associate with the Center on Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, 8-25-2015, "China bashing: American campaign ritual or harbinger of tougher policy?," http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/25/China-bashing-American-campaign-ritual-or-harbinger-of-tougher-policy.aspx)

China-bashing in the 2016 presidential election has begun in earnest. In past campaigns, many of the attacks on China were forgotten as candidates dropped out of the race or were defeated. In 2012, for example, Mitt Romney pledged to declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. He never got the chance, of course, and Obama's policies were unaffected by Romney's campaign rhetoric. Sometimes, promises to 'get tough' with China during the campaign simply became irrelevant as presidents, once in power, confront the demands of real-world policy challenges. When George W Bush ran for president in 2000, he criticised his predecessor Bill Clinton for calling China a strategic partner, and instead said China should be viewed as a 'strategic competitor.' After becoming president, however, Bush dropped that label. When a Chinese jet collided with a US surveillance plane over the South China Sea, Bush worked hard to avert a US-China political crisis, and after the September 11 attacks, he welcomed Beijing's proposal to fight together against terrorism. This time may be different, however. China's repressive policies at home, combined with its transgressions in the South China Sea and massive cyber attacks on US companies and the Federal Government, make it an easy target. Moreover, criticism of China likely resonates with most Americans. Republican candidates will accuse Obama of being too soft on China and vow that if elected, they will stand up for American interests. Democrats, including Obama's former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, are more likely to find fault with than defend the current Administration's approach to managing US-China relations. Regardless of who is elected president in November 2016, he or she is likely to adopt a firmer approach to China on a litany of issues. So what are the candidates saying about China so far? GOP candidate Donald Trump condemned China's recent currency devaluation as 'the greatest theft in the history of the United States.' If elected president, Trump said, 'Oh would China be in trouble!' Carly Fiorina, another GOP contender, criticised China's cyber hacks on federal databases as an 'act of aggression' against America. She also warned against allowing the Chinese to control trade routes in the South China Sea and pledged she would be 'more aggressive in helping our allies...push back against new Chinese aggression.' In a lengthy critique of Obama Administration policies published in Foreign Affairs, GOP candidate Marco Rubio lambasted Obama's 'willingness to ignore human rights violations in the hope of appeasing the Chinese leadership.' He also accused China of pursuing 'increasingly aggressive regional expansionism.' Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has joined the fray in an effort to shield herself from the accusation that she was complicit in the implementation of a policy that accommodated China and failed to sufficiently stand up for American interests. Clinton acknowledges that as secretary of state she worked hard to build a better relationship with China and says she would continue to do so as president. But she also warns about the dangers posed by China's militarisation of the South China Sea and condemns China's 'stealing commercial secrets, blueprints from defense contractors' and 'huge amounts of government information' in its quest for an advantage over other nations. The presidential campaign is just starting to heat up. The torrent of China-bashing in the remaining 15 months before the general election is likely to have a profoundly negative effect on China's image in the US, which is already unfavourable. In a 2014 poll by the Pew Research Center, only 35% of Americans had a positive view of China, while 55% had a negative one. China's image in the US has tilted in a more negative direction in recent years – as recently as 2011 half of Americans gave China a positive rating. The negative public mood will likely align with harsher attitudes in Congress, reinforcing the proclivities of the next US president to adopt a tougher stance against Chinese trade policies, human rights violations, cyber intrusions, and assertiveness in the South China Sea. Despite a sincere desire for a positive bilateral relationship with the US, Xi Jinping is likely to prioritise the preservation of domestic stability, defence of sovereignty, and pursuit of the Chinese Dream.

### 2NC Link Wall – General

#### Republicans will spin increased engagement as soft on China

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Another factor that one cannot dodge when debating American foreign policy or US China relations in particular is political ideology. Dueck explains that electoral needs caused the Republican Party “by the time of the Korean War to become more hawkish than Democrats—a position they have never relinquished”, and concludes that “today as before, a hawkish American nationalism forms the center of gravity of the Republican Party, especially in its conservative base, when it comes to foreign policy issues” (Dueck, p.307). Focusing specifically on the China debate, Peter Heyes Gries (2014) argues in his book “The Politics of American Foreign Policy: how ideology divides liberals and conservative over foreign affairs” that “Conservatives desire a tougher China Policy than liberals do… because on average they maintain much more negative attitudes towards communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular” (n.p.). Meanwhile, when regarding the other political opposition, Gries infers that “the anti-China advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal warmth towards China within the Democratic Party” (n.p.). It becomes revealed that a clear divergence between general attitudes of Republican and Democrat voters when it comes to China, with the former preferring cooler relations. Therefore the rethink of the military bases is likely to be spun as soft on China, especially in conservative circles, and used to berate Democrats for caving to Chinese aggression.

#### The perception that Obama makes deals with America’s enemies uniquely benefits Trump – tough reputation

Jim Geraghty, contributor at the National Review, 10-6-2015, “Obama’s Weakness Fuels the Demand for Trump’s Strength,” http://www.nationalreview.com/article/425153/obamas-weakness-fuels-demand-trumps-strength-jim-geraghty

I never understood the appeal of Trump until I saw Kerry holding hands with Lavrov the day Putin started bombing secular rebels in Syria,” quipped former National Review news editor Dan Foster. One of the less obvious assets of Donald Trump’s campaign is the Obama administration’s flailing foreign policy. The president’s penchant for making abysmal deals with our enemies abroad and advertising his inability to affect the course of events gives Trump exactly the contrast he needs to sell his reputation as a tough negotiator.

#### Plan is spun as being weak on China – flips votes

Donald Gross, Adjunct Fellow of the Pacific Forum, Center on Strategic and International Studies, October 2012, “The China Fallacy”, http://www.donaldgross.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-China-Fallacy-Excerpts.pdf

U.S. politicians who attack Beijing for economic practices that lead to “shipping American jobs to China” also discourage policymakers and experts from highlighting the benefits of improved relations between the two countries. When these politicians exploit patriotic feelings and engage in demagogic “China bashing” to attract votes, they have a chilling effect on policy analysts. In this atmosphere, proposals that could significantly improve relations become vulnerable to political attacks as “appeasement,” “un-American” or “weak on China.” Conversely, highly questionable protectionist measures to help uncompetitive companies are seen as “tough” and “pro-American.” The upshot is that the acceptable bounds of the policy debate on China are far narrower than they ought or need to be.

### Link – Economic Engagement

#### Foreign aid spending alienates voters – GOP plays up fears of budget tradeoffs

Seth McLaughlin, staff writer at the Washington Diplomat, May 2011, “Key Foreign Policy Players Try to Master Capitol Hill,” <http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7829:key-foreign-policy-players-try-to-master-capitol-hill&catid=1473:may-2011&Itemid=471>

The Beltway battle over the federal budget was temporarily interrupted by the real-life fighting in Libya and natural catastrophe in Japan, but the spending debate roared back to life in mid-April, consuming lawmakers on Capitol Hill as they scrambled to avoid a government shutdown, which would have been the first since 1995. The game of chicken came down to the wire, but a shutdown was ultimately averted, although that was just round one of what's set to be a drawn-out tug of war over America's finances. Round two over the 2012 budget and round three, raising the country's debt ceiling — which if left unchecked, could prove even more economically catastrophic than a shutdown — promise to be even more epic. But it's not just politicos in Washington and anxious Americans who are following the partisan showdown. The city's diplomats have been intently watching the congressional sparring as well. After all, strengthening economic ties with the world's largest economy is among every diplomat's top priorities. Whether it's development assistance or trade and investment, the state of the U.S. government checkbook matters not just to Americans, but to the world. However, after a decade of tax cuts coupled with two wars, a housing boom and bust and an economic recession, America's bloated and battered checkbook needs rebalancing. Both Republicans and Democrats agree that with a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion and climbing — along with a national debt of about $14.2 trillion — federal spending must be curbed. But by how much, from where and how fast, especially in the midst of a still fragile recovery and sagging unemployment, will be the talk of the town for months to come. Immediately after the dust settled over the budget for the 2011 fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, both sides set their sights on the 2012 numbers that will also decide the amount of money and manpower the United States releases across the globe. Though the State Department and foreign operations budget represent a sliver of total spending, most peg it at about 1 percent of more than $3.5 trillion federal budget, money spent on diplomacy and development has become a convenient whipping post for voters and lawmakers searching for quick answers to the country's financial mess, but also wary of the fallout from reforming the real drivers of federal spending — popular entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, and spending on defense (also see "America's Foreign Affairs Budget Faces Congressional Chopping Block" in the March 2011 issue of The Washington Diplomat). Even if politicians are more willing to broach so-called third rail subjects like Medicare and Medicaid, the international affairs budget still faces the threat of significant cuts by lawmakers determined to show fiscal restraint across the board. A congressman would be hard pressed to take away grandmother's Medicare and justify giving more assistance to rebel fighters in Libya, for instance, even if the two cases aren't exactly correlated. Explaining fiscal nuance is not an easy sell. Politically speaking, it's simply easier for lawmakers to cut foreign aid than to go after programs that have a more noticeable effect on their constituents back in their home districts. Public misperceptions also drive the political expediency. Americans think that 25 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign assistance, according to a recent poll by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes. The real amount? The total international affairs budget comes in at under 1.5 percent. But you can be sure both sides will be clawing over every scrap of that 1.5 percent. As it stands, the fiscal 2011 budget allocated $48.3 billion for State and foreign operations — an $8.4 billion reduction from the president's requested amount though it was on par with 2010 levels. As part of the $38 billion of cuts in the 2011 budget, about $500 million was carved out of the State Department's budget compared to last year, while U.S. payments to the United Nations will be decreased by $377 million. Pay for Foreign Service officers was also frozen, and USAID operating expenses were trimmed by $39 million. But the GOP is eyeing far bigger cuts in foreign aid for 2012. President Obama has sounded the starting gun on next year's spending battle by rolling out a $3.7 trillion request that included $47 billion for the State Department and USAID — roughly a 1 percent increase compared to 2010 levels. Combined with additional diplomacy and development efforts, including the Peace Corps and the Millennium Challenge Corp., the president is requesting $50.9 billion in foreign assistance. That's $3.7 billion less than what was requested in fiscal 2011. Obama is also requesting $8.7 billion in supplemental funding for the State Department and USAID in fiscal 2012 as they can take on additional responsibilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In general, most (though not all) Republicans have been highly critical of any increase to the international affairs budget in a time of fiscal austerity, arguing that America needs to get its own economic house in order before sending money abroad. Some conservatives also want better vetting of foreign aid programs to make certain they indeed strengthen national security and that federal money isn't being funneled into countries with poor records of democracy and human rights. Others though have suggested the budget line should be zeroed out altogether, or severely gutted.

### Link – North Korea

#### The public cares about North Korea – the plan will be spun as ‘soft’ on the DPRK – galvanizes the right wing

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Meanwhile, an editorial in the NYT objected to the rejectionist attitude displayed in the Wall Street Journal, arguing, “It’s hard to understand what America would lose by testing the North’s intentions once again, especially as China may be ready to be a more responsible partner in finding a solution” (The Editorial Board, 2015, n.p.). These varying views and calls to action show that political ideology is a factor in Americans stances towards the DPRK, and portrays that Gries’s assertion is visible in media debates in the most recent of times. From the above analysis regarding Congressional actions, think-tank proposals, and media opinions in the US toward the DPRK, it is clear that it is a topic of controversy in US domestic politics. The analysis leads to the conclusion that Republican policy makers are likely to attack the administration, framing the rethink as not harsh enough on the DPRK.

### Link – Taiwan / Grand Bargain

#### Engaging China over Taiwan is electoral suicide – sparks huge opposition from strong lobbies

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Sutter evaluates that unlike the executive branch, “the US Congress is much more open to and dependent on domestic American constituencies” (Shambaugh, p.103). Therefore, a more consistent fight against the reforms is likely to occur in both chambers of the legislative branch. Congress’ dependence on American constituencies causes it to be much more responsive to the interests of certain lobbying groups and public opinion. For example, the ‘pro-Taiwan’ lobby always has a stake in policy regarding US-China relations for fairly obvious reasons; likewise, some interest groups will attempt to influence policy in regards to topics that are not necessarily visibly correlated to their issue of concern. Colin Dueck (2010) explains this phenomena in his book Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II by arguing that “electoral coalitions in the United States come together across a broad range of issues, many of which have nothing to do with international relations at all;” this analysis brings to light how the reforms could draw criticisms from a coalition of interest groups, some not directly related to security (p.301). As this section alluded to earlier, the most likely source of opposition to reform will come from the Taiwan lobby. Sutter, as well as many other experts, have claimed that Taiwan is “the most sensitive and complex issue regarding US-China relations”, and while Taiwan manages to maintain support in the US due to Taiwan-interest lobby members of Congress, this complicates US policy towards the ROC (Sutter, p.138). In his Foreign Affairs article “Diplomacy Ink: the influence of lobbies on US foreign policy,” John Newhouse (2009) claims that “for years, the lobby that promoted Taiwanese interests, known simply as the China lobby, was the superpower of lobbies representing foreign causes in the United States” (p.90). The lobby, with its strong hold on Congress, has previously managed to complicate the US’ pursuit of improved relations with the PRC. For example, the State Department legal adviser during Carter’s administration, when commentating on the Taiwan Relations Act, said, “We were not as Taiwan-oriented as the Senate Foreign Relations committee” attributing that to “[a] lot of provisions that were cranked into the bill once it got there were… Taiwan-favoring positions.” (Tucker, 2011, p.119). In more recent times, with the aid of the Taiwan lobby, “many in Congress and among the Republican presidential aspirants criticized President Obama’s decision not to sell F-16 Fighters despite strong requests from Taiwan’s president” (Tucker, 2011, p.252). In its pursuit of cooler measures towards the PRC, the Taiwan lobby could find an ally in labor unions in the US. Labor unions that fight for workers’ rights in the US see the ‘world factory’—the PRC—as an adversary to their cause. Sutter notes this can be seen in “think tanks associated with organized labor in the United States [that] have tended to call for tougher policies against perceived unfair Chinese trade and economic policies” (Shambaugh, p.122). A security deal that is set to improve US-China relations will be seen as a source of improvement in trade between the two states. Although they are not natural stakeholders on a debate about national security, labor unions are likely to lobby Congress against reforms alongside the Taiwan lobby.

### Link – AT: Big Business Shields Clinton

#### Soft-line China policies put Democrats on the defensive – big business hates engagement with China

Demetri Sevastopulo, writer at the Financial Times, and Shawn Donnan, writer at the Financial Times, 8-26-2015, "Republicans line up for potshots at China," http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ced1bce8-4baa-11e5-a089-1a3e2cd1819b.html#axzz49gbNsW5i

China has long served as a bogeyman in US presidential elections. Whether Bill Clinton referring to the “butchers of Beijing” in reference to the Tiananmen Square massacre, George W Bush attacking Mr Clinton for being soft on China or Mr Obama touting the need for alliances to challenge Beijing, US presidential contenders have long lambasted China while vowing to take a tougher stance than the White House incumbent if elected president. But some analysts say China is sparking a different degree of anger now for several reasons: its growth as an economic power, its assertive actions in the South China Sea, rampant cyber attacks, theft of intellectual property rights and the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business. Frank Jannuzi, president of the Mansfield Foundation, which promotes US-Asia relations, said there had been a bipartisan consensus since Richard Nixon went to China in 1972 that the US would profit by engaging the country. But he said the consensus had almost unravelled because companies had become “increasingly disenchanted” with China.

#### Big business soured on China – won’t counter anti-engagement rhetoric

Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times, 7-12-2010, “American Business Sours on China,” <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecad46e0-8de3-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html#axzz4GOeNxOKy>

Were it not for the power of big business, the relationship between the US and China might have gone sour years ago. There are forces on both sides of the Pacific – Chinese nationalists, American trade unionists, the military establishments of both countries – that would be happy with a more adversarial relationship. For the past generation it has been US multinationals that have made the counter-argument – that a stronger and more prosperous China could be good for America. So it is ominous, not just for business but for international politics, that corporate America is showing increasing signs of disillusionment with China. In recent months, three of the most celebrated and powerful companies in the US have clashed with the Chinese government. Google, Goldman Sachs and General Electric are symbols of American prowess in technology, finance and industry. Google’s high-profile dispute over censorship came within an ace of forcing the company out of China. Even after last week’s face-saving compromise, the company’s future in China remains highly uncertain. Last month, the backlash against Goldman Sachs reached China, as the banking group found itself accused in the official media of “going around the Chinese market slurping gold and sucking silver”, and of making excessive profits. Complaints from Jeff Immelt, GE’s chief executive – even though they were later qualified – are particularly telling because Mr Immelt has made a substantial personal commitment to the Chinese market. Last year, I visited GE’s gleaming new research facility in Shanghai. Under Jack Welch, Mr Immelt’s predecessor, the company had made a modest investment in China-based research. Mr Immelt has stepped it up considerably. GE now employs more than 2,000 Chinese engineers working on cutting-edge environmental and healthcare technology, much of it designed for the local market. Last year GE made more than $6bn in sales in China. Yet these are relatively modest figures for one of America’s most successful multinationals. GE’s overall revenues worldwide last year were $157bn and the company had been hoping to make $10bn a year in China by now. At a private dinner in Italy last month, Mr Immelt gave voice to his frustrations about the way the Chinese government is treating foreign companies, saying: “I’m not sure that in the end they want any of us to win or any of us to be successful.” These remarks challenge the way in which both American and Chinese political leaders have talked about the relationship between their two nations. On a visit to a Boeing factory in the US a couple of years ago, Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, lauded a big Chinese order as an example of “win-win” logic. Successive US presidents, including Barack Obama, have said the US welcomes the rise of China because, in a globalised world, both sides gain from burgeoning business ties. In some ways, it is a strange time for multinationals to go sour on China. For many, the Chinese market is finally beginning to deliver on its long-anticipated promise. American fast food companies such as KFC and McDonald’s are doing very well. China is now the world’s largest market for vehicles. And yet when Google, Goldman Sachs and GE all run into difficulties simultaneously, it seems clear that a bigger trend is at work. Privately, senior US officials have been worrying for some time that Chinese trade and economic policy is taking a more nationalist direction that is penalising US companies. They worry that, after 30 years of strong economic growth, China believes it can now afford to take a less welcoming attitude to foreign investment, and instead concentrate on promoting national champions. A souring in the relationship between American business and China would come at a particularly bad time in relations between the two countries. The Great Recession has begun to undermine the US’s acceptance of globalisation. With US unemployment still uncomfortably close to 10 per cent and the country’s power to shape the world challenged by rising budget deficits and military setbacks, American politicians and academics are increasingly questioning if the US should welcome the rise of China. Anti-Chinese sentiment is reflected in the push in Congress to impose trade sanctions on the country’s goods, in response to China’s refusal to let its currency rise substantially against the dollar. In the past, American business has acted as the single biggest constraint on an anti-Chinese backlash in the US. If companies such as GE, Google and Goldman Sachs qualify their support for China or refuse to speak up, the protectionist bandwagon will gather speed.

### Link – AT: Obama Shields Clinton

#### Any change in China policy exposes Clinton to political risks

Xiaoqing Rong, writer at the Global Times, 4-16-2015, "Clinton may find it best to be quiet on China," http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/917207.shtml

China has become a fixed topic in US elections at state and federal level in recent years. Most of the sound bites are negative. And in many elections, candidates blame each other for being too soft on China. A Washington Post editorial during the 2012 presidential election explained the reason wittily: "It's an iron law of US politics: You can't go wrong bashing China. Polls show the public believes that the US is losing jobs due to unfair economic competition from abroad, especially from China. And so, every four years, presidential candidates fall all over themselves promising to get tough on imports." Sometimes the Sinophobia can be stretched to an insane level. In 2013, when the now Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell was campaigning for re-election in Kentucky, his wife Elaine Chao, the Taiwan-born former secretary of labor in George W. Bush's administration, was attacked by supporters of his rival for being a "Chinese wife" who prompted her husband to "create jobs for China." Clinton doesn't want to be seen as "soft" on China. In her 2014 memoir Hard Choices, she called on other Asian countries to form an alliance so they could collectively stand up to China. She also criticized China's censorship. She mentioned a confrontation with a Chinese leader about Tibet. And she devoted a whole chapter to how the Americans helped Chen Guangcheng, the blind activist who went to the US Embassy in Beijing and then was allowed to leave China for asylum in the US. The attacks have continued. Clinton recently used her Twitter account to criticize China for detaining five feminist activists. But even this "tough on China" tone doesn't seem to have convinced her political opponents or even some of the people on her side. The alliance among smaller Asian countries she hoped to see is at best weak. And now it could be further dissolved with the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The "James Bond-style activity" of Chen's American saviors described in her book doesn't fit entirely with Chen's own account in his newly published autobiography in which he blamed the US for not fulfilling its promises to him. And the thorniest issue Clinton faces might be money. According to joint research of the Washington Examiner and watchdog Judicial Watch, during Clinton's tenure as secretary of state, her husband, former president Bill Clinton, made $48 million from foreign countries for giving 215 speeches, including $1.7 million for giving four speeches in China or to Chinese-sponsored entities in the US. In addition, entities that have close ties to China donated between $750,000 to $1.75 million and the Clinton Foundation, the family's charitable organization. Clinton resigned from the board of the family foundation right after Sunday's announcement to avoid conflicts of interest. Still, her opponents will not easily let go of the opportunity to question her ethics. What may also be brought up in the process is Clinton's once close relationship to Chinese-American fundraiser Norman Hsu whose 2007 arrest for illegal fundraising prompted her to return $850,000 in campaign donations he helped to raise. Hsu was later indicted for fundraising fraud. In 1996, the Democratic National Committee also returned $360,000 in donations raised by questionable Taiwan-born fundraiser Johnny Chung for Bill Clinton's reelection campaign. Chung said he got some money from the mainland, which denied the connection. Clinton's campaign will reportedly cost $2.5 billion. The figure has already raised many eyebrows. There is no doubt Clinton has the ability to raise whatever she needs without crossing the line. But the astronomical spending will likely bring up all the money-related questions and memories and mean that Clinton has an incentive to keep her distance from China. Maybe. Clinton should keep in mind a warning from Henry Paulson. When asked at an event at the Asian Society on Monday what he'd like to hear the presidential candidates say about China, the former US treasury secretary quipped: "I'd like them to say as little as possible."

### AT: Link Turns – General – Negative Voter Theory

#### Negative reaction to the plan fuels turnout against Clinton – popular support for the plan gets swamped by backlash

Brian Harpuder, PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Ohio State University, 2003, “Electoral Behavior in U.S. Senate Elections, A Simultaneous Choice Model,” http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Harpuder%20Brian%20Eric.pdf?osu1069347453

With respect to evaluations of the economy and personal finances the research clearly shows support for the angry voter hypothesis. Citizens who are dissatisfied with the state of the national economy, angry voters, are more likely to turnout than those who are satisfied. Their dissatisfaction is expressed toward incumbents because they become more likely to vote for the challenging party. Personal financial evaluations are also shown to have a limited impact on electoral behavior.

### AT: Link Turns – General – Spin

#### No risk of a link turn – negativity bias means China engagement will always be spun negatively

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies Task Force, Winter 2015, “Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia,” <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Finally, another constraint regarding the PRC is general American public opinion towards the East Asian country. Sutter explains that “American Public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but it is not in a position, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, to prompt serious negative change in American China policy”( Shambaugh, p.117). While public opinion in the US regarding the PRC has soften since the early 1990’s, the general distaste for Chinese actions lead politicians to pursue populist rhetoric at times in order to appease public sentiment. Sutter points that this can be seen in the media that “reflected trends in American public opinion in demonstrating a continuing tendency to highlight the negative implication of Chinese developments for American interests and values” (Shambaugh, p.118). While American public opinion, as Sutter points out, is not a position to strongly affect American actions towards the PRC, it could provide further motivation for politicians to use harsh rhetoric against the PRC.

### 2NC – Link Turns the Aff – Relations Advs

#### The link turns the aff – electoral backlash causes misunderstandings that deck bilateral cooperation

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 8-31-2015, "China: The Mishandled Issue in the U.S. Presidential Election Campaign," http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-mishandled-issue-us-presidential-election-campaign

What we are witnessing is a repetition of the usual quadrennial spectacle regarding relations with China. In presidential campaign after presidential campaign, candidates (especially those representing the party not controlling the White House) either neglect the issue or play the role of demagogue. In the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan criticized Jimmy Carter’s administration for “abandoning” Taiwan and establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Twelve years later, candidates Bill Clinton and Ross Perot vied with each other to accuse President George H. W. Bush of being too soft on China. Repeatedly citing the Tiananmen Square bloodshed, Clinton referred to Chinese leaders as “the butchers of Beijing.” During the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush viewed China as a worrisome “strategic competitor,” rather than an economic partner of the United States. The good news is that once in office the new presidents continued the responsible, pragmatic policies toward China first developed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The inflammatory campaign rhetoric was quickly discarded. That will likely be the case this time as well. The bilateral economic relationship is simply too valuable to jeopardize by imprudent White House actions. But campaign posturing, even if not meant seriously, creates needless suspicions and resentment in U.S.-China relations. Presidential candidates need to remember that preserving a cordial relationship with China must be a top U.S. foreign policy priority. Bilateral cooperation enables China and the United States to foster global strategic stability and economic prosperity. Conversely, a breakdown of the relationship would lead to unpleasant and possibly catastrophic global consequences. Policy toward China is far too important for candidates either to ignore or demagogue. Unfortunately, the current crop of presidential aspirants seems determined to do one or the other.

## Internals

### 1NC FoPo Key

#### The plan creates clear contrast between the parties on foreign policy – Clinton gets tied to Obama and the plan – swings the election

John Amble, former U.S. Army intelligence officer and PhD candidate at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London, 1-28-2016, “We Still Don’t Know if Foreign Policy Matters in the Presidential Election,” <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/we-still-dont-know-if-foreign-policy-matters-in-the-presidential-election/>

So wait, is this a foreign policy election or not? Good question, one that Elizabeth Saunders sought to answer this week in The Washington Post. One reason voters sometimes don’t support candidates based on foreign policy issues, even when they profess to be concerned with them, is because the divides between candidates’ positions can be less stark than on issues like, say, taxes and social welfare policy: “Consider Vietnam and the 1968 election … [when] most individuals’ votes were not based on Vietnam — because there was little difference between the public positions taken by Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. … That’s potentially true in 2016 as well. The most likely Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, has taken more hawkish foreign policy positions than many recent Democratic candidates, presumably bringing her positions closer to the more traditionally hawkish Republican side.” Democratic candidates avoiding foreign policy While the GOP field is happy to talk about national security and foreign policy issues, the Democrats (as we’ve noted before) are simply not interested. For Buzzfeed, Zack Beauchamp talked to Democratic foreign policy wonks who aren’t happy about that. Some of the highlights: Heather Hurlburt, New America Foundation: “The discussion of national security in the presidential debate is terrible. You sit around and say, ‘If only they would talk more about our issues in the context of the presidential campaign,’ and then they do. Just be careful what you wish for.” Matt Duss, Foundation for Middle East Peace: “Whenever there’s a crisis, Democratic leaders scramble to make statements about what we should do. But there’s a failure to constantly articulate a progressive vision for foreign policy.” Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Hillary is probably a little more interventionist than the Democratic base would like. Bernie Sanders is closer to where the Democratic base is … [but] that’s not the message he wants his campaign to be about. Although Clinton is kind of an exception To be fair, in this week’s Democratic town hall hosted by CNN, Clinton did spend a lot of time tackling foreign policy issues, especially compared to her two opponents. She addressed the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Islamic State, radicalization, and Benghazi. But as Frida Ghitis writes for CNN, “there was, however, a downside for Clinton. … The once seemingly inevitable Democratic nominee opted to tie herself ever more closely to President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Indeed, come the general election, Clinton’s full-throated defense of the controversial Iran deal and other foreign policy choices will make it that much harder to distance herself from the broader historic catastrophe of the unraveling of the Middle East that has unfolded during Obama’s watch.”

