NEGATIVE MILITARY POLICY, 2010-11

Table Of Contents. 1

SAMPLE NEGATIVE EVIDENCE.. 7

Table Of Contents 3

Arguing Negative on the Military Topic 9

***Topicality Definitions*** 11

The 12

United States 13

Federal Government 14

Should 15

Substantially 16

Reduce 17

Its 18

Military And/Or Police Presence 19

In One Or More Of The Following 20

South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey 21

***Afghanistan Neg*** 22

Inherency Answers 23

AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key 24

AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key 25

AT: Stability Advantage – Alt Causes 26

AT: Hegemony Advantage – Link Turn 27

AT: Hegemony Advantage – No Impact 28

Negotiations Counterplan – 1NC Shell 29

Negotiations Counterplan – Solvency Ext. 30

Negotiations Counterplan – Solves Stability 31

Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext. 32

Negotiations Counterplan – Terrorism Ext. 33

NATO DA – 1NC Shell 34

NATO DA – Links 35

NATO DA – Afghanistan Key 36

CMR DA Links 37

Politics DA Links – Plan Popular 38

Politics DA Links – Plan Unpopular 39

***Iraq Militarism Neg*** 40

“Withdrawal” Is Not The Same As “Reduce” 41

Details Of Withdrawal Plans Are Key 42

Withdrawal Should Be Tied To A Strong Iraq 43

Vietnam Is A Poor Comparison To Iraq 44

Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony 45

Occupation Degrades US Imperialism/Hegemony 46

Militarism Is Justified 47

Critical Pedagogies Are Failed Approaches 48

We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq 49

We Have An Ethical Obligation To Stay In Iraq 50

Withdrawal Undermines Democracy 51

Withdrawal Undermines US Leadership 52

Withdrawal Causes Major Regional Conflicts 53

Withdrawal Causes Genocide 54

Withdrawal Causes Genocide 55

Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State 56

Withdrawal Makes Iraq A Failed State 57

***Japan Neg*** 58

Hegemony Disadvantage – Shell 59

Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension 60

Hegemony Disadvantage – Key to Power Projection 61

US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Shell 62

US-Japan Alliance Disadvantage – Extensions 63

Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Shell 64

Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Impact Overview 65

Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Uniqueness 66

Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Proliferation Impact 67

Japanese Rearmament Disadvantage – Hegemony Impact 68

AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – Fissile Material 69

AT: Japan Won’t Nuclearize – F-22’s Impact 70

AT: Chinese Containment Bad Advantage 71

AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – No Set Agenda 72

AT: Japanese Politics Advantage – Dollar Turn 73

Consult Japan Counterplan – Shell 74

Consult Japan Counterplan – Extensions 75

***SK Neg*** 76

Plan Unpopular 77

Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC 78

Hegemony Disadvantage 1NC 79

Hegemony Disadvantage – Link Extension 80

North Korea Disadvantage – Bioweapons Shell 81

North Korea is a Threat – Bioweapons 82

North Korea is a Threat – US Posture is Key 83

Realism Good – Genocide 84

AT: Colonialism Advantage – Can’t Solve Root Cause 85

AT: Colonialism Advantage – Democracy Turn 86

AT: Colonialism Advantage – Colonialism Turn 87

AT: Colonialism Advantage – Hegemony Turn 88

AT: Structural Violence Outweighs 89

AT: Positive Peace 90

AT: No Great Power War – War is Possible 91

AT: No Great Power War – Even Small Wars Are Bad 92

AT: Kritik of Disadvantages 93

***Generic Advantage Core Neg*** 94

US Is Not Overstretched 95

US Recruitment Is High 96

