

---

# West Coast Publishing

---

## Arms Sales 2019-20 Negative

**Edited by Jim Hanson**

Researchers

Angie Tinker, Eric Robinson, Jonathan Shane, Kinny Torre, Matt Stannard,  
Serena Fitzgerald, Shelby Pryor, William James Taylor

Thanks for using our Policy, LD, Public Forum, and Extemp Materials.

**Please don't share this material with anyone  
outside of your school**

including via print, email, dropbox, google drive, the web, etc.  
*We're a small non-profit; please help us continue to provide our products.*

**Contact us at [jim@wcdebate.com](mailto:jim@wcdebate.com)**

[www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States.**

# NEGATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

## ARMS SALES 2019-2020 WEST COAST NEGATIVE

**Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States.**

### Finding Arguments in this File

Use the table of contents on the next pages to find the evidence you need or the navigation bar on the left. We have tried to make the table of contents as easy to use as possible. You'll find scenario/impacts, affirmatives, disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks listed alphabetically in their categories.

### Using the Arguments in this File

We encourage you to be familiar with the evidence you use. Highlight (underline) the key lines you will use in the evidence. Cut evidence from our files, incorporate your and others' research and make new files. File the evidence so that you can easily retrieve it when you need it in debate rounds. Practice reading the evidence out-loud; Practice applying the arguments to your opponents' positions; Practice defending your evidence in rebuttal speeches.

### Use West Coast Evidence as a Beginning

We hope you enjoy our evidence files and find them useful. In saying this, we want to make a strong statement that we make when we coach and that we believe is vitally important to your success: DO NOT USE THIS EVIDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR YOUR OWN RESEARCH. Instead, let it serve as a beginning. Let it inform you of important arguments, of how to tag and organize your arguments, and to offer citations for further research. Don't stagnate in these files--build upon them by doing your own research for updates, new strategies, and arguments that specifically apply to your opponents. In doing so, you'll use our evidence to become a better debater.

### Copying and Sharing West Coast Evidence?

Our policy gives you the freedom to use our evidence for educational purposes without violating our hard work.

- You may print and copy this evidence for those on your team.
- **You may not electronically share nor distribute this evidence with anyone other than those on your team unless you very substantially change each page of material that you share.**

For unusual situations, you can e-mail us at [jim@wcdebate.com](mailto:jim@wcdebate.com) and seek our consent.

### Ordering West Coast Materials

1. Visit the West Coast Web Page at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)
2. E-mail us at [jim@wcdebate.com](mailto:jim@wcdebate.com)
3. Fax us at 877-781-5058

Copyright 2018. West Coast Publishing. All Rights Reserved.

**Visit our web page!  
[www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)**

*We're a small non-profit. Please don't share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States.....	2
NEGATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO .....	3
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	4
Negative Topic Strategies .....	14
Definitions.....	17
Substantial .....	18
Direct Commercial Sales .....	19
Foreign Military Sales.....	20
Arm Sales .....	23
Topicality Arguments.....	25
Topicality: Substantial means 49% .....	26
Topicality: Substantial Means Without Conditions .....	27
Topicality: Arms Sales Mean Equipment and Munitions .....	28
Topicality: Arms Sales Means Surveillance Technology.....	29
Topicality: Arms Sales Means Artificial Intelligence .....	30
Topicality: Reduce Does Not Mean Eliminate.....	31
Topicality: Arms Sales Does Not Mean Aid .....	32
Neg vs General Military Aid/Arms Sales .....	33
Military aid is better than US troops.....	34
Aid key to American interests.....	35
Aid is key to check China.....	38
Aid supports American jobs .....	39
Allowing authoritarian regimes to fail is bad.....	41
Bahrain terrorism support .....	44
Response to “Aid increases terrorism” .....	48
Response to “Aid solidifies dictatorships” .....	50
Response to “Aid hurts human rights” .....	51
Response to “Aid to Egypt is bad” .....	52
Response to “Aid stops democratization” .....	54

Response to “Aid hurts US interests” ..... 55

Neg vs Arming Insurgents ..... 56

    Arming insurgents key to stop ISIS/terrorism..... 57

    Arming rebels promotes democracy and stability..... 60

    Rebuttal to Arms provision empirically fails ..... 62

    Rebuttal to Past failures..... 64

    Rebuttal to Rebels can’t be trusted ..... 66

    Rebuttal to Arm governments instead ..... 68

    Rebuttal to Direct intervention better..... 69

    Rebuttal to Syrian arms provision bad..... 70

Neg vs Egypt Aff ..... 72

    U.S.-Egypt Ties Solve Middle East War Scenarios ..... 73

    U.S.-Egypt Relations Impacts ..... 74

    Solvency Answers..... 75

    France PMN/Counterplan ..... 76

    Conditional Aid Counterplan Solvency..... 77

    Egypt-Israel-Palestine Disadvantage..... 78

    Egypt-Israel-Palestinian Disadvantage..... 79

    Russia Disadvantage..... 80

    Russia Disadvantage..... 81

    Russia Disadvantage: Links..... 82

    Russia Disadvantage: Links..... 83

    Russia Disadvantage: Impacts..... 84

    Answers to Soft Power Advantage..... 85

    Revolution in Egypt Inevitable ..... 86

    Egypt Will Shift Allegiances to China..... 87

    Alliance Shift to China: Impacts ..... 88

    Terrorism Impacts ..... 89

    Terrorism Impacts: WMD..... 90

    Terrorism Impacts: WMD..... 91

Neg vs Israel Aff ..... 92

    Israel isn’t dependent on the US for arms ..... 93

    Israel/Iran war won’t happen ..... 96

Ending sales to Israel would cause conflict.....	99
Israel backlash DA .....	101
US Hegemony.....	103
Economy DA.....	105
Counterplan: The United States should support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. .....	107
Neg vs South Korea Aff .....	110
Answers to North Korea.....	111
Deterrence Solves .....	112
Deterrence key to Diplomacy .....	113
North Korea is a Threat.....	115
Hegemony Turn.....	117
North Korea War .....	119
No South Korea Arms Industry .....	120
Answers to China .....	121
Chinese Hegemony Coming .....	122
China War Impacts .....	124
Korean Economy Answers .....	125
No Solvency.....	126
Peace Treaty Counterplan.....	127
Korean Politics DA.....	129
Gridlock Now.....	130
Plan Unpopular – in Korea .....	131
South Korean Economy.....	133
US Politics DA Links .....	134
Plan Unpopular .....	135
Plan Popular .....	137
Neg vs Vietnam Aff.....	138
China containment works now .....	139
Arms sales are key to balance China.....	141
Arms sales key to prevent SCS crisis .....	145
Arms sales are key to Vietnam defense.....	149
Arms sales help US diplomacy .....	151