### 2NC FoPo Key

#### GOP candidates will rhetorically weaponize the plan – flips the election

Peter Harris, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, 1-26-2016, "President Obama’s Partisan Foreign Policy," <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/president-obamas-partisan-foreign-policy-15019?page=show>

The political scientist V.O. Key once wrote that “latent” public opinion is the only type of public opinion that government officials truly care about. Politicians do not cater to audiences in the here and now, he suggested, but rather are focused on engineering positive endorsements of their policies among people in the future. Indeed, leaders are quite willing to tolerate poor approval ratings because there is always a hope—an expectation, even—that posterity will bring absolution. Given his standing in the polls, President Barack Obama can probably be counted among those politicians who have put their faith in vindication by future generations. But Obama will have to wait a long time before anything close to a unanimous verdict on his legacy can emerge—let alone a positive one. This is especially true in the realm of foreign affairs, where Obama’s agenda has been thoroughly partisan and divisive—pleasing to Democrats but anathema to Republicans. When it comes to Obama’s record on foreign policy, Republicans smell blood. Indeed, it has been a staple for the party’s presidential hopefuls to accuse Obama of weakness on national security, with his failure to “defeat” the Islamic State, the resurgence of Russia as a bona fide power on the world stage, the nuclear deal with Iran—along with the attendant worsening of relations with Israel—and the looming rise of China being among the most common lines of attack. Earlier this month, the Republican presidential debate in South Carolina offered a window into how the party is using foreign policy to sully Obama and the Democrats. Riled up over the seizure of U.S. sailors by Iran two days prior, the assembled GOP contenders fell over themselves to castigate the president for allowing the country and members of its armed forces to be humiliated by a sworn adversary. Ted Cruz led the charge. “I give you my word,” he declared, “[that] if I am elected president, no serviceman or servicewoman will be forced to be on their knees in any nation that captures our fighting men and women. We’ll field the full force and fury of the United States of America.” The detainees had already been released by the time this grandstanding took place. And the truth is that the sailors had only been held by Iran’s forces because they had wrongly strayed into Iranian waters. More sober critics of President Obama were probably correct to avoid politicizing the issue; Nikki Haley, for example, wisely declined to invoke the crisis in her response to the president’s State of the Union. Yet the overreaction of the GOP’s presidential candidates showed just how eager they are during this electoral cycle to weaponize the perception that Obama is weak on national security. What mattered to them were not the facts—that this was, in sum, a very minor encounter and certainly not a military crisis—but rather the political potential to make foreign policy a winning issue for the Republican Party come November.

#### Foreign policy is a key 2016 issue

Erin McPike, political reporter at the Huffington Post, 6-21-2015, “Democrats Are Ceding Foreign Policy Too Early in the 2016 Election”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-mcpike/democrats-are-ceding-fore_b_7632524.html> ,06/21/2015 4:53 pm EDT, N.G.)

There's a decent chance the 2016 presidential election will be about national security. If that's the case, recent spin by Democratic pundits may undercut former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's campaign before it has much of a chance to establish itself. "I think foreign policy is a Republican base issue, which is why you see Republicans coming out of the gate talking about it," Democratic strategist Stephanie Cutter said on NBC's Meet the Press on June 14. Challenged on that, she said, "It's a Republican establishment issue, and it always has been." Tell that to President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry, former Maine Democratic Sen. George Mitchell, the Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all the voters who opposed the Iraq war, all the veterans who support Democrats, the organization known as VoteVets.org, etc. From the rise of ISIS, to Russian President Vladimir Putin's chest-thumping, to Israel's struggles with the Palestinians, to the nuclear negotiations with Iran, to cybersecurity, trade, China's rise and tensions with North Korea, foreign policy has become all-consuming for the executive branch and will take up a huge chunk of the 45th president's time and energy.

#### GOP will use foreign policy to attack Clinton by politicizing the plan – she’s electorally vulnerable

Peter Harris, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, 1-26-2016, "President Obama’s Partisan Foreign Policy," <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/president-obamas-partisan-foreign-policy-15019?page=show>

It is clear, then, that the Obama foreign policy has given groups within the Democratic coalition plenty to be happy about: diplomatic solutions that have reduced reliance on militarism, the promise of improved relations with some longstanding adversaries and achievements in the realms of climate, human rights and trade. And indeed, Democrats are much more likely to rate Obama favorably as a world leader. The cost of these achievements has been to reject the militarist and macho brand of foreign policy that plays well with hawkish voters, the result being that Obama has little chance of being remembered as a strong commander-in-chief. He will have to live with his detractors’ attempts to blame him for turmoil in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere; his legacy will long be tarnished by accusations of weakness, appeasement and misplaced priorities. In his new book, The Obama Doctrine, Colin Dueck notes that President Obama achieved a very rare thing during the 2012 presidential election by turning foreign policy into a “winning issue” for the Democrats. An aggressive foreign policy of targeting terrorists that culminated in the death of bin Laden, a new start with some of America’s former adversaries and a seemingly imminent end to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—all of these things made it hard for Mitt Romney to land punches on the sitting president when it came to foreign affairs. But this was a fleeting moment. Just four years later, foreign policy is back to being a highly politicized and utterly partisan issue. Worse still for Obama and his co-partisans, foreign policy an issue area that the Democrats are decidedly vulnerable over, especially given sustained Republican attacks on Hillary Clinton’s record as Secretary of State. And so while Obama (like his predecessor before him) might well view posterity as some sort of coconspirator—a source of ultimate validation and vindication for foreign policies not appreciated in their time—his would-be successors in the Democratic Party can enjoy no such luxury. Future public opinion is the least of their worries.

### 2NC FoPo Key – China Key

#### China is a key foreign policy issue for Trump – he’ll harness anti-China anger to beat Clinton

Richard McGregor, Fellow at the Kissinger Center on China and the United States at the Wilson Center, 9-8-2015, “Hawks Gain Upper Hand in US Policy on China,” <http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2015/09/hawks-gain-upper-hand-in-us-policy-on-china/>

Donald Trump has made an art form of baiting China, even as he passes himself off on the side as somewhat of a scholar on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Trump suggested the state diner for Xi be replaced with Big Macs. Wisconsin governor Scott Walker went further, and called for Xi’s visit to be cancelled altogether. They had nothing on Marco Rubio, the Florida senator who has taken up the mantle of the party’s leading hawk. Accusing Mr Obama of “appeasement”, Mr Rubio said if China pressed “illegitimate territorial claims…I will not hesitate to take action.” The rush among Republican candidates to outflank Mrs Clinton, let alone the White House, and pile onto China, though, is telling. China has often threatened to be a major issue in presidential elections, only to fade away as a vote changer by the time ballots are cast. The candidates, however, trying to appeal to a sagging American middle class which sees China as the villain, clearly sense that this time may be different.

#### China fears are key to Trump’s popularity – plan hands Trump attack material on a silver platter

Ethan Epstein, Associate Editor at the Weekly Standard, 3-8-2016, “America's China Syndrome Helps Explain Trump's Popularity,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/americas-china-syndrome-helps-explain-trumps-popularity/article/2001455

America's China Syndrome Helps Explain Trump's Popularity Half of Americans view China as the world's leading economic power. China may still lag far behind the United States in total gross domestic product, but that's not how most Americans see it. According to a new Gallup survey, fully 50 percent of Americans view China as the world's leading economic power; only 37 percent of respondents think of the United States as number one. Perhaps that's why Republican presidential frontrunner Donald Trump has made such an issue of China in his presidential campaign, and why economically beleaguered Americans are evidently responding to it. Indeed, Trump's pledge to fight Chinese trade abuses is arguably a more prominent feature of his campaign than his well-covered anti-illegal immigration stance is. And it's also a long-standing position. While Trump is something of a johnny-come-lately to immigration hawkishness, he has been railing against trade deals with China for years.

#### The public is extremely responsive to Trump’s China bashing – activates key sectors of the electorate

Julia Jacobs, contributor to US News and World Report, 1-26-2016, “Will Trump's Tough Talk on China Soften?” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-01-26/will-trumps-tough-talk-on-china-soften

Will Trump's Tough Talk on China Soften? Plenty of past presidential candidates have taken China to task in stump speeches. To Donald Trump, China is one mammoth obstacle to an American winning streak. And as the voting in Iowa and New Hampshire edges closer, Trump has raised the volume of his rant. "China is ripping us on trade. They're devaluing their currency and they're killing our companies." Trump said at the Republican debate Jan. 14. "I love the Chinese people but they laugh themselves, they can't believe how stupid the American leadership is." This preoccupation with China isn't new for Trump. In his campaign announcement in June, he said the word "China" 23 times — more than twice as much as he referenced the United States, accusing the Communist power of "devaluing their currency to a level that you wouldn't believe" and making it "impossible for our companies to compete, impossible." Xiaodang Fang, a 28-year-old Georgetown University PhD student who left Shanghai in 2010 to study American politics, isn't surprised by the tenor of the GOP campaign. He said China is often used in presidential contests as a "scapegoat" for the decline of the U.S. manufacturing industry. Liberty University President Jerry Falwell, Jr. introduces Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump with a sports jersey after he delivered the convocation in the Vines Center at the university on Jan.18, 2016, in Lynchburg, Va. RELATED Liberty University's Jerry Falwell Jr. Endorses Trump Fang said candidates tend to air their grievances about China during the campaign, but once they take the oath of office, they realize the economic advantage of doing business with his home country — something he said entrepreneurs like Trump are well aware of. "It's a campaign speech. It helps increase voter choice, but it's not necessarily true," Fang said in a phone interview. He is scheduled to finish his PhD program on American government this year. "Most candidates will take a tough stance on China, but once the presidential elections end they will be soft." Like Trump, former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney during his 2012 White House bid promised to increase U.S. competition with China and designate the country as a currency manipulator. As a presidential candidate in 1980, Ronald Reagan also took a tough stance on China by proposing to restore official relations with Taiwan, but then abandoned the idea after he took office. And in his 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton coined the term "butchers of Beijing" in reference to the China's human rights record, then as president supported the country's entry into the World Trade Organization. But Trump's characterization of China as the country to beat appeals to voters with a "nationalistic streak," said Adrian Gray, a Republican strategist who previously worked with the George W. Bush administration. "His electorate is mostly defined by people who haven't really caught up to some of the larger macro trends that are going on in America," he said, referring to globalization and technological innovation. "I think they're hoping for the world that was — and not preparing for the world that's coming." [DECISION 2016: U.S. News Covers the Race to the White House] While announcing his presidential run, Trump lamented the U.S.'s trillion-dollar debt to China, expounded on their allegedly unfair trade tactics, and even suggested that the country's military buildup was of greater concern than the Islamic State. Trump presented himself as the best candidate to take on what he views as a growing hegemon. "Our country is in serious trouble," Trump said. "When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let's say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time." The New York real estate mogul trumpeted similar rhetoric about Japan in the 1980s, but China's economic rise in the 21st century has altered the conversation, said Gray, who worked on both Bush-Cheney campaigns. Now, China's plummeting stock market has shifted the conversation on the GOP stage. Republican presidential candidate Sen. Marco Rubio told Fox News earlier this month that China's stock market woes are a reflection of a mismanagement of the country's overall economy. Yet Trump has stuck to his decades-old argument that the U.S. needs to even the playing field with China on trade, defending his proposal to impose a tariff on Chinese exports in the most recent Republican debate. Trump's claim about Chinese devaluing currency by selling it in foreign exchange markets to keep the price of their goods low had carried some weight in previous Republican contests, Gray said. However, attempts to contain China could have Cold War implications, said Philippe Le Corre, a visiting fellow at Brookings and a Chinese foreign policy expert. Anti-Chinese policies will only cause the country's investments in the U.S. to dry up and migrate to other parts of the world, Le Corre said. "American multinationals are the ones who created China," he said. "If you start being anti-Chinese, that will backfire." Trump may not have the power to reverse global trends as his oratory suggests, Gray said, but voters are paying attention. "There are a lot of people who that messages resonates with," the Republican strategist said.

### 2NC FoPo Key – AT: Economy

#### Foreign policy is more important to voters than the economy – boosts the GOP – polls prove

Josh Kraushaar, politics editor at the National Journal, and Alex Roarty, senior political reporter for Roll Call, 4-14-2015, “GOP Poll: Foreign Policy, Not Economy, Voters' Top Concern,” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/gop-poll-foreign-policy-not-economy-voters-top-concern/435663/

A GOP poll is reinforcing Republican strategists' conviction that foreign policy will be a major issue in 2016—one the party believes it can wield to its advantage against Democratic congressional candidates and Hillary Clinton. The internal survey, conducted by the GOP firm OnMessage, found that security issues ranked first on a list of top priorities for voters, ahead of economic growth, fiscal responsibility, and moral issues, among others. A 22 percent plurality of all respondents ranked it as the top issue, compared with 13 percent who listed economic growth as their top concern. (14 percent listed "fiscal responsibility" at the head of their list.)

### 2NC Issues Key – General

#### Policy is key – structural factors can’t explain outcomes – best polisci

John Sides, Associate Professor of Political Science at George Washington University, 6-13-2013, “What If a Party Re-branded Itself, and Americans Never Noticed?” http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/13/what-if-a-party-re-branded-itself-and-americans-never-noticed/

Second, structural conditions don’t explain everything, of course. A simple economic measure—like changes in gross domestic product over the first half of the election year—explains about 40% of the variation in post-WWII presidential election outcomes. (Nate Silver has more on this.) Moreover, there is evidence that voters punish incumbents for policies they disagree with. House members who are out-of-step with their constituents are more likely to lose (see here or here). House incumbents can be punished for controversial roll call votes—as were Democrats for their support of Obamacare, according to research by me and others. For members of Congress, as Ryan Enos noted in response to Sargent, all of these effects will be more important for in swing districts. Presidential candidates who are ideologically further from the center also appear to pay a penalty (see Table 2 of John Zaller’s article and also Silver). So I would never suggest that ideology or policy is irrelevant to elections.

### Issues Key – AT: Demographics

#### Policies are more important than demographics

Ruy Teixeira, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation and Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, 4-5-2013, “Is the Obama Majority Here to Stay?” http://thinkprogress.org/election/2013/04/05/1826221/obama-majority/?mobile=nc

Political reality is far more complicated than suggested by the neat orderly progression of classic realignment theory, political scientists argue. Nothing is inevitable in American politics; everything is contingent. There are no automatic majorities and certainly no permanent majorities. I am open to all this. Democrats will certainly not win every election for decades, no matter how big their demographic advantages. Decisions made by parties and the consequences of those decisions (e.g., for economic growth and distribution) certainly will be central to the ability of any party to win elections in a sustained fashion.

### Issues Key – AT: Economy

#### Other issues matter in addition to the economy

Rachel Sylvester, a weekly columnist and political interviewer for The Times, 7-8-2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/rachel\_sylvester/article4289607.ece

It is the biggest cliché in politics that “it's the economy, stupid” that determines the result of elections. It's also the biggest fallacy. Of course voters are cross about the rising price of food and fuel, but it is the sense of chaos in the world around them that really eats into their souls. People know that the economy is like the weather, something that is, at least to some extent, beyond the Government's control. What they really want from politicians is a sense of optimism about creating a different, more orderly, society. During the recent London mayoral elections the word used most frequently by focus group members was “grim”. This covered everything from parking tickets to graffiti, but it was the violence and disorder on the streets that worried them most. It is not just in the capital that people fear for themselves and - more intensely - for their children.

### Issues Key – AT: Ideology

#### Ideology doesn’t shape elections

John Sides, Associate Professor of Political Science at George Washington University, 6-13-2013, “What If a Party Re-branded Itself, and Americans Never Noticed?” http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/13/what-if-a-party-re-branded-itself-and-americans-never-noticed/

Third, despite this evidence, I still think people overestimate the role that ideology plays in elections. That was one of the points of my earlier Wonkblog post on the GOP’s “re-boot.” I think this point got elided because that post was largely read in the context of the “emerging Democratic majority” thesis—see Eric Schickler, Jon Chait, and Nate Cohn—which is somewhat separate. In that post, I showed that Obama won even though Romney was perceived as more moderate and even though public opinion about the size of government had taken a conservative turn under Obama. Let me bring more data to bear on this. For the past 40 years, the American National Election Study has asked respondents to place the Democratic and Republican parties on a seven-point scale that ranges from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” Here is the trend, including the 2012 study that was just released and excluding the small fraction of respondents who could not place each party: Two features of this graph deserve emphasis, I think. One is how poorly the trends conform to prevailing narratives about how the parties have changed. In particular, there is precious little evidence that Americans perceived the Democratic Party’s “re-boot” in the late 1980s and 1990s—when many observers believe that the party moved to the center under the influence of the Democratic Leadership Council and Bill Clinton. This is one reason why I’m skeptical that ideological “re-branding” is all that consequential.

## Impacts

### 1NC MPX – Clinton Good – Warming

#### GOP president will undermine efforts to meet US climate targets under the Paris Deal – key to check global climate change

Ben Adler, covers environmental policy and politics for Grist, with a focus on climate change, energy, and cities, 12-16-2015, “Republicans still hope to throw a wrench in the Paris climate deal,” <http://grist.org/climate-energy/republicans-still-hope-to-throw-a-wrench-in-the-paris-climate-deal/>

Republicans didn’t even wait for a global climate change deal to be struck in Paris to start undermining it. Last month, congressional Republicans were loudly discouraging other nations from signing onto any agreement, arguing that the U.S. won’t keep up its end of the bargain if a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election. And they passed bills that would repeal the Clean Power Plan, the new set of EPA restrictions on carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants, which is the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s strategy for meeting its emissions targets under the Paris Agreement. While U.S. negotiators were hard at work in Paris trying to secure a deal, congressional Republicans kept working hard to make the U.S. look insincere. The House passed an energy bill that would expedite permitting for oil and gas projects such as pipelines and expand liquefied natural gas exports. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who is running for president, held a hearing stuffed with climate science deniers, including one who Greenpeace revealed is on the fossil fuel industry’s payroll. Republicans in Congress have also voted to end the crude oil export ban as part of the budget deal. That policy change would be a giveaway to the oil industry that would increase domestic oil production at the expense of the environment. Once a deal came out of Paris, naturally Republicans started criticizing it. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), chair of the Environment and Public Works Committee, complained — nonsensically, since he doesn’t even accept climate science in the first place — that the agreement does not hold countries such as China and India to strong enough standards. Anyway, he promises to interfere with any effort to meet our emissions targets or climate finance commitments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said President Obama “is ‘making promises he can’t keep’ and should remember that the agreement ‘is subject to being shredded in 13 months,’” according to the Associated Press. As AP explains, “McConnell noted that the presidential election is next year and the agreement could be reversed if the GOP wins the White House.” The U.S. — as the world’s largest economy, largest historic polluter, and second-largest present-day carbon polluter — is an essential player in any functioning global climate agreement. Well aware of this, President Obama made a huge and largely successful effort on climate diplomacy over the last year, crafting bilateral agreements with key nations such as China, India, and Brazil in order to lay the groundwork for an international deal. Republicans, knowing the importance of U.S. cooperation, are eager not only to kneecap any U.S. climate policy, but also to prevent global cooperation on climate change. Perhaps they fear that a future Republican president will face more pressure from allies and trading partners to address climate change now that everyone else in the world has already committed to do so. So over the next five years, until the world comes together again in 2020 to hopefully negotiate a stronger set of national targets, congressional Republicans will be working to destroy the agreement and its future potential by preventing the U.S. from keeping its word. Their game plan will be to undo the Clean Power Plan and revoke U.S. pledges of financing to assist developing nations with expanding clean energy and adapting to climate change. How this plays out will depend on the outcome of the next presidential election. All of the leading Republican presidential candidates are climate science deniers who oppose the Clean Power Plan. On the campaign trail this week, most of them have avoided any discussion of the Paris Agreement. All but one of the top nine GOP campaigns did not respond to a query on the subject from The New York Times.

#### Top experts agree – warming is real and causes extinction

Don Flournoy, PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College at Ohio University, Former Associate Dean at State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Professor of Telecommunications at the Scripps College of Communications at Ohio University, January 2012, "Solar Power Satellites," Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

### 2NC Clinton Good – Warming

#### Trump victory risks extinction via climate change

Matthew Nisbet, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University, 5-27-2016, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," https://www.newscientist.com/article/2090672-trump-would-deliver-fatal-blow-to-fight-against-climate-change/

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement“, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the “stupid” Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish.

#### Trump reverses all of Obama climate policies – undermines our ability to meet Paris obligations

Bill Murray, energy policy contributor at RealClearPolitics, 5-17-2016, "Would Trump Undo Obama's Environmental Legacy?," http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/05/17/would\_trump\_undo\_obamas\_environmental\_legacy\_130583.html

A simple parsing of his phrases – “opening up energy” or “put the miners back to work” –implies overturning important elements of President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (CPP), which is the main method by which the U.S. plans to meet its emissions obligations promised at the Paris climate change convention in December. “According to the attitude that he has expressed, he would be a major threat to health and the environment” if elected, said David Goldston, the director of government affairs for the Natural Resources Defense Council Action Fund. “He doesn’t believe in climate change, he doesn’t believe in the ozone hole, and he talks about dismantling the EPA.” How is a wholesale rollback of Obama’s environmental regime possible? The quick answer is that the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in 2010 forced the administration to try and achieve its environmental goals via the executive branch. By deciding to go down the executive-action path, the risk existed of a rollback if Republicans regained the White House. The easiest way to undo Obama’s environmental efforts would be for a President Trump to simply order his administration to stop working on a series of environmental rules that are still in draft form or mired in the federal court system. The CPP would qualify, given that federal courts may not decide on its legality until 2017. Other EPA-sponsored energy-related rules that could be quickly undermined by a Trump presidency include a “well-control” methane rule just finalized last week, and a Waters of the United States rule, both of which are struggling to make it through the courts. “He’s going to be an old-school pro-business Republican with a harder edge,” said Mike McKenna, a GOP strategist who deals with energy and environment issues. “He would target the things that underpin the whole structure of the Obama environmental policy. He’ll look at the Clean Power Plan and say, ‘Are we out of our frigging mind?’”

#### A Trump win tanks the Paris accords – guarantees extinction via warming

Lucia Graves, columnist for the Guardian and a staff correspondent at the National Journal, 1-5-2016, “The Whole World Has a Stake in the Outcome of Our Presidential Election” <http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/2016-presidential-election-does-the-world-have-a-future>

It would be difficult but not impossible for a Republican president to undo the Paris Agreement. For that reason alone, the 2016 election is about whether the world has a future. Last year, 2015, was easily the hottest year on the books, but you would never know it to hear our presidential candidates talk on the trail. Just days after world leaders forged the Paris climate agreement, the planet's best hope for curbing the catastrophic effects of global warming, Republican presidential candidates assembled for a debate. And nobody, not the nine candidates on the main stage or the three moderators before them, mentioned the Paris Agreement as anything more than a passing jab. "And when I see they have a climate conference over in Paris, they should have been talking about destroying ISIS," Ohio Governor John Kasich said. Donald Trump merely scoffed at how President Obama thinks climate change is even a priority. That was it, in the wake of the historic moment: nada, zip, zilch, zero actual conversation. Just a one-touch dismissal from a guy most people don't know is even running, and a jibe in the deal's general direction from The Donald. It wasn't an oversight—it's standard practice on climate for Republicans. The party's internally incoherent consensus on the matter seems to be that the climate agreement is somewhere between "reckless," "ridiculous," and a "threat" to our sovereignty—and anyway, climate change is not really happening. But how, exactly, would the candidates respond to the landmark deal once in office? Specifically, would they submit an even stronger climate plan by 2020, as the U.S. is now required to do under the international accord? Or would they tear up the document entirely? It might not be easy for a Republican president to destroy the Paris Agreement—but it would be a whole lot easier than what the world pulled off at le Bourget. Where candidates come down on this matter will have tremendous consequences, not just for environmentalists or even for Americans, but for the world. While Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have done a remarkable job of skirting Republican opposition in Congress—laying the groundwork through intercountry alliances in recent years—experts say a GOP president could legally unravel the deal. Whether it's by rolling back Obama's Clean Power Plan—a lynchpin of the U.S. commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions—or by pulling out of the deal directly, a Republican president could single-handedly undo the past decade of progress on climate and propel the world far beyond the warming cap of two degrees Celsius needed to stave off the worst consequences of climate change. The U.S., as the world’s second-largest emitter currently and the biggest emitter cumulatively, has an outsized duty in preserving the planet’s future.

### Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Structural Barriers Check Trump

#### Trump can repeal all environmental regulations and tank the Paris accords – no political or legal barriers

Eric Posner, Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, 6-4-2016, "And if Elected: What President Trump Could or Couldn’t Do" www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/opinion/campaign-stops/and-if-elected-what-president-trump-could-or-couldnt-do.html

In May, Mr. Trump vowed to rescind President Obama’s environmental policies. He would be able to do that as well. He could disavow the Paris climate change agreement, just as President Bush “unsigned” a treaty creating an international criminal court in 2002. He could choke off climate regulations that are in development and probably withdraw existing climate regulations. Even if a court blocked him, he could refuse to enforce the regulations, just as Mr. Obama refused to enforce immigration laws.

### Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Courts Roll Back CPP

#### Even if the CPP is struck down, electing a Democratic president allows the agency to revise the plan – solves legal challenges

Ben Adler, covers environmental policy and politics for Grist, with a focus on climate change, energy, and cities, 12-16-2015, “Republicans still hope to throw a wrench in the Paris climate deal,” <http://grist.org/climate-energy/republicans-still-hope-to-throw-a-wrench-in-the-paris-climate-deal/>

No matter who becomes the next president, the third branch of government will also have a say. Conservative state attorneys general and corporate fossil fuel interests are challenging the Clean Power Plan in federal court. The presidential election probably won’t determine the court case’s outcome — only a vacancy on the Supreme Court before the case is heard might lead to that — but it will determine how the EPA responds if the rule is overturned. The Supreme Court has already held that EPA has the legal authority to regulate carbon pollution, so if the CPP is overturned, it would mean that the agency could promulgate new regulations on power plants that are more likely to be deemed compliant with the Clean Air Act. But whether their boss wants them to or not will depend on who sits in the White House.

### Clinton Good – Warming – AT: Paris Deal Fails

#### Paris agreement solves warming – U.S. leadership is key – impact is extinction

Rebecca Willis, Council Member of the Natural Environment Research Council, August 2014, “Paris 2015: Getting a global agreement on climate change,” http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/resources/Paris%202015-getting%20a%20global%20agreement%20on%20climate%20change.pdf

At the Paris summit in December 2015, 196 countries will meet to sign a new climate change agreement. But how likely is it that it will be meaningful and make a difference to climate action on the ground? Not only is a deal possible but, with the right political leadership, it can lead to ambitious outcomes that will have a real impact on tackling climate change. Countries like the US and China are working to ensure an outcome is likely in 2015; and the years since the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations have seen some significant breakthroughs. The 2009 negotiations were fraught and chaotic, with a last minute agreement emerging after frantic scenes on the conference floor. Yet international negotiations remain vital for countries to build on national approaches, providing reassurance that they are not acting alone, and making it easier for nations to work together towards a low carbon future. This is why the 2015 Paris summit is important. To ensure meaningful action on climate change, the deal must contain the following elements: • ambitious action before and after 2020 • a strong legal framework and clear rules • a central role for equity • a long term approach • public finance for adaptation and the low carbon transition • a framework for action on deforestation and land use • clear links to the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals A strong deal will make a significant difference to the ability of individual countries to tackle climate change. It will provide a clear signal to business, to guide investment toward low carbon outcomes. It will reduce the competitiveness impacts of national policies, and create a simpler, more predictable framework for companies operating in different countries. Vitally, a strong climate deal will help to meet international development aims, which are at increasing risk from rising global temperatures. Eliminating poverty, improving health and building security are all outcomes linked to tackling climate change. And it will also bring huge benefits to the natural environment by helping to avoid biodiversity loss and the degradation of ecosystems upon which we all depend.