US Will Withdraw Troops Now 97

Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony 98

Overstretch Is Not Key To Hegemony Cont’d 99

Hard Power Key Hegemony 100

Multipolarity Inevitable 101

Multipolarity Inevitable Cont’d 102

Soft Power Is Already High 103

Soft Power Is Already High Cont’d 104

The US Will Never Reinstate The Draft 105

Reinstating The Draft Is Good 106

Hegemony Bad – AT: Great Power Wars 107

Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars 108

Hegemony Bad – Entanglement Wars Cont’d 109

Offshore Balancing Good – War 110

Offshore Balancing Good – War Cont’d 111

Hegemony Bad – China 112

Rapid Proliferation Coming 113

Prolif Bad – Nuclear War 114

Prolif Bad – Nuclear War Cont’d 115

Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves 116

Prolif Bad – AT: Deterrence Solves Cont’d 117

Prolif Bad – Japan 118

***Prolif DA*** 119

Proliferation DA 1NC 120

Uniqueness – No Proliferation Now 121

Link – Perception of Retreat 122

Link – All Allies 123

Link – Laundry List of Allies 124

Link – Middle East Troops 125

Link – South Korea 126

Link – Japan 127

Link – Turkey 128

Link – Kuwait 129

Impact – Proliferation Bad – Leads to Nuclear Terrorism 130

Impact – Saudi Arabia Scenario 131

Impact – Japan Scenario 132

Impact – Japan Scenario – Asian Wars Impact 133

Impact – Turkey Scenario – Relations Impact 134

Impact – Turkey Scenario 135

Impact – Taiwan 136

AT: Proliferation Inevitable 137

AT: Deterrence Prevents Escalation 138

AT: No Wildfire Proliferation 139

***Hegemony DA*** 140

Hegemony DA 1NC 141

Hegemony DA 1NC 142

Hegemony DA 1NC Cont’d 143

Uniqueness – Hegemony High Now 144

Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now 145

Uniqueness – AT: Multipolarity Coming Now Cont’d 146

Links – General Withdrawal 147

Links – Afghanistan 148

Links – Japan 149

Links – Iraq 150

Links – Kuwait 151

Links – Kuwait Cont’d 152

Links - South Korea 153

Links – Turkey 154

AT: Link Turn – Soft Power 155

Hegemony Good – Conflict 156

Hegemony Good – Conflict Cont’d 157

Hegemony Good – Democracy 158

Hegemony Good – Free Trade 159

Hegemony Good – Proliferation 160

Hegemony Good – Proliferation Cont’d 161

Hegemony Good – Transition Impacts 162

Hegemony Good – AT: Multipolarity Better 163

Hegemony Good – AT: Counter-Balancing 164

Hegemony Good – AT: Terrorism 165

***Midterms DA*** 166

Midterms DA 1NC 167

Midterms DA 1NC 168

Uniqueness – GOP Win Now 169

Link – Generic 170

Link – Winner’s Win 171

Link – Reigning in Spending 172

Link – Japan 173

Link – South Korea 174

Link – Iraq 175

Link – Afghanistan 176

Internal – Obama Popularity Key 177

Impact – Economy 178

Impact – Wars 179

Impact – Warming Regulations 180

Impact – Card Check 181

AT: “Weak on Foreign Policy” Link Turn 182

AT: Health Care Outweighs 183

AT: Unemployment Outweighs 184

AT: Other Issues In the Interim 185

***Politics DA*** 186

Climate Bill – 1NC Shell 187

Climate Bill – 1NC Shell 188

Uniqueness - Yes Climate Bill 189

Uniqueness – Yes Political Capital 190

Links – Changing Military Policy 191

Links – Afghanistan Reductions Hurt Obama 192

Links – Iraq Reductions Hurt Obama 193

Links – Japan Reductions Hurt Obama 194

Links – Kuwait Reductions Hurt Obama 195

Links – South Korea Reductions Hurt Obama 196

Links – Turkey Reductions Hurt Obama 197

Internal Link – Obama Gets the Blame 198

Internal Link - Political Capital Key to Climate 199

Internal Link - Political Capital Finite 200

AT: Link Turn - Winners Don’t Win 201

AT: Link Turn – Popularity Not Key to the Agenda 202

Impact – US Competitiveness 203

Impact – Anti-Americanism 204

Impact – Warming Real/Fast 205