US involvement is key .....	153
Arms sales will promote other engagement.....	155
Soft containment of China fails.....	159
US and allies aren't the aggressors .....	162
Code of Conduct won't solve .....	164
Arms sales trade off link .....	165
Answer to Human Rights .....	166
Politics link .....	167
East Asia DA .....	168
China 1NC.....	169
China Extensions .....	173
Uniqueness – Deterrence Now – 5 .....	174
Links – General.....	177
Links – Vietnam .....	178
Links – South Korea.....	179
Internal Links.....	180
Impacts.....	182
North Korea 1NC.....	184
North Korea Extensions .....	186
Uniqueness.....	187
Links - South Korea.....	188
Links – Japan .....	190
Internal Links.....	192
Impacts.....	193
Economy DA.....	196
1NC.....	197
US arm sales are up now.....	202
US holds competitive advantage now .....	206
US arms competitiveness on the brink .....	210
Link—Saudi Arabia .....	213
Link—Israel.....	215
Link—Regulation/Treaty .....	216
Arms spending key to jobs .....	217

Arms spending key to stock market strength .....	218
Arms sales are key to the overall industry.....	220
Arms manufacturing key to US economy .....	222
Arms sales promote free trade .....	224
US key to international economy .....	225
Free trade from arms sales good .....	227
Arms sales key to oil price stability.....	229
A2 China will replace the US .....	231
A2 Arms spending increases deficit .....	232
Russia DA.....	233
1NC.....	234
Uniqueness.....	237
US Up.....	238
Russia Down .....	240
Links .....	243
General.....	244
Middle East .....	245
Central and East Asia .....	248
Saudi Arabia .....	249
Egypt .....	251
Vietnam.....	252
Internal Links.....	255
Arms key to Hegemony.....	256
Arms key to Human Rights.....	260
Arms key to Economy .....	261
Impacts.....	263
Russian Heg Bad – Europe Scenario.....	264
Russia Heg Bad – Arctic Sea Scenario .....	266
Saudi Prolif DA .....	269
OVERVIEW.....	270
SAUDI PROLIF SHELL .....	271
1NC—Uniqueness .....	272
1NC—Link.....	273

1NC—Int. Link—Saudi Arabia .....	274
1NC—Int. Link .....	275
1NC—Impact .....	276
***EXTENSIONS*** .....	277
***UNIQUENESS*** .....	278
Arms Sales Stable .....	279
Arms Sales Stable .....	280
Arms Sales High Now – Trump Policy .....	281
Arms Sales High Now – Methodology.....	282
Arms Sales High Now – Looser Restrictions.....	283
No Saudi Prolif Now .....	284
No Saudi Prolif Now .....	285
No Saudi Prolif Now—A/T US Helping Saudi Proliferate .....	286
US/Saudi Relations on Brink .....	287
US/Saudi Relations on Brink .....	288
US/Saudi Relations on Brink .....	289
***LINKS*** .....	290
Restrictions on Sales Cause Prolif .....	291
Security Guarantees Key to Stop Prolif .....	292
Security Guarantees Key to Stop Prolif .....	293
Arms Sales Key to Relations .....	294
Arms Sales Key to Relations .....	295
Arm Sales Reassure Allies .....	296
***INTERNAL LINKS*** .....	297
Arms Sales Are Security Guarantees.....	298
Arms Sales → Security Guarantees.....	299
Arms Sales Key to Security Perception .....	300
Arms Sales Key to Security Perception .....	301
Saudi Threat Perception.....	302
***IMPACTS*** .....	303
Prolif→ Nuclear War .....	304
Prolif→ Intentional and Accidental Nuclear War .....	305
Accidents/Theft.....	306

Arms Sales Good – Laundry List .....	307
Economy.....	308
US Heg DA .....	309
1NC Shell .....	310
Uniqueness – US influence is high now .....	311
Link – cutting arms sales would decrease US influence .....	312
IL – US influence good/ multipolarity bad .....	313
Impact – great power war leads to extinction.....	314
Backup.....	315
Uniqueness.....	316
Links – General.....	318
Links – US hard power.....	322
Links – Egypt.....	326
Links – Japan .....	328
Links – Middle East.....	329
Links – Saudi Arabia .....	332
Links – South Korea .....	336
Links – Vietnam .....	337
Internal links – US hegemony good/ multipolarity bad .....	338
Impacts.....	339
Conditions CP .....	341
Explanation Paragraph .....	342
1NC—Condition CP—Solvency .....	343
Condition CP—General .....	344
Condition CP—General .....	345
Solvency—Signaling .....	346
India Conditions CP .....	347
1NC—India CP .....	348
India Says Yes – Government Support .....	349
India Says Yes – Russia/Pakistan Deal.....	350
Solvency – No Arms from Russia.....	351
Solvency – No Arms from Russia.....	352
Solvency – No Arms from Russia.....	353

Solvency Booster – India Needs Arms .....	354
Solvency Booster – India Needs Arms .....	355
Net Benefit – Politics.....	356
Net Benefit – Relations/China Containment .....	357
A/T Sanctions Solve.....	358
Egypt Conditions CP .....	359
1NC—Egypt CP .....	360
Egypt CP—Conditions Key.....	361
Egypt Says Yes—Empirics.....	362
Egypt CP—Solvency.....	363
Egypt CP—Solvency.....	364
Egypt CP—Stability.....	365
Egypt CP—Human Rights .....	366
Egypt CP—Human Rights .....	367
Saudi Conditions CP .....	368
1NC—Saudi CP .....	369
Saudi CP—Solvency—Say Yes .....	370
Saudi CP—Solvency—Say Yes .....	371
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War .....	372
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War .....	373
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War .....	374
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War .....	375
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War .....	376
Saudi CP—Solvency—Yemen War—A/T Buy Elsewhere .....	377
Saudi CP—Human Rights .....	378
Turkey Conditions CP .....	379
1NC—Turkey CP .....	380
Turkey CP—Solvency.....	381
Turkey CP—Solvency.....	382
Turkey CP—Net Benefit .....	383
UN Arms Trade Treaty CP .....	384
1NC.....	385
HR/I-Law solves arms sales.....	390

ATT makes arms sales transparent .....	394
ATT key to HR credibility .....	397
ATT key to US leadership .....	399
ATT key to solve development/poverty.....	405
Development Extension.....	408
ATT key to solve failed states.....	411
Saudi arms sales should be stopped through I-Law .....	413
Answer to Trump undermines credibility .....	414
Answer to Won't be enforced/universal .....	416
Answer to Regulates domestic sales.....	417
Fem IR Kritik .....	420
1NC Shell .....	421
1NC Shell .....	422
1NC Shell .....	424
Extension.....	425
Links – Arms Sales .....	426
Links – Arms Sales .....	427
Links – (ATT) Arms Trade Treaty .....	428
Links – (ATT) Arms Trade Treaty .....	429
Links—Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW) .....	431
Links - Drones.....	433
Links – Focus on War tactics (not militarism) .....	434
Links – Ignoring Gender / (A2: “Link of Omission”) .....	435
Links – The State (general).....	436
Links – The State (A2: “state good”) .....	437
Links - “Women in Foreign Policy Now” .....	438
Links – Genocide .....	440
Links— Human Rights .....	441
Answers to Permutations.....	442
Answers to Permutations.....	444
Alternative Solvency .....	446
Alternative Solvency .....	448
Impacts.....	450