#### Paris deal will successfully limit climate change

Erwin Jackson, Deputy CEO of the Climate Institute, 12-18-2015, “Is the Paris Agreement Toothless?” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-paris-agreement-toothless-14667>]

The countries of the world seemed to sigh with collective relief when the Paris climate change agreement was finalized. After years of toil, nearly 200 countries agreed to ratchet up action over time to achieve a net-zero-emissions global economy. Yet, no sooner was the ink dry than discussion began about whether the deal had enough 'teeth' to achieve its goals. The national targets under the agreement aren't legally binding, critics said. In fact, the Paris agreement has been viewed with everything from caution to outright cynicism. To an extent, this is understandable. What governments say is not always matched by their actions. And Australia is a case in point. Take the announcement of our Government joining 'the Coalition for High Ambition' in Paris. Convened by the Marshall Islands, this group includes the United States, EU, Brazil and smaller countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia and other small island states. Among other things, it supports a goal in the Paris agreement to limit global warming to less than 1.5°C by the end of century. For low-lying island nations already battling rising sea levels, like the Marshall Islands, this target is a matter of survival. Yet if other countries adopted Australia's current emissions targets, we would see the world warm by 3-4°C. It is a clear disconnect between words and actions. But Australia is not alone in this. Nearly all countries need to lift targets and policies if we are to achieve a less than 2°C or 1.5°C goal. So, does the criticism that emissions targets aren't legally binding actually matter? If we are to achieve a reduction in the emissions entering the planet's atmosphere, it will be done through countries taking effective domestic action, not by the mere existence of an international agreement. The Paris agreement, firstly, requires that every five years all countries set an emissions reduction target that is stronger than the last (with some exceptions for the world's nations that are poorest and the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change). Importantly, these targets are to be justified against the less than 2ºC or 1.5°C goals that the Marshall Islands and others need for survival. Secondly, the Paris agreement binds countries to implement domestic policies to achieve that target. The point is that legally binding targets don't necessarily equal effectiveness. It is participation in the agreement, through action, that is vital. After all, the most binding agreement is useless if the United States, China, India and other major emitters don't participate. Recent history shows us that, just because a commitment is not binding, it does not necessarily follow that countries won't act or participate. Under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, for example, it was voluntary for countries to put forward 2020 emissions targets. Yet, since then, the number of domestic laws to control pollution around the world has more than doubled from around 420 to 800. According to the World Bank, about 40 nations have begun to make emitting companies pay for their carbon pollution. And the number of carbon pricing laws across the world has nearly doubled since 2012. Additionally, eight in ten countries now have national renewable energy targets. Renewable energy is now the world's second-largest source of electricity, with investment in renewable electricity increasing by 30 percent since Copenhagen. Over this period, more than $1.12 trillion was invested in renewable capacity. This all happened with just over 10 percent of global emissions being covered by internationally binding emissions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It was not driven by fear of sanction from other countries. It was driven by the fact that major economies, national security agencies, central bankers, institutional investors, major global businesses and many others now see climate change, and the global response to it, as a major strategic issue that must be managed. This is not to say we shouldn't hold countries accountable for their actions. The Paris agreement requires that countries regularly review each others' targets and actions towards achieving net-zero emissions. It also contains binding systems to promote transparency (eg. expert international teams will review biannual emissions reports from each country). The Paris agreement is not perfect, but to judge it by whether or not it is legally binding misses the point. Post Paris, the test of any nation's commitment to climate change is now two-fold. First, do its pollution-reduction targets help achieve the net-zero-emissions goals of the Paris agreement? By assessing one another on this every five years, international pressure will result in action. Second and most importantly, do its domestic laws make major emitters responsible for the pollution they cause? If the nations of the world can answer 'yes' to both these questions, it should deliver us, and nations like the Marshall Islands, the climate action we all need.

### 2NC Warming MPX

#### Warming is anthropogenic and is an existential risk – best studies

Eric Holthaus, meteorologist and writer at Slate, 3-30-2014, “New U.N. Report: Climate Change Risks Destabilizing Human Society,” http://www.slate.com/blogs/future\_tense/2014/03/30/ipcc\_2014\_u\_n\_climate\_change\_report\_warns\_of\_dire\_consequences.html

In a new U.N. report released on Monday morning (Japan time) scientists come to a stark conclusion: Unless the world changes course immediately and dramatically, the fundamental systems that support human civilization are at risk. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s new report—which is seven years in the making—draws on “widespread” evidence of “substantial” climate change impacts “on all continents and across the oceans.” For the first time, the IPCC has scientifically linked the changing climate with the destabilization of nation states. It is also increasingly confident of serious effects on food crops, water supplies, and human health, plus global species loss. This is a follow-up to a similarly major report issued last September, which concluded the scientific evidence for climate change was “unequivocal,” with human activity “extremely likely” to be the dominant cause. If September’s report answered the question of “what’s happening to the climate and why?”, this one tackled the more practical “So, what does it mean for us?” Unless we change our path, the simple answer is: Climate change could put our future into question. What makes the new IPCC statement so striking is its process. The entire 44 page summary was agreed to line-by-line by scientists and political representatives from more than 110 governments during a marathon session over the last week. Simply because of the way it was constructed, this report instantly becomes the most authoritative ever written on the subject of climate change impacts and the long-term consequences of current (in)action. Fast-growing China must agree with tiny Maldives, and the relatively rich United States must align with poor governments like Tanzania. That process also makes the report’s conclusions necessarily conservative. The document therefore touches only on the effects of climate change that have widespread consensus. Turns out, that list is much longer than was agreed upon in the previous report, released in 2007. For better or worse, actions we take now “affect the risks of climate change throughout theI 21st century.”

#### Status quo warming causes multiple feedback loops – each causes extinction

Guy McPherson, is professor emeritus at the University of Arizona, Biological Sciences, 2-7-2011, “Extinction event?” Nature Bats Last, http://guymcpherson.com/2011/02/extinction-event/

At the same time Arctic ice is melting, the planet is losing its lungs. Catastrophic drought in the Amazon has it emitting carbon dioxide more rapidly than the United States. Simultaneously, permafrost is thawing and methane stored in eastern Siberia is venting into the atmosphere at an alarming rate. Methane, by the way, is a much more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Against this background, it is easy to foresee a rapidly and profoundly warming Arctic as a trigger for positive feedbacks such as release of methane hydrates and reduced albedo. These extremely dangerous feedbacks, which forecasters did not expect until the planet becomes 2 C warmer than the baseline (vs. the current level of ~0.75 C warmer), could trigger runaway greenhouse. In other words, any of these event — never mind all of them at once — could lead directly and quickly to the extinction of Homo sapiens.

#### Rapid warming ensures ocean acidification – extinction

Guy McPherson, is professor emeritus at the University of Arizona, Biological Sciences, 6-20-2012, “We’re done,” Nature Bats Last, http://guymcpherson.com/2012/06/were-done/

We also know that the situation is far worse than indicated by recent data and models (which are reviewed in the following paragraphs). We’ve known for more than a decade what happens when the planes stop flying: Because particulates were removed when airplanes were grounded, Earth’s diurnal temperature range increased by more than 1 C in the three days following 11 September 2001. If the change in range leans toward warming, in other words, Earth’s temperature is already nearly 2 C higher than the industrial-revolution baseline. And because of positive feedbacks, 2 C leads directly and rapidly to 6 C, acidification-induced death of the world’s oceans, and the near-term demise of Homo sapiens. We can’t live without life-filled oceans, home to the tiny organisms that generate half the planet’s oxygen while comprising the base of the global food chain (contrary to the common belief that Wal-Mart forms the base of the food chain). So much for the wisdom of the self-proclaimed wise ape.

### 2NC Warming MPX – Climate Wars

#### Warming is a conflict multiplier – causes global wars and multiple independent extinction scenarios

Janet Sawin, Senior Director of the Energy and Climate Change Program at the WorldWatch Institute, August 2012, “Climate Change Poses Greater Security Threat than Terrorism” http://www.worldwatch.org/node/77

As early as 1988, scientists cautioned that human tinkering with the Earth's climate amounted to "an unintended, uncontrolled globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war." Since then, hundreds of scientific studies have documented ever-mounting evidence that human activities are altering the climate around the world. A growing number of international leaders now warn that climate change is, in the words of U.K. Chief Scientific Advisor David King, "the most severe problem that we are facing today—more serious even than the threat of terrorism." Climate change will likely trigger severe disruptions with ever-widening consequences for local, regional, and global security. Droughts, famines, and weather-related disasters could claim thousands or even millions of lives and exacerbate existing tensions within and among nations, fomenting diplomatic and trade disputes. In the worst case, further warming will reduce the capacities of Earth's natural systems and elevate already-rising sea levels, which could threaten the very survival of low-lying island nations, destabilize the global economy and geopolitical balance, and incite violent conflict. Already, there is growing evidence that climate change is affecting the life-support systems on which humans and other species depend. And these impacts are arriving faster than many climate scientists predicted. Recent studies have revealed changes in the breeding and migratory patterns of animals worldwide, from sea turtles to polar bears. Mountain glaciers are shrinking at ever-faster rates, threatening water supplies for millions of people and plant and animal species. Average global sea level has risen 20-25 centimeters (8-10 inches) since 1901, due mainly to thermal expansion; more than 2.5 centimeters (one inch) of this rise occurred over the past decade. A recent report by the International Climate Change Taskforce, co-chaired by Republican U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, concludes that climate change is the "single most important long term issue that the planet faces." It warns that if average global temperatures increase more than two degrees Celsius—which will likely occur in a matter of decades if we continue with business-as-usual—the world will reach the "point of no return," where societies may be unable to cope with the accelerating rates of change. Existing threats to security will be amplified as climate change has increasing impacts on regional water supplies, agricultural productivity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, financial flows and economies, and patterns of international migration. Specific threats to human welfare and global security include: ► Climate change will undermine efforts to mitigate world poverty, directly threatening people's homes and livelihoods through increased storms, droughts, disease, and other stressors. Not only could this impede development, it might also increase national and regional instability and intensify income disparities between rich and poor. This, in turn, could lead to military confrontations over distribution of the world's wealth, or could feed terrorism or transnational crime.

### 2NC Warming MPX – K MPX – Structural Violence

#### Climate change is a form of massive structural violence against the global periphery

Zack Beauchamp, writer at Vox and former writer at Think Progress, 6-2-2014, “This Map Explains Why Climate Change is so Unfair,” http://www.vox.com/2014/6/2/5765030/obama-global-inequality-power

They also might be Obama's greatest contribution to the fight against global poverty. Climate change is bad for everyone. But it's particularly bad for the world's poorest. Standard and Poor's, the credit rating company, recently published a report assessing the risk each country faces from climate change. You'll notice the more vulnerable (redder) countries cluster in Asia and Africa, while the better off (greener) countries are almost all in North America or Europe: The cost to the developing world of unmitigated climate change will be staggering. Assume the globe warms by about four degrees celsius, which is easily possible absent major emissions reductions. Those notorious hippies at the World Bank suggest that this could lead to massive increases in disease, extreme storms, droughts, and flooding. The effects will be so massive, according to the bank's President Jim Kim, that they could roll back "decades of development gains and force tens of more millions of people to live in poverty." This isn't theoretical: we're already seeing the harm climate change is doing to the global poor. The World Health Organization estimates that 150,000 people are killed by climate change's effects annually — a number that's obviously going to rise significantly as the earth heats up. That's nearly the total death toll of the Syrian civil war, every year. And once again, poor countries are hit by far the hardest: There are basically two reasons why poor countries have it so rough: geography and poverty. Most of the red countries on the S&P map lie near the equator, where climate change-caused storms, flooding, and droughts will be more intense. Poverty makes these effects much worse. You'll notice, for instance, that Indonesia is red on the S&P map while Australia, its much wealthier neighbor, is green. Poor countries tend to have more poorly constructed homes, fewer resources for emergency response and relocation after sea level rise, and weaker health care systems ill-equipped to deal with increased rates of tropical disease. Imagine Hurricane Katrina levels of flooding in a city like Dhaka, Bangladesh — home to 15 million people. Actually, we don't need to imagine: we know from "normal" extreme-weather events that poor countries have it the roughest. From 1980-2007, only 15 percent of hurricanes, typhoons, and the like happened in low-income countries, but 68 percent of people killed by these storms died in poorer nations.

### 2NC Warming MPX – AT: Too Late

#### It’s not too late – reductions can avoid and delay catastrophic impacts

Nina Chestney, environmental correspondent at the Huffington Post, 1-13-2013, “Climate Change Study: Emissions Limits Could Avoid Damage By Two-Thirds,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/13/climate-change-study-emissions-limits_n_2467995.html>

The world could avoid much of the damaging effects of climate change this century if greenhouse gas emissions are curbed more sharply, research showed on Sunday. The study, published in the journal Nature Climate Change, is the first comprehensive assessment of the benefits of cutting emissions to keep the global temperature rise to within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, a level which scientists say would avoid the worst effects of climate change. It found 20 to 65 percent of the adverse impacts by the end of this century could be avoided. "Our research clearly identifies the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions - less severe impacts on flooding and crops are two areas of particular benefit," said Nigel Arnell, director of the University of Reading's Walker Institute, which led the study. In 2010, governments agreed to curb emissions to keep temperatures from rising above 2 degrees C, but current emissions reduction targets are on track to lead to a temperature rise of 4 degrees or more by 2100. The World Bank has warned more extreme weather will become the "new normal" if global temperature rises by 4 degrees. Extreme heatwaves could devastate areas from the Middle East to the United States, while sea levels could rise by up to 91 cm (3 feet), flooding cities in countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the bank has said. The latest research involved scientists from British institutions including the University of Reading, the Met Office Hadley Centre and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, as well as Germany's Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. It examined a range of emissions-cut scenarios and their impact on factors including flooding, drought, water availability and crop productivity. The strictest scenario kept global temperature rise to 2 degrees C with emissions peaking in 2016 and declining by 5 percent a year to 2050. FLOODING Adverse effects such as declining crop productivity and exposure to river flooding could be reduced by 40 to 65 percent by 2100 if warming is limited to 2 degrees, the study said. Global average sea level rise could be reduced to 30cm (12 inches) by 2100, compared to 47-55cm (18-22 inches) if no action to cut emissions is taken, it said. Some adverse climate impacts could also be delayed by many decades. The global productivity of spring wheat could drop by 20 percent by the 2050s, but the fall in yield could be delayed until 2100 if strict emissions curbs were enforced. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions won't avoid the impacts of climate change altogether of course, but our research shows it will buy timeto make things like buildings, transport systems and agriculture more resilient to climate change," Arnell said.

### 2NC Warming MPX – AT: Warming Not Real / Anthropogenic

#### Warming is real, anthropogenic, and causes extinction – acting now is key to avoid catastrophic collapse – scientific consensus goes our way

Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, 4-2-2014, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]

### 2NC Clinton Good – Economy / Trade

#### Trump presidency decks the US and global economy – harmful fiscal policy, protectionism, plummeting business confidence

Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard University, former treasury secretary and director of the National Economic Council in the White House, 6-5-2016, "Trump is a much worse threat than Brexit," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/01/larry-summers-donald-trump-is-a-serious-threat-to-american-democracy/?tid=sm\_fb

Yet, as great as the risks of Brexit are to the British economy, I believe the risks to the U.S. and global economies of Trump’s election as president of the United States are far greater. Indeed, if he were elected, I would expect a protracted recession to begin within 18 months. The damage would in all likelihood be felt far beyond the United States. Here’s why. First, there is a substantial risk of highly erratic policy. Trump has raised the possibility of more than $10 trillion in tax cuts, which would threaten U.S. fiscal stability. He has also raised the possibility of the United States restructuring its debt in the manner of a failed real estate developer. Perhaps this is just campaign rhetoric. But historical research suggests that, contrary to popular belief, presidents tend to carry out their major campaign promises. The shadowboxing over raising the debt limit in 2011 (where all participants recognized the danger of default) was central to the stock market falling by 17 percent. A president with an entirely reckless fiscal program and an openness to restructuring debt could damage confidence and markets in the short run and the creditworthiness of the country and centrality of the dollar over the longer term. Second, in a world economy defined by global integration, Trump’s economic nationalism is highly dangerous. Exports have been a major driver of the U.S. economy in recent years. What would happen to them if we built a wall along our southern border and abrogated all our trade treaties? How would other countries react? The failure of the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be the least of the international economic problems brought about by a Trump presidency. Withdrawal from trade agreements does not currently require congressional approval. If Trump did even half of what he has promised, he would surely set off the worst trade war since the Depression. Third, prosperity depends on a secure geopolitical environment. Requiring Japan and Korea to defend themselves and scaling back NATO is a prescription for both emboldening China and Russia and promoting nuclear proliferation as our allies seek to become self-sufficient. A perception that the United States is at war with Islam rather than with radical elements within Islam is an invitation to terrorism. In such an environment, it is hardly likely that investment and trade would flourish. Fourth, Trump’s authoritarian style and cult of personality surely would take a toll on business confidence. He has proposed to bring back torture as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and to change the law so he can sue and punish publications he does not like. The country was paralyzed by the Watergate scandal and, to a lesser extent, Iran-Contra, both of which involved extralegal activity by the president’s staff and the abuse of government power. Who would rest secure with President Trump controlling the FBI, CIA and IRS? Finally, there is the question of uncertainty and confidence. Improving business confidence is the cheapest form of stimulus. Creating an environment where every tradition of the rule of law, internationalism and consistency in policy is up for grabs would be the best way to damage a still-fragile U.S. economy. In no election in my lifetime has a major-party candidate for president been so dangerous for the economy. Markets now are discounting the possibility of a Trump presidency. Let us all pray they are right.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, 5-30-2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53 Issue 2, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2011.571015

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#### Protectionism causes global nuclear war

Michael Panzner, Professor at the New York Institute of Finance, 2008, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future From Economic Collapse, pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile,many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, maylook to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Clinton Good – Economy

#### Trump collapses the economy – trade, taxes, and immigration

Bryce Covert, editor at Think Progress, 3-2-2016, "The Biggest, Greatest, Most Terrific Recession," http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2016/03/donald\_trump\_s\_presidency\_would\_create\_a\_deep\_recession.html

A Donald Trump presidency would cause the U.S. economy to collapse. By Bryce Covert trump. Donald Trump speaks at a rally at Valdosta State University on Monday in Georgia. Mark Wallheiser/Getty Images Donald Trump has formidably strong support among working-class voters, who showed up for him in a big way on Super Tuesday. He’s cultivated that following by making grandiose promises not just about isolationism but also about the economy. Trump’s mantra about making America great again is, in large part, centered on economic growth, and specifically on jobs. Of the policy positions he spells out on his website, three of the five are tied to the economy. He wants drastic changes to our trade relations with China, which is part of his promise to restore all the manufacturing jobs lost to other countries. His tax plan will “create jobs and incentives of all kinds while simultaneously growing the economy.” His theory of immigration reform “puts the needs of working people first.” Beyond the appeals to racism and xenophobia, his message is all about restoring the economic prospects of Americans who have seen them decline. But if President Trump puts these plans into effect, there is no way they would make jobs great again. Instead, they would most likely throw us into a recession. How does Trump want to reform relations with China? One big plank is imposing huge tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S., possibly as large as 45 percent. He would also somehow crack down on China’s lax labor regulations and declare the country a currency manipulator, thereby ensuring more fairness in a global playing field in which Americans have lost too many jobs overseas. “Jobs and factories will stop moving offshore and instead stay here at home,” he assures his followers. “The economy will boom.” One study found that the country lost somewhere around 2 million jobs between 1999 and 2011 to trade competition with China—about 10 percent of all manufacturing job losses during that time. But many of those jobs are likely gone for good and have moved on from China to even lower-wage countries like Vietnam and Indonesia. What tariffs are certain to do is hurt Americans’ wallets. When Trump says the U.S. loses $58 billion to Mexico in trade, he neglects to mention what we get in return for that money: cheap goods. Tariffs on those products would drive up their prices, forcing Americans who are not seeing much in the way of wage growth to spend more for the same things. There was a natural experiment with just this policy in 2009, when the U.S. levied a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires. That move saved a maximum of 1,200 jobs while it raised costs for Americans buying those tires by $1.1 billion in one year alone. It would cost a lot of money to deport so many people—about $400 billion to $600 billion. Under Trump’s plan, China would also likely retaliate, as it did against the tire tariff with its own on American chicken imports, costing our exporters about $1 billion. That would only hurt American companies, who would likely cut back on jobs. Next, Trump’s tax plan. The candidate declared that his plan would offer the poor and middle class relief while it went after the “hedge fund guys” by changing the capital gains tax rate on investment income. But the details didn’t bear out his big promises. According to the Tax Policy Center, under Trump’s scheme, the poorest fifth of the country would get less than 1 percent of the benefits of his plan over a decade while the top fifth would get more than two-thirds. Yet it would cost $9.5 trillion in revenue—a far larger bite than under Reagan or even George W. Bush. The conservative-leaning Tax Foundation found that Trump’s claim that the plan will be revenue-neutral not to be true “under any scenario.” There’s little reason to think that big tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy will lead to a supercharged economy. There’s certainly no evidence that higher rates have a negative impact on economic growth, and in fact, growth has historically been faster under higher top marginal rates. What massive tax cuts for the wealthy do accomplish, on the other hand, is faster growth in income inequality, which hurts economic growth. Third and last, we turn to Trump’s brand of immigration reform, which wouldn’t help the economy either. Economists have found little negative effect on Americans’ wages from immigration. On the other hand, mass deportation and a blockade against immigrants trying to come into the country could have serious negative consequences, knocking $1.6 trillion off of our gross domestic product. Immigrants are projected to provide nearly all growth in the labor force for the next 40 years, but deporting them would shrink it by 6.4 percent over 20 years. Of course, it would also cost a lot of money to deport so many people—about $400 billion to $600 billion. Overall, Trump’s prescriptions are pretty pricy: Added altogether, the conservative Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget found that his policies would add between $11.7 trillion and $15.1 trillion to the national debt, including interest payments. Deficits in and of themselves don’t necessarily harm growth, and can in fact simulate it, particularly when the country is climbing out of a recession. The outcomes depend on how the money is spent; Trump’s plans aren’t likely to involve productive expenditures. And if Trump wants to deliver on his promise to make his plans revenue-neutral, he’ll have to find huge cost savings elsewhere, cutting spending by trillions. Given that he’s said he won’t touch Medicare and Social Security, he would have to slash current spending by more than three-quarters. Those cuts would all but decimate most government programs, including those that spur the economy such as infrastructure projects, job training, and a safety net that boosts economic productivity and mobility, to name only a few. There’s no telling what a President Trump could actually get passed if he were to enter the White House. But if he got even part of what he wanted, we’d all be in for a very rocky economic ride.

### 2NC MPX – Clinton Good – Liberal Order

#### Trump will deck US alliances – sparks great power war

John Ford, Captain in the United States Army’s JAG Corps, 12-30-2015, "The Trump Doctrine," http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-trump-doctrine/

Given that Donald Trump continues to lead in polls for the Republican presidential nomination, it’s worth asking what kind of foreign policy he would implement if elected. Trump has set forth a surprisingly consistent view of foreign policy. If we treat his public statements seriously as a reflection of what he would do if elected, what emerges is a foreign policy that would be so cataclysmic for the United States that it might be impossible to undo the damage done. Trump’s statements reflect a surprisingly consistent worldview — a Trump Doctrine. The current international system is held up by several key pillars, the most important of which are that states should be formally treated as equals; that all states should enjoy freedom of trade and navigation; that the distribution of resources should be driven by markets, and not by national governments; and that national sovereignty should generally be respected. This liberal order has proven durable because most countries think they get a fair deal under it and they tend to stand with the United States in upholding it against challengers. Trump’s foreign policy rejects these basic pillars of the international system that have helped ensure global stability. If Trump were elected and acted on his promises, the United States would go from the defender of the liberal order to its main challenger. Trump’s foreign policy is the policy of a revisionist power that seeks to fundamentally rewrite the rules of the international system. Trump has promised to demand enormous concessions from U.S. allies in exchange for defending them and has pledged to upend the global trading system. He has proposed tariffs that would dramatically alter global trade patterns. Most dangerously, he would reject the idea that commodities like oil should be bought and sold freely on open markets. Instead, Trump would dramatically heighten the chances of a war between major powers by making control of oil a battleground for national governments.

# CP Advantages CPs

Advantage Counterplans are used to solve portions of the Affirmative’s advantages without using the core process of plan. By avoiding that core process, the Negative can claim that they solve the advantages without risking links to core Disadvantages like politics and allied relations (Japan, India, etc.). Because the net benefit comes from avoiding the Aff’s core action entirely, answering the perm should be as easy as explaining the Disad’s link. Advantage CPs are often combined into a single, multi-plank fiat so you can solve multiple advantage and impact scenarios. To avoid justified Aff theory arguments, I suggest defending this multi-plank CP as a single, conditional advocacy (i.e. you can kick the entire CP at any point but you can’t kick the individual planks). Advantage CPs not only require that you win an independent Disad but typically require some on-case solvency and impact defense support in the 2NR as well. Solvency is particularly important because it will allow the 2NR to compare the mechanisms of the CP against the plan.

## Military Spending CP

## 1NC

The United States federal government should substantially increase its military spending.

#### Military spending is being cut now and will face more cuts that affect readiness

Peter Harris. Writer at National Interest. July 14, 2015. America's Shrinking Military: The End of U.S. Primacy? <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-shrinking-military-the-end-us-primacy-13324?page=2> (accessed 5-15-16)

The real risks to U.S. primacy are (1) if sequestration is allowed to continue extracting a toll on the Army and the other branches of the armed forces; and (2) if enough Americans come to see cuts to the military as harmless or even desirable, initiating a spiral effect whereby domestic groups begin to urge military downsizing above and beyond what is currently being contemplated under sequestration. Under current spending plans, projections are that the Army will drop to around 420,000 active troops—a size that military planners warn would jeopardize the military’s ability to effectively deploy to multiple war zones at any one time. Not only would this number be a far cry from the circa 566,000 troop–level seen at the height of Iraq and Afghanistan, but it would double-down on the Pentagon’s previous repudiation of a decades-old mantra that the United States ought to be able to fight multiple land wars simultaneously. Whether or not they are thinking in these terms, America’s leaders are sanctioning what could end up amounting to a major strategic adjustment. The implicit choice facing them is between investing to maintain military primacy or acquiescing in its loss. Quietly, reluctantly—and perhaps even unintentionally—fiscal policies are militating towards the latter.

#### Low US military spending is causing tension between China and our regional allies

Steve Cohen. Writer at Observer. January 26, 2015. Reckless Cuts to US Military Spending Leaving America Vulnerable. http://observer.com/2015/01/reckless-cuts-to-us-military-spending-leaving-america-vulnerable/ (accessed 5-15-16)

The horrific events in Paris have underscored the obvious: there are dangerous people in the world committed to killing us. And we must be able to prevent – or at the very least defend against aggressors. Less obvious is the dangerous truth that budget cuts are seriously eroding our capabilities. For the first time since the end of World War II, the United States won’t have an aircraft carrier in East Asian waters. Defense funding shortfalls have dictated a four-month gap between the departure of the USS George Washington from its homeport of Yokosuka, Japan and the scheduled arrival of the USS Ronald Reagan. The George Washington will then be out of service for three to four years while it undergoes nuclear refueling and refurbishment. Though the US Navy says their concerns are overblown, the foreign media in the region have given the story a considerable amount of attention. One reason for our allies’ concern is their profound unease about China’s intentions. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center found that 93% of Filipinos, 85% of Japanese, and 83% of South Koreans are worried that China’s territorial ambitions could lead to military conflict. And significantly, those concerns have become more pronounced since Pew’s similar survey a year earlier.

#### Increased funding restores naval power—that contains Chinese aggression scenarios

Ronald O’Rourke. Specialist in Naval Affairs. 2009. Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GiMDs3NdgwoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=navy+funding+key+to+naval+power&ots=96mbEkXrjW&sig=D3fsTQqQ6jSLSDTntWgDm_uMCiY#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 5-15-16)

In the debate over future U.S. defense spending, including deliberations taking place in the¶ current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a key issue is how much emphasis to place on¶ programs for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years. Observer’s disagree¶ on the issue, with some arguing that such programs should receive signiﬁcant emphasis. Others¶ arguing that they should receive relatively little, and still others taking an intermediate position.¶ The question of how much emphasis to place in US, defense planning on programs for¶ countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy.¶ because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall¶ within the Navy’s budget. In terms of potential impact on programs and spending‘ the Navy might¶ have more at stake on this issue than the Army and Marine Corps, and perhaps at least as much. If not more, than the Air Force, Decisions that policymakers make on the issue of how much¶ emphasis to place on programs for countering improved Chinese military forces could¶ significantly affect the future size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy; Navy funding¶ requirements, and the shipbuilding industrial base.