AT: Impact Turn - Climate Bill Helps the Economy 206

***Courts CP*** 207

Courts CP 1NC 208

Courts CP 1NC Cont’d 209

Courts CP 1NC 210

Courts CP 1NC Cont’d 211

2NC Impact – SOP - Hegemony 212

2NC Impact – Executive Power - Democracy 213

AT: Permutation – Do Both 214

AT: Permutation – Do Both Cont’d 215

AT: Permutation – Do the Counterplan 216

AT: Courts Not Perceived 217

AT: The President Will Ignore the Ruling 218

AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction 219

AT: Troop Deployment Not in Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction Cont’d 220

Troop Deployment/War Powers Key to Separation of Powers. 221

AT: Obama Already Solved Executive Power 222

Deference Bad – Conflict 223

Deference Bad – Environment 224

AT: Deference Key to Hegemony 225

AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Expertise/ Timing 226

AT: Deference Key to Foreign Policy – Pres Leadership Not Key 227

Courts Don’t Link to Politics 228

Courts Don’t Link to Politics Cont’d 229

***Recruitment CP*** 230

Child Care CP 1NC 231

Child Care Insufficient Now 232

Private Care Fails 233

Family Care Centers Are Key 234

CP is a Pre-Requisite to Retention 235

Child Care Key to Hegemony – Readiness/Retention 236

Child Care Key to Hegemony – Productivity 237

Child Care Key to the Economy 238

The CP Reinvigorates the Economy 239

Retention Key To Hegemony 240

Force Key To Hegemony 241

Forces Are The Only Way to Power Project 242

Forces are More Important Than Tech Investment 243

AT: Spending DA To CP 244

AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP 245

AT: DOD Tradeoff DA to CP 246

AT: Casualty Aversion Prevents Solvency 247

AT: Iraq Withdrawal is Key to Retention/Readiness 248

The CP Helps Obama’s Agenda 249

The CP Avoids the Political Capital DA 250

***Security K*** 251

Security K Explanation 252

Security K 1NC 253

Security K 1NC 254

Security K 1NC 255

The Word “Security” Is Security Logic 256

China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security 257

China Threat Claims Are Rooted In Security 258

Russian Threat Discourse Securitizes 259

North Korea Arguments Are Rooted In Security 260

India-Pakistan Scenarios Are Securitizing 261

Afghanistan Is A Securitizing Mission 262

Realism Is A Flawed Understanding Of IR 263

Securitization Fosters Violence And Extinction 264

Securitization Denies A Value To Life 265

Rejecting Security Representations Solves 266

Rejecting Security Representations Solves 267

Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security” 268

Permutations Do Not Break Down “Security” 269

***Capitalism K*** 270

Capitalism K Explanation 271

Capitalism K 1NC 272

Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d 273

Capitalism K 1NC 274

Capitalism K 1NC Cont’d 275

Uniqueness – Capitalism Is Collapsing 276

Link – Anti-War 277

Link – Iraq 278

Link – Afghanistan 279

Link – Afghanistan Cont’d 280

Link – Hegemony 281

Link – Hegemony Cont’d 282

Link – Law 283

Capitalism Bad – War 284

Capitalism Bad – Genocidal Violence 285

Capitalism Bad – Environment 286

AT: Capitalism Good 287

AT: Capitalism Good Cont’d 288

Alternative Solves – General 289

Alternative Solves – Withdrawing 290

AT: Permutation 291

AT: Permutation 292

AT: Permutation Cont’d 293

SAMPLE NEGATIVE EVIDENCE

AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key

Withdrawal emboldens terrorists – leads to new funding and recruitment

Mu Xuequan, Editor of Xinhua News Agency, 09-28-2009, “Pentagon opposes timeline to withdraw troops from Afghanistan,” China View, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/28/content_12118798.htm