Answers to “Realism Good” (or link to Realism Bad) .....	452
Securitization Kritik .....	454
1NC Shell .....	455
1NC Shell .....	457
Arms Sale Link Extension .....	458
Arms Sale Link Extension .....	459
Politics of Fear Link/Impact Extension .....	461
State Links .....	463
Africa Links (State-based Security).....	464
Africa Links (Threat Perception / Security) .....	465
China Links – Fear-based Politics .....	466
China Links – State-centric Politics.....	467
China Links – African Interventionism .....	468
China Links (No threat) .....	469
Russia Links (New Missile Tech/Security Logic) .....	470
Russia Links (New Missile Tech).....	471
Russia Links (NATO Competition) .....	473
Climate Change Links .....	474
Child Soldiers Links.....	475
Child Soldiers Links.....	476
Rape/Sexual Violence Links.....	477
Alternative Extension .....	478
Alternative Extension.....	479
Alternative Extension.....	480
Alternative Extension.....	481
Alternative Extension.....	482
Permutation Answers .....	483
Impacts – Serial Policy Failure.....	484
Impacts - Extinction.....	486
A2: Realism (reflexive) .....	487

# Negative Topic Strategies

## Disadvantages

### Economy:

The most straightforward argument is centered around the economic benefits of arms sales. There are the obvious answers about the billions of dollars of revenue that get generated directly from the sale. There is also ample literature available that attest to many indirect benefits that arms sales provide; technological advancements, job growth, etc. Moreover, the Trump administration's arms sales are at historic highs which means that an ending of arms sales would trigger perceptual links to investor flight and general stock market downturns. Moreover, prominent buyers of arms e.g. Saudi Arabia, have built their economic relations through military sales—the oil embargo of 1973 devastated the US economy and oil prices quadrupled.

### Hegemony:

Arms sales have been an integral part towards the strengthening of alliances and effectiveness of the US military. They provide an incentive for allies to work with the US because of the guarantee in terms of the quantity as well as quality of weapons. Moreover, the sell of arm, particularly to lesser developed countries, has served as a stabilizing effect in regions around the world. Arms sales a method to ensure not only economic growth but to bolster our allies and as innovation increases, it also decreases the cost of arms for the American military.

### Allied Proliferation:

Arms sales include various bureaucratic checks to prevent the spread of weapons. The UN Conventional Arms Trade Treaty is supposed to facilitate the minimal and safe development of weapons; however, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India haven't even signed the agreement. Therefore, it is only US checks that prevent proliferation—one of the methods being the on-site inspections of sovereign territory. By committing to US arms sales purchasing entities also adapt their foreign policy to the confines of US strategic interests—most notably by not interacting with America's enemies. Arms sales regulation also stops the sell of American weapons; the US even kicked Israel out of the Joint Strike Fighter program for selling UAV parts to China.

Allied proliferation has a variety of impacts attached to them e.g. nuclear proliferation leads to miscalculation and nuclear war, non-state actors steal bombs or materials, the magnification of proxy and civil wars etc. What's important in all of these arguments is that perceptual link is particularly strong; the past half century of American foreign policy has utilized consistent and ever-growing arms sales and the affirmative reverses this precedent.

### Democratic Reforms:

America is not consistent in its support of human rights when it supports authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia. However, military supplies are used as a carrot to incentivize democratic reforms and the expansion of civil liberties. Saudi Arabia, with all of its problems, have made some reforms in regard to women's rights and part of that came from Western influences. This type of argument has the utility of

hedging back against affirmatives that are based in democratic ideals because there is strong case to be made that when countries feel insecure that is when there is a crackdown on civil liberties.

Politics:

Trump's withdrawal from the UN Arms Trade treaty, the treaty that was intended to regulate international transfers of arms, was met with partisan backlash. Nancy Pelosi's outcry against this was based in the need for a regulatory framework for arms sales.

The reduction of arms sales could be viewed as bad because the US provides checks in arms sales, but it could also be regarded as good because it limits the proliferation of arms. In other words, the link is based in both perception but also the ability for the affirmative to curtail the spread of weapons.

Kritiks

Colonialism: The links to this argument stems from colonial standards of rationality i.e. savage states must be punished. This Kritik would work best against affirmatives that are based in liberalism or realism because there are both predicated upon the civilizing of society and the disciplining of "bad" countries. I think that alternatives should focus on decolonial modes of governance because in an ideal world the neg would want to solve for international problems as well. The benefit of this strategy is that it would be able to out-left liberal affirmatives and outweigh conservative ones.

Security: Kritiks of securitization would be centered around a maintenance of US hegemony or the very least, the containment of bad actors. Therefore, the negative is given access to arguments that are rooted in the endless pursuit of security through the never-ending maintenance of arms sales programs. Indeed, anytime that there has been a reform to arms trade regulation it has been solely for the purpose national security.

Realism:

This Kritik could move into either direction; this paragraph will address affirmatives that are liberalist or Marxist. In other words, realism good. The Kritik would have the standard tenants of realism good and inevitable but the power of the Kritik comes from it's structural analysis about the nature of states and conflict. In particular, there is a lot of evidence that Russia and China are desperately trying to expand their influence, whether that be through economic development of African states, to the securitization of the artic. These arguments would turn the solvency of the affirmative because another state would simply fill the void and do even worse actions than whatever the affirmative isolates in the 1AC.

Counterplans

The counterplans for this topic is rather hard to predict i.e. no access to alternative actor CPs. That being stated I think that the negatives best counterplan would be a Conditions counterplan. Since the majority of countries that buy the US arms are now dependent upon a consistent supply of arms that provides a high incentive for countries to implement domestic reforms. Moreover, there is a precedent for conditions counterplans—the very process of arms sales, regardless of FMS or DCS, require safeguards and multiple checks (conditions) that must be met. Conditions CPs would work the best against democracy affirmatives or affirmatives that involve countries using American weapons in bad ways e.g. arming others or conducting wars.

***We're a small non-profit. Please don't share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)***

The second counterplan that should come to mind is the delay counterplan. Considering how the presidential election is imminent arguments stemming from political capital or winners-win etc.