## 2NC

#### Underfunding is killing military readiness

Tom Cotton. US Senator from Arkansas. February 9, 2016. Congress Must Stop the Decline of Our Military Readiness. <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/02/congress-must-stop-decline-our-military-readiness/125818/> (accessed 5-15-16)

These are complex, unconventional threats. Confronting them will require a mix of asymmetric solutions supported by a credible conventional force that denies our enemies the freedom to act in any domain, as well as a nuclear force that can reliably punish our strategic adversaries. Unfortunately, today our military is at a breaking point. Our soldiers and marines, fighter and bomber squadrons, submarines and aircraft carriers, and modernized nuclear forces simply cannot confront current threats. Former Army Secretary John McHugh recently testified that Army readiness is at the “ragged edge” of being able to execute ongoing missions. Air Force readiness is so poor that the president was forced to acknowledge the manpower shortage in this budget—but he still didn’t give them enough. And the Navy will experience the first prolonged aircraft carrier gap in the Arabian Gulf since 2007, as well as periodic gaps in the Western Pacific, two key theaters. Yet the president’s budget merely seeks to manage these declines rather than begin to reverse them. As a comparison, look back 25 years ago to 1991. At the beginning of Desert Storm, we had almost two million active duty members, all reporting excellent readiness levels. That’s 700,000 more troops than today. Our technological capabilities, including stealth and precision guided munitions, far surpassed the rest of the world. Today we have fewer assets, for example 55 fighter squadrons versus 134 in 1991, as our peer competitors inch closer to technological parity.

#### Low military spending hurts operational flexibility

Steve Cohen. Writer at Observer. January 26, 2015. Reckless Cuts to US Military Spending Leaving America Vulnerable. http://observer.com/2015/01/reckless-cuts-to-us-military-spending-leaving-america-vulnerable/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Funding shortfalls are having other disturbing consequences. Retired Vice Admiral Peter Daly, CEO of the United States Naval Institute recently told a gathering in Washington that “given the current glide slope, in a year we will only be able to deploy two carrier groups” worldwide, even with 30 days notice. That is down from three currently, and five carrier groups just a year ago. The Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for Operations, Vice Admiral Charles Michel told the same Washington gathering that his service had the resources to intercept just 25% of identified and confirmed major illegal drug shipments in the Caribbean. The sea services aren’t the only branches being strained by spending levels. The Air Force’s top officers have noted that our air fleet is the smallest and oldest in the service’s history. General Philip Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, even went so far as to say that he is not sure the United States can maintain air supremacy in a major conflict. Congressman Randy Forbes, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, points out that air supremacy accounts for much of the difference in American lives lost between Vietnam and more recent conflicts.

#### The military is currently unprepared for conflicts

Diem Nguyen Salmon. Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation. January 30, 2015. A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget> (accessed 5-15-16)

The unprioritized nature and severity of sequestration in FY 2013 degraded readiness of all the Armed Services. The Army faced a readiness spending shortfall of $3.2 billion in FY 2013, while the Air Force was forced to ground bomber and fighter units. The increased spending from the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) for FY 2014 and FY 2015 allowed the services to begin rebuilding readiness. However, the military has not fully recovered from the losses in FY 2013. Today, the Army is operating at a tiered readiness level, with 80 percent of the force at “lower readiness levels.”[27] Meanwhile 65 percent of non-deployed Marines are “experiencing degraded readiness.”[28] Less than half of the combat squadrons that the Air Force grounded in FY 2013 have returned to “‘pre-sequestration’ levels of readiness.”[29] In the President’s FY 2015 Budget Request, the military plans to continue increasing readiness through the FYDP. However, given the increased operational tempo and the necessity of readiness, all services need a greater investment in readiness, enabling the services to rebuild readiness more quickly.

#### Increased funding causes naval fleet expansion and effective deterrence

Tony Capaccio. Writer at Bloomberg. July 7, 2014. U.S. Navy Warns It Can’t Meet 30-Year Funding Needs. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-07/u-s-navy-warns-it-can-t-meet-30-year-funding-needs.html> (accessed 5-15-16)

The U.S. Navy can’t meet its funding needs for surface warships and a new class of nuclear attack submarines from 2025 to 2034, according to the service’s latest 30-year shipbuilding plan. ¶ the congressionally required blueprint, submitted late last week and obtained by Bloomberg News, says the Navy’s plan “requires funding at an unsustainable level” unless spending on shipbuilding is increased. ¶ The document outlines challenges facing the plan to increase the Navy fleet to 306 vessels from the current 289 while building 12 new Ohio-class submarines, part of the nation’s nuclear triad of air, land and sea weapons. ¶ The Navy report provides one service’s challenges beyond the Pentagon’s current five-year funding plan in an era of declining defense spending. After 2019, the Defense Department will confront a confluence of expenses that includes the new submarines, planned full production of Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 fighter jet and a new Long-Range Strike bomber. ¶ The average cost of the Navy plan during the period when the service will be spending the most on the new submarine is $19.7 billion a year, including more than $24 billion at the peak year of fiscal 2032, according to the report. ¶ This budget “cannot be accommodated by the Navy from existing resources -- particularly if” the Pentagon remains under congressionally mandated automatic cuts known as sequestration, the report said. ¶ The Navy’s historical shipbuilding budget has averaged about $13 billion a year, in fiscal 2014 dollars. ¶ “Even if the Ohio-replacement program is removed” from the Navy plan, the average shipbuilding funding required beginning in fiscal 2020 is as much as $15 billion annually, the report found.

## A2 Military is overfunded now

#### Defense cuts haven’t solved waste

Diem Nguyen Salmon. Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation. January 30, 2015. A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget> (accessed 5-15-16)

Some argue that the spending reductions were not a problem because of the sheer size of the budget and excessive waste in the department. This is a misperception of the DOD budget. While waste does affect the DOD budget, it comprises a small portion of the overall budget, not nearly equivalent to the amount that was cut. To illustrate this, in the “Department of Everything” former Senator Tom Coburn (R–OK) itemizes an expansive list of wasteful programs in the DOD amounting to $67.9 billion over 10 years.[17] If Congress could eliminate every single one of the listed programs, the annual savings would amount to a little more than 1 percent of the budget. It is also wrong to assume that simply reducing overall defense spending can eliminate waste. In truth, eliminating wasteful spending at the DOD (as in other government institutions) requires separate legislation and internal reform. The past several years of defense spending reduction not only cut the fat, but also much of the actual meat—real U.S. military capabilities.

#### The US military isn’t too large and there is no spending surge

Justin T Johnson. Writer at National Interest. January 25, 2016. 5 Bad Arguments for Cutting U.S. Defense Spending. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002> (accessed 5-15-16)

Statistically true, but not particularly helpful. The United States also spends more on health care than the next nine countries combined. In 2012, Americans accounted for about one-third of the world’s total spending on entertainment. We’re a big, rich country—with a lot to protect and a host of vital interests around the globe. More important is the trend in defense spending. The same data set that pegs U.S. spending at more than the next seven countries today shows that we spent more than the next thirteen countries combined in 2011. Our investment in national security compared with the rest of the world has dropped dramatically over the last four years. Defense spending has grown since the 9/11 terror attacks—but not nearly as fast as the rest of the federal government. From 2001 through 2015, spending on social and economic programs dramatically outpaced spending on national security: 61 percent compared with 38 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars. Defense Department outlays now account for only 15 percent of all federal spending—less than its share before 9/11. Add in state and local government spending, and national security accounts for only 10 percent of total public spending. As a percentage of America’s gross domestic product, total national security spending has fallen from a high of 4.7 percent in 2010 and to an estimated 3.3 percent in 2015. (It stood at 2.9 percent in 2001.) So where’s that so-called ‘surge’ in defense spending?

#### Recent defense cuts aren’t justified by Bush era war spending

Diem Nguyen Salmon. Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation. January 30, 2015. A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget> (accessed 5-15-16)

Another argument in favor of recent defense cuts claims that the department has benefitted from earlier budget growth and that these cuts are just a natural drawdown. As Table 1 shows, defense spending is historically cyclical. Increases in spending tend to be linked to periods of war or conflict and are immediately followed by reductions, as in the past decade, when spending grew after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the start of the Global War on Terrorism. However, the post-2001 budget growth cannot be used to justify recent cuts. First, the initial growth was largely invested in capabilities needed specifically to fight Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, namely end strength and equipment for the Army, such as mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles and HMMWVs (Humvees).[18] These investments do not necessarily translate into capabilities that may be needed for future military engagements. Second, the defense spending reductions began while military troops were still engaged in hostilities.

#### Defense cuts don’t solve national debt

Ernesto Londoño and Lisa Rein. Writers at the Washington Post. February 21, 2013. Military service chiefs warn budget cuts will undermine readiness. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/military-service-chiefs-warn-budget-cuts-will-undermine-readiness/2013/02/21/a8d19480-7c60-11e2-82e8-61a46c2cde3d\_story.html (accessed 5-15-16)

The debt is a serious problem, indeed. But it is not a national security threat, nor does it mean that we must cut defense spending even more. The national debt is a different kind of threat. The national debt is a significant drag on the economy and will make life much worse for future generations. But it will not launch nuclear missiles or suicide attacks. ISIS, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea do, however, pose real and potentially deadly threats—and those threats won’t become more manageable by directing spending away from national security. Nor can we fix the debt problem simply by reducing our security spending. From 2009 through 2013, annual federal deficits exceeded the entire national security budget. The Office of Management and Budget predicts that Defense Department spending will decline from 15 percent of total federal spending to just 11.7 percent by 2020. That’s because spending on Social Security, health care and interest payments are soaring.

#### The size of other militaries doesn’t justify defense cuts

Justin T Johnson. Writer at National Interest. January 25, 2016. 5 Bad Arguments for Cutting U.S. Defense Spending <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002> (accessed 5-15-16)

Unfortunately, the United States needs both to fight terrorists and to deter potential adversaries, such as Russia and China. Moscow’s invasions of Georgia and Crimea and the continued fighting in eastern Ukraine show that Russia is still a dangerous power. China is aggressively asserting authority over ever larger areas of the South China Sea. North Korea continues to expand its illegal nuclear bomb program while Iran advances its own ballistic missile program. The United States needs to deter these countries while supporting ongoing operations against terrorists. The security threats facing the United States are numerous and challenging. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the Senate last year, “The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.” The United States needs a diverse array of capabilities to deter and defeat these diverse and complex threats. The debate about the U.S. national security budget often devolves into issues that are not actually relevant to U.S. national security. Comparing U.S. fleet size or military budgets against those of other countries is an interesting analytical exercise, but not a rational basis for budget determinations. Many of these arguments do not make sense upon closer inspection. Instead, the United States should build its national security budget based on a coherent strategy that realistically assesses the threats to the nation and its commitments and interests abroad.

## Ocean Fertilization CP

## 1NC

The United States federal government should substantially increase is research and development of methods to fertilize the Earth’s oceans with iron deposits.

#### Adding iron to the ocean produces carbon eating algae—that counters global warming

David Biello. Editor at Scientific American. July 1, 2014. Engineering the ocean https://aeon.co/essays/can-tiny-plankton-help-reverse-climate-change (accessed 5-15-16)

That these tiny creatures could affect such massive change is not as unreasonable as it sounds. Much of the oxygen we breathe comes from just one species of cyanobacteria, Prochlorococcus. This species was not even discovered until the 1980s: it is so tiny that millions can fit into a single drop of water and no one had produced a sieve small enough to catch it. The oxygen made by these tiny marine plants dwarfs that produced by the Amazon rainforest and the rest of the world’s woodlands combined. By taking in CO2 and exhaling oxygen, these tiny creatures serve as the planet’s lungs, whose steady breathing is limited only by nutrition. Just as land plants need nitrogen, phosphorus and other elements to thrive, missing nutrients restrain planktons’ growth. Add enough of those missing elements – via dust blown off a continent or fertiliser run-off from farm fields – and the oceans will produce blooms that can be seen from space. Many of these plankton pastures are held back by iron shortages, especially in places that are largely cut off from continental dust and dirt. With access to more iron, the plankton would proliferate and siphon more and more planet-heating CO2 from the atmosphere. Back in 1988, the late John Martin, then an oceanographer at the Moss Landing Marine Observatory, said: ‘Give me a half tanker of iron, and I will give you an ice age.’

#### A proven method is available but it isn’t being researched sufficiently now

David Biello. Editor at Scientific American. July 1, 2014. Engineering the ocean https://aeon.co/essays/can-tiny-plankton-help-reverse-climate-change (accessed 5-15-16)

Smetacek’s experiment was a success. For two weeks, he was able to induce carbon to fall to the sea floor at the highest rate ever observed – some 34 times faster than normal. Just as marine and terrestrial plants sucked up CO2 from Carboniferous or Jurassic skies only to be buried and cooked with geologic heat and pressure into coal, gas and oil, these modern microbes helped pull back some of the CO2 released when we burned their ancestors to make electricity, or to propel hulks of metal over tarred roads. This marine tinkering could help buffer the ever-increasing concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere, concentrations that have touched 400 parts-per-million, levels never before experienced in the hundreds of thousands of years that our clever species, Homo sapiens, has existed. Smetacek has given us the blueprints for a man-made portal for our pollution, a column of plankton running between the atmosphere and the deep ocean. Despite this progress, there have been no scientific research cruises since 2009, and there are none planned for the future. At the very moment it revealed its promise, the white whale of iron fertilisation seems to have slipped under the waves anew. Back in Bremen, Smetacek told me that commerce might be the only way to motivate further research into iron fertilisation. Replenishing missing krill, and the whales it supports, could be the best route to broader acceptance of the practice.

#### US federal research is key to safe and effective management

Ken Caldeira. Professor at Stanford University. November 27, 2013. The Need for Climate Engineering Research http://issues.org/27-1/caldeira/ (accessed 5-15-16)

For the moment, the United States and other nations are trying to address this risk by controlling emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, with mixed success at best. The time may well come, however, when nations judge the risk of climate change to be sufficiently large and immediate that they must “do something” to prevent further warming. But since “doing something” will probably involve intervening in Earth’s climate system on a grand scale, the potential for doing harm is great. The United States needs to mount a coordinated research program to study various options for mitigating climate change in order to ensure that damaging options are not deployed in haste. The United Kingdom and Germany have initiated research programs on such climate intervention technologies, and many U.S. scientists are already engaged in this topic, funded by a hodgepodge of private funds and the redirection of federal research grants. Some senior managers at federal agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration would like to initiate research funding, but they cannot act without political cover, given the understandably controversial nature of the technology. Given the rapid pace at which the research debate about governance is moving in the United States and abroad, delay in establishing a federal program will make it progressively harder for the U.S. government to guide these efforts in the public interest.

## 2NC

#### Research is key to solve problems and make fertilization cost effective

Ken Caldeira. Professor at Stanford University. November 27, 2013. The Need for Climate Engineering Research http://issues.org/27-1/caldeira/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Making an objective analysis of the economics of CDR systems is one area where cross-cutting research is needed. Of course, it remains critically important that the United States and other nations continue efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Indeed, much deeper cuts are needed. Reducing emissions will require, first and foremost, the development and deployment of low-carbon–emission energy systems. But even with improved technology, reducing emissions might not be enough to sufficiently reduce the risk of climate change. Scientists have identified a range of engineering options, collectively called geoengineering, to address the control of greenhouse gases and reduce the risks of climate change. One class of geoengineering strategies is carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which removes greenhouse gases from the atmosphere after they have already been released. This approach may involve the use of biological agents (such as land plants or aquatic algae) or industrial chemical processes to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. CDR seeks to address the underlying cause of the climate problem: elevated greenhouse gas concentrations.

#### Iron fertilization offsets atmospheric carbon and supports ocean biodiversity

Rob Waugh. Writer at Daily Mail. July 19, 2012. Could dumping iron in the oceans cure climate change? First 'geo-engineering' trial is hailed a success <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2175477/Eifex-New-hi-tech-geo-engineering-trial-hailed-success--cure-climate-change.html> (accessed 5-15-16)

According to Prof. Dr. Victor Smetacek from the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in the Helmholtz Association, this was all the more remarkable because the EIFEX bloom developed in a 100 metre deep mixed layer which is much deeper than hitherto believed to be the lower limit for bloom development. The bloom was dominated by diatoms, a group of algae that require dissolved silicon to make their shells and are known to form large, slimy aggregates with high sinking rates at the end of their blooms. These results contrast with those of the LOHAFEX experiment carried out in 2009 where diatom growth was limited by different nutrient conditions, especially the absence of dissolved silicon in the chosen eddy. Instead, the plankton bloom consisted of other types of algae which, however, have no protective shell and were eaten more easily by zooplankton. 'This shows how differently communities of organisms can react to the addition of iron in the ocean', says Dr. Christine Klaas. 'We expect similarly detailed insights on the transportation of carbon between atmosphere, ocean and sea bottom from the further scientific analysis of the LOHAFEX data", adds Prof. Dr. Wolf-Gladrow, Head of Biosciences at the Alfred Wegener Institute, who is also involved in the Nature study.

#### Experiments show that the algae won’t be dispersed by currents

David Biello. Writer at Scientific American. July 18, 2012. Controversial Spewed Iron Experiment Succeeds as Carbon Sink <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fertilizing-ocean-with-iron-sequesters-co2/> (accessed 5-15-16)

Such blooms occur naturally, of course, so the first part of the hypothesis is not controversial. What remained questionable until now is whether such blooms in fact sequestered much carbon or if it was being quickly recycled back into the atmosphere. The problem for scientists is that oceanic waters tend to mix, which makes monitoring and delineating an experiment in the ocean challenging. The solution, devised by biological oceanographer Victor Smetacek of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research in Germany and his colleagues, was to use an eddy. Such swirling currents can be remarkably self-contained. In fact, the new research to be published in Nature on July 19 shows that less than 10 percent of the eddy's waters mixed with the surrounding ocean. (Scientific American is part of Nature Publishing Group.) As expected, microscopic sea life bloomed. Chaetoceros atlanticus, Corethron pennatum, Thalassiothrix antarcticus and nine other species of diatoms grew in abundance, boosting the amounts of chlorophyll, organic carbon and other signs of life in the waters to depths of as much as 100 meters beneath the surface. The results offer fresh hope to would-be geoengineers hoping to draw down ever-increasing concentrations of industrial CO2 in the atmosphere, such as the ill-fated company Planktos and its failed bid to fertilize the ocean off Ecuador with iron. This new experiment induced carbon to fall 34 times as fast as natural rates for nearly two weeks—the highest such rate ever observed outside the laboratory.

#### Concerns about climate stasis are unfounded

Brad Allenby. Professor at University of Ontario. February 12, 2014. Geoengineering redivivius http://www.elementascience.org/article/info:doi/10.12952/journal.elementa.000023 (accessed 5-15-16)

Each technology has its own potential advantages and risks, which are poorly categorized at present, in part because research and research funding has been significantly impeded by significant opposition to the concept, especially in the environmental and climate change communities. Moreover, the categories themselves have different cost/benefit profiles. CDR technologies, for example, would also help manage ocean acidification, which is rising because CO2 when absorbed in the ocean creates more acid conditions, threatening animals such as clams and corals. SRM technologies, which only impact insolation, would not prevent continuing acidification. Moreover, both CDR and SRM proponents sometimes imply that implementing these technologies would facilitate a return to previous atmospheric and climactic states. This is a category mistake. Simple systems when disturbed may return to equilibrium points, but we are dealing with complex adaptive systems. Whatever path they take, it will not involve a return to previous conditions. Thomas Wolfe was right: you can’t go home again. More importantly, it means that whatever we do about climate — implement the Kyoto Protocol, deploy CDR or SRM technology systems, or do nothing — we are engineering the system. There is no stable base to return to, or rely on. The sleigh ride is already in progress. The only real question is whether we will accept the responsibility, and try to behave rationally, given that reality (Allenby, 2011).

#### Iron fertilization drastically lower atmospheric carbon

Wynne Parry. Writer at Live Science. July 18, 2012. Could Fertilizing the Oceans Reduce Global Warming? http://www.livescience.com/21684-geoengineering-iron-fertilization-climate.html (accessed 5-15-16)

Some hope fertilizing tiny, floating plants in the ocean, prompting them to suck carbon dioxide out of the air, could help solve global warming. A new experiment confirms this controversial idea has some merit, although important questions remain. Using an eddy in the Southern Ocean near Antarctica, researchers used iron fertilizer — the sort used to improve lawns — to create a man-made algal bloom. In the weeks that followed, researchers say, this bloom funneled a significant amount of Earth-warming carbon down into the ocean's depths, where it will remain sequestered for some time, unable to contribute to global warming. This experiment provides some important insight into this potential approach to combating climate change, said Ken Buesseler, of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, writing in Thursday's (July 19) issue of the journal Nature. Phytoplankton, which includes microscopic marine plants and photosynthetic microbes, blooms naturally in the ocean. However, in seawater, there is only limited iron, an element these organisms need to grow, so by adding iron to seawater, it's possible to make a man-made bloom.

#### Even conservative estimates prove fertilization is enough to offset the worst impacts of warming.

Damian Carrington. Writer at the Guardian. July 18, 2012. Dumping iron at sea can bury carbon for centuries, study shows <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/18/iron-sea-carbon?newsfeed=true> (accessed 5-15-16)

Dumping iron into the sea can bury carbon dioxide for centuries, potentially helping reduce the impact of climate change, according to a major new study. The work shows for the first time that much of the algae that blooms when iron filings are added dies and falls into the deep ocean. Geoengineering – technologies aimed at alleviating global warming – are controversial, with critics warning of unintended environmental side effects or encouraging complacency in global deals to cut carbon emissions. Maybe deliberate enhancement of carbon storage in the oceans has more legs than we thought but, as the scientists themselves acknowledge, it's still far too early to run with it." Prof John Shepherd, chair of the report, said on Wednesday: "It is important that we continue to research these technologies but governance of this research is vital to protect the oceans, wider environment and public interests." Smetacek's team added seven tonnes of iron sulphate to the ocean near Antarctica, where iron levels are extremely low. The addition of the missing nutrient prompted a massive bloom of phytoplankton to begin growing within a week. As the phytoplankton, mostly species of diatom, began to die after three weeks, they sank towards the ocean floor, taking the carbon they had incorporated with them. The scientists conclude in the journal Nature that the carbon is therefore likely to be kept out of the atmosphere for many centuries or longer. A dozen other experiments have shown that iron can prompt phytoplankton blooms, but this is the first study to show that the carbon the plants take up is deeply buried. But sequestering some CO2 could make the difference between crossing a climate "tipping" point, where feedback effects lead to runaway global warming.

## Sulfate Aerosols CP

## 1NC

#### It’s too late for emission cuts to matter—geoengineering is key

David Rotman. Writer at Technology Review. February 8, 2013. A Cheap and Easy Plan to Stop Global Warming. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/511016/a-cheap-and-easy-plan-to-stop-global-warming/ (accessed 5-15-16)

The overriding reason why Keith and other scientists are exploring solar geoengineering is simple and well documented, though often overlooked: the warming caused by atmospheric carbon dioxide buildup is for all practical purposes irreversible, because the climate change is directly related to the total cumulative emissions. Even if we halt carbon dioxide emissions entirely, the elevated concentrations of the gas in the atmosphere will persist for decades. And according to recent studies, the warming itself will continue largely unabated for at least 1,000 years. If we find in, say, 2030 or 2040 that climate change has become intolerable, cutting emissions alone won’t solve the problem. “That’s the key insight,” says Keith. While he strongly supports cutting carbon dioxide emissions as rapidly as possible, he says that if the climate “dice” roll against us, that won’t be enough: “The only thing that we think might actually help [reverse the warming] in our lifetime is in fact geoengineering.”

#### Sulfate aerosols can be researched and developed in time

David Rotman. Writer at Technology Review. February 8, 2013. A Cheap and Easy Plan to Stop Global Warming. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/511016/a-cheap-and-easy-plan-to-stop-global-warming/ (accessed 5-15-16)

According to Keith’s calculations, if operations were begun in 2020, it would take 25,000 metric tons of sulfuric acid to cut global warming in half after one year. Once under way, the injection of sulfuric acid would proceed continuously. By 2040, 11 or so jets delivering roughly 250,000 metric tons of it each year, at an annual cost of $700 million, would be required to compensate for the increased warming caused by rising levels of carbon dioxide. By 2070, he estimates, the program would need to be injecting a bit more than a million tons per year using a fleet of a hundred aircraft. One of the startling things about Keith’s proposal is just how little sulfur would be required. A few grams of it in the stratosphere will offset the warming caused by a ton of carbon dioxide, according to his estimate. And even the amount that would be needed by 2070 is dwarfed by the roughly 50 million metric tons of sulfur emitted by the burning of fossil fuels every year. Most of that pollution stays in the lower atmosphere, and the sulfur molecules are washed out in a matter of days. In contrast, sulfate particles remain in the stratosphere for a few years, making them more effective at reflecting sunlight.

#### Sulfate aerosols are the cheapest and most feasible method

NASA Earth Observatory. February, 2014. Aerosols and Incoming Sunlight (Direct Effects) http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Aerosols/page3.php (accessed 5-15-16)

Sulfate injection may sound like a pie-in-the-sky idea, but in fact, it’s not as far-fetched as it sounds. It mimics a well-documented natural process – the cooling that occurs when massive volcanic eruptions release huge quantities of sulfur. The largest recent example happened in 1991 when the Mount Pinatubo eruption spewed millions of tons of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere. Temperatures began to drop within months and the planet saw an average temperature reduction of around .7 degrees Fahrenheit. The United States experienced one of its coldest and wettest summers in decades. Experts say that artificial injections of sulfates could have a similar effect. Albedo modification is considered more feasible and less expensive than most other geoengineering ideas – sulfate particles could be blasted into the sky with artillery shells or sprayed from modified commercial aircraft, while cloud-brightening mists could be sprayed from unmanned ships. Preliminary cost estimates suggest that a sustained program of sulfate injection could be carried out for a few billion dollars a year – well within reach of any number of industrialized countries.

## 2NC

#### Sulfate aerosols empirically cause cooling

NASA Earth Observatory. February, 2014. Aerosols and Incoming Sunlight (Direct Effects) http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Aerosols/page3.php (accessed 5-15-16)

Aerosols can have a major impact on climate when they scatter light. In 1991, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines ejected more than 20 million tons of sulfur dioxide—a gas that reacts with other substances to produce sulfate aerosol—as high as 60 kilometers (37 miles) above the surface, creating particles in the stratosphere. Those bright particles remained above the clouds and didn’t get washed from the sky by rain; they settled only after several years. Climatologists predicted global temperatures would drop as a result of that global sulfate infusion. They were right: Following the eruption, global temperatures abruptly dipped by about a half-degree (0.6°C) for about two years. And Pinatubo isn’t a unique event. Large, temperature-altering eruptions occur about once per decade. Scientists believe the cooling from sulfates and other reflective aerosols overwhelms the warming effect of black carbon and other absorbing aerosols over the planet. Models estimate that aerosols have had a cooling effect that has counteracted about half of the warming caused by the build-up of greenhouse gases since the 1880s. However, unlike many greenhouse gases, aerosols are not distributed evenly around the planet, so their impacts are most strongly felt on a regional scale.

## Geoengineering links to politics

#### Geoengineering solutions are unpopular

Carolyn Y. Johnson. Professor at Amherst College. March 14, 2013. Harvard professor argues geoengineering needs oversight http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/03/14/geoengineering-solutions-global-warming-need-oversight-harvard-professor-argues/sGtkpnGqOVXdcajdDBl70O/story.html]//fw (accessed 5-15-16)

Large-scale projects that could temper or reverse the effects of climate change by blocking some incoming sunlight or manipulating the atmosphere have long been unpopular on two opposing fronts. On one side are those worried about the unintended consequences and doomsday scenarios that could be set off by careless experiments. On the other are those who believe such research is important, but to support it now will detract from the urgent need to cut greenhouse gas emissions that are driving global temperature rise.