The Pentagon on Sunday opposed setting timetable to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan as U.S. President Barack Obama is weighing on a decision whether to further increase troop levels there. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told CNN during an interview that setting such timelines or laying out an exit strategy would be a "strategic mistake" that could embolden al-Qaida and the Taliban. "The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States," he said, suggesting that a premature pullout would be perceived by the extremists as a victory over the United States, similar to the former Soviet Union's withdrawal from the country in 1989. "Taliban and al-Qaida, as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, al-Qaida recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on," Gates said.

A strong US presence is key to prevent terrorist takeover in Pakistan and Afghanistan

John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Security, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103131.html

America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization -- one that we clearly must win. U.S. policymakers must, of course, weigh all actions against America's global interests and the possible opportunity costs. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, low-cost strategies do not have an encouraging record of success. U.S. efforts to secure Afghanistan on the cheap after 2001 led it to support local strongmen whose actions alienated the population and thereby enabled the Taliban to reestablish itself as an insurgent force. Drone attacks, although efficient eliminators of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders, have not prevented extremist forces from spreading and threatening to undermine both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called "light footprint" option has failed to secure U.S. objectives; as the Obama administration and the U.S. military leadership have recognized, it is well past time for a more comprehensive approach.

Strong US presence in Afghanistan key to prevent instability that would spread across the region

Erin Simpson, Former professor at the Marine Command and Staff College, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103131.html

The war is worth fighting, and it's worth fighting well. Years of strategic neglect and severely limited resources have seriously undermined U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan. In the last year we finally acknowledged that Pakistan is critical to the success of our efforts in Afghanistan. In the next year we must recognize the degree to which Afghanistan is key to Pakistan's future stability. A fragmented, war-torn, or Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would offer both al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban a plush sanctuary with greater freedom of movement than is currently enjoyed in Pakistan. It is the future stability of this nuclear-armed neighbor that demands our presence and our perseverance in Afghanistan. Some might argue for a quarantine strategy for Afghanistan, akin to previous counterterrorism missions. But this is not a war that can be meaningfully fought from stand-off range. The intelligence demands are daunting and cannot be met from either the Indian Ocean or satellites in orbit. And even if they could, given the distances involved, such information is perishable. Only people on the ground -- civilians and soldiers, Americans and Afghans -- can secure the population and deny our adversaries the sanctuaries they crave. Is the War in Afghanistan worth fighting? Yes, but we've really only just begun.

AT: Stability Advantage – Troops Key

Withdrawal from Afghanistan causes massive regional instability and would inevitably draw us back in

Clint Douglas, Freelance writer and Afghanistan war veteran, 08-31-2009, “Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103131.html

It has become painfully difficult to continue to argue for a continued American occupation of Afghanistan. However, I can see no other realistic options. The war, odious and vicious as it is, must continue. The difficulty lies not with all of the tragically squandered blood and treasure, nor with the tenacity of the Taliban, but with the venality of the Karzai regime. The thuggish kleptocracy that passes for a government in Afghanistan does more to further the spread of the insurgency than any misguided air strike. If the Afghan government, which is propped up by both American guns and money, cannot provide some facsimile of a reasonably efficient rule, then the brutal but otherwise predictable alternative offered by the Taliban will prevail. There is no reason to believe that the government will improve any time soon, if the shenanigans surrounding these latest elections are any indication. And we have much less influence in domestic Afghan politics than we'd like to admit. However, we are far from powerless. We can continue to fund the expansion of the Afghan security forces, and we can enforce zones of relative stability that could facilitate the organic emergence of an Afghan leadership that can project both strength and integrity. All of which is a long shot, but a return to the status quo antebellum is impossible given the ever closer ties between the Taliban and the jihadist movement. An American withdrawal from Afghanistan now is not a move towards peace, but one that all but guarantees much greater instability and bloodshed in central and south Asia, which, let's face it, will inevitably draw us back into the region and on even less hospitable terms.