# Definitions

## Substantial

### **Substantial means at least 49%**

Shimon **Arad**, Retired Colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces, May 15, **2018**, "Trump's Plan for Selling Weapons to the Middle East", <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumps-plan-selling-weapons-the-middle-east-25839>. (accessed 05/13/2019)

Arms exports to the Middle East comprise a substantial part of America's global sales, accounting for 49 percent of total US arms exports between 2013 and 2017. The overall value of U.S. major arms sales to the Middle East is difficult to determine exactly but a moderate estimate would put it at over \$150 billion since 2007. This includes hundreds of advanced fighter jets, attack and utility helicopters; advanced munitions; Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) Ships; as well as Patriot and THAAD air defense systems. Many of these arms sales frequently generate follow-on, multiyear paid training, technical and logistical support as well as the building of relevant infrastructure.

### **Substantial means at least 42%**

**Government Accountability Office**, May **2018**, "Foreign Military Sales", <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/692484.pdf>, (accessed 05/13/2019)

The FMS program provides support to over 150 foreign partners, with sales totaling \$416 billion between fiscal years 2007 and 2017. Annual sales were over \$30 billion in each of these years except two, and grew 80 percent over the period to \$42 billion in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 1). The types of equipment and services sold to foreign partners ranged from fighter jets and integrated air and missile defense systems to combat helmets and training on the use of equipment. According to DSCA officials, fluctuations in annual sales are driven by changes in individual foreign partners' needs for equipment and other goods and services from year to year. For example, **the fiscal year 2012 annual sales of \$69 billion were substantially driven by one sale to Saudi Arabia that was valued at \$29 billion.**

### **Substantial means a large amount or size**

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, No Date, "Substantial", <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/substantial>, (accessed 05/13/2019)

large in amount, size, or number A substantial number of people commute to work each day. This will save us a substantial [=considerable] amount of money/time. Activities like that pose a substantial risk of injury. She purchased her tickets at a substantial discount.

### **Substantially means without qualification or conditions**

Don **Blewett**, Chairperson California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, January 29, 1976, Young v. Laura Scudder's Pet, Inc. January 29, **1976**. [www.cuiab.ca.gov/precedent/pb181.doc](http://www.cuiab.ca.gov/precedent/pb181.doc), (accessed 05/14/2019)

"Substantially. Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner. Kirkpatrick v. Journal Pub. Co., 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58, 59; Gibson v. Glos, 271 Ill. 368, 111 N.E. 123, 124; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 694, 139 P. 242, 243. About, actually, competently, and essentially. Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of Washington, 171 Wash. 346, 17 P. 2d 886, 887."

***We're a small non-profit. Please don't share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)***

## Direct Commercial Sales

### **Direct Commercial Sales are American non-governmental actors selling defense articles and services to Non-US purchasers**

Robert **Nichols** Jade C. **Totman** and Christine **Minarich**, Partner and Associates at Covington and Burling LLP, September 30, **2014**, “Direct Commercial Sales”, [https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/final-fms-dcs\\_30\\_sep.pdf](https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/final-fms-dcs_30_sep.pdf) (accessed 05/13/2019)

In addition to the U.S. Government’s FMS program, U.S. Contractors 71 can sell U.S. defense articles and services to Non-U.S Purchasers 72 without the direct involvement of the U.S. Government, subject to certain regulatory hurdles and U.S. Government oversight. This type of transaction is typically referred to as a Direct Commercial Sale (“DCS”). DCS is like FMS in that it is as “an integral part of safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives.”<sup>73</sup> Both FMS and DCS facilitate the interoperability of foreign military partners and U.S. forces, and thus they are seen by the U.S. Government as complementary, not competing.

### **Direct Commercial Sales are transactions between a US defense contractor and a foreign government, corporation, or an individual WITHOUT the direct involvement of the US government**

Tina S. **Kaidanow**, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, June 15, **2017**, “Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee”, <https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2017/271928.htm>, (accessed 05/13/2019)

The first is Direct Commercial Sales. Generally in a DCS case, a foreign entity – be it a government, a corporation, or an individual – works directly with a partner in the U.S. defense industrial base to obtain equipment or services. Neither the U.S. military nor the U.S. government is directly involved in the sale or acquisition. If the articles or services in question constitute defense articles or defense services, as defined by the U.S. Munitions List and the ITAR, the State Department must authorize the transaction through a license or other form of approval. All such applications are reviewed under the CAT policy and other statutes or regulations as appropriate, and may include interagency review to ensure U.S. interests are properly protected. Depending on the nature of the transaction, the Department may convene an interagency working group to formulate policy recommendations on whether to grant the license or other form of approval. The composition of this group varies, but the main players include the Department and DoD. If the value of the license exceeds the levels identified in the AECA, the Department must notify the proposed license to Congress. Following State Department review, and, if required, the successful conclusion of Congressional notification, the Department may issue a license or otherwise approve the transaction.

## Foreign Military Sales

### **Foreign Military Sales are government-to-government sales through the Foreign Military Sales Program for the purpose of strengthening relationships**

David Gillman, General Counsel & Principal Direct of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, September 30, 2014, "Foreign Military Sales", [https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/final-fms-dcs\\_30\\_sep.pdf](https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/final-fms-dcs_30_sep.pdf) (accessed 05/13/2019)

International military sales are on the rise. While the United States and European Union are cutting their defense expenditures, several countries—particularly in East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and South America—are increasing expenditures. Hence, U.S. Contractors are increasingly seeking to sell products and services to these markets. There are two primary methods for doing so: government-to-government sales through the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales ("FMS") program and similar mechanisms, and Direct Commercial Sales ("DCS") negotiated directly between the contractor and the foreign customer. Both methods have existed for decades, but a novice to international sales has a steep learning curve regarding the complexities of each. Just how big is this market? From 2003 to 2006, government-to-government sales administered by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency ("DSCA"), of which FMS sales are greatest part, were approximately \$10-\$12 billion per year; since 2006, however, annual sales have repeatedly exceeded \$21 billion, hitting \$69 billion in 2012. And available data indicates that DCS sales are even greater. In 2005, the value of DCS deliveries eclipsed that of FMS deliveries by nearly a 3:1 margin.<sup>1</sup> From 2005 to 2009, DCS is estimated to have accounted for almost 60% of exported U.S. military articles—almost \$60 billion out of \$101 billion.<sup>2</sup> Of this total, DCS was responsible for roughly 66% (i.e., \$17 billion) of aircraft equipment and parts exports; roughly 80% (i.e., \$15 billion) of satellites, communications and electronic equipment, and parts exports; and roughly 40% (i.e., \$7 billion) of aircraft exports.<sup>3</sup> Of course, whether U.S. Contractors will retain their market share of international sales is another question. Foreign defense firms have become significant competitors for the U.S. defense establishment.<sup>4</sup> This competition makes it even more important for U.S. Contractors to understand and actively navigate the rules governing FMS and DCS—alternatives that are complementary, not rivals, but that have unique attributes. Accordingly, two threshold considerations for a foreign country Purchaser or U.S. Contractor contemplating an international purchase/sale are (a) which option is available for a particular sale, whether FMS or DCS (or both); and (b) the advantages and disadvantages of each option. As discussed below, FMS offers a "total package" approach that appeals to many Purchasers; alternatively, for eligible defense articles and services, savvy U.S. Contractors and Non-U.S. Purchasers might find greater flexibility in DCS to structure, negotiate, and execute contract terms that are tailored to their respective needs and goals. A decision as to whether to pursue FMS, DCS, or a combination of both, will likely depend upon the unique circumstances of each transaction, as well as the risks and challenges created by a complicated patchwork of relevant U.S., foreign, and international laws. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section, authored by Derek Gilman, the General Counsel of DSCA, presents an overview of the FMS process and legal issues relevant to FMS. The second section, authored by the Government Contracts practice group at the law firm Covington & Burling LLP, discusses the DCS process and legal issues relevant to DCS. The final section summarizes some of the considerations that Purchasers and U.S. Contractors may consider when choosing between FMS and DCS. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES I. AN OVERVIEW OF FMS The Foreign Military Sales (as defined above, "FMS") program has been a key component of U.S. foreign policy and national security for the last several decades. In 3 recent years, it has taken on increased importance, as the United States has sought to build the capabilities of foreign partners to participate in counter-terrorist operations, and in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Further, the enactment of various "building partner capacity" authorities has resulted in increased reliance on the FMS process to implement so-called "FMS pseudo cases." As noted above, sales by the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") have increased substantially over the past decade. The FMS program exists, not necessarily for the purpose of providing a market for U.S. Contractors, but for the purpose of building relationships with foreign countries.