#### There is no public support for geoengineering

Erik Vance. Editor at Environmental Research Web. February, 24, 2010. Geoengineering divides scientists http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/news/41830]//fw (accessed 5-15-16)

In the end, debates about the best form of climate manipulations may be moot because geoengineering remains publicly unpopular. Ortwin Renn, a sustainable technology expert at the University of Stuttgart, Germany, cited recent small-scale studies that suggest the more people learn about geoengineering, the less likely it is that they will endorse it. As if to confirm the public's continued confusion, protesters gathered outside the meeting; several managed to attend and pepper the scientists with questions about secret government climate-manipulation plots.

## Geoengineering does not link to politics

#### The fossil fuel industry supports geoengineering projects

Jim Thomas. Writer at the Ecologist. June 28, 2010. The link between BP, geoengineering and GM http://www.theecologist.org/blogs\_and\_comments/commentators/other\_comments/522729/the\_link\_between\_bp\_geoengineering\_and\_gm.html (accessed 5-15-16)

Just as the oil industry is eager to get on with the exploitation of hard-to-reach sources of black gold, an increasingly vocal and well-organised lobby of geoengineers is anxious to get on with testing a variety of climate intervention schemes. Underlying both is a thinly disguised hubris that the Gulf catastrophe should vividly awake us to. Both oil and geoengineering have strong connections in Washington, sometimes even in the same people. To state the obvious, big oil would certainly benefit if the atmosphere could be engineered to withstand higher concentrations of greenhouse gases.

#### The fossil fuel lobby controls legislation

Dan Froomkin. Writer at Huffington Post. April 6, 2011. How The Oil Lobby Greases Washington's Wheels <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html> (accessed 5-15-16)

Clout in Washington isn't about winning legislative battles -- it's about making sure that they never happen at all. The oil and gas industry has that kind of clout. Despite astronomical profits during what have been lean years for most everyone else, the oil and gas industry continues to benefit from massive, multi-billion dollar taxpayer subsidies. Opinion polling shows the American public overwhelmingly wants those subsidies eliminated. Meanwhile, both parties are hunting feverishly for ways to reduce the deficit. But when President Obama called on Congress to eliminate about $4 billion a year in tax breaks for Big Oil earlier this year, the response on the Hill was little more than a knowing chuckle. Even Obama's closest congressional allies don't think the president’s proposal has a shot. Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.), co-author of a House bill that closely resembles Obama's proposal, nevertheless acknowledges that it has slim chances of passing. "It will be a challenge to get anything through the House that includes any tax increase for anyone under any circumstance," he told The Huffington Post. The list goes on: "It's not on my radar," said Frank Maisano, a spokesman for Bracewell Giuliani, a lobbying firm with several oil and gas industry clients. "It's old news and it's never going to happen in this Congress. It couldn't even happen in the last Congress." Indeed, the oil and gas industry's stranglehold on Congres is so firm that even when the Democrats controlled both houses, repeal of the subsidies didn't stand a chance. Over the last decade in particular, the Republican Party's anti-tax policies and pro-drilling campaign rhetoric have become nearly indistinguishable from those of Big Oil. "Obama's been proposing to get rid of these subsidies since his first budget in February 2009," said Tyson Slocum, director of the energy program for the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen. "The obstacle has been the petroleum industry. The American Petroleum Institute has dug in their heels and is fighting tooth and nail to retain these subsidies." The American Petroleum Institute (API) is the industry's enormously powerful lobbying and trade association.

#### The geoengineering lobby is powerful

John Vidal. Writer at the Guardian. October 6, 2011. Big names behind US push for geoengineering http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/oct/06/us-push-geoengineering (accessed 5-15-16)

Over the Atlantic, though, the geoengineers are more gung-ho. Just days after the British got cold feet, the Washington-based thinktank the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) published a major report calling for the United States and other likeminded countries to move towards large-scale climate change experimentation. Trying to rebrand geoengineering as "climate remediation", the BPC report is full of precautionary rhetoric, but its bottom line is that there should be presidential leadership for the nascent technologies, a "coalition of willing" countries to experiment together, large-scale testing and big government funding. So what is the BPC and should we take this non-profit group seriously? For a start these guys - and they are indeed mostly men - are not bipartisan in any sense that the British would understand. The operation is part-funded by big oil, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, and while it claims to "represent a consensus among what have historically been divergent views," it appears to actually represent the most powerful US academic, military, scientific and corporate interests. It lobbies for free trade, US military supremacy and corporate power and was described recently as a "collection of neo-conservatives, hawks, and neoliberal interventionists who want to make war on Iran". Their specially convened taskforce is, in fact, the cream of the emerging science and military-led geoengineering lobby with a few neutrals chucked in to give it an air of political sobriety. It includes former ambassadors, an assistant secretary of state, academics, and a chief US climate negotiator.

## Currency Swap CP

## 1NC

Counterplan—The United States Federal Reserve should substantially increase currency swap lines between the US Dollar and the Chinese Renminbi.

#### The counterplan solves currency war and US financial leadership

David Marsh. Writer at Market Watch. February 1, 2016. Opinion: How the Federal Reserve could prevent a currency war with China http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-federal-reserve-could-prevent-a-currency-war-with-china-2016-02-01#:ZU\_hIcz5GttlgA (accessed 5-15-16)

One key element that is missing in the incomplete architecture of the developing multicurrency reserve system is a swap line between the U.S. and China. It is time that the world’s two largest economies filled this lacuna by negotiating a Federal Reserve-People’s Bank of China swap agreement in each other’s currencies, with the aim of supplying dollar and yuan liquidity on international financial markets. Most of the more than 30 swap lines agreed between the PBoC and foreign central banks in the last eight years have been designed to help renminbi (yuan) settlement of international trade and investment — though they have also been used in currency support for some emerging-market trading partners. A Fed-PBoC accord, with the full-scale backing of the U.S. Treasury, would command more headlines. It would emphasize steadying the yuan USDCNH, +0.2485% against its main trading partners, with a major potential effect in calming financial markets. A Sino-American swap line would also strengthen the U.S. Treasury’s bid to regain ground in international financial diplomacy, following Washington’s less than sure-footed handling of the establishment of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank last year. In line with these ambitious goals, a Fed-PBoC accord would probably have to exceed the 350 billion yuan ($52 billion) swap lines in force between China and the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.

#### Dollar-backed forex swaps have been empirically successful at stabilizing volatile currencies

Benn Steil. Analyst at Council on Foreign Relation. March, 2015. The Spread of Central Bank Currency Swaps Since the Financial Crisis <http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/central-bank-currency-swaps-since-financial-crisis/p36419#!/> (accessed 5-15-16)

Both the State Department and the Treasury were consulted about which countries fit the criterion laid out by the Fed, which was that “intensification of stresses in [these countries] could trigger unwelcome spillovers for both the U.S. economy and the international economy more generally.” The transcript of the FOMC meeting at which the final decision was made shows that members had very specific concerns, such as whether countries with large holdings of mortgage-backed securites issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might be tempted to dump them all at once if they lacked easier access to dollars, thereby forcing up mortgage rates and impeding recovery in the United States. In his book International Liquidity and the Financial Crisis, William Allen provides estimates for a series of countries on the gap between the amount of bank liabilities in a particular currency that needed to be refinanced and the funds available for this purpose. Of the emerging-market economies, the Brazilian banking system had the greatest dollar gap and the Korean banking system had the greatest dollar gap among Asian banking systems. The Fed swap lines to emerging economies, like those to developed economies, helped fill these dollar gaps and lowered dollar interest rates.

#### The counterplan circumvents congress and improves US-Sino trade relations

David Marsh. Writer at Market Watch. February 1, 2016. Opinion: How the Federal Reserve could prevent a currency war with China http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-the-federal-reserve-could-prevent-a-currency-war-with-china-2016-02-01#:ZU\_hIcz5GttlgA (accessed 5-15-16)

Questions might be asked in Congress about the possible repercussions for U.S. taxpayers of a contingent credit accord between the U.S. and Chinese central banks. But Fed and Treasury officials would able to argue that such an agreement would be similar to standing arrangements between the Fed and other major foreign central banks. Typically, swap agreements are decided at the operational and policy levels between individual central banks, and do not require legislative approval. A further factor helping calm the political environment for such an accord is that it would lower the probability that Chinese depreciation would spark further “currency wars” between major trading partners, harming U.S. exporters in a U.S. election year. The accord would help calm nerves in Japan about undue depreciation of the yuan against the yen JPYCNY, +0.282822%. It would pave the way too for more constructive engagement between the U.S. and China extending beyond present dollar strength, preparing for the inevitable time — perhaps in two or three years — when the greenback starts to weaken again. Under arrangements formalized in 2007 and made permanent in 2013, the Fed maintains swap lines with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank. Earlier, the Fed built swap lines with Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Sweden, though these were withdrawn after the acute phase of the trans-Atlantic financial crisis.

## 2NC

#### Credit liquidation would backstop a Chinese economic crisis

Silver Coin Investor. February, 2016. China Currency Swaps and Prepping For the Last Monetary Frontier http://www.silver-coin-investor.com/China-Currency-Swaps-and-Prepping-For-the-Last-Monetary-Frontier.html (accessed 5-15-16)

The threat of a deflationary collapse in the Chinese economy seems to be growing. Another important issue is the growth of China’s own huge credit bubble. The Chinese seem to be playing it cool, perhaps waiting until the BOJ’s recent money printing experiment ultimately fails. This already appears to be happening, as evidenced by the Japanese equity market collapse in response to the latest version of Abenomics. In essence, this survival move on China’s part will be seen as a threat to other nations due to the emerging Chinese economy’s massive size. The Chinese depend on the United States to buy their cheap products as much as Americans depend on the Chinese to make cheap items for them to buy. Cheaper products are usually in greater demand in challenging financial times, while in abundant times people tend to seek out and pay up for higher quality items. A sudden disruption to U.S. Dollar based trade would potentially set the United States and its trade position back decades, and preparation for this day’s ultimate arrival has been happening for years. Nevertheless, too many systems at the heart of survival and functioning depend on a stable financial trade mechanism. In the end, the only budget that matters is yours, and it is also the only place where you have some control. This remains the one to study, plan and forecast for.

#### US-China swap would stabilize China’s economy

Robin Wigglesworth and Joe Rennison. Writers at Financial Times. January 11, 2016. Reserve selling lifts safer government bond yields https://next.ft.com/content/91407dce-b8b5-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb (accessed 5-15-16)

Since 2015, the domestic and international economic and financial situations facing China have changed drastically. China's economic growth has slowed to below 7 percent and the yuan has been depreciating amid an unprecedented trend of capital outflows. Such situations are completely different from what China was facing right after the financial crisis. The PBC should be concerned with how to avoid further yuan depreciation and possible related shocks. China needs a relatively stable internal and external financial environment in order to address the problems facing the domestic economy. It is highly necessary for China to establish a new mechanism to strengthen the stability of the yuan as the currency's internationalization is already well underway. Some could argue from a geopolitical point of view that the US may not agree to cooperate with China to fulfill this need. But according to my personal opinion, this issue is negotiable. Maintaining the stability of the international financial market and the yuan exchange rate, as well as the health of the Chinese economy is beneficial for the US too. Nations generally do not benefit from economic fluctuations in other nations, given the more deeply globalized world economy. Some analysts have pointed out that given the scale of the two economies and their importance to the global financial market, the two countries can work together to stabilize the global economy. A currency swap between China and the US could ease the yuan depreciation pressure, so China's policymakers should give it some consideration. And if such a deal materializes, it could also enhance the yuan's internationalization.

#### Currency swaps are empirically effective

He Jun. Writer at Global Times (China). March 9, 2016. China should consider currency swap with US http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/972715.shtml (accessed 5-15-16)

A currency swap agreement between China and the US has been advocated by economists and strategists before, as they believe it could have a positive impact in stabilizing international finance. Judging from the current domestic and overseas situations, promoting such an agreement seems even more relevant now. Currency swaps between developed countries have been around for quite some time. In 1962, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of France signed the first bilateral currency swap agreement. Up to the mid-1990s, the Fed signed currency swap agreements with other central banks and international settlement banks up to a value of $30 billion. By maintaining market confidence in dollar assets, the Fed aimed to stabilize international financial markets and maintain the dollar's role as the world's primary reserve currency. It also helped to consolidate the existing pattern of the international currency system, and to cope with changes in the global governance landscape. China started to consider currency swaps in 2000, and the People's Bank of China (PBC), the central bank, paid even closer attention after the US subprime mortgage crisis. When the crisis erupted in 2008, the PBC proposed studying currency swaps under the framework of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meeting, and to use currency swaps as a means of coping with the crisis. Back then, some countries were facing risks from capital flight and liquidity shortages, and were seeking closer collaboration with China. It was against this backdrop that China signed its first currency swap agreement with central banks of foreign countries, and opened up a new era of yuan internationalization. So far, China has signed currency swap agreements with 30 countries around the world, with a total value of more than 3 trillion yuan ($460 billion). What is noteworthy is that these swap agreements were not signed under the precondition of a completely freely tradable yuan. But because the yuan was not freely tradable, the effectiveness of the agreements was limited compared with the Fed's currency swap agreements.

## China A2/AD CP

## 1NC

Counterplan—The United States federal government should substantially increase its development of a maritime anti-access area denial strategy to contain potential aggression scenarios in East Asia.

#### The counterplan kills China’s leverage in the South China Sea

J Michael Cole. Writer at the Diplomat. November 12, 2013. How A2/AD Can Defeat China http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/how-a2ad-can-defeat-china/ (accessed 5-15-16)

Far less discussed, however, is the fact that China’s A2/AD strategy, or the likelihood that it will directly affect the course of a conflict, is contingent on a U.S. or allied response along conventional lines. In other words, China’s deterrence/denial efforts assume two things: first, that outside forces would seek to deploy closer to China in order to conduct operations; and second, that such deployments would involve traditional warships, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft and bombers — in other words, everything that the ill-defined Air-Sea Battle strategy promises to include. This “asymmetrical” approach provides China with a relatively inexpensive way to counter an opponent’s superior platforms: the PLA can afford to build and deploy several DF-21D launchers, while the U.S. would be loath to risk losing modern surface combatants, let alone a multi-billion-dollar aircraft carrier. Now a new report by the RAND Corporation proposes turning the tables on China by creating a regional A2/AD alliance, relying principally on anti-ship missiles (ASM), to impose a “far blockade” on China should the latter threaten regional security. Under the plan explored in Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific, U.S. forces and partner countries would respond to Chinese aggression by deploying land-based anti-ship cruise missiles with operational ranges of between 100 km and 200 km at various chokepoints — among them the Strait of Malacca, the Straits of Sunda and Lombok and the Java Sea Routes, waters between Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, as well as sea areas between Japan and South Korea — to keep the PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels (and presumably merchant ships) bottled inside the first island chain.

#### China would feel immense economic strain from a maritime denial strategy

Michael W Pietrucha. Writer at the Week. January 24, 2015. America's battle plan against China is suicidal. Here's a better one http://theweek.com/articles/567876/americas-battle-plan-against-china-suicidal-heres-better (accessed 5-15-16)

The war the United States should base its strategy upon is another conflict in which it fought an island nation that had successfully executed an "A2AD" strategy by physically occupying much of the Asian landmass from Manchuria to Burma — to Wake Island and the Solomons. The example we are looking for, and should be planning to, is the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945. An analysis of the flow of goods and materials into and out of China reveals that with 98 percent of all freight moving by sea, China is practically, if not geographically, an island nation. As such, it is vulnerable to interdiction of trade routes and energy supplies to a far greater degree than a land power, and this is a national vulnerability that air power is well-positioned to exploit — if applied properly.

## 2NC

#### The counterplan equalizes the actors involved in South China Sea

J Michael Cole. Writer at the Diplomat. November 12, 2013. How A2/AD Can Defeat China http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/how-a2ad-can-defeat-china/ (accessed 5-15-16)

The presence of such missiles, the report argues, would undermine the ability of PLAN warships, transport vessels, and amphibious craft to safely carry out sea operations in those areas while denying them access into the West Pacific. In addition, the size of the aggregate territory involved in the proposed alliance (optimally Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and perhaps Australia) as well as the number of islets on which ASM launchers could be dispersed, would severely challenge the PLA’s ability to locate such systems and render them inoperable using ballistic missiles, air strikes or sabotage. By resorting to such a plan, small regional powers would be in a position to wage their own A2/AD strategy against China and to threaten, at a relative low cost, more formidable and far more expensive Chinese naval platforms such as warships, landing helicopter docks, and carriers.

#### China’s economic would be ground to a halt without maritime access—their land routes aren’t developed

Michael W Pietrucha. Writer at the Week. January 24, 2015. America's battle plan against China is suicidal. Here's a better one http://theweek.com/articles/567876/americas-battle-plan-against-china-suicidal-heres-better (accessed 5-15-16)

There are only five long-haul rail lines crossing the border at all — three crossing from Siberia and two from Kazakhstan, and those lines carry more exports than imports. The primary reason for the expansion of the PRC's rail crossings in the last five years has been to carry exports to markets rather than to import goods or resources. The fifth line, Hunchun, has been closed for most of the last 15 years, but reopened in late 2013. In 2014, the Hunchun line moved comparatively little rail traffic, mostly coal. While China has expanded and upgraded its border crossings in the last five years, they are limited in capacity by the infrastructure on both sides of the border. All five lines are far more limited than their U.S. counterparts, because they tend not to be double tracked — less than half of China's rail lines are double tracked — and do not have the high height limits of U.S. trains, which can carry double-stack containers. China's road systems are also substantially less developed, with long distances between markets and with limited capacity compared to the U.S. interstate system. Also unlike the United States, China's international land ports are concentrated in five locations, all rail and road-served.

## Lawfare CP

## 1NC

The United States federal government should substantially increase efforts to coordinate international legal claims against aggressive actions committed by the People’s Republic of China.

#### The counterplan would constrain China’s actions in the South China Sea

Harry Kazianis. Writer at Asia Times. March 31, 2016. Time for a new US South China Sea strategy <http://atimes.com/2016/03/time-for-a-new-us-south-china-sea-strategy/> (accessed 5-15-16)

Washington should work with its allies and partners in the South China Sea to settle any disputes in the region that do not involve Beijing. America must work with its friends throughout Asia to make sure they can speak with a united, multilateral voice against Chinese coercion. This would be a big down payment towards such a goal. And while certainly not an easy task, Beijing’s growing mastery of the region could spur these parties to reach agreement. With this concluded all parties that have claims against China could then join the Philippines and file their own challenge in recognized international courts. While “lawfare,” as it is now know, will likely draw no formal challenge from China beyond its claims of “indisputable sovereignty,” a much larger filing by a united front of nations would certainly constitute a stronger action. While Washington would take no stance in such a large, multilateral lawfare action, it could offer important support in the press and diplomatically, urging Beijing to settle such disputes before court rulings turn public opinion even further against its efforts to dominate the South China Sea. Another idea along the same lines could see South China Sea claimants file a flood of separate lawsuits — but all filed simultaneously for maximum impact. This would clearly make China worry — creating a public-relations nightmare that no one dismissive press conference could easily cast aside.

#### US lawfare constrains Chinese aggression and improves US leadership

Sean Mirski. Writer at National Interest. June 4, 2015. How America Should Wage 'Lawfare' in the South China Sea <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-should-wage-lawfare-the-south-china-sea-13040> (accessed 5-15-16)

The law of sovereignty governs the question of territorial ownership—who owns which islands and reefs. It decides which claimant is entitled to reign over each of the physical features that dot the South China Sea. In contrast, the law of the sea (also known as maritime law) governs the question of maritime entitlements—in other words, which claimant (if any) can lawfully exert jurisdiction over the waters and seabed that are adjacent to any given piece of territory. Although both bodies of law touch on territorial questions, the laws can operate independently from each other. With some limited exceptions, a court could decide on the breadth of an island’s maritime zones without knowing who owns it, and vice versa. The United States has failed to make the most of the difference between the two sets of laws. Of course, this is not to suggest that international law is inapplicable except where convenience demands it. Rather, international law should be understood as one method of dispute resolution among many. When prodding the claimants toward a peaceful resolution of the dispute, Washington has a choice: it can emphasize international law as a basis for political settlement, or it can emphasize other factors—such as more abstract notions of “justice” or even raw power—instead. Thus far, American policymakers have often encouraged the claimants to resolve the conflict on the basis of “international law” writ broadly without specifying which bodies of international law can provide the best grounds for resolving the dispute. This omission has serious costs: by encouraging the disputants to resolve the dispute through recourse to “international law”—including the law of sovereignty—the United States may be unwittingly prolonging the dispute and encouraging aggressive behavior. Likewise, by not stressing the law of the sea enough on its own, Washington may be missing an opportunity to help the smaller claimants band together against China’s recent bout of regional assertiveness.

## 2NC

#### The US is best positioned to unite anti-China claimants

Sean Mirski. Writer at National Interest. June 4, 2015. How America Should Wage 'Lawfare' in the South China Sea <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-should-wage-lawfare-the-south-china-sea-13040> (accessed 5-15-16)

Historically, many of these nations flouted UNCLOS’ maritime entitlement provisions with abandon, grasping for control over as much of the ocean as they thought they could get away with. But this approach was a mistake: not only did it open them to charges of hypocrisy when they later criticized China’s own expansive claims, but it also led these claimants into disputes with each other, stymieing much-needed cooperation against the greater threat from Beijing. The United States is perfectly positioned to undo this damage and facilitate cooperation among the smaller claimants. The State Department has long evaluated other nations’ divergence from UNCLOS’ dictates in its meticulously researched and well-regarded “Limits in the Seas” (LIS) series. (Though the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it can legitimately interpret maritime law because it accepts most of UNCLOS’ substantive provisions as reflecting binding, customary international law.) While UNCLOS cannot solve all the region’s maritime boundary disputes, American diplomats should use the LIS reports to cajole and cudgel the non-China disputants into cutting their excessive claims down to size and resolving—or at least shelving—any distracting disputes with each other. This cooperation is already in its early stages, but more must be done to reconcile the smaller claimants’ domestic laws with UNCLOS.

#### The US has legal justification for international court challenges

Fu-Kuo Liu and Jonathan Spangler. Research Fellows at Taiwan Center for Security Studies. January 2016. South China Sea Lawfare: Legal Perspectives and International Responses to the Philippines v. China Arbitration Case http://www.scstt.org/Publications/South-China-Sea-Lawfare.pdf (accessed 5-15-16)

The United States has an “abiding interest in freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms in … the South China Sea.”13 Consequently, U.S. officials have emphasized that the country would “view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including … [UNCLOS].”14 Rising tensions in the South China Sea have prompted the United States to openly criticize China’s “nine-dash line” as inconsistent with international law. In December 2014, a State Department study concluded that, absent further clarification from China, the nine-dash line does not accord with the international law of the sea.15 Assistant Secretary Russel elaborated on these findings during his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 2015, stating that “maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with the international law of the sea” and that “claims in the South China Sea that are not derived from land features area fundamentally flawed.”16 Thus, Assistant Secretary Russel concluded that “any use of the ‘nine dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law.”17

# Kritik Realism K

### Argument Summary

This argument concerns competing approaches to IR (international relations) – it contends that realism is the best explanatory framework and that liberalism, or basing our interaction with China on liberalist justifications, is misled and dangerous. Simply put, engagement (or at least non-realist engagement) is a bad strategy for interacting with China because it fails to acknowledge or prioritize the fundamental dynamics of power that guide the actions of both parties.

#### Background

The resolutional question of whether the United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic and/or economic engagement with China gets at the very core of what motivates state decisionmaking. The foreign policy objectives of engagement aim to positively influence the behavior of another state, or bring about favorable change through such interaction – on what basis, then, do we determine what the results will be and why? Affirmatives defending engagement will posit assumptions underpinning state behavior by outlining the effects of the plan. This argument takes issue with that reasoning by contesting the very criteria for predicting how and why we believe states behave in certain ways.

In international relations two predominate paradigms of thinking exist: *realism* and *liberalism*. In addition to the grand theories, there are several alternative paradigms in existence, however, *constructivism*, above all has gained the most academic recognition. Successful deployment of this argument will require debaters to command an understanding of these theories and ability to debate their respective merits. So, let’s start by establishing a basis for each of the theories.

* **Realism** suggests that China’s domestic economic growth and international financial strength makes security competition between the United States and China inevitable. This theory posits that the international system is one of anarchy, i.e. there is no global government to dictate or constrain the action of states making them the primary political actors. States are rational, self-interested and value their own security above all else. The result of this security dilemma is that gains and losses are zero-sum between competing powers. China will not be the only state affecting the balance of power, the United States (and probably regional states) will seek to balance Chinese shifts. Chinese actions with regard to the South and Yellow Seas, North Korea’s aggression, and Taiwan will all by dictated by an effort to assert sovereignty over an increasing sphere of influence. This means U.S. security interests should be paramount in configuring our relationship with China.
* **Liberalism** argues that the economic interdependence, in the era of globalization combined with China’s increasing participation in international institutions will soon trump any security competition between the two (or others) states. Economic interdependence is believed to deter conflict by increasing the costs of war amongst trading partners. This combined with what liberals refer to as the democratic peace theory makes prospects for conflict extremely low Specifically, liberalism argues that China’s changing domestic landscape (emergence of a middle class through free market principles), will ultimately lead to democratization; the results of which would offset any security competition between states involved in the economic relationship. Thus, U.S. policy should seek to expand marketization and democratization of China in pursuit of peace and mutual gain.
* **Constructivism** and state identity has also served as a prominent paradigm for understanding China within the international system. Theoretically, Constructivism can be understood as the identity of a state shaping international behaviors, as apposed to any fixed material interest. Constructivists discard the realist balance of power theory and instead argue that a shared identity will determine whether the U.S. and China view each other as threats. From this perspective, establishing a sense of interconnectedness with the international community would encourage China to adhere to international norms and reap the benefits of such inclusion in institutions across the board thereby nullifying any future urge for conflict.

The larger question is: how do we know which one to accept?

#### Link Explanation

The very rationale for economically and/or diplomatically engaging China is tied up in beliefs of liberalism, that economic interdependence or liberal/democratic norms will enhance or fundamentally change our dynamic of competition with China. These assumptions are harmful in that they inform bad policy decisions. China will continue to do what is geopolitically strategic regardless of trade or dialogue, and faith in liberal norms is what is used to justify military expansionism to reshape the Asian sphere. Whether the Aff claims to combat terrorism by spreading liberal values, or dissuade conflict by increasing economic liberalization, this model for international relations incorrectly assesses the decision calculus of states failing to produce any reform and informing dangerous attitudes that lend themselves to imperialist warfighting.

The first Mearsheimer card provides a useful heuristic to establish the link to the judge – demonstrate how the 1ac manifests each of the three assumptions of neoconservative/liberal IR. The probability question needs to be communicated clearly on the link debate – establish the impossibility of their exaggerated impacts versus the systemic necessity of yours.

#### Impact Explanation

The 1nc Mearsheimer impact evidence says liberal interventionism is decidedly awful, a few reasons:

* US casualties are largely poorer, often persons of color. Iraq and Afghanistan have claimed 6,700 Americans but hundreds of thousands of veterans have been diagnosed with PTSD and vet suicide rates are rapidly outpacing civilians. Persons who are often functionally forced into service become disposable at the whims of security elites
* Military presence abroad trades off with crucial social services, education or transportation infrastructure investment which can help reduce structural inequality. (It probably also trades off with space exploration which is a bummer too). It also creates economic drags that make quality of living generally lower for everyone.
* Plus the imperial machine is pretty directly responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Vietnam, Cambodia, Latin America, and Africa

These are comparatively more likely than their worst-case exaggerations, because yours are status quo trends and theirs are unprecedented disaster scenarios – it’s structural, not terminal. The Aff can’t access any offense because liberalism only messes up where it intervenes – that’s the first Walt card – policymakers apply flawed problem-solution frameworks onto complex situations and are shocked to find that they can’t re-craft the world in their image. Great power war is unlikely but it’s more probable under liberalism because interventionism sets dangerous precedents and encourages enemy aggression.