Withdrawal causes terrorism – undermines cooperation with Pakistan

Frederick Kagan, resident scholar at AEI, Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War, 03-23-2009, “Yes, We Can,” The Weekly Standard, http://www.aei.org/article/100251

Those who answer in the negative point out that Afghanistan no longer hosts substantial concentrations of al Qaeda. They argue that it is these international terrorists who should be of concern to the United States and that we shouldn't waste our resources fighting the Taliban and assorted other local malefactors. It is true that today there are more al Qaeda fighters, to say nothing of leaders, in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. But the most effective steps we can take to target them, using Predators and other assets, are made possible by the coalition troop presence in Afghanistan. If coalition forces pull out of Afghanistan or substantially reduce their presence, the already limited willingness of the government of Pakistan to cooperate with the United States will evaporate. Pakistan will see that the Taliban are heading toward victory and will cut deals with them-something that is already happening but will accelerate if U.S. forces are seen as being on the way out.

Withdrawal causes Taliban fill-in and civil war

Vanda Felbab-Brown, fellow at the Brookings Institution, 12-02-2009, “President Obama’s New Strategy in Afghanistan: Questions and Answers,” Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1202_afghanistan_felbabbrown.aspx

If the United States withdrew today, significant portions of the country, especially in the south and east, would fall into the hands of the Taliban. Other parts would either become engulfed in Taliban-generated and other local conflicts, or splinter into fiefdoms. Civil war à la the 1990s could easily be envisioned under such circumstances. At the same time, continuing with the current troop deployments would at best mean a stalemate, or at worst, a deepening of a quagmire.

AT: Stability Advantage – Alt Causes

Alt cause to instability – Pakistan

Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/26/obamas-options-in-afghanistan/

Pakistan being central to any solution of the Afghanistan issue, its geopolitical sensitivities cannot be ignored. Increasing Indian engagement in Afghanistan that Pakistan deems hostile to its security will force Pakistan to rely on Taliban support to neutralise Indian threat. This necessitates international pressure to be brought upon India to accept the peace accord that Pakistan is agreeable to and that would resolve contentious issues like Kashmir, moving them both towards peaceful coexistence.

No solvency – support for Israel and Iranian intervention

Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/26/obamas-options-in-afghanistan/

Iran must also be brought into the mix. Although Iran has been helpful in Afghanistan in the past, current tensions between the US and Iran will likely cause it to refrain from throwing its weight behind a multilateral arrangement. Engagement of Iran will have to be given serious attention and Israel will have to be kept on a tight leash. Similarly, Russian apprehensions about American intentions to marginalise it by gaining control over energy resources of Central Asia using Afghanistan as a conduit will have to be allayed too. Russia, India and Iran will also have to be brought on board to accept US-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia supported Taliban dominated government, owing to their past association with the Northern Alliance. And above all, American support to the biggest perpetrator of state terrorism – Israel, which in turn has fuelled terrorism around the world, will have to be rationalised.

Opium undermines stability

National Security Network, 05-13-2008, “AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM CRISIS UNDERMINES ITS LONG-TERM STABILITY,” NS Network, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/858

In plain view of the United States and the international community, the opium trade is overwhelming Afghanistan’s legitimate government. The facts are stunning: in 2001, after a Taliban ban on poppy cultivation, Afghanistan only produced 11 percent of the world’s opium. Today it produces 93 percent of the global crop; the drug trade accounts for half of its GDP; and nearly one in seven Afghans is involved in the opium trade. In Afghanistan, more land is being used for poppy cultivation than for coca cultivation in all of Latin America. The trade strengthens the government’s enemies and – unless its large place in the Afghan economy is permanently curtailed by crop replacements and anti-poverty efforts – poses a potentially fatal obstacle to keeping the country stable and peaceful. Afghanistan is caught in a vicious cycle. The fall of the Taliban brought the end of their highly coercive crop reduction program. A combination of U.S. inattention and widespread insecurity and poverty allowed poppy cultivation to explode. As the opium economy expanded, it spread corruption and empowered anti-government forces, undermining the Afghan state, leading to more poverty and instability, which in turn only served to further entrench the drug trade. Meanwhile the illicit activity has been a boon to the Taliban insurgency, which has traditionally used poppy cultivation as a lever to improve its own position. Today, the Taliban relies on opium revenues to purchase weapons, train its members, and buy support.