# Topicality Arguments

## **Topicality: Substantial means 49%**

### **A. Substantial means at least 49%**

Shimon **Arad**, Retired Colonel of the Israeli Defense Forces, May 15, **2018**, "Trump's Plan for Selling Weapons to the Middle East", <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trumps-plan-selling-weapons-the-middle-east-25839>. (accessed 05/13/2019)

Arms exports to the Middle East comprise a substantial part of America's global sales, accounting for 49 percent of total US arms exports between 2013 and 2017. The overall value of U.S. major arms sales to the Middle East is difficult to determine exactly but a moderate estimate would put it at over \$150 billion since 2007. This includes hundreds of advanced fighter jets, attack and utility helicopters; advanced munitions; Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) Ships; as well as Patriot and THAAD air defense systems. Many of these arms sales frequently generate follow-on, multiyear paid training, technical and logistical support as well as the building of relevant infrastructure.

### **B. Violation: the affirmative does not decrease arms sales by 49%**

### **C. Standards**

- 1. Predictable Ground: Without a 49% reduction there are an infinite amount of affs that are possible. The interp also ensures that the negative has links beyond perception which allows for in-depth education**
- 2. Field context: Arad is a retired Colonel which means that our author understands how militaries perceive actions which is key to effective advocacy.**

### **D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and education.**

## **Topicality: Substantial Means Without Conditions**

### **A. Substantially means without qualification or conditions**

Don **Blewett**, Chairperson California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, January 29, 1976, Young v. Laura Scudder's Pet, Inc. January 29, **1976**. [www.cuiab.ca.gov/precedent/pb181.doc.](http://www.cuiab.ca.gov/precedent/pb181.doc.), (accessed 05/14/2019)

"Substantially. Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; in a substantial manner. Kirkpatrick v. Journal Pub. Co., 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58, 59; Gibson v. Glos, 271 I11. 368, I11 N.E. 123, 124; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 694, 139 P. 242, 243. About, actually, competently, and essentially. Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co. of Washington, 171 Wash. 346, 17 P. 2d 886, 887."

### **B. Violation: the affirmative conditions arms sales**

#### **C. Standards:**

- 1. Limits: there are an infinite number of things that the aff could condition to an infinite amount of countries which explodes the neg research burden**
- 2. Ground: Conditions CPs are core negative ground that allow us to test immediacy and process of the affirmative which grants us better topic and policy making education**

### **D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and Education**

## **Topicality: Arms Sales Mean Equipment and Munitions**

### **A. Arms sales are military equipment including munitions as well as vehicles**

Jose **Olivares**, Multimedia journalist, May 14, **2018** “UNDER TRUMP, U.S. STILL LEADS WORLD’S ARMS EXPORTERS — AND YEMENIS ARE STILL PAYING THE PRICE”, <https://theintercept.com/2018/03/14/us-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-yemen/>, (accessed 05/14/2019)

UNDER THE TRUMP administration, the U.S. government and weapons manufacturers are making a killing through arms sales to other countries. A report released by the Security Assistance Monitor documented that more than \$80 billion worth of arm sales notifications were sent to Congress in 2017. The massive arms sales during President Donald Trump’s first year in office amounted to \$5.7 billion more than the Obama administration proposed during its final year in 2016. Barack Obama’s banner year for sales, 2010, saw \$102 billion worth of government-to-government sales proposed. The U.S. was responsible for 34 percent of the entire world’s arms exports from 2013 to 2017. Owing to the spate of large sales under both administrations, the U.S. has maintained its role as the biggest arms exporter in the world. In a report released on Monday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, an international institute researching conflict and armaments, the U.S. was responsible for 34 percent of the entire world’s arms exports from 2013 to 2017. Russia follows with 22 percent of the world’s exports. All the while, U.S. arms manufacturing corporations have been raking in tremendous amounts of cash. Stocks for Lockheed Martin – ranked first for arm sales in 2016 by SIPRI – have been steadily on the rise since 2013. Stocks for the Boeing Company, which ranks second, have also been on the rise since 2013, but rose at an accelerated pace in 2017. The report from the Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks and analyzes U.S. security assistance programs worldwide, notes another difference between the Obama and Trump administration sale proposals: the types of equipment offered to foreign governments. The most significant sale offers under the Obama administration were for military aircraft, while in the first year of the Trump administration, missile and bomb sales dominated.

### **B. Violation: The aff reduces the sale of non-physical arms**

#### **C. Standards:**

- 1. Limits: the aff explodes by the negative research burden by expanding into cyberspace and all possible programs that could be used for military purposes.**
- 2. Topic Literature: Experts are concerned with the way that physical arms have been used to hinder or bolster US interests**

### **D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and education**

## Neg vs General Military Aid/Arms Sales

## **Military aid is better than US troops**

### **Military aid stops the US from using large-scale interventions**

Mara **Karlin**, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, November/December **2017**. “Why military assistance programs disappoint.” Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/> (accessed 12/7/18).