#### Alternative/Framing

The plan text was mere seconds of the 1AC – but this idea is motivated chiefly by problematic IR commitments that, if endorsed here, gain intellectual legitimacy and produce bad understanding of the world. The alternative seeks to divest from those commitments and ideas by endorsing a realist lens for interacting with China. Proper theorization of international behavior would produce a comparatively better foreign policy involving strategic moderations and restraint.

The last Walt card of the 1nc says the complexities of contemporary foreign policymaking need more rigorous theory that can be discussed and refined here. Policymakers implicitly rely on theory all the time, in problem selection, diagnosis, and management, as well as risk forecasting – bad theory means failure at every level and an inability to adapt to changing factors, and reliance on often xenophobic stereotypes of others. Think of evaluating the debate through reflecting on how well the aff accords with predetermined security interest. If it has the wrong interests in mind then it probably leads to bad policy. Debate should be used to find and compare strategic priorities.

### 1NC

#### The aff is entrapped within liberal idealism – their desire to manage the world is driven by exaggerated threat scenarios that ignore our position of historic security

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/24/16)

The story is this: America’s national-security elites act on the assumption that every nook and cranny of the globe is of great strategic significance and that there are threats to U.S. interests everywhere. Not surprisingly, they live in a constant state of fear. This fearful outlook is reflected in the comments of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, before Congress in February 2012: “I can’t impress upon you that in my personal military judgment, formed over thirty-eight years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.” In February 2013, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that Americans “live in very complex and dangerous times,” and the following month Senator James Inhofe said, “I don’t remember a time in my life where the world has been more dangerous and the threats more diverse.” These are not anomalous views. A 2009 survey done by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that 69 percent of the Council on Foreign Relations’ members believed the world was more dangerous than—or at least as dangerous as—it was during the Cold War. In short, the elite consensus is that Egypt and Syria are not the only countries Washington has to worry about, although they are among the most pressing problems at the moment. This grim situation means the United States has a lot of social engineering to carry out, leaving it no choice but to pursue an interventionist foreign policy. In other words, it must pursue a policy of global domination if it hopes to make the world safe for America. This perspective is influential, widespread—and wrong. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the United States is a remarkably secure country. No great power in world history comes close to enjoying the security it does today. What’s more, Egypt and Syria are not vital strategic interests. What happens in those countries is of little importance for American security. This is not to say they are irrelevant but rather that Washington’s real interests there are not great enough to justify expending blood and treasure. Nor is there a compelling moral case for intervening in either country. Equally important, the United States has little ability to rectify the problems in Egypt and Syria. If anything, intervention is likely to make a bad situation worse. Consider America’s dismal record in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Moreover, it does not matter much who is in charge in Cairo or Damascus. The United States has a rich history of working with leaders of all types, including Communists, fascists, military dictators and traditional monarchs. For all the talk about the need to topple Syria’s Bashar al-Assad because he is a ruthless tyrant, Washington was able to live with him—and his equally ruthless father—for more than forty years. Interfering in countries like Egypt and Syria and turning the world into one big battlefield has significant costs for the United States. The strategic costs are actually not great precisely because the United States is such an extraordinarily secure country. It can pursue foolish policies and still remain the most powerful state on the planet. (This is not to deny that America’s interventionist policies are the main cause of its terrorism problem. Nevertheless, terrorism is a minor threat, which is why Washington is free to continue pursuing the policies that helped cause the problem in the first place.) The pursuit of global domination, however, has other costs that are far more daunting. The economic costs are huge—especially the wars—and there are significant human costs as well. After all, thousands of Americans have died in Afghanistan and Iraq, and many more have suffered egregious injuries that will haunt them for the rest of their lives. Probably the most serious cost of Washington’s interventionist policies is the growth of a national-security state that threatens to undermine the liberal-democratic values that lie at the heart of the American political system. Given these significant costs, and given that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Egypt and Syria, let alone the capacity for fixing the problems afflicting those countries, it should adopt a hands-off policy toward them. American leaders would do well to honor the principle of self-determination when dealing with Cairo and Damascus, and with many other countries around the world as well.

### 1NC

#### Liberal interventionism causes massive human suffering and economic difficulty and constrains effective public policy

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/24/16)

Unlike the strategic costs, the economic costs of global dominance have been enormous. For starters, the United States has had to maintain a huge and sophisticated military with bases all over the world so that it can intervene anywhere on the planet. Not surprisingly, its defense budget dwarfs that of any other country; in 2012, for example, the United States spent more on defense ($682 billion) than the next ten countries combined ($652 billion). That enormous defense budget accounts for roughly 20 percent of U.S. government spending, which is almost as much as it spends on Social Security and about the same amount it spends on Medicare and Medicaid put together. And then there are the various wars America has fought since 2001, which will probably end up costing a staggering $4–6 trillion. The enormous amount of money spent on defense since September 11 has contributed significantly to America’s huge national debt, which is now well over $16 trillion. That debt has been a major drag on the American economy and promises to be so for a long time to come. There are also major opportunity costs associated with all the money spent pursuing global dominance. Some of the hundreds of billions of dollars wasted on preparing for and fighting unnecessary wars could have been spent instead on education, public health and transportation infrastructure, just to name a few areas on the home front where additional resources would have made the United States a more prosperous and livable country. Then there are the human costs of these imperial policies, and here the main concern is the casualties from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Unlike the economic costs, which affect virtually every American, the human costs are borne by a narrow slice of American society. Because the United States has an all-volunteer force, only about 0.5 percent of the population serves in the military. Contrast that figure with World War II, where more than 12 percent of the population was in uniform. That means the overwhelming majority of Americans who have been eligible to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq have never put on a uniform, much less served in combat. The fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq has exacted a huge price from the U.S. military—especially the army and the Marines. More than 6,700 soldiers have been killed so far in those two conflicts, and over fifty thousand have been wounded in action, about 22 percent with traumatic brain injuries. Furthermore, as always happens in war, many of the combatants are psychological casualties, as they return home with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression. The Department of Veterans Affairs reported in the fall of 2012 that more than 247,000 veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have been diagnosed with PTSD. Many of those soldiers have served multiple combat tours. It is hardly surprising that the suicide rate in the U.S. military increased by 80 percent from 2002 to 2009, while the civilian rate increased only 15 percent. And in 2009, veterans of Iraq were twice as likely to be unemployed as the typical American. On top of all that, returning war veterans are roughly four times more likely to face family-related problems like divorce, domestic violence and child abuse than those who stayed out of harm’s way. In short, the small segment of U.S. society that has fought in these recent wars has paid a huge price for its service, while the vast majority of Americans have stayed out of uniform and paid no price at all. Proponents of the Iraq War like to claim that these human costs are deeply regrettable, but that it is a price that the United States had to pay in the wake of September 11. But Iraq was an unnecessary war: Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction, and even if he did, he could have been contained [6], just as the United States contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It was necessary to topple the Taliban in the fall of 2001. But once that goal was achieved—which happened quickly and with few American deaths—the United States should have left Afghanistan and stayed out. Instead, both the Bush and Obama administrations upped the ante in Afghanistan, in what soon became another unnecessary war. Second, both of these wars are lost causes. The Iraq that the U.S. military left behind after a decade of occupation is teetering on the brink of civil war, and anger at the United States runs deep among its people as well as its leaders. In Afghanistan, a corrupt and incompetent leader has consistently undermined American efforts to pacify and stabilize that country. There is little doubt that when U.S. troops finally leave, there will be fighting across Afghanistan and the Taliban will emerge as the most powerful force in the land. The herculean efforts of the American military in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been in vain. The final reason to think these wars were not worth fighting is that most Americans felt that way. Consider Iraq. According to polling by ABC News and the Washington Post, “By February 2004, just short of a year after it started, 50 percent of Americans said the war was not worth fighting; it reached a majority that June and stayed there, with just three exceptions, in 52 ABC/Post polls across the ensuing nine years.” When the fighting in Iraq was at its worst in April 2007, 66 percent said the war was not worth fighting. Likewise, in December 2009, as Obama ordered his troop surge into Afghanistan, a Pew poll found that only 32 percent of Americans supported this decision. Moreover, only 56 percent of the public thought the initial decision to invade Afghanistan in 2001 had been correct. PERHAPS THE GREATEST cost of a strategy that calls for intervening in countries like Egypt and Syria is the damage it does to the political fabric of American society. In particular, individual rights and the rule of law will not fare well in a country that maintains a large and powerful military and is addicted to fighting wars.

### 1NC

#### Vote negative to endorse realist moderation against their liberal idealism. Distinguishing the specificity of our political interests against cheap moralism and propaganda is key to a more careful foreign policy

Williams ‘4 (Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 58, Fall 2004, pp. 633-665 [DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304040202] accessed: 4/27/16)

This recognition allows one to make sense of Morgenthau's claim that as an ideal-type purely "political" man would be a "beast": as a sphere without content or limits, politics is potentially a remarkably destructive dimension of human action.'\*'\* Yet at the same time, politics is the protean center of social life, and Morgenthau views the indeterminacy of politics as a potentially positive phenomenon, representing the possibility of change, and as a core principle of democracy. As he characterized this ethic in direct contrast to that of Nazism: "The doctrine of democracy starts with the assumption that all citizens are potentially capable of arriving at the right political decision and that, consequently, nobody has a monopoly of political wisdom to which, at least potentially, the others would not have access.... Philosophic relativism, political pluralism, the protection of minorities of all kinds and with respect to all kinds of activities are therefore the earmarks of democratic theory and practice."''^ The limitless nature of politics is thus the source of both its perils and its possibilities."\*^ Politics is an extraordinarily dangerous sphere. By understanding its essence—its narrow conceptual specificity—it is possible to see the logic of political conflict, and the possibilities for its amelioration. Political conflict cannot be reduced to conflicts of material interest and calculation.'" It is far more fundamental; indeed elemental. Rather than wishing away this conflict, it is necessary to recognize its nature and attempt to exploit its positive potential. It is here that the importance of limits in realism becomes clearer. The process of conceptual limitation is linked to political practices of limitation. Far from precluding a broad analysis of political life, the narrow definition of politics becomes the foundation of a sophisticated sociological and institutional analysis, in which a limited conception of politics is deployed in an attempt to constrain the destructive capacities of the logic of politics, while retaining its possibilities for creativity. This requires discerning the structures and practices that support this goal, identifying those that are lacking, and developing a strategy to maximize the promise of politics and limit its perils. In Morgenthau's thinking, this realist strategy of limitation develops along three dimensions. First, he defines politics and political power as separate from other forms of power, particularly physical violence. This provides the basis for a limitation on the legitimate use of violence within the sphere of domestic politics. Second, he seeks to foster the development of other social spheres whose forms of interest and power can balance those of politics, minimizing the attraction of its violent potential and counteracting its capacities. Third, he attempts to insulate these spheres from each other. The spheres of morality, law, and economics must be insulated against the intrusion of the logic of limitless domination characteristic of politics, while the openness of the political sphere must be defended against its subsumption within these other spheres. In actuality, these structures and strategies of limitation will always be partial, and political practice will always involve the interpenetration of different spheres and the struggle between them. But this interpenetration must always take place against the background of their basic separation, a separation that is essential for the operation of an ethical and balanced political order.

### 1NC

#### Debate should prioritize good theoretical justification – it’s foundational to debating U.S.-China policy and key to life skills and policymaking

Walt ’12 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012 [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/] accessed: 4/18/16)

We live in a world of dizzying complexity. Each day, policy makers must try to figure out which events most merit attention and which items can be deferred, and they must select longer-term objectives and choose policy instruments they believe will advance them. To do this, they depend on purely factual knowledge (e.g., What is the current balance of payments? How much enriched uranium does Iran have?) but also on simple typologies (e.g., “revisionist” versus “status quo” powers), on “rules of thumb” derived from experience, or on well-established empirical laws (e.g., “Democracies don’t fight each other”). And whether they are aware of it or not, policy makers invariably use explicit or implicit theories that purport to identify causal relations between two or more variables of interest. Because contemporary IR theories are relatively weak and definitive empirical tests are elusive, policy debates often hinge on competing theoretical claims. In the 1990s, for example, disagreements over how to respond to the Balkan wars rested in part on competing theories about the causes of ethnic strife.12 Today, competing prescriptions over how to deal with China’s rise rest in part on rival theories of world politics, with realists favoring preventive actions designed to contain Chinese ambitions, liberals advocating policies of engagement designed to foster ties of interdependence, and social constructivists seeking to “socialize” China within existing norms and institutions.13 These debates are important because relying on bogus theories can get states into deep trouble. Prior to World War I, German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s “risk theory” argued that naval expansion would put the Royal Navy at risk and deter Great Britain from opposing German ambitions. Instead, this policy led the British to align more closely with Germany’s enemies. The infamous “domino theory” helped justify America’s costly involvement in Indochina and its ill-advised interventions in Central America, just as the neo-conservatives’ naïve beliefs about the ease with which democracy could be spread via military force paved the way toward disaster in Iraq. The converse is also true, of course: good theories often produce beneficial policy results. The Ricardian theory of free trade helped increase global economic growth, and the theory of nuclear deterrence developed in the 1950s informed many aspects of US defense policy and almost certainly reduced the danger of nuclear war. From a policy maker’s point of view, what is a good theory? A good theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid (i.e., it should fit the available evidence), it should also help policy makers comprehend phenomena that would otherwise be incomprehensible. (This is what we mean by a theory’s “explanatory power.”)14 Theories are more useful to policy makers when they deal with important phenomena, and when they contain variables over which policy makers have some leverage.15 Finally, theories are most useful when they are stated clearly. Ceteris paribus, a theory that is hard to understand takes more time for potential users to grasp and is usually harder to verify and test. How does theory help policy makers do their jobs more effectively? First, theory can help them diagnose new situations as they arise. When seeking to address either a recurring issue or a specific new event, policy makers must figure out exactly what sort of phenomenon they are confronting. Is a stalemated negotiation due to lack of trust or are the protagonists simply too far apart to strike a bargain? Is an adversary seeking to alter the status quo because it is greedy, over-confident, or ideologically inspired, or because it is insecure and trying to enhance a weak position? By expanding the set of possible interpretations, theories provide policy makers with a broader set of diagnoses, and can help them avoid premature closure or dangerous forms of stereotyping. Second, by identifying the central forces at work in the international system—what Kenneth Waltz called a “picture of a realm”—theory helps policy makers anticipate future developments.16 This capacity is especially valuable when circumstances are changing rapidly and when straight-line projections from the past are unreliable. To take an obvious example, it would be foolish to try to forecast China’s future conduct by looking solely at its past actions, or even its recent behavior, because Chinese leaders are likely to revise their preferences as their relative power increases. A good theory, however, could tell us how shifts in the balance of power will affect Chinese behavior and help leaders craft policies designed to forestall dangerous future developments. Third, theory is essential to formulating policy prescriptions because all policy actions depend on at least some crude notion of causality. In other words, policy makers select measures A, B, or C because they believe they will produce the desired result. Theory helps policy makers select objectives, guides the selection of policy instruments, and identifies the conditions that must be met for these instruments to work.

## Links

### Engagement

#### China foreign policy is meaningless if it’s not strategic hedging of U.S. interests, engagement will be ignored by Chinese realists and encourage aggression

Pei ‘14 [Minxin Pei, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College, “How China and America See Each Other: And Why They Are on a Collision Course,” in Debating China: The US.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. Edited by Nina Hachigian. Oxford University Press. [http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Pei.2014.FA.Hachigan.pdf] accessed: 5/3/16)

The worrying dynamics on display in Debating China should tip the scales in favor of the realist view. The liberal assumption seemed more valid when China was relatively weak and lacked the ability to directly challenge the U.S.-led order. But what many liberals have overlooked is that China's current acquiescence in this order does not add up to an endorsement of it. Given the incompatibilities between the defining characteristics of the international system (namely, openness and rule-governed behavior) and those of China's domestic regime (closed politics and the arbitrary exercise of power), it is doubtful that Chinese elites will ever view the Western order as legitimate, even if they concede its practical usefulness.¶ As a result, as China continues to grow stronger, it will seek either to modify the existing order or, if such an endeavor proves too risky or too costly, to construct a parallel order more to its liking. Such an order would not necessarily stand in direct conflict with the U.S.-led order, in the way that the Soviet bloc did, but it would have its own rules, exclude the West, and allow China to play a dominant role. Indeed, Beijing's investments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the planned BRICS development bank (a joint financial institution to be established by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) suggest that China is already moving down this path. China's controversial establishment last November of an air defense identification zone that overlaps with those of Japan and South Korea dramatically raised the risks of conflict with the United States and its allies. And it has further vindicated the realists' warning that China will not hesitate to challenge the Western order once it has the ability to do so.¶ The best American response to such behavior would be to continue its policy of strategic hedging-an approach, as explained by Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that backstops engagement by "shoring up relations with key maritime allies and partners and ensuring that states within the region are not easily intimidated by growing Chinese power." Strategic hedging can reassure China's neighbors and make Beijing think twice about advancing its interests through coercion. Meanwhile, liberalism offers no plausible alternative to such a policy, especially given how well versed in realism and balance-of-power tactics China's current leaders are. Of course, a policy of hedging, as typified by the pivot to Asia, will only confirm Beijing's long-held suspicion that Washington's liberal rhetoric masks a hard-nosed determination to perpetuate U.S. dominance.¶ But that is a price the United States must be prepared to pay. Until now, U.S. policymakers have relied on a two-pronged approach of hedging and engagement, drawing on both realist and liberal ideas about China. But as Chinese power continues to grow, maintaining such a balance will become harder than ever.

### Economic Engagement

#### Economic engagement only belies the security dilemma—Chinese nationalism proves political considerations overwhelm economic interdependence

Mearsheimer ’15 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Interviewed by Nikkei senior staff writer Hiroyuki Akita, “US, China heading toward face-off, says Mearsheimer,” Nikkei: Asia Review. March 16, 2015. [http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/US-China-heading-toward-face-off-says-Mearsheimer] accessed: 4/27/16)

Q: What do you think of the argument made by some scholars that economic interdependence between China and the U.S., or between China and other Asian countries, can lower the risk of conflict?¶ A: I've given my talk on why China can't rise peacefully probably about 135 times, and the single argument against me that is used the most often is economic interdependence theory, which says that because of all the economic interdependence in East Asia and between the United States and China, no one in their right mind would start a war because the economic costs would be so great. I think this is wrong.¶ Q: Why?¶ A: Because I think in many cases when you get into a conflict situation, political considerations trump -- overwhelm -- economic considerations. And what proponents of economic interdependence theory are saying is that in a crisis, economic considerations would be so overwhelming that political considerations will be pushed to the side. ... I don't think that's the case, and let me give you one example that highlights this, I think, quite clearly. The Chinese have made it very clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence, de jure independence, China would go to war immediately against Taiwan, even though it would involve significant economic cost. What the Chinese are saying is that political considerations are more important than economic considerations.¶ Switch to the Senkaku Islands -- it is possible to imagine China and Japan getting involved in a shooting war in the next few years. It's not likely, but it's possible. The reason that it is possible is because I think Chinese nationalism is so powerful that if a crisis breaks out, there may be great pressure from below in China on the leaders to actually fight against Japan. And the Japanese view the Senkaku Islands as sacred territory, so they will fight to defend that territory. All of this is to say that the politics of the situation -- here we're talking about nationalism, and nationalism in the Japanese case as well, because when you designate territory as sacred that's nationalism at play. What we're saying is that nationalism might override economic considerations.

### Diplomatic Engagement

#### Diplomatic engagement is a rigged game—China talks diplomacy while doing the opposite, realism is inevitable and explains interstate conflict

Mearsheimer ‘15 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Interviewed by Nikkei senior staff writer Hiroyuki Akita, “US, China heading toward face-off, says Mearsheimer,” Nikkei: Asia Review. March 16, 2015. [http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/US-China-heading-toward-face-off-says-Mearsheimer] accessed: 4/27/16)

A: China sends mixed signals when it talks -- it says very different things. China talks about rising peacefully and it tries to assure its neighbors, countries like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, that as it grows more powerful, those neighbors have nothing to worry about. However, at the same time the Chinese have made it clear that: No. 1, they want the Senkaku Islands back or they want to make them part of China; No. 2, they intend to make Taiwan part of China once again and, No. 3, they plan to turn the South China Sea into a giant Chinese lake.¶ What the Chinese are saying is that as we get more powerful we're going to try to change the status quo. This is going to frighten all of China's neighbors, and it's sending the opposite message from the one that says China can rise peacefully and that China is a benign power in the region. I think in the end ... that message -- that China is a benign power -- will be drowned out by China's behavior, which will be much more oriented towards altering the status quo, and by military force, if necessary.¶ Q: It sounds like you are saying a conflict between the U.S. and China is unavoidable unless China changes its behavior. But are you also saying that China will not change if its economy continues to grow?¶ A: My argument is that it makes good sense for China, if it continues to grow economically in an impressive way, to try to dominate Asia. It's not foolish for any country to want to dominate its area of the world. It makes very good sense for China to be in a position where it is by far the most powerful state in Asia and the United States is no longer in Asia. That's the ideal situation from China's point of view, just as from the American point of view, the ideal situation is to dominate the Western Hemisphere, to have no other great powers in the neighborhood and no distant great powers from either Europe or Asia come into the Western Hemisphere. That's ideal from the American point of view.¶ But to go back to Asia, it may be in China's interest to dominate Asia. But it is not in Japan's interest and it is not in America's interest to have a China that is what we call a "regional hegemon." Now, what will happen if China continues to grow is that you will get an intense security competition between China on the one hand and countries like Japan and the United States on the other. Whether or not that security competition leads to an actual war is difficult to say. It might not lead to a war, but there is at least a good chance that you'll have a fight, an armed conflict over the Senkakus or Taiwan or the South China Sea.

### IR Theory

#### The Aff’s scholarship underestimates the China threat by ignoring empirical evidence of realist aggression; only U.S. can power prevent escalation

Khoo ‘14 (Nicholas Khoo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago, New Zealand, “Is Realism Dead? Academic Myths and Asia’s International Politics,” Orbis (published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute), Spring 2014, 182-197. [http://www.otago.ac.nz/politics/otago077521.pdf] accessed: 5/4/16)

If what has been argued in this article seems like common sense, it should be noted that this has been in rather short supply in recent years. As we have shown, an influential group of scholars in the United States and Asia have promulgated perspectives that obfuscate rather than illuminate the realpolitik features that characterize inter-state behavior in the Asia-Pacific region. An appropriate attention to the empirical facts has not accompanied this fashionably abstract theorizing. Meanwhile, regional states have prioritized economics over the dictates of strategy and politics. In the process, they have underestimated the security dilemmas that could affect the region deleteriously.¶ Lulled by a decade and a half of post-Asian Financial Crisis economic¶ growth, regional elites developed a form of collective amnesia. Recent events in the East and South China Seas have rudely awakened them to the verities of power politics. Power balances power. Judiciously applied U.S. pressure could persuade the Chinese leadership to resolve regional conflict, rather than embark on an ultimately futile policy of expanding its influence at its periphery. If China’s rise and Asia’s future is to be peaceful and prosperous, it requires a more realist appreciation of power and its contemporary application to the Asian sphere than currently exists among both scholars and the region’s political elites.

### AT: China Is Only Responding

#### Aggression is not reactive – China initiated every recent dispute

Friedberg ‘14 [Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness,” The Washington Quarterly. 37:4 pp. 133–150. [https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27433/uploads] accessed: 4/24/16)

There are at least two major difficulties with the claim that China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas has been merely reactive rather than assertive. First, cutting into the narrative of an ongoing dispute at one point, rather than another, can produce dramatic shifts in perspective as to which side is most at fault. Thus, Beijing presents its own recent actions as a response to Japan’s purchase of the Senkakus. But Tokyo’s decision to take this step was driven in turn by China’s escalation of the dispute over the islands, extending back at least to the 2010 fishing boat incident.13¶ Similarly, the April 2012 dispatch of the Philippines naval frigate that so incensed Beijing was a reaction to the deliberate intrusion of Chinese fishing vessels a few days earlier into¶ waters claimed by Manila, made worse by the discovery that they had been violating Filipino law by harvesting endangered clams, sharks, and¶ corral.14¶ Second, even if China was provoked in these or other instances, it did not necessarily have to respond as aggressively as it did. In recent years, Beijing has repeatedly chosen to escalate ongoing disputes rather than wind them down. This pattern is so obvious that analysts have come up with a label to describe it:¶ Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt calls it “reactive assertiveness.”15 As a report by the International Crisis Group explains, under this approach “Beijing uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change the facts on the ground in its favour.”16

### AT: China Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### ‘Self-fulfilling prophecy’ is infinitely regressive—China continues to militarize despite US and regional overtures—and allies will securitize even if we don’t. The only question is whether we maintain deterrence.

Blumenthal et al. ’11 (Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs, Mark Stokes, Executive Director of Project 2049 Institute, was previously founder and president of Quantam Pacific Enterprises, an international consulting firm, and vice president and Taiwan country manager for Raytheon International, Michael Mazza, program manager for the American Enterprise Institute’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, former Research Assistant for Cornell University’s Southeast Asia Program, MA in IR from Johns Hopkins, studied at Inter-university Program for Chinese Language Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, “Avoiding Armageddon with China,” Foreign Policy, 9/6/2011, [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/06/avoiding\_armageddon\_with\_china?wpisrc=obinsite] accessed: 4/17/16)

The balancing and hedging strategy should involve options to avoid what Traub rightfully describes as "Armageddon." We call for a myriad of conventional options short of striking the nuclear-armed PRC, in the hope that such a strategy enhances deterrence in the first place and avoids Armageddon should deterrence fail. The strategy aims to slow escalation rather than quicken it. The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one -- is like a unicorn; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan. Traub asks whether our allies and partners will be willing to participate in an "anti-Chinese coalition," as he describes it. As the paper says, all allies, partners, and potential partners are already modernizing their militaries in response to China. And they will continue to do so regardless of whether the U.S. pursues what Traub would see as an "anti-China" strategy. Even laid-back Australia has plans to double its submarine fleet -- it is not doing so to defend against Fiji. The paper argues that it is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional nuclear arms race, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends. This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, would lead to Armageddon.