AT: Hegemony Advantage – Link Turn

Withdrawal undermines hegemony – multiple warrants

J Alexander Their, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 11-30-2009, “Afghanistan Is Still Worth the Fight,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/afghanistan_is_still_worth_the_fight?page=full

The final argument that compels continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is perhaps the most difficult for Obama to make: failure in Afghanistan will have broad and unpredictable implications for the U.S. role in the world. The United States and NATO would suffer a credibility crisis if the Taliban and al Qaeda can claim a full military victory in Afghanistan. On the heels of the disastrous U.S. experience in Iraq, the United States risks appearing feckless, unable to accomplish its highest priority national security objectives and perhaps unable to even define them. Where will its allies be willing to follow the United States next? If NATO is similarly unable to sustain commitment to its first-ever declaration of collective action in defense of a member, how will it respond to other challenges in the future? This is not a question of "saving face"-- the lifespan of al Qaeda and Talibanism will be determined by the perceptions of the region's populations about the strength and righteousness of the militants. In 2001, the Taliban were not just weakened, but discredited. In 2009, will the Taliban be seen as Afghanistan's (and Pakistan's) future? This malaise is likely to hit the United States at home, as well. Americans will grow increasingly skeptical of their ability to act effectively in the world, to deliver aid, to keep a difficult peace. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, U.S. engagement in the unstable corners of our world will remain an essential element of our security and prosperity in the next century. In that context, Afghanistan, beset by extremism, conflict, and poverty remains not only important in its own right, but a critical exemplar of the challenges we must meet in the decades to come.

No risk of the Vietnam scenario – plan undermines hegemony

Shahid R. Siddiqi, co-founded the Asian American Republican Club, 04-26-2009, “Obama’s Options in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Journal, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/26/obamas-options-in-afghanistan/

The sight of the American military giant limping back home, abandoning the much trumpeted war on terror, could signal American withdrawal from the world stage at a time when its monopoly on power is being challenged by other emerging power centres. This would badly compromise Obama’s ability to wield political and military influence in Europe and elsewhere and give Jihadi movements a shot in the arm. President Obama is acutely aware that he cannot allow Afghanistan to become another Vietnam, for then he stands no chance of winning back his office in 2012. He must, therefore, wrap up the war or come close to wrapping it up before the elections to avoid losing to rejuvenated Republicans and being shunned by war weary voters.

Withdrawal would undermine international cooperation – Pakistan proves

Wall Street Journal, 10-01-2009, “U.S. Credibility and Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html

Mr. Qureshi's arguments carry all the more weight now that Pakistan's army is waging an often bloody struggle to clear areas previously held by the Taliban and their allies. Pakistan has also furnished much of the crucial intelligence needed to kill top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in U.S. drone strikes. But that kind of cooperation will be harder to come by if the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and Islamabad feels obliged to protect itself in the near term by striking deals with various jihadist groups, as it has in the past. Pakistanis have long viewed the U.S. through the lens of a relationship that has oscillated between periods of close cooperation—as during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s—and periods of tension and even sanctions—as after Pakistan's test of a nuclear device in 1998. Pakistan's democratic government has taken major risks to increase its assistance to the U.S. against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Mr. Qureshi is warning, in so many words, that a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would make it far more difficult for Pakistan to help against al Qaeda.