Since the end of World War II, **U.S. administrations** of both parties **have relied on a time-honored foreign policy tool: training and equipping foreign militaries**. Seeking **to stabilize fragile states**, the United States has adopted this approach in nearly every region of the world over the last 70 years. Today, Washington is working with the militaries of more than 100 countries and running large programs to train and equip armed forces in such hot spots as Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Pakistan. The logic behind this approach is simple. **Fragile states jeopardize U.S. interests, but large-scale interventions are costly and unpopular. By outsourcing regional security in places where U.S. interests are not immediately threatened, Washington can promote stability without shouldering most of the burden itself. And heading off threats before they metastasize means that the United States can keep its eye on** more sophisticated **rivals such as China and Russia**.

## Aid key to American interests

### **Military aid is key to soft power**

Joe **Gould**, reporter for Defense News, March **2017**. "White House plan to gut foreign military financing would cost defense jobs, senators warn." Defense News. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/> (accessed 12/7/18)

**When top Central and Eastern European diplomats came to Capitol Hill on March 7, they urged lawmakers to support U.S. soft power efforts — and FMF — as a counterweight to the alleged Russian influence campaigns targeting their citizens. Georgia's ambassador to the U.S., David Bakradze, said U.S. aid, in place since his country declared its independence from the Soviet Union, has been essential to its survival. FMF is "supporting Georgia's resilience when it comes to the defense and security cooperation," he said.**

### **Military aid strengthens US power by stopping states from conceding to the demands of terrorists and making them dependent on US aid**

Navin A. **Bapat**, professor at the University of North Carolina, May **2011**. "Transnational Terrorism, U.S. Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent." Journal of Peace Research. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin\\_Bapat/publication/227574734\\_Transnational\\_Terrorism\\_US\\_Military\\_Aid\\_and\\_the\\_Incentive\\_to\\_Misrepresent/links/0c96052616f8ac6f3a000000.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin_Bapat/publication/227574734_Transnational_Terrorism_US_Military_Aid_and_the_Incentive_to_Misrepresent/links/0c96052616f8ac6f3a000000.pdf) (accessed 12/3/18)

Although military aid appears intended to defeat terrorist groups, we see that military aid may actually give host states an incentive not to terminate their conflicts with terrorist groups. Terminating the conflict would result in a loss of aid. By contrast, simply **using the aid as a deterrent decreases the risk that the terrorist group will directly challenge the center, though it allows the terrorist group to remain active. This insight might explain why military aid appears ineffective against terrorism: it provides host states with a disincentive to remove their terrorism problem.** **However**, we see an additional consequence. **If** hosts have no incentive to fully disarm their **terrorists** in order to receive military aid, these groups may **strengthen their organizational and military capabilities over time. This** newfound capability **may induce the groups to make greater demands of the center in negotiation.** At some point in the conflict, **the demands of the terrorist group may become so great that the host can no longer consider negotiation as a viable option. Once this happens, the host will be essentially dependent on the U.S. to keep it in power.** This suggests that while hosts can initially blackmail the U.S., they eventually become entrapped into fighting their terrorist movements, and therefore become dependent on the U.S. to sustain them. This suggests that **the goal of military aid may not be a complete defeat of a terrorist group.** According to the model, military aid is unlikely to accomplish this. **Military aid, however, can be effective at preventing host states from accommodating anti-American terrorist groups.** Additionally, if terrorist groups do not eventually cease operations in response to the strengthening of the center, military aid may create a dependency for host states on U.S. military aid.

## Shying away from US hegemony encourages opportunistic conflict

Bradley A. **Thayer**, associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, November 10, **2006**. "In Defense of Primacy." National Interest.

<https://nationalinterest.org/article/in-defense-of-primacy-1300?page=0%2C2> (accessed 12/9/18)

A grand strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and **American global interests**. These **interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world**, that the **global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected**. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see nato in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, **retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy**. This is because **threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics**. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. **Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted**. Simply by declaring that **the United States** is "going home", thus **abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests** and **allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression**. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

## US military aid protects US interests by ending the incentive to accommodate terrorist demands

Navin A. **Bapat**, professor at the University of North Carolina, May **2011**. "Transnational Terrorism, U.S. Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent." Journal of Peace Research.

[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin\\_Bapat/publication/227574734\\_Transnational\\_Terrorism\\_US\\_Military\\_Aid\\_and\\_the\\_Incentive\\_to\\_Misrepresent/links/0c96052616f8ac6f3a000000.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin_Bapat/publication/227574734_Transnational_Terrorism_US_Military_Aid_and_the_Incentive_to_Misrepresent/links/0c96052616f8ac6f3a000000.pdf) (accessed 12/3/18)

The conclusions from the theoretical model and subsequent empirical test demonstrate that military aid prolongs terrorist campaigns largely because the promise of such aid can make the business of fighting terrorism profitable. However, the model demonstrates that the U.S. is not completely foolish in continuing to provide military aid despite this set of incentives. The model demonstrates that **without military aid, hosts would likely negotiate with terrorists in order to reach an efficient, peaceful solution to their disputes. If the issue in dispute for these groups is hostility toward U.S. foreign policy, such a negotiated settlement would likely involve change that is unfavorable to U.S. interests. However, if the U.S. provides military aid to the host, the gains from military aid give the host no incentive to accommodate the terrorists, and may keep the host loyal to the U.S. Therefore**, if we evaluate the effectiveness of **military aid**, we can see that while it is ineffective in that it prolongs campaigns by giving host states disincentives to disarm their terrorists, it **is effective at keeping stopping terrorists from altering a host states foreign policy in any meaningful way. In that sense, military aid can be effective at accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives**.

## **Military aid can work – Greece proves**

Mara **Karlin**, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, November/December **2017**. “Why military assistance programs disappoint.” Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/> (accessed 12/7/18).

History is not replete only with tales of failure, however. **Under certain circumstances, the United States has succeeded in reforming foreign militaries. Perhaps the best example is the first: the U.S. program to build Greece’s military after World War II.** In 1946, communist insurgents began waging war against the Greek government. In the words of Dean Acheson, then the U.S. secretary of state, “Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be saved.” **Concerned about growing Soviet influence around the world, the administration of President Harry Truman quickly undertook a \$300 million effort to strengthen the Greek economy and military.**

## Aid is key to check China

### **US presence in East Asia is key to balance China's rise and deter military force**

Robert S. **Ross** professor of political science at Boston College, Summer **2013**. "US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for East Asia." Strategic Studies Quarterly. [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-07\\_Issue-2/Ross.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-07_Issue-2/Ross.pdf) (accessed 12/9/18)

On the other hand, even should China not have aspirations for regional leadership, it will emerge as the regional hegemon unless its rise is balanced by another great power. Local powers, responding to China's growing advantage in the balance of capabilities in the region, will gravitate toward it rather than risk its hostility. In the absence of balancing, the rise of China will challenge a cornerstone of US security—a divided flank across the Pacific Ocean. The United States requires sufficient military and political presence in East Asia to balance the rise of China and to deter it from using force to achieve regional hegemony, should it become frustrated at the pace of change. US strength will also reassure local powers that their security does not require accommodation to China's rise.<sup>15</sup> The optimal US grand strategy for East Asia will secure balance-of-power objectives at the least possible cost to US blood, treasure, and honor.