### Hegemony

#### Power politics remain primary – but their attempt to re-secure a global Pax Americana only bolsters a dangerous idealist foreign policy consensus

Walt ’14 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Bad Old Days Are Back,” Foreign Policy, 5/2/2014. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/02/the\_bad\_old\_days\_ are\_back\_china\_us\_russia\_power\_politics\_realism, accessed: 4/17/16])

Declaring an end to power politics is a time-honored U.S. tradition, of course; presidents as varied as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have offered sweeping statements about the imminent end of old-fashioned geopolitics and the dawn of an increasingly democratic, globalized, market-driven, institutionalized, and allegedly benevolent world order. Of course, that's easier to say when you're the dominant world power, have no strong enemies nearby, and possess the ultimate deterrent in the form of thousands of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the idea that power politics was disappearing has been an article of faith in the U.S. foreign-policy community ever since the end of the Cold War. Both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists embraced the idea that power politics was fading because it appealed to their own cherished beliefs about America's positive role in the world. For neoconservatives, power politics was dead in part because humankind had reached the "end of history" and free market democracy was going to be recognized as the only viable formula for a modern society, and in part because U.S. dominance made serious geopolitical rivalries impossible by definition: How could we have "power politics" when there was only one great power? For their part, liberal internationalists welcomed this claim because it suggested the United States could use its power, wealth, prestige, and influence to right the world's wrongs and spread democracy, free markets, and human rights far and wide. Even a rising China would pose no problem in this brave new globalized world; a powerful but benevolent America would embrace its rise and gradually "socialize" Beijing into a world order governed by institutions designed and (mostly) made in America. Because this vision was both seductive and self-congratulatory, it's unsurprising that so many members of the U.S. foreign-policy elite succumbed to it. A world without power politics put the United States at the center of a supposedly tranquil order and portrayed America's global role in a consistently positive light. It offered up an optimistic vision of international affairs in which mutually beneficial cooperation was the norm, yet it also gave the foreign-policy elite plenty of worthy and seemingly feasible projects to pursue in the name of the greater global good. With power politics gone, American foreign-policy mandarins could focus on a bunch of not-very-powerful "rogue states" and on spreading democracy, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, chasing down terrorists, spreading human rights, and whatever other worthy projects occurred to them. Unfortunately, over the past two decades five adverse developments eroded prospects for a durable Pax Americana and a permanent end to power politics. The first problem arose from hubris. Convinced that no one could stand up to America's daunting combination of might and right, members of the U.S. foreign-policy elite began expanding NATO in the mid-1990s, but without giving much thought to its potential costs and risks, most notably the possibility that this expansion would adversely affect relations with Russia. They also committed the United States to containing Iraq and Iran simultaneously and eventually decided to try to transform much of the Middle East essentially at gunpoint. The adverse results are painfully obvious: a heightened danger from terrorism, a costly debacle in Iraq, the quagmire in Afghanistan, and a deteriorating relationship with Moscow. Yet even a steady diet of setbacks did not end America's evangelical impulses entirely, as NATO's ill-fated intervention in Libya in 2011 and the protracted drone wars in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere attest. Not only did these mistakes cost several trillion dollars and thousands of lives, but they also diverted attention from more fundamental long-term challenges. Secondly, the most obvious challenge, of course, was the rise of China. As China grew richer, its leaders did not cheerfully accept the passive role that U.S. elites intended for it. Although the country still faces major internal challenges and is much weaker overall than the United States, Beijing isn't accepting every element of the existing geopolitical order. In particular, it is not willing to sacrifice its own territorial objectives and long-term desire for a dominant role in Asia or help Washington pursue its agenda in places like Iran. And the wealthier and stronger that China has become, the more willing it has been to challenge the existing status quo, especially in areas close to its shores. If power politics is over, Beijing doesn't seem to have gotten the message.

### Military

#### Liberal hegemony reinforces a dangerous and imperialist foreign policy consensus

Mearsheimer ’12 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “John Mearsheimer on Power as the Currency of International Relations, Disciplining US Foreign Policy, and Being an Independent Variable,” Theory Talks, 6/24/2012 [http://www.theory-talks.org/2012/06/theory-talk-49.html] accessed: 4/24/16)

I think the principle real-world problem for the US today is its liberal imperialist bent. The fact is that, both on the left and on the right in contemporary America, there is a powerful inclination to try to run the world and to rely heavily on military force for that purpose. Take the Bush Doctrine, for example. The US was bent on using military force to reorder the entire Middle East. The US was talking about imposing democracy on countries all across the Middle East at the end of a rifle barrel. This was a remarkably ambitious strategy! It was a strategy that many liberals and democrats supported, which is why there was so much support across the American political spectrum for the 2003 Iraq War. The key point is that the US has this imperial impulse wired into it today, and this includes both left and right wing elites. The end result of this is that the US has gotten itself into a heck of a lot of trouble over the past ten years, maybe even the past twenty years if you include some of the misadventures of the Clinton administration. The question is, how are we going to rid ourselves of this imperial impulse, and how are we going to break our addiction to war? If you look at the US today, it's quite clear that its elites are addicted to war. The US has been at war for two out of every three years since the Cold War ended. The US has fought six wars since 1989: the 1991 war against Iraq, the war against Serbia over Bosnia in 1995; the war against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999; the Afghanistan war, which started in 2001 and is still going on; the 2003 Iraq war; and then the war against Libya last year (2011). This is remarkable! And we're now talking about the possibility of using military force against Iran, and maybe even Syria! America’s elites are addicted to using military force. Plus they believe the US has both a right and a responsibility to run the world. This is not a healthy situation and it is imperative that the US figures out a way to break these bad habits. This is the key foreign policy issue at this point in time.

### Democracy

#### Democracy promotion is a dangerous slippery slope – forces unending violent interventions propelled by continual failures

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/24/16)

ONE MIGHT CONCEDE this point, but argue instead that moral considerations demand deep American involvement in Egypt and Syria—and other countries as well—to eliminate their ruling autocrats. The underlying logic is that these strongmen deny their people basic human rights and are likely to kill innocent civilians. The ultimate goal, unsurprisingly, is to promote democracy in those countries, not only for human-rights reasons, but also because democratic regimes are likely to be friendly to America. This line of thinking is not convincing; in fact, it is dangerous. The United States should not be the world’s policeman, in part because it should respect the principle of self-determination and allow countries to decide their own political fate. For good reason, almost every American recoils at the idea of another country interfering in their political life; they should realize other peoples feel the same way about U.S. interference in their domestic affairs. What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. Furthermore, the United States would be deeply involved in the politics of countries all across the globe if it pursued this ambitious policy. After all, there will never be a shortage of nondemocratic regimes to reform, and sometimes there will be the temptation to use the sword to achieve that end. Moreover, the United States has an abysmal track record when it comes to social engineering of this sort. Remember that the Bush Doctrine, which crashed and burned in Iraq, was supposed to facilitate the spread of democracy across the Middle East. Thus, if Washington pursues a policy of toppling authoritarian regimes and promoting democracy, there will be no end to our crusading but few successes along the way.

### Terrorism

#### Apocalyptic terrorism impacts feed public anxieties, encourage US interventionism, and centralize power in an industry with a vested interest in exaggerating the threat

Walt ’13 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Embarrassing Debate Over the ‘War on Terror’,” Foreign Policy, 12/9/2013 [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/04/the\_embarrassing\_debate\_over\_the\_war\_on\_terror#sthash.5tdKpkHs.dpbs] accessed: 4/17/16)

Are you as frustrated as I am by the whole discussion of terrorism in U.S. national security discourse? Given the billions of dollars that have been spent trying to protect Americans from terrorists (trillions if you add in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), and the army of academics, policy wonks, think tankers, and consultants who've been studying this matter for the past decade or more, you would think we would have a better idea of how well we are doing. And given the stakes involved, by this time you'd think that some serious cost-benefit analysis would be applied to the problem of counterterrorism: Hard-nosed people would be asking whether it really makes sense to spend all that money hardening the United States and chasing terrorists with drones and special operations forces, especially if most terrorists aren't focused on the United States and don't have the capability to do much damage to us. I raise this question because our leaders don't seem to be able to get their stories straight on this one. A good case can be made that the "war on terror" is mostly won -- in the sense that we've defanged the most dangerous anti-American types -- and that what's left are various copycats in various places that ultimately don't matter that much to the United States and are best dealt with by local authorities. If this view is correct, then President Barack Obama was right to suggest that the "war on terror" is over and to try to shift our attention back to other foreign-policy priorities. To say that is not to say the danger is zero -- indeed, there will be terrorist attacks in the future - it is just to say that it's more of a tragic nuisance than a Major Threat. But now we're being told by Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Mike Rogers, the heads of the Senate and House Intelligence committees, that the terrorist threat is back and worse than it was a few years ago. In particular, they point to the growing jihadi role in places like Syria and to self-congratulatory statements from al Qaeda leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri. The implication, as this New York Times story makes clear, is that the United States needs to get more directly involved in defeating this ever-expanding set of terrorist copycats. I understand that terrorist groups like al Qaeda do operate in secret (to the extent that they can), and that gauging the actual level of the threat they pose is not an exact science. And I recognize that risk-averse politicians prefer to err on the side of caution. If you issue lots of scary warnings and nothing happens, you can take credit for having been prudent. But if you tell people the danger isn't that great and then an attack takes place, you sound naïve, credulous, and insufficiently devoted to national security. So when in doubt, politicians are inclined to oversell the danger. Still, it really is important to get this right: Just how serious is the threat, some 12 years after the 9/11 attacks? In terms of the direct harm to Americans in the United States, the danger appears to be quite modest. So why are Feinstein and Rogers so animated by this latest set of developments? And doesn't Boston's defiant and resolute reaction to the city's marathon bombing in April suggest that the American population isn't nearly as querulous as politicians fear: If you explain to them that there is no such thing as 100 percent security, they don't go all wobbly. Instead, they display precisely the sort of calm resolution that causes terrorist campaigns to fail. It is even more important to figure out how best to respond. If Islamic extremists using terrorist methods are trying to gain power in various countries, does it make sense for the United States to insert itself in these conflicts and inevitably invite their attention? Or is the country better off remaining aloof or just backing local authorities (if it can find any who seem reasonably competent)? My larger concern is that we have also created a vast counterterrorism industry that has a vested interest in continuing this campaign. Those in the industry are the most prominent and visible experts, but fighting terrorists is also a meal ticket for many of them and self-interest might naturally incline them to hype the threat. The danger is that the United States will devote too much effort and energy to chasing relatively weak and obscure bad guys in various not-very-important places (see under: Afghanistan, Pakistan's frontier provinces, Somalia, etc., etc.,) while other problems get short shrift.

### Cyberwar

#### Cyberwar discourse is inaccurate and dangerous

Walt ’10 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Is the cyber threat overblown?” Foreign Policy, 3/30/2010 [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is\_the\_cyber\_threat\_overblown] accessed: 4/17/16)

 Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "cyber-warfare" business may be overblown? It’s clear the U.S. national security establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine -- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are increasingly worried by the danger of some sort of "cyber-Katrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure looks to me like a classic opportunity for threat-inflation. Mind you, I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of cyber-warfare don't have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-the-sand complacency. But here’s what makes me worry that the threat is being overstated. First, the whole issue is highly esoteric -- you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software, encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might be. Unfortunately, details about a number of the alleged incidents that are being invoked to demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard for us lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really was or is. Moreover, even when we hear about computers being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing, etc., it’s hard to know how much valuable information was stolen or how much actual damage was done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of the experts have a clear vested interest in hyping the threat, so as to create greater demand for their services. Plus, we already seem to have politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their states. Second, there are lots of different problems being lumped under a single banner, whether the label is "cyber-terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an enemy’s military capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys would penetrate computer networks and shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other important elements of infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the movie Live Free and Die Hard. A third problem is web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in Nigeria announcing that they have millions to give us once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is “cyber-espionage”; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or defense contractors’ computers and download valuable classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect the stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP). This sounds like a rich menu of potential trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun makes it sound trendy and a bit more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to be different too. Some issues -- such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical fixes but simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems may not require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and the private sector have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs to civil liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet. Third, this is another issue that cries out for some comparative cost-benefit analysis. Is the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid greater than the likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of cyber-espionage greater than the potential danger from more traditional forms of spying? Without a comparative assessment of different risks and the costs of mitigating each one, we will allocate resources on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable precautions against a potential set of dangers; my concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as dangerous as we are currently being told they are.

### Isolating Iran

#### Aggressively isolating Iran is contradictory to US interests – it creates destabilizing power asymmetries wherein Saudi Arabia and Israel can act uncontested

Walt ’13 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “What’s Really At Stake in the Iranian Nuclear Deal,” Foreign Policy, 11/25/2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/25/iran\_the\_us\_and\_the\_middle\_east\_balance\_of\_power#sthash.RVL4Oetv.oVjL8F63.dpbs] accessed: 4/17/16)

 The interim nuclear deal with Iran is an important step forward, and the various negotiating teams can be justly proud of their achievement. Far be it from me to be a killjoy at this rare moment of progress, but let's not lose our heads amid all the high-fiving and back-patting. Why? Because Iran's nuclear program is not in fact the real issue. The more important issues are Iran's future relations with the outside world and whether the deal paves the way for reintegrating that country into the world economy and the broader international community. There is something of a paradox in the ways that opponents and supporters of a deal approach the whole subject of Iran's nuclear program and the country's broader relations with the United States and other major powers. Opponents of a deal tend to believe that 1) Iran is governed by irrational and highly aggressive Shiite fanatics; 2) it is hellbent on getting a nuclear weapons capability; and 3) if Iran does get the bomb, it will have dramatic and overwhelmingly negative consequences for regional stability and world politics more generally. Given those (unwarranted) beliefs, you'd think hawks would be thrilled with this deal, insofar as it freezes Iran's current capabilities, will reduce the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium (i.e., the stuff that could be enriched to weapons grade fairly quickly), and leaves all the truly significant sanctions in place. If the nuclear program is your big concern, then this is a great first step and a more far-reaching comprehensive deal would be even better. (The alternatives -- an unconstrained Iranian program or another Middle East war -- are clearly inferior.) By contrast, many who support the current deal believe that 1) Iran's leaders are rational individuals seeking to advance Iran's national interests; 2) Iran has not yet decided to seek a nuclear weapon and probably prefers a condition of nuclear latency to a fully developed nuclear arsenal; and 3) getting the bomb wouldn't transform Iran into a major world power overnight and certainly wouldn't enable it to threaten Israel or blackmail its neighbors. If this view is accurate, then a final deal on Iran's nuclear program -- i.e., one that scales back those elements that shorten the breakout period but leaves Iran with some enrichment capacity -- isn't that significant by itself, because Iran wasn't really seeking a weapon anyway and its getting a few bombs wouldn't have that big an impact on world politics. Thus, the paradox: Many supporters of a diplomatic deal don't believe the danger of a "nuclear Iran" is all that momentous, while opponents of the current deal think Iran's nuclear program poses a grave and imminent threat. One would think the former would be more relaxed about recent progress, while the latter would be more enthusiastic. But that isn't the case: Those with a moderate view of the nuclear danger are much happier with the deal than those who (logically) ought to be more interested in anything that constrains what Iran is able to do. In fact, the real issue isn't whether Iran gets close to a bomb; the real issue is the long-term balance of power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Iran has far more power potential than any of the other states in the region: a larger population, a fairly sophisticated and well-educated middle class, some good universities, and abundant oil and gas to boost economic growth (if used wisely). If Iran ever escapes the shackles of international sanctions and puts some competent people in charge of its economy, it's going to loom much larger in regional affairs over time. That prospect is what really lies behind the Israeli and Saudi concerns about the nuclear deal. Israel and Saudi Arabia don't think Iran is going to get up one day and start lobbing warheads at its neighbors, and they probably don't even believe that Iran would ever try the pointless act of nuclear blackmail. No, they're just worried that a powerful Iran would over time exert greater influence in the region, in all the ways that major powers do. From the perspective of Tel Aviv and Riyadh, the goal is to try to keep Iran in a box for as long as possible -- isolated, friendless, and artificially weakened. But from the U.S. perspective, that's neither a realistic nor a desirable long-term goal. As I laid out last week, America's main strategic interest in the Greater Middle East is a balance of power in which no single state dominates. In such a situation, U.S. interests and leverage are best served by having good relations with as many states as possible and at least decent working relations with all of them. America's long-term interests are best served by helping reintegrate Iran into the global community, which is likely to strengthen the hand of moderate forces there and make Iran less disruptive in other contexts (e.g., Lebanon). Managing this process will require reassuring existing allies, but this development would also force current allies to listen to Washington a bit more attentively, which wouldn't be a bad thing.

### AT: Mearsheimer is talking about Syria and Egypt

#### Syria and Egypt in the first Mearsheimer card represent case studies that characterize how we should evaluate the aff’s predictions – specifically, that traditional US foreign policy thinking often overstates both threats and the US government’s capacities to resolve them – Mearsheimer is using Egypt and Syria to invalidate these “widespread beliefs” about foreign policy thinking

## Impact

### Impact – 2NC

#### Liberal interventionism is decidedly awful – that’s Walt:

#### US casualties are largely poorer, often persons of color. Iraq and Afghanistan have claimed 6,700 Americans but hundreds of thousands of veterans have been diagnosed with PTSD and vet suicide rates are rapidly outpacing civilians. Persons who are often functionally forced into service become disposable at the whims of security elites

#### Military presence abroad trades off with crucial social services, education or transportation infrastructure investment which can help reduce structural inequality. (It probably also trades off with space exploration which is a bummer too). It also creates economic drags that make quality of living generally lower for everyone.

#### Plus the imperial machine is pretty directly responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Vietnam, Cambodia, Latin America, and Africa

#### These are comparatively more likely than their worst-case exaggerations, because ours are status quo trends and theirs are unprecedented disaster scenarios – it’s structural, not terminal.

#### They can’t access any offense because liberalism only messes up where it intervenes – that’s the first Walt card – policymakers apply flawed problem-solution frameworks onto complex situations and are shocked to find that they can’t recraft the world in their image. Great power war is unlikely but it’s more probable under liberalism because interventionism sets dangerous precedents and encourages enemy aggression.

### Democracy

#### Global managerialism degrades domestic democratic politics – the government works on trust

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/17/16)

Lying is driven in some cases by the government’s need to hide illegal or constitutionally suspect activities from its citizenry. For example, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, was asked in congressional testimony on March 12, 2013: “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?” He answered, “No.” It quickly became apparent that he was lying, which he admitted when he wrote to Congress several months later: “My response was clearly erroneous—for which I apologize.” Later, he said that he responded to that question in the “least untruthful” manner possible. Although lying to Congress is a felony, Clapper has not been charged and remains in his position today. One could easily point to other cases where policy makers—including President Obama—have been less than honest with the American people. Pervasive obfuscating and lying, however, inevitably creates a poisonous culture of dishonesty, which can gravely damage any body politic, but especially a democracy. Not only does lying make it difficult for citizens to make informed choices when they vote on candidates and issues, but it also undermines the policy-making process, because government officials cannot trust each other, and that greatly increases the transaction costs of doing business. Furthermore, the rule of law is undermined in a world where distorting the truth is commonplace. There has to be a substantial amount of honesty and trust in public life for any legal system to work effectively. Finally, if lying is pervasive in a democracy, it might alienate the public to the point where it loses faith in democratic government.

### Turns Case – Military Interventionism

#### Threat exaggeration and global managerialism are both internal links to expanded executive illegality – turns the case

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/24/16)

Another consequence of America’s policy of global dominance is that the government inevitably violates the individual rights that are at the core of a liberal society and tramples the rule of law as well. The taproot of the problem is that a democracy constantly preparing for and fighting wars, as well as extolling the virtues of using force, will eventually transform itself into a national-security state. Specifically, the executive will become especially powerful at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Traditional checks and balances will matter little, resulting in an imperial presidency. An unchecked executive, however, does not simply accumulate great power. It also engages in behavior that involves breaking the law or operating in secrecy, largely to avoid public scrutiny and judicial or congressional review. In this regard, the checks and balances built into the U.S. system encourage executives to act in secret, because that may be the only way to get things done quickly. Leaders do not act this way because they are evil, but because they believe the country’s security demands it. In the tradeoff between security and civil liberties, they almost always come down on the side of security. After all, a country’s highest goal has to be its survival, because if it does not continue it cannot pursue its other goals. Given the exaggerated fear of foreign threats that permeates the American national-security establishment, it is unsurprising that Presidents Bush and Obama have pursued policies that endanger liberal democracy at home.

### AT: Great Power War

#### Great power war is a zero-risk impact – their threats are blatant politicized exaggerations that ignore numerous preventative factors

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/17/16)

THE UNITED STATES is an exceptionally secure great power, contrary to the folderol one frequently hears emanating from America’s national-security community. A good way to illustrate this point is to reflect on isolationism, a grand strategy with a rich but controversial history. Isolationism rests on the assumption that no region of the world outside of the Western Hemisphere is of vital strategic importance to the United States. Isolationists do not argue that America has no interests in the wider world, just that they are not important enough to justify deploying military force to defend them. They are fully in favor of engaging with the rest of the world economically as well as diplomatically, but they view all foreign wars as unnecessary. I am not an isolationist, but the logic underpinning this grand strategy is not easy to dismiss. Quite the contrary, as President Franklin Roosevelt discovered in the early 1940s, when he had great difficulty countering the isolationists. It is commonplace today to dismiss those isolationists as fools or even crackpots. But that would be a mistake. They were wrong to think the United States could sit out World War II, but they made a serious case for staying on the sidelines, one that many Americans found compelling. At the heart of the isolationists’ worldview is a simple geographical fact: the American homeland is separated from Asia and Europe by two giant moats. No great power can mount an amphibious operation across the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, and thus no outside power, whether it was Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, could directly threaten the survival of the United States. If the case for isolationism was powerful before Pearl Harbor, it is even more compelling today. For starters, the United States has thousands of nuclear weapons, which are the ultimate deterrent and go a long way toward guaranteeing a state’s survival. No adversary is going to invade America and threaten its survival, because that opponent would almost certainly end up getting vaporized. In essence, two giant oceans and thousands of nuclear weapons today shield the United States. Moreover, it faces no serious threats in its own neighborhood, as it remains a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the United States faces no great-power rival of any real consequence. In fact, most strategists I know believe it has been operating in a unipolar world since the Cold War ended, which is another way of saying America is the only great power on the planet; it has no peers. Others believe China and Russia are legitimate great powers and the world is multipolar. Even so, those two great powers are especially weak when compared to the mighty United States. In addition, they have hardly any power-projection capability, which means they cannot seriously threaten the American homeland. All of this is to say that the United States, which is the most secure great power in world history, has been safer over the past twenty-five years than at any other time in its history. General Dempsey’s assertion that the present marks the most dangerous era in his lifetime is completely wrong. The world was far more perilous during the Cold War, which witnessed the various Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. And it is hard to fathom how Senator Inhofe, who was born one year after Hitler came to power, could think today’s world is more dangerous than the first decade of his life.

## Alt

### Thesis

#### Five core assumptions of structural realism

Mearsheimer ‘6 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 , pp. 71-88. [http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf] accessed: 4/18/16)

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for power. It is based on five straightforward assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each other’s expense. But when they are married together, they depict a world of ceaseless security competition. The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states. The opposite of anarchy is hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic politics. The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. Each state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbour. Of course, that capability varies among states and for any state it can change over time. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states). The problem, however, is that it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. One might respond that policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy documents, which can be assessed. The problem with that argument is policy-makers sometimes lie about or conceal their true intentions. But even if one could determine another state’s intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with a revisionist or status quo state. The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. This is not to deny that they miscalculate from time to time. Because states operate with imperfect information in a complicated world, they sometimes make serious mistakes. Again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the possibility that there is a revisionist state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing about why all states pursue power. It is only when all the assumptions are combined together that circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense. To begin with, great powers fear each other. There is little trust among them. They worry about the intentions of other states, in large part because they are so hard to divine. Their greatest fear is that another state might have the capability as well as the motive to attack them. This danger is compounded by the fact that states operate in an anarchic system, which means that there is no nightwatchman who can rescue them if they are threatened by another country. When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call. The level of fear between states varies from case to case, but it can never be reduced to an inconsequential level. The stakes are simply too great to allow that to happen. International politics is a potentially deadly business where there is the ever-present possibility of war, which often means mass killing on and off the battlefield, and which might even lead to a state’s destruction. Great powers also understand that they operate in a self-help world. They have to rely on themselves to ensure their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they can turn to if they are attacked. This is not to deny that states can form alliances, which are often useful for dealing with dangerous adversaries. In the final analysis, however, states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community. Fearful of other states, and knowing that they operate in a self-help world, states quickly realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful. The reasoning here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the USA, because it is so powerful relative to its neighbours. This simple logic drives great powers to look for opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favour. At the very least, states want to make sure that no other state gains power at their expense. Of course, each state in the system understands this logic, which leads to an unremitting competition for power. In essence, the structure of the system forces every great power – even those that would otherwise be satisfied with the status quo – to think and act when appropriate like a revisionist state.

### Thesis – Inevitable

#### States will always act to preserve security

John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 30-32

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.5 There is no “government over governments.”6 The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.7 There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.8 Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist.”9 States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule *should* behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

### Thesis – China

#### Realism’s inevitable and good—most pragmatic way to reduce casualties in areas of rising instability, China proves

Kaplan ’11 Robert Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Libya, Obama and the triumph of realism,” Financial Times, 8/28/2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1wy5cqsYh, accessed: 4/17/16

Realism supposedly died at the end of the cold war, when the spread of free societies across eastern Europe highlighted the role of idealism in foreign policy. But then came the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, and the debacle of Iraq, and realism rose from the ashes. It will rise again now, given that the Middle East and East Asia are bound to get messier. Today’s attacks on realism are just as spurious as those that came before. It is said the theory failed the US by providing the rationale to support Arab dictators. But for any foreign policy to stay relevant for so long is itself a mark of success. The US also derived great benefits from this policy: stable bilateral relations and Arab-Israeli peace agreements ensued; trade routes in the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, on which global commerce and energy supplies depend, were made secure. More important, the political and technological conditions for democratic change in the Arab world were not propitious until recently, and the US should never be in the business of demanding revolutionary overthrows across a quarter of the earth for years on end. Realism counsels dealing with the material at hand, not seeking perennially to change it from half a world away. There is also the charge that realism is cynical, and does not therefore represent western values. But realism in the service of the national interest is the most consistently humanitarian approach possible – because realism is about the avoidance of war through the maintenance of a balance of power. The humanitarian interventionism in the Balkans notwithstanding, the greatest humanitarian gesture in living memory was US president Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, engineered by Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. By dropping the notion that Taiwan was the real China, they obtained China’s agreement to stop supporting communist insurgencies throughout south-east Asia. Also, with the US implicitly providing protection against the Soviet Union and an economically resurgent Japan, China was able to devote itself to the peaceful growth that would lift most of Asia out of poverty. As more than a billion people saw their living standards rise, there was a consequent explosion of personal freedoms. Such can be the wages of realism. Declaring realism dead because of events in the Middle East is also to demonstrate profound ignorance about Asia. There, nationalism is on the rise, as are military budgets. A half-dozen rising naval powers, principally China, have competing claims in the energy-rich South China Sea. This is a world of amoral balance-of-power calculations that will help define the 21st century. The futures of Libya, Yemen and Syria will all be decidedly troubled, even after all their dictators are overthrown, while post-Mubarak Egypt is an economic wreck with Nasserite and Islamist tendencies. In truth, the Middle East is undergoing less a democratic revolution than a crisis in central authority. Because instability is a given, realism – which counsels that interests are paramount in facing a multiplicity of situations – will once again prove to be the only credible belief system for those who, like Mr Obama, seek to wield power.

### Offshore Balancing

#### Offshore balancing solves—deters conflict while avoiding our unsustainability args

Walt ‘11 (Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Offshore Balancing: An idea whose time has come,” Foreign Policy, 11/2/2011, [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore\_balancing\_an\_idea\_whose\_time\_has\_come, accessed: 4/18/16]

Consider his column in today's Times. He makes two basic points: 1) the strategic stakes in Central Asia aren't worth the costs, and 2) withdrawal from Iraq will exacerbate Iranian-Iraqi relations and improve our strategic position. Gee, where did I hear those ideas before? And then he goes further, pointing out that getting out of our current "land wars in Asia" will restore our freedom of maneuver and give us more strategic options. Here's the money quotation from Friedman, based on testimony from a prominent Indian scholar: 'If the U.S. steps back, it will see that it has a lot more options,' argues C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research, in New Delhi. ‘You let the contending regional forces play out against each other and then you can then tilt the balance.' He is referring to the India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, China and Northern Alliance tribes in Afghanistan. ‘At this point, you have the opposite problem. You are sitting in the middle and are everyone's hate-object, and everyone sees some great conspiracy in whatever you do. Once you pull out, and create the capacity to alter the balance, you will have a lot more options and influence to affect outcomes - rather than being pushed around and attacked by everyone.' The United States today needs much more cost-efficient ways to influence geopolitics in Asia than keeping troops there indefinitely. We need to better leverage the natural competitions in this region to our ends. There is more than one way to play The Great Game, and we need to learn it." One might add that playing "hard to get" a bit would also make other countries do more to retain U.S. backing, and that would be good for us too. [[BREAK]] Although Friedman doesn't use the term in his column, the logic he's outlining here is pure offshore balancing. That strategy -- which would eschew nation-building and large onshore ground and air deployments -- would both increase our freedom of action and dampen anti-Americanism in a number of key areas. It would acknowledge that Americans are not very good at running other countries -- particularly when their histories and culture are vastly different from our own -- and that trying to do so is neither necessary nor wise. Offshore balancing would take advantage of America's favorable geopolitical position, most notably its distance from most of the world's trouble spots and centers of power. (Why should a country that has no great power rivals near its own borders be so eager to send its military forces deep into the Asian landmass, in search of monsters to destroy, especially when there are no threats to the overall balance of power in these areas? Better to follow Muhammed Ali's famous advice and "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.) Offshore balancing is not isolationism, however, because the United States would still be diplomatically engaged in many places and committed to intervening in key areas if and when the balance of power broke down. By eschewing costly onshore commitments and fruitless exercises in "regional transformation" and nation-building, however, it would husband the resources on which America's long-term prosperity depends and help us rebuild a society that used to be inspire others and increasingly disappoints.