### **China and Russia are both providing arms to oil and gas producers, diminishing US influence**

Michael T. **Klare**, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, May 1, **2008**. "The New Geopolitics of Energy." The Nation. [http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2008/05/20080501\\_Nation\\_%20TheNewGeopoliticsOfEnergy.pdf](http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2008/05/20080501_Nation_%20TheNewGeopoliticsOfEnergy.pdf) (accessed 12/9/18)

No other major power is capable of matching the United States when it comes to the global deployment of military power in the pursuit or protection of vital raw materials. Nevertheless, other powers are beginning to challenge this country in various ways. In particular, China and Russia are providing arms to oil and gas producers in the developing world and beginning to enhance their military capacity in key energy-producing areas. China's drive to gain access to foreign supplies is most evident in Africa, where Beijing has established ties with the oil-producing governments of Algeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan. China has also sought access to Africa's abundant mineral supplies, pursuing copper in Zambia and Congo, chromium in Zimbabwe and a range of minerals in South Africa. In each case the Chinese have wooed suppliers through vigorous diplomacy, offers of development assistance and low-interest loans, high-visibility cultural projects--and, in many cases, arms. China is now a major supplier of basic combat gear to many of these countries and is especially known for its weapons sales to Sudan--arms that reportedly have been used by government forces in attacks on civilian communities in Darfur. Moreover, like the United States, China has supplemented its arms transfers with military-support agreements, leading to a steady buildup of Chinese instructors, advisers and technicians, who now compete with their US counterparts for the loyalty of African military officers. Much the same process is under way in Central Asia, where China and Russia cooperate under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to provide arms and technical assistance to the military forces of the Central Asian "stans"--again competing with the United States to win the loyalty of local military elites. In the 1990s Russia was too preoccupied with Chechnya to pay much attention to this area, and China was likewise consumed with other priorities, so Washington enjoyed a temporary advantage; in the past five years, however, Moscow and Beijing have made concerted efforts to gain influence in the region. The result has been a far more competitive geopolitical environment, with Russia and China, linked through the SCO, gaining ground in their drive to diminish US influence.

*We're a small non-profit. Please don't share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)*

## Aid supports American jobs

### **Ending military aid would cause allies to turn to Russia and China, costing US jobs and influence**

Joe **Gould**, reporter for Defense News, March **2017**. "White House plan to gut foreign military financing would cost defense jobs, senators warn." Defense News. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/> (accessed 12/7/18)

A key argument for FMF is that **if America ends arms subsidies, it lets strategic allies get weaker and cedes business and influence to Russia and China** — its largest rivals strategically and for global defense markets. "The last thing I want allies to do is go to the Russians and the Chinese because we are penny-wise and pound-foolish," Graham said. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's ranking member, Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Md., said he would strongly oppose the change, which "would have serious consequences for U.S. foreign and defense policy" and "potentially kill the program." Because **subsidies further U.S. relationships and leverage with recipient countries**, "if anything [the program] should be expanded, not undermined," Cardin said in a statement. **Cardin drew a link between the FMF proposal and Trump's past suggestions that foreign military aid is a bad deal for the U.S., saying the president "does not appear to appreciate that these sales and the FMF program are in America's foreign policy and national security interest, not as a favor to these countries."** "Given this proposal and the rumored huge cuts to the U.S. foreign assistance budget, the president seems determined to empty America's national security toolbox, leaving only the hammer of military force," Cardin said. "I'm particularly concerned that **this move would result in lost U.S. jobs**, particularly in Maryland."

### **Military aid supports jobs in the US**

STEVEN LEE **MYERS**, veteran diplomatic and national security correspondent, MARCH 23, **2012** "Once Imperiled, U.S. Aid to Egypt Is Restored." New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/world/middleeast/once-imperiled-united-states-aid-to-egypt-is-restored.html> (accessed 12/7/18)

The **military assistance** to Egypt **underscores** a point Mrs. Clinton and other officials have made when it comes to **foreign aid in general: much of it comes back to American corporations and organizations for equipment or services.** "**Lockheed Martin values the relationship established between our company and the Egyptian customer** since the first F-16s were delivered in the early 1980s," said Laura F. Siebert, a spokeswoman for the company, which is based in Fort Worth. **The M1A1 components are built in factories in Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania**, several of them battleground states in an election that has largely focused on jobs. **Because the United States Army plans to stop buying new tanks by 2014, continued production relies on foreign contracts, often paid for by** American taxpayers as **military assistance.**

## Military aid is key to jobs

Joe **Gould**, reporter for Defense News, March **2017**. "White House plan to gut foreign military financing would cost defense jobs, senators warn." Defense News. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/> (accessed 12/7/18)

Andrew Shapiro, an Obama administration chief of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which has policy authority over FMF, called the broader State Department cuts "ill-advised" and argued for preserving FMF. **If the U.S. were to pull the grants, not only would relationships with recipient countries suffer, but defense business might go to U.S. rivals, who offer less expensive alternatives. In Asia, where the U.S. uses FMF to promote maritime security for allies, China may step in, and Russia and others "may try to fill the gap" in the Middle East, Shapiro said. "In effect, we are cutting money that would go to U.S. defense companies," Shapiro said of the proposed FMF change. "It helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities."**

## Allowing authoritarian regimes to fail is bad

### **Military assistance can help civil wars end more quickly**

Kenneth **Pollack**, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, **and** Barbara **Walter**, **2015**. "Escaping the Civil War Trap in the Middle East." Washington Quarterly.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282803497\\_Escaping\\_the\\_Civil\\_War\\_Trap\\_in\\_the\\_Middle\\_East](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282803497_Escaping_the_Civil_War_Trap_in_the_Middle_East) (accessed 12/9/18)

**External powers can help bring about a rapid end to civil wars by providing military assistance to tilt the military balance decisively in favor of one side.** They can also help by standing aside and not helping the weaker side in such a contest. In a study of 150 civil wars between 1945 and 1999, Notre Dame Professor Patrick Regan found that **when aid was offered exclusively to one side, it created a shorter war than those in which both sides had outside support.** For this reason, **military assistance generally needs to be offered early in a war in order to be decisive, before the other side can find similar backing.**<sup>9</sup>

### **Failing states provide openings for terrorist groups to organize**

Stewart **Patrick**, research fellow at the Center for Global Development, **2006**. "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" The Washington Quarterly.