### Offshore Balancing Solves Heg

#### Transition to offshore balancing makes primacy stable—solves our offense

Walt ‘11 [Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “The End of the American Era,” The National Interest, 10/25/11, (http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037] accessed: 4/17/16)

THE TWILIGHT of the American Era arrived sooner than it should have because U.S. leaders made a number of costly mistakes. But past errors need not lead to a further erosion of America’s position if we learn the right lessons and make timely adjustments. Above all, Washington needs to set clear priorities and to adopt a hardheaded and unsentimental approach to preserving our most important interests. When U.S. primacy was at its peak, American leaders could indulge altruistic whims. They didn’t have to think clearly about strategy because there was an enormous margin for error; things were likely to work out even if Washington made lots of mistakes. But when budgets are tight, problems have multiplied and other powers are less deferential, it’s important to invest U.S. power wisely. As former secretary of defense Robert Gates put it: “We need to be honest with the president, with the Congress, with the American people . . . a smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places and be able to do fewer things.” The chief lesson, he emphasized, was the need for “conscious choices” about our missions and means. Instead of trying to be the “indispensable nation” nearly everywhere, the United States will need to figure out how to be the decisive power in the places that matter. For starters, we should remember what the U.S. military is good for and what it is good at doing. American forces are very good at preventing major conventional aggression, or reversing it when it happens. We successfully deterred Soviet ambitions throughout the long Cold War, and we easily reversed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The U.S. naval and air presence in Asia still has similar stabilizing effects, and the value of this pacifying role should not be underestimated. By contrast, the U.S. military is not good at running other countries, particularly in cultures that are radically different from our own, where history has left them acutely hostile to foreign interference, and when there are deep ethnic divisions and few democratic traditions. The United States can still topple minor-league dictators, but it has no great aptitude for creating stable and effective political orders afterward. It follows that the United States should eschew its present fascination with nation building and counterinsurgency and return to a grand strategy that some (myself included) have labeled offshore balancing.2 Offshore balancing seeks to maintain benevolent hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and to maintain a balance of power among the strong states of Eurasia and of the oil-rich Persian Gulf. At present, these are the only areas that are worth sending U.S. soldiers to fight and die in. Instead of seeking to dominate these regions directly, however, our first recourse should be to have local allies uphold the balance of power, out of their own self-interest. Rather than letting them free ride on us, we should free ride on them as much as we can, intervening with ground and air forces only when a single power threatens to dominate some critical region. For an offshore balancer, the greatest success lies in getting somebody else to handle some pesky problem, not in eagerly shouldering that burden oneself. To be more specific: offshore balancing would call for removing virtually all U.S. troops from Europe, while remaining formally committed to NATO. Europe is wealthy, secure, democratic and peaceful, and it faces no security problems that it cannot handle on its own. (The combined defense spending of NATO’s European members is roughly five times greater than Russia’s, which is the only conceivable conventional military threat the Continent might face.) Forcing NATO’s European members to take the lead in the recent Libyan war was a good first step, because the United States will never get its continental allies to bear more of the burden if it insists on doing most of the work itself. Indeed, by playing hard to get on occasion, Washington would encourage others to do more to win our support, instead of resenting or rebelling against the self-appointed “indispensable nation.” In the decades ahead, the United States should shift its main strategic attention to Asia, both because its economic importance is rising rapidly and because China is the only potential peer competitor that we face. The bad news is that China could become a more formidable rival than the Soviet Union ever was: its economy is likely to be larger than ours (a situation the United States has not faced since the nineteenth century); and, unlike the old, largely autarkic Soviet Union, modern China depends on overseas trade and resources and will be more inclined to project power abroad. The good news is that China’s rising status is already ringing alarm bells in Asia. The more Beijing throws its weight around, the more other Asian states will be looking to us for help. Given the distances involved and the familiar dilemmas of collective action, however, leading a balancing coalition in Asia will be far more difficult than it was in Cold War Europe. U.S. officials will have to walk a fine line between doing too much (which would allow allies to free ride) and doing too little (which might lead some states to hedge toward China). To succeed, Washington will have to keep air and naval forces deployed in the region, pay close attention to the evolving military and political environment there, and devote more time and effort to managing a large and potentially fractious coalition of Asian partners. Perhaps most importantly, offshore balancing prescribes a very different approach to the greater Middle East.

## Framing

### Theory First – 2NC

#### Even if the plan’s a good idea, their bad theory acts as “mental mapping” which causes bad policy later

Walt ’13 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, interviewed by Phoebe Benich and Michael Campbell, “Applying Theory: A Scholar’s Lessons for Policymakers and the Academy: Interview with Stephen Walt,” Monitor International Interviews, vol. 6, no. 1, issue 1, 10/17/2013 [http://monitorjournal.org/interviews/06-1/01-walt.pdf] accessed: 4/18/16)

MJ: The European Journal of International Relations recently concluded with a special issue entitled “The End of IR Theory?” We want to hear more about your contribution to that debate. Is IR theory dead? SW: I obviously don’t think IR theory is dead. I would argue that the end of the Cold War, and a lot of development since then, have provided all sorts of interesting questions for us to think and theorize about. We still don’t have really good theoretical conceptions about globalization and what it means when information, ideas, and materials can flow so freely around and between countries as they are now. Similarly, we’ve never seen the emergence of a unipolar world before. In the 1990s, people began to write scholarly articles theorizing what the politics of such a world would be like. So theory is alive and well – or it should be. My contribution with John Mearsheimer to that collection was a piece on how the importance attached to theory by academics was declining. We argued that this was not a good trend, and that it was producing work that was less valuable, less policy relevant, and in fact less valid. The field was moving from a greater focus on theory to what we called “simplistic hypothesis testing,” which is hypothesis testing loosely based on underlying theoretical understandings. The hypothesis tests themselves are often done rather poorly and therefore, they don’t expand our understanding of international politics. We were not arguing that everybody in IR should be trying to write theory. Instead, we were saying that regardless of whether you are trying to do theory or hypothesis testing, it has to be informed by a sophisticated understanding of theory. By theory I mean clear, well-specified, and simple explanatory models that give you a clear sense of what the causal relationships and mechanisms are. In our view, the field has moved away from a careful reliance on theory, and is just mindlessly going out and testing hypotheses without thinking very hard about what’s really causing what. MJ: You said that theory is important for both scholars and policymakers. With that in mind, what guidance can you provide to undergraduates in the way that they think about the world as they prepare to enter the policy or academic communities? SW: I think there is actually great value in reading a lot of theory and reading it carefully. We all ultimately have to rely on rather basic and simple mental maps to navigate our way through this complicated world. You can’t figure out which maps or tools you’re going to use until after you’ve not only read a bunch of them, but also thought about them and considered whether they are logically coherent. You have to ask if they seem to be consistent with what you already know about the world. Another reason to read theory carefully is because of its excellent training in critical analysis. It allows you to acquire the ability to read something, unpack its core arguments, and then evaluate them. As you go into either a policy job, or the business world, or just being an ordinary citizen, you’re going to be constantly bombarded with people trying to persuade you of something. If you learn to determine whether something makes sense, that it hangs together, and that the evidence presented really does support it, you will have developed a very valuable skill.

### Conflict

#### Struggle is empty and inevitable, and is the condition of possibility for politics – the alts tension with the plan is productive

Williams ‘4 (Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 58, Fall 2004, pp. 633-665 [DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304040202] accessed: 4/17/16)

Seen in light of this Weberian heritage, the specificity of politics in realism becomes clearer. Power and struggle are intrinsic to human life. Politics is the sphere of contest over the determination of values and wills—an undetermined realm in which the struggle for power and domination is pure (without content) and thus potentially limitless. The specificity of the political sphere thus lies in power as an interest in itself. Politics, as an autonomous sphere, has no intrinsic object of interest; it is literally lacking in any concrete "interest" except the pursuit of power. This indeterminacy stands in contrast to other social spheres that possess concrete interests, forms of power, and limits that politics does not; for example, the economic sphere has a specific logic of interest (material gain) and a dominant form of power (control over material resources) that define its operation and give it a particular set of limits. Paradoxically, it is the unlimited nature of politics that is the basis of its conceptual specificity, and the basis of the distinction between the political sphere and other social spheres.'\*^ Yet the essential emptiness of politics also represents its promise and positive potential. The quest for power without a fixed interest leaves those interests open to transformation and revision and is, thus, the condition of change and progress. As a realm without a fixed interest, politics becomes the sphere of activity uniquely concerned with the consideration, generation, and transformation of common interests and understandings: the sphere where the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined. The lack of fixed understandings of the good and the true is the condition of modern politics, and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change. Morgenthau shares this understanding of politics. Politics, in principle, has no limits—it lacks defined objects of interest or resources of power. Its limits lie only in the confrontation between divergent wills, interests, and the forms of power they can wield. To return to Morgenthau's illustration of "nonpolitical" issues cited at the outset of this article, both legal (extradition) and trade relations are not political because they are conducted within largely shared and settled structures of agreement on the appropriate norms, rules, and procedures. The political struggle for power—the struggle over foundational principles, values, and so on—does not prevail in these relations (unless one actor is explicitly using them to these ends). By contrast, because it has no specific object to govern its interests or its potential forms of power, politics is an almost limitless field of struggle and domination. As Morgenthau repeatedly makes clear, the conceptual specificity of politics applies across all political realms; at this level, there is no fundamental distinction between domestic and international politics. The primary difference between the two lies in the social resources—institutional and ideational—available for the limitation of the negative logic of politics, and the exploitation of its positive capacities. As he puts it, "The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart," a symmetry "modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and the international spheres.""-'

### Policy Relevance Good

#### Policy relevance is key to addressing the endless list of pressing global issues and check a slide into fascism – whether their proposition seems “true to us academics” should be evaluated through the terms of how it would be translated to policymakers

Walt ’12 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012 [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/] accessed: 4/18/16)

Most social scientists would like to think that their work helps solve important problems. For scholars of international relations, there is certainly no shortage of issues to address: ethnic and religious conflict, managing a fragile world economy, global terrorism, climate change, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the Euro crisis, etc.—the list is endless. In this increasingly complex and still-contentious global order, one might think that scholarly expertise about international affairs would be a highly valued commodity. One might expect to see academic theorists working overtime to devise practical solutions to various real-world problems and playing prominent roles in public debates about foreign policy. Yet this does not seem to be the case for most of them. Former policy makers complain that academic scholarship is “either irrelevant or inaccessible. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion,” and one academic recently charged that “scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world. . . Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and in-grown.”1 This situation is not what I anticipated when I decided to pursue a PhD in political science in the spring of 1976, while studying at Stanford University’s overseas program in Berlin, Germany. My undergraduate major was International Relations, and I was torn between graduate study in political science or the more well-trodden and risk-averse path to law school. A lecture on Weimar-era intellectuals by historian Gordon Craig tipped the balance: Craig argued that many German intellectuals had withdrawn from public life during this period—deeming politics too corrupt and sordid for their enlightened participation—and their abdication had helped open the door to Nazism.2 Young and idealistic (some would say naïve), I decided to get a PhD and try to bring scholarship to bear on important public policy issues.3 It has been nearly thirty years since I received my PhD. At that time, I was convinced that systematic scholarly research could uncover and verify timeless truths about international politics and foreign policy, and that once those discoveries had been made, a grateful policy community would quickly absorb them and adopt the right prescriptions. With the passage of time, I’ve gained both a greater respect for the limits of what social science can accomplish and a greater appreciation for the imperviousness of the policy community to reasoned discourse, especially in the United States. Even if scholars were able to produce more convincing analyses—itself a debatable proposition—overcoming the entrenched interests that shape what policy makers choose to do is not easy.

### Academic Theory > Think Tanks

#### The affirmative is biased and politicized think-tank information – theory which re-engages the political is key

Walt ’12 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012 [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/] accessed: 4/18/16)

Instead, the gap between theory and policy has been filled by the growing array of think tanks, consultants, and other quasi-academic groups that now dominate intellectual life in major world capitals, and especially in Washington, DC. Policy makers no longer need to consult university-based scholars for advice on pressing global problems, as there is no shortage of people inside the Beltway who are happy to weigh in and are being paid to do just that. These organizations can provide useful guidance, but there are obvious downsides to their growing prominence. Most Washington-based think tanks have an ideological agenda—usually shaped by their financial supporters—and their research output is subject to far less rigorous standards. They also lack the elaborate vetting procedures, including peer review, that universities rely upon to make personnel decisions. Policy makers can get outside advice that addresses immediate concerns but it is neither disinterested nor authoritative.

### Scholarship Key To Politics – 2NC

#### Engaged academia key to check government groupthink, make sense of global affairs for their fellow citizens, and reinvigorate public political discourse

Walt ’12 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012 [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/] accessed: 4/17/16)

Despite these limitations, academic scholars—including IR theorists—have at least three useful roles to play in the broader public discourse on international affairs. First, those who have thought longest and hardest about the nature of modern world politics can help their fellow citizens make sense out of our “globalized” world. Ordinary people often know a great deal about local affairs, but understanding what is happening overseas generally requires relying on the knowledge of specialists. For this reason alone, university-based academics should be actively encouraged to write for and speak to broader audiences, instead of engaging solely in a dialogue with each other. Second, an engaged academic community is an essential counterweight to governmental efforts to manipulate public perceptions. Governments have vastly greater access to information than most (all?) citizens do, especially when it comes to foreign and defense policy, and public officials routinely exploit these information asymmetries to advance their own agendas. Because government officials are fallible, society needs alternative voices to challenge their rationales and suggest different solutions. Academic scholars are protected by tenure and not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, so they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and conventional wisdoms. For these reasons, a diverse and engaged academic community is integral to healthy democratic politics. Third, the scholarly community also offers a useful model of constructive debate. Although scholarly disputes are sometimes heated, they rarely descend to the level of ad hominem attack and character assassination that increasingly characterizes political discourse today. Indeed, academics who use these tactics in a scholarly article would probably discredit themselves rather than their targets. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in contemporary public life.

### Scholarship Key To Politics – 2NR

#### Scholarship is useless if it’s not shaped to provide practical responses to pressing public issues—extend Walt—advocacies should be weighed according to their ease of implementation and directness of intellectual justification

#### Public passivity is inevitable—accessible policy scholarship checks governmental and media dogma

### Uniqueness

#### SQ foreign policy elites are dogmatic liberals resistant to change

Walt ’13 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “How Not to Get Fresh Thinking on U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, 12/9/2013 [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/09/how\_not\_to\_get\_fresh\_thinking\_on\_us\_foreign\_policy#sthash.kCtCAojE.dpbs] accessed: 4/17/16)

Nonetheless, Ignatius is surely correct that there has been remarkably little imaginative thinking about America's role in the world and a dearth of serious debate about the fundamentals of U.S. grand strategy. This situation is especially surprising because there were two obvious moments when a serious rethinking of U.S. grand strategy should have occurred but didn't. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a fundamental shift in the global balance of power every bit as significant as the emergence of bipolarity at the end of World War II. The disappearance of America's main rival should have sparked an intense reassessment of America's global posture: In the absence of a peer competitor, was it necessary or wise for the United States to spend a substantially greater fraction of its national wealth on defense than its many wealthy allies were, to deploy powerful military forces around the world, and to take on increased security burdens in several areas? America's European and Asian allies were seriously concerned that the United States might seek to maximize its "peace dividend" and reduce its global commitments, but this possibility barely registered back in Washington. Instead, most of the discussion revolved around how far the post-Cold War Pax Americana should be extended, and no prominent foreign-policy officials proposed reducing America's global role by even a modest amount. To be sure, a handful of academics and policy wonks called for significant retrenchment during the Clinton years, but their views attracted little attention inside the Beltway and had zero impact on U.S. policy. One might also have expected a serious debate on U.S. grand strategy in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the 2008 financial crisis. These events exposed the folly of some earlier decisions and underscored the limits of U.S. power, and together they helped elect Barack Obama, who at least sounded like he wanted to do things differently. Yet the 2008 election proved to be a turning point where policy did not turn very much: The tone and tactics of U.S. foreign policy shifted in certain ways, but the core principles remained unchanged and for the most part unquestioned. Indeed, at no point in the post-Cold War era did the United States seriously consider reducing its global military role or cutting back on some (though of course not all) of its security commitments. The Obama administration did withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and set a deadline for the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, and U.S. force deployments have shifted in response to regional events and specific policy decisions. Yet the United States continued to spend more on national security than the next 20 countries combined -- even after the sequester -- and it maintains extensive security commitments on every continent. Remarkably, we seem to be deeply worried that we might have to come home from Afghanistan. Perhaps a major revision in U.S. grand strategy was neither necessary nor wise, and maybe U.S. leaders were correct to maintain such an expansive global role (and ambitions to match). Nonetheless, it is still striking that an event as momentous as the end of the Cold War, or the combination of two costly quagmires and a global financial collapse, had only a minor impact on U.S. foreign and national security policies and caused only minor ripples in the elite consensus on America's preferred role in the world. And in terms of the foreign-policy establishment, the difference really isn't generational. It mostly has to do with whether one is a part of the long-standing neoconservative/liberal internationalist coalition that has been running foreign policy for a long time. Ignatius is right to call for a fresh look at these issues -- especially the question of just how large these alleged "foreign threats" really are -- but we'd need to include a more wide-ranging cast of characters to get some genuinely new thinking into the mix.

### AT: Perm

#### Begs the question of our link arguments. They chose their 1AC justifications – voting aff implies endorsing theoretical and ideological commitments to IR liberalism that we find extremely problematic – that’s a reason to vote negative because it maintains interventionist cycles of violence and baseless fears of foreign others.

#### Any other permutation is severance – you should ignore it because it’s a moving target and doesn’t meaningfully test the 1AC

#### This is a method debate – they don’t get a perm – we are contesting the *controversial* 1AC defense of liberal IR and defending a competing school of thought – there’s an overwhelming amount of liberal literature criticizing realism, they should be able to generate offense without swamping the alt too

#### Framework filters competition – the Walt evidence says prior reflection on how our positions are theoretically based is key to decision-making and shapes future policy actions – that means you should evaluate the 1AC not in terms of the plan, but in terms of their commitments to liberal IR instead of realist IR

### AT: Perm – Heg Link

#### The perm’s retention of always “doing something” to solve problems reaffirms the legitimacy of an interventionist American hegemon

Walt ’13 (Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “Is America Addicted to War?” Foreign Policy, 4/4/2011 [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/04/is\_america\_addicted\_to\_war] accessed: 4/17/16)

A fourth reason we keep meddling all over the world is the fact that the foreign-policy establishment is hard-wired in favor of "doing something." Foreign-policy thinking in Washington is dominated either by neoconservatives (who openly proclaim the need to export "liberty" and never met a war they didn't like) or by "liberal interventionists" who are just as enthusiastic about using military power to solve problems, provided they can engineer some sort of multilateral cover for it. Liberal interventionists sometimes concede that the United States can't solve every problem (at least not at the same time), but they still think that the United States is the "indispensable" nation and they want us to solve as many of the world's problems as we possibly can. These worldviews are developed, promulgated, and defended by a network of think tanks, committees, public policy schools, and government agencies that don't always agree on what should be done (or which problems deserve most priority) but that are all committed to using U.S. power a lot. In short, our foreign policy is shaped by a bipartisan class of foreign policy do-gooders who spend years out of power maneuvering to get in, and spend their time in office trying to advance whatever their own pet project(s) might be. Having scratched and clawed to get themselves on the inside, the people who run our foreign policy are not likely to counsel restraint, or to suggest that the United States and the rest of the world might be better off if Washington did a bit less. After all, what's the point of being a big shot in Washington if you can't use all that power to try to mold the world to your liking? Compared with most Americans, this is a wealthy, privileged, highly educated group of people and most of them are personally insulated from the consequences of the policies they advocate (i.e., with a few exceptions, their kids don't serve in the military -- see No. 3). Advocates of intervention are unlikely to suffer severe financial reverses or face long-term career penalties if some foreign war goes badly; they'll just go back to the same think-tank sinecures when their term of service is over.

### AT: Perm – Moralism Link

#### The moral exceptionalism underpinning their advocacy is exactly why it needs to be rejected – this just causes more hypocrisy and violence

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/24/16)

What makes these policies even more alarming is that the national-security elites who execute and support them fervently believe in “American exceptionalism.” They are convinced that the United States is morally superior to every other country on earth. It is, so the story goes, the “light of the world,” a shining city on a hill. Americans stand tall and see further than other peoples, as Madeleine Albright put it. These elites obviously do not look in the mirror. But, if they did, they would understand why people all around the world think hypocrites of the first order run American foreign policy.

### AT: Heg Inev – Public

#### Public resistance to interventionism has tangible policy effects – Syria debate proves

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639] accessed: 4/17/16)

The American public, however, has become less enthusiastic about acting as the world’s policeman, especially when it means using military force and possibly getting involved in more wars. But this disconnect between the foreign-policy elites and the citizenry had not hindered the pursuit of global domination in any meaningful way until this past summer, when President Obama threatened to bomb Syria. It quickly became apparent that a large majority of Americans were strongly opposed to using military force there. Indeed, the opposition was so apparent that Obama seemed unlikely to get congressional backing for an attack, even though he promised it would be limited and the United States would not be drawn into another war. It was, as columnist Peggy Noonan put it, “a fight between the country and Washington, between the broad American public and Washington’s central governing assumptions.”

### AT: Alt 🡪 Isolationism

#### The alt isn’t isolationism – just a more realistic appraisal of what constitutes a security interest

Mearsheimer ’14 (John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, January-February 2014, [http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/america-unhinged-9639], accessed 5/4/16)

None of this is to say the United States should become isolationist or ignore its position in the global balance of power. On the contrary, it should make sure it remains the most powerful country on the planet, which means making sure a rising China does not dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It should also use force when core strategic interests are threatened. But Washington should stop intervening in the politics of countries like Egypt and Syria and more generally abandon its interventionist strategy of global domination, which has led to unending trouble. We might then begin to restore the tarnished liberal-democratic principles that once made America truly exceptional and widely admired.

### AT: Risk Not Objective/Bad

#### Even if objectivity is impossible, the fact that subjects exist external to ourselves necessitates moderated forecasting

Aven ‘3 [Terje Aven, professor of Risk Analysis and Risk Management at the University of Stavanger, Principle Researcher at the International Research Institute of Stavanger, former adjunct professor in Reliability and Risk Analaysis at the University of Oslo, and former dean of the Faculty of Technology and Science at the University of Trondheim, Norwegian Institute of Technology, Foundations of Risk Analysis: A Knowledge and Decision-Oriented Perspective, published by John Wiley & Sons, 2003, p. 44, http://www.need4stud.ru/\_dr/0/82\_2c0f2987cd35b41.pdf, accessed: 4/17/16]

Many social scientists have criticized traditional engineering risk assessments. We mention Beck (1992), Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Perrow (1984) and Shrader-Frechette (1991). The critical point seems to be that the idea of an objective risk cannot be justiﬁed. According to Slovic (1998), risk does not exist out there, independent of our minds and cultures. We must take the ‘naive positivist’ view, to use the terminology of Shrader-Frechette (1991), that risk exists objectively and can be measured, and replace it by a more balanced view. The answer is not the other extreme – the relativist view saying that A’s risk description is as good as B’s, regardless their bases – but a middle position, expressing that formal risk assessments provide useful information to support decision-making, by combining facts and judgements using scientiﬁc principles and methods. Most people, we think, are in favour of such a middle position, see (Shrader-Frechette 1991), but the challenge is to establish a proper platform for it. The aim of this book is partly to provide one.

#### Predictions inform policy discourse and strengthen theoretical foundations—complexity and possibility of error should not deter us, predictions are productive even when inaccurate

John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, 2001 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Chapter 1: Introduction, pp. 7-8.

Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available.) In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

### AT: Constructivism/Reps Matter

#### Reps don’t come first – it’s our reality that structures our existence

Wendt 2k (Alexander Wendt (Professor of IR at Ohio State University; Review of International Studies, 2000, 26: 165–180.)

Having been a classmate of hers in graduate school I am not surprised that Roxanne Doty believes her cats exist, and I am sure that upon meeting them most other postpositivists in IR would agree with her. To my knowledge not even the most hardened postmodernists have explicitly denied that the objects of everyday experience exist.9 Given this agreement on at least a ‘commonsense realism’,10 however, it is then instructive to consider how Doty knows her cats exist. I can only speculate, but my guess is that she knows it because she has seen them with her own eyes, and because believing that her cats are real has enabled her to deal more successfully with them. If so, note that this reasoning reproduces, in a lay science context, exactly what a positivist would say about professional science: she has used empirical observations and instrumental success to test the correspondence, the truth, of her theory of cats against the world. To be sure, things get more complicated when moving to things of greater interest to IR scholars like states, which are neither directly observable (thwarting commonsense realism) nor completely separable from observing subjects (unlike cats, states depend on actors’ beliefs for their existence). Having conceded commonsense realism, however, it becomes harder to deny scientific realism. It can be done—that is the empiricist version of positivism—but in the book I develop a lengthy argument against empiricism, which Doty does not challenge. That leaves the unique features of social kinds as the last line of defence for a radical denial of positivism in IR. Perhaps there positivism finally collapses, though I argue to the contrary, but Doty has not supplied an argument to that effect either. Raising the question of the ontological status of cats is useful because it calls attention to the fact that postmodern epistemology is not nearly as radical in practice as it sounds in theory. I don’t want to tar postmodernists with the brush of ridiculous views: I want to know why they hold such conventional ones. Thus, in her own empirical work on representations of subordinate peoples in imperial discourses, Doty proceeds more or less as any positivist would—amassing data and developing the best narrative she can to make sense of them.11 The same could be said about the empirical work of other IR scholars who are identified with postmodernism, like David Campbell or Cynthia Weber. Yet, if in practice postmodernists do not deny the existence, and even knowability, of a world outside of discourse, then what exactly are they saying? That all observation is theory-laden? That theories cannot be tested directly against the world but only against other theories? That as a result knowledge can never have perfectly secure foundations? These are all positions held by sophisticated positivists today. The straw man here in fact tends to be naive versions of positivism, which even if still believed by some are hardly a challenging target for post-positivist ire. Be that as it may, Doty has made an important move in explicitly embracing what has previously been only an implicit commonsense realism; now going a step further and addressing why she and other postmodernists are just like the rest of us in this respect might show that there is less at stake in the positivism wars than is often thought.

### AT: State Focus Bad

#### Get over it, the state is inevitable—any alternative is just another state

Mearsheimer ‘1 (John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 366.)

Another reason to doubt these claims about the state’s impending demise is that there is no plausible alternative on the horizon. If the state disappears, presumably some new political entity would have to take its place, but it seems that nobody has identified that replacement. Even if the state disappeared, however, that would not necessarily mean the end of the security competition and war. After all, Thucydides and Machiavelli wrote long before the birth of the state system. Realism merely requires anarchy; it does not matter what kind of political units make up the system. They could be states, city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, feudal principalities, or whatever. Rhetoric aside, we are not moving toward a hierarchic international system, which would effectively mean some kind of world government. In fact, anarchy looks like it will be with us for a long time. Finally, there is good reason to think that the state has a bright future. Nationalism is probably the most powerful political ideology in the world, and it glorifies the state.10 Indeed, it is apparent that a large number of nations around the world want their own state, or rather nation-state, and they seem to have little interest in any alternative political arrangement. Consider, for example, how badly the Palestinians want their own state, and before 1948, how desperately the Jews wanted their own state. Now that the Jews have Israel it is unthinkable that they would give it up. If the Palestinians get their own state, they will surely go to great lengths to ensure its survival.