[http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034\\_file\\_06spring\\_patrickTWQ.pdf](http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034_file_06spring_patrickTWQ.pdf) (accessed 12/3/18)

In other words, weak and failing states can provide useful assets to transnational terrorists, but they may be less central to their operations than widely believed. If there is one failed state today that is important to transnational terrorism, it is probably Iraq. As CIA director Porter Goss testified in early 2005, **the U.S.-led invasion and occupation transformed a brutal but secular authoritarian state into a symbol and magnet for the global jihadi movement.** **Although all four governance gaps** associated with weak and failing states **may contribute to transnational terrorism, political and security gaps are the most important.** In the absence of peaceful outlets for political expression, frustrated groups are more likely to adopt violence against repressive regimes and their perceived foreign sponsors. Similarly, **states that do not control borders or territory facilitate terrorist infiltration and operations.** Two other gaps may play supporting roles. **When states do not meet basic social needs, they provide openings for charitable organizations or educational systems linked to radical networks. Similarly, states lacking effective economic institutions are more likely to suffer from stagnant growth, breed political extremism, and be unable to regulate terrorist financing.**

## Weak states lead to pandemics

Stewart **Patrick**, research fellow at the Center for Global Development, **2006**. “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly.

[http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034\\_file\\_06spring\\_patrickTWQ.pdf](http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034_file_06spring_patrickTWQ.pdf) (accessed 12/3/18)

In the spring of 2005, **weak health infrastructure in Angola amplified an outbreak of the hemorrhagic fever Marburg. The same year, the government of Nigeria failed to enforce a national immunization program, allowing polio, a disease on the brink of eradication, to spread across a broad swath of Africa and beyond to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. Diseases incubated in weak and failing states pose both direct and indirect threats to the United States. Significant numbers of U.S. citizens may become infected and die. Even if they do not, such epidemics may impose high economic costs and undermine key countries or regions.** The World Bank estimates that **SARS cost the East Asian regional economy some \$20– 25 billion, despite killing only 912 people.**<sup>45</sup> **The political costs of disease are** more nuanced but no less real. In the most heavily affected African countries, HIV/AIDS has **decimated human capital and fiscal systems, undermining the already limited capacity of states to deliver basic services, control territory, and manage the economy.** It has strained health and education systems, eroded social cohesion, undermined agriculture and economic growth, and weakened armies. The pandemic is spreading rapidly into Eurasia and could surge to 110 million cases by 2010, with dramatic increases in countries of strategic significance such as India, China, and Russia.<sup>46</sup> **In the growing transnational threat posed by epidemics, the weak-state problem tends to be one of capacity more than will.** Although there have been prominent cases of official denial and foot-dragging (e.g., over HIV/ AIDS in Russia or SARS in China), the greater problem is a genuine inability to prevent and respond adequately to disease outbreaks. The most salient governance gap in the case of epidemics is in providing social welfare, notably underdeveloped public health infrastructure.

## Failed states lead to terrorism

James A. **Piazza**, professor at the University of North Carolina, **2008**. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly.

[http://media.iaas.msu.ru/Incubators%20of%20Terror\\_%20Do%20Failed%20and%20Failing%20States%20Promote%20Transnational%20Terrorism\\_.pdf](http://media.iaas.msu.ru/Incubators%20of%20Terror_%20Do%20Failed%20and%20Failing%20States%20Promote%20Transnational%20Terrorism_.pdf) (accessed 12/4/18)

A growing body of scholars and policymakers have raised concerns that **failed and failing states pose a danger to international security because they produce conditions under which transnational terrorist groups can thrive.** This study devises an empirical test of this proposition, along with counter-theories, **using** simple descriptive statistics and a timeseries, **cross-national** negative binomial **analysis of 197 countries from 1973 to 2003.** It **finds that states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, have their nationals commit transnational attacks, and are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists themselves.**

## Authoritarianism is key to investor confidence – Egypt proves

Shana **Marshall**, associate director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University.

**2015.** “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egyptian\\_armed\\_forces.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egyptian_armed_forces.pdf) (accessed 12/1/18)

In order to hedge against the Mubarak government’s campaign of economic liberalization and privatization, **Egypt’s military leaders diversified their** formerly statist **economic portfolio with financing and technology from** foreign and domestic **private sector sources, as well as joint partnerships with** a variety of **nonmilitary businessmen and foreign interests**.<sup>5</sup> These novel funding and technology sources gained the EAF entry into global supply chains in industries ranging from automobile manufacturing and the production of computer hardware to wastewater recycling and solar panel fabrication. **The EAF also worked to maintain its role as a domestic supplier and subcontractor in infrastructure projects—such as wind farms— financed by foreign donors.**<sup>6</sup> In addition, the EAF succeeded in securing small shareholdings in some of the high-profile projects that formed an important component of the Mubarak regime’s economic program—including the privately operated cargo container facilities that were being built at Egypt’s maritime ports. **These joint ventures represented significant new investment from state banks and international lenders** and, in the case of maritime transport, some of the world’s largest shipping conglomerates. **The enormous private investment in Egypt’s port sector triggered growth in complementary industries** in which the military remained active, **such as inland rail and the network of river barges that provides transport along the Nile.**<sup>7</sup> And **because many of these joint ventures were organized in holding companies under the authority of the Ministry of Investment, the Egyptian state was liable for potential financial losses while the EAF had de facto control over revenues.**<sup>8</sup> **This arrangement was not lost on regional investment analysts, who highlighted the “full support” of the government that these holding companies enjoyed as a factor for potential investors to consider when examining the viability of** subsidiaries and **joint ventures.**<sup>9</sup> **It was precisely such investor confidence that the military had in mind when it deployed to protect the strategic assets of high-profile private sector investment partners** during the unrest of 2011–2012, actions that included the violent repression of labor demonstrations that threatened production at critical sites.

## Crises in weak states spill over

Stewart **Patrick**, research fellow at the Center for Global Development, **2006.** “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly.

[http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034\\_file\\_06spring\\_patrickTWQ.pdf](http://cgdev.org.488elwb02.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/7034_file_06spring_patrickTWQ.pdf) (accessed 12/3/18)

Experience since the end of the Cold War has shown that **conflict in developing countries can have critical transnational dimensions.**<sup>53</sup> A common contention is that **violent conflict and complex emergencies often spill over the porous borders of weak and failing states, destabilizing regions.** Such claims have merit. As state structures collapse and borders become more porous, these countries often export violence as well as refugees, political instability, and economic dislocation to states in their vicinity. This risk is compounded when weak, vulnerable, or collapsed states are adjacent to countries with similar characteristics that possess few defenses against spillovers. **Weaknesses in one state can thus encourage the rise of an entire bad neighborhood. Such a pattern emerged in West Africa during the 1990s, as the conflict in Liberia under Charles Taylor poured across national borders in the form of people, guns, and conflict diamonds, undermining neighboring Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire.**<sup>54</sup>

*We’re a small non-profit. Please don’t share this file with those who have not paid including via dropbox, google drive, the web, printed copies, email, etc. Visit us at [www.wcdebate.com](http://www.wcdebate.com